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,M]C1IAEL  DAVITT 

{Ftoni  a jjhofograph  taken  a!  Os^iJi  uil  Cninii^  Orange  Free  State) 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  EOR 

II 

FREEDOM 


FROM  THE  BEGIXXIKG  OF  HOSTILITIES  TO 
THE  PEACE  OF  PRETORIA 


Third  Edition,  Revised  and  Completed 


BY 

MICHAEL  DAVITT 

AUTHOR  OF  “LEAVES  FROM  A PRISON  DIARY." 
“LIFE  AND  PROGRESS  IN  AUSTRALASIA,”  ETC. 


“ Tot  den  laatsten  droppel  bloed 
Onversehrokken,  dapper,  getroow  en  goed  ' 


NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 

FHKK  & WAGNALLS  COMPANY 

1902 


Copyright,  1902,  by 
MICHAEL  DAVITT 

REGISTERED  AT  STATIONERS’  HALL,  LONDON 
\_Pnnted  in  the  United  States  of  America] 


Published  in  May,  190S 


Dedication 


TO 

THE  MEMORY  OF 

GENERAL  PHILIP  BOTHA 

O.  F.  S.  ARMY 

WHO  NOBLY  DIED  FIGHTING  FOR  BOER  INDEPENDENCE 
AGAINST  THE  ARCH-ENEMY  OF  HIS  RACE 

AND  country; 

AS  AN  HUMBLE  TRIBUTE  OF 
ADMIRATION,  AND  IN  GRATEFUL  RECOLLECTION 
OF  THE 

HOSPITALITY  AND  COURTESIES  OF 
OSSPRUIT  CAMP,  O.  F.  S., 

1900 


Peeface 


FTER  resigning  membership  of  the  British  House  of  Commons 


in  October,  1899,  as  a personal  and  political  protest  against 
a war  which  I believed  to  be  the  greatest  infamy  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  I proceeded,  a short  time  afterwards,  to  the  Transvaal  to 
see  and  learn  more  about  the  little  nation  against  whose  liberty 
and  land  this  crime  had  been  planned  and  executed. 

This  book  embodies  the  facts  and  information  which  I obtained 
in  my  intercourse  with  the  leaders  and  people  of  both  Republics. 
It  also  contains  the  impressions  which  followed  from  a few  months’ 
close  contact  with  them  during  their  unparalleled  struggle  to  retain 
their  independence. 

I owe  the  expression  of  grateful  acknowledgments  for  the  facili- 
ties given  and  the  assistance  willingly  tendered  to  me  by  members 
of  both  governments  during  my  stay  in  the  Transvaal  and  Orange 
Free  State,  and  to  numerous  officers  and  officials  who  supplied  me 
with  authentic  details  of  the  earlier  battles  of  the  campaign  in  ISTatal 
and  on  the  western  borderland. 

My  thanks  are  specially  due  to  Dr.  Reitz,  State  Secretary  of  the 
S.  A.  R. ; Attorney-General  (now  Commandant)  Smuts;  and  to  Mr. 
Piet  Grobler,  also  of  the  Administration.  To  Commandant-General 
Louis  Botha,  his  military  secretary  Adjutant  Sandberg,  Adjutant 
Robert  Emmet,  Field  Cornet  Cherrie  Emmet,  General  De  la  Rey, 
General  Tobias  Smuts,  Colonel  Trichardt  (head  of  the  Transvaal 
artillery),  Colonel  Blake,  the  Hollander  officers  in  charge  of  the 
English  prisoners  at  Pretoria,  the  Landrosts  of  Pretoria  and  Johan- 
nesburg, and  to  the  editors  and  proprietors  of  the '‘Volksstem  ” 
and  of  the  “ Standard  and  Diggers’  Hews.” 

I am  likewise  under  similar  obligations  to  President  Steyn  and 
the  members  of  his  administration  in  Kroonstad,  0.  F.  S. ; to  the 
late  General  Philip  Botha,  and  to  all  the  officers  of  his  staff  at 
Osspruit  Camp;  to  Judge  (now  Commandant)  Hertzog,  Com- 
mandant George  Brand,  the  Landrosts  of  Kroonstad  and  Hoopstad, 
and  to  many  more  minor  officials,  officers  and  burghers  who  were 
my  traveling  and  tent  companions  in  my  visits  to  the  various  camps. 


vi  PREFACE 

laagers  and  localities  embraced  in  my  journeys  through  the  two 
Republics  and  north  Natal. 

The  late  Count  Villebois-Mareuil,  and  M.  Leon  Grunberg,  of 
Paris,  also  supplied  me  with  most  interesting  statements  based 
upon  their  unique  experience  during  the  initial  stages  of  the  war, 
in  which  both  had  played  conspicuous  and  romantic  parts. 

M.  D. 

Lalkey,  Ieelaxd,  June,  1902. 


COOTENTS 


CHAPTER 


Introductory  ........ 

J/"  The  Transvaal  Government  at  the  Outbreak  of  the 


PAGE 

I 

y 


War  ..... 

11 

II. 

The  Boer  “ Oligarchy  ” . 

25 

on. 

Who  Provoked  the  War  ?. 

40 

vIV. 

The  Boer  at  Bay 

50 

V. 

Transvaal  Preparations  . 

56 

VI. 

Boer  Artillery  and  Commandoes 

66 

VII. 

British  and  Boer  Patriotism  . 

74 

VIII. 

Disposition  of  British  and  Federal  Forces 

82 

IX. 

Kraaipan  . . . 

92 

X. 

The  Advance  on  Dundee  . 

102 

XI. 

Battle  of  Talana  Hill  . 

110 

XII. 

Capture  of  Dundee  . 

120 

XIII. 

Battle  of  Elandslaagte  . 

126 

XIV. 

Battle  of  Modderspruit  . 

143 

XV. 

England’s  Kaffir  Allies  . 

168 

XVI. 

Mafeking  and  Kimberley  . 

177 

XVII. 

Battle  of  Belmont  . 

188 

XVIII. 

Battles  of  Rooilaagte  (Enslin) 

AND  Modder 

River 

194 

XIX. 

Battle  of  Magersfontein 

209 

XX. 

Battle  of  Stormberg 

225 

XXI. 

The  Dash  on  Estcourt  . 

241 

XXII. 

Battle  of  Colenso  . 

251 

XXIII. 

Botha’s  Great  Victory 

275 

XXIV. 

The  Siege  of  Ladysmith  . 

284 

XXV. 

Foreign  Volunteers  . 

300 

XXVI. 

Blake’s  Irish  Brigade 

317 

XXVII. 

Spion  Kop  .... 

337 

XXVIII. 

Campaign  around  Colesberg  . 

356 

XXIX. 

Siege  of  Ladysmith  Abandoned 

365 

XXX. 

Paardeberg  .... 

383 

XXXI. 

After  Paardeberg 

399 

XXXII. 

Sannas  Post  .... 

409 

XXXIII. 

The  Last  Meeting  of  the  Volksraad 

421 

XXXIV. 

Evacuation  of  Pretoria  . 

. 

431 

XXXV. 

JllAFEKING  AND  ElANDS  RiVER  . 

438 

XXXVI. 

Diary  of  the  War — June  to  December, 

1900 

444 

:/ 


CONTENTS 


viii 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XXXA’II.  Diary  of  the  War — January  to  June,  1901  . . 475 

XXXVIII.  Diary  of  the  War — July  to  December,  1901  . . 508 

XXXIX.  Diary  of  the  War — January  to  May,  1902  , . 543 

XL.  Peace  and  it.s  Terms 575 

XLI.  Conclusion — England’s  Cowardly  and  Unchristian 

Warfare 585 

Index  . . 595 


ILLUSTEATIOK'S 


Michael  Datitt  ........  Frontispiece 

PAGE 

Commandaxt-Gexeeal  Piet  J.  Joubeet  ......  3 

Teachees’  coxfeeexce  of  the  Sohth  Afeican  Repeblic,  held  at 

Peetoeia,  July,  1897  ........  15 

The  P.alace  of  Justice,  Peetoeia  ......  18 

Pbesidext  axd  Mrs.  Krhger  ix  theie  cottage  ix  Pretoria,  April, 

1900  26 

The  Executive  Couxcel  of  the  South  Afeicax  Republic  . . 30 

Presidext  Kruger  axd  his  great-geaxdchildeex,  Axxie  Eloff  axd 

Gerald  Eloff  .........  31 

Mrs.  Kruger  heaeixg  from  her  geaxd-daughtee.  Miss  Nettie 

Eloff,  the  latest  xems  from  the  froxt  ....  38 

S.  J.  Paulus  Kruger,  Presidext  of  the  South  Africax  Republic  41 

Presidext  Kruger  at  Pretoria  .......  43 

The  Boer  meetixg  at  Paardekraal,  at  which  it  was  decided  to 

STAXD  FIRM  AGAIXST  EXGLAXD  ......  46 

Dr.  Willem  Johaxxes  Letds  .......  47 

M.  T.  Stetx,  Presidext  of  the  Oraxge  Free  State  ...  51 

F.  W.  Reitz,  State  Secretary  of  South  Africax  Republic  . . 52 

Presidext  Steyx  at  BLOEiiFOXTEix  ......  54 

A Maxim-Nordexfelt  axd  its  service  ......  67 

CoilMAXDAXT  TrICHARDT,  HEAD  OF  THE  TrAXSVAAL  ARTILLERY  . . 69 

A “ Loxg  Tom  ” axd  its  service  .......  71 

Johax'xesburg  Uitlaxders,  fleeixg  from  the  expected  war,  fight- 

IXG  FOR  seats  ix  OPEX  TRUCKS  ......  75 

The  Johaxxesburg  Police  leavixg  for  the  froxt,  October  26,  1899  77 

Three  gexeratioxs  of  fightixg  Boers  ......  79 

Military  attaches  of  the  Boer  army  ......  83 

The  Boer  commaxdo  guardixg  Vax  Reexax’s  Pass  ...  86 

Detachmext  of  Boers  guardixg  a pass  .....  88 

Free  State  commaxdaxts  ........  90 

Gexeral  .Jacob  Hercules  De  la  Rey  ......  93 

Gexeral  Sxymax  .........  93 

The  first  shots  of  the  war — Firixg  ox  the  armored  traix  at 

Kraaipax  ..........  94 


X 


ILLUSTBATIONS 


PAGE 

The  armored  train  captured  at  Kraaipan  .....  97 

Mountain  guns  captured  at  Kraaipan  manned  by  Staats  artil- 
lery ...........  98 

CoMM.\ND.\NT  Erasmus  ........  103 

General  Meyer  ..........  108 

General  Lukas  Meyer  at  Talana  Hill  .....  Ill 

Boer  scouts  mtth  captured  British  mountain  gun  . . .115 
Ready  for  the  enemy  .........  118 

General  Kock  and  his  commando  which  fought  at  Elandslaagte, 

October  20,  1899  .........  129 

The  German  corps — Battle  of  Elandslaagte  ....  132 

The  battlefield  of  Elandslaagte  ......  137 

General  Joubert  at  mess  ........  150 

Nicholson’s  Nek,  scene  of  De  Wet’s  first  ihctory  . . . 155 

British  soldiers  captured  at  Nicholson’s  Nek  arriving  in  Pre- 
toria ...........  158 

Commandant-General  Louis  Botha  ......  162 

General  Louis  Botha  and  wife  .......  164 

General  Christian  De  Wet  ........  165 

Mrs.  Christian  De  Wet  and  children  ......  167 

General  Schalk  Burger’s  commando  ......  170 

“ The  Black  Watch  ” at  Mafeking  ......  174 

Boer  “ Long  Tom  ” outside  of  IMafeking  .....  179 

Boer  commandoes  besieging  Kimberley,  November,  1899  . . 184 

General  P.  A.  Cronje  .........  199 

A GROUP  OF  Boer  fighters  ........  204 

Cronje  and  lieutenants  around  one  of  the  Creusot  guns  . . 212 

Shooting  back  the  British  ........  218 

General  E.  R.  Grobler  ........  227 

Service  of  the  solitary  Boer  gun  at  Stormberg  victory  . . 235 

John  Hendrik  Olliiher  ........  239 

Louis  Botha  ..........  242 

Winston  Churchill,  with  other  prisoners  of.  war,  at  Pretoria  245 
School  building  at  Pretoria,  where  British  prisoners  were  kept  246 
Fiuveral  of  Commandant-General  Piet  Joubert,  in  Pretoria  . 250 

Boer  trench  near  the  Bridle  Drift — Battle  of  Colenso  . . 253 

Battle  of  Colenso,  December  15,  1899 — Position  of  the  Boer 

center  ...........  255 

Battle  of  Colenso,  December  15,  1899  ......  259 

Langwani  Hill — Battle  of  Colenso  ......  261 

Boer  patrol,  Colenso,  December,  1899  ......  269 

Adjutant  Robert  Emmet  ........  271 

The  Boer  “ Pom-Pom  ” which  did  such  execution  at  Colenso, 

CALLED  “ Hell-Fire  ” by  English  Tommies  ....  273 

The  British  guns,  captured  at  Colenso,  arriving  at  Pretoria 

STATION  ..........  279 

Ferry  across  the  Tugela  River  .......  282 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


XI 


Boer  Howitzer  shelling  Ladysmith  . 

Colonel  Yillebois-Mareuil  and  Baron  van  Dedem 
Pretoria  town  burghers  at  the  front  . 

Colonel  Yillebois-Mareuil  . 

General  Kolbe  and  Colonel  Maximoff 
M.  Leon  Grunberg  .... 

Colonel  John  Franklin  Blake  . 

Irish  Willie  ” . 

Blake’s  Irish  Brigade  at  Ladysmith  . 

Colonel  Arthur  Lynch  and  Captain  Oates 
Colonel  Lynch’s  (the  Second  Irish)  Brigade  . 

The ’Chicago  Irish- American  Yolunteers  . 

The  Hollander  Corps  leaving  Pretoria  for  the  front 
Adjutant  J.  C.  Sandberg  ..... 

Spion  Kop  . . . . . 

The  northeast  side  of  Spion  Kop,  up  which  the  Boers  ch 
AND  A group  of  HEROES  OF  THE  FIGHT 

British  firing  on  Boers  at  Spion  Kop  . 

A Boer  comiiando  below  Spion  Kop  after  the  battle 
British  dead  on  Spion  Kop  ..... 

After  the  battle  of  Spion  Kcp  .... 

Commandant  Ben  Yiljoen  and  staff  . 

Ylljoen’s  comman^do  defending  Yaal  Krantz 
Pieter’s  Hill  ....... 

General  Tobias  Smuts  ..... 

The  Boer  “ Long  Tom  ” in  retreat  from  Ladysmith 
Boer  Council  of  War  near  Bloemfontein  . 

Members  of  General  Philip  Botha’s  camp,  Osspruit,  E 
A typical  Boer  camp  ...... 

The  Volksraad  building,  Pretoria 

A GROUP  OF  leaders  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  WAR  . 

Near  the  Pretoria  railway  station  . 

Boer  battery  outside  INIafeking  .... 

Captain  Daanie  Theron,  the  great  Boer  scout  . 

General  Schalk  Burger  ..... 

General  Louis  Botha  ...... 

Judge  (now  Commandant)  Hertzog,  who  led  second  invasii 
Cape  Colony  ..... 

General  Christian  He  Wet  and  staff  . 

Commandant  (late  Attorney-General)  Smuts 
General  Philip  Botha  and  staff 
“ On  Guard  ”...... 

Commandant  Kritzinger  .... 

“ Unarmed  ” natives 


ARGED, 


aster,  1900 


on  of 


PAGE 

287 

292 

295 

301 

306 

312 

317 

318 

321 

322 

323 
326 
328 
330 
341 

345 

347 

349 

351 

353 

366 

369 

375 

378 

381 

402 

406 

414 

424 

429 

436 

439 

445 

460 

463 

466 

473 

480 

490 

506 

525 

534 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


xii 

MAPS 

PAGE 

Southwestern  Transvaal  ........  lOO 

Upper  Natal  ..........  107 

Modder  and  Riet  Rivers,  Orange  Free  State  ....  190 

Northeastern  Cape  Colony  . 230 

Central  Orange  Free  State  .......  411 

South  Middle  Transvaal  ........  451 

South  Africa  .......  Following  Index 


Tke 

Boer  Fight  for  Freedom 


INTRODUCTORY 

England’s  alleged  “ enlightened  ” objects  in  the  war  examined  in 

THE  LIGHT  OF  HEE  SoUTH  AFRICAN  RECORD ThE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  BOER 

— His  colonization  of  Cape  Colony — Mr.  Froude’s  testimony — 
General  Joubert’s  story  of  British  injustice  told  in  his  letter 
TO  Queen  Victoria — A dramatic  sketch  of  Boer  struggles  and 
OF  persistent  English  oppression — Mr.  Chamberlain’s  historic 
PRAISE  OF  THE  BOER  RACE — HiS  DENUNCIATION  OF  “ A NATIONAL 
Crime.” 

The  present  war  is  the  third  attempted  conquest  by  the  English 
of  the  fourth  country  which  the  Dutch  race  has  settled  and 
civilized  in  South  Africa.  This  fact  is  purposely  ignored  in  the 
various  attempts  which  British  writers  are  making  to  explain  “ the 
enlightened  ” motives  with  which  an  Empire,  boasting  of  300,- 
000,000  subjects,  has  provoked  a conflict  with  a little  Eepublic  of 
150,000  souls,  which  possessed  the  richest  gold  mines  in  the  world. 
It  is  a fact,  however,  which  forms  a material  part  of  the  case  against 
the  English  in  this  instance,  and  somewhat  discounts  the  character 
and  value  of  the  “ reforming  purpose  that  lay  behind  the  Jameson 
Raid,  and  which  inspired  and  informed  the  equally  altruistic  spirit 
and  intent  of  Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain’s  diplomacy. 

The  first  act  of  British  aggression  upon  the  land  and  liberty  of 
the  Boers  is  now  near  a hundred  years  old.  It  occurred  in  Cape 
Colony.  This  part  of  the  dark  continent  had  been  selected  by  a 
company  of  Dutchmen  as  a desirable  settlement.  As  early  as  1652, 
a number  of  adventurers  from  Holland  arrived  there,  and  com- 
menced the  labor  of  founding  a white  community  among  the  Kaffir 
races.  They  were  followed  by  other  contingents  from  time  to  time ; 
among  these  being  several  hundred  Huguenots,  who  had  fled  from 
the  religious  oppression  of  Louis  XIV.  in  search  of  freedom  of 
faith  and  of  personal  liberty  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  These 
expatriated  Frenchmen  soon  mingled  with  the  hardy  emigrants 
from  the  Netherlands,  and  in  time  helped  to  produce  the  sturdy, 
independence-loving  race  which  has  won  the  admiration  of  the 


2 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


world  during  the  past  three  years  by  its  courage  and  capacity  in 
once  more  resisting  the  militarj^  might  of  the  British  Empire. 

The  Boers  grew  and  prospered  in  Cape  Colony.  They  conquered 
the  Hottentots  around  them,  and  shed  far  less  blood  in  subduing 
the  natives  to  their  rule  than  did  any  British  settlement  which 
was  ever  planted  among  savage  races.  Towns  were  built,  roads 
were  made,  lands  were  cultivated,  and  the  Colony  progressed  in 
jjeace  and  in  industry,  unmolested  by  white  foes,  for  seven  genera- 
tions. 

Then  the  English  arrived.  The  French  Eevolution  had  involved 
the  I^etherlands  in  the  subsequent  struggles  between  Napoleon  and 
European  powers,  and  near  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  the 
British  took  possession  of  the  Cape,  in  the  role  of  a good  friend 
anxious  to  protect  the  territory  of  a weak  neighbor  and  ally.  The 
Colony  was  restored  to  Holland  in  1802,  but  was  again  taken  by  the 
English  in  1806.  The  seizure  on  both  occasions  was  declared  to  be 
in  the  interest  of  the  House  of  Orange.  The  final  retention  of  the 
Colony  by  the  English  put  the  object  of  their  previous  intervention 
in  its  proper  light. 

The  Boers  were  violently  opposed  to  the  intrusion  of  the  British, 
but  were  too  Tveak  to  resist  successfully  a usurpation  of  their  country 
by  a Power  which  had  done  nothing  whatever  to  develop  or  promote 
its  prosperity  or  civilization.  As  Mr.  James  A.  Froude  says  in  his 
“ Oceana  ” : “ They  resented  it ; the  hotter  spirits  resisted ; they 

were  called  rebels,  and  were  shot  and  hanged  in  the  usual  fashion.” 

The  new  rulers  soon  commenced  their  traditional  policy  of  under- 
mining the  nationality  of  their  unwilling  subjects.  The  Dutch 
language  was  abolished  in  the  courts,  and  schools  were  also  ordered 
to  he  conducted  in  the  English  tongue.  The  Boers  were  made  to 
feel  by  their  British  governors  and  officials  that  they  were  a sub- 
jugated people,  with  few  rights  or  privileges  left  to  them  in  the 
land  of  their  birth  beyond  those  enjoyed  by  the  Kaffirs  around 
them. 

The  native  races  were,  in  fact,  preferred  before  them,  and  enjoyed 
a greater  measure  of  toleration  from  the  English  than  was  shown 
by  these  to  the  former  rulers  of  the  country.  This  treatment 
naturally  deepened  the  discontent  of  the  Boers,  and  made  the  rule 
of  the  British  more  hateful  and  unbearable. 

“ We  justified  our  conquest  to  ourselves,”  wrote  Mr.  Froude, 
“ by  taking  away  the  character  of  the  conquered,  and  we  constituted 
ourselves  the  champions  of  the  colored  races  against  them,  as  if 
they  were  oppressors  and  robbers.  . . .We  had  treated  them 

unfairly  as  well  as  unwisely,  and  we  never  forgive  those  whom  we 
have  injured.”  {Oceana,  pp.  34-,  35.) 


INTRODUCTORY 


3 


In  one  of  the  most  eloquently  pathetic  letters  ever  written,  the 
late  Commandant-General  Joubert  told  Queen  Victoria,  in  June, 
1899,  five  months  before  the  present  war  was  declared,  the  story 
of  the  Boer  race,  and  of  the  continuity  of  her  country’s  persistent 
oppression  of  his  people  from 
1806  down  to  the  date  when 
he  knew  that  England  was 
once  again  resolved  upon  an 
act  of  spoliation.  He  re- 
lated the  systematic  persecu- 
tions which  drove  the  Dutch 
farmers  into  the  Great  Trek 
— into  the  abandonment  of 
the  country  which  they  had, 
in  a sense,  created  for  white 
men.  He  told  of  the  indigni- 
ties to  which  the  Boers  were 
subjected,  and  the  hopeless  out- 
look created  for  their  children 
in  the  settled  purpose  of  their 
complete  domination  at  the 
hands  of  English  officials.  It 
was  such  a story  as  a doomed 
Thracian  leader  might  have 
told  to  a Eoman  patrician  on 
the  eve  of  a gladiatorial  display 
within  the  Colosseum. 

After  alluding  to  the  fact 
that  the  English  officials  tried 
their  utmost  to  prevent  Piet 
Eetief  and  his  companions 
from  providing  themselves  with 
ammunition  on  their  departure 
from  Cape  Colony  to  face  the  savage  foes  and  wild  animals  which 
would  be  encountered  across  the  Drakensberg  and  the  Orange  Eiver, 
General  Joubert  continued: 


“Your  Majestjq  who  can  describe  the  sufferings  they  endured? 
They  ventured  forth,  trusting  in  God,  to  rid  themselves  of  all  human 
despotism,  in  search  of  a free  land  for  their  children  and  children’s 
children.  They  wandered  in  small  groups  further  and  further,  ever 
onward,  until  they  arrived  at  the  Vaal  Eiver.  Here  they  pitched 
their  tents  and  regarded  the  new  country  as  their  El  Dorado. 
. . . Their  hopes  were  short-lived.  IMoselekatse,  head  of  a 

cruel  Kaffir  tribe,  came  with  a large  force  of  warriors  from  the  far 


4 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


north,  and  attacked  a small  party  of  Boers  near  the  river,  no  warn- 
ing having  reached  them  of  the  intended  onslaught.  The  odds  were 
twenty  to  one,  but  God  gave  them  courage,  and  they  not  only 
repulsed  the  horde  of  savages,  but  succeeded  in  rescuing  several 
children  and  several  wounded  women  who  had  been  captured  by  the 
Kaffirs.  . . . Other  parties  of  Boers  from  Cape  Colony  had 

gone  eastward.  . . . With  these  they  (those  who  had  fought 

as  above)  now  decided  to  combine.  Moselekatse,  however,  pursued 
them  with  a second  expedition  stronger  than  the  previous  contingent, 
commanding  it  not  to  return  so  long  as  there  remained  a Boer 
living.  . . . The  fleeing  Boers  reached  Vechtkop,  in  the 

Orange  Free  State,  where,  recognizing  the  futility  of  continuing 
their  flight,  they  built  up  a laager  or  camp  with  their  wagons,  and 
calmly  awaited  their  pitiless  foe.  Prepared  to  die  in  the  face  of  over- 
whelming odds,  they  nevertheless  determined  to  fight  manfully  to 
the  last,  trusting  in  God.  As  the  enemy  pressed  on,  each  Boer  made 
the  best  use  of  his  rifle,  causing  the  smoke  to  ascend  in  such 
volumes  to  heaven  that  even  the  flying  enemy  imagined  the  Boers 
had  been  vanquished,  and  that  their  laager  was  in  flames  and 
its  defenders  utterly  annihilated.  We  were  afterwards  told  that 
when  the  intelligence  reached  Grahamstown,  Cape  Colony,  your 
Majesty's  subjects  were  so  elated  thereat  that  they  celebrated  the 
receipt  of  the  news  by  bonfires  and  other  illuminations,  thinking 
that  the  last  of  the  Boers  had  fallen.” 

General  Joubert  next  told  Her  Majesty  how  the  Boers,  who  had 
thus  fought  for  their  lives  in  search  of  a new  home,  crossed  into 
Natal  through  the  passes  of  the  Drakensberg  and  united  their 
fortunes  with  those  of  Eetief,  Maritz,  and  Uys;  leaders  who  had 
trekked  into  that  country  when  the  party  to  which  J oubert’s  father 
had  attached  himself  had  ventured,  as  related,  to  gain  the  Trans- 
vaal, and  had  encountered  Moselekatse  and  his  savage  legions.  He 
told  how  Eetief  and  his  followers  purchased  the  region  of  Natal 
from  Dingaan,  its  dominant  Zulu  chief,  and  obtained  a written 
agreement  from  him  for  a Boer  settlement  in  that  region;  and 
continued  his  story  of  how  the  Dutchmen  settled  in  and  fought 
for  their  second  country,  to  be  again  ousted  out  of  it  by  British 
power : 

“ It  is  doubtless  known  to  your  Majesty  how  this  cruel  and  bar- 
barous Chief  (Dingaan)  mercilessly  and  treacherously  murdered 
Piet  Eetief  and  his  seventy  men  (whom  he  had  invited  to  visit  him), 
immediately  afterwards  sending  out  his  commandoes  to  massacre 
those  awaiting  the  return  of  Eetief  and  the  unsuspecting  women 
and  children.  Thus  without  warning  were  600  helpless  old  men, 
women  and  children  butchered  in  cold  blood.  ...  A vessel 
arrived  at  Port  Natal,  and  Captain  Jarvis  stepped  on  shore.  ‘ Thank 


INTRODUCTORY 


5 


God,  assistance  was  at  hand;  now  no  more  starvation.  No  more  fear 
of  the  sword  of  Dingaan.  Succor  has  come  at  last.’  Such  were 
the  thoughts  of  many  a simple-minded  Boer.  But,  alas ! how  soon 
was  their  joy  to  be  turned  into  grief  and  indignation,  for  how 
horribly  surprised  were  they  to  learn  that,  instead  of  having  come 
to  their  aid,  he  was  sent  to  forbid  them  to  fight  with  the  natives 
and  to  disarm  them  ! ” 


Joubert  next  relates  how  the  Boers  concealed  their  arms  and 
ammunition  from  the  prying  eyes  of  J arvis  and  his  force,  until  they 
saw  him  take  his  departure.  Two  hundred  men  were  then  got 
together  by  Pieter  Uys  and  Hendrick  Potgieter,  and  they  resolved 
to  seek  Dingaan  in  his  lair  and  avenge  the  massacre  of  Eetief  and 
the  600  victims  of  England’s  protected  savages.  The  Boers  were, 
however,  beaten  in  the  fight  and  were  compelled  to  retreat  after 
having  killed  hundreds  of  their  Kaffir  foes,  Uys  and  his  little  boy 
(a  type  of  many  a heroic  lad  who  has  fought  and  died  in  the  present 
war  against  the  whilom  patrons  of  Dingaan)  with  several  more 
farmers  being  slain  in  the  fierce  encounter. 

Dingaan  and  his  Zulus  followed  up  their  victory,  and,  encouraged 
by  their  success,  resolved  to  exterminate  the  Dutchmen.  It  was 
again  a fight  for  life  on  the  part  of  the  Boers,  and  at  Bosmans 
Eiver,  near  where  Louis  Botha  defeated  the  English  about  the  end 
of  November,  1899,  the  little  commando  entrenched  itself.  After 
three  days’  continuous  fighting,  against  thousands  of  Zulu  foes, 
it  gained  a complete  victory  over  Dingaan.  The  Boers  made  a 
frightful  carnage  of  their  assailants.  “ For  years  afterwards  the 
veldt  was  white  with  their  bones.”  The  victors  lost  but  one  man  in 
this  battle;  a circumstance  which  the  pious  pilgrim  farmers  attrib- 
uted to  the  protecting  care  of  the  Almighty. 

Andreas  Pretorius,  one  of  the  greatest  of  the  Boer  leaders,  now 
appeared  on  the  scene,  having  with  other  Boers  left  the  Cape 
Colony  to  aid  his  kindred  to  hold  the  newly  occupied  country  against 
the  Zulu  tribes.  He  organized  a force  of  400  men  from  all  the 
Boer  settlements,  and  with  these  set  forth  in  search  of  Dingaan 
and  his  hordes.  Pretorius  was  as  wise  as  he  was  brave.  He  was 
an  ideal  Boer  general  and  statesman,  and  he  well  merits  the  title 
of  being  the  father  of  the  Boer  nation  of  our  day.  He  utterly 
defeated  Dingaan,  and  destroyed  his  power  forever  in  Natal,  on  the 
16th  of  December,  1838;  a day  which  has  ever  since  been  celebrated 
as  “ Dingaan’s  Day  ” by  the  Boer  people,  and  once  or  twice  in  the 
present  war  by  Boer  generals  in  a manner  not  agreeable  to  their 
English  foes. 

General  Joubert  continues: 


6 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


“ One  would  have  thought,  your  Majesty,  that  the  Boer  after  this 
would  have  been  left  alone  to  live  peaceably,  praising  his  God  in 
the  countr}''  he  had  bought  so  dear.  But  no ! His  cup  of  bitter- 
ness was  not  yet  emptied.  The  yoke  of  oppression  had  not  yet  been 
broken.  Scarcely  had  the  Boers  laid  out  the  village  of  Pieter- 
maritzburg than  threatening  clouds  began  to  gather  and  the  alarm 
to  sound  again.  Not  the  Kaffirs  this  time.  No,  a thousand  times 
worse.  The  English  came;  an  officer  with  a company  of  soldiers 
equipped  with  cannon  and  shell  arrived.  The  officer  was  Captain 
Smith,  and  he  came  to  annex  the  country  as  a possession  of  that 
mighty  Empire,  Great  Britain — to  make  an  end  to  our  boasted 
independence  and  to  destroy  our  peace.” 

The  Boers  were  not  tamely  prepared  to  surrender  the  land  for 
which  they  had  sacrificed  so  much,  and  200  of  them  attacked  Smith 
and  his  men,  putting  them  to  flight  and  capturing  their  guns. 
English  reenforcements  soon  arrived,  however,  and  General  Joubert 
tells  what  followed: 

“ The  Boers  were  not  trained  to  the  use  of  cannon,  and  could 
not  prevent  the  landing  of  a force  stronger  than  themselves.  They 
dared  no  longer  fight  the  English,  for  the  Kaffirs  had  already  com- 
menced to  harass  them  from  the  rear.  A Boer  had  been  killed  on  his 
farm,  another  was  murdered,  and  his  wife  and  daughter  sv'.jected 
to  the  most  inhuman  treatment,  ravished,  and  driven  away  naked. 
Others  were  assaulted  and  barely  escaped  with  their  lives.  In  this 
way  the  Kaffirs  proved  of  great  service  to  Captain  Smith  and  his 
soldiers,  who  were  besieged  by  the  Boers,  and  had  already  been  driven 
to  the  extremity  of  eating  horseflesh,  and  who  would  undoubtedly 
have  been  obliged  to  capitulate  had  it  not  been  for  the  harassing 
attacks  of  the  Kaffirs  in  the  rear  of  the  Boers,  which  necessitated 
their  hastening  out  to  their  farms  in  order  to  save  their  families 
from  certain  death.  And  thus  it  came  to  pass  that  the  Boers  lost 
their  right  to  the  territory  of  Natal  which  had  been  purchased  with 
the  blood  of  their  slain.” 

England  annexed  Natal  as  she  had  already  grabbed  Cape  Colony, 
and  commenced  at  once  the  same  policy  of  confiscation,  of  tyranny 
and  of  racial  antagonism  which  drove  the  Boers  out  of  their  first 
homeland. 

Other  contingents  of  pilgrim  farmers  had  in  the  meantime 
crossed  the  Orange  Eiver  from  Cape  Colony,  and  settled  in  the 
region  lying  between  that  stream  and  the  Vaal  Eiver.  Thither 
many  of  the  Natal  Boers  trekked  after  the  destruction  of  the  infant 
Eepublic  beyond  the  Drakensberg.  England  was  again  on  their 
track,  and  by  an  Act  of  the  Imperial  Parliament  that  whole  terri- 
tory, and  the  regions  north  to  the  Portuguese  possessions,  were  de- 


INTRODUCTORY 


7 


dared  to  be  within  the  sphere  of  British  rule ! The  Orange  Territory 
thus  followed  Natal  into  English  hands,  after  Pretorius  had  fought 
Sir  Henry  Smith  at  Boomplaats  in  August,  1849,  and  the  Boers  were 
compelled  to  retire  over  the  Vaal  Eiver  into  the  Transvaal.  There 
a colony  had  already  been  established  on  a concession  made  by  the 
Portuguese  to  Potgieter  and  Pretorius,  and  the  town  of  Potchef- 
stroom  had  been  founded  as  the  capital  of  the  (third)  new  country 
to  which  the  Boers  had  been  driven  by  the  English. 

General  Joubert  omitted  at  this  point  in  his  letter  to  Queen 
Victoria  to  remind  her  that,  while  her  soldiers  were  thus  employed 
in  taking  countries  from  the  Boers  as  fast  as  these  could  conquer 
and  settle  them,  the  Kaffirs  were  causing  trouble  to  their  British 
protectors.  The  Basutos  rose  in  revolt  against  the  English  in  the 
Orange  Elver  Settlement,  and  the  latter  appealed  to  the  Boers  to 
help  quell  the  insurrection.  The  Boers  rightly  refused,  and  it  be- 
came necessary  to  recognize  how  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  it  would 
be  for  the  English  troops  in  South  Africa  at  the  same  time  to 
hold  the  Boers  in  subjection,  and  to  keep  the  Basutos  and  other 
tribes  under  control,  now  that  these  had  ceased  to  make  the  Dutch- 
men the  sole  objects  of  their  murdering  and  cattle-raiding  warfare. 

Joubert  passed  over  this  chapter  in  the  story  of  British  aggres- 
sion, and  continued  his  letter  as  follows : 

“ It  had  by  this  time  begun  to  dawn  upon  your  Majesty’s  Govern- 
ment that  it  was  more  politic  to  leave  the  Boer  severely  alone  than 
to  be  everlastingly  pursuing  him  from  place  to  place.  With  the  object 
of  assuring  the  Boers  that  they  would  not  be  interfered  with  north 
of  the  Vaal  Eiver,  and  could  administer  their  own  affairs,  your 
^Majesty’s  special  Commissioner,  Mr.  C.  M.  Owen,  was  sent  (to  the 
Boers)  with  the  result  that  a Convention  was  entered  into  on  the 
16th  of  January,  1852,  signed  by  your  Majesty’s  Commissioners, 
Major  Hogg  and  IMr.  Owen;  the  first  three  articles  of  which  read 
as  follows  : 

“‘Art.  I.  Her  Majesty’s  Commissioners,  on  behalf  of  the 
British  Government,  do  absolutely  guarantee  to  the  emigrant 
farmers  north  of  the  Vaal  Eiver  the  right  of  administering  their 
o\vn  affairs,  and  af  governing  in  accordance  with  their  own  laws, 
without  any  interference  whatsoever  on  the  part  of  the  British 
Government,  and  that  no  extension  shall  be  made  by  the  said 
Government  north  of  the  Vaal;  with  the  additional  assurance  that 
it  is  the  fervent  desire  of  the  British  Government  to  maintain  peace 
and  free  trade,  and  to  promote  a friendly  understanding  with  the 
emigrant  Boers  occupying  or  still  to  occupy  the  said  territory;  and 
it  is  further  understood  that  these  terms  are  to  be  mutually 
adhered  to. 

“ ‘Art.  II.  Should  there  arise  any  misunderstanding  regarding 


8 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


the  meaning  of  the  word  Vaal  Eiver,  the  question  shall  be  decided 
by  a mutually  appointed  Commission. 

“‘Art.  111.  That  Her  Majesty’s  Commissioners  disavow  all 
compacts  of  whatever  nature  with  the  colored  natives  north  of  the 
Vaal.’  ” 

Two  years  subsequently,  the  freedom  and  independence  conceded 
to  the  Transvaal  in  the  Sand  River  Convention  was,  likewise,  under 
a duly  signed  treaty,  obtained  by  the  Orange  Free  State,  and  both 
Republics  were  thus  recognized  and  declared  by  England  to  be  two 
sovereign  States,  absolutely  free  from  all  British  rule  or  inter- 
ference. 

Mr.  Fronde,  the  English  historian,  relates  in  his  book  “ Oceana  ” 
the  shameful  breach  by  his  country  of  these  treaties,  and  I will 
leave  General  Joubert’s  letter  to  Queen  Victoria  for  a moment  so 
as  to  support  his  testimony  by  the  evidence  of  so  thoroughly  con- 
servative a British  writer  as  the  author  already  quoted. 

The  ink  on  the  treaty  of  Aliwal  North”  (the  Convention 
recognizing  the  independence  of  the  Free  State),  says  Mr.  Froude, 
“ was  scarcely  dry  when  diamonds  were  discovered  in  large  quanti- 
ties in  a district  which  we  had  ourselves  treated  as  a part  of  the 
Orange  Territory  before  our  first  withdrawal,  and  which  had  ever 
since  been  administered  by  Orange  Free  State  magistrates.  There 
was  a rush  of  diggers  from  all  parts  of  the  country.  . . . 

There  was  a notion  that  the  finest  diamond  mine  in  the  world  ought 
not  to  be  lost  to  the  British  Empire.  ...  It  was  an  ill  hour 
we  lent  ourselves  to  an  aggression  for  which  there  was  no  excuse. 
Lord  Kimberley  gave  his  name  to  the  new  Settlement.  The  Dutch 
were  expelled.  The  manner  in  which  we  acted  was  insolent  in  its 
cynicism.  We  had  gone  in  as  the  champions  of  the  Chief  Waterboer. 
We  gave  Waterboer  and  his  Griquas  a tenth  of  the  territory.  We 
kept  the  rest  and  all  that  was  valuable  ourselves.  . . . The 

treaty  of  Aliwal  North  is  our  all  suflficient  condemnation.  This  one 
action  has  been  the  cause  of  all  the  troubles  which  have  since 
befallen  South  Africa.”  (Oceana,  pp.  It-O,  J^l.) 

Returning  to  General  Joubert’s  letter : he  touches  briefiy  upon  the 
disgraceful  transaction  so  strongly  denounced  by  Mr.  Froude,  and 
reminds  Queen  Victoria  of  the  additional  breach  of  the  treaty  of 
Sand  River  in  the  forcible  seizure  of  the  Transvaal  by  Sir  Theophi- 
lus  Shepstone  and  a British  force  on  the  12th  of  April,  1877,  on  the 
pretexts  that  the  Republic  was  too  weak  to  resist  native  insurrec- 
tions— instigated  by  British  agency — and  that  some  of  the  burghers 
favored  the  introduction  of  English  rule.  The  Commandant- 
General  continues  : 

“ Your  Majesty  is  probabljy  aware  that  the  Boers,  notwithstand- 


INTRODUCTORY 


9 


ing  their  indignation  at  this  great  wrong,  submitted  to  the  law  and 
preserved  order,  intending  to  petition  your  Majesty  against  this 
manifestly  unjust  breach  of  the  Convention,  committed  in  your 
Majesty’s  name.  They,  therefore,  without  a murmur  permitted 
the  publication  of  the  British  proclamation  announcing  the  act  of 
annexation.  When,  however,  the}^  wanted  to  have  a proclamation 
printed,  declaring  to  the  world  their  rights.  Major  Clarke  ordered 
his  men  to  open  fire  on  them — and  this  without  previous  warning 
or  the  proclaiming  of  war.  Thus,  on  December  16,  1880,  war  was 
declared  by  England  against  the  Boers,  regardless  of  the  Conven- 
tion of  1852,  wherein  their  independence  was  guaranteed  to  them.” 

The  old  veteran  next  tells  the  story  of  the  “ war  of  freedom,” 
which  culminated  in  the  victory  of  Majuba,  gained  by  himself,  but 
of  which  personal  achievement  he  makes  no  mention  in  his  narra- 
tive. He  pays  a glowing  tribute  of  praise  to  the  action  of  Mr. 
Gladstone  in  effecting  the  settlement  which  followed  Majuba. 

“Actuated  by  a generous  and  noble  impulse  he  caused  the  unjust 
war  to  cease  and  restored  the  honor  of  Great  Britain  by  transforming 
an  act  of  violence  into  a magnanimous  deed.  . . . The  Boers 

were  free  again,  and  they  hoped  it  woiild  now  go  better  with  them. 
They  vainly  imagined  so.  Poor  Transvaal  ! You  have  hardly 
survived  one  disaster,  when  two  others  stand  staring  you  in  the 
face. 

“ Unfortunately  a rich  gold  mine  was  discovered  in  our  country. 
Poor  and  abandoned  men  began  soon  to  flock  to  this  new  El 
Dorado,  and  were  presently  followed  by  a legion  of  unscrupulous 
speculators.  Afterwards  certain  ambitious  capitalists  arrived  on 
the  scene,  who  knew  how  to  use  their  influence  and  were  indifferent 
as  to  what  role  they  played  or  of  what  became  of  the  country  so  long 
as  they  could  increase  their  wealth  tenfold.  And  to  what  end  did 
they  eventually  apply  their  gold,  derived  from  the  Transvaal  mines  ? 
Let  history  tell  your  Majesty,  and  it  will  prove  that  it  was  not 
devoted  to  the  good  of  the  country  or  the  welfare  of  their  fellowmen ; 
but,  on  the  contrary,  to  the  detriment  of  the  country  whose  hospi- 
tahty  they  were  enjoying. 

“ Their  object  was  to  overthrow  the  Government  and  to  rob  the 
people  of  their  liberty,  by  force  if  necessary.  As  they  had  money 
in  abundance,  the  proceeds  of  the  gold  they  had  won  from  the  mines, 
they  bought  thousands  of  rifles  and  (some)  Maxim  cannons  for  the 
purpose  of  using  them  against  the  people  of  the  Transvaal.  With 
this  aim  in  view,  they  had  made  a compact  with  one  Cecil  Rhodes 
to  undertake  a raid  into  the  Transvaal,  Dr.  Jameson  acting  as  the 
tool.  . . . Altho  we  had  it  in  our  power  to  refuse  to  grant 

quarter  or  pardon  to  J ameson  and  his  gang  of  freebooters, 
we  did  not  shoot  them  down  as  perhaps  another  military  power 
would  have  done,  or  even  follow  the  example  of  Slachter’s  Nek. 


10 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


The  thought  that  they  were  British  subjects  sufficed  for  the  Boers 
not  to  treat  them  according  to  their  deserts,  but  to  hand  them  over 
to  the  law  officers  of  your  Majesty  to  be  dealt  with  as  your  Majesty 
deemed  fit.  And  what  is  tlie  thanks  we  get  for  our  magnanimity 
for  libcratijig  Jameson,  Bhodes’  henchman?  Instead  of  thanks, 
we  are  cursed  with  the  revival  of  the  Johannesburg  agitation  of 
1895-96.  . . . 

“ Will  your  Majesty  permit  a small  weak  State  to  be  oppressed 
and  overthrown  bj^  the  world-renowned  power  and  might  of  Great 
Britain  simply  owing  to  the  misrepresentations  of  the  persons  I 
have  already  mentioned  ? 

“Such  is  the  inquiry  of  him  who  considers  it  an  honor  and  a 
privilege  to  extol  your  Majesty  the  Queen  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland  and  Empress  of  India.  . . . He  will  never  believe 

that  your  Majesty  will  suffer  the  sacred  rights  of  a weak,  peace- 
loving  people  to  be  violated  in  your  name,  and  South  Africa  to  be 
cast  into  grief  and  mourning. 

“ Such  is  the  wish  and  prayer  of  your  Majesty’s  most  humble 
petitioner, 

“ P.  J.  JOUBERT.” 

As  a postscript  to  General  Joubert’s  vain  appeal  to  the  British 
monarch  to  avert  a war  against  the  South  African  Republic,  the 
following  eloquent  testimony  to  the  historic  justice  of  the  Boer 
cause,  and  outspoken  denunciation  of  the  wrong  and  iniquity  of  any 
British  attempt  to  annex  the  Transvaal  or  to  destroy  its  independ- 
ence, will  not  be  inappropriate  ; 

“ The  Boers  are  animated  by  a deep  and  even  stern  religious 
sentiment,  and  they  inherit  from  their  ancestors — the  men  who 
won  the  independence  of  Holland  from  the  oppressive  rule  of 
Philip  II.  of  Spain — they  inherit  from  them  their  unconquerable 
love  of  freedom  and  liberty.  Are  they  not  qualities  which  commend 
themselves  to  men  of  the  English  race  ? Is  it  against  such  a nation 
that  we  are  to  be  called  upon  to  e.Kercise  the  dread  arbitrament  of 
arms  ? These  men  settled  in  the  Transvaal  in  order  to  escape 
foreign  rule.  They  had  had  many  quarrels  with  the  British.  They 
left  their  homes  in  Natal  as  the  English  Puritans  left  England  for 
the  United  States,  and  they  founded  a little  Republic  of  their  own 
in  the  heart  of  Africa.  In  1852  we  made  a treaty  with  them,  and 
we  agreed  to  respect  and  guarantee  their  independence;  and  I say 
under  these  eirci;mstances,  is  it  possible  we  could  maintain  a forcible 
annexation  of  the  country,  without  incurring  the  accusation  of 
having  been  guilty,  I will  not  say  of  national  folly,  but  I say  of 
national  crime  ?”  (The  Right  Honorable  Joseph  Chamberlain, 
M.  P.,  at  Birmingham,  June  7,  1881;  Authorized  edition  of 
speeches — 1885 — pp.  18-19.) 


Chapter  I 


THE  TRANSVAAL  GOVERNMENT  AT  THE  OUTBREAK 
OF  THE  WAR 

The  South  African  Republic  an  independent  nation  after  the 
London  convention — A country  of  peace  and  civilization — Civic 
ORDER  AT  Johannesburg — The  Boer  system  of  education — The 
Transvaal  constitution — Democratic  ieatures — Principle  of  the 
referendum — Religious  disabilities — The  judiciary — The  volks- 
RAAD — Land  laws — Herbert  Spencer’s  comparison  of  the  Trans- 
vaal WITH  England  before  the  Reform  Bill — Author’s  comparison 
OF  Transvaal  with  England  of  the  present. 

HE  short  spell  of  independence  enjoyed  by  the  Transvaal  Boers 


under  the  Sand  Elver  Convention  was  too  checkered  to  offer 


mneh  encouragement  to  the  various  tasks  of  settled  government. 
War  followed  war  with  native  races,  instigated  by  English  agency, 
rendering  the  labor  of  internal  administration  difficult  and  spas- 
modic. The  real,  independent  life  of  the  Eepublic  dates,  therefore, 
from  the  signing  of  the  London  Convention  of  1884.  Eeckoning 
from  that  j'ear  to  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  October,  1899,  we 
have  a small  nation  in  full  possession  of  its  own  freedom,  of  initia- 
tive and  action,  for  a period  of  only  fifteen  years.  It  is,  conse- 
quently, a Government  of  this  age,  confronted  from  1890  until 
forced  into  the  present  conflict  with  unscrupulous  English  intrigue 
and  combinations,  that  has  been  held  up  by  the  capitalist  press  to 
the  opprobrium  of  the  civilized  world  for  faults  and  failures  ! Can 
it  not  be  asked,  in  all  fairness,  whether  there  has  ever  been  written 
in  the  history  of  nations  a more  grotesque  parody  of  just  criticism 
than  that  which  applies  the  codes  and  standards  of  States  hundreds 
of  years  in  the  enjoyment  of  freedom,  to  the  acts  of  a nation  of 
less  than  150,000  souls,  and  judges  thereby  what  it  has  and  has 
not  done  for  “ human  progress,  civilization,  and  enlightenment,” 
within  the  space  of  fifteen  years  ? It  is  as  if  a child  of  tender  age 
were  denounced  and  cited  for  punishment  because  he  had  not 
developed  the  personal  strength  of  a Sandow,  or  the  mental  equip- 
ment of  a Herbert  Spencer.  And  it  is  for  the  inevitable  faults  of 
inexperience,  and  for  falsely  accused  failure,  that  this  little  State 
has  been  hounded  down  by  its  English  enemies  in  the  press  of 


12 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


England  and  America,  and  handed  over  to  the  power  of  the  British 
Empire  for  reform  by  strangulation. 

No  one  who  wanted  to  be  a witness  to  the  truth  could  travel 
through  the  Transvaal,  either  before  war  began  or  during  its  earlier 
progress,  without  seeing  evidence  everywhere  of  both  careful  and 
enlightened  administration  in  its  cities  and  towns,  and  of  comfort 
and  content  in  the  homes  and  habits  of  the  people.  Pretoria  is  a 
city  handsome  in  every  sense.  Its  public  edifices,  notably  its  Gov- 
ernment Buildings  and  Palace  of  Justice,  would  do  credit  to  any 
European  capital.  Its  streets  are  wide,  and  are  lit  with  electric 
light.  It  possesses  as  good  a telephone  service  as  any  British  town 
of  equal  size,  while  the  whole  country  is  served  with  efficient  rail- 
way and  telegraphic  systems.  Pretoria  impressed  the  visitor  as  a 
well-ruled  city;  bright,  comfortable,  and  clean;  furnished  with  an 
admirable  market,  and  an  abundant  water  supply.  Its  working 
classes  were  better  housed  than  those  of  London,  Manchester,  or 
Dublin,  while  the  taxation  on  wages  in  the  Transvaal  was  much 
less  than  the  amount  which  English  working  men  have  to  pay 
annually  in  their  own  country. 

Johannesburg  alone,  the  center  of  the  anti-Boer  agitation,  would 
amply  vindicate  Boer  Government,  and  refute  the  false  statements 
of  its  worst  enemies,  could  the  place  have  been  seen  by  fair-minded 
men,  and  all  the  facts  relating  to  its  people,  their  character  and 
pursuits,  have  been  impartially  considered.  Here  was  the  center  of 
the  richest  gold  mines  in  the  world,  inhabited  by  over  100,000  white 
people,  and  fully  80,000  Kaffirs  who  were  employed  in  the  mines 
of  the  town  and  locality.  The  whites  embraced,  along  with  the 
reputable  classes,  all  the  elements  known  to  flock  to  such  a center: 
men  of  the  worst  character  and  lowest  passions;  purveyors  of  prosti- 
tution, gamblers,  cheats,  sharpers,  scoundrels,  and  loafers — all  of 
alien,  not  one  of  Boer,  blood.  Not  a single  English  critic  has  had 
the  sense  of  fairness  to  take  account  of  the  difficulties  in  the  way 
of  the  police  and  the  administrators  of  justice  in  dealing  with  a city 
so  inhabited,  and  containing  within  its  limits  more  potential  agen- 
cies, passions,  and  incitements  to  civic  and  social  disorder  than  any 
other  city  in  Christendom.  And  yet,  what  was  the  actual  record 
of  Johannesburg  in  its  relation  to  law  and  order  from  1890  to  1899  ? 
I assert  in  all  confidence  that  there  have  been  less  murders,  less 
rapes,  less  serious  outrages  on  person  and  property,  among  the  whole 
white  population  within  this  unique  city  during  these  ten  years, 
than  in  any  single  city  in  England  of  equal  population  for  a like 
period.  Eighty  thousand  savages  were  kept  under  orderly  control 
without  undue  severity,  and  made  subject  to  civilized  laws  and 
customs  in  a manner  reflecting  the  highest  credit  upon  the  police 


TRANSVAAL  GOVERNMENT  AT  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR  13 


and  magistracy  of  Johannesburg.  General  order  was  maintained 
without  any  violent  interference  with  the  liberty  of  citizens  (less 
by  far  than  occurs  in  Ireland  to-day),  and  when  it  became  necessary 
to  the  purposes  of  the  plots  and  plans  of  Boer  enemies  within  their 
gates  to  libel  these  police  and  officials  of  the  law,  all  the  cases  which 
the  model,  moral  Uitlander  “ reformers  ” could  place  at  Sir  Alfred 
Milner’s  disposal  for  his  indictment  of  the  State  which  Englishmen 
had  conspired  to  destroy,  embraced  an  alleged  murder  of  an  Eng- 
lishman, which  turned  out  to  be,  at  worst,  a case  of  manslaughter; 
the  murder,  by  undetected  ruffians,  of  a lady  for  her  crusade  against 
illicit  drink  traffic;  an  attack  by  a Field  Cornet  upon  a Cape 
Kaffir  family;  an  organized  disturbance  of  a Ehodesian  meeting, 
and  a few  minor  instances  of  alleged  failures  of  justice.  These 
and  nothing  more.  The  meagerness  of  the  list  bore  eloquent  evi- 
dence to  the  success  of  the  Government  which  had  kept  such  a 
place  in  such  order. 

A popular  conviction  was  fostered  in  England  that  President 
Kruger  and  his  “ oligarchy  ” were  either  the  foes  of  education  or 
were  indifferent  to  the  spread  of  instruction  among  the  Boers. 
“ Ignorant,”  “ half -civilized,”  were  common  expressions  used  about 
them  by  speakers  and  writers  who  took  no  trouble  to  ascertain  a 
truth  which  for  the  purposes  of  their  argument  they  were  not  over- 
anxious to  find.  Most  of  the  talk  of  this  kind  was  indulged  in  by 
persons  who  were  probably  thinking  of  the  educational  centers  of 
Oxford  and  Cambridge,  and  of  a much  more  recently  organized 
English  School  Board  system,  as  a proud  contrast  to  the  resources 
of  the  benighted  Dutchmen  of  the  Transvaal.  But  these  Dutch- 
men had  only  fifteen  or  sixteen  years  of  full  self-governing  exist- 
ence in  which  to  build  up  their  educational  centers  and  system,  and 
the  following  is  the  record  of  what  they  have  done  for  the  instruc- 
tion of  the  children  of  the  people  within  that  period  : 

Professor  Mansvelt,  Superintendent  of  Education  in  the  State 
School  of  Pretoria,  kindly  supplied  the  facts  and  figures  herein 
adduced. 

In  1882  the  pupils  in  the  public  schools  of  the  South  African 
Eepuhlic  numbered  875.  In  1898  they  numbered  14,702;  an  in- 
crease of  over  1,500  per  cent,  in  fifteen  years. 

The  character  of  the  Boer  system  of  instruction  was  threefold  : 
primary,  secondary,  and  higher  education.  Primary  and  secondary 
instruction  were  given  in  the  village  and  ward  schools.  Higher 
education  was  confined  to  the  upper  classes  of  the  State  Girls’ 
School  and  the  State  Boys’  School  (called  the  State  Model  School), 
in  the  State  Gymnasium;  an  institution  equivalent  in  teaching  and 
in  subjects  to  a French  lycee  or  an  English  college.  Then  there 


14 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Avas  the  State  School  of  Mines,  in  which  the  character  of  the  in- 
struction approached  more  to  a university  teaching  than  to  that 
of  a high  school. 

The  total  number  of  schools  (in  1898)  in  the  Transvaal  amounted 
to  509;  462  of  these  being  rural  (village  and  ward  schools),  and 
47  urban  schools. 

The  attendance,  in  the  year  quoted,  averaged,  for  rural  schools, 
91  per  cent.,  and  in  urban  schools,  85. 

Professors,  certificated  and  other  teachers  numbered  830:  578 
male,  and  252  female,  instructors;  these  teachers  being  divided, 
according  to  nationality^  into  323  Europeans,  mostly  Dutch;  349 
born  in  Cape  Colony;  and  158  born  within  the  South  African 
Bepublic. 

The  program  of  instruction  covered  reading,  writing,  arithme- 
tic, sacred  history,  history  of  South  Africa,  the  Dutch  language, 
object  lessons,  recitation,  geography,  and  singing,  in  the  primary 
schools;  while  in  the  secondary  and  higher  establishments  the  pro- 
gram embodied  geometry,  algebra,  living  languages,  drawing  and 
design,  physiology,  botany,  zoology,  chemistry,  dead  languages, 
bookkeeping,  and  technical  instruction. 

The  sum  expended  by  the  Eepublic  on  its  schools  and  scholars 
in  1882,  amounted  to  £10,000.  In  1898,  the  total  amount  so  ex- 
pended for  that  year  was  £227,000. 

The  salary  of  a male  teacher  was  seldom  below  £120  per 
annum,  “ and  all  found.”  The  majority  of  the  ward  and  village 
teachers  earned  from  £120  to  £250.  Teachers  of  State  schools 
drew  fix;ed  salaries,  from  £150  to  £500,  according  to  rank  and 
diploma.  The  professors  of  the  State  Gymnasium  and  of  the 
School  of  Mines  had  a salary  of  £800  per  annum. 

The  teaching  of  English  was  not  prohibited  in  any  school.  It 
could  be  taught  in  all  schools,  if  required  by  children’s  parents, 
after  the  third  year’s  course.  This  applied  to  the  children  of 
Dutch  parentage.  To  meet  the  requirements  of  the  English 
population  which  had  grown  so  rapidly  in  the  Band  district  since 
1886,  the  Government  had  erected  State  Schools  in  which  English 
was  the  medium  of  instruction  in  all  standards  ; a few  hours’ 
teaching  of  Dutch  per  week  being,  however,  compulsory — a limit 
which  was  increased  gradually  as  the  pupils  advanced  in  their 
knowledge  of  the  official  language  of  the  Bepublic. 

It  will  he  seen  from  this  summary  of  the  facts  and  figures 
dealing  with  the  educational  provisions  made  by  the  “ ignorant 
Boers  ” within  a brief  period  of  fifteen  years,  that  they  were  neither 
hostile  nor  indifferent  to  intellectual  culture,  but  were,  on  the 
contrary,  as  anxious  for,  and  as  generous  in  their  support  of. 


CONFERENCE  OP  THE  SOUTH  AFRICAN  REPUBLIC,  HELD  AT  PRETORIA,  JULY,  1897 


THE  BOEE  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


1« 

popular  education  as  any  community  of  Anglo-Saxon  people  in  any 
part  of  the  British  Empire. 

The  Eepublic  itself  had  been  described  by  its  libelers  as  “ a 
Eepublic  in  name  only.”  They  have  been  careful  to  deal  in 
accusations  and  assertion,  and  not  to  invite  a comparison  between 
their  statements  and  the  truth.  A reference  to  even  the  Grondwet 
of  1858,  which  has  remained  as  the  basis  of  the  Transvaal  Con- 
stitution, amended  in  1896,  will  show  that  it  was  thoroughly 
democratic  in  principle  and  in  purpose,  if  somewhat  rustic  in  its 
machinery  of  law  and  general  administration. 

The  salient  features  of  the  Constitution  are  found  in  the  fol- 
lowing clauses  : 

1.  This  State  shall  be  called  “ The  South  African  Eepublic.” 

2.  The  form  of  Government  of  this  State  shall  be  that  of  a 
Eepublic. 

3.  It  desires  to  be  recognized  and  respected  by  the  civilized 
world  as  a free  and  independent  people. 

6.  Its  territory  shall  be  open  to  all  strangers  who  comply  with 
the  laws  of  the  Eepublic.  All  persons  who  may  happen  to  be  in 
the  territory  of  this  Eepublic  shall  have  an  equal  claim  to  protec- 
tion of  person  and  property. 

8.  The  people  demands  the  highest  possible  social  liberty,  and 
expects  to  derive  such  from  the  maintenance  of  its  religious  belief, 
from  the  observance  of  its  engagements,  from  its  submission  to 
law,  order,  and  right,  and  from  the  vindication  of  the  same. 

10.  The  people  shall  not  tolerate  any  slave  traffic  or  slavery  in 
this  Eepublic. 

19.  The  liberty  of  the  press  shall  be  permitted,  provided  that 
the  printer  and  publisher  shall  be  responsible  for  all  libelous, 
insulting,  and  defamatory  articles. 

The  principles  of  Government  embodied  in  this  Grondwet  were, 
as  a matter  of  fact,  more  democratic  than  those  of  the  British 
Constitution.  But,  in  any  ease,  the  framers  of  these  laws  and 
regulations  were  arranging  a Constitution  for  themselves,  and  not 
for  Englishmen;  for  a small  community  in  the  wilds  of  South 
Africa,  and  not  for  the  satisfaction  of  external  critics.  They  were 
called  upon  to  mold  a system  of  rule  and  to  make  laws,  not  for  a 
mixed  nation,  nor  for  a complex  society,  but  for  a community  of  a 
few  thousand  families,  all  of  one  faith,  virtually  of  one  occupation, 
and  of  identical  social  standing.  The  framers  of  the  Boer  code 
had  no  “ classes  ” to  consider,  no  warring  religious  sects  to  protect 
from  each  other,  no  claims  of  hereditary  right  to  trouble  the 
possession  or  occupation  of  land,  and  no  complicated  system  of  land 
tenure  to  regulate.  They  were  free  from  these  great  difficulties. 


TRANSVAAL  GOVERNMENT  AT  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR  17 


and  had  only  to  provide  for  a people,  few  in  number,  who  were  not 
economically  or  otherwise  in  need  of  elaborate  legislation.  Still, 
the  fundamental  spirit  underlying  the  Boer  system  of  Government 
and  laws  was  the  unfettered  power  of  the  people  to  manage  their 
own  affairs. 

The  English  have  termed  the  Government  of  the  Eepublic  an 
“ oligarchy,”  as  becomes  a nation  of  critics  with  a hereditary 
House  of  Lords  having  power  to  veto  legislation  demanded  by  the 
people.  In  Article  13  of  the  Grondwet  it  is  provided  that  “ the 
people  shall  place  the  legislative  power  in  the  hands  of  the  Volks- 
raad,  the  supreme  authority  of  the  country,  consisting  of  repre- 
sentatives, or  power-holders,  of  the  people,  elected  by  burghers 
entitled  to  vote,  but  subject  to  three  months’  time  being  allowed 
the  people,  if  it  so  elect,  to  deliver  to  the  Volksraad  its  opinion 
concerning  any  proposed  law,  with  the  exception  of  such  laws 
as  shall  not  permit  of  any  delay.” 

Here  we  find  a modified  Keferendum,  adopted  by  these  South 
African  farmers  at  a time  (1858)  when  to  ask  a vote  for  a laborer 
in  England  was  considered  revolutionary,  and  when  the  franchise 
was  restricted  to  property  qualification  in  a country  which  can  now 
make  the  alleged  denial  of  the  franchise  to  aliens,  in  a small 
foreign  State,  in  1899,  the  pretended  cause  of  a war. 

It  is  true  that  membership  of  the  Volksraad  and  offices  in  the 
Eepublic  were  reserved  to  the  community  of  the  State  ChurcK. 
Eoman  Catholics,  and  Protestants  not  subscribing  to  the  tenets 
of  the  Heidelberg  Catechism,  were  specifically  disqualified  for 
membership  of  the  Chamber.  This  was  a narrow  and  reaction- 
ary restriction,  but  it  was  only  thirty  years  behind  the  British 
Parliament  with  respect  to  the  non-admission  of  Catholics  to  the 
House  of  Commons  who  were  not  prepared  to  swear,  before  an 
assembly  of  Protestants,  that  the  oldest  faith  in  Christendom  was 
heretical  and  superstitious.”  Even  to-day  no  Catholic  can 
occupy  either  the  Throne  of  England,  the  position  of  Lord  Lieu- 
tenant of  Ireland  (a  Catholic  country),  or  that  of  the  Lord  Chan- 
cellor in  the  House  of  Lords,  while  the  King  of  England’s  corona- 
tion oath  is  grossly  insulting,  in  some  of  its  expressions,  to  no  less 
than  ten  millions  of  his  subjects  who  are  Eoman  Catholics.  No 
true  friend  of  the  Boer  cause  defends  the  denial  to  Catholics  and 
others  the  rights  of  religious  equality.  Still,  justice  requires  that 
the  foregoing  facts  in  the  religious  and  social  history  of  the  Trans- 
vaal should  he  home  in  mind,  and  also  demands  recognition  of  the 
fact  that  the  Government  of  the  Eepublic  from  1890  to  1899  was 
surely,  if  slowly,  adapting  its  laws  and  institutions  to  the  needs 
and  rights  of  its  new  population. 

2 


18 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


The  administration  of  justice  in  the  Transvaal  was  divided  into 
courts,  or  departments,  as  follows  : The  High  Court,  sitting  in 
Pretoria ; a Circuit  Court ; a Landrost  Court ; Landrost  Commis- 
sioners; and  various  other  special  Courts:  such  as  Mine  Commis- 
sioners, Xative  Commissioners,  Field  Cornets’  Courts,  and  Resident 
Justices  of  the  Peace. 

Six  judges  constituted  the  High  Court,  and  two  formed  a quo- 
rum. One  judge  attended  regularly  in  camera. 

Xine  jurymen  and  one  judge  formed  a Criminal  Court.  A unani- 
mous verdict,  as  in  England,  was  reqrrired  in  every  criminal  case. 


THE  PALACE  OF  JUSTICE,  PKETOIllA 


There  was  no  regular  appeal  from  the  decision  of  this  Court,  but 
no  capital  sentence  could  be  carried  out  until  the  unanimous  deci- 
sion of  the  Executive  Council,  on  a consideration  of  the  facts  of  the 
case,  was  first  obtained. 

The  judges  of  the  High  Court  were  invested  by  the  Grondwet 
with  jurisdiction  over  every  person  in  the  Republic,  without  dis- 
tinction. They  had  to  be  duly  qualified  in  jurisprudence,  and 
held  their  positions  for  life. 

A Circuit  Court  was  constituted  like  a similar  court  in  England; 
one  judge  of  the  High  Court  visiting  districts  periodically,  and 
trying  cases  which  could  not  be  adjudicated  upon  by  minor  courts. 

The  two  leading  judges  of  the  Transvaal  High  Court  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war.  Chief  Justice  Gregorouski  and  Mr.  Justice 


TBANSYAAL  GOVERNMENT  AT  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR  19 


Morice,  were  both  strongly  pro-British  in  their  personal  feelings 
and  predilections. 

One  of  the  most  serious  charges  brought  against  the  Boer  Gov- 
ernment was  that  the  independence  of  the  High  Court  was  delib- 
erately taken  away  by  a Volksraad  resolution  early  in  1897.  This 
allegation  was  a wilful  distortion  of  the  real  facts,  which  were 
these  : Two  judges  of  the  High  Court  had,  for  the  first  time, 
called  in  question  the  law-making  power  of  a resolution  of  the 
Volksraad;  they  claiming  for  the  High  Court  a right  to  test  (toets- 
ingsreeht)  the  constitutional  validity  of  such  resolution  by  compari- 
son with  the  Grondwet  of  1858.  What  the  Volksraad  did,  in  face 
of  this  pronouncement,  was  to  affirm  that  a resolution  of  that  body 
had  always  been  the  source  of  law,  and  must  continue  to  possess 
that  power  if  not  vetoed  by  the  people.  This  resolution  or  law  was 
put  in  force  without  the  three  months’  prior  publication  men- 
tioned in  Article  13  of  the  old  Grondwet,  but  on  the  ground  of 
the  urgency  of  the  case,  as  provided  for  in  the  power  given  for 
dispensing  with  that  provision;  the  Volksraad  claiming  that  the 
decision  of  the  High  Court  judges  had  unsettled  the  law  and 
created  judicial  confusion. 

The  Volksraad  was  compelled  to  assert  its  paramount  authority 
in  the  making  and  in  the  changing  of  laws,  but  it  did  not  in  any 
way  interfere  with  the  independence  of  the  High  Court  in  admin- 
istering the  laws  thus  made.  It  was  as  if  two  English  judges  had 
declared  that  no  new  law  passed  by  Parliament  would  have  bind- 
ing effect  unless  it  was,  in  their  opinion,  in  conformity  with  the 
laws  which  obtained  a generation  ago.  In  fact,  what  the  two 
Transvaal  judges  tried  to  do  was  to  set  themselves  above  the 
Parliament  of  the  country,  with  judicial  power  to  restrict  the 
law-making  Assembly  in  its  supreme  right  under  the  Constitution 
to  make  and  mold  the  laws  of  the  Eepublic. 

Landrosts’  Courts  performed  similar  duties  to  County  Courts  in 
England,  only  jurisdiction  was  limited  in  civil  cases  to  certain 
amounts  in  dispute  as  to  property,  and  in  criminal  cases  to  the 
infliction  of  fines,  or  imprisonment  not  to  exceed  a term  of  six 
months. 

Kative  Commissioners  dealt  with  cases  arising  out  of  illegalities 
committed  by  Kaffirs.  Competent  interpreters  attended  such 
Courts,  and  assisted  the  plaintiffs  or  the  accused,  as  the  case  might 
be.  Crime  of  a serious  character  among  Kaffirs  had,  however, 
to  be  dealt  with  in  a Circuit  Court. 

The  land  laws  of  a nation  who  were  land  workers  in  both  agri- 
cultural and  pastoral  pursuits  were  necessarily  simple,  being  framed 
for  themselves  by  men  of  the  people.  No  country  in  Europe  can 


20 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


boast  of  a better  land  system,  or  of  one  more  favorable  to  the  chief 
and  foundation  of  all  industries.  The  system  was  an  occupier  owner- 
ship, subject  to  a tax  by  the  State;  not  per  acre  but  per  farm.  This 
tax  was  not  to  exceed  forty  rix  dollars  (rix  dollar:  about  one  shilling 
and  six  pence)  or  to  be  less  than  six  rix  dollars  and  a half,  annually; 
the  amount  between  the  extremes  to  be  regulated  according  to 
valuation  by  authorized  persons.  Owners  of  farms  or  of  ground 
values  living  outside  the  Transvaal  were  to  pay  double  taxes;  a 
just  principle  applied  to  absentees,  tho  involving  only  a moderate 
penalty. 

Land  Commissioners  held  Courts  for  the  settlement  of  disputes 
as  to  boundaries  and  other  matters  of  a non-judicial  nature  aris- 
ing out  of  land  occupation.  Burghers  noted  for  their  knowledge 
of  land  and  for  their  reputation  as  wise,  competent  men  were 
selected  as  Commissioners  in  each  district.  Appeals  lay  from  all 
these  minor  Courts  to  either  the  Circuit  Court  or  the  High  Court 
at  Pretoria. 

The  transfer  and  registration  of  land  was  made  quite  simple, 
and  involved  no  costly  lawyer’s  search  for  title  and  the  rest.  All 
such  sales  were  to.be  registered  in  the  Landrost’s  office;  the  cost 
in  the  case  of  the  transfer  and  registration  of  a farm  being  less 
than  ten  shillings.  All  surveyed  or  inspected  farms  were  to  be 
transferred  within  six  months  from  date  of  sale,  or  the  fees  were 
doubled. 

Such  were  the  laws  and  Constitution,  briefly  summarized,  of  the 
Boer  nation,  which  a class-ruled  England,  boasting  of  hereditary 
law-makers,  and  of  a land  system  the  most  reactionary  in  principle 
to  be  found  in  the  civilized  world,  condemned  as  unsuited  to  the 
requirements  of  the  Uitlander  population  of  the  Band  ! 

To  provide  a plausible  justification  for  the  contemplated  over- 
throw of  the  little  Eepublic,  and  for  the  annexation  of  the  coun- 
try to  the  British  Empire,  it  became  a necessary  part  of  the 
capitalist-Uitlander  plot,  and  of  the  correlated  Chamberlain-Milner 
diplomacy,  to  libel  the  Boer  State,  and  to  hold  up  its  institutions, 
laws,  and  customs  to  the  ridicule  and  contempt  of  other  nations. 
The  reptile  Ehodesian  organs  of  Johannesburg  and  Cape  Town 
forged  the  calumnies,  and  the  capitalist  press  of  Great  Britain,  the 
British  Colonies,  and,  largely,  of  America,  spread  the  fabrications 
broadcast  and  created  a prejudice  against  a government  which  was 
so  persistently  and  skilfully  maligned.  What  rendered  this  propa- 
ganda of  defamation  the  more  damaging  to  the  Transvaal  was 
the  circumstance  that  there  was  a modicum  of  fact  and  of  founda- 
tion at  the  bottom  of  the  Uitlander  charges.  Just  as  a lie  that  is 
half  a truth  is,  on  that  account,  the  worst  kind  of  falsehood  to  re- 


TRANSVAAL  GOVERNMENT  AT  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR  21 


fute,  so  were  these  accusations  against  the  Eepublic  rendered  more 
damaging  than  if  they  were  mere  baseless  inventions. 

The  Transvaal  Government  was  far  from  being  an  ideal  Com- 
monwealth, and  its  laws  were  not  free  from  defects.  The  best  friends 
of  the  Boer  cause  admitted  these  shortcomings,  and  were  advocates 
of  reform,  but  the  crusade  of  lies  carried  on  by  the  capitalist  news- 
papers was  in  no  way  justified  by  the  actual  facts  of  Transvaal  laws 
and  administration. 

The  greatest  thinker  of  our  time,  himself  an  Englishman  of 
unquestioned  patriotism,  raised  his  powerful  voice  against  the 
systematic  hounding  down  of  the  little  Eepublic  by  prejudiced 
critics  on  the  score  of  its  alleged  reactionary  tendencies.  Writing 
to  the  chairman  of  an  English  meeting,  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  the 
great  philosopher,  has  said  : 

“ Has  there  been  prepared  and  published  a comparison  between 
the  Constitution  and  doings  of  the  so-called  Boer  oligarchy,  and  the 
Constitution  and  doings  of  the  English  oligarchy  before  the  Eeform 
Bill  ? It  would  embrace,  among  other  items  : 

“ 1.  England:  Permanent  exclusion  from  the  franchise  of  the 
greater  part  of  the  population,  tho  of  the  same  blood. 

“ 1.  Transvaal:  Temporary  exclusion  from  the  franchise  of  a 
moiety  of  the  population  consisting  of  aliens. 

“2.  England:  The  corn  monopoly,  maintained  by  the  whole  of 
the  landed  classes  for  the  benefit  of  their  cause;  semi-starvation  of 
the  poor. 

“ 2.  Transvaal:  The  dynamite  monopoly,  said  to  be  maintained 
by  the  Boer  oligarchy  for  personal  ends  at  the  cost  of  a sprinkling 
of  greedy  capitalists. 

“ 3.  England:  The  determination  of  the  landed  classes  to  main- 
tain their  monopoly,  constitutional  and  material,  over  crime  only 
by  the  danger  of  revolution. 

“ 3.  Transvaal:  The  much  smaller  opposition  to  reform  on  the 
part  of  the  ruling  classes  in  the  Transvaal. 

“4.  England:  The  corruption  set  down  in  the  Black  Book 
familiar  in  pre-Eeform  days. 

“ 4.  Transvaal:  The  corruption  ascribed  to  the  Boer  oligarchy.” 
— (London  Daily  Hews,”  September  27,  1900.) 

The  comparison  which  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  has  suggested  be- 
tween Transvaal  laws  and  government  may,  however,  be  partly 
made,  not  with  what  obtained  in  the  England  of  thirty  or  forty 
years  ago,  but  with  the  very  England  which  has  attempted  to  justify 
this  war  for,  among,  other  reasons,  the  alleged  “ oligarchical  ” char- 
acter of  the  Boer  Volksraad  and  government,  and  the  reactionary 
nature  of  their  legislation.  The  following  twelve  points  of  com- 
parison between  present  England  and  the  Boer  Transvaal  when 


22 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


hostilities  broke  out  on  the  11th  of  October,  1899,  will  further 
illustrate  the  glaring  inconsistency  of  the  British  authors  of  the 
war. 


COMPARISON  OF  ENGLISH  AND  BOER  GOVERNMENTS 


Present  England 

1.  An  hereditary  monarchy.  The 
people  have  no  voice  in  the  selection 
of  the  head  of  the  State. 

2.  Legislature:  A House  of  Lords 
absolutely  independent  of  the  peo- 
ple’s votes.  Can  veto  all  legislation 
Avithout  having  to  undergo  an  ordeal 
of  electio'n. 

A House  of  Commons  elected  by 
some  6,000,000  of  voters  in  a popula- 
tion of  some  40,000,000  (Great  Bri- 
tain and  Ireland).  Property  and 
wealth  have  plural  voting,  and  the 
cost  of  election  expenses  is  so  great 
that  working  men  are  all  but  de- 
barred from  membership  of  Parlia- 
ment. 

3.  Roll  of  Voters.  Registration 
laws  enable  agents  of  the  Tory  or 
wealthy  classes  to  disfranchise  al- 
most any  number  of  voters  by  mak- 
ing objections  and  compelling  work- 
ing men  and  others  to  attend  Regis- 
tration Courts  to  sustain  their 
claims.  A voter  must  reside  almost 
two  years  in  a district  before  he  can 
exercise  a right  to  take  part  in  an 
election. 

4.  Members  of  Parliament  are  not 
paid,  even  for  their  postage.  An  ex- 
pense of  fully  £200  a year  is  in- 
curred by  the  most  economical  mem- 
ber in  attending  to  his  public  duties 
for  which  he  receives  no  compensa- 
tion. 

5.  Referendum.  No  such  law. 
Parliamentary  elections  every  sev- 
enth year;  but  liable  to  take  place 
more  frequently. 


6.  Taxation.  Largely  levied  upon 
articles  of  consumption  required  by 
the  masses  of  the  people.  Average 
daily  wage  of  an  ordinary  British 
working  man  about  5s. 

7.  Land  Laws.  The  land  of  Eng- 
land monopolized  by  the  landlord,  or 
aristocratic,  class,  who  own  the 
House  of  Lords  and  largely  control 


The  Transvaal  of  1899 

1.  A Republic.  The  President 
elected  every  seven  years  by  man- 
hood suffrage. 

2.  A Volksraad  of  two  Chambers, 
both  elective  by  the  people  on  a fran- 
chise of  burgher  or  manhood  suf- 
frage. No  official  election  expenses 
incurred  by  candidates  in  contests 
for  either  Chamber. 


3.  Roll  of  Voters.  No  registra- 
tion laws.  All  burghers  arriving  at 
the  age  of  twenty-one  and  having 
their  names  inscribed  on  the  Field 
Cornet’s  roll  are  entitled  to  vote  in 
elections. 


4.  Members  of  both  Volksraads 
were  paid  an  average  .of  £ 3 per  day 
while  engaged  in  Pretoria  in  attend- 
ing to  the  legislative  concerns  of  the 
Republic. 

5.  Referendum,  I have  already 
alluded  to  this  enlightened  Boer 
law.  In  addition  to  the  power  thus 
recognized  in  the  people,  the  elec- 
tions for  the  Volksraad  occurred 
every  fourth  year. 

6.  Taxation  fell  chiefly  upon  capi- 
tal and  weath.  Workers  were  like- 
wise taxed  in  necessaries,  as  in  Eng- 
land, but  the  (Uitlander)  working 
man  in  the  Transvaal  earned  from 
15s.  to  25s.  per  day. 

7.  The  Land  Laws  of  the  Trans- 
vaal have  been  already  described. 
They  favorably  compare  with  the 
most  enlightened  laws  of  Europe. 


TRANSVAAL  GOVERNMENT  AT  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR  23 


the  House  of  Commons,  and,  there- 
fore, resist  proposals  of  land  reform 
which  would  interfere  with  their 
monopoly. 

8.  Land  Tax.  The  land  of  Eng- 
land paid  almost  all  the  expense  of 
government,  up  to  the  period  of  the 
Long  Parliament.  The  landlords 
contracted  subsequently  to  pay  4s. 
in  the  pound  on  the  valuation  of 
their  estates.  If  this  tax  were  paid 
to-day  upon  present  valuation  it 
would  realize  over  £30,000,000  for 
the  Exchequer.  It  is  paid,  how- 
ever, on  a valuation  which  is  more 
than  150  years  old,  and  only  realizes 
about  £900,000  annually. 

9.  Class  Legislation.  The  present 
Government  of  England  has  carried 
two  measures  in  the  Parliament 
responsible  for  the  war  which  openly 
benefited  the  land-owming  classes 
at  the  expense  of  the  common 
Exchequer.  The  English  Agricul- 
tural Eating  Act  was  an  indirect 
gift  of  the  supporters  of  Lord  Salis- 
bury’s Government  of  £ 10,000,000 
in  a period  of  four  years.  The  act 
was  renewed  again  last  year. 

The  Local,  or  County  Government 
Act  for  Ireland  passed  in  1898  pro- 
vided for  the  Irish  landlord  sup- 
porters of  the  Ministry  by  relieving 
them  of  rates  and  taxes  on  their 
property  amounting  to  about  £ 300,- 
000  a year. 

10.  Pauperism.  Every  fortieth 
person  in  the  population  of  England 
is  a pauper.  About  one  out  of  every 
seven  working  men  over  the  age  of 
60  in  England  dies  an  inmate  of  a 
workhouse. 


11.  Drunkenness,  Crime  and  Deg- 
radation. In  1899  over  200,000 
persons  were  prosecuted  for  drunk- 
enness in  England  and  Wales. 

In  Part  I.  Criminal  Statistics, 
1899  (Parliamentary  Blue  Book), 
page  136,  the  following  statistics  of 
crime  are  given  for  that  year:  Mur- 
ders, 121 ; convictions  for  same,  65, 
leaving  36  murders  unpunished; 
attempted  murders,  71;  man- 
slaughter, 201 ; felonious  wounding, 
259;  malicious  wounding,  1,001; 
rapes,  indecent  assaults  on  females, 
and  defilement  of  young  girls,  1,330; 


8.  The  Transvaal  Land  Tax  has 
been  referred  to.  It  fell  equally  on 
all  owners  of  land,  and  contributed, 
in  a small  tax  on  each  farm,  to  the 
revenues  of  the  State.  Absentee 
landowners  had  to  pay  double  taxes. 


9.  The  various  charges  made  by 
the  Uitlander  enemies  of  the  Boers 
against  the  Volksraad,  but  not 
proved.  I deal  with  these  allega- 
tions in  the  next  chapter. 


10.  There  was  no  pauperism  in 
the  Transvaal.  Relief  was  some- 
times given  to  poor  farmers  when 
their  crops  were  injured  by  locusts, 
but  it  was  voted  by  the  Volksraad 
for  special  reasons.  The  workhouse 
had  no  place  in  the  social  system  of 
the  Boers. 

11.  There  was  little  if  any  drunk- 
enness in  the  Transvaal  before  the 
advent  of  the  Uitlanders.  Crime 
was  very  rare.  There  were  no 
brothels  except  when  introduced  by 
the  same  foreign  element.  It  is  al- 
most safe  to  say  there  was  not  a 
single  house  of  ill  fame  in  the  Re- 
public before  the  arrival  of  the  Jo- 
hannesburg “ reformers  ” from  Eng- 
land and  her  colonies. 


24 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


unnatural  offences,  200;  bigamy, 
115. 

A report  of  the  Society  for  the 
Prevention  of  Cruelty  to  Children 
quoted  from  on  p.  44,  says  that 
10,790  children  were  “ immorally 
outraged  ” in  England  and  Wales, 
307,904  “ neglected  and  starved,” 

59,269  “ assaulted  and  ill-treated,” 
and  that  7,686  were  found  to  be 
“ sufferers  in  other  ways  ” since 
that  society  commenced  its  humane 
labors. 

There  were  a total  of  76,000  in- 
dictable offenses  committed  in  Eng- 
land and  Wales  in  1899,  for  which 
crimes  53,359  persons  were  appre- 
hended, leaving  over  20,000  crimes 
unpunished. 

There  are  supposed  to  be  upward 
of  50,000  prostitutes  in  London 
alone,  at  the  present  time. 

12.  England’s  Army.  This  army, 
according  to  Rudyard  Kipling, 
ought  to  be,  or  is,  made  up  of  brutes 
and  gentlemen.  Of  the  presence 
within  it  of  the  former,  such  con- 
duct as  that  of  the  Lancers  at 
Elandslaagte,  and  the  reports  of 
General  Kitchener  give  ample  evi- 
dence. 


12.  The  Transvaal  Army  Officers 
are  elected  by  the  burghers.  A 
National  Militia  composed  of  the 
best  and  most  patriotic  men  in  the 
Republic,  and  requiring  no  pay. 
Had  the  male  population  of  Eng- 
land volunteered  to  fight  in  this  war 
in  the  same  proportion  as  Transvaal 
burghers  did,  no  less  than  3,000,000 
Englishmen — not  of  the  Kipling 
Tommy  Atkins  kind — would  have 
asked  for  arms,  without  pay. 


Chapter  II 


THE  BOER  “OLIGARCHY” 

Hypoceisy  of  English  charges  of  corruption  against  the  government 
OF  THE  Transvaal — Comparison  of  Kruger  with  the  Rand  capital- 
ists— Personnel  of  the  Transvaal  executive — Sketches  of 
Kruger,  Joubert,  Reitz,  Ceonje,  Kock,  Wolmaeans,  and  Burger 
— Nobility  of  Boer  character — Testimony  of  Me.  Froude. 

The  charges  made  against  Mr.  Kruger’s  Government — against 
what  Mr.  Chamberlain  called  a “ foreign  State  ” in  1896 — 
were  many  and  various.  They  may,  however,  be  included  in  the 
dual  allegation  of  “ corrupt  ” and  “ incompetent.”  What  the  in- 
competence or  even  corruption  of  a “ foreign  State  ” had  to  do 
with  the  duties  of  a British  Colonial  Secretary,  is  not  a question 
that  appeared  to  trouble  the  minds  of  English  critics.  Yet,  it  is 
safe  to  say  that,  had  France  been  guilty  of  the  same  responsible 
relationship  as  England  with  the  J ameson  Eaid,  and  had  the  French 
Minister  for  the  Colonies  assumed  the  rights  of  intervention  and  of 
minatory  advice  claimed  after  that  Eaid  by  Mr.  Chamberlain  under 
the  Convention  of  1884,  English  opinion  would  have  been  unani- 
mous in  calling  such  intermeddling  both  unjustifiable  and  wrong. 

In  any  case  it  would  be  asked,  whether  the  charges  of  corruption 
and  of  incompetence  were  really  true,  or  were  but  allegations 
founded  upon  a distortion  of  facts  and  an  interested  manipulation 
of  circumstances  creating  suspicion  but  inconclusive  in  proof.  Judg- 
ment would  not  be  pronounced  without  the  evidence  of  some  sup- 
porting testimony,  as  is  the  rule  with  Englishmen  when  England 
is  herself  the  judge  of  both  her  own  and  her  adversary’s  case. 

Men  do  not  develop  dishonest  practises  when  in  power,  without 
some  previous  disposition  or  record  which  predisposes  them  to  such 
an  immoral  misuse  of  authority.  The  honor  of  a high  official  posi- 
tion, the  responsibilities  of  national  duty,  and  the  satisfaction  of 
a great  ambition  are  the  rewards  which  follow  from  legitimate 
political  success,  and  these,  among  undegenerate  peoples,  supply 
all-sufficient  incentives  for  seeking  political  power.  What  is  there 
in  Mr.  Kruger’s  career  to  sustain  the  theory  of  a corrupt  misuse 
of  the  position  to  which  his  people  had  twice  elected  him?  He 
has  spent  his  life,  not  in  money  making,  but  in  the  noble  task 


26 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


of  making  a nation.  Even  his  enemies  bear  evidence  to  his  bravery ; 
to  his  strong,  if  rugged,  qualities  as  a leader;  to  his  indomitable 
will  and  persistency  of  purpose,  in  this  great  task.  Such  a task 
or  achievement  would  not  be  considered  the  ambition  of  a depraved 
nature  or  of  an  ignoble  mind — if  pursued,  say,  against  French  or 
German  or  Eussian  policy.  Why,  then,  should  it  mean  a low  and 
mercenary  motive  only  when  England’s  Imperial  interests  are  alone 
concerned  ? 

Mr.  Kruger’s  home  in  Pretoria  was  an  ordinary  cottage  in  one  of 
the  city’s  secondary  streets.  There  were  neither  costly  furnishings 


PRESIDENT  AND  MRS.  KRUGER  IN  THEIR  COTTAGE  IN  PRETORIA,  APRIL,  1900 


within  nor  expensive  display  in  the  outside  appearance  of  the  Presi- 
dential residence.  It  would,  probably,  not  compare  in  structural 
show  or  costliness  with  the  house  of  Lord  Salisbury’s  head  gate- 
keeper at  Hatfield.  I can  assert  from  actual  observation  and  com- 
parison that  the  difference  between  the  President’s  home  and  the 
mansions  built  in  Johannesburg  by  his  chief  traducers — the  former 
penniless  upstarts  who  made  rapid  fortunes  under  Mr.  Kruger’s 
Government — was  as  striking  as  that  between  an  average  bank 
clerk’s  dwelling  and  a squire’s  lordly  hall  in  England.  All  the 
external  evidences  usually  denoting  wealth  were  wanting  in  the 
life,  private  and  Presidential,  of  Mr.  Kruger. 


THE  BOER  “OLIGARCH! 


27 


But  it  is  alleged  that  he  has  accumulated  great  riches,  whereas 
he  was  poor  not  many  years  ago.  Here,  again,  is  an  instance  of 
insinuation,  and  not  a matter  of  established  fact.  But,  even  if 
true,  why  should  it  follow  that  such  wealth  was  dubiously  acquired  ? 
]\Ir.  Alfred  Beit  was  a clerk  earning  weekly  wages  in  Hamburg, 
not  many  years  ago.  Mr.  Cecil  Ehodes  possessed  no  riches  when 
he  exchanged  the  climate  of  England  for  that  of  the  Kimberley 
region  of  South  Africa.  Members  of  the  precious  “ Eeform  Com- 
mittee ” of  Johannesburg  were  able  to  pay  fines  of  £25,000  to  the 
Transvaal  Government,  in  expiation  of  a crime  of  high  treason, 
and  this  after  but  a few  years’  sojourn  on  the  Eand,  tho  they  each 
and  all  arrived  there  in  search  of  fortune  with  the  proverbial 
shilling.  Most  of  these  persons  are  now  multi-millionaires.  All  of 
them  are  welcomed  into  the  highest  London  society;  some  of  them 
being  admitted,  it  is  said,  even  to  the  companionship  of  British 
Eoyalty. 

The  gold  of  the  Transvaal,  which  has  made  millionaires  of  Mr. 
Kruger’s  bitterest  enemies,  has  also,  doubtless,  enriched  the  Presi- 
dent and  many  of  his  friends.  Mr.  Kruger  sold  a farm,  named 
Geduld,  near  Boxburg,  in  1898,  for  £120,000.  It  is  now  worth 
millions  to  the  purchasers.  He  divided  the  greater  portion  of  the 
proceeds  of  this  sale  among  his  numerous  children,  gave  certain 
sums  to  churches,  and  loaned  £40,000  to  the  Transvaal  Treasury 
on  the  very  eve  of  the  war — not  a penny  of  which  has  yet  been 
paid  back.  When  leaving  Lourenzo  Marquez  for  Europe,  in  1900, 
he  took  with  him  a sum  of  only  £4,000. 

Other  Boers  sold  rich  farms;  the  land  of  the  Witwatersrand, 
now  knoum  to  have  covered  the  richest  gold-reefs  in  the  whole 
world,  was  owned  by  burghers,  and  was  purchased  from  them  by 
more  fortunate  speculators.  Possibly  Mr.  Kruger  has  invested 
some  of  his  money  well  and  wisely.  Eumor  asserts  that  the  late 
Queen  Victoria’s  savings  were  similarly  set  aside.  The  President’s 
salary  was  £7,000  a year,  while  his  mode  of  living,  simple  and 
economical  in  keeping  with  his  whole  career,  would  not  draw  upon 
more  than  one-tenth  of  that  salary  annually.  Here  there  is  an- 
other evident  source  of  accumulating  wealth,  which,  when  taken 
into  account  with  the  income  already  referred  to,  would  explain  the 
possession  of  riches,  but  of  wealth  fairly  and  honorably  obtained 
in  his  own  countr}-. 

The  capitalists  who  had  flocked  to  Johannesburg,  and  the  upstart 
rich  who  had  made  rapid  fortunes  there,  were  not  the  masters  of 
the  statesmen  and  politicians  of  the  little  Africander  nation.  They 
could  neither  have  laws  made  to  suit  their  own  interests  and  schemes, 
nor  purchase  a single  seat  in  the  Volksraad.  They  had  tried  and 


28 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


failed.*  Neither  President  Kruger,  nor  his  Government,  nor  the 
Boer  Legislature  could  be  bribed  or  bought.  Here  was  a state  of 
things  which  could  not  be  tolerated.  England  was  dominated  by 
landlords  and  money-mongers;  America  by  Trusts;  the  Continent 
of  Europe  by  Stock  Exchanges  and  the  Kothschilds;  Australia  by 
the  Banks.  But,  the  Transvaal  was  owned  and  ruled  for  Land 
and  People ! This  was  opposed  to  all  “ enlightened  progress,”  the 
“ welfare  of  humanity,”  and  “ true  civilization  ” ; and,  therefore, 
“ Down  with  the  reactionary  Boer ! ” became  the  watchword  of  that 
ardent  champion  of  civil  and  religious  liberty,  the  capitalist  mil- 
lionaire. 

The  Government  of  the  Transvaal  could  have  had  the  enthusiastic 
help  and  “ loyalty  ” of  the  Echstein-Beit-Barnato  combination  of 
Band  “ Eeformers  ” at  any  time,  if  money  were  the  sole  and  corrupt 
aim  of  its  Administration.  Obtainable  bribes  were  there  by  the 
million,  if  sought  for.  Eiches  beyond  the  dreams  of  avarice  could 
have  been  got  by  the  President  and  the  members  of  his  Executive, 
if  they  had  only  consented  to  accommodate  the  machinery  of  Trans- 
vaal rule  and  laws  to  the  requirements  of  the  capitalist  kings  who 
controlled  the  Eand  with  a treasury  of  gold.  These  mine  exploiters 
ruled  the  virtuous  English  Uitlanders  completely  and  absolutely; 
purchased  their  leaders,  kept  ” their  press,  and  subsidized  their 
British  loyalty,  both  in  the  “ Eeform  ” movement,  and  in  the  get- 
ting up  of  the  precious  petition  to  the  Queen.  These  Anglicized 
German  Jews  did  all  this  easily,  and,  as  a matter  of  capitalistic 
business  and  policy,  with  the  English  population  of  Johannesburg 
and  district.  But  they  failed,  in  every  attempt,  to  purchase,  bribe, 
or  exploit  the  Boer  Executive. 

It  was  pointed  to,  as  a conclusive  proof  of  Boer  oppression  in  the 
taxation  of  Uitlanders,  that  a Transvaal  revenue  of  £200,000,  before 
the  development  of  the  Eand  mines  began,  mounted  to  three  or 
four  million  afterward.  This  is  a sample  of  the  arguments  and  of 
the  “ evidence  ” put  forward  by  the  paid  traducers  of  the  Eepublic 
to  justify  a war.  But,  if  “ evidence  ” of  this  kind  and  character 
proves  “ corruption  ” against  one  set  of  persons,  it  must  stand  for 
the  same  measure  of  moral  guilt  in  others. 

It  was  not  an  easy  matter  to  discover  in  J ohannesburg  what  were 

* “ In  1894  they  (the  capitalists)  so  far  departed  from  their  attitude  of 
abstention  as  to  give  money  to  be  used  as  an  electioneering  fund  for  the  reform 
of  the  Raad.  The  Raad  of  1895  was  their  experiment.  The  failure  of  the  ex- 
periment was  complete.  No  session  in  Transvaal  history  was  more  clearly  dis- 
astrous to  the  interests  of  justice  and  good  government  than  the  session  of 
1895.  During  this  session  revolution  was  for  the  first  time  commonly  talked 
of.  During  this  session  the  capitalists  came  to  the  determination  to  espouse 
the  popular  cause,  and  from  that  moment  revolution  was  inevitable.”  (The 
“ Times"  History  of  the  War,  Vol.  I.,  p.  148. 


THE  BOER  “ OLIGARCHY 


39 


the  incomes  of  the  leaders  of  the  British  Uitlanders  when  they  first 
entered  the  Transvaal.  It  would  have  been  a task  akin  to  that  of 
searching  for  the  Highlander’s  breeks.  These  men  soon  became 
enormously  rich;  not  under  British,  but  under  Boer  rule.  They 
were  the  accusers  of  the  Government  whose  country  and  laws  had 
enabled  this  wealth  to  be  quickly  and  easily  accumulated.  Is  it, 
then,  to  be  contended  that  great  riches,  realized  in  a short  time  by 
mere  exploiters,  are  a right  and  legitimate  gain,  and  that  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  country,  which,  as  steward  for  the  State,  was  the 
virtual  owner  of  the  most  valuable  gold  mines  in  the  world,  was  not 
to  benefit  by  the  development  of  these  mines  ? That  was  the  Band 
doctrine;  the  belief  of  the  Echsteins,  Wernhers,  Beits,  Barnatos, 
Phillipses,  Goretzes,  hieumanns,  Eouillots,  Eplers,  Scholtzes,  Birk- 
enruths,  Strakoshes,  Solomons,  Markses,  Langermans,  Alhus,  Gold- 
manns,  Brakhauses,  Morkels,  Steylers,  Lilienfelds,  bourses,  Joels, 
Abrahams,  Herchhorns,  Hinds,  Michaelises,  Breitmeyers,  Haarhoffs. 
Langes,  Orpens,  Eaynhams,  Harrises,  Mosenthals,  Bernheims,  Drey- 
fusses,  Peisers.  Sutroes,  Bonasses,  Becks,  Josephs,  Anhaeussers, 
Grimmers,  and  Wybergs;  and  of  the  other  “Englishmen”  and 
“ Eeformers  ” who,  with  Mr.  Cecil  Ehodes,  have  succeeded  in  en- 
forcing that  doctrine  hy  the  arbitrament  of  war — at  a cost  to  the 
British  people  of  over  £150,000,000  in  taxes,  and  30,000  lives. 

The  revenue  of  the  Eepuhlic  grew  economically,  as  the  wealth 
of  the  Transvaal  was  developed ; as  happens  in  every  other  country. 
It  would  have  grown  in  similar  proportions  had  Englishmen  been 
its  rulers;  and  it  increased  more  legitimately  under  Boer  adminis- 
tration than  did  the  huge  fortunes  of  the  hostile  strangers  who  had 
arrived  almost  penniless  on  the  Eand. 

THE  TRAKSVAAL  EXECUTIVE 

The  Transvaal  Executive  preliminary  to  and  during  the  early 
stages  of  the  war,  consisted  of : 

President  S.  J.  Paulus  Kruger 
Commandant-General  Piet  J.  Joubert 
State  Secretary  F.  W.  Eeitz 
General  Piet  A.  Cronje 
Johannes  Hermanns  Michael  Kock 
Jacob  Martin  Wolmarans 
Schalk  William  Burger 

Of  Mr.  Kruger  the  world  has  formed  its  estimate,  and  it  is  not 
an  unfavorable  one  outside  of  the  British  Empire.  Like  all  men 
who  are  accounted  great,  he  has  his  admirers  and  enemies,  his  laud- 


30 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


atory  eulogists  and  envenomed  detractors.  Had  he  struggled  for 
a political  lifetime  against  any  other  power  than  that  of  England, 
and  had  fought  and  damaged  the  military  prestige  of  any  other 
Empire  as  he  has  that  of  Great  Britain,  his  present  foes  and  vili- 
tiers  would  have  exhausted  the  English  language  in  terms  of  un- 
stinted praise,  and  would  have  ranked  him  in  history  as  a fit  com- 
peer of  Hampden,  Washington,  or  Lincoln.  But  he  has  fought 


j.  M.  Wolraarans  F.  W.  Reitz  Schalk  William  Bur;;er  J.  H.  M Kock 


P.  J.  Joubert  S.  J.  P.  Kruger  P.  A.  Crouje 

THE  EXECUTIVE  COUNCIL  OP  THE  SOUTH  AFRICAN  REPUBLIC 


England  and  humiliated  her  military  pride,  and  he  is,  instead,  a 
corrupt,  cunning,  hypocritical,  and  semi-savage  foeman! 

All  who  wish  to  err  on  the  side  of  charity  and  of  justice,  rather 
than  on  the  opposite  side  of  injustice  and  malignity  in  their  judg- 
ment of  him,  will  accept  the  patriotic  rather  than  the  meaner 
estimate  of  the  man.  It  is  undoubtedly  the  more  consistent  with 
his  whole  career  and  character,  and  more  in  keeping  with  the  view 
which  unprejudiced  minds  have  formed  of  him. 

Mr.  Kruger  is  and  has  always  been  a sincerely  religious  man. 


THE  BOER  “ OLIO  ARC  HY 


31 


All  fair  testimony  on  this  point  goes  to  establish  this  fact.  His 
religious  scruples  have  told,  not  once  but  often,  against  his  own 
cause  during  this  war.  Xo  stronger  proof  than  this  could  be 
found  in  support  of  the  general  Boer  belief  in  the  piety  of  their 
President. 

When  in  the  summer  of  1899  it  became  evident  that  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain’s diplomacy  was  making  directly  for  war,  some  European 


PRESIDENT  KRUGER  AND  HIS  GREAT-GRANDCHILDREN,  ANNIE  EI.OPP  AND  GERALD  ELOFP 

This  picture  was  taken  in  1900,  for  the  Chicago  “ Tribune,”  shorlly  after  President  Kruger’s 

arrival  in  Europe 


officers  of  high  repute  offered  to  have  one  or  two  British  fransports, 
conve}dng  British  troops  to  South  Africa,  attacked  by  torpedo 
boats  at  certain  points  on  the  voyage.  The  plans  were  submitted 
to  competent  opinion,  and  were  found  to  be  perfectly  feasible.  The 
proposal  was  laid  in  due  course  before  President  Kruger,  and  in- 
stantly and  emphatically  rejected  as  “ barbarous  and  unchristian.” 

During  the  earlier  stages  of  the  siege  of  Ladysmith,  a plan  for 
using  dynamite  in  the  task  of  forcing  the  British  garrison  out  of 


33 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


its  entrenchments  was  put  before  Joiihert,  and  discussed  between 
himself  and  Kruger.  Both  condemned  and  rejected  the  scheme  as 
“ unchristian.”  No  hypocrites  would  have  harbored  such  objec- 
tions. An  unscrupulous  politician,  making  an  insincere  profession 
and  use  of  religion,  would  have  had  no  more  objection  to  the  em- 
ployment of  torpedoes  and  the  use  of  dynamite,  under  the  circum- 
stances, than  English  generals  had  to  lyddite  shells,  and  to  the 
burning  of  De  Wet’s,  and  Botha’s,  and  De  la  Key’s  farms,  and  to 
the  “ concentration  camps  ” for  Boer  women  and  children,  as 
“ civilized  ” methods  of  warfare.  Whatever  may  be  the  ultimate 
judgment  of  Englishmen  upon  this  old  man’s  Bible  reading  and 
religious  sincerit}^,  many  of  his  friends  and  admirers  who  know 
of  his  active  interference,  on  Biblical  and  Scriptural  grounds,  with 
certain  plans  of  younger  Boer  generals  less  scrupulous  than  him- 
self and  Joubert,  will  assign  to  President  Kruger  a part  responsi- 
bility with  the  dead  Commandant-General  for  the  initial  blunders 
of  the  Boer  campaign. 

Of  General  Joubert  it  is  unnecessary  to  write  in  defense  or  in 
praise.  Even  English  testimony  to  his  chivalry  and  humanity — 
now  that  he  is  dead — is  on  record.  He  has  earned  the  reluctant 
praise  of  his  enemies,  and  their  appreciation  of  his  personal  quali- 
ties and  military  capacity  relieves  his  friends  of  the  task  of  estab- 
lishing his  claim  to  a high  and  honorable  reputation  which  is  not 
denied  by  his  foes. 

State  Secretary  Eeitz  is  an  intense  Boer  Nationalist,  a man  of 
refinement  and  culture,  a scholar  and  a poet.  His  popularity 
among  the  race  to  which  he  belongs  has  been  shown  in  his  presi- 
dency of  the  Free  State,  in  the  occupancy  of  the  judicial  bench,  and, 
later,  in  the  post  in  which  it  was  his  duty,  ably  assisted  by  the  bril- 
liant young  Attorney-General,  Mr.  Smuts,  now  a gallant  and  suc- 
cessful Boer  officer  in  the  field,  to  enter  the  lists  in  diplomatic 
fencing  with  Sir  Alfred  Milner  and  Mr.  Chamberlain.  No  im- 
partial reader  of  the  documents  which  followed  the  British  Colonial 
Secretary’s  despatches  in  prompt  and  brilliant  sequence  of  argu- 
ment and  refutation,  in  the  correspondence  which  preceded  the  war, 
can  fail  to  see  the  evidence  of  a virile  intellect  and  of  a master  of 
a trenchant,  controversial  style  in  the  presentation  of  the  Transvaal 
case.  Mr.  Eeitz  clearly  and  conclusively  upheld  the  justice  of  his 
cause,  while  pitilessly  exposing  the  accusations  and  shuffling  state- 
ments of  the  English  Colonial  Secretary. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  Mr.  Eeitz’s  salary  was  £3,000.  Soon 
after  hostilities  began — to  be  more  accurate,  on  October  17,  1899 — 
a decree  of  the  Executive  Council  reduced  all  official  salaries  as 
follows : Salaries  of  £500,  35  per  cent. ; from  £600  to  £700,  40  per 


THE  BOEE  “OLIGARCHY’* 


33 


cent. ; and  in  like  proportion  up  to  salaries  of  £1,000 ; £1,000  to 
£1,200,  60  per  cent.;  £1,500  to  £2,000,  70  per  cent.;  £2,000  to 
£3,000,  75  per  cent.;  salaries  of  £3,000  and  above,  80  per  cent. 

All  these  sweeping  reductions  affected  every  member  of  the 
Executive  and  every  official  of  the  Government,  from  the  President 
downward;  the  higher  paid  officers  being  called  upon  to  sacrifice 
most  in  proportion  to  salary. 

When  Mrs.  Eeitz  and  her  large  family  had  to  leave  Pretoria  on 
the  entry  therein  of  the  British,  her  husband’s  whole  financial  re- 
sources could  provide  her  only  £300  with  which  to  reach  Hol- 
land. Mr.  Eeitz  remained  behind  with  the  fighting  burghers, 
and  is  sharing  with  them  to-day  the  perils  and  privations  of  a 
“ no  surrender  ” courage  and  consistency  in  patriotic  defense  of 
Boer  independence. 

Eeference  has  been  made  to  tbe  poetic  taste  and  tendencies  of 
Secretary  Eeitz.  The  first  of  the  following  parodies  is  said  to  be 
from  his  pen;  I know,  as  a matter  of  fact,  that  he  is  the  author  of 
the  second: 


PEOGEESSIOHAL 
(Dedicated  to  Mr.  Mudyard  Pipling) 


Gods  of  the  Jingo — Brass  and  Gold, 

Lords  of  the  world  by  “ Eight  Divine,” 

Under  whose  baneful  sway  they  hold 
Dominion  over  “ Mine  and  Thine.” 

Such  Lords  as  these  have  made  them  rotten. 
They  have  forgotten — they  have  forgotten. 


The  Nigger  or  the  Chinee  dies. 

The  Gladstones  and  the  Pitts  depart; 

But  “ Bigger  Englanders  ” arise 

To  teach  the  world  the  Eaiders’  art. 

Such  Lords  as  these  have  made  them  rotten. 
They  have  forgotten — they  have  forgotten. 


They’ve  “got  the  Gold,  the  Ships,  the  Men,” 
And  are  the  Masters  of  To-morrow; 

And  so  mankind  shall  see  again 
The  days  of  Sodom  and  Gomorrah. 

These  are  the  Lords  that  made  them  rotten. 
They  have  forgotten — they  have  forgotten. 

3 


34 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Drunken  with  lust  of  Power  and  Pelf, 
They  hold  nor  man  nor  God  in  awe. 
But  care  for  naught  but  only  Self, 

And  cent,  per  cent.’s  their  only  Law. 
These  are  their  Lords,  for  they  are  rotten. 
They  have  forgotten — they  have  forgotten. 


THE  WEARING  OF  THE  GREEN 

(Pretoria,  17th  March,  1900) 

They  tell  me  that  good  honest  Pat, 

By  favor  of  the  Queen, 

Has  got  the  right — as  well  he  might — 
To  wearing  of  the  Green, 

Ah,  Patrick  Atkins,  how  your  breast 
Must  swell  with  pride  and  joy 
To  think  that  Mr.  Chamberlain 
Has  found  his  Irish  boy  ! 

Did  we  not  hear,  only  last  year. 

That  on  St.  Patrick’s  Day 
Denis  Malone  in  “gaol”  was  thrown. 
And  docked  of  all  his  pay. 

Because — oh  dreadful  to  relate — 

This  “ Soldier  of  the  Queen  ” 

Had  with  unblushing  impudence 
Been  wearing  of  the  Green  ? 

Now  this  great  change  is  very  strange. 
And  sure  it’s  puzzling  quite, 

That  what  was  wrong  for  centuries  long 
Should  now  at  last  be  right  ! 

And  that  the  Dublin  Fusiliers 
By  all  may  now  he  seen 
Without  the  fear  of  punishihent 
A-wearing  of  the  Green. 

But  if  you  say,  now  tell  me  pray. 

What  may  this  difference  “ mane  ” ? 
Listen  to  me  and  you  will  see 
The  matter  is  quite  plain. 

It  means  that  Paddy  now  has  got 
This  “ favor  ” from  the  Queen, 

Becase — and  that’s  a fact — ^becase 
He  is — so  very  green  ! 


THE  BOER  ‘■'OLIGARCHY 


35 


General  Piet  Cronje  is  a prisoner  in  St.  Helena.  The  world  of 
military  criticism  has  spoken  its  verdict  on  his  courage  and  genius 
in  the  defensive  combats  which  led  up  to  his  surrender  at  Paarde- 
berg.  Even  English  Jingo  malignity  has  been  silenced  in  his  re- 
gard since  he  has  written  his  name  in  more  enduring  characters 
in  military  history  than  any  of  the  English  generals  who  fought 
himself  and  his  4,000  famished  farmers  with  40,000  British  sol- 
diers and  100  guns. 

General  Kock,  Secretary  of  the  Executive  Council,  fought  and 
lost  the  battle  of  Elandslaagte  with  800  Boers  against  four  times 
that  number  of  British.  He  was  one  of  the  noblest  t3'pes  of  living 
burgher  freemen,  and  received  at  the  hands  of  his  sorrowing  fellow- 
citizens  in  Pretoria  funeral  honors  as  great  as  those  which  marked 
the  obsequies  of  General  Joubert.  Before  the  war  Mr.  Kock  was 
popular  alike  with  British  residents  and  the  ordinary  citizens 
of  the  Transvaal,  and  has  left  an  absolutely  stainless  record  as  a 
heritage  to  his  family  and  the  Boer  nation. 

It  is  notoriously  known  throughout  Afrikander dom  that,  as  the 
handsome  and  stately  looking  Boer  general  lay  wounded  at  Elands- 
laagte, after  having  made  a gallant  fight  against  overwhelming  odds, 
he  was  stripped  of  his  clothes  and  robbed  of  his  watch  and  money, 
and  left  for  over  ten  hours  unattended  on  the  battle-field. 

Mr.  Wolmarans  was  chosen  five  times  in  succession  as  non-official 
member  of  the  Transvaal  Executive  Council.  He  is  a Knight 
Commander  of  the  Order  of  Orange  Kassau.  Ko  charges  have 
been  made  by  the  virtuous  Johannesburg  “ Eeformers  ” against 
this  colleague  of  Oom  Paul’s  in  the  government  of  the  Eepublic. 
He  is  at  present  in  Holland,  as  one  of  the  Boer  Delegates  to 
Europe. 

General  Schalk  Burger  has  fought  in  the  war  from  its  outbreak 
to  the  present  hour.  He  has  not  been  as  successful  in  the  field  as 
other  Boer  generals,  but  he  has  shirked  no  duty  or  danger,  and, 
tho  Vice-President  of  the  Eepublic,  he  has  acted  throughout  the 
campaign  in  the  spirit  of  a common  burgher. 

In  the  absence  of  Mr.  Kruger  in  Europe,  General  Schalk  Burger 
is  the  acting  President  of  the  Transvaal  Eepublic. 

These  seven  men  were  the  Executive  Council,  or  Government, 
of  the  South  African  Eepublic  when  war  was  declared.  It  was 
against  their  administration  and  country  that  the  Echstein-Beit 
combination  of  Eand  capitalists,  in  conjunction  with  the  Chamber- 
lain-i\Iilner  jingoism,  engineered  the  war.  How  this  administra- 
tion faced  the  mighty  conflict  into  which  its  members  were  driven, 
is  now  matter  of  history. 

Of  these  members,  two  out  of  the  seven  have  given  their  lives 


36 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


for  the  Republic  in  the  war.  General  Cronje  is  a prisoner  in  St. 
Helena.  Mr.  Reitz  and  General  Schalk  Burger  are  with  the  com- 
mandoes still  in  the  field,  while  Mr.  Wolmarans  is  in  Europe. 

Paul  Kruger  is  in  exile,  and  doomed  to  die  there,  after  learning 
of  the  death  of  two  of  his  sons  on  the  field  of  battle,  and  of  two 
more  being  prisoners  of  war.  He  was  far  removed  from  the  de- 
voted partner  of  his  life,  in  their  old  age,  and  her  death  in  Pretoria, 
separated  from  husband  and  children,  is  a subject  which  touches 
every  true  man’s  heart  too  closely  for  contemplation. 

Thus  lives,  homes,  children,  and  wealth  have  been  sacrificed  by 
the  members  of  that  Government  which  an  ignoble  gang  of  money- 
mongers  calumniated  in  a reptile  Rand  and  Cape  Town  press;  but 
one  will  search  in  vain  to  find  among  the  foemen  of  the  Transvaal 
Executive  in  the  field  a single  name  of  those  who  paid  for  the 
Jameson  Raid,  and  who  have  succeeded  in  making  the  British  tax- 
payer pay  for  the  war  which  promises  to  be  the  successful  supple- 
ment to  that  sordid  and  calculated  crime. 

Of  the  manly  race  who  were  ruled  by  Mr.  Kruger’s  Government 
the  world  now  needs  to  be  told  very  little.  They  have  made  them- 
selves the  best-known  people  on  earth,  by  their  splendid  patriotism, 
signal  valor  in  the  field,  and  a spirit  of  self-sacrificing  devotion 
to  National  freedom  without  a single  parallel  in  the  story  of  man- 
kind’s struggles  for  liberty.  They  have  lifted  themselves  by  their 
deeds  high  above  the  racial  level  to  which  English  calumny  tried 
to  lower  them  in  the  ranks  of  civilized  nationhood.  And,  as  the 
Boer  people  have  been  raised  in  universal  esteem  by  the  testimony 
of  deeds  nobly  done,  and  of  sufferings  bravety  borne  during  the 
last  three  years,  the  national  character,  the  moral  standards,  and 
the  military  reputation  of  their  unscrupulous  foes  have  sunk  corre- 
spondingly in  ,the  opinion  of  every  civilized  community  outside  of 
British  shores. 

Giving  his  impressions  of  the  Boers  in  an  interview  with  a re- 
porter of  a London  paper  (“  The  Evening  News,”  December  1, 
1884),  the  late  Mr.  Froude,  the  English  historian,  expressed  himself 
as  follows : 

“ First  of  all,  I must  tell  you  that  I think  very  highly  of  the 
Boers.  I found  them  in  every  instance  to  be  honest,  truthful,  and 
God-fearing.  IJncorrupted  by  our  liberal  civilization,  they  are 
content  as  quiet  husbandmen  to  till  the  soil  in  South  Africa,  to 
raise  cattle;  in  fact,  to  earn  their  living  rather  by  hard  work  than 
by  overreaching  their  neighbors,  while  bringing  up  their  families 
in  pious  fashion.  Morning  and  evening,  servants  and  sojourners 
assemble  with  the  family  to  hear  a chapter  in  the  Bible  read,  and 
in  the  prayer  that  follows  this,  all  join  devoutly  enough.  In  all 


TEE  BOER  '^OLIGARCHY 


37 


my  experience  no  Boer  ever  lied  to  me  or  prevaricated  in  any 
smallest  particular. 

“ I wish  I could  say  as  much  for  our  own  countrymen  in  that 
quarter  of  the  globe.  The  English  settlers  in  South  Africa  ap- 
peared to  me  as  miserable  a set  of  good-for-nothings  as  ever  I met. 
Given  over  body  and  soul  to  cants,  wedded  to  humbugs,  and  averse 
from  truth  and  honest  labor,  they  could  prate  of  their  Attorneys- 
General,  and  become  eloquent  in  regard  to  their  ‘ constitootion’ ; hut 
in  all  real  faculty  and  manhood  they  compared  badly  with  the 
Dutchmen.’’ 

There  are  no  complex  qualities  in  the  Boer  people.  In  one  sense 
there  is  some  truth  in  the  saying  of  their  enemies,  that  they  are 
wanting  in  “ civilization.”  They  are ; but  it  is  in  the  “ civiliza- 
tion ” with  which  we  are  familiar  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries — that 
of  a godless  culture,  of  refined  vice,  of  divorce  courts  and  immor- 
ality, of  drunkenness  and  prostitution.  The  Boer  is  very  backward 
in  these  modern  customs,  and  is  altogether  lacking  in  the  accom- 
plishments which  can  conceal  the  worst  appetites  of  an  educated 
animalism  beneath  a simulated  regard  for  propriety  and  religion. 

The  130,000  men,  women,  and  children  of  the  Transvaal  who 
were  not  afraid  to  fight  the  British  Empire  could  not  be  nurtured  on 
such  a “ civilization.”  They  are  the  products  of  a hardy  stock,  made 
tougher  and  stronger  in  body  and  mind  by  the  unique  environment 
of  their  existence.  The  Boer  is  neither  emotional  nor  magnetic  in 
his  temperament.  He  is  deliberate  in  thought  and  in  action  and 
rarely  influenced  by  passion;  cool  and  calculating  in  all  his  acts, 
whether  making  a bargain  in  a market  or  a laager  on  a battle-field ; 
rough  in  speech  and  manner,  but  capable  of  developed  refinement 
when  the  training  of  education  brings  into  play  the  latent  mental 
forces  of  a robust  and  nimble  intellect. 

The  Boers  have  a stronger  attachment  to  land  and  the  life  which 
its  ownership  requires  than  any  other  civilized  race.  They  possess 
that  pride  of  personal  independence  which  comes  from  a conscious 
lordship  of  the  soil.  They  have  not  had  to  go  through  the  social 
servitude  of  a rent-tenancy  before  reaching  the,  natural  dignity  of 
a proprietor.  The  Boer  is  a land-owning  democrat,  owing  no 
homage  to  any  man  or  class,  and  feeling  in  his  social  independence 
and  burghership  of  a free  Eepublic  that  sense  of  equality  and  love 
of  freedom  which  are  the  inherited  and  acquired  national  sentiment 
of  his  race.  He  has  all  the  strong  natural  traits  of  a people  reared 
away  from  the  many  debilitating  influences  of  city  life.  He  is 
abstemious  when  young,  loyal  to  the  obligations  of  marriage,  affec- 
tionately attached  to  parents,  devoted  to  the  duties  of  domestic  life, 
and  naturally  disposed  to  the  social  virtue  of  hospitality. 


38 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


The  Boer  woman  has  all  these  natural  virtues  in  even  greater 
degree.  She  is  strong  in  mind  and  body,  and  proud  of  her  fidel- 
it}"  to  the  noblest  functions  of  motherhood  in  the  rearing  of  chil- 
dren, while  l)eing  religious,  chaste,  and  intensely  patriotic.  The 
Boer  mother  looks  uj^on  the  English  as  the  enemies  of  her  race, 
a:id  believes  that  no  degradation  could  be  greater  for  her  children 


Copyright,  “Keview  ot  Reviews,”  London,  Eng. 

.MRS.  KRUGER  REARING  FROM  HER  GRANDDAUGHTER,  MISS  NETTIE  ELOPF,  THE  LATEST  NEWS 

FROM  THE  FRONT 


tlian  the  position  of  paid  soldier  for  her  son  or  of  house-servant 
for  her  daughter  under  British  rule. 

Their  experiences  of  British  dealings  with  South  Africa  have 
tended  to  make  the  Boers  unsociable  towards  other  races.  The 
English  are  to  them  the  exemplars  of  modern  ways  and  ideas.  They 
see  drunkenness  and  immorality  following  in  the  footsteps  of  their 
power,  whether  in  its  inroads  upon  Dutch  life  or  communities,  or 


THE  BOER  “OLIGARCHY 


39 


in  its  efEects  upon  native  races.  They  look  upon  the  English  as 
mamnionized,  godless,  and  unscrupulous,  and  consider  that  their 
example  and  customs  are  destructive  of  that  moral  manliness  which 
the  Boer  mother  inculcates  in  her  children  as  the  true  guardian 
of  their  country’s  religion  and  of  its  independence. 

The  average  Boer  is  a man  of  strong  physique,  above  the  Euro- 
pean build,  sinewj'  in  structure,  and  capable  of  almost  any  en- 
durance. His  out-of-door  daily  existence;  his  personal  pride  in  the 
management  of  a horse  and  in  the  use  of  a rifle;  the  acquired 
alertness  of  movement  and  accuracy  of  eyesight  which  are  bred  of 
his  veldt  life,  with  its  varied  herding,  hunting,  and  health-giving 
occupations,  have  all  combined  to  mold  the  men  who  have  fought 
the  best  flght  for  freedom  of  which  human  history  gives  us  a record. 
They  are  to-day  showing  the  world,  by  their  capacity  and  their 
measureless  sacriflces  for  libertj',  their  preeminent  claim  over  the 
British  to  the  permanent  and  paramount  right  of  nationhood  in 
South  Africa.  And  this  right  their  virile  and  proliflc  land-loving 
race  are  yet  destined,  by  the  laws  of  fltness  and  of  nature,  to  vindi- 
cate and  enjoy. 


Chapter  III 


WHO  PROVOKED  THE  WAR? 


The  British  contention  examined — Pretexts  for  intervention — 

CiTLANDER  “ GRIEVANCES  ” CAPTAIN  MARCH  PHILLIPS’  DESCRIPTION 

OF  THESE  “ WRONGS  ” How  AND  WHY  THEY  WERE  MANUFACTURED 

IN  Johannesburg — England  debarred  by  the  London  Convention 

FROM  INTERFERING  IN  THE  DOMESTIC  AFFAIRS  OF  THE  TRANSVAAL — 

Mb.  Chamberlain’s  admissions — President  Kruger’s  concessions 
FOR  THE  prevention  OF  WAR — ThE  PERFIDY  OF  THE  COLONIAL  OFFICE — 
Mr.  Chamberlain’s  ultimatum  of  the  22nd  of  September — The 
British  Parliament  summoned  to  meet  and  the  eeserxfs  called 
OUT — Mr.  Kruger’s  “ultimatum” — Repeated  efforts  of  the  Trans- 
vaal TO  SUBMIT  ALL  MATTERS  IN  DISPUTE  WITH  ENGLAND  TO  ARBITRA- 
TION— Mb.  Chamberlain’s  constant  refusal — England  prevents 
THE  admission  OF  TrANSVAAL  REPRESENTATIVES  TO  ThE  HaGUE  CON- 
FERENCE— Evidence  of  England’s  preparations  for  war  in  1887 — 
Lord  Wolseley’s  effort  to  have  w.ar  declared  in  June,  1899 — 
Lord  Lansdowne’s  astounding  admissions — The  British  agent 
AT  Pretoria  threatened  war  in  August — “ War  for  matter  of 
FORM  ” — The  Colonial  Secretary’s  confession  in  the  House  of 
Commons — Mr.  Herbert  Spencer’s  condemnation  of  the  policy  pur- 
sued BY  THE  British  Government. 

HE  one  fact  upon  which  the  English  base  the  assertion  that 


_L  the  Boers  were  the  first  to  declare  war,  rests  upon  what  has 
been  called  Mr.  Kruger’s  “ ultimatum.”  This  would  be  an  un- 
assailable position,  and  would  conclusively  establish  the  inno- 
cence of  Great  Britain  if  Mr.  Kruger’s  despatch  of  the  9th  of 
October,  1899,  stood  in  the  controversy  as  a solitary  factor  of 
provocation.  We  know  that  it  bore  no  such  character. 

In  all  contentions,  whether  between  individuals  or  States,  a 
knowledge  of  previous  occurrences  directly  bearing  upon  the  con- 
duct or  explanatory  of  the  motives  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute, 
is  essential  to  the  formation  of  a fair  judgment.  The  question, 
“ who  provoked  the  war,”  cannot  be  answered  rightly  without  tak- 
ing into  account  the  events  which  led  up  to  it  and  compelled  the 
Boer  Executive,  “ to  push  back  the  sword  which  was  held  to  their 
throats,”  to  use  the  graphic  phrase  employed  by  President  Steyn 
in  his  letter  to  Lord  Kitchener.  The  most  cursory  examination 
of  a few  notorious  facts  will  prove  that  the  real  ultimatum  which 
made  the  war  inevitable  was  resolved  upon  and  issued  in  London, 
and  not  in  Pretoria. 


WHO  PROVOKED  THE  WARf 


41 


The  story  of  England’s  treatment  of  the  Boer  race  from  1806 
to  1896,  as  told  by  General  Joubert  in  his  letter  to  Queen  Victoria 
— the  usurpation  of  Cape  Colony,  the  seizure  of  Natal,  the  grab- 
bing of  the  Free  State,  and  the  annexation  of  the  Transvaal  in 
P877 — ^lias  some  little  bearing  upon  the  charge  against  the  same 
Power  that  she  deliberately  provoked  the  present  war  in  the  spirit 
of  persistent,  national  animosity  towards  the  same  people,  and  for 
the  same  predatory  purposes  which  have  inspired  and  directed 
British  policy  against  them  for  a hundred  years.  England  comes 
into  court  as  the  violator  of 
solemn  treaties,  and  with  her 
Empire  in  South  Africa  actu- 
ally covering  the  very  terri- 
tories which  she  had  violently 
and  fraudulently  seized  from 
the  race  who  had  settled  and 
civilized  them.  Weighted  down 
with  the  very  proofs  of  her  own 
past  culpabiliW,  she  innocently 
asks  a jury  of  civilized  public 
opinion  to  believe  her  when  she 
declares,  “ President  Kruger 
began  the  present  war  in  his 
ultimatiim  of  the  9th  of  Octo- 
ber, 1899 ! ” 

Let  us  see  ; The  Jameson 
Paid  of  1896,  engineered  and 
•paid  for  by  a British  Colonial 


S.  J.  PAULUS  KRUGER,  PRESIDENT  OF  THE 
SOUTH  AFRICAN  REPUBLIC 


Prime  Minister,  connived  at  by 

the  British  Colonial  Office,  and 
actually  carried  out  by  officers  holding  commissions  in  the  British 
army,  was  an  act  of  war.  The  object  of  this  criminal  enterprise 
was  to  overthrow  the  TransvanT~Eepublic  and  to  obtain  possession 
of  the  fabulously  rich  Rand  Mines.  It  did  not  succeed,  andlhe 

magnanimity  of  the  Boers  in  sparing~l:he  lives  of  the  captured 
freebooters  who  attempted  the  seizure,  stands  out  in  signal  contrast 
to  the  action  of  the  vindictive  executioners  of  the  brave  and  gallant 
Commandants  Lotter  and  Scheepers,  who  were  captured  in  British 
territory  while  engaged  in  legitimate  warfare. 

Of  the  TJitlander  conspiracy  which  succeeded  the  Raid — 
financed  and  directed  by  the  very  capitalists  who  promoted  the 
Jameson  plot — it  is  quite  unnecessary  to  speak  at  any  length.  Its 
objects  were  obvious  to  the  Transvaal  Government  and  to  all  who 
followed  with  any  attention  the  movement  for  “ the  redress  of  the 


42 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


intolerable  grievances  ” of  the  German  J ews  and  the  cosmopolitan 
adventurers  which  was  carried  on  by  the  paid  agents  of  Messrs. 
Rhodes,  Beit,  Echstein  and  Company  in  Johannesburg.  One  com- 
ment upon  the  “ grievances  ” thus  manufactured  by  a subsidized 
press — the  honest  and  manly  view  of  an  upright  British  soldier 
who  had  been  conversant  with  the  whole  situation  in  Johannes- 
burg— will  be  enough  to  lay  bare  the  hollow  mockery,  and  the 
mercenary  and  mendacious  character,  of  the  movement  upon  the 
existence  of  which  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  Sir  Alfred  Milner 
grounded  their  pretext  for  a policy  of  war. 

Captain  March  Phillips,  in  his  book  “With  Rimington,”  (Lon- 
don, Edward  Arnold,  publisher,  1901,  pp.  105,  106)  writing,  both 
as  a Uitlander  and  an  English  officer  who  had  fought  in  the  war, 
says: 

“ As  for  the  Uitlanders  and  their  grievances,  I would  not  ride  a 
yard  or  fire  a shot  to  right  all  the  grievances  that  were  ever  invented. 
The  mass  of  Uitlanders  (i.e.  the  miners  and  working  men  of  the 
Rand)  had  no  grievances.  I know  what  I am  talking  about,  for  I 
have  lived  and  worked  among  them.  I have  seen  English  newspapers 
passed  from  one  to  another,  and  roars  of  laughter  roused  by  the 
‘ Times  ’ telegrams  about  these  precious  grievances.  We  used  to 
read  the  London  papers  to  find  out  what  our  grievances  were;  and 
very  frequently  they  would  be  due  to  causes  of  which  we  had  never 
even  heard.  I never  met  one  miner  or  working  man  who  would  have 
walked  a mile  to  pick  the  vote  up  off  the  road,  and  I have  known 
and  talked  with  scores  and  hundreds.  And  no  man  who  knows  the 
Rand  will  deny  the  truth  of  udiat  I tell  you. 

“No;  the  Uitlanders  the  world  has  heard  of  were  not  these, 
but  the  Stock  Exchange  operators,  manipiilators  of  the  money 
market,  company  floaters,  and  gamblers  generally,  a large  percentage 
of  them  Jews.  They  voiced  Johannesburg,  had  the  press  in  their 
hands,  worked  the  wires,  and  controlled  and  arranged  what  sort  of 
information  should  reach  England.  As  for  the  grievances,  they 
were  a most  useful  invention,  and  have  had  a hand  in  the  making  of 
many  fortunes.  It  was  by  these  that  a feeling  of  insecurity  was 
introduced  into  the  market  which  Avould  otherwise  have  remained 
always  steady ; it  was  by  these  that  the  necessary  and  periodic  slump 
was  brought  about.  When  the  proper  time  came,  ' grievances,’ 
such  as  Avould  arrest  England’s  attention  and  catch  the  ear  of  the 
people,  were  deliberately  invented.” 

Mr.  Chamberlain’s  demand  for  such  an  extension  of  the  franchise 
as  would  give  to  the  Uitlanders  thus  described  the  virtual  control 
of  the  Transvaal  Government,  was  in  every  way  worthy  of  the 
motives  and  morals  of  the  very  men  and  agencies  by  whom  the 
Jameson  Raid,  for  the  same  end,  had  been  organized.  It  was 


44 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


cynical  in  its  effrontery  to  the  last  degree  of  shameless  audacity. 
For,  apart  from  the  patent  hypocrisy  of  the  demand,  what  were 
the  fundamental  rights  of  the  Bepublic  which  these  oppressed 
capitalist  conspirators  wanted  to  override  ? 

The  same  Mr.  Chamberlain,  speaking  in  the  House  of  Commons 
on  the  8th  of  May,  1896,  five  months  after  the  Jameson  invasion 
of  the  Transvaal,  clearly  laid  down  the  limits  within  which  British 
intervention  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  Bepublic  were  confined 
by  the  London  Convention  of  1884.  He  said: 

“ TVe  do  not  claim,  and  never  have  claimed,  the  right  to  inter- 
fere in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  Transvaal.  The  rights  of  our 
action  under  the  Convention  are  limited  to  the  offering  of  friendly 
counsel,  in  the  rejection  of  which,  if  it  is  not  accepted,  we  must  be 
quite  wilhng  to  acquiesce.’’ 

There  is  no  ambiguity  about  this  language  of  the  Colonial  Secre- 
tary. It  was  his  belief  and  declaration  then  that  England  would 
have  as  much  right  to  insist  upon  a reform  of  the  franchise  in 
behalf  of  her  subjects  in  the  South  African  Bepublic,  as  she  would 
to  make  a demand  of  a similar  nature  upon  the  Government  of 
Holland.  Yet,  what  happened  ? 

At  the  Bloemfontein  conference  between  President  Kruger  and 
Sir  Alfred  Milner — a conference  suggested  with  sinister  aim  by 
Mr.  Chamberlain — the  British  High  Commissioner  demanded  a 
five  years’  residential  franchise  for  the  alien  population  of  the 
Transvaal.  This,  Mr.  Kruger  refused,  and  from  that  moment  it 
became  evident  that  Milner’s  policy  of  provocation  would  be  to 
insist  upon  a reform  which  he  believed  the  President  would  not 
concede,  and  the  refusal  of  which  on  his  part  could  be  represented 
as  a proof  of  Boer  antagonism  to  England’s  “ friendly  counsel  ” and 
of  a spirit  of  oppression  towards  the  suffering  Uitlanders. 

Mr.  Kruger,  however,  changed  his  attitude  when  it  became 
apparent  to  him  what  the  true  meaning  of  the  Milner  proposal 
was.  He,  therefore,  offered,  on  the  19th  of  August,  1899,  the  five 
years’  franchise  which  Milner  had  put  forward  at  Bloemfontein. 
This  proposal  was  made  as  a concession  to  his  enemies  to  prevent 
the  armed  intervention  for  which  the  English  war  press  was  already 
clamoring.  It  was  the  choice  between  two  evils,  and  was  as  great  a 
sacrifice  as  any  State  could  possibly  make,  with  any  due  regard 
to  its  own  rights  and  independence,  in  the  hope  of  averting  the 
crime  of  war.  It  was,  however,  of  no  avail  with  the  representatives 
of  that  Power  which  had  behind  it  the  South  African  record  of 
Great  Britain,  and  saw  within  its  reach  the  gold-fields  of  the  Band. 

In  addition  to  the  five  years’  franchise,  the  Boer  Executive  also 


WHO  PBOYOKED  TEE  WAR? 


45 


proposed  a reference  of  all  the  matters  in  dispute  between  the  two 
Governments  to  an  arbitral  tribunal,  which  might  be  composed, 
exclusively,  of  English,  Colonial,  or  Boer  members,  and  whose 
President  or  Umpire  should  likewise  be  English,  Colonial,  or  Boer. 

“ These  offers,”  wrote  Mr.  Conyngham  Greene,  the  British  Agent 
at  Pretoria,  “ I promised  to  recommend  to  you  (the  Colonial  Secre- 
tary) for  acceptance  by  Her  Majesty’s  Government  in  return  for 
waiving  the  proposal  of  a joint  inquir3^”  {Blue  Book,  C.  9518, 
August,  1899,  p.  1^5.) 

On  the  26th  of  August,  Mr.  Chamberlain  delivered  a violent 
speech  against  the  Transvaal  at  Highbury,  and  made  no  reference 
either  to  President  Kruger’s  concession  of  the  Milner  franchise 
proposal,  the  offer  to  submit  the  whole  question  in  dispute  to 
arbitration,  or  to  Mr.  Greene’s  recommendation  that  these  offers 
of  a peaceful  settlement  shoiild  be  accepted  by  England. 

On  the  31st  of  August  Sir  Alfred  Milner  cabled  from  Cape 
Town  that  “British  SouthAfrica  is  prepared  forextreme  measures.” 

On  the  22nd  of  September  Mr.  Chamberlain  addressed  a despatch 
to  the  Transvaal  Government  breaking  off  all  negotiations,  and 
announcing  that  the  British  Government  “ will  formulate  their 
own  proposals  for  a final  settlement.”  {Blue  Book,  C.  9521,  p.  17.) 

The  entire  press  of  England  declared  this  despatch  of  the 
Colonial  Secretary’s  to  he  the  “ultimatum”  of  Her  Majesty’s 
Government.  Preceding  the  receipt  of  this  real  ultimatum  at 
Pretoria,  State  Secretary  Eeitz  had  addressed  a communication  to 
Mr.  Conyngham  Greene,  on  the  16th  of  September,  in  which  he 
said: 

“ This  Government  wishes  to  state  that  it  learns  with  a feeling 
of  deep  regret  that  it  must  understand  that  Her  Majesty’s  Govern- 
ment withdraws  from  this  invitation  sent  in  your  letter  of  the  23rd 
of  August,  and  accepted  by  this  Government,  and  substitutes  in  its 
place  an  entirely  new  proposal.  . . . The  proposal  which  has 

now  lapsed  was  induced  by  suggestions  given  by  the  British  Agent 
to  the  Transvaal  State  Attorney,  and  these  were  accepted  by  this 
Government  in  good  faith  and  on  express  request,  as  equivalent 
to  an  assurance  that  the  proposal  would  be  acceptable  to  Her 
Majesty’s  Government.”  {Blue  Book,  C.  9521,  p.  12.) 

On  September  25  the  English  army  headquarters  in  Katal  were 
removed  from  Ladysmith  north  to  Dundee,  nearer  the  Transvaal 
border. 

On  October  3 the  British  Parliament  was  officially  summoned 
for  a special  session. 

On  October  7 the  British  Army  Eeserves  were  called  out. 


46 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


On  October  9 ]\rr.  Kruger’s  “ ultimatum  ” was  delivered ! 

In  face  of  this  record  of  undeniable  facts,  Lord  Salisbury  and  the 
apologists  of  the  crime  for  wbicli  bis  Ministry  will  be  forever 
made  responsible  in  history,  still  declare,  “ The  Boers  began  it ! ” 
One  or  two  more  facts  may  not  be  out  of  place  in  further  refu- 
tation of  this  truly  impudent  allegation. 

From  1897  until  the  9th  of  October,.  1899,  President  Kruger 
pleaded  for  a reference  of  all  matters  in  dispute  between  the 
Eepubljc  and  Great  Britain  to  arbitration.  Again  and  again  this 
proposal  was  pressed  both  by  Dr.  Leyds,  when  State  Secretary, 


THE  BOER  MEETING  AT  PAARDEKRAAL,  AT  WHICH  IT  WAS  DECIDED  TO  STAND  FIRM  AGAINST 

ENGLAND 


and  subsequently  by  Dr.  Eeitz,  in  behalf  of  the  Boer  Government. 
With  equal  persistence  ]\Ir.  Chaml^erlain  refused  to  submit  the 
English  case  to  an}'  such  tribunal.  Not  alone  did  this  refusal  obtain, 
but,  when  the  Transvaal  asked  for  admittance  to  The  Hague  Con- 
ference to  participate  in  the  labors  of  promoting  peaceful  arbitra- 
tion as  a substitute  when  possible  for  the  arbitrament  of  war, 
Great  Britain  objected,  and,  we  have  it  upon  the  recent  declara- 
tion of  M.  Bourgeois,  a prominent  French  delegate,  that  England 
gave  the  representatives  of  the  other  Powers  the  choice  between 
a British  or  a Boer  attendance  at  the  Conference. 

In  the  secret  document  found  upon  a wounded  British  officer 
at  Dundee,  which  was  shown  to  me  by  the  Transvaal  Government 
in  Pretoria,  and  from  which  I largely  quote  in  a succeeding  chapter, 
it  is  made  evident  that  war  had  been  decided  upon  by  England  as 


WTW  PBOYOKED  THE  ^YAB? 


47 


far  back  as  1897,  and  that  plans  were  being  prepared  in  that  year 
for  the  advance  of  a British  army  through  both  the  Free  State  and 
the  Transvaal.  By  June,  1899,  these  plans  were  matured;  at  least 
in  the  belief  of  Lord  Wolseley,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  British 
army,  as  the  following  evidence  will  show : 

On  the  15th  of  March,  1901,  Lord  Lansdowne,  speaking  in  the 
House  of  Lords,  made  this  candid  and  astounding  admission  : 

“ He  (Lord  Wolseley)  wished  us  to  mobilize  an  army  corps.  He 
suggested  to  us  that  we  might  occupy  Delagao  Bay.  ...  I 


would  remind  him  that  he 
pressed  these  measures  upon  me, 
as  he  says,  in  the  month  of  June 
(1899)  with  the  expression  of 
his  desire  that  the  operations 
might  begin  as  soon  as  possible. 
Why?  In  order  that  we  might 
get  the  war  over  before  the  month 
of  November,  1899.  My  lords, 
the  idea  of  forcing  the  pace  in 
such  a manner  as  to  complete 
the  subjugation  of  the  two  Ee- 
publics  by  the  month  of  Novem- 
ber, 1899,  was,  I frankly  con- 
fess, one  that  did  not  at  all  com- 
mend itself  to  Her  Majesty’s 
Government.  But  do  not  let  it 
be  supposed  that  all  this  time 
we  were  sitting  with  our  hands 
folded!  . . . We  earnestly 

desired  to  have  the  country  with 
us.  We  believe  the  country  was 
of  June  and  July,  1899.” 


Copyright  by  Ellioit  & Fry,  London 

DR.  WILLEM  JOHANNES  LEYDS 


not  ready  for  war  in  the  months 


No  ! England  was  not  ready  for  the  war  in  June,  1899,  but  Mr. 
Chamberlain  beheved  she  was  fully  prepared  for  the  conflict  when 
he  broke  off  negofiations  with  the  Transvaal  on  the  22nd  of  the 
following  September.  And  yet  the  Government  whose  War  Secre- 
tary made  the  above  statement,  and  whose  Colonial  Secretar}"  issued 
the  ultimatum  of  September,  1899,  now  want  a world  which  has 
read  both  to  believe  that  it  was  j\Ir.  Kruger’s  despatch  of  October 
9th  which  must  be  held  responsible  for  the  hostilities  that  followed! 

In  August,  1899,  the  British  Agent  in  Pretoria,  in  a conversation 
with  Attorney-General  Smuts,  said:  Her  Majesty’s  Government, 

who  had  given  pledges  to  the  IJitlanders,  would  be  bound  to  assert 
their  demands  and,  if  necessary,  to  press  them  by  force.” 

In  fact,  the  choice  presented  to  the  Transvaal  by  England’s 


48 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


representatives  was  one  between  a five  years’  franchise  and  war, 
with  the  obvious  resolve  on  the  part  of  the  Power  which  had  signed 
the  Sand  Eiver,  Aliv'al  North,  and  London  Conventions,  to  force 
a conflict  upon  the  little  Eepublic,  franchise  or  no  franchise.  This 
resolve  is  removed  from  the  category  of  all  doubt  by  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain’s own  admissions. 

On  the  19th  of  October,  1899 — eight  days  after  war  had  been 
declared — the  historic  encounter  between  the  Colonial  Secretary 
and  Sir  Edward  Clarke  occurred  in  the  House  of  Commons.  The 
(then)  member  for  Plymouth  argued  that  the  war  could  have  been, 
and  should  have  been,  avoided,  owing  to  the  extent  of  the  conces- 
sions made  to  the  British  demands  by  the  Transvaal  Executive, 
and  continued  as  follows: 

“ Sir  Edward  Clarice. — The  extraordinary  incident  that  has 
marked  the  proceedings  of  this  evening  has  been  the  statement  of 
the  Colonial  Secretary  that  the  answer  to  that  proposal  (i.e.,  the 
five  years’  franchise  proposal)  might  have  been  taken  as  an  accept- 
ance. That  was  the  phrase  he  used,  but  it  is  an  ambiguous  phrase, 
and  I should  like  to  know — Was  that  answer  intended  as  an  accept- 
ance ? ’ 

“Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain — At  that  time  we  thought  the  pro- 
posal of  the  Transvaal  extremely  promising.  We  intended  to  send 
a most  conciliatory  answer,  accepting,  as  far  as  it  was  humanly 
possible  for  us  to  do  so,  their  proposal,  and,  as  the  only  point  of 
difference  was  the  internal  intervention,  I thought  myself  it  would 
be  accepted.’ 

“ Sir  E.  Clarice — ' Then  I take  it  that  it  was  intended  to  be  an 
acceptance  of  that  proposal.  Now,  Mr.  Speaker,  if  that  were  so, 
if,  in  fact,  the  Colonial  Secretary  intended  to  accept  the  proposals 
of  the  Transvaal,  then  undoubtedly  this  amendment  is  proved  up 
to  the  hilt.’ 


“Mr.  J.  Chamberlain — ‘The  honorable  member  harps  upon  the 
word  “ acceptance.”  He  must  remember  he  asked  me  the  question 
whether  we  intended  to  accept.  I,  myself,  should  have  thought  that 
the  Boers  would  have  taken  it  as  an  acceptance,  but  I suppose  it  may 
be  properly  described  as  a qualified  acceptance.  We  did  not  accept 
everjdhing,  but  we  accepted  at  least  nine-tenths  of  the  whole.’ 

“ Sir  E.  Clarice — ‘ Eeally,  this  becomes  more  and  more  sad.  It 
is  dreadful  to  think  of  a country  of  this  kind  entering  upon  a war, 
a crime  against  civilization,  when  this  sort  of  thing  has  been  going 
on.  Why,  in  the  very  next  sentence,  the  right  honorable  gentleman 
says  : “ It  is  on  this  ground  that  her  IMaJesty’s  G-overnment  have 
been  compelled  to  regard  the  last  proposal  of  the  Government  of 
the  South  African  Eepublic  as  unacceptable  in  the  form  in  which 
it  has  been  presented.”  ’ 


WHO  PBOVOXm  THE  WAB?  49 

“Mr.  J.  Chamherlain — ‘In  the  form.’ 

“ Sir  E.  Clarice — ‘ Is  it  a matter  of  form  ? ’ 

“ Mr.  J.  Chamherlain — ‘ Yes/  ” 

— {Hansard,  pp.  307-311, 1st  Vol.,  Autumn  Session,  1899.) 

In  other  words,  a week  after  hostilities  had  begun  the  statesman 
who  had  succeeded  in  forcing  war  upon  the  Transvaal  confessed  that 
this  “ crime  against  civilization ' ’ was  resorted  to  on  account  of 
“ a matter  of  form  ” ! It  was  thus  that  England  precipitated 
a combat  which  she  had  obviously  determined  upon  from  the  very 
commencement ; despite  all  her  hollow  professions  in  favor  of  peace, 
and  dishonest  demands  for  franchise  concessions. 

This  conduct,  as  represented  by  the  language  and  threats  of  Mr. 
Chamberlain  and  Sir  Alfred  Milner  throughout  the  whole  negotia- 
tions, provoked  the  following  censure  and  judgment  from  the 
greatest  of  living  philosophers  and  thinkers.  Writing  to  Mr. 
Leonard  Courtney,  M.  P.,  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  said  : 

“ I rejoice  that  you  and  others  are  bent  on  showing  that  there 
are  some  among  us  who  think  the  national  honor  is  not  being 
enhanced  by  putting  down  the  weak.  Would  that  age  and  ill-health 
did  not  prevent  me  from  aiding. 

“ jSTo  one  can  deny  that  at  the  time  of  the  Jameson  Eaid  the  aim 
of  the  Uitlanders  and  the  raiders  was  to  usurp  the  Transvaal 
Government,  and  he  must  be  wilfully  blind  who  does  not  see  that 
what  the  Uitlanders  failed  to  do  by  bullets  they  hope  presently 
to  do  by  votes;  and  only  those  who,  while  jealous  of  their  own 
independence,  regard  but  little  the  independence  of  people  who 
stand  in  their  way,  can  fail  to  sympathize  with  the  Boers  in  their 
resistance  to  political  extinction. 

“ It  is  sad  to  see  our  Government  backing  those  whose  avowed 
policy  is  expansion,  which,  less  politely  expressed,  means  aggression, 
for  which  there  is  still  a less  polite  word  readily  guessed.  On  behalf 
of  these  the  big  British  Empire,  weapon  in  hand,  growls  out  to  the 
little  Boer  Eepublic,  ‘ Do  as  I bid  you  ! ’ 

“ I have  always  thought  that  nobleness  is  shown  in  treating 
tenderly  those  who  are  relatively  feeble,  and  even  sacrificing  on 
their  behalf  something  to  Avhich  there  is  a just  claim.  But  if 
current  opinion  is  right  I must  have  been  wrong. — Yours  truly, 

“Herbert  Spekcer.” 


4 


Chapter  IV 


THE  BOER  AT  BAY 

The  Kbtjger  “ xjltimatum  ” — The  loyalty  of  the  Orange  Free  State — 
Its  chivalrous  resolve  to  stand  by  the  Transvaal  Republic — 
The  British  declaration  of  war. 

IMMEDIATELY  following  the  Privy  Council  meeting  on  the 
6th  of  October,  a Eoyal  Proclamation  was  issued  in  London 
authorizing  the  calling  out  of  the  First  Class  Army  Eeserves.  A 
similar  order  was  published  for  the  mobilization  of  a full  field 
force  for  South  Africa.  The  “ terms  of  settlement  ” which  the 
Colonial  Secretary  declared  would  be  submitted  by  his  Government 
in  due  course  were  plainly  indicated  to  the  Transvaal  by  the  nature 
and  purpose  of  these  Eoyal  Proclamations.  These  were  England’s 
virtual  declaration  of  war  against  the  independence  of  the  South 
African  Eepublic. 

This  open  abandonment  of  peaceful  measures,  by  a Power  which 
had  so  often  previously  violated  its  pledges  and  torn  up  Conventions, 
left  no  alternative  to  the  menaced  Eepublic  but  a resolve  to  meet 
force  by  force.  President  Steyn,  in  his  despatch  to  Sir  Alfred 
Milner  on  the  5th  of  October,  indicated  plainly  what  the  two  Ee- 
publics  required  from  the  British  Government  as  a proof  of  the 
sincerity  of  its  professed  desire  for  a peaceful  ending  of  the  crisis; 
a desire  which  the  High  Commissioner  took  the  trouble  to  reiterate 
on  the  very  eve  of  the  mobilization  of  a full  field  force  for  South 
Africa,  and  of  the  calling  out  of  the  Eeserves. 

The  President  of  the  Orange  Free  State  wrote: 

‘‘  I consider  it  would  not  be  practicable  to  induce  the  Government 
of  the  South  African  Eepublic  to  make  or  entertain  (further) 
proposals  or  suggestions  unless  not  only  the  troops  menacing  their 
State  are  withdrawn  further  from  their  borders,  but  that  an  assur- 
ance be  given  by  her  Majesty’s  Government  that  all  further  despatch 
and  increase  of  troops  w'ill  at  once  and  during  the  negotiations 
be  stopped,  and  that  those  now  on  the  water  should  either  not  be 
landed  or,  at  least,  should  remain  as  far  removed  as  can  be  from 
the  scene  of  possible  hostilities.  . . . If  so,  I would  be  pre- 

pared to  take  steps  at  once  to  try  and  obtain  any  needful  assurance 


THE  BOER  AT  BAY 


51 


to  safeguard  against  any  act  of  invasion  or  hostility  any  portion  of 
her  Majesty’s  colonies  or  territories,  pending  the  negotiations.” 

This  offer  was  not  accepted. 

On  Monday,  the  9th  of  October,  the  Transvaal  Government  put 
President  Steyn’s  reply  to  Sir  Alfred  Milner  in  the  form  of  a 
final  despatch  to  the  Ministers  of  the  Queen  of  England.  The 
document  was  handed  to  Mr.  Conyngham  Greene  on  the  afternoon 
of  that  day,  and  an  irrevocable  step  was  thus  taken  in  the  fate  of 
the  Eepublic. 

The  civilized  world  almost 
held  its  breath  on  reading  the 
terms  of  Mr.  Elruger’s  com- 
munication. “ This  Govern- 
ment,” wrote  State  Secretary 
Eeitz,  “ feels  bound  to  insist 
on  the  British  Government  im- 
mediately ending  the  tension, 
and  giving  an  assurance: 

“ 1.  That  all  debatable 
points  shall  be  settled  by  ar- 
bitration, or  in  a peaceful 
manner  agreed  upon; 

“ 2.  That  the  troops  on  the 
border  shall  be  withdrawn  im- 
mediately. 

“ 3.  That  all  reenforce- 
ments since  the  1st  of  June 
shall  be  removed  to  the  coast, 
and  thence  removed  in  a rea- 
sonable time  to  be  agreed  upon,  and  mutual  undertakings  given 
against  warlike  acts  during  negotiations  ; and 

“ 4.  That  troops  on  sea  shall  not  be  landed. 

“ The  Eepublic’s  Government  insist  on  an  immediate  affirmative 
reply  before  Wednesday,  11th  October,  at  five  o’clock  in  the  evening. 

“ If  no  reply  arrives  the  Eepublic  will  consider  it  as  a formal 
declaration  of  war,  and  act. 

“ In  the  meantime  if  troops  are  moved  nearer  the  border  this 
also  will  be  considered  a formal  declaration  of  war.” 

Many  external  friends  of  the  Boer  cause  deeply  regretted  the 
wording  of  this  despatch.  They  looked  upon  it  as  playing  into  the 
hands  of  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  of  the  English  war  party.  Doubt- 
less it  did.  So  would  a continuation  of  useless  proposals  and  nego- 
tiations, only  more  so.  The  due  formulation  of  Mr.  Chamberlain’s 


52 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


terms  of  settlement  would  have  meant  such  a convenient  delay  as 
would  have  enabled  England  to  place  50,000  more  troops  in  trans- 
ports for  South  Africa,  with  which  to  enforce  the  Colonial  Secre- 
tary’s purpose.  President  Kruger  acted  boldly,  and  thereby  acted 
wisely,  remembering  the  perfidious  foe  with  whom  he  had  to  deal. 
It  was  a question  with  him,  wdiether  he  should  draw  England’s  fire 
before  she  had  quadrupled  her  soldiers  in  South  Africa,  or  wait 
until  the  borders  of  the  Free  State  and  Transvaal  were  occupied 
by  forces  powerful  enough  to  back  up  an  imperative  demand  for 

impossible  concessions  with  an 
overwhelming  army  of  invasion. 
He  acted  wdth  judgment  and 
with  rare  courage  in  resolving 
to  face  the  ordeal  of  actual  con- 
flict sooner  than  later,  knowing 
as  he  did  hostilities  were  inevi- 
table, and  that  England  would 
only  hold  her  hand  until  she  had 
force  enough  in  the  field  with 
which  to  strike  for  the  prize  and 
the  revenge  for  which  she  hun- 
gered. 

Sir  Alfred  Milner  made  a de- 
mand upon  President  Steyn  for 
a declaration  of  the  attitude  of 
the  Free  State  in  view  of  the 
terms  contained  in  the  Trans- 
vaal despatch,  and  the  following 
dignified  and  courageous  reply 
was  forwarded  to  Cape  Town  from  Bloemfontein,  on  the  11th  of 
()ctober : 

“ I have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  Excellency’s 
telegram  of  this  evening.  The  high-handed  and  unjustifiable  policy 
and  conduct  of  her  Majesty’s  Government  in  interfering  with  and 
dictating  in  the  purely  internal  affairs  of  the  South  African  Ee- 
public,  constituting  a flagrant  Imeach  of  the  Convention  of  London, 
accompanied  at  first  by  preparations  for,  and  latterly  followed  by, 
the  active  commencement  of  hostilities  against  that  Eepublic,  which 
no  friendly  and  well-intentioned  efforts  on  our  side  could  induce 
her  Majesty’s  Government  to  abandon,  constitutes  such  an  undoubted 
and  unjust  attack  on  the  independence  of  the  S.  A.  Eepublic  that 
no  other  course  is  left  to  this  State  than  honorably  to  abide  by  its 
Conventional  engagement  entered  into  with  that  Eepublic.  On 
behalf  of  this  Government,  therefore,  I beg  to  notify  that,  compelled 


THE  BOER  AT  BAY 


53 


thereto  by  the  action  of  her  Majesty’s  Government,  they  intend  to 
carry  out  the  instructions  of  the  Volksraad  as  set  forth  in  the  last 
part  of  the  resolution  referred  to  by  your  Excellency.” 

The  action  of  the  Free  State  in  resolving  to  throw  in  its  lot  with 
the  desperate  fortunes  of  the  Transvaal  has  been  variously  criticised. 
President  Steyn  has  been  blamed  by  one  trend  of  opinion,  and 
lauded  by  another.  It  has  been  urged,  in  condemnation  of  the 
course  which  he  took,  that  his  action  was  one  of  supreme  folly  in 
inviting  the  certain  destruction  of  his  country’s  independence  by 
voluntarily  taking  the  field  against  the  forces  of  the  British  Empire. 
This,  however,  is  the  comment  of  a soulless  selfishness,  regardless 
of  national  honor.  It  is  also  a view  that  has  been  urged  by  jour- 
nals and  men  on  the  British  side  who  have  laiaded  to  the  skies  the 
egregious  and  gratuitous  jingoism  of  Canada  and  the  Australias 
in  offering,  on  account  of  racial  ties,  to  fight  for  England  against 
so  small  a foe.  Blood  is  only  “ thicker  than  water  ” when  it  flows 
from  an  Anglo-Saxon  source.  President  Steyn  and  his  burghers 
were  neither  deaf  to  the  appeal  of  racial  kinships  nor  blind  to 
the  motives  which  animated  and  the  purposes  which  inspired  the 
authors  of  the  war.  They  nobly  responded  to  the  stern  duties  con- 
tracted in  the  Treaty  of  1897,  and  in  doing  so  exhibited  to  a grossly 
selfish  age  and  to  the  capitalist-ridden  governments  of  Europe  an 
example  of  exalted  statesmanship  and  of  chivalrous  self-sacrifice 
in  the  cause  of  liberty  which  will  earn  for  them  to  all  time  the 
grateful  admiration  of  every  mind  that  can  differentiate  between 
the  brigand  aims  of  modern  Imperialism  and  the  nobler  spirit  and 
mission  of  Nationality. 

Altho  no  member  of  the  Transvaal  Executive  had  any  doubt 
as  to  the  reply  which  the  British  Government  would  return  to  the 
message  of  the  9th,  it  was  with  a feeling  of  suppressed  excitement 
that  President  Kruger,  Mr.  Eeitz,  and  Mr.  A.  D.  Wolmarans  heard 
the  door-keeper  of  the  Executive  Chamber  announce  Mr.  Conyng- 
ham  Greene  ” early  on  the  afternoon  of  the  11th  of  October.  The 
British  Agent  shook  hands  with  the  Executive  members,  and  handed 
his  fateful  message  to  the  State  Secretary.  The  document  read  as 
follows  ; 


“ H.  M.’s  Agency, 

“ Pretoria,  October  11th,  1899. 

“ Sir — I am  instructed  by  the  High  Commissioner  to  state  to 
you  that  her  Majesty’s  Government  have  received  with  great  regret 
the  peremptory  demands  of  the  Government  of  the  South  African 
Eepublic  conveyed  to  me  in  your  note  of  the  9th  instant,  and  I 
am  to  inform  you  in  reply  that  the  conditions  demanded  by  the 


54 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Government  of  the  South  African  Eepublic  are  such  as  her  Majesty’s 
Government  deem  it  impossible  to  discuss. — I have  the  honor  to 
be,  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 

W.  CoNYNGHAM  Greene,  C.B.” 


PRESIDENT  STEYN  AT  BLOEMFONTEIN 


There  was  a moment’s  deep  silence  in  the  room,  after  which  the 
courteous  medium  of  England’s  haughty  message  was  told  in 
respectful  terms  that  the  note  just  delivered  would  be  considered 
as  a declaration  of  war.  Mr.  Greene  bowed  his  head,  and  with- 


THE  BOER  AT  BAY 


55 


drew,  after  having  requested  that  his  passport  should  he  prepared 
without  delay.  After  England’s  representative  had  left  the  Council 
Chamber,  the  aged  President  inclined  his  head  for  a few  moments 
in  silent  prayer,  and  then  attached  his  signature  to  the  document 
which  was  to  give  Mr.  Greene  safe  passage  through  the  territory 
of  the  Transvaal  Eepublic. 

Within  an  hour  after  this  memorable  interview  and  scene,  a word 
was  flashed  over  the  wires  of  the  two  Kepublics  from  Pretoria — a 
single  word — to  every  Landrost  in  every  district,  and  to  each  officer 
in  command  of  burghers  along  the  Natal  and  the  Western  border- 
lands. The  word  was  “War,”  and  from  that  time  forth  the  Boers 
of  the  two  little  nations  loaded  their  Mausers,  and  stood  at  bay. 

At  six  o’clock  the  same  evening  the  President  of  the  Free  State 
caused  a “ Gazette  Extraordinary  ” to  be  issued,  in  which  an  impas- 
sioned appeal  to  the  sister  Eepublic  was  published,  calling  upon  its 
burghers  to  stand  by  their  brethren  across  the  Vaal  in  their  hour 
of  danger  against  “ the  oppressor  and  violator  of  justice.”  President 
Steyn  further  said  ; 

“ In  carrying  on  this  struggle  let  no  single  action  of  yours  he 
otherwise  than  such  as  becomes  a Christian  and  a burgher  of  the 
Free  State.  Let  us  look  forward  with  confidence  to  a successful 
issue  to  that  struggle,  trusting  in  a Higher  Power,  without  whose 
support  no  human  weapons  avail  anything.  To  the  God  of  our 
forefathers  we  humbly  submit  the  justice  of  our  cause.  May  He 
protect  the  right,  may  He  bless  our  arms.  Under  His  banner  do 
we  draw  the  sword  for  freedom  and  for  Fatherland.” 

On  learning  of  the  nature  of  England’s  reply  to  the  last  demand 
for  arbitration.  President  Steyn  telegraphed  to  Pretoria,  “ We  are 
ready ! ” 


Chapter  V 


TRANSVAAL  PREPARATIONS 


The  Salisbury  Government’s  suppression  of  the  truth — Their 
“ ignorance  ” OF  Boer  armaments — A War  Office  secret  document 

EXPOSES  THE  FALSITY  OF  MINISTERIAL  ASSERTIONS ThE  EXTENT  AND 

character  of  Boer  armaments — When  and  where  rifles,  guns,  and 
ammunition  ^vere  purchased — The  strength  of  Boer  field  forces 
KNOWN  TO  THE  ENGLISH  WaR  OFFICE  IN  JUNE,  1899. 

HE  actual  strength  of  the  Federal  fighting  forces,  and  the  ex- 


I tent  and  character  of  their  military  equipment,  were  subjects 
of  keen  public  interest  after  war  had  been  declared.  President 
Kruger’s  preparations  were  an  unknown  quantity  outside  of  the 
knowledge  of  the  Transvaal  Executive — except  to  the  British  War 
Office.  The  English  press  resorted  freely  to  conjecture,  and  placed 
the  number  of  burghers,  guns,  and  Mausers  at  General  Joubert’s 
disposal,  at  the  particular  figure  which  the  argument  of  the  occasion 
required.  When  the  conviction  was  widespread  in  England  that 
General  Buller  would  march  to  Pretoria  after  a two  months’  cam- 
paign, the  opposing  Boer  force  was  deemed  to  be  anything  between 
15,000  and  30,000  men.  After  the  defeats  inflicted  on  the  English 
armies  at  Dundee,  Modderspruit,  Magersfontein,  and  Colenso,  the 
English  estimate  of  the  Boer  armies  ranged  from  50,000  to  120,000 
burghers,  with  5,000  foreigners.  The  Boers  were  also  found  after 
the  first  engagement  to  be  in  possession  of  an  artillery  which  out- 
classed that  of  their  foes,  and  it  was  confidently  asserted  that  these 
guns  had  been  worked  by  trained  artillerists  from  Germany,  France, 
and  Holland,  numbering  at  least  300  skilled  gunners. 

The  plea  put  forward  by  the  English  press  in  explanation  of 
these  defeats  was  the  double  one  of  want  of  due  preparation  for 
such  a conflict  on  the  part  of  the  English  War  Office,  and  the 
surprising  extent  and  character  of  the  Federal  equipment  in  both 
men,  guns,  and  ammunition.  This  plea  was  universally  accepted 
in  England,  and,  to  a great  extent,  abroad,  as  an  explanation  of 
the  humiliating  reverses  suffered  by  England’s  best  generals  and 
troops  during  the  first  few  weeks  of  the  war.  This  explanation  did 
not  stop  at  that  point.  The  Boer  preparations  were  made  to  es- 


TRANSVAAL  PREPARATIONS 


57 


teblish  something  more  than  a reason  why  Yule,  White,  Methuen, 
Buller,  and  Gatacre  had  been  beaten  back  in  British  territory  by 
the  Federal  generals.  It  was  declared  to  be  a proof  that  there  had 
been  “ a Dutch  conspiracy  ” to  oust  the  British  from  South  Africa, 
and  that  in  pursuance  of  this  purpose  Transvaal  arming  must  have 
been  carried  on  for  years  anterior  to  the  Jameson  Eaid.  All  this 
was  a comforting  discovery  for  the  J ingo  authors  of  the  war.  Did 
we  not  tell  you  so?”  was  the  cry  of  both  capitalist  and  Jingo  organs, 
and  the  hesitating  qualms  of  conscience  which  had  feebly  protested 
in  some  English  minds  against  the  war  as  unuecessary,  or  as  being 
promoted  by  the  Ehodes- Johannesburg  combination,  gave  way  be- 
fore this  conclusive  demonstration  of  Dutch  deception. 

The  Government  of  Lord  Salisbury,  both  in  and  out  of  Parlia- 
ment, connived  at  the  creation  of  this  conviction  in  the  popular 
mind.  It  was  important  also  to  encourage  this  impression  with 
reference  to  the  state  of  foreign  opinion  on  the  war  and  its  causes. 
This  opinion  had  been  almost  uniformly  hostile  to  the  action  of 
England  in  forcing  so  unequal  a combat  with  so  over-matched  an 
opponent.  But,  if  it  could  be  shown  that  the  Boers  had  been  arm- 
ing for  ten  or  a dozen  years;  that  they  had  succeeded  in  placing 
double  the  number  of  men  in  the  field  which  England  had  counted 
upon  as  likely  to  oppose  her,  and  that  their  real  aim  and  purpose 
were  to  contest  with  Great  Britain  the  supremacy  of  rule  in  South 
Africa,  England’s  action  would  not  look  so  selfish  or  unfair,  and  a. 
more  modified  view  of  her  policy  and  motives  might  obtain.  ISTot 
a word,  therefore,  was  given  to  the  public  of  the  reliable  information 
which  was  in  possession  of  Lords  Salisbury,  Lansdowne,  and  Wolse- 
ley,  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  Mr.  Balfour,  and  of  the  less  prominent 
members  of  the  Ministry,  about  the  actual  Boer  armaments  and 
forces,  and  the  date  when  President  Kruger  commenced  to  place 
the  Eepublic  in  a state  of  defense.  On  the  contrary,  each  of  the 
j\Iinisters  responsible  for  the  war  declared,  in  so  many  words,  that 
England  was  taken  completely  by  surprise,  and  that  the  Boers 
had  evidently  begun  their  work  of  aggressive  armament  long  before 
the  time  of  the  J ameson  Eaid. 

Speaking  in  the  House  of  Lords  on  the  30th  of  January,  1900,  in 
reply  to  Lord  Kimberley,  the  Prime  Minister  used  these  words  : 

“ The  noble  earl  says  that  we  must  have  known  about  the  artillery 
and  munitions  of  war  that  the  Eepublics  were  introducing.  I ask, 
how  on  earth  were  we  to  know  it  ? I believe,  as  a matter  of  fact — 
though  I do  not  give  this  as  official — that  the  guns  were  generally 
introduced  in  boilers  and  locomotives,  and  the  munitions  of  war 
were  introduced  in  pianos.  It  was  not  our  territory,  we  had  no 
powers  of  search,  we  had  no  power  of  knowing  what  munitions  of 


58 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


war  were  sent  in,  and  we  certainly  had  no  power  of  supervising 
their  importation  into  the  Eepuhlics.” 

This  language  and  attitude  were  thoroughly  in  keeping  with  the 
whole  policy  of  unscrupulous  purpose  and  deception  which  brought 
on  the  war.  It  was  a glaring  suppression  of  the  truth,  as  the  follow- 
ing facts  will  show. 

A few  days  after  war  began  a document  was  found  upon  a British 
officer  at  Dundee  which  gave  this  whole  English  contention  away, 
in  all  its  suggestions  and  details.  This  document  was  in  the  form 
of  a small  book,  and  contained  about  120  pages  of  matter.  The  front 
page  reads  as  follows  : 


This  paper  is  transmitted  by  direction 
of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  for 

“ Secret.  the  personal  information  of 

while  holding  the  appointment  of 

and  is  to  be  considered  secret. 

‘^MILITARY  NOTES 

ON  THE 

DUTCH  REPUBLICS  OF  SOUTH  AFRICA, 
COMPILED  IN  SECTION  B.  INTELLIGENCE  DIVISION, 

WAR  OFFICE. 

REVISED  JUNE,  1899.” 

The  preface  to  the  book  reads  : 

“ Preface. 

“ These  notes  have  been  carefully  compiled  from  many  sources, 
and  are  intended  to  supplement  the  following  recent  Intelligence 
Division  publications  : 

“ Reconnaissance  Reports  over  the  Vaal  and  Orange  Rivers. 

“ Reconnaissance  Reports  on  the  Lines  of  Advance  through  the 
Orange  Free  State.  Parts  I.,  II.,  and  III. 

“Report  on  Natal  Government  Railways,  and  of  the  defense  of 
them,  etc.,  by  Captain  Gale,  R.E. 

“ Report  on  the  Communications  in  Natal,  north  of  the  latitude 
of  Ladysmith. 

“ South  African  Republic : Road  and  Railway  Reports. 

“ Swaziland.  Precis  of  information  on,  1898. 

“ Basutoland.  Precis  of  information,  revised  to  February,  1898. 

“ Notes  on  the  Line  of  Communications,  Cape  Colony. 

“ J.  C.  Aedagh,  Major-General.” 


TBANSVAAL  PREPARATIONS 


59 


At  page  15  we  read  : 

“ The  actual  nuniber  of  rifles  known  to  be  now  in  possession  of 
the  Transvaal  are  as  follows  : 


“ Kifles. 


“ Martini-Henry . 34,000 

Lee-Metford 2,850 

Mauser 24,000 

Guedes 2,000 

Krag- Jorgensen 100 


62,950 

“ They  have  also  acquired  2,000  Martini-Henry  Carabines  and 
6,000  M^eble}"  Eevolvers. 

“ The  actual  number  of  rifles  in  the  Eepublic  are  more  than 
double  the  number  of  burghers,  but  the  surplus  is  intended  to  arm 
the  disloyalists  from  Cape  Colony  and  Natal.” 

On  page  27  Lord  Lansdowne  settles  the  point  about  the  date  of 
the  Boer  armaments,  and  supplies  a few  items  of  other  information 
of  a startling  kind,  in  addition  : 

“ Of  the  enormous  quantity  of  rifles  now  in  possession  of  the 
South  African  Eepublic,  only  some  13,500  Martini-Henry  rifles 
were  in  the  country  before  the  Jameson  Eaid.  The  whole  of  the 
remainder  have  been  purchased  since  that  date  in  England,  France, 
Germany,  and  Belgium.  This  enormous  stock  of  rifles  would  suffice 
to  arm  more  than  double  the  number  of  the  whole  forces  of  the 
Transvaal.” 

And  on  page  28,  in  the  same  connection,  is  found  this  supplemen- 
tary and  astounding  bit  of  intelligence  : 

“ From  the  record  of  shipments  made  in  the  United  Kingdom 
it  is  known  that  the  supply  of  ammunition  in  possession  of  the 
Eepublic  is  sufficient  for  a protracted  campaign.” 

Here,  then,  we  have  the  English  War  Office  itself  establishing 
the  following  facts  against  the  public  and  political  statements  of 
the  Jingo  Ministers  of  the  Government  and  the  British  press  : 

1.  That  the  Boers  had  only  a few  thousand  Martini-Henry  rifles 
before  the  Jameson  Eaid. 

2.  That  they  had  no  Mauser  rifles. 

3.  That  the  rifles  subsequently  purchased  were  bought  in  Eng- 
land as  well  as  on  the  Continent,  and 

4.  That  it  was  from  the  United  Kingdom  that  President  Kruger 


60 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


obtained  “ the  supply  of  ammunition  sufficient  for  a protracted 
campaign  ” ! 

The  extent  to  which  this  policy  of  deliberate  deception  was  carried 
by  English  statesmen  will  be  more  fully  seen  in  further  extracts 
from  Lord  Lansdowne’s  circular. 

On  pages  19  and  20  the  following  particulars  are  given  : 

“ Permanent  Forces  of  Transvaal.  Corps  of  Staats 

Artillery. 

“ In  January,  1896,  the  strength  of  the  Staats  Artillery  was 
9 officers  and  100  men,  tho  only  70  men  were  actually  doing  duty. 
Immediately  after  the  Jameson  Paid  the  corps  Avas  increased  in 
strength  to  about  400,  and  in  January  last  was  stated  by  the 
Commandant-General  to  have  an  actual  strength  of  473  officers  and 
men.  This  is  exclusive  of  the  reserve,  which  in  the  time  of  the 
Paid  amounted  only  to  50  men,  but  may  now  be  estimated  at  200 
or  300  at  least. 

“ The  men  are  all  burghers  of  the  State,  altho  among  them 
individuals  of  foreign  origin  are  to  be  found,  and  even  some  Eng- 
lishmen. 

“ Staff. 

“ The  Staats  Almanac  for  1899  gives  the  following  list  of  officers : 

Lieutenant-Commandant  Trichardt. 

Major  P.  E.  Erasmus. 

1st  Lieut.  Adjutant  Th.  Kroon. 

2nd  Lieut.  Adjt.  W.  Baaij. 

Bandmaster  2nd  Lieut.  J.  Maggs. 

Quartermaster  2nd  Lieut.  E.  B.  E.  Hoffman. 

“ Artillery. 

“ Major  J.  F.  Wolmarans. 

Captain  P.  J.  Van  der  Merwe. 

1st  Lieut.  J.  L.  Pretorius. 

Lieutenant  M.  J.  de  Jager. 

“ M.  du  Toit. 

“ F.  Townsend. 

“ Oelofse.” 

We  see  it  here  explicitly  declared,  as  known  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment, that  the  Transvaal  Artillery  was  an  active  force  of  70  men 
in  January,  1896,  with  9 officers  and  100  men,  nominally  available  ! 
What  a proof  this  affords  of  “ the  great  Dutch  conspiracy  ” prior  to 
the  Jameson  Paid  ! 

Dealing  with  the  Free  State  Artillery,  the  “ Notes  ” on  page  36 
give  the  following  facts  : 


TRANSVAAL  PREPARATIONS 


61 


“ Chapter  4. 

Military  Forces,  Armaments,  and  Forts  of  the 
Free  State. 

“ In  peace  no  head-quarter  staff  exists ; on  the  outbreak  of  war 
a Commandant-General  is  elected  by  the  District  Commandants 
and  Field  Cornets,  and  receives  his  instructions  from  the  President 
of  the  State.  The  District  Commandants  and  Field  Cornets  have, 
however,  the  curious  right  during  the  campaign  of  discharging  the 
Commandant-General,  and  reporting  their  reasons  to  the  President, 
who,  if  he  considers  such  reasons  sufficient,  will  then  appoint  a day 
for  the  election  of  a successor.  There  is  no  ‘ war  department  ’ at 
Bloemfontein,  as  has  been  established  during  the  last  few  years  at 
Pretoria ; but  the  V olksraad  appoints  annually  a Committee  of  five 
or  more  of  its  members,  who,  in  conjunction  with  the  President, 
inquire  into  the  state  of  war  material  (Law  29  of  1896). 

“ St^va-TS  Artillery. 

“ This  corps  is  commanded  by  Major  Albrecht,  a German,  and 
has  two  German  officers.  Its  establishment  comprises  114  of  all 
ranks,  and  there  is  stated  to  be  a reserve  of  300  men.  Of  these  40 
were  mobilized  by  vote  of  the  Raad,  dated  23rd  of  June,  1899.  The 
corps  is  recruited  from  the  burgher  class.  Two  non-commissioned 
officers  have  recently  been  instructed  at  Pretoria  in  field  telegraphy. 

“ Armament. 

“ The  following  is  a list  of  guns  in  charge  of  the  Staats  Artillery : 

“ 3 — 3 p.r.  M.  L.  Whitworths. 

14 — 7.5  c.m.  B.  L.  (Krupps),  with  eight  ammunition  wagons. 

1 — 6 p.r.  Whitworth. 

1 — 3 c.m.  Krupp. 

1 — 3 p.r.  Mountain  Gun. 

5 — ^9  p.r.  Armstrongs. 

3 — Eifle  Maxims. 

“ By  vote  dated  23rd  June,  1899,  the  Eaad  granted  money  for 
three  Q.F.  guns  and  three  more  Maxims.  Funds  were  also  voted 
for  the  purchase  of  improved  field  telegraphic  equipment,  300  tents, 
provision  wagons,  and  a large  quantity  of  ammunition.” 

As  showing  the  thoroughness  of  the  information  possessed  by 
the  English  War  Office  of  all  the  possible  fighting  forces  of  the 
Transvaal  and  Free  State,  I will  quote  the  Notes”  on  the  Police 
Force  of  the  South  African  Republic.  These  men  (excepting  the 
colored  members),  known  in  the  war  as  “ The  Zarps,”  have  fought 
with  conspicuous  bravery  throughout  the  campaign,  and  the  English 
officers  who  were  sent  to  the  Transvaal  to  obtain  knowledge  for 


62 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


the  War  OfBce  took  note  of  this  splendid  body  of  burghers,  as 
follows  : 

“ Transvaal  Police  Force. 

“ The  total  strength  of  this  force  on  the  31st  December,  1897,  was 
1,356,  comprising  5 commandants,  14  lieutenants,  1 head-constable, 
91  under  officers,  448  mounted  police,  636  white  foot-police,  and 
164  native  police.  A further  increase  of  200  men  for  Johannes- 
burg was  sanctioned  in  May,  1899,  and  the  men  recruited.  The 
mounted  police  are  composed  of  much  the  same  class  as  the  Cape 
Mounted  Police,  but  are  not  so  efficient.  The  white  foot-police  are 
drilled  as  soldiers. 

“ The  above  does  not  include  the  Swaziland  police,  the  strength 
of  which  is  given  in  the  Staats  Almanac  as  3 officers  and  117 
mounted  police  and  50  natives,  but  it  is  believed  that  the  mounted 
police  of  Swaziland  has  since  been  increased  to  400.  The  Swazi 
police  are  commanded  by  Lieut.  C.  Botha.  This  increase,  however, 
is  no  increase  in  the  total  forces  of  the  Eepublic,  as  it  must  be 
deducted  from  the  burghers’  strength.” 

We  now  come  to  the  number  of  burghers  who  were  available  for 
the  Boer  armies.  English  Jingo  papers  have  given  various  estimates 
of  the  forces  which  defeated  Penn  Symons,  Yule,  White,  Buller, 
Warren,  Methuen,  and  other  British  generals  from  the  battle  of 
Dundee  to  the  surrender  of  Cronje.  Some  of  these  figures  went 
as  high  as  100,000.  Other,  more  modest,  calculations  put  down  the 
Boers  in  the  field  at  from  50,000  to  70,000,  not  counting  Colonial 
and  foreign  volunteers.  The  lowest  English  press  calculation 
would  not  admit  that  these  victories  could  have  been  gained  over 
British  troops  with  less  than  an  army  of  50,000  burghers  for 
Botha,  Cronje,  De  Wet,  and  De  la  Eey  to  draw  upon  for  their 
commandoes. 

Here  are  the  figures  which  were  in  the  possession  of  the  English 
War  Office  in  June,  1899  : 

“ Number  of  burghers  liable  to  military  service  in  the  Transvaal  : 
From  18  to  34  years  of  age,  15,696;  from  34  to  50  years,  9,050; 
under  18  and  above  50,  4,533.  Grand  total,  29,279.” 

At  page  27  these  figures  are  dealt  with  in  the  following  observa- 
tions : 

“ From  the  foregoing  data  it  would  appear  that  the  total  number 


of  persons  liable  to  militarj^  service  in  the  Transvaal  is  as  follows  : 
“ Staats  Artillery  (including  Eeservists)  . . . 800 

Police  (including  recent  increase)  ....  1,550 

Burghers  (exclusive  of  Staats  Artillery  Ee- 
servists)   28,979 

Grand  total 31,329 


TBANSVAAL  PBEPAEATIONS 


63 


“Burgher  Force^  Orange  Free  State. 

“As  in  the  case  of  the  Transvaal,  this  force  is  the  backbone  of 
the  military  strength  of  the  Free  State,  and  is  organized  on  similar 
tho  not  quite  indentical  lines. 

“ Every  burgher  is  liable  by  law  to  military  service  between  the 
ages  of  16  and  60.  The  system  of  organization  is  territorial.  Each 
ward  elects  its  Field  Cornet  from  amongst  its  own  burghers,  and 
each  district  its  own  Commandant. 

“ No  figures  as  to  the  number  of  burghers  liable  to  military 
service  are  published  officially,  but  Von  Lobell,  in  his  annual  reports 
on  military  changes,  1897,  stated  that  the  number  was  20,000.  As 
the  Commandant  of  the  Staats  Artillery  is  a German,  it  is  not  im- 
probable that  Yon  Lobell  derived  his  information  from  official 
sources.  Moreover,  this  estimate  agrees  fairly  well  with  the  follow- 
ing calculation,  based  on  actuarial  formula,  that  the  males  between 
the  ages  of  16  and  60  are  equivalent  to  55  per  cent,  of  the  total 
male  population.” 

The  male  population  is  then  given,  in  tabulated  form,  for  each 
district. 

The  circular  proceeds  : 

“ Taking  all  these  matters  into  review,  the  following  deductions 


may  reasonably  be  made  : 

“ Sick,  caretakers  of  arms,  etc.,  10  per  cent. 

of  whole 2,930 

Police  duties 1,200 

Johannesburg  garrison  (exclusive  of  artil- 
lery)   5,000 

Pretoria  (exclusive  of  artillery) 500 

Force  watching  Ehodesia  and  holding  in  check 
natives  in  Zoutpansberg  district  ....  2,500 

Force  in  Swaziland  border 1,000 

Force  watching  Mafeking 500 

Force  watching  Fourteen  Streams  ....  100 

“ Total  deduction  from  Transvaal  forces  . 13,730 


leaving  an  effective  field  force  of,  say,  16,000  burghers,  including 
the  Eeservists  of  the  Staats  Artillery.  The  artillery  portion  of  the 
force  would  comprise  five  field  batteries,  and  possibly  a smaller 
howitzer  battery. 

“ Similarly,  deductions  must  be  made  from  the  strength  of  the 


Free  State  : 

“ Sick,  caretakers  of  farms,  etc 2,000 

Force  watching  Basutoland 3,000 

Force  watching  Kimberley 1,000 

Garrison  of  Bloemfontein 500 


“ Total  deduction  from  Free  State  forces  . 6,500 


64 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


leaving  a force  to  take  the  field  from  the  Free  State  of  about  13,500 
burghers,  with  two  batteries  of  field  artillery. 

“ The  grand  total  of  the  Dutch  Eepublics’  field  force  may  be 
estimated,  therefore,  as  follows  : 


“Transvaal  16,000 

Free  State 13,500 

Disloyal  Colonists 4,000 


“Total 33,500 


with  seven  batteries  of  field  artillery,  one  howitzer  battery,  and 
20  to  30  Maxim  guns.” 

These  estimates  are  too  high  in  each  particular.  The  deductions 
given  in  the  number  of  available  burghers  of  the  Transvaal  do  not 
allow  for  backsliders,  people  in  business,  sons  of  widows  exempt 
from  service,  men  employed  in  mines  by  Government,  clergymen, 
wealthy  burghers  who  went  away  before  war  was  declared.  Govern- 
ment officials,  railway  servants,  and  a percentage  of  burghers  hold- 
ing pro-British  sentiments  who  would  not  on  that  account  be  forced 
to  go  to  the  front. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  number  of  burghers  allotted  to  the 
Johannesburg  garrison  would  be  4,000  in  excess  of  the  needs  of 
that  post  after  war  was  commenced.  The  estimate  was  an  error 
in  exaggerating  the  number  of  Boers  required  to  keep  the  Band  in 
order.  The  police  of  Johannesburg  were  quite  equal  to  that  duty. 

The  Free  State  had  a percentage  of  Scotch  and  English  burghers 
among  its  people.  These  men,  except  in  a very  few  instances,  did 
not  join  the  Boer  armies.  They  removed  to  Cape  Colony  before 
and  after  war  was  declared.  Allowing  for  these  desertions,  and  also 
for  exemptions  similar  to  those  in  the  Transvaal,  the  available 
fighting  force  of  the  Free  State  would  not  reach  beyond  10,000 
men. 

The  “ Disloyal  Colonists  ” * who  actually  fought  in  the  war  num- 
bered, according  to  one  of  their  prominent  organizers,  not  more 
than  3,500  men. 

Taking  these  extra  deductions  from  the  War  Office  estimate, 
we  find  a net  total  of  available  fighting  burghers  for  both  Kepublics 
amounting  to  27,500. 

* The  above  estimate  of  Colonial  “ rebels  ” applies  to  the  period  of  the  war 
anterior  to  the  resort  by  Lords  Roberts  and  Kitchener  to  the  farm-burning  and 
other  Weylerite  methods  of  barbarous  warfare.  These  • brutalities  are  now 
(March,  1902)  believed  by  many  persons  who  have  recently  come  from  South 
Africa  to  have  induced  fully  10,000  more  Cape  Dutchmen  to  join  the  Boer  com- 
mandoes during  the  last  two  years. 


TRANSVAAL  PREPARATIONS 


65 


Account,  however,  must  be  taken  of  the  Uitlanders  of  the  Rand 
who  volunteered  to  join  the  Transvaal  army,  and  of  the  “ foreign 
volunteers  ” who  enlisted  in  the  same  service.  Lord  Lansdowne’s 
“ Notes  ” do  not  deal  with  these  extraneous  forces,  as  such  aux- 
iliaries were  not  anticipated  or  taken  into  account  by  the  officers 
who  collected  facts  and  information  for  the  British  authorities. 

The  number  of  Uitlanders  who  joined  the  Boer  commandoes 
would  not  exceed  3,000,  while  the  “ foreign  volunteers  ” — that  is, 
men  who  went  expressly  from  Europe  and  America  to  help  the 
Republics  in  the  field — did  not  reach  the  number  of  700.  Accept- 
ing, however,  these  maximum  estimates,  they  would  add  some  4,000 
men  to  the  burgher  forces,  making  the  grand  total  of  the  Federal 
armies  reach  the  figure  of  31,500. 

This  is  nearly  the  same  number  which  was  obtained  by  the  British 
War  Office  from  its  sources  of  information  in  the  manner  specified 
in  the  “ Military  Notes.” 

Lord  Lansdowne’s  circular  likewise  quotes  the  text  of  the  treaty 
of  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  between  the  two  Republics  It 
reads: 

“ Political  Treaty  concluded  between  the  Orange  Free  State  and 
the  South  African  Republic,  July,  1897  : 

“Article  I.  That  there  is  to  be  everlasting  peace  between  both 
States. 

“ Article  II.  That  the  two  Republics  shall  mutually  aid  and  help 
each  other  when  the  independence  of  either  be  threatened  in  any 
way,  unless  the  State  to  give  support  should  show  and  prove  the 
injustice  of  such  support. 

“ Article  III.  That  the  Governments  of  both  States  shall,  as  soon 
as  possible,  inform  each  other  of  such  matters  which  may  unfavor- 
ably affect  the  independence  and  peace  of  either  of  them. 


“ Article  VII.  of  the  Military  Convention  agreed  to  in  J uly,  1897, 
says  : In  a common  war,  one  State  may  not  conclude  peace  without 
the  consent  of  the  other.” 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  treaty,  for  the  mutual  protection  of  the 
Republics,  was  concluded  in  July,  1897,  eighteen  months  after 
the  Jameson  Raid.  Such  a compact  would  have  been  one  of  the 
first  acts  of  a conspiracy  to  overthrow  British  supremacy  in  South 
Africa.  There  is  no  record  of  any  such  plot  in  Lord  Lansdowne’s 
“ Military  Notes.”  On  the  contrary,  it  is  shown  how  the  treaty 
thus  formed,  like  the  arming  of  the  two  Republics,  followed,  and 
did  not  precede,  the  attempt  on  the  part  of  Rhodes  and  Jameson 
to  seize  the  Transvaal  and  its  gold  mines  in  1896. 

5 — 


Chapter  VI 


BOER  ARTILLERY  AND  COMMANDOES 

Boek  guns — The  Staats  artillery — The  Boer  commando  system  of 

MILITARY  ORGANIZATION — BoEE  METHODS  OF  WARFARE. 

HE  information  obtained  by  the  British  War  Office  as  to  the 


extent  of  the  Boer  preparations  in  arms  and  ammunition  was 
approximatel}^  correct.  The  alleged  methods  of  importation  re- 
ferred to  by  Lord  Salisbury  were,  however,  only  employed  in  Jingo 
imagination.  There  was  no  disguise  of  any  kind  adopted  in  the 
purchase  or  conveyance  of  the  armaments  for  the  Eepublic.  The 
Martini-Henry  and  Lee-Metford  rifles  were  bought  in  England, 
and  carried  to  Lourenzo  Marquez  in  English  ships — a means  of 
transhipment  which  might  well  excuse  the  dull  Portuguese  cus- 
toms’ officials  from  suspecting  hostile  designs  against  England. 
Twelve  million  rounds  of  rifle  ammunition  were  purchased  in  Eng- 
land, through  Beckett  and  Co.,  of  Pretoria,  who  were  the  Transvaal 
agents  of  Kynoehs,  of  Birmingham.  I failed  to  obtain  while  in 
Pretoria  accurate  information  as  to  the  amount  of  Mauser  car- 
tridges purchased  in  Europe,  but  it  is  safe  to  say  that  large  quanti- 
ties were  obtained  by  both  Kepublics  from  Belgium  and  Germany. 
There  would  be  over  50,000,000  rounds  of  small-arm  ammuni- 
tion in  possession  of  the  Boers  on  the  declaration  of  war.  All 
the  Webley  revolvers  referred  to  in  Lord  Lansdowne’s  “ Military 
Notes”  were  “made  in  Birmingham”  and  purchased  there  for 
Boer  service.  Excepting  the  Mauser  rifles  and  their  ammunition, 
and  the  Creusot  and  Krupp  guns,  the  weapons  and  bullets  with 
which  the  burghers  have  fought  their  English  foes  were  supplied 
by  English  manufacturers  and  forwarded  by  means  of  English 
vessels  to  the  seaport  nearest  to  Pretoria. 

The  facts  as  to  the  character  of  the  Boer  artillery  were  not  so 
well  known  to  the  British  War  Office,  with  the  exception  of  those 
relating  to  the  twenty-two  automatic  guns.  These  Maxim-Norden- 
felts  and  Vickers-Maxims  were  bought  in  London.  On  one  of 
them  I found  the  following  inscription: 


BOEB  ARTILLEEY  AND  COMMANDOES 


67 


“ Maxim-Nordenfelt  C.  and  A.  Co.,  Ltd., 

No.  2124, 

37  m|m  Aut.  Gun.  Mark  II. 
Maxim-Nordenfelt,  London.” 

These  were  the  “ pom-poms  ” which  did  almost  as  much  to  de- 
moralize the  British  armies  in  the  larger  engagements  of  the  war 
as  the  deadly  shooting  qualities  of  the  Mauser  rifle.  English  Gov- 
ernment officials  knew  of  these  purchases,  as  they  did  of  the  am- 
munition and  other  armaments  specified  in  Lord  Lansdowne’s 


A MAXIM-NORDENFELT  AND  ITS  SERVICE 


Notes,”  and  it  was  equally  known  to  them  that  they  were  for- 
warded direct  from  London  to  Lourenzo  Marquez. 

In  addition  to  these  four  small  batteries  of  automatic  guns,  the 
Boer  Government  had  purchased  four  15  c.m.  Creusots  (“  Long 
Toms  ”),  six  7.5  c.m.  quick-firing  Creusot  field  guns,  four  Ivrupp 
howitzers,  and  eight  Krupp  field  guns,  of  the  same  caliber  as  the 
7.5  c.m.  Creusot  quick-firing  fifteen-pounder — in  all,  forty-four 
guns.  The  Orange  Free  State  had  only  time  to  acquire  six  Ivrupps 
of  the  same  class  and  caliber,  hut  of  an  older  pattern,  and  two 
Maxim-Nordenfelts,  before  war  began.  The  two  Republics  had 
fifty-two  guns,  all  told,  of  the  classes  described,  which,  with  half  a 
dozen  more  of  Maxims  and  Krupps  taken  from  Jameson  in  1896, 


68 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


comprised  the  entire  artillery  equipment  of  the  Federal  forces. 
The  old  Armstrongs  and  Whitworths  referred  to  in  the  secret  Eng- 
lish circular  as  being  part  of  the  Free  State  artillerjq  were  not 
used  throughout  the  war.  Adding  these,  however,  to  the  list  with 
which  I was  supplied  by  officials  of  the  Boer  Government,  it  will 
be  seen  that  the  number,  tho  not  the  character,  of  the  Federal 
artillery  Corresponds  almost  exactly  with  the  details  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  British  War  Office. 

There  was  no  secrecy  of  any  kind  employed  in  the  purchase  of 
the  Creusot  guns.  They  were  openly  bought  of  the  famous  French 
firm,  and  their  range,  capacity,  and  simplicity  of  breech  mechanism 
had  been  described  long  before  the  war  in  the  Paris  “ Echo  des 
Mines  et  de  la  Metallurgie  ” for  the  information  of  any  British 
military  attache  in  France  who  could  have  spared  sufficient  time 
from  a study  of  L’Affaire  Dreyfus  ” to  acquaint  himself  with  what 
was  being  published  concerning  the  French  guns  destined  for  the 
South  African  Eepublic.  These  guns  have  made  their  mark  in 
the  war  as  probably  the  most  effective  in  range  and  velocity  ever 
produced.  The  fifteen-pounder  Creusot  far  outclassed  the  vaunted 
British  field  gun  of  the  same  caliber,  having  2,000  yards  of  a longer 
range,  along  with  other  corresponding  advantages  over  its  English 
rival. 

A dozen  batteries  of  these  splendid  guns  were  in  order  when 
hostilities  began,  despite  General  Joubert’s  protests  against  any 
more  guns  being  bought.  “What  can  I do  with  more  guns?” 
the  old  man  was  in  the  habit  of  exclaiming,  when  the  certainty  of 
war  was  seen  by  other  members  of  the  Executive  Council  as  Jou- 
bert  could  not,  or  would  not,  recognize.  “ Have  we  not  more  of 
them  already  than  we  can  use?”  This  short-sighted  view  was 
largely  responsible  for  the  fatal  delay  in  placing  an  order  which, 
had  it  only  been  carried  out  in  time,  might  have  changed  the  whole 
fortunes  of  the  war.  Joubert’s  blind  faith  in  the  peace-com- 
pelling power  of  the  English  Liberal  Party,  and  his  belief  in  a pos- 
sible conversion  of  Queen  Victoria  to  the  views  set  forth  in  his 
letter  of  June,  1899,  were  responsible  for  even  more  deplorable 
errors  than  this  in  the  initial  stages  of  the  great  struggle.  He 
failed  to  see  that  neither  the  monarch  nor  the  Opposition  had 
the  power  or  the  will  to  oppose  Mr.  Chamberlain’s  policy  when  the 
combined  national  and  commercial  and  religious  conscience  of 
Great  Britain  was  in  “ righteous  conflict  ” with  the  Boer  rulers  of 
the  world’s  richest  gold  reefs — over  a two  years’  dispute  as  to  the 
franchise.  Other  patriots  have  died  with  warnings  born  of  bitter 
disillusionment  not  to  put  faith  in  princes.  The  old  hero  of  the 
Boer  War  of  Freedom  could  justly  say  to  his  country  when  his 


BOER  ARTILLERY  AND  COMMANDOES 


69 


passing  came  in  Pretoria,  “ Put  not  your  trust  in  English  queens 
or  politicians.” 

The  Transvaal  Staats  Artillery  numbered  1,000  trained  burghers, 
mostly  young  men,  in  1899.  The  officers’  names  are  correctly 
given  in  the  “ Military  Notes.”  In  1896  the  same  force  consisted 
of  one  hundred  men  and  nine  officers,  on  active  duty.  The  corps 
was  first  founded  in  1890.  Majors  Wolmarans  and  Erasmus  were 


Photx)  by  Mr.  Davitt 

C03IMANDANT  TRICHARDT,  HEAD  OF  THE  TRANSVAAL  ARTILLERY 


sent  to  Europe  by  General  Joubert  to  study  the  artillery  systems 
of  the  Continent.  They  remained  away,  chiefly  in  Holland  and 
Germany,  for  four  years,  and  began  to  organize  the  Republic’s 
tiny  artillery  force  on  their  return.  The  encounter  with  the  Jame- 
son Raiders  at  Doornkop  in  January,  1896,  was  their  first  experi- 
ence of  actual  combat,  and  the  surrender  of  the  troopers  before  a 
Boer  gun  was  fired  left  them  with  bloodless  laurels  on  an  unfought 
field.  The  Raid,  however,  awoke  the  Executive  to  the  necessity 
for  a larger  force,  and  the  year  1897  saw  the  commencement  of  the 
effective  training  and  increase  of  that  body  which  enabled  the 


70 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Eepublic  in  its  hour  of  need  to  have  the  service  of  the  most 
successful  artillerists  who  have  ever  handled  guns  on  a battle-field. 

These  men  were  not  trained,  as  the  English  press  alleged,  by 
German,  French,  or  Eussian  officers.  Erasmus  and  Wolmarans 
did  the  necessary  training;  no  foreigners  being  required  for  the 
purpose.  Two  German  lieutenants  were  in  charge  of  the  Johan- 
nesburg Fort  when  war  began,  and  three  Dutch  officers  and  one 
private  were  nirmbered  in  the  force.  Outside  of  these  six  or  seven 
Europeans,  the  whole  Transvaal  Artillery  was  composed  of  Afri- 
cander Boers. 

In  the  Orange  Free  State  an  ex-German  officer.  Major  Albrecht, 
had  command  of  that  Eepublic’s  artillery,  which  numbered  300 
men.  A few  of  these  were  Europeans,  some  more  were  Dutch 
from  Cape  Colony,  but  over  ninety  per  cent,  of  the  corps  were 
Free  Staters. 

A few  words  explanatory  of  the  military  organization  of  the 
Boers  will  not  be  out  of  place  ere  we  come  to  see  the  little 
Eepublics  locked  in  deadly  combat  with  their  gigantic  antagonist. 
The  basis  of  the  system  is  thus  laid  down  and  described  in  the 
Transvaal  Constitution: 

“ The  military  power  shall  comprise  all  the  able-bodied  men  in 
this  Eepublic,  and,  if  necessary,  all  such  natives  within  the  country 
whose  chiefs  are  subordinate  to  the  Eepublic. 

“ By  able-bodied  white  men  shall  be  understood,  all  males  between 
the  ages  of  sixteen  and  sixty  years  of  age. 

“ For  the  purpose  of  classifying  the  field  forces  according  to 
locality,  the  territory  of  the  Eepublic  shall  be  divided  into  Field- 
Cornetcies  and  Districts.  The  boundaries  of  these  Field-Cornetcies 
and  Districts  shall  be  fixed  jointly  by  the  President  of  the  Execu- 
tive Council,  the  Commandant- General,  and  the  Commandants  and 
Field  Cornets  in  the  adjoining  Divisions. 

“ The  troops  shall  be  under  the  command  of  officers,  ranking 
upwards  as  follows  : Assistant  Field  Cornets,  Field  Cornets,  Com- 
mandants, and  Commandant-General. 

“ The  officers  shall  be  elected  by  a majority  of  votes,  namely  : 
the  subordinate  officers  by  the  enfranchised  burghers  of  the  different 
wards,  the  Commandants  by  the  burghers  in  the  Districts,  and  the 
Commandant-General  by  the  burghers  of  the  Eepublic. 

“ The  voting  tickets  for  the  election  of  these  officers  shall  be 
handed  to  the  respective  Landrosts  (Magistrates),  who  shall  send 
the  same  to  the  Executive  Council. 

“ Not  more  than  two  Commandants  shall  be  elected  by  any 
District. 

“ The  field  forces,  with  the  exception  of  the  colored  mercenaries, 
shall  be  called  out  to  maintain  order;  to  go  on  commando  (to  take 


72 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


the  field)  in  the  event  of  internal  risings;  and,  without  any  excep- 
tion, to  defend  the  country  and  to  wage  war  upon  foreign  foes.” 

It  may  be  observed  here  that,  despite  the  power  given  in  the 
Grondwet  to  utilize  native  subject  races  in  defense  of  the  country, 
in  no  instance  did  the  Boers  avail  themselves  of  the  service  of  such 
allies  in  this  war  until  the  British  had  extensively  employed  armed 
Kaffirs  in  the  field.  It  is  absolutely  false  to  assert  they  did  so  in 
the  earlier  stages  of  the  conflict,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  it  will 
be  proved  further  on  in  this  narrative,  by  undeniable  facts  and 
photographs,  that  savages  were  employed  against  the  Transvaal  and 
Free  State  forces  in  the  defense  of  Mafeking  and  Kimberley,  at 
Deredepoort,  and  throughout  the  whole  campaign. 

Other  Grondwet  provisions  specify  the  class  of  men  who  are  to 
be  exempt  from  military  service;  they  include  members  of  the 
Volksraad,  State  officials.  Ministers  of  the  Church,  duly  appointed 
school  teachers,  dealers,  only  sons  of  widows,  “ and  all  who  can 
adduce  such  lawful  and  well-founded  reasons  as  shall  excuse  them.” 

All  burghers  capable  of  bearing  arms  are,  however,  compelled 
to  go  on  commando  whenever  martial  law  is  proclaimed. 

The  merits  on  one  side,  and  the  weakness  and  deficiencies  on  the 
other,  of  this  military  system  will  be  pointed  out  when  we  come 
shortly  to  deal  with  operations  in  the  field. 

The  declaration  of  war  gave  to  the  military  critics  topics  of 
absorbing  interest  for  discussion.  The  British  army,  drilled  and 
equipped  on  the  general  European  disciplined  system,  was  to  meet 
an  opponent  untrained  in  military  tactics,  but  formidable  on  ac- 
count of  his  mobility,  skill  in  marksmanship,  and  the  unknown 
quantity  of  his  unit  initiative  and  formation  on  a field  of  large 
operations.  Apart  from  comparative  numbers  and  equipment,  the 
Boers  would  possess  many  obvious  advantages  which,  tho  they 
could  not,  humanly  speaking,  be  expected  to  enable  the  Transvaal 
and  Free  State  forces  to  prevail  against  the  strength  and  resources 
of  the  British  Empire,  would  give  to  their  resistance  a more  deter- 
mined and  prolonged  character  than  the  mass  of  English  opinion 
flattered  itself  in  believing.  These  probable  advantages  caused  the 
saner  British  critics  some  anxiety  in  their  forecasts  of  the  conflict 
into  which  Mr.  Chamberlain’s  diplomacy  and  the  Uitlander  knavery 
of  Johannesburg  had  plunged  Great  Britain. 

The  coming  fight  would  be  on  a field  seven  thousand  miles  dis- 
tant. The  country  in  which  operations  would  have  to  be  carried  on 
would  offer  many  difficulties  in  transport  and  in  concentration. 
Climatic  conditions  would  tell  against  the  health  of  the  English 
soldier,  and,  especially,  against  the  horses  which  would  be  indis- 


BOER  ARTILLERY  AND  COMMANDOES 


73 


pensable  to  that  branch  of  the  British  forces  on  which  most  reliance 
would  have  to  be  placed  for  turning  movements,  rapidity  of  action, 
and  for  dealing  the  final  blow  where  their  adversaries  should  meet 
with  a reverse.  Conversely,  the  Boer  would  know  every  inch  of 
the  ground.  His  horse,  like  himself,  would  have  kinship  with  the 
veldt.  He  could  be  counted  upon  for  swiftness  of  movement  and 
for  great  mobility  of  forces.  There  would  be  little  or  no  trouble 
with  a cumbersome  commissariat,  or  with  unwieldy  heavy  guns. 
His  unit  formation  would  offer  a minimum  target  for  the  weapons 
which  the  British  would  rely  most  upon  for  their  demoralizing 
and  striking  power — the  artillery;  while  this  disadvantage  for  the 
enemy  would  be  greatly  increased  in  the  fact  that  the  English  bat- 
talion formation  would  give  the  Boers  the  maximum  of  aiming 
opportunity  in  big  human  targets  for  their  noted  powers  of  straight 
shooting. 

Then,  there  was  the  well-known  natural  strategy  of  the  Boer  to 
utilize  cover.  This,  with  his  unequaled  mobility,  was  virtually 
his  only  idea  of  military  tactics;  but  in  countries  like  Natal,  the 
Free  State,  and  the  Transvaal  it  was  an  idea  which,  like  the  single 
plan  of  the  cat  in  the  fable  of  pussy  and  the  fox,  would  probably 
turn  out  more  effective  in  its  application  than  all  the  Salisbury 
Plain  maneuvers  that  would  be  employed  on  the  other  side.  The 
task  of  crushing  such  an  opponent,  numerically  weak  tho  he 
might  be,  was  considered  by  competent  military  critics  not  likely 
to  be  settled  in  an  imposing  military  promenade  from  Cape  Town 
to  Pretoria,  such  as  the  English  Jingo  papers  bragged  exultingly 
it  would  be.  Britain’s  military  prestige  was  destined  to  bear  a 
startling  testimony  to  the  correctness  of  the  critics’  view  before  the 
Boer  forces  should  be  beaten  into  a final  submission  to  overwhelm- 
ing numbers. 


Chapter  VII 

BRITISH  AND  BOER  PATRIOTISM 


The  Rasd  and  the  War — Uitlanders  foe  the  Boers — An  English 

APPRECIATION  OF  THE  EX-RanD  “ REFORMERS  ” VOLUNTEERING  IN 

Great  Britain  foe  the  conflict — Transvaal  volunteers  for  the 
Republic — Preparations  for  the  combat. 

“V'TT^HILE  the  burghers  of  the  Band,  with  large  numbers  of 
V V non-British  Uitlanders,  were  mustering  for  the  front  in  the 
early  days  of  October,  the  trains  for  Natal  and  Delagoa  Bay  were 
being  crowded  every  day  with  refugees  of  the  “ Eeforming  ” 
camp,  mainly  British  and  Colonial.  They  rushed  off  in  a needless 
panic  weeks  before  war  broke  out.  They  were  neither  threatened 
nor  molested  by  the  police  or  officials  of  Johannesburg.  No  im- 
mediate risk  menaced  their  persons  or  liberties,  yet  so  eager  were 
these  very  men  who  were  declared  to  have  invited  Jameson  in  1895 
to  come  to  lead  them  to  an  attack  on  the  Eepublic  to  get  away  from 
the  impending  fight,  that  they  rushed  into  cattle  trucks  in  their 
hurr}"  to  be  off;  fought  for  places  in  every  kind  of  conveyance 
■ — some  of  them,  in  their  mad  desire  to  escape,  actually  pulling 
British  women  out  of  the  carriages  in  order  to  obtain  their  places. 

It  was  a significant  fact,  eloquent  in  its  testimony  to  the  dishon- 
esty of  the  movement  against  the  Transvaal,  that  very  few  of  the 
population  of  the  Eand,  outside  of  British  nationality,  volunteered 
to  fight  on  the  English  side.  Indeed,  comparatively  few  even  of 
the  British  element  on  the  gold  fields  showed  any  desire  to  take 
up  arms  in  a war  which  was  to  hand  over  the  laws  as  well  as  the 
mining  industry  of  the  Transvaal  to  Mr.  Cecil  Ehodes  and  Co. 

On  the  other  hand,  Hollanders,  Germans,  Frenchmen,  Irishmen, 
Italians,  Scandinavians,  Americans,  Eussians,  and  Swiss  joined 
the  Boers — miners  who  must  have  suffered  equally  with  the  British 
Uitlanders  if  the  grievances  put  forward  on  their  behalf  by  Eng- 
land, as  a pretext  for  the  war,  had  had  any  real  existence.  It  is 
not  in  human  nature  to  volunteer  to  assist  in  saving  a Government 
which  does  you  a wrong.  Coerced  to  do  so  some  men  may  be. 
Others  may  sell  their  services  to  such  a Power.  But,  in  the  case 
of  the  miners  of  the  Eand  who  joined  the  Boers,  there  was  neither 


JOriANNESBUl^G  UlTLANDERS,  FLEEING  FROM  THE  EXPECTED  WAR,  FIGHTING  FOR  SEATS  IN  OPEN  TRUCKS 


76 


THE  BOEB  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


coercion  nor  pay  employed  to  enlist  their  help.  They  were  free  to 
leave  the  country,  like  the  British  miners,  or  to  remain;  secure 
in  the  neutrality  of  Continental  Powers  against  being  forced  to 
fight  against  their  will.  A large  number  voluntarily  selected  to 
remain,  and  to  risk  their  lives  in  defending  the  South  African 
Eepuhlic. 

Commenting  upon  the  rush  of  the  British  Uitlanders  out  of  the 
reach  of  danger  on  the  eve  of  the  war,  the  military  correspondent 
of  the  “ Newcastle  Chronicle,”  in  his  impressions  of  Maritzburg,  in 
a letter  which  appeared  on  the  5th  of  December,  gave  the  following 
pen  picture  of  the  precious  refugees  whom  he  had  seen: 

“ It  must  be  a great  relief  to  the  military  commander  in  Natal 
to  know  that  the  30,000  or  40,000  Uitlanders  of  Johannesburg  had 
left  that  city  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  Otherwise  we 
should  have  had  Cornishmen  and  Jew  boys  from  “^the  golden  city’ 
Avhining  and  imploring  our  generals  to  come  and  save  them.  Noth- 
ing can  exceed  the  contempt  of  the  real  Englishman  for  this  veritable 
scum  of  the  earth.  It  makes  our  blood  boil  to  think  that  the  pick 
of  the  British  army  is  engaged  in  mortal  combat  to  make  things 
easy  for  the  sharpers  and  swindlers  who  fatten  on  the  illicit  profits 
of  the  gold  industry.  On  the  other  hand,  one  cannot  help  respect- 
ing the  Boers,  who  are  fighting  for  their  hearths  and  homes.  It 
will  be  one  of  General  Buller’s  chief  difficulties,  when  the  troops 
near  Pretoria  and  Johannesburg,  to  know  how  to  deal  with  the 
armed  rabble  who  will  crowd  round  him  ready  to  offer  advice  and 
to  seize  on  all  lands  and  property  within  reach.  Verily  the  lust 
for  gold  brings  out  the  worst  passions  in  the  human  race ! ” 

Scenes  of  enthusiasm  were  witnessed  as  each  train  for  Natal  left 
Johannesburg  with  its  passenger  load  of  burghers.  Women  and 
girls  accompanied  the  commandoes  on  their  march  to  the  Bram- 
fontein  railway  station;  many  of  the  fair  sex  insisting  on  carrying 
the  Mausers  of  their  brothers  or  sweethearts  on  the  way.  The 
most  pojmlar  body  leaving  Johannesburg  was  the  Police  Corps. 
Finer  specimens  of  combatants  could  not  be  seen  anywhere.  Their 
mounts  were  of  the  best,  while  the  trained  hearing,  the  soldierly 
appearance  of  the  men,  who  had  kept  down  the  rowdy  elements 
of  the  gold-reefed  city,  and  had  preserved  its  peace  as  the  law  and 
order  of  no  other  great  mining  center  had  ever  been  upheld,  evoked 
general  praise.  They  were  cheered  again  and  again  by  the  popu- 
lace as  they  neared  the  train  which  was  to  take  them  to  meet  the 
enemy.  “ We  have  warrants  to  arrest  General  Sir  Eedvers  Buller,” 
cried  the  “ Zarps,”  while  the  Boer  girls  shouted  back,  “ Don’t  re- 
turn without  Ehodes,  Jameson,  and  Milner,”  indicating  the  feel- 
ing which  was  uppermost  in  the  minds  of  the  women  towards  the 


BRITISH  AND  BOER  PATRIOTISM 


77 


men  whom  they  believed  to  be  most  responsible  for  the  war  which 
was  to  desolate  many  a burgher  home. 

Outside  the  Johannesburg  district  the  mustering  of  the  burgher 
forces  was  more  quietly,  but  not  less  ardently  or  loyally,  carried 
out.  A wave  of  the  strongest  patriotic  feeling  swept  through  the 
tiny  State  at  the  thought  of  the  wrong  on  which  England  had  re- 
solved, at  the  instigation  of  the  meanest  and  most  contemptible 
men  and  motives  that  ever  robbed  the  names  of  war  and  civilized 
government  of  every  shred  of  honorable  meaning.  The  women 
were  everjwvhere  the  most  earnest  and  strenuous  in  the  spirit  of 
resistance  to  British  aggression.  They  took  pride  in  boasting  of 


THE  JOHANNESBURG  POLICE  LEAVING  FOR  THE  FRONT,  OCTOBER  26,  1899 
This  company  has  distinguished  itself  for  bravery  in  many  engagements 


husbands  and  sons  having  gone  to  the  front  when  the  danger  signal 
of  English  troops  on  the  Natal  border  called  the  burghers  to  arms. 
“ I have  my  husband  and  three  sons  in  commando,”  proudly  ex- 
claimed a Boer  matron  in  conversation  with  me  at  Middelburg, 
“ and  another  who  is  only  fourteen  is  guarding  the  bridge.  I wish 
I had  twenty  more  to  tight  against  our  enemy.”  It  was  this  deep, 
all-pervading  love  of  liberty  and  country,  and  hatred  of  the  oppres- 
sion and  perfidy  associated  in  the  Boer  mind  with  the  name  of  Eng- 
land, which  has  made  the  war  the  most  memorable  ever  fought  for 
nationality  and  freedom. 

English  politicians  and  papers  have  boasted  loudly  of  the  patri- 
otism of  their  people  because  110,000  men  out  of  a total  (British) 
population  of,  say,  35,000,000  volunteered  to  join  the  regular  Im- 
perial forces  when  war  was  declared.  The  boast  was  a justifiable 


78 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


one,  to  the  extent  of  the  facts  and  figures  on  which  it  rested.  The 
volunteering  in  Great  Britain  proved  the  war  to  he  popular  with  the 
masses.  The  known  numerical  weakness  of  the  Boers,  and  the  too 
sanguine  predictions  of  the  Jingo  newspaper  prophets  as  to  the 
probable  short  duration  of  the  conflict,  had,  possibly,  some  little 
human  influence  upon  the  action  of  some  of  those  who  responded 
to  the  appeal  of  their  Government.  Still,  the  youth  of  England 
rallied  in  loyal  enthusiasm  to  the  British  flag  in  the  combat  with 
the  Eepublics.  The  volunteering  was  a prompt  and  patriotic  re- 
sponse to  a sense  of  national  duty,  and  Englishmen  are  Justified  in 
extolling  the  citizen  virtue  which  was  thus  displayed. 

But  what  of  the  Boers  in  the  corresponding  connection?  More 
than  seventy-five  per  cent,  of  the  (Dutch)  manhood  of  the  Transvaal 
and  Orange  Free  State  capable  of  bearing  arms  volunteered  to  face 
and  fight  “ the  greatest  Empire  the  world  has  ever  seen,”  as  we 
hear  it  described  daily.  There  were  no  recruiting  sergeants , em- 
ployed; no  pay  was  offered  or  expected;  there  was  virtually  no  press 
to  excite  youthful  military  ardor  in  impassioned  appeals  to  stand 
for  the  flag;  no  great  demonstrations  organized  to  evoke  popular 
enthusiasm;  no  Boer  Kipling;  no  illustrated  papers;  and  no  military 
bands  to  awaken  soldierly  desires  in  the  breasts  of  the  young. 
Yet  not  in  a single  historic  instance  of  civilized  warfare,  has  there 
ever  been  so  prompt  and  so  great  a muster  of  men,  in  proportion  to 
population,  to  fight  what  all  the  world  deemed  a hopeless  contest, 
as  readily  responded  at  the  call  of  the  Kruger  Government.  Fully 
one-ninth  of  the  whole  people  made  this  magnificent  and  unique 
answer  to  the  invaders  of  their  country  and  freedom;  a number 
which,  if  based  upon  the  Transvaal  Boer  population  of  150,000 
souls,  would  be  equivalent  to  a volunteer  British  muster,  on  the 
same  scale,  of  nearly  4,000,000  men!  And  the  Government  which 
was  thus  sustained  in  its  hour  of  peril  has  been  described  in  Eng- 
land as  having  been  unpopular  with\  its  own  people,  while  these 
same  people,  after  this  unparalleled  exhibition  of  devotion  to  coun- 
try, principle,  and  liberty,  have  been  persistently  and  malignantly 
reviled  by  the  baser  kind  of  English  critic,  and  never  even  Justly 
Judged  by  their  less  hostile  British  foes. 

Kor  did  the  two  Eaads  lack  any  of  the  patriotic  spirit  so 
splendidly  shown  by  their  constituents.  Four  out  of  the  six  mem- 
bers of  the  Executive  Council — the  Transvaal  Cabinet — went  to 
the  front,  as  did  the  Chairman  of  the  First  Volksraad,  with  no 
less  than  two-thirds  of  the  members  of  both  Chambers.  In  fact, 
every  successful  Boer  general  will  be  found  to  have  been  either 
a member  or  an  official  of  the  Eaads  of  the  two  Eepublics  on  the 
day  of  the  declaration  of  war. 


BRITISH  AND  BOER  PATRIOTISM 


79 


Boer  “ incapacity  ” in  every  department  of  civil  government  has 
been  the  constant  theme  of  Jingo  accusation.  It  has  been  harped 
upon  until  the  violence  of  reiteration  has  tended  to  defeat  the  pur- 
pose of  the  calumniators.  In  nothing  has  this  blind,  unreason- 
ing antipathy  been  more  conspicuous  than  in  the  uniform  silence 
of  the  Cape  and  English  press  on  every  incident  or  act  which  has 


THREE  GENERATIONS  OF  FIGHTING  BOERS 


conspicuously  belied  the  unjust  estimate  of  the  Boer  by  his  im- 
placable enemy.  The  admirable  way  in  which  order  was  main- 
tained on  the  Band  by  these  farmer-administrators  of  government 
when  the  mines  were  shut  down,  and  upwards  of  one  hundred  thou- 
sand Kaffirs  were  to  be  dealt  with  as  discharged  em]:)loyees,  never 
won  a single  word  of  appreciation  from  a British  journal.  Here 
was  a task  which  might  well  tax  the  power,  patience,  and  civic  abili- 
ties of  the  oldest  and  strongest  Government  in  Europe.  Yet  it  was 


80 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


carried  through  hy  Kruger’s  ofl&cials  without  any  resort  to  violence, 
and  with  very  little  public  disorder;  with  less  popular  disturbance, 
in  fact,  than  a strike  of  a thousand  British  working  men  in  London 
or  Glasgow  would  occasion.  The  sound  common  sense  and  tact  of 
the  civic  and  military  officials  of  the  little  Republic  accomplished 
this  difficult  work,  and  the  Boers  made  no  boast  about  its  per- 
formance. 

Consider  the  situation  after  Mr.  Conyngham  Greene’s  visit  to 
the  Executive  on  the  memorable  11th  of  October.  A hostile  army 
was  advancing  through  Fatal  towards  the  Transvaal  border;  resist- 
ing forces  were  to  be  prepared  and  handled;  defenses  to  be  seen 
to  in  the  East  and  West,  as  in  the  South;  relief  to  be  organized; 
ammunition  and  stores  to  be  distributed;  plans  of  operations  to 
be  considered;  new  laws  to  be  framed;  proclamations  to  be  issued; 
law  and  order  looked  after  and  upheld  where  sixty  or  seventy 
tliousand  British  subjects  became  so  many  semi-hostile,  clamoring 
refugees,  demanding  safe  conduct  from  the  Rand  and  from  the 
other  centers  of  the  Republic.  There  was,  in  addition,  the  enor- 
mous number  of  natives  already  referred  to,  whose  savage  nature 
and  dispositions  called  for  special  vigilance  after  they  had  learned 
that  they  were  to  be  expelled  on  the  shutting  down  of  the  mines. 
These  and  a hundred  and  one  other  exacting  responsibilities  con- 
fronted the  rustic  statesmen  of  the  Republic,  and  were  faced  and 
overcome  quietly,  systematically,  completely.  There  was  no  break- 
down in  the  civil  or  military  machinery,  no  panic,  no  disorder.  A 
dozen  of  these  despised  “farmer  administrators,”  the  Jouberts, 
Kocks,  Reitzes,  Wolmaranses,  Smutses,  Groblers,  Van  der  Merwes, 
Van  Dams,  Krauses,  and  Municks,  with  the  aid  of  a few  more 
minor  officials  in  Pretoria  and  in  Johannesburg,  possessing  rare  in- 
telligence and  a splendid  loyalty  to  the  little  State,  got  through  this 
huge  multiform  task  in  a manner  that  could  not  be  surpassed,  if 
indeed  it  could  even  he  equaled,  hy  any  European  State  Adminis- 
tration. Men  not  endowed  by  nature  or  acquirement  with  real 
governing  capacity  could  never  have  accomplished  this  work  in 
this  way.  There  would  have  been  woful  breakdowns  in  every  de- 
partment, blunders  in  dealing  with  trying  difficulties,  and  a col- 
lapse of  all  respect  for  law  and  order,  had  President  Kruger  and 
his  Executive  been  the  incapahles  their  English  traducers  declared 
them  to  he  in  all  the  higher  responsibilities  of  government. 

Two  significant  proclamations  were  issued  hy  the  Executive  as 
a part  of  the  policy  forced  upon  the  Government  by  the  war,  which 
were  probably  unique  in  the  history  of  civilized  States.  One 
ordered  an  immediate  reduction  of  all  official  salaries,  averaging 
fifty  per  cent,  above  a certain  figure,  and  the  other  suspended  the 


BRITISH  AND  BOER  PATRIOTISM 


81 


payment  of  rent  for  houses  occupied  by  the  families  of  fighting 
burghers,  and  of  farms  similarly  circumstanced.  Action  of  this 
kind  in  the  interest  of  the  industrial  democracy  would  scarcely 
be  tolerated  in  a capitalist-ridden  State.  The  British  Ministry 
did  not  solicit  Parliament  to  frame  such  a self-denying  law.  Nor 
did  the  wealthy  conspirators  of  Park  Lane  or  other  Chartered  Com- 
pany promoters  of  the  war  make  any  offer  to  lessen  for  the  British 
taxpayer  the  cost  of  the  conflict  which  the  Band  millionaires  and 
their  accomplices  had  successfully  engineered.  The  maligned 
Boer  was  in  every  sense  and  on  every  occasion  the  patriotic  and 
self-denying  contrast  to  his  sordid  English  foe. 

6 


Chapter  VIII 

DISPOSITION  OF  BRITISH  AND  FEDERAL  FORCES 

British  and  Federal  forces  in  the  field  on  the  declaration  of  war — 
Their  relative  strength  and  disposition — Character  sketch  of 
Commandant-General  Joubert. 

BEFOEE  the  actual  commencement  of  hostilities  the  disposi- 
tion of  troops  on  both  sides  indicated  a mutual  belief  that 
fighting  would  begin,  as  in  the  war  of  1880,  at  or  near  Laing’s 
Nek.  Ladysmith  was,  therefore,  made  the  chief,  and  Dundee  the 
secondary,  base  of  jirobable  British  operations  in  North  Natal, 
while  Newcastle  and  Charlestown,  nearer  the  Boer  border,  were 
held  as  points  of  observation  with  small  bodies  of  cavalry  who  were 
under  instruction  to  fall  back  on  the  Glencoe-Dundee  camp  before 
any  large  force  of  advancing  Boers.  The  railway  from  Maritzburg 
to  Charlestown,  running  through  Natal,  enabled  reenforcements 
to  be  sent  to  any  point  threatened  with  attack. 

The  number  of  British  troops  in  Natal  on  the  date  of  the  de- 
livery of  the  British  Note  was  estimated  by  the  Boer  authorities 
to  be  from  15,000  to  20,000.  They  were  distributed  as  follows: 

Forces  of  observation  and  patrol  north  of  Glencoe,  about  1,000; 
at  Glencoe  Junction  and  Dundee,  about  5,000,  comprising  Eoyal 
Dublin  Fusiliers,  1st  Leicestershires,  18th  Hussars,  King’s  Eoyal 
Eifles,  several  companies  of  mounted  infantry,  four  batteries  of 
Eo3fal  Field  Artillery,  and  various  Natal  Volunteer  levies. 

At  Ladysmith  about  6,000  Imperial  troops  were  massed,  includ- 
ing King’s  Eoyal  Eifles,  the  Devons,  Manchesters,  Gloucester s, 
and  the  Liverpool  Eegiment,  together  with  cavalry,  embracing 
Lancers,  Hussars,  and  mounted  infantry,  six  batteries  of  Field  Ar- 
tillery, and  numerous  Natal,  Cape,  and  other  Volunteers. 

At  Colenso,  Estcourt,  Maritzburg,  and  Durban  further  forces 
were  stationed,  but  in  smaller  details. 

South  of  the  Orange  Eiver  a body  of  700  or  800  troops  held 
the  Stormberg  Junction,  the  center  of  a pro-Boer  locality,  in 
the  north  of  Cape  Colony.  Other  detachments  were  posted  at 
various  points  along  the  railway  from  Molteno  to  East  London, 


DISPOSITION  OF  FORCES 


83 


as  a menace  to  possible  active  sympathizers  among  the  Dutch 
Colonists  with  their  kindred  across  the  Orange  and  Yaal  Eivers. 
There  was  also  a small  garrison  at  De  Aar  in  charge  of  immense 
military  stores. 

Measures  for  the  protection  of  Kimberley  and  Mafeking  and  of 
the  Western  border  had  also  been  taken,  and  an  abundance  of  am- 
munition had  been  forwarded  to  these  points  from  Cape  Town  be- 
fore any  interruption  of  railway  communication  had  occurred. 


Captain  Reicbman.  Lieutenant  Thomson, 

United  States  Netherlands  Captain  AUum 


Colonel  Gourko,  Captain  Demange,  Lieutenant  Duval, 

Russia  Prance  France 

Mr.  Fisher 

MILITARY  ATTACHES  OF  THE  BOER  ARMY 


These  dispositions  of  the  enemy’s  troops  necessarily  influenced 
the  distribution  of  the  opposing  Federal  forces.  The  Transvaal 
frontier,  north  and  east  of  ISTatal,  and  the  Western  boundar}",  from 
Fourteen  Streams  to  the  most  northern  point  where  an  advance 
from  Ehodesia  by  Chartered  Company  troops  (Kaffir  or  British) 
might  be  expected,  had  to  be  guarded  by  Transvaalers.  At 
Fourteen  Streams  the  Transvaal  and  Orange  Free  State  joined 
the  British  territory  of  Griqualand  West,  and  the  frontier  from 
thence  south  to  the  Orange  Eiver,  east  to  Basutoland,  and  north  to 
Botha’s  Pass,  near  Laing’s  Nek,  had  to  be  watched  by  the  Free 
State  burghers.  This  combined  frontier  line  would  be  over  a 


84 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


thousand  miles  in  extent,  and  demanded  large  drafts  upon  the 
Federal  commandoes  for  defensive  and  patrolling  purposes. 

The  Free  State  had  the  most  vulnerable  border-line  to  guard, 
with  the  lesser  forces  of  the  allied  Eepublics  at  its  disposal.  Two 
lines  of  railway,  from  British  seaports,  one  from  Port  Elizabeth, 
and  another  from  East  London,  entered  its  territory  in  the  Bethulie 
district,,  while  the  main  line  from  Cape  Town  to  Kimberley, 
Mafeking,  and  Ehodesia  also  skirted  its  western  frontier  the  whole 
length  of  Griqualand  West.  The  enemy’s  chief  force  was  to  ad- 
vance by  these  lines  on  Bloemfontein  and  Pretoria,  according  to  the 
forecasts  of  all  the  military  critics,  and  it  was  therefore  decided  to 
compel  him,  if  possible,  to  fight  his  first  battles  on  the  territory 
of  the  first  Boer  Eepublic  which  he  had  grabbed  from  its  founders. 
Katal  was  also  the  nearest  British  colony  to  the  strongest  and  best- 
equipped  of  the  allied  States.  She  had  clamored  for  war  through 
her  Jingo  Go-vernor  in  July,  and  it  was  thought  proper,  on  political 
as  on  strategical  grounds,  to  anticipate  the  British  invasion  of  the 
FTee  State  by  a Boer  advance  into  Natal. 

The  Federals  began  to  mobilize  their  small  armies  in  September, 
when  it  became  evident,  from  the  war  cries  of  the  English  press, 
the  hurried  embarkations  of  troops,  and  the  menacing  language 
of  Mr.  Chamberlain’s  replies  to  Mr.  Kruger’s  concessions,  that  the 
British  Government  meant  war  and  annexation,  while  pretending 
to  seek  only  a redress  of  Uitlander  grievances.  The  Colonial  Sec- 
retary’s final  despatch  on  the  22nd  of  September  was  England’s 
ultimatum,  and  no  time  was  lost  by  the  Boer  Governments  after 
that  date  in  preparing  their  resisting  forces.  Mr.  Kruger  was 
in  favor  of  launching  his  reply  of  the  9th  of  October,  the  day  after 
the  receipt  of  Mr.  Chamberlain’s  message  breaking  off  the  nego- 
tiations, but  both  General  Joubert  and  President  Steyn  strongly 
urged  a further  delay  in  the  hope  and  belief  that  Great  Britain 
would  not  proceed  to  extremities.  The  calling  out  of  the  British 
Eeserves  and  the  decision  of  the  Cabinet  to  send  50,000  more  troops 
to  Cape  Colony  and  Natal  after  Mr.  Chamberlain’s  ultimatum  had 
been  despatched,  left  no  further  doubt  upon  any  mind  in  South 
Africa  as  to  the  certainty  of  war.  A fortnight  had  thus  been  lost 
by  the  Federals,  and  gained  by  their  enemy,  in  the  work  of  massing 
men  near  the  threatened  scenes  of  first  encounter. 

On  the  11th  of  October,  when  the  word  “ War”  was  flashed  over 
the  wires  from  Pretoria,  the  combined  Boer  forces  near  the  British 
borders  of  the  two  Eepublics  numbered  26,000  men.  They  were 
distributed  as  follows:  On  the  Natal  border,  chiefly  at  Sandspruit, 
Volksrust,  and  near  the  Buffalo  Eiver,  8,000,  under  the  supreme 
command  of  General  Joubert;  in  the  west,  watching  the  Bechuana- 


DISPOSITION  OF  FORCES 


85 


land  border  and  Mafeking,  5,000,  under  General  Cronje;  while  at 
or  near  Deredepoort,  on  the  borders  of  Rhodesia;  in  the  Zoutpans- 
berg  district  in  the  north;  at  Komatipoort,  in  the  east  (the  Portu- 
guese border),  and  near  the  Swaziland  border,  there  were  comman- 
does averaging  300  men  each.  Bridges  and  culverts  had  also  to 
be  guarded  over  the  whole  extent  of  the  railways  in  the  Transvaal 
against  possible  injury  by  English  partisans  within  the  Republic. 
These  various  points,  with  small  emergency  garrisons  in  Johannes- 
burg and  Pretoria,  would  absorb  a total  of  some  2,000  more  men. 

The  Free  State  commandoes  were  scattered  over  an  area  very 
little  less  extended.  There  were  3,000  men  under  Martinus  Prins- 
loo  at  Harrismith  and  along  the  Drakensberg,  watching  Van  Ree- 
nan’s  Pass  and  the  railway  from  Ladysmith  which  entered  the  Free 
State  through  that  alpine  gap  in  the  mountains.  Grobler  and  01- 
livier  had  a combined  commando  of  Free  Staters,  Transvaalers, 
and  Cape  Colony  Africanders  of  3,500  men  in  the  southern  district, 
guarding  the  dangerous  border  where  the  two  lines  from  the  Cape 
Colony  crossed  the  Orange  River  and  formed  a junction  at  Spring- 
fontein.  Further  west,  near  Belmont,  a force  of  1,500,  under 
Jacob  (Koos)  Prinsloo,  watched  the  railway  from  De  Aar,  while 
some  2,000  more  under  Vessels  and  Ferreira  were  in  observation 
upon  the  British  garrison  at  Kimberley.  An  additional  1,000  men 
were  employed  in  guarding  the  Basuto  borderland  and  the  bridges 
and  culverts  along  the  whole  railway  line  through  the  Free  State 
from  Bethulie  to  A^ereeniging. 

Each  of  the  large  commandoes  had  a share  of  the  combined  artil- 
lery, in  proportion  to  the  number  of  their  men,  or  in  respect  of  the 
extent  of  the  enemy’s  force  which  the  positions  occupied  might  de- 
mand.* 

The  total  burgher  force  in  the  field  on  the  day  war  was  declared 
was  inadequate  to  the  carrying  out  of  any  strong  forward  move- 
ment. Great  distances  separated  the  scattered  commandoes,  and 
the  railways  were  not  sufficiently  extended  in  either  Republic  for 
purposes  of  rapid  concentration.  It  thus  happened  that,  beyond 
the  general  idea  of  defending  the  territory  of  the  allied  States 
against  invasion  from  the  south  and  west  (which  was  the  only  mili- 
tary plan  of  the  two  Republics,  and  the  most  urgent  purpose  in 
every  Boer  mind),  no  prearranged  scheme  of  operations  had  been 
decided  upon  excepting  that  of  an  immediate  advance  on  Katal. 

Laing’s  Kek  was  the  object  of  keenest  military  attention  on  both 
sides,  and  the  spot  where  a collision  between  the  opposing  armies 

* These  forces  were  augmented  by  7,000  or  8,000  more  men,  burghers  and 
volunteers,  by  Christmas,  1899;  thus  raising  the  combined  Federal  armies  to 
a total  strength,  of  33,000,  the  highest  number  placed  by  the  Republics  in  the 
field  during  any  single  stage  of  the  war. 


THE  BOER  COMMANDO  GUARDING  VAN  REENAN’s  PASS 


T 


DISPOSITION  OF  FORCES 


87 


was  first  expected.  Volksrust  is  the  railway  station  on  the  Trans- 
vaal side  of  the  tunnel  which  pierces  the  Nek,  and  Charlestown 
the  station  on  the  Natal  side  of  the  line  connecting  the  British 
and  Boer  territories.  It  was  round  this  locality,  too,  that  historic 
memories  gathered  most  in  the  minds  of  the  men  who  were  await- 
ing with  mutual  impatience  the  unloosening  of  war  passions.  Ma- 
juba  Hill  was  visible  to  some  of  both  forces  in  its  towering  height 
of  mountain  majesty,  recalling  the  victory  of  Joubert  to  the 
burghers  whom  he  again  commanded,  and  conjuring  up  in  British 
thoughts  the  fate  of  Colley  and  of  his  defeated  forces.  To  repeat 
Majuba  was  the  vow  and  determination  on  one  side;  to  avenge  and 
reverse  Majuba  the  grim  resolve  on  the  other.  Ingogo  and  Laing’s 
Nek  were  likewise  inspiring  memories  in  the  one  camp,  and  of 
humiliating  reverses  in  that  of  the  enemy,  as  both  awaited  the 
signal  which  might  witness  repetitions  of  these  conflicts  on  the 
very  ground  fought  upon  in  1881. 

An  early  indication  of  the  resourcefulness  of  the  burghers  in 
handling  heavy  artillery  was  seen  in  the  dragging  of  a large  Creu- 
sot  gun  up  the  steep  side  of  Boskop  Hill,  on  the  border  near  Volks- 
rust, the  day  the  last  Boer  message  was  handed  to  Great  Britain’s 
representative.  The  placing  of  this  piece  upon  the  mountain  was 
deemed  to  be  impossible  by  tbe  Creusot  engineer,  M.  Leon,  who 
was  present.  The  hill  was  considered  too  precipitous  and  rugged. 
This,  however,  was  not  the  view  of  the  Boers.  Three  hundred 
volunteers  were  called  for  by  Colonel  Trichardt,  ropes  and  chains 
were  requisitioned,  and  in  a few  hours’  time  the  muzzle  of  the  for- 
midable gun,  subsequently  known  as  “ Long  Tom,”  was  pointing 
from  the  towering  elevation  towards  the  enemy’s  position  across 
the  border. 

Before  orders  were  received  from  Pretoria  for  a forward  move- 
ment, General  Joubert  had  issued  instructions  to  all  the  men  and 
officers,  both  as  to  the  discipline  and  conduct  of  burghers  when  in 
occupation  of  any  portion  of  the  enemy’s  country.  In  reference  to 
their  attitude  towards  food  and  property  when  in  British  territory 
he  spoke  in  strong  terms,  and  his  words  of  warning  were  in  keeping 
with  his  whole  career  and  character.  He  said: 

“ When  we  are  unwillingly  compelled  to  cross  the  border-line  of 
our  country,  let  it  not  be  thought  or  said  that  we  are  a band  of 
robbers;  and  with  that  view  let  us  remain  as  far  as  possible  away 
from  anjj^  private  dwellings  or  places,  where  no  enemy  is  stationed, 
and  not  allow  each  one  to  help  himself. 

“ When  food,  forage,  or  cattle  are  needed,  let  one  or  two  persons 
be  appointed  in  each  division,  and  let  them  be  assisted  by  as  many 
men,  and,  if  necessary,  officers,  as  may  be  required  to  acquire 


88 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


such  goods  from  the  owner  or  caretaker,  enter  them  upon  a proper 
list,  and,  if  desired,  let  a receipt  be  given  for  the  same,  with  a 
promise  of  recompense  the  Government  of  the  S.  A.  E. 

“ I will  not  allow  robbery  or  plunder,  and  forbid  any  personal 
injury  to  be  done  to  any  private  individual. — P.  J.  Joubert, 
Commandant-General.’’ 

Commandant-General  Joubert  was  in  his  68th  year  when  he 
found  himself  once  again  in  the  field  against  the  implacable  enemy 


DETACH5IENT  OF  BOERS  GUARDING  A PASS 


of  Boer  nationhood.  He  was  born  on  the  21st  of  January,  1831, 
in  the  district  of  Graaff-Eeinet,  Cape  Colony.  His  Breton  ancestors 
arrived  in  the  country  in  1688;  one  Pierre  Joubert  and  his  young 
wife,  Isabeau  Eichard,  having  formed  part  of  the  Huguenot  con- 
tingent of  emigrants  sent  out  by  the  Netherlands  Company  twenty 
years  after  Jan  Van  Eiebeck’s  original  consignment  of  settlers  had 
arrived  at  the  Cape.  The  Jouberts  joined  in  the  first  Boer  trek 
rather  than  live  as  British  subjects,  and  followed  Pretorius,  Uys, 
Potgieter,  and  others  into  Natal  to  found  a State  of  their  own. 
The  English  pursued  them,  grabbed  the  country,  and  the  Jouberts, 
with  others  of  their  race,  crossed  into  the  Transvaal.  Joshua  Fran- 


DISPOSITION  OF  FORCES 


89 


^ois,  the  father  of  the  future  general,  died  shortly  after  the  selec- 
tion of  the  new  home  and  country,  and  the  son,  with  other  chil- 
dren, was  left  to  the  care  of  a widowed  mother.  He  grew  into 
manhood  a strong,  clear-headed  youth,  with  a more  than  average 
Boer  education;  his  family  being  well  known  for  its  accomplish- 
ments, and  his  own  acquirements  being  supplemented  in  the  tui- 
tion of  an  English  teacher,  a Mr.  Stead,  of  Pretoria. 

In  1852  he  took  part  in  the  campaign  against  the  Chief  Sechele, 
the  Kaffir  protege  of  the  famous  Dr.  Livingston.  In  this  he  had 
for  a companion-in-arms  his  future  friend,  Paul  Kruger.  He  mar- 
ried a Miss  Botha,  and  settled  at  Wakkerstroom,  where  his  ability 
in  matters  of  business  and  general  capacity  won  him  the  esteem 
and  confidence  of  his  fellow-burghers.  He  was  elected  to  the 
Yolksraad  in  1863,  and  remained  the  representative  of  his  district 
until  he  was  elected  to  the  Chairmanship  of  the  Assembly  in  1875. 
His  part  in  the  opposition  to  the  Shepstone-Frere  Scheme  of  An- 
nexation, and  in  the  Mar  of  Freedom  which  followed  has  been 
briefly  touched  upon  in  his  letter  to  Queen  Victoria. 

His  command  of  the  small  forces  of  the  Transvaal  in  the  con- 
tests with  the  unfortunate  General  Colley  showed  him  to  be  an 
able  officer,  with  all  the  magnetic  qualities  of  a soldier  who  can 
inspire  great  confidence  in  his  subordinates.  By  a series  of  rapid 
but  well-calculated  movements  he  smashed  the  blundering  English- 
man in  every  encounter,  and  finally  overwhelmed  him  in  the  bril- 
liant attack  which  on  the  summit  of  Majuba  ended  both  the  career 
of  Colley  and  the  usurpation  of  the  English. 

The  triumphs  of  the  Mar  of  Freedom  gave  Joubert  unbounded 
prestige  with  the  Boer  people,  and  his  subsequent  visits  to  Eng- 
land and  the  United  States  enabled  him  to  taste  some  of  the  pleas- 
urable recognition  of  a widespread  fame.  He  subsequently  con- 
tested the  Presidency  of  the  Eepublic  twice  with  Mr.  Kruger,  and 
was  beaten  by  only  700  votes  in  the  first  election.  In  Trans- 
vaal politics  he  was  what  might  be  called  progressive,  in  oppo- 
sition to  Mr.  Kruger’s  more  conservative  principles  and  views.  He 
was  the  first  debater  in  the  Volksraad,  and  a gifted  after-dinner 
speaker.  His  popularity  in  the  Eepublic  was  probably  greater  than 
that  of  the  President,  and  his  position  as  Commandant-General  was 
as  secure  in  the  confidence  of  the  people  as  was  that  of  the  Presi- 
dency for  his  friend  and  rival.  He  was  less  opposed  to  the  English, 
in  a racial  sense,  than  other  Boer  leaders,  and  up  to  the  receipt 
of  Mr.  Chamberlain’s  ultimatum  on  the  22nd  of  September,  1899, 
reposed  a greatly  misguided  confidence  in  the  Liberalism  of  Eng- 
land and  of  the  once  Gladstonian  Party. 

The  veteran  of  many  small  campaigns,  the  capable  organizer 


Major  Albrecht  Du  Plessls  Nel  President  Stejm  OUlvler  J.  Prinsloo  De  YlHiers 

M.  Prinsloo  Van  Zyl  Du  Plooy  Lubbe  Naudi 


JlilCKBOn,  ^ ^ , -.r 

State  Attorney  Swanepoel  Steenkamp  Ferreira  Flck  Potgieter  Wessels  Du  Tolt  van  der  A-.erwe 


DISPOSITION  OF  FORCES 


91 


of  a few  thousand  burghers  when  his  French  and  Dutch  blood 
coursed  more  swiftly  through  his  veins,  was  called  upon  when  near- 
ing his  seventieth  year  to  fight  the  greatest  army  England  had  ever 
placed  in  the  field.  The  task  was  too  big  for  the  conqueror  of 
Colley,  and  he  crossed  the  Natal  frontier  on  the  12th  of  October 
with  none  of  the  enthusiasm  and  little  of  the  confidence  with  which 
he  carried  the  Vierkleur  to  victory  on  this  same  ground  twenty 
golden  years  before. 


Chapter  IX 


KRAAIPAN 

Some  Boer  initial  mistakes — First  blood  for  the  Federals — Kraaipan 
— Boer  and  British  reports  compared — Sketch  of  General 
Hercules  De  la  Key. 

The  Federals  lost  no  time  in  resolving  to  meet  the  enemy  after 
war  had  been  declared.  At  midnight,  on  the  11th  of  October, 
in  a downpour  of  rain,  Joubert’s  forces  rode  in  three  columns  over 
the  frontier  of  Xatal,  at  Laing’s  Nek,  Botha’s  Pass,  and  a drift 
over  the  Buffalo  Eiver.  The  invading  commandoes  comprised  the 
Middelburg,  Pretoria,  Johannesburg,  Krugersdorp,  Heidelberg, 
Ermelo,  Standerton,  Wakkerstroom,  Utrecht,  and  Vryheid  burgh- 
ers, the  Hollander  Corps,  and  Blake’s  Irish  Brigade. 

At  the  same  midnight  hour  on  the  11th,  De  la  Key,  at  the  head 
of  a strong  patrol  of  Cronje’s  western  column,  crossed  the  Bechu- 
analand  border,  about  twenty  miles  to  the  south  of  Mafeking,  on 
a reconnaissance  to  discover  the  strength  and  possible  movements 
of  its  garrison. 

Cronje’s  force,  numbering  some  5,000  men,  had  been  laagered 
at  Polfontein,  since  being  mobilized.  It  consisted  of  the  Marico, 
Eustenburg,  Potchefstroom,  Lichtenburg,  and  Bloemof  comman- 
does; these  being  the  western  districts  of  the  Transvaal  which  their 
burghers  were  called  upon  to  defend  under  the  Boer  system  of 
territorial  military  organization.  With  these  commandoes  was  a 
small  Scandinavian  corps. 

This  relatively  strong  force  was  meant  more  as  a check  upon 
the  Mafeking  garrison  than  for  any  contemplated  invasion  of  the 
Bechuanaland  territory.  It  was  not  intended  to  act  as  a unit,  but 
to  supply  such  details  of  men  as  the  movements  of  the  enemy  over 
the  border  and  in  Ehodesia  might  require  in  the  work  of  stopping 
any  attempted  entry  into  the  Transvaal  from  British  possessions 
west  and  north.  It  soon  became  necessary  in  the  carrying  out  of 
this  plan,  to  divide  this  force  into  three  small  divisions;  one  under 
De  la  Eey,  one  under  Commandant  Snyman,  with  the  stronger  of 
the  three  bodies  remaining  with  the  old  hero  of  Potchefstroom, 
for  his  subsequent  combats  with  Methuen,  Kitchener,  and  others. 


KEAAIPAN 


93 


The  initial  blunder  of  the  war  on  the  part  of  the  Boer  generals 
was  committed  in  this  disposition  and  division  of  the  western  com- 
mandoes. It  was  part  of  the 
deplorably  short-sighted  policy 
of  wasting  men  and  opportuni- 
ties in  watcliing  comparatively 
small  British  garrisons.  The 
troops  under  Baden-Powell  in 
Mafeking  would  not  have  ven- 
tured to  cross  the  frontier  for 
any  serious  purpose,  nor  could 
the  Ehodesian  levies  inflict  much 
injury  upon  the  thinly-peopled 
localities  in  the  northwest  before 
assistance  from  the  eastern  dis- 
tricts would  arrive  and  hold 
them  in  check.  Almost  a third 
of  the  whole  Transvaal  army 
was  sent  to  watch  a few  thou- 
sand troops  who  were  cut  off 
from  reenforcements,  while 
Joubert  was  to  attempt,  with  less  than  doi;l)le  the  same  number 
of  Cronje’s  burghers,  the  invasion  of  territory  held  by  British 

forces  larger  than  his  own,  and  which 
were  being  increased  by  every  transport 
arriving  from  England.  A plan  similar 
to  Joubert’s,  which  Cronje  in  part  at- 
tempted when  too  late,  would  have 
changed  the  whole  fortunes  of  the  war, 
if  carried  out  simultaneously  with  the 
crossing  of  the  Commandant-General 
into  Natal.  De  Aar  Junction,  on  the 
main  line  from  Cape  Town  to  Kimber- 
ley, was  some  sixty  miles  south  of  the 
Orange  Eiver.  Enormous  military 
stores  were  accumulated  there  as  part 
of  the  plan  for  the  British  advance  on 
Bloemfontein,  with  only  a weak  garri- 
son in  defense  of  the  place.  Naauw- 
poort,  another  railway  junction  some 
fifty  miles  eastward,  and  near  a strong 
pro-Boer  center,  could  have  been  taken 
with  comparative  ease.  The  English  trembled  for  the  fate  of  these 
places  in  the  first  week  of  the  war,  but  the  commandoes  under 


94 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Grobler  across  the  river,  and  of  Prinsloo  and  Wessels  near  Bel- 
mont and  Kimberley,  made  no  move  on  these  vulnerable  positions. 
Had  Cronje  advanced  south  on  Kimberley,  at  the  time  Joubert 
marched  through  Laing’s  Kek,  the  Diamond  City  would  have  been 
in  the  hands  of  the  Federals  long  before  Lord  Methuen  could  have 
forced  his  way  past  De  Aar.  The  fear  of  offending  a Bond  Minis- 
try in  Cape  Colony  was  to  blame  for  this  disastrous  act  of  omission. 

The  first  encounter  of  the  war  occurred  at  Kraaipan,  south  of 
Mafeking,  and  to  General  De  la  Eey  belongs  the  credit  of  securing 
the  initial  victory  for  the  cause  of  the  Eepublic.  He  had  started 
from  Cronje’s  laager  with  two  hundred  Lichtenburghers  before 


1 


TUE  FIRST  SHOTS  OF  THE  WAR — FIRING  ON  THE  ARMORED  TRAIN  AT  KRAAIPAN 


artillery  had  arrived  from  Pretoria,  in  order  to  be  over  the  border 
at  midnight,  and  was  to  await  the  arrival  of  Captain  Van  der 
Merwe  with  guns  before  engaging  any  force  he  might  locate  be- 
tween Vryburg  and  Mafeking.  On  reaching  the  railway  station 
at  Kraaipan  he  found  that  the  English  outposts  at  that  place  had 
retired  on  seeing  the  approach  of  the  Boers.  De  la  Eey,  in  await- 
ing the  arrival  of  Van  der  Merwe,  tore  up  the  railway  going  south 
to  Kimberley,  and  cut  the  telegraph  wires. 

The  object  for  which  the  column  had  crossed  the  border  was 
accomplished,  but  De  la  Eey  remained  for  possible  developments 
from  the  direction  of  Mafeking.  His  scouts  soon  discovered  an 
armored  train  steaming  from  the  south  towards  the  railway  station. 
This  mobile  fort  consisted  of  an  engine  and  two  trucks  lined  with 
bullet-proof  armor  sheeting,  and  was  armed  with  a Maxim  and 


KEAAIPAN 


95 


two  mountain  guns.  The  “ fort  ” bore  down  upon  the  station  at 
Kraaipan  during  the  evening  of  the  12th  of  October,  the  officer 
in  command  being  evidently  ignorant  of  the  damage  done  to  the 
railway  line.  The  engine  and  trucks  capsized  on  reaching  the 
derailed  spot,  hut  not  so  completely  as  to  prevent  the  surprised 
occupants  from  trying  to  replace  the  train  on  the  rails.  This  the 
Boers  easily  succeeded  in  preventing  by  their  rifle  fire.  The  Eng- 
lish were  enabled,  however,  to  use  their  mountain  guns  and  Maxim, 
and  by  this  means  to  keep  De  la  Key  at  a respectful  distance  dur- 
ing the  night. 

The  official  report  of  this  opening  engagement  of  the  war,  as 
sent  by  General  Cronje  to  Pretoria,  was  as  follows  : 

“ General  De  la  Key  on  his  arrival  at  Kraaipan  found  that  all 
the  British  troops  and  police  had  fled  to  Mafeking. 

“ He  immediately  tore  up  the  railway  lines  on  both  sides  of  the 
station,  and  also  cut  the  telegraph  wires. 

“ In  the  evening  a locomotive  with  two  wagons,  protected  by  iron 
work,  was  seen  approaching  the  derailed  spot. 

“ On  reaching  it  the  locomotive  capsized,  together  with  the 
wagons. 

“ The  burghers  prevented  the  train  from  being  replaced  on  the 
rails,  and  were  successful  in  their  efforts  throughout  the  night. 

“ Meanwhile  the  enemy  kept  up  a hot  fire  with  a Maxim  and  two 
mountain  guns. 

“ The  burghers  kept  strict  watch  during  the  night. 

In  the  morning  Captain  Van  der  Merwe  arrived  with  cannon. 

“ Directly  he  opened  Are  with  them,  the  white  flag  was  hoisted, 
and  the  enemy  surrendered. 

“ On  our  side  there  was  no  wounded. 

“ The  enemy’s  casualties  were  their  captain  and  eight  men 
(slightly)  wounded. 

Dum-Dum  (Mark  IV  ?)  bullets  were  found  with  the  enemy.” 

This  account,  brief  and  laconic  as  it  is,  as  dealing  with  the  first 
fight  of  the  war,  was  a lengthy  document  in  comparison  with  re- 
ports of  more  important  engagements  in  which  Cronje  took  part 
subsequently.  His  first  “ story  ” of  the  brilliant  victory  he  gained 
at  Magersfontein  was  told  in  a despatch  of  thirty  words.  Doubt- 
less the  above  report  was  that  sent  to  the  old  veteran  by  De  la 
Key,  and  transmitted  as  received  by  Cronje  to  the  War  Department 
at  Pretoria. 

The  report,  it  will  be  seen,  is  a bald  statement  of  facts.  There 
is  not  a word  of  self-praise  or  of  Boer  glorification  in  it.  The 
details  of  the  encounter  are  related  in  the  restrained  and  sober 
language  which  has  invariably  characterized  the  utterances  of  these 
maligned  people  in  their  dealings  with  their  enemy. 


96 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


As  a sample  of  the  contrary  spirit  which  has  prevailed  in  almost 
every  phase  of  this  war,  the  spirit  of  boastful  achievement,  of  Fal- 
stafiian  exaggeration  on  the  British  side,  the  following  account  of 
the  Kraaipan  affair,  which  appeared  in  the  British  press,  is  in- 
teresting. 

The  Kimberley  war  news  man’s  history  of  the  fight  at  the  train 
reads  as  follows: 

“Kimberley,  Friday  Afternoon. — The  armored  train  to  which 
the  disaster  happened  was  a small  one,  and  it  was  sent  from 
Mafeking  on  Thursday  morning  for  the  purpose  of  repairing  the 
telegraph  lines  which  had  been  cut  by  the  Boers. 

“ It  was  commanded  by  Captain  Nesbit,  and  the  crew  consisted 
of  fifteen  men  of  the  Bechuanaland  Protectorate  Field  Force  and  a 
skilled  telegraphist. 

“ The  train  was  named  the  Mosquito. 

“ All  went  well  until  the  train  was  nearing  Kraaipan,  where  the 
telegraph  break  had  been  localized. 

“ At  that  point  the  look-out  man  saw  a Boer  battery  ( ! ) posted 
in  a position  commanding  the  track. 

“ Captain  Kesbit  determined  to  make  a run  for  it,  and  putting 
on  full  steam  made  the  attempt. 

“ The  Boer  artillery  ( !)  opened  fire,  and  almost  simultaneously  a 
mine  ( !)  exploded  beneath  the  track,  and  in  another  moment  the 
armored  train  was  off  the  rails. 

“ Captain  Nesbit  and  his  men  took  up  positions  and  commenced 
to  return  the  Boer  fire. 

“ The  Boers  steadily  pounded  the  train  with  shell  ( !)  and  Nesbit 
and  his  men  pluckily  replied. 

“ The  unequal  fight  lasted  for  four  hours.  At  the  end  of  that 
time  there  was  no  longer  any  response  from  the  Mosquito,  and 
the  Boers  then  advanced  and  took  possession  of  what  was  left  of 
it. 

“ It  is  known  that  the  Boers  lost  heavily  ( ! ) 

“ The  list  of  casualties  on  our  side  has  not  been  received,  but 
there  is  too  much  reason  to  fear  that  Captain  Nesbit  and  all 
his  men,  including  the  civilian  telegraphist,  perished  at  their 
posts.”  (!!) 

Various  editors  of  London  Jingo  papers,  not  to  be  outdone  by 
the  Kimberley  historian  in  the  eulogy  of  Nesbit  and  his  men,  de- 
clared that  such  bravery  as  theirs,  in  “ dying  at  their  posts  in 
preference  to  surrender,  added  another  glorious  chapter  to  English 
military  annals.”  When  the  truth  had  a chance  of  competing 
with  the  war  correspondents  and  their  editorial  rivals,  it  was  found 
that  Captain  Nesbit’s  thumb  had  been  slightly  injured  in  the  en- 
counter, and  that  all  his  men  were  prisoners,  practically  unhurt, 
in  the  hands  of  the  Boers,  having  hoisted  the  white  flag. 


7 


THE  ARMORED  TRAIN  CAPTURED  AT  KRAAIPAN 


98 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Armored  trains  as  novelties  in  actual  warfare  were  destined  not 
to  perform  the  feats  which  the  English  counted  upon  in  their  con- 
struction. The  idea  sought  to  he  carried  out  was  to  build  a mobile 
fort  for  patrol  and  reconnaissance  purposes,  and  for  the  repairing 
of  railways  when  damaged  by  the  Boers.  It  seemed  not  to  occur 
to  the  military  minds  who  planned  these  machines  that  the  dis- 
placement of  a single  rail  in  front  or  behind  the  locomotive  would 
place  the  trucks,  their  defenders,  and  guns  at  the  mercy  of  an 
attacking  party.  They  were  also  built  in  ignorance  of  the  pene- 
trating j^ower  of  the  Creusot  field  gun  and  of  the  Maxim-Norden- 
felt,  and  have  in  consequence  been  a complete  failure  in  the  war. 

These  trains  consisted  of  two  or  more  carriages  sheeted  over  with 


MOUNTAIN  GUNS  CAPTURED  AT  KRAAIPAN  MANNED  BY  STAATS  ARTILLERY 


three-quarter  inch  boiler  iron.  The  engine  was  placed  between 
the  trucks  and  protected  with  armor  plating,  the  cab  being  roofed 
over  by  similar  covering.  Each  truck  was  fitted  to  hold  some  fifty 
men,  with  loopholes  for  machine  guns  and  slots  for  rifle  fire. 

GENERAL  DE  LA  KEY 

Jacob  Hercules  De  la  Rey,  who  fought  the  first  successful  en- 
gagement of  the  war,  first  saw  the  light  in  the  district  of  Lichten- 
burg  fift3^-four  years  ago.  His  father  was  born  in  the  Orange  Free 
State  and  was  of  Huguenot  origin.  He  took  part  with  Pretorius 
in  driving  the  English  out  of  Bloemfontein  in  1848,  and  had  his 
farm  and  property  confiscated  after  Sir  Harry  Smith  had  reversed 
the  situation  by  forcing  the  old  Boer  warrior  back  again  across  the 
Vaal.  The  De  la  Eeys  sought  a new  home  in  the  west  of  the  Trans- 
vaal, where  Jacob  Hercules  spent  his  early  life.  The  general  is 


KRAAIPAN 


99 


a man  over  the  medium  height,  sinewy  in  build,  and  remarkable 
for  his  quiet,  dignified  manner.  He  has  deep-set,  dark  eyes,  a 
prominent  Eoman  nose,  and  a large,  dark  brown  beard,  giving  to 
his  face  a strong,  handsome,  and  patrician  expression. 

He  was  born  of  a fighting  family,  and  has  had  the  experience 
and  training  of  campaigns  in  conflicts  with  hostile  Kaffir  tribes. 
His  first  command  was  in  the  war  which  the  English  incited  the 
Basutos  to  wage  against  the  Free  State  in  the  early  sixties,  when 
he  was  quite  young.  These  experiences  qualified  him  for  a promi- 
nent military  position  when  the  present  war  broke  out,  and  he  was 
unanimously  elected  to  the  command  of  the  Lichtenhurg  burghers 
who  became  part  of  Cronje’s  western  column. 

He  represented  his  native  district  in  the  A^olksraad  for  ten  years, 
and  was  a consistent  supporter  of  the  Jouhert,  as  against  the 
Kruger,  following  in  that  Assembly.  He  favored  a large  franchise 
concession  to  the  Uitlanders  as  a means  of  averting  a conflict  with 
England,  but  soon  saw  that  a demand  for  political  reforms  was 
only  a pretext  for  precipitating  a conflict.  He  was  one  of  the  most 
ardent  advocates  of  an  attacking  as  against  a defensive  military 
policy  when  England  forced  a resort  to  hostilities. 

Like  General  Cronje,  he  carries  no  weapons  in  the  field.  His 
field-glass,  wooden  pipe,  and,  last  but  not  least,  his  Bible,  are  his 
inseparable  companions.  He  is  a universal  favorite  with  the 
burghers  of  both  Eepublics,  and  inspires  great  confidence  in  his 
men  by  his  almost  unerring  military  judgment,  splendid  general- 
ship, heroic  courage,  an  indomitable  tenacity  of  purpose,  and  an 
all-round  resourcefulness  in  all  emergencies. 

He  is  remarkably  self-contained  in  his  actions,  never  getting 
excited,  even  in  the  thickest  of  the  fight,  but  always  remaining 
cool,  cautious,  and  alert. 

Colonel  Baden-Powell  essayed  a double  blow  at  his  assailants  on 
the  day  of  the  catastrophe  to  Captain  Kesbit’s  armored  train  at 
Kraaipan.  Learning  of  the  approach  of  another  body  of  Boers, 
towards  a point  on  the  line  about  a dozen  miles  north  of  Mafeking, 
he  despatched  two  trucks  laden  with  dynamite,  and  hauled  by  an 
engine  to  the  locality.  On  nearing  the  place  occupied  by  a party 
of  Marico  burghers,  the  engine  driver  unhooked  his  engine,  let  his 
trucks  run  forward,  and  then  retraced  his  way,  safely,  back  to 
Mafeking.  The  Boers  fired  upon  the  trucks,  as  was  expected,  and 
a terrible  explosion  followed.  Powell’s  calculation  was  not,  how- 
ever, realized.  The  wary  Boers  did  not  approach  the  trucks  as 
near  as  their  chivalrous  foe  had  hoped  for  and  anticipated,  the 
result  being  a great  waste  of  dynamite  on  the  British  side,  with 
no  loss  to  the  objects  of  this  savagely-devised  plan  of  slaughter. 


09RMAV  & CO^,  N.Y 


KRAAIPAN 


101 


The  first  prisoners  taken  in  the  war  were  the  men  who  had  been 
captured  at  Kraaipan  by  General  De  la  Eey,  after  the  fight  over  the 
armored  train.  They  were  kindly  treated  by  their  captors,  on  their 
own  admission,  and  sent  on  to  General  Cronje’s  head  laager  at  Pol- 
fontein.  Cronje  telegraphed  to  Pretoria  for  instructions  as  to  what 
action  he  was  to  take  with  these  prisoners,  intimating  in  the  same 
message  that  he  favored  their  being  put  over  the  border  upon 
swearing  they  would  not  take  up  arms  again  against  the  Republics. 
The  Executive  at  Pretoria  instructed  the  general  to  forward  his 
prisoners  to  the  capital.  Cronje’s  generous  impulse  and  soldierly 
desire  did  him  great  credit.  The  day  was  to  come  when  very  little 
of  the  same  consideration  would  be  shown  towards  himself  by  his 
foes.  The  future  prisoner  of  St.  Helena  had  not  yet  learned  that 
nothing  even  akin  to  soldierly  chivalry  was  to  be  expected  on  the 
side  of  the  forces  fighting  for  England.  In  ordering  the  general 
to  send  his  prisoners  to  Pretoria,  the  Executive  were  not  unmind- 
ful of  the  obligations  on  which  civilized  warfare  insists  in  the  treat- 
ment of  captured  foes.  By  the  special  order  of  President  Kruger, 
Field  Cornet  Meintjes  was  despatched  to  Lichtenburg  with  a mule- 
wagon  load  of  refreshments  for  the  use  of  the  prisoners  during  the 
journey  to  the  Boer  capital. 


Chapter  X 


THE  ADVANCE  ON  DUNDEE 


Invasion  of  Natal — Joubert’s  commandoes  and  plans — The  English 
FORCES  IN  Dundee  and  Ladysmith — Scene  of  the  impending  battle 
DESCRIBED TALANA  HiLL SKETCH  OF  GENERAL  LUKAS  MeTER. 

HILE  events  were  taking  place,  as  related,  on  the  Western 


V V border,  the  main  burgher  forces,  under  the  immediate  com- 
mand of  Joubert,  had  moved  southward  into  Natal,  across  the  pass 
known  as  Laing’s  Nek.  Not  expecting  any  serious  attempt  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy  to  defend  Charlestown,  the  Commandant- 
General  had  Newcastle  as  his  objective;  a small  town  distant  about 
twenty-five  miles  from  Laing’s  Nek,  and  where  a body  of  Colonial 
troops  had  been  for  some  time  watching  for  movements  from  the 
Transvaal.  Charlestown  had  also  been  occupied  by  the  British, 
but  they  fell  back  on  Newcastle  on  learning  of  the  advance  of 
General  Jan  Kock  through  Botha’s  Pass  with  the  Johannesburg 
and  Band  commandoes.  The  village  was  found  by  the  Boers  to  have 
been  looted  by  Kaffirs  and  Coolies  after  the  departure  of  the  Eng- 
lish forces. 

The  country  through  which  the  burghers  were  to  force  their  way 
to  meet  the  enemy  is  remarkable  for  its  superb  mountain  scenery 
and  for  its  historic  associations.  The  road  from  Standerton  through 
Volksrust  crosses  the  Drakensberg  range  and  goes  on  to  Newcastle 
and  Ladysmith  by  the  pass  of  Laing’s  Nek.  The  Nek  is  over  4,000 
feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea,  and  is  an  opening  in  the  range  seven 
miles  long,  which  ends  on  the  west  in  an  imposing  mountain  with 
precipitous  sides  and  some  wooded  ravines.  This  hill  is  Majuba. 
The  summit  is  more  or  less  table-shaped,  and  the  view  from  it 
embraces  the  magnificent  alpine  prospect  of  the  towering  Drakens- 
bergs  to  the  west  and  south,  and  a country  of  diversified  pictur- 
esqueness to  the  east,  with  defiles  and  valleys  through  which  the 
Buffalo  Eiver  winds  its  way  southward  to  the  Tugela;  separating 
in  its  course  the  Utrecht  and  Vryheid  (Transvaal)  districts  from 
the  northeastern  frontier  of  Natal — a country  of  mountains  and 
ridges,  of  kopjes,  valleys,  and  grassy  plateaus,  with  its  bracing  alti- 
tudes and  inspiring  natural  panorama.  Down  from  these  heights. 


THE  ADVANCE  ON  DUNDEE 


103 


and  past  ]\Iajuba,  Joubert  and  his  burghers  rode  resolutely  on  the 
12th  and  13th  of  October  to  encounter  the  forces  of  the  British 
Empire  and  to  decide  again,  and  perhaps  forever,  whether  Boer  or 
Briton  shall  rule  the  Transvaal. 

While  the  Commandant-General  was  advancing  upon  the  English 
positions  from  the  north  by  the  direct  road  from  Volksrust,  a small 
force  under  Eield  Cornet  Botha,  form- 
ing part  of  the  Vryheid  commando, 
had  crossed  the  Jfatal  border  at  De 
Jager’s  Drift,  on  the  Buffalo  Eiver, 
on  a reconnaissance.  Six  frontier  po- 
lice were  taken  without  any  resistance 
by  Botha’s  men  on  touching  Natal 
soil,  and  he  thus  shared  with  De  la 
Eey  the  credit  of  making  the  first 
haul  of  British  prisoners. 

On  the  15th  of  October  scouts 
brought  tidings  to  Newcastle  of  the 
British  positions  to  the  south  as  far 
as  Glencoe  Junction  and  Dundee. 

The  enemy’s  outposts  at  Dannhauser, 
on  the  railway  line  twelve  miles  south 
of  Newcastle,  had  fallen  back  on 
Glencoe  on  learning  that  Jan  Kock 
and  Viljoen’s  column  of  Johannes- 
burgers  had  swept  southward  over  the 
Biggarsberg  to  the  west  of  Glencoe, 
and  were  believed  to  be  intent  on 
forming  a junction  with  Prinsloo’s 
Free  Staters,  who  had  entered  Natal 
through  Van  Eeenan’s  Pass.  The 
main  British  camp  was  located  on 
the  road  from  Glencoe  Junction  to 
Dundee,  where  General  Penn  Symons  was  in  command  of  a com- 
bined infantry  and  cavalry  force  estimated  at  6,000  men,  and  four 
batteries  of  field  artillery. 

It  was  decided  by  the  Boer  generals  to  make  an  attack  upon 
Penn  Symons  on  the  morning  of  Friday,  the  20th,  from  two  hills, 
one  to  the  east  and  one  to  the  northwest  of  Dundee,  which  the 
English  had  left  unguarded  on  the  flanks  of  their  position.  Gen- 
eral Lukas  Meyer,  with  2,500  burghers  and  four  guns,  was  to  ad- 
vance on  the  Transvaal  side  of  Briflalo  Eiver  as  far  as  Doornberg, 
east  of  Dundee,  and  in  a night  march  from  thence  to  reach  Craig- 
side,  or  Talana  Hill,  on  the  early  morning  of  the  appointed  day. 


104 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Commandant  Erasmus,  with  3,000  men  and  Trichardt’s  artillery, 
was  to  proceed  south  from  Dannhauser  along  the  railway,  and, 
striking  eastward  from  the  line  a few  miles  north  of  Glencoe,  make 
(also  under  cover  of  a night  march)  for  the  heights  of  Impati,  which 
overlooked  the  British  position  to  the  west;  the  plan  being  to  de- 
liver a simultaneous  blow  at  Penn  Symons  from  the  hills  to  his 
right  and  left. 

From  telegrams  left  behind  at  Dundee  after  the  battle  about 
to  be  described,  and  which  fell  into  Boer  hands,  the  English  general 
appeared  to  be  in  complete  ignorance  of  Joubert’s  movements  up 
to  the  18th.  He  was  also  uncertain  as  to  his  ability  to  hold  the 
place  if  attacked  by  the  Boers.  The  following  messages  were  sent 
by  him  to  General  White  and  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  at  Ladysmith; 

“ Glencoe  Camp,  October  18th. 

“ From  G.O.C.  to  Chief  of  Staff,  Ladysmith. 

“ 1.35. — Large  body  of  Boers  reported  by  our  patrols  to  be  at 
Dannhauser.  Our  Basuto  scouts  say  that  they  have  seven  guns 
with  them,  and  that  they  are  coming  straight  here  to  attack  us. 
Our  patrols  are  watching  them  now,  and  I have  sent  out  a squadron 
of  cavalry  in  support.  Dannhauser  is  14  miles  from  this  camp. 
Dundee  was  cleared  last  night  of  undesirable  men.-’’ 

“ 9.45. — Last  patrol  from  the  north  has  come  in.  There  were 
no  Boers  at  Dannhauser  at  6 p.m.  The  officer  in  charge  was 
told  that  many  of  the  enemy  at  Ingagane  had  gone  back  to  New- 
castle. As  a result  of  further  inquiries  I am  convinced  that,  unless 
more  rain  falls,  from  want  of  water  Dundee  could  not  be  invested 
by  a large  force  for  any  length  of  time.” 

It  will  be  seen  from  this  official  message  of  the  English  general 
that  armed  Kaffirs  (all  scouts  are  necessarily  armed)  were  used  by 
the  English  from  the  very  outbreak  of  the  war. 

It  appears  from  the  following  telegram  that  General  White  had 
contemplated  the  withdrawal  of  Penn  Symons  and  his  force  from 
Dundee,  on  learning  of  the  advance  of  Kock  and  Viljoen  southward 
of  Glencoe.  The  rapid  advance  of  Joubert’s  column  from  New- 
castle on  the  19  th  frustrated  this  intention. 

The  telegram  reads  : 


“ Glencoe  Camp,  18th  October,  3.26  a.m. 

“ From  General  Symons  to  Sir  George  White,  Ladysmith. 

“ 1.33. — Urgent.  Clear  the  line.  I cannot  fulfil  the  conditions 
you  impose,  namely,  to  strongly  entrench  myself  here  with  an 
assured  water  supply  within  my  position.  I must  therefore  comply 


THE  ADVANCE  ON  DUNDEE 


105 


with  your  order  to  retire.  Please  to  send  trains  to  remove  civilians 
that  will  remain  in  Dundee,  our  stores,  and  sick.  I must  give  out 
that  I am  moving  stores  and  camp  to  Glencoe  Junction  in  view  of 
attacking  Newcastle  at  once. 

“W.  P.  Symons,  L.G.” 

The  egregious  Moneypenny,  of  the  Johannesburg  “ Star,”  was 
likewise  at  fault  in  his  journalistic  scouting  for  the  London 
“ Times  ” at  Dundee,  but  from  the  concluding  words  in  the  fol- 
lowing message  it  would  appear  that  if  he  knew  nothing  about  the 
movements  of  the  Boers  he  still  knew  how  to  libel  them  ; 

“ From  Moneypenny,  to  ‘ Times,’  London. 

“ Glencoe  Camp,  October  18th. — Attack  this  position,  which 
thought  possible  last  few  days,  seems  not  likely  take  place.  No 
evidence  enemy  in  force  this  side  Newcastle,  and  patrols  report 
small  party  which  advanced  Ingagane  retiring.  Vryheid  commando 
believed  near  Landman’s  Drift.  Eeports  state  general  drunken- 
ness, laxity  discipline,  Boer  camp  Newcastle.” 

The  British  Military  Censor  was  also  already  at  work  in  his  task 
of  limiting  the  information  which  the  British  public  was  to  be 
permitted  to  receive  from  English  war  correspondents,  where  they 
did  not  speak  exclusively  of  British  achievements.  The  following 
censored  message  fell  into  Boer  hands  at  Glencoe  : 

“ From  Gumming,  to  Advertiser,’  London. 

“ Eeport  reached  camp  that  Boers  had  been  sighted  seven  miles 
out.  Squadron  18th  Hussars,  under  command  Major  Laming, 
rode  out.  The  advanced  officers’  patrol  under  Lieutenant  Cape, 
on  reaching  brow  of  hill  beyond  Hattingh  Spruit  Station,  discovered 
strong  advance  party  of  enemy.  (Censored:  ‘ The  Hussars  patrol 
fell  back,  and  Boers  advancing  swiftly  poured  in  a scattering  fire 
without  dismounting  at  400  yards.’)  ” 

Dundee  is  a pretty  little  town  with  about  a hundred  and  fifty 
dwellings,  three  or  four  churches,  and  two  or  three  small  hotels. 
It  is  situated  at  the  northeastern  extremity  of  a semicircular  area, 
almost  surrounded  by  hills.  The  railway  from  Glencoe  Junction 
cuts  across  this  stretch  of  rugged  veldt,  which  is  also  intersected 
by  a spruit,  a branch  tributary  of  a small  river  that  falls  into  the 
Buffalo  a few  miles  east  of  the  town.  The  distance  across  the  plain 
from  Glencoe  to  Dundee — that  is,  from  southwest  to  east — is  about 
seven  miles;  while  the  north  to  south  distance  is  some  five  or  six 
miles. 

To  the  east  of  Dundee,  at  a distance  of  about  three  thousand 


106 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


yards,  rises  a square-topped  hill  to  a height  of  twelve  or  fifteen 
hundred  feet  above  the  level  of  the  town.  To  reach  this  hill  from 
the  town,  3^ou  descend  a sloping  road  for  about  a mile,  and,  cross- 
ing a small  spruit  and  wire  fence,  you  begin  to  ascend  the  grassy 
slopes  of  Talana  Hill.  On  the  side  of  the  hill  facing  Dundee  there 
is  a plantation,  some  two  hundred  yards  square,  of  closely-planted 
trees.  The  plantation  does  not  reach  to  the  top  of  the  hill.  To 
the  right  and  left  of  these  trees  pathways  lead  to  the  summit  of 
Talana,  while  an  irregular  fence  of  loose  stones  stretches  across 
the  face  of  the  hill,  starting  from  the  wood  and  going  round  to  the 
crest  of  the  northern  extremity. 

Talana  slopes  down  on  the  right  (still  looking  at  the  hill  from 
Dundee)  over  a nek  to  another  kopje,  at  the  foot  of  which  there 
are  some  coal  mines,  about  three  miles  south  of  the  town.  Beyond 
these  mines  the  ground  rises  again  to  the  Biggarsherg  range  in  the 
direction  of  Helpmaakar  and  Ladysmith.  Between  the  coal  mines 
and  Talana  Hill,  a roadway  passes  over  the  nek  from  Dundee,  under 
the  base  of  the  hill,  leading  on  to  De  Jager’s  Drift,  across  the 
Buffalo  Eiver  and  into  the  Transvaal. 

To  the  left  of  Talana  Hill  (looking  from  Dundee)  there  rises 
Impati  Hill;  a valley  three  or  four  miles  wide  running  in  between 
the  two  hills  towards  Doornberg.  Impati,  like  Talana,  commands 
the  town  of  Dundee  completely,  being  about  6,000  yards  away  to  the 
northwest.  Impati  at  its  highest  point  rises  1,000  feet  above 
the  level  of  the  town,  but  a spur  on  its  southern  slope,  in  the  di- 
rection of  Griencoe,  stands  no  higher  than  400  or  500  feet  over 
the  groiind  on  which  the  English  camp  was  pitched.  The  camp  was 
located  on  a spot  gradually  rising  from  the  town,  and  on  its  western 
side,  distant  about  2,000  yards,  in  the  direction  of  Glencoe. 

Why  a position  was  chosen  on  which  to  meet  the  advancing 
Boers  that  Avas  dominated  by  two  hills  in  the  immediate  direction 
of  their  march,  has  not  been  explained  in  any  English  account  of 
the  two  battles  of  Talana  Hill  and  Dundee.  It  was  possibly  done 
in  ignorance  of  the  fact  of  the  Boers  possessing  artillery  with  a 
range  equal  to  the  distance  from  Impati  to  General  Penn  Symons’ 
location.  In  any  case,  there  was  no  natural  advantage  in  the  Eng- 
lish position  Avhich  could  not  have  been  found  anywhere  behind, 
nearer  to  Glencoe.  Two  miles  further  away  from  Impati  would 
have  taken  the  British  army  beyond  the  reach  of  artillery  on  either 
hill,  while  it  would  have  given  the  English  general’s  mounted 
troops  better  ground  on  which  to  act  if  the  Boer  column  should 
venture  an  attack  on  the  town  of  Dundee  from  the  Doornberg 
direction. 

Another  unexplained  fact  is  even  stranger  still:  no  scouts  had 


108 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


been  placed  on  either  of  the  commanding  hills  to  the  right  and 
left  of  the  British  camp!  Two  very  unpleasant  surprises,  there- 
fore, awaited  the  enemy,  when,  at  five  in  the  morning  of  the  20th 
of  October,  Captain  Pretorius,  of  the  Transvaal  Artillery,  sent  a 
Creusot  shell  from  the  top  of  Talana  Hill  across  the  town  of  Dun- 
dee, clean  into  General  Penn  Symons’  tents.  The  Boers  were  on 
the  hill,  and  they  possessed  guns  which  could  easily  search  the 
British  position. 


GENERAL  MEYER 

Lukas  Johannes  Meyer,  who  was  to  fight  the  first  pitched  battle 
of  the  war  with  the  English  as  Commandant  of  the  Southeastern 
Transvaal  burghers,  was  horn  in  1851  in  the  Orange  Free  State. 
He  removed  in  early  life  to  Natal,  and  ultimately  settled  in  the 

Vryheid  district,  near  the  Zulu 
border.  He  commanded  a 
small  force  under  Joubert  in 
the  War  of  Freedom  in  1881, 
and  was  seriously  wounded  at 
Ingogo,  in  one  of  the  encoun- 
ters with  General  Colley’s 
troops.  A few  years  subse- 
quently he  volunteered  along 
with  some  other  adventurous 
spirits  to  fight  for  the  Zulu 
chief,  Dinizulu,  in  the  latter’s 
campaign  against  a rival  claim- 
ant for  Cetewayo’s  kingship  of 
the  warrior  race  of  Dingaan 
and  Chaka,  and  the  victorious 
son  of  Cetewayo  rewarded 
Meyer  for  his  services  by  pre- 
senting him  with  the  section 
of  Zululand  which  was  wedged 
in  between  the  south  of  Swaziland  and  the  northeast  of  Natal. 

Meyer,  being  of  an  ambitious  and  romantic  disposition,  formed 
his  territory  into  a small  State,  which  he  called  “ The  New  Repub- 
lic.” A large  number  of  Boers  from  the  Transvaal  and  Africanders 
from  Cape  Colony  migrated  to  the  new  Boer  country.  Meyer,  how- 
ever, soon  relinquished  the  idea  of  ruling  a State  by  himself,  and 
obtained  the  consent  of  his  fellow-burghers  to  join  their  territory 
to  that  of  the  Transvaal.  He  was  elected  to  represent  the  Vryheid 
district,  the  locality  of  the  “ New  Republic,”  in  the  Volksraad  at 


TEE  ADVANCE  ON  DUNDEE 


109 


Pretoria,  and  had  graduated  by  ability  and  popularity  to  the  posi- 
tion of  Chairman  of  the  First  Eaad  a few  years  before  war  was 
declared.  He  went  to  the  front  as  Speaker  of  the  Boer  House  of 
Commons. 

Lukas  Meyer  has  a striking  appearance,  being  six  feet  four  in 
height,  and  built  in  proportion,  with  a strong,  handsome  face, 
markedly  German  in  features  and  expression.  He  is  a man  of 
good  education,  with  cultured  tastes,  and  was  immensely  popular 
among  the  Boers  of  his  district,  with  whom  he  was  known  as  “ the 
Lion  of  Vryheid.” 

Daniel  Erasmus,  who  at  the  head  of  the  Pretoria  and  other  com- 
mandoes, was  to  have  cooperated  with  General  Meyer  in  the  attack 
on  Dundee,  had  no  record  or  qualification  for  his  election  to  the 
position  of  Commandant  other  than  his  wealth.  He  is  a tall,  heavy- 
looking, dark  man,  aged  about  fifty,  and  unsoldierly  in  appearance. 


Chapter  XI 


BATTLE  OF  TALANA  HILL 

Boer  and  British  positions — Failure  of  Commandant  Erasmus  to 
ARRIVE — General  Meyer  fights  Penn  Symons — The  battle  de- 
scribed— The  British  claim  to  victory  examined — Forces  employed 
and  results  of  battle  considered — Casualties  on  both  sides — 
Facts  and  figures  deny  the  British  claim. 

The  selection  of  Dundee  as  a base  for  a large  British  force 
operating  in  the  north  of  Xatal  was  most  unwise  from  a 
military  standpoint.  It  was  easily  open  to  attack  by  a force  from 
the  east,  through  the  Utrecht  and  Vryheid  districts  of  the  Trans- 
vaal, while  the  railway  line  on  the  west,  from  Newcastle  to  Glencoe, 
offered  a very  favorable  means  for  the  march  of  a cooperating 
column.  In  fact,  the  whole  plan  of  defending  Natal  north  of  the 
Tugela  with  less  than  an  army  of  50,000  troops,  against  an  invading 
force  of  10,000  burghers,  was  wanting  in  the  most  elementary 
generalship. 

The  country  between  Laing’s  Nek  and  the  Tugela  Kiver  has  the 
Free  State  on  the  immediate  west,  with  the  Drakensberg  mountains 
acting  as  boundary;  and  the  Transvaal  on  the  immediate  east, 
having  the  Buffalo  Eiver  and  hilly  country  as  dividing  line.  This 
section  of  Natal  resembles  in  formation  a triangle,  with  the  base 
at  the  Tugela  and  the  apex  at  Laing’s  Nek;  having  a depth  of 
ninety  or  a hundred  miles,  and  a width  at  the  base  of  fifty  or  sixty. 
I'or  forty  miles  of  the  east  depth,  the  Transvaal  border  is  crossed 
by  drifts  over  the  Buffalo  Eiver,  which  offer  little  difficulty  to  a 
Boer  army;  while  Van  Eeenan’s  Pass,  on  the  west  side  of  the  tri- 
angle, gave  the  Free  Staters  a safe  way  for  a cooperating  force  to 
march,  with  flanks  secured  by  impassable  mountains,  to  the  aid 
of  a column  moving  south  along  the  opposite  side  of  the  triangle. 

The  section  of  Natal  included  in  this  triangle  is  an  ideal  country 
for  Boer  methods  of  warfare.  It  abounds  in  strong  positions,  in 
kopjes  and  kloofs,  with  its  western  boundary  made  unassailable  by 
the  towering  walls  of  the  Drakensberg  range. 

The  resolve  to  defend  Dundee  was,  therefore,  most  unwise  in 
itself,  while  the  attempted  defense,  which  was  made  on  the  20th 
and  21st  of  October,  was  foredoomed  to  utter  failure. 


BATTLE  OF  T ALAN A HILL 


111 


Seasons  other  than  strategic  must  have  determined  the  selection 
of  this  towm  for  a stand-up  fight  with  the  advancing  Boers.  These 
reasons  might  have  had  their  inspiration  in  the  existence  of  coal 
mines  needing  protection,  or  in  the  fact  that  the  little  town  had 
been  made  a depot  for  an  enormous  amount  of  military  stores. 
Political  considerations  were  probably  the  essential  factor  in  deter- 
mining the  unwise  proceeding.  The 
position  of  the  farmers,  traders,  and 
others  in  this  portion  of  “the  Garden 
Colony  ” had  to  be  thought  of  in  Pieter- 
maritzburg. The  public  promise  made 
some  months  previously  by  the  Gover- 
nor, on  the  inspiration  of  the  Colonial 
Office,  “that  Natal,  if  attacked,  will  be 
defended  by  all  the  forces  of  the  Em- 
pire,” was,  doubtless,  the  real  cause  of 
cooping  up  General  Penn  Symons  and 
his  men  in  the  position  in  which,  but 
for  the  failure  of  Commandant  Eras- 
mus to  carry  out  his  part  of  the  Boer 
plan  of  attack  on  the  20th,  the  entire 
British  force  would  have  been  captured 
or  destroyed. 

General  Joubert  remained  at  Dann- 
hauser  on  the  19th  and  20th. 

Lukas  Meyer,  with  burghers  from 
eight  commandoes,  namely,  Utrecht. 

Vryheid,  Ermelo,  Wakkerstroom,  Piet 
Eetief,  Krugersdorp,  Middelburg,  and 
Bethel,  numbering  2,500  men,  marched 
from  Doornberg  during  the  night  of 
Thursday,  the  19th.  The  weather  was 
wet  and  cold,  but  the  long  nighPs  ride 
of  twenty  miles  was  successfully  per- 
formed. The  march  was  continued  in 

silence,  and  the  north  side  of  Talana  Hill  was  reached  about  two  in 
the  morning  of  Friday.  Dividing  his  force  into  three  divisions, 
Meyer  disposed  them  as  follows : The  right  was  to  hold  the  northern 
end  of  the  valley  running  in  between  Impati  and  Talana.  The  cen- 
ter was  to  occupy  the  hilltop,  and  the  left  was  extended  to  a circular 
kopje  behind  the  coal  mines  to  the  south,  and  was  to  prevent  an  out- 
flanking movement  by  way  of  the  neck  where  the  railway  line 
crossed  from  the  coal  mines  in  the  direction  of  Landman’s  Drift  on 
the  Buffalo  Eiver.  The  four  guns  were  hauled  up  the  side  of  Talana 


GENERAL  LUKAS  METER  AT  TALANA 
HILL 


112 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


by  willing  hands,  and  were  placed  near  the  crest  immediately  over- 
looking Dundee;  Captain  Pretorius  being  in  charge  of  the  small 
battery,  which  consisted  of  one  Krupp  quick-firer,  two  fifteen- 
pound  Creusots,  and  one  pom-pom. 

Anxious  eyes  looked  to  the  west  across  the  valley  to  Impati 
heights  as  the  sun  began  to  roll  up  the  morning  mists  from  hill 
and  plain.  Nothing,  however,  was  visible  except  the  hold  outline 
of  the  unoccupied  hill  against  the  dark  gray  sky.  There  was  no 
sign  of  Erasmus!  Away  right  in  front  lay  Dundee,  a tempting 
target  on  the  plain  right  under  the  hill,  while  the  white  tents  of 
Penn  Symons’  army  dotted  the  veldt  about  a mile  beyond  the  town; 
whether  reachable  by  the  yet  untested  French  fifteen-pounder  re- 
mained an  unsolved  problem  for  the  dark,  hashing  eye  of  Pretorius. 

The  light  was  growing,  five  o’clock  arrived,  but  still  no  sight  of 
the  Pretoria  column.  Suddenly  the  sharp  crack  of  a Mauser  was 
heard  on  the  right,  and  some  British  outposts  were  seen  hurriedly 
retiring  in  the  direction  of  Dundee.  The  enemy  had  discovered 
the  Boers  who  were  holding  the  valley,  and  the  battle  could  no 
longer  be  delayed. 

Pretorius  trained  his  Creusots  on  the  British  camp,  and  sent  his 
first  pair  of  shells  over  the  town,  right  into  the  center  of  the 
enemy’s  position,  some  three  miles  away.  The  response  to  this 
top  of  the  morning  ” salute  from  Talana  Hill  was  instant.  The 
English  guns  belched  forth  their  reply,  and  soon  the  side  of  the 
hill  was  being  pounded  by  the  British  artillery. 

It  was  found,  after  nearly  two  hours’  firing,  that  Penn  Symons’ 
guns  failed  to  reach  the  Boer  center  on  Talana.  His  batteries  were, 
therefore,  moved  into  new  positions,  nearer  to  the  hill;  a change  of 
plan  on  the  part  of  the  English  general  which  would  have  been  all 
but  impossible  had  Erasmus,  with  Trichardt’s  battery,  occupied 
the  Impati  heights,  to  the  British  left,  as  arranged. 

It  was  a daring  move,  but  the  overwhelming  force  by  which  the 
guns  were  protected  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  fewness  of  General 
Meyer’s  guns  on  the  other,  encouraged  the  operation.  The  fire 
of  the  enemy’s  batteries  from  their  new  and  nearer  position  began 
to  tell  upon  the  Boer  lines  on  the  head  of  the  hill,  and  necessitated 
a withdrawal  of  their  artillery  further  back  from  the  crest  of  the 
mountain.  The  British  fire  was,  however,  generally  ineffective;  a 
great  number  of  the  shells  going  fifty  feet  above  the  heads  of  the 
burghers.  Captain  Pretorius  handled  his  little  battery  with  ad- 
mirable coolness,  and  developed  a much  greater  accuracy  of  aim 
than  did  his  British  adversaries  below. 

It  was  soon  seen  from  the  hilltop  what  General  Penn  Symons’ 
plan  of  operations  was  to  be.  Under  cover  of  his  numerous  guns. 


BATTLE  OF  T ALAN  A HILL 


113 


he  sent  out  three  attacking  columns;  two  composed  of  cavalry  and 
mounted  infantry,  with  guns,  to  turn  the  flanks  of  the  Boers  to 
the  right  and  left  of  Meyer’s  position  on  Talana;  one  to  sweep  in 
south  of  the  circular  kopje,  near  the  coal  mine;  the  other  to  rush 
the  valley,  to  Meyer’s  right,  between  Talana  and  Impati;  while  the 
third,  composed  of  the  Dublin  Fusiliers,  Royal  Rifles,  and  Royal 
Irish  Fusiliers,  was  to  work  up  the  slope  of  Talana,  facing  Dundee, 
under  the  shelter  of  Smith’s  plantation  and  a loose  stone  wall 
which  crossed  diagonally  the  face  of  the  hill  from  the  east  to  the 
north.  This  main  attack  on  Meyer’s  center  was  to  he  covered  by 
the  play  of  the  enemy’s  guns  from  the  new  position  in  front  of 
Dundee. 

There  was  practically  a simultaneous  move  forward  by  the  three 
attacking  columns,  and,  as  they  cleared  from  the  shelter  of  their 
camp  and  the  town,  and  came  out  on  the  open  to  the  south,  east, 
and  north  of  Dundee,  the  Boer  guns  played  upon  them  with  deadly 
eft'eet,  while  several  hundred  of  the  Utrecht  and  Middelburg  com- 
mandoes on  the  west  of  Talana  moved  down  the  hill,  under  cover 
of  the  wall  and  plantation,  and  poured  a searching  rifle  fire  into  the 
center  attacking  column.  This  body  of  troops  suffered  severely  by 
this  counter  attack,  and  already  the  grass  on  Smith’s  fields,  over 
which  the  Irish  Fusiliers  were  moving,  was  being  dyed  with  blood. 
The  British  raced  for  the  shelter  of  the  trees,  into  which  cover 
Pretorius  now  sent  his  pom-pom  shells  with  unerring  aim. 

It  was  at  this  critical  stage  in  the  combat  that  the  English 
general  entered  the  zone  of  fire,  and  ultimately  received  his  death 
wound.  He  had  marked  the  advance  of  the  Fusiliers  and  Royals 
across  the  spruit  and  into  the  plantation,  where  they  remained. 
He  saw  also  the  steady  fire  from  Talana  into  the  trees,  and  it  looked 
as  if  the  column  were  about  to  be  hurled  back,  despite  the  inces- 
sant play  of  his  batteries  upon  the  Boer  position.  He  then  rode 
rapidly  across  the  open  space  at  the  base  of  the  hill,  and  entered 
the  plantation.  He  left  his  horse,  and,  addressing  the  Fusiliers 
and  Royals,  urged  them  to  charge  the  hill.  Encouraged  by  this 
example  and  appeal,  the  men  went  forward  again  and  gained  the 
shelter  of  the  upper  wall  of  loose  stones  which,  starting  from  the 
top  end  of  the  plantation,  wont  round  slantingly  towards  the  north, 
or  right,  of  the  Boer  center  on  Talana.  To  make  this  advance  in 
face  of  a galling  fire,  I have  been  assured  by  Boer  officers  that  the 
British  officers,  revolver  in  hand,  had  frequently  to  threaten  their 
men  unless  they  moved  upward.  Officers  in  every  instance  had 
to  lead  the  way,  and  this  accounts  for  the  extraordinary  propor- 
tion of  men  of  rank  who  fell  in  the  fight.  Boers  who  fought  in 
the  commandoes  which  defended  Meyer’s  center  have  related  that 
8 


114 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


several  British  officers  were  shot  down  from  behind  while  pointing 
their  weapons  towards  their  own  men  in  order  to  induce  them  to 
advance. 

The  Boers  contested  every  yard  of  the  ground,  firing  from  be- 
hind any  cover  which  presented  itself,  and  making  gaps  in  the 
ranks  of  the  climbing  Fusiliers.  At  one  point,  a little  to  the  north 
of  the  end  of  the  plantation,  where  the  stone  wall  approached  a 
hollow  in  the  side  of  the  hill,  a body  of  burghers  lay  waiting.  On 
the  British  approaching  within  a hundred  yards  of  the  place  a 
deadly  volley  was  poured  into  them,  which  sent  those  of  them  who 
survived  down  the  hill  again  towards  the  shelter  of  the  wood.  It 
was  at  this  juncture  in  the  fortunes  of  the  advancing  British 
column  that  the  English  gunners  missed  their  mark  most  disas- 
trousl}^  as  has  happened  with  the  British  artillery  at  almost  every 
subsequent  big  engagement.  They  were  signaled  to  from  below 
the  plantation  to  fire  on  the  cleft  in  the  face  of  the  hill,  where  the 
Boers  lay  concealed.  At  that  very  moment  the  fire  from  these 
burghers  was  compelling  the  advancing  Tommies  to  race  back  for 
the  protection  of  the  trees,  and,  just  as  they  were  doubling  down  the 
side  of  the  hill,  shells  from  their  own  batteries  fell  among  them, 
killing  eight  men  and  wounding  more. 

It  was  a few  minutes  before  this  British  artillery  blunder  that 
General  Penn  Symons  received  a mortal  wound  in  the  stomach 
from  a rifle  bullet.  He  was  returning  from  the  cover  of  Smith’s 
wood  to  the  foot  of  the  hill  to  rejoin  his  staff  when  he  was  shot, 
and  had  to  be  taken  into  Smith’s  farmhouse.  The  injury  to  their 
general  was  unknown  to  most  of  the  troops  in  front  or  to  those 
of  the  right  and  left  columns,  until  after  the  fight  had  finished. 

In  the  meantime  Penn  Symons’  right  column  went  round  by 
the  coal  mine  and  engaged  a small  Boer  force  which  had  been 
placed  on  the  round  kopje  to  protect  the  left  flank  of  Meyer’s 
central  position.  A body  of  these  Boers  came  down  from  the  hill 
and  engaged  the  British  troops.  The}''  were  soon  outflanked,  and 
had  to  retire  on  the  neck  connecting  the  kopje  with  Talana,  leaving 
seventeen  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  English  and  suffering  the 
loss  of  six  killed.  They  had  checked,  however,  the  movement 
which  was  intended  to  turn  Meyer’s  left  flank. 

The  column  which  had  been  sent  forward  to  turn  the  Boer  right 
met  with  a repulse.  The  Wakkerstroom  commando  was  guarding 
this  position  vigilantly  as  a fog  commenced  to  descend  upon  the 
battle-field.  They  awaited  the  approach  of  the  Hussars  and  Fusi- 
liers, fired  into  them  at  500  yards,  and  then  charged  them 
at  the  east  extremity  of  the  valley,  capturing  a Maxim,  and  com- 
pelling them  to  retreat.  The  men  who  charged  numbered  only 


BATTLE  OF  T ALAN A HILL 


115 


twenty-five,  but  the  fog  concealed  the  smallness  of  the  force  from 
the  British,  while  the  volleys  of  supporting  Mauser  fire  from  the 
higher  ground  behind  completed  the  discomfiture  of  the  English 
column  and  drove  them  into  the  fog. 

It  was  this  column,  thus  driven  back,  that  did  not  return  to 
Dundee.  They  wandered  in  the  mist,  which  now  commenced  to 
fall  rapidly  on  the  field  of  battle,  and  found  themselves  on  the 
north  side  of  Impati  Hill  that  evening,  where  they  fell  in  with 
some  men  of  Trichardt’s  commando  and  of  Blake’s  Irish  Brigade, 


BOER  SCOUTS  WITH  CAPTURED  BRITISH  MOUNTAIN  GUN 


who  were  in  search  of  the  battle-field,  and  were  driven  by  them 
into  a cattle  kraal,  fought,  and  captured. 

The  artillery  ammunition  failing,  and  the  non-arrival  of  Erasmus, 
caused  General  lileyer  to  give  orders  to  retire  to  his  base.  The  900 
men  of  his  center,  who  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  fight  for  seven 
hours,  fell  back,  with  guns  and  equipment  intact,  without  confu- 
sion, before  a single  British  soldier  had  reached  the  crest  of  Talana. 
A thick  fog  had  fallen  over  the  battle-field,  which  shut  completely 
out  from  view  the  enemy’s  movements  below  the  hill. 

It  was  for  these  three  reasons  that  the  Boer  general  retired  be- 
hind the  Buffalo  Eiver.  He  Avas  to  learn  on  the  morroAV  that  he 
had,  in  reality,  won  a victory  Avithout  knoAving  it. 

Captain  Nugent,  with  tAvo  bullets  in  his  bod}^  Avas  the  first 
Britisher  to  gain  the  top  of  the  hill.  There  was  not  a single  Boer  in 
sight  when  the  Fusiliers  had  worked  their  way  round  to  the  crest 


116 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


by  the  shelter  of  the  loose  stone  wall.  No  Englishman  had  reached 
the  hilltop  while  a single  Boer  remained  upon  it.  There  was, 
therefore,  no  ‘‘  brilliant  charge  ” such  as  has  been  described  in  the 
British  press;  no  performance  like  that  which  the  imagination  of 
the  English  war  correspondents  had  alone  witnessed;  no  vaunted 
application  of  “ cold  steel  ” to  which  the  spirit  of  boastful  inven- 
tion had  given  the  credit  of  finally  deciding  the  bloody  issue  of 
the  day  on  the  summit  of  the  mountain. 

The  fortunes  of  the  fight  are  to  be  determined,  not  by  the  state- 
ments of  correspondents,  but  by  the  results  of  the  battle.  Captain 
Nugent  was  a prisoner  in  the  hands  of  the  Boers  within  forty-eight 
hours,  as  were  250  more  of  his  wounded  companions;  including  the 
general  who  had  inspired  the  attack  on  the  hill  by  his  courage  and 
exhortation. 

Down  from  the  top  to  the  bottom  of  the  mountain  British  dead 
and  wounded  lay,  almost  at  every  yard,  showing  how  dearly  the 
Fusiliers  and  Eoyal  Eifles  had  paid  for  their  fruitless  climbing  of 
the  fiercely-contested  hillside.  In  and  around  Piet  Smith’s  farm- 
stead, over  fifty  British  killed  were  found,  and  in  a quiet  corner  of 
the  small  plantation,  under  the  shade  of  the  rocking  trees,  in  the 
branches  of  which  the  doves  were  telling  their  tales  of  love,  I have 
seen  the  graves  of  these  men,  side  hy  side  with  some  of  the  Boers 
who  had  killed  them  in  battle — in  a battle  fought  hy  the  unfor- 
tunate “ Tommies  ” for  the  capitalists  and  schemers  of  London  and 
Johannesburg. 

The  number  of  Boer  killed  and  wounded  was  accurately  ac- 
counted for  when  Erasmus  entered  Dundee  on  the  Monday  follow- 
ing the  battle  of  Talana.  The  list,  according  to  each  commando 
engaged,  was  compiled  and  published  as  follows: 


Commando 

Wounded 

Killed 

Utrecht 

. . 32 

13 

Middelburg 

. . 15 

9 

Wakkerstroom 

. . 12 

9 

Piet  Eetief 

. . 12 

5 

Staats  Artillery  .... 

. . 11 

. . 

Bethel 

. . 3 

4 

Krugersdorp 

. . 3 

2 

Vryheid 

. . 2 

1 

Outside 

. . 1 

91 

1 

44 

Adding  to  these  numbers  the  17  burghers  who  were  taken  prisoner 
in  the  encounter  near  the  coal  mine,  but  were  subsequently  aban- 
doned on  the  retreat  from  Dundee,  the  total  Boer  casualties  in  the 
fight  on  the  20th  amounted  to  152  men. 


BATTLE  OF  T ALAN A HILL 


117 


On  the  British  side  there  was  a total  loss  of  60  killed — including 
General  Penn  Symons — and  253  wounded.  To  this  list  of  casualties 
must  be  added  the  243  Dublin  Fusiliers  and  Hussars  who  sur- 
rendered to  Colonel  Trichardt  after  having  retreated  from  the  fight 
with  the  Wakkerstroom  burghers  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  Boer 
central  position.  Altogether  the  British  casualties  reached  the 
total  of  556;  or  more  than  three  times  the  number  on  the  Boer  side. 

The  forces  engaged  on  both  sides,  with  their  relative  equipment 
of  artillery,  are  also  a most  material  factor  in  deciding  to  which 
army  the  real  fruits  of  victory  belonged.  The  Boer  general  had  a 
total  of  2,500  men  under  his  command,  tho  it  is  claimed  by 
Me5^er  that  only  1,700  of  these  came  into  action.  This  claim, 
however,  ignores  the  services  rendered  by  the  commandoes  which 
watched  over  the  right  and  left  wings  of  his  fighting  line,  protected 
the  horses  at  the  back  of  Talana,  and  otherwise  rendered  indirect 
and  essential  aid. 

Lukas  Meyer  had  only  four  guns,  but  admittedly  his  fifteen- 
pounder  Creusots  and  the  pom-pom  were  far  more  effective  in  their 
fire  than  the  whole  of  Penn  Symons’  batteries. 

On  the  English  side,  there  were  6,000  men,  with  18  guns.  The 
advantages  for  the  British,  therefore,  were:  in  men,  two  to  one; 
and  in  guns,  over  four  to  one. 

Against  this  superiority  in  strength  and  equipment,  there  was 
the  apparent  advantage  of  the  Boer  position  on  Talana  Hill.  This 
position,  however,  ought  to  have  been  easily  turnable  by  a numeri- 
cally stronger  force  from  the  two  vulnerable  points  to  Meyer’s  left 
and  right,  as  there  were  no  entrenchments  to  defend  the  hill  on 
either  its  top  or  sides.  Talana  was  occupied  by  Lukas  Meyer  as 
part  of  a plan  of  attack  which,  if  it  had  been  carried  out  as  ar- 
ranged, would  have  completely  safeguarded  his  right  while  menac- 
ing with  a counter  envelopment  the  left  of  Penn  Symons’  camp  and 
position,  and  the  barring  of  the  enemy’s  only  way  of  retreat  to 
Ladysmith.  The  failure  of  Erasmus  to  appear  on  Impati  exposed 
Meyer  to  a defeat  which  was  only  averted  by  the  splendid  fighting 
qualities  which  his  small  force  displayed  in  a first  encounter  with 
an  antagonist  greatly  superior  in  men  and  artillery. 

The  one  convincing  and  conclusive  fact,  however,  which  deter- 
mines the  question  of  which  side  really  won  the  battle  of  Talana, 
is  the  retreat  of  the  British  army  from  Dundee  within  thirty  hours 
after  the  fight;  leaving  the  dead  unburied,  their  wounded  general, 
and  240  wounded  officers  and  men,  240  prisoners,  with  the  entire 
camp,  an  enormous  quantity  of  ammunition,  and  immense  stores 
of  provision,  in  the  hands  of  the  Boers. 

The  fierceness  of  the  Boer  attack  upon  a British  army,  and  the 


118  - 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


deadly  hail  of  infantry  fire  by  which  it  was  sustained,  were  a revela- 
tion to  the  English  general  and  his  officers.  They  had  not  reck- 
oiied  upon  any  such  development  of  Boer  fighting  qualities  from  a 
Eepublic  which  Dr.  Jameson  and  a handful  of  raiders  believed  five 
years  ago  could  be  overturned  in  a dash  upon  Johannesburg  or 
Pretoria.  The  dead  and  the  wounded  on  the  sides  of  Talana  Hill, 
the  Maxim  fire  which  had  never  before  rained  its  showers  of  lead 
upon  British  troops,  were  a rude  awakening  to  those  who  planned 
Dundee  as  a garrison  from  which  North  Natal  could  be  defended 
against  the  Transvaal  until  overwhelming  numbers  should  arrive 
and  clear  a way  to  Pretoria.  And  this  was  not  all  which  the  battle 


READY  FOR  THE  ENEMY 


of  Talana  Hill  made  clear  to  English  officers.  It  taught  the 
British  a more  alarming  lesson  still;  namely,  the  great  inferiority 
of  the  drilled  English  soldiers  as  compared,  man  for  man,  with 
the  undisciplined  burghers.  They  found  on  the  morrow  of  the 
encounter  on  Talana  that  Tommy  Atkins,  Kiplingized  into  an  in- 
vincible warrior  for  his  exploits  against  savage  foes  armed  with 
spears,  was  no  match  for  the  first  white  foeman  he  has  met  in  com- 
bat in  this  generation.  They  saw  him  retreating  from  a field  on 
which  6,000  of  England’s  best  men  had  been  attacked  by  a force 
of  2,500  untrained  farmers;  leaving  his  dead  unburied,  his  wounded 
to  the  mercies  of  his  foe,  his  provisions  and  ammunition  to  the 
adverse  fortune  of  a pronounced  defeat.  It  was  a disastrous 
experience  for  British  arms,  that  refusal  to  fight  again  on  the  day 
after  the  alleged  “brilliant  victory”  at  Dundee,  that  three  days’ 


BATTLE  OF  TALANA  HILL 


119 


and  three  nights’  continuous  flight  through  the  passes  of  the  Big- 
garsberg,  in  drenching  rain  and  benumbing  cold,  in  preference  to 
holding  a selected  British  battle-field  against  the  Mausers  and  Max- 
ims of  the  despised  Boers.  It  was  the  Boer,  and  not  the  Briton, 
who  remained  the  actual  victor  at  the  battle  of  Talana  Hill. 

There  are  many  stories  of  Boer  bravery  related  of  this  battle. 
General  Meyer  has  honorably  mentioned  one  which  is  to  the  credit 
of  the  Wakkerstroom  burghers:  25  of  these  charged  the  250  of 
the  Dubhn  Fusiliers  and  Hussars,  who  fled  from  the  encounter, 
leaving  a Maxim  gun  behind  them,  and  ultimately  surrendered  at 
Marais’  Farm  to  300  of  their  foes. 

A lad  named  Scheepers,  18  years  old,  fought  with  kis  father, 
who  was  mortally  wounded  in  the  attack  on  the  Boer  right  by  this 
English  column.  The  lad  was  guarding  his  dying  father  when  the 
English  rode  up  and  made  him  prisoner.  He  asked  to  he  allowed 
to  remain,  hut  was  refused.  Soon  after,  however,  the  Wakker- 
stroomers  swept  down  upon  the  English,  drove  them  into  the  fog, 
and  released  the  hoy,  who  hastened  back  to  where  his  father  lay, 
now  dead.  Several 'boys  under  16  took  part  in  this  battle. 

Lieutenant  Mike  Du  Toit,  of  the  Staats  Artillery,  was  severely 
wounded  early  in  the  fight.  He  was  unable  to  stand,  but  refused 
to  he  removed  from  the  field.  He  remained  alongside  of  his  pom- 
pom, and  continued  to  give  orders  to  the  gunners,  on  receiving 
from  them  the  resiilts  of  their  observations  of  the  enemy’s  batteries 
and  doings. 

I heard  a pathetic  incident  of  the  battle  related  when  visiting 
the  scene  of  the  conflict  in  May,  1900.  Three  days  after  the 
fight,  a number  of  British  were  found  dead  in  Piet  Smith’s  cow 
shed.  They  had  either  crept  in  there  severely  wounded,  or  had 
been  carried  there  as  dead,  and  left  by  their  comrades.  On  the 
2)laee  being  entered  by  Boers  on  the  Monday  after  the  battle,  a 
collie  dog  was  found  faithfully  watching  the  lifeless  body  of  its 
owner.  It  had  evidently  been  there  for  the  three  days,  giving  in  its 
beautiful  loyalty  a sad  instance  of  how  much  nobler  some  instincts 
of  dumb  animals  are  to  the  vaunted  superior  virtues  of  their 
masters. 


Chapter  XII 


CAPTURE  OF  DUNDEE 

The  erratic  movements  of  Commandant  Erasmus — Attack  and  capture 
OF  Dundee — Retreat  of  the  British,  leaving  their  wounded  and 

BAGGAGE — JoUBERT’S  GENERALSHIP  AT  FAULT — SOME  ANECDOTES  OF  THE 
BATTLE-FIELD. 

The  movements  of  Commandant  Erasmus’  column  form  part 
of  the  story  of  the  battle  of  Talana  Hill,  and  of  the  British 
retreat  from  Dundee.  They  explain  the  failure  of  the  Boer  plan 
to  completely  crush  or  capture  Penn  Symons’  army,  and  account 
for  the  first  big  battle-blunder  on  the  Federal  side. 

The  Pretoria,  Heidelberg,  Standerton,  Boxburg,  and  Ermelo 
commandoes,  under  Erasmus’  orders,  crossed  the  Buffalo  River 
on  the  14th  at  Newcastle  Drift,  in  all  about  3,000  men.  They  had 
negotiated  the  Drakensberg  by  the  Wakkerstroom  road  in  a con- 
tinuous downpour  of  rain  as  a “ saddle  commando  that  is,  with 
tents  and  baggage  left  behind,  carrying  only  rifles  and  bandoliers, 
and  such  food  as  each  man  could  handle  for  himself,  in  a hurried 
order  to  march  forward;  and  were  suffering  from  fatigue  and  ex- 
posure on  reaching  Newcastle.  The  column  started  south  again 
on  the  17th,  with  its  wagons  and  tents,  accompanied  by  a battery 
of  artillery,  which  included  a “ Long  Tom.” 

The  country  south  of  Newcastle  drops  downward  towards  Glen- 
coe, having  broken  ridges  to  the  east  and  spurs  of  the  Drakensberg 
to  the  west,  with  the  picturesque  Biggarsberg  range  of  hills  cross- 
ing from  west  to  east  between  Glencoe  and  Ladysmith.  A strong 
patrol  was  sent  ahead  to  discover  the  enemy’s  position,  and  it  was 
found  that  Dannhauser,  midway  between  Newcastle  and  Glencoe, 
had  been  evacuated  by  the  English  two  days  previously;  the  enemy 
falling  back  upon  their  base  at  Dundee. 

Dannhauser  was  reached  and  occupied  on  the  18th,  and  the 
burghers  were  ordered  to  sleep  in  their  clothes,  with  horses  saddled 
and  everything  in  readiness  for  a movement  forward  in  search  of 
the  foe,  at  a moment’s  notice. 

Early  on  the  19th,  amid  a heavy  rainstorm,  the  commandoes 


CAPTURE  OF  DUNDEE 


121 


received  orders  to  reach  Impati  heights  before  daylight  the  follow- 
ing morning,  for  the  concerted  joint  attack  upon  the  British  at 
Dundee. 

The  day  continued  stormy,  and,  as  night  approached,  a wet  fog 
added  to  the  difficulties  of  the  march.  The  column  wandered  about 
in  search  of  the  appointed  hill,  and  off-saddled  for  a few  hours  in 
the  evening  at  the  foot  of  a kopje  which  was  supposed  to  he  a spur 
of  Impati  heights.  During  the  night  the  column  climbed  the  hill, 
and  awaited  the  morning,  which  it  was  hoped  would  reveal  the 
British  camp,  with  Lukas  Meyer  and  his  burghers  on  Talana  Hill 
opposite. 

When  the  morning  of  the  20th  came,  the  fog  still  shrouded  every- 
thing in  obscurity.  To  add  to  the  disappointment  felt  by  all  the 
burghers,  the  sound  of  cannon  was  heard  to  the  east,  indicating  the 
progress  of  a conflict  not  many  miles  away.  The  fog  continued 
during  the  whole  day.  The  force  descended  in  the  evening,  and 
took  i;p  a position  for  the  night  on  a lower  terrace  of  the  hill.  The 
Fusiliers  and  Hussars  who  had  had  an  encounter  with  the  Wakker- 
stroom  burghers  in  the  morning,  and  had  retreated  into  the  fog, 
were  met  by  two  bodies  of  the  Pretoria  and  Ermelo  burghers,  num- 
bering 300  men,  under  Trichardt,  who  were  trying  to  find  the 
locality  of  the  fighting  which  had  been  heard  away  east.  The 
British  column  numbered  250,  and  on  finding  themselves  in  face 
of  the  Boers  they  retired  to  an  enclosure  near  by,  where  they  took 
up  position.  Trichardt’s  men  surrounded  the  kraal,  and,  on  send- 
ing a couple  of  shells  into  the  enclosure,  the  white  flag  was  raised, 
and  the  English  surrendered  after  some  twelve  of  them  had  been 
killed  and  w'ounded. 

An  interesting  incident  occurred  at  the  capture  of  the  roaming 
British  by  Colonel  Triehardt’s  men.  Among  the  latter  were  some 
thirty  men  of  Blake’s  Irish  Brigade,  who,  contrary  to  strict  orders, 
had  left  the  main  body  of  their  corps  at  the  base,  and  had  followed 
the  Erasmus  commando  on  learning  that  fighting  was  about  to  take 
place  to  the  south  of  Newcastle.  These  Irishmen,  who  carried  a 
green  flag  at  their  head,  manifested  a special  interest  in  the  Dublin 
Fusiliers,  who  formed  the  bulk  of  the  captured  British.  Nor  were 
the  prisoners  less  interested  in  the  flag  and  nationality  of  some  of 
their  captors.  A little  recrimination  occurred  between  the  divided 
Irish,  but  did  not  go  beyond  a few  words  of  reproach  addressed  by 
some  of  Blake’s  men  to  fellow-countrymen  who  could  fight  against 
a small  and  a republican  nation  for  the  power  which  deprived  their 
common  country  of  self-governing  liberties.  The  Fusiliers,  on 
finding  that  nothing  more  unpleasant  than  a political  lecture  was 
to  be  inflicted  upon  them  for  the  present,  fraternized  with  the  pro- 


132 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Boers,  to  whom  they  related  details  of  the  morning’s  attack  upon 
the  Dundee  camp. 

On  Saturday  morning,  the  21st,  Erasmus  found  himself  between 
Glencoe  and  Impati,  in  the  very  neighborhood  where  the  encounter 
between  Meyer  and  Penn  Symons  had  taken  place  on  the  previous 
day.  He  moved  forward  at  once  to  the  heights  he  had  failed 
to  occupy  twenty-four  hours  earlier,  and  on  reaching  the  hill 
overlooking  the  town  of  Dundee  discovered  the  whole  British  camp 
in  great  disorder.  Trichardt’s  guns,  including  his  “ Long  Tom,” 
were  trained  without  delay  upon  the  enemy’s  position. 

Hero  again  Erasmus  exhibited  his  blundering  incapacity  as  a 
general.  He  had  failed  already  to  cooperate  with  Meyer  in  what 
would  have  been  a crushing  defeat  of  Penn  Symons’  forces, 
wedged  as  they  would  have  been  between  6,000  burghers  and  a 
dozen  guns.  The  prevalence  of  fog  has  been  given  as  the  explana- 
tion of  this  failure.  The  same  fog  hung  over  the  march  of-  the 
Meyer  commandoes,  but  did  not  prevent  their  reaching  Talana  Hill 
in  time.  This  reason  is  put  forward  by  Erasmus’  apologists  as  an 
excuse  for  the  first  military  blunder  of  the  war  on  the  Boer  side, 
but  the  feeling  among  officers  and  men,  with  whom  I discussed 
this  question  while  on  the  scene  of  the  battle  in  May,  was  that 
Erasmus  could  have  easily  reached  the  appointed  rendezvous  on 
the  morning  of  the  20th,  after  having  heard  the  guns  to  the  east, 
had  he  been  spurred  by  any  very  strong  or  very  earnest  desire  to 
get  there.  His  ignorance  of  the  topography  can  be  pleaded  for  all 
it  is  worth,  and  the  fog  adduced  as  an  exculpation  of  his  apparent 
remissness;  but  he  will  be  blamed  notwithstanding  in  the  Boer 
mind  while  the  memory  of  this  war  lives  in  Afrikander  recollec- 
tion for  having  been  instrumental  in  permitting  the  English  to 
escape  destruction  or  capture  at  Dundee. 

On  arriving  at  Impati  heights  and  observing  the  demoralized 
condition  of  the  enemy’s  forces,  a general  capable  of  forming  an 
elementary  plan  of  battle  would  have  thought  only  of  the  delivery 
of  a crushing  blow  at  the  half-beaten  foe.  He  would  have  estab- 
lished immediate  communications  with  General  Meyer,  who  had 
inflicted  the  damage  from  vs^hich  the  enemy  was  suffering,  and  who 
was  no  more  than  two  or  three  hours’  ride  from  Talana,  and  would 
have  concerted  a renewed  attack  for  the  following  morning  under 
conditions  which  would  have  insured  a brilliant  triumph  for  the 
Eepublican  army.  Or,  he  would  have  asked  Joubert  for  reenforce- 
ments from  the  rear.  Ho  such  thought  of  planning  a crushing 
blow  found  place  in  the  mind  of  Erasmus.  He  ordered  an  artillery 
fire  upon  Dundee  from  his  safe  position  on  the  hill,  and  contented 
himself  with  looking  on  while  General  Yule  transferred  his  men- 


CAPTURE  OF  DUNDEE 


133 


aced  camp  from  its  exposed  position  southward  of  the  railway  line, 
heyond  the  reach  of  Trichardt’s  powerful  Creusot  gun.  The  Eng- 
lish guns  were  unahle  to  return  the  artillery  fire  with  any  effect. 
Their  shells  fell  short  of  the  Boer  guns  hy  a couple  of  thousand 
yards. 

General  Yule  made  no  attempt  to  storm  Impati,  tho  it  was 
far  more  accessible  for  the  purposes  of  such  an  assault  than  Talana 
Hill.  He  had  still  over  5,000  disciplined  men  at  his  command, 
with  three  batteries  of  artillery,  hut  there  was  no  attempt  made 
to  grapple  at  close  quarters  with  Erasmus  and  his  3,000  undisci- 
plined Boers.  Here  was  a chance  for  “ cold  steel,”  and  frontal 
attack,  and  a display  of  British  pluck,  and  all  the  rest;  but  the 
chance  was  allowed  to  pass  hy.  The  order  was  not  to  charge  Im- 
pati. It  was  to  clear  for  Ladysmith. 

During  these  hours,  when  the  fate  of  Penn  Symons’  army  would 
have  been  determined  by  a competent  Boer  officer,  the  British 
Empire  was  ringing  with  the  news  of  “ the  great  victory  of  Dun- 
dee ”!  Majuha  was  avenged,  and  another  glorious  chapter  had 
been  added  to  the  annals  of  England’s  military  glor3^  These  were 
the  tidings  of  great  Jingo  joy  which  London  was  flashing  on  its 
wires  to  Montreal,  to  Melbourne,  to  India.  But  on  that  very  day, 
on  Saturday,  October  21,  it  was  only  due  to  the  accident  that  a 
man  with  no  military  judgment  had  the  command  of  3,000 
brave  and  capable  burghers;  a man  who  had  already  failed  to 
carry  out  the  simplest  of  movements  on  a momentous  occasion — it 
was  owing  to  this  stroke  of  British  good  luck  that  the  most  damag- 
ing blow  of  the  whole  war  was  not  struck  at  5,000  of  the  Queen’s 
best  troops,  at  the  very  spot  where  the  imaginary  triumph  of  the 
previous  day  had  been  won — ^by  the  war  correspondents  and  the 
London  editors. 

General  Yule  retreated  on  Ladysmith  after  the  battle  of  Talana. 
He  naturally  anticipated  a junction  between  Erasmus  and  Meyer, 
or  the  coming  up  from  Dannhauser  of  the  Commandant-General 
with  the  reserves  from  the  base  of  the  Boer  army,  and  wisely  deter- 
mined to  get  away.  Further  blundering  on  the  part  of  his  foes  en- 
abled him  to  do  so.  All  Saturday  was  wasted  by  Erasmus  in  gazing 
down  from  the  hill  upon  the  enemy.  Jouhert  was  away  at  Dann- 
hauser, a few  miles  north  of  Erasmus,  doing  nothing  in  particular 
with  the  reserve  burghers.  Lukas  Meyer  was  a dozen  miles  away 
on  the  Buffalo  River,  seemingly  indifferent  to  what  was  taking  place 
at  Dundee,  while  General  Kock  was  actually  engaged  in  fighting 
4,000  of  the  Ladysmith  garrison  at  Elandslaagte  with  his  Johannes- 
burg commando.  In  a word,  8,000  Boers,  within  a radius  of  thirty 
miles,  with  a beaten  army  of  6,000  in  between,  had  no  plan,  no 


124 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


intercommunication  in  concerted  effort  to  prevent  Yule  from 
carrying  his  defeated  and  dispirited  troops  to  the  shelter  of  Lady- 
smith. 

It  was  the  first  great  opportunity  which  the  war  had  offered  to 
J oubert  for  the  exercise  of  his  generalship  in  the  field,  and  he  was 
found  wofully  wanting  in  the  qualities  which  the  occasion  de- 
manded. The  result  of  the  fight  on  Friday,  which  ended  at  two 
in  the  afternoon,  must  have  been  known  to  the  Commandant- 
General  that  night.  The  discovery  of  Impati  Hill  by  Erasmus,  and 
the  consequent  break-up  of  the  British  camp  at  Dundee  on  Satur- 
day, could  not  be  concealed  from  him,  even  were  it  attempted,  as 
he  was  immediately  in  the  rear  of  Erasmus’  column.  He  was  in 
touch  with  Lukas  Meyer’s  men,  east  of  his  own  position,  with  no 
enemy  in  between,  and  yet  not  a single  move  was  ordered  by  him, 
either  to  direct  a continued  and  crushing  attack  on  Yule,  or  to  pre- 
vent this  all  but  encircled  officer  from  escaping  by  the  Helpmakaar 
road  to  Ladysmith — ^the  only  way  left  for  him  to  retreat  by.  Noth- 
ing, in  fact,  was  done  that  should  have  been  the  obvious  and  im- 
perative work  of  the  moment  in  face  of  the  enemy’s  desperate  diffi- 
culties, and  he  was,  therefore,  allowed  to  steal  away  on  Sunday 
night  from  under  Erasmus’  guns,  practically  unmolested. 

General  Yule’s  escape  through  the  Biggarsberg  passes  was  one 
of  the  most  notable  performances  of  the  war,  and  must  rank  high 
in  the  military  achievements  of  the  British  in  the  campaign.  It 
was  the  one  and  only  way  in  which  to  save  his  force  from  capture. 
The  success  of  the  desperate  enterprise  of  carrying  a straggling 
beaten  force  of  5,000  men  and  three  batteries  of  artillery  through 
tortuous  gorges  and  across  a range  of  mountains  in  a continuous 
march  of  three  days  and  nights  of  wet  and  frightful  weather,  where 
1,000  Boers  could  have  successfully  barred  the  way,  was  due,  next 
to  his  own  sagacity  and  resource,  to  the  lack  of  cohesive  pur- 
pose and  want  of  intelligent  military  direction  in  his  opponent’s 
plans. 

Erasmus  took  possession  of  Dundee  on  Monday,  October  23. 
The  town  was  not  much  injured  by  Boer  shells,  owing  to  the  Eng- 
lish camp  having  been  placed  a mile  away  towards  Glencoe,  and  to 
the  activity  of  the  Boer  guns,  both  from  Talana  and  Impati,  these 
being  directed  towards  the  changed  positions  of  the  English  artil- 
lery. Enormous  military  stores  were  found,  and  among  them  huge 
quantities  of  Mark  IV.  ammunition — the  ammunition  which  it  was 
declared,  in  Parliament,  in  July  and  October,  was  not  to  be  used  by 
British  soldiers  in  the  event  of  war  breaking  out  in  South  Africa! 

Two  incidents  connected  with  the  capture  of  Dundee  were  re- 
lated to  me  while  standing,  a few  months  subsequently,  in  the  little 


CAPTURE  OF  DUNDEE 


125 


graveyard  in  the  town  where  General  Penn  Symons  sleeps  oblivious 
of  further  battles  and  bloodshed. 

A Dublin  Fusilier  and  a young  burgher  were  lying  side  by  side 
in  one  of  the  extemporized  hospitals,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the 
doctors  to  dress  their  wounds.  Said  the  Boer: 

“ Tell  me,  my  friend,  do  you  know  w'hy  you  have  been  sent  out  to 
fight  against  the  people  of  the  Transvaal  ? ” 

Dublin  Fusilier— “ Well,  I’ll  be  hanged  if  I do!  ” 

Boer — “ Then  I will  tell  you.  It  is  because  Mr.  Chamberlain 
wanted  our  Government  to  give  the  franchise  to  the  Englishmen 
on  the  Eand  after  five  years’  residence  in  the  country,  instead  of 
seven,  as  President  Kruger  proposed.” 

Dublin  Fusilier — “Do  you  tell  me  so!  Why,  we  have  been 
fighting  for  a full  franchise  in  Ireland  for  700  years,  and  we 
haven’t  got  it  yet!  ” 

A nephew  of  General  Joubert’s  who  had  reached  Dundee  with 
the  advanced  portion  of  Erasmus’  force  entered  a shed  from  whence 
sounds  of  pain  came  from  a party  of  wounded  British.  On  push- 
ing open  a door  which  gave  admission  to  the  place,  he  over- 
heard one  of  the  wounded  say  in  tones  of  fear,  “ May  God  have 
mercy  on  us,  here  they  come ! They  will  cut  our  throats ! ” “ Oh, 

no,  we  won’t,”  instantly  responded  Mr.  Joubert.  “We  are  Chris- 
tians like  yourselves,  and  you  will  be  treated  just  as  kindly  as  our 
own  wounded!  ” 

“ Good  Lord,  Mike,”  exclaimed  the  agreeably  astonished  Fusilier, 
turning  to  his  companion,  “ the  Boers  speak  better  English  than 
we  do  in  Dublin.” 

In  further  conversation  with  the  wounded  Tommies,  Mr.  Joubert 
found  that  their  minds  had  been  crammed  with  the  usual  English 
lies  about  the  character  of  the  Boers.  They  were  believed  to  be 
a compound  of  uneducated  Dutchmen  and  of  savage  Kaffir;  a 
treacherous,  inhuman  foeman,  dead  to  all  the  better  feelings  of 
civilized  soldiers;  unkempt,  cruel,  and  rapacious.  Great  and  agree- 
able, therefore,  was  the  astonishment  of  the  British  prisoners  and 
wounded  at  this  first  encounter  with  the  maligned  Boer.  They 
found  him  the  very  reverse  of  the  picture  which  the  Ehodesian 
slanderers  in  the  Cape  and  London  press  had  drawn  of  the  people 
whose  country  was  to  be  ruthlessly  despoiled  by  Imperial  forces. 


Chapter  XIII 

BATTLE  OF  ELANDSLAAGTE 

Details  of  the  battle — Weakness  of  General  Kook’s  position — Eight 

HUNDRED  against  FOUR  THOUSAND KOCK  RECEIVES  FATAL  WOUND — ■ 

“ The  pig-sticking  ” boasts  of  the  British — Confessions  of  bru- 
tality— Charges  against  the  enemy — Boer  vs.  British  treatment 
of  their  foes — Sketch  of  General  Kock. 

aEXEEAL  JAX  KOCK  and  his  Johannesburg  commando, 
which  comprised  a Krugersdorp  contingent,  a Hollander  corps, 
and  a German  brigade,  in  all  about  800  strong,  entered  Katal 
through  Botha’s  Pass  at  midnight  on  the  12th  of  October.  The 
particular  movement  to  be  carried  out  by  Kock  and  his  column 
was  not  revealed  in  any  order  or  instructions  from  Joubert.  These 
800  men  were  considered  a crack  force,  and  numbered  some  of  the 
most  daring  spirits  on  the  Boer  side  in  the  Band  and  district. 
Many  of  the  leading  burghers,  men  like  Dr.  Hermanns  Coster,  the 
State  Prosecutor;  Goldman,  of  the  Eailway  Commission;  De  Wit 
Hamer,  the  Town  Clerk  of  Pretoria;  Major  Hall,  an  Englishman; 
Landrost  Bodenstein,  and  several  other  equally  prominent  citizens, 
were  also  volunteers  under  Kock.  The  Hollander  Corps,  number- 
ing 150  Dutch  Uitlanders  under  Commandant  Jan  Lombard,  mem- 
lier  of  the  Second  Eaad,  was  a fighting  body  from  which  much  was 
expected,  while  the  German  Uitlander  Corps  under  Colonel  Schiel, 
100  strong,  included  many  Eand  miners  who  had  been  trained  to 
arms  in  the  German  army.  Ben  Viljoen,  member  of  the  Second 
Eaad  for  the  Eand,  was  in  command  of  the  Johannesburg  con- 
tingent, which  made  up  the  bulk  of  Koek’s  force,  and  the  fire- 
eating reputation  of  the  handsome  Ben  was  looked  to  in  the  golden 
city  as  a pledge  of  brave  deeds  to  be  done  when  the  enemy  was 
encountered.  The  column  was  accompanied  by  150  Free  Staters, 
and  its  entire  artillery  equipment  consisted  of  two  Maxim-Korden- 
felts. 

On  reaching  Ingogo,  General  Kock  wired  to  Joubert  for  reen- 
forcements, owing  to  information  he  had  received  that  the  English 
were  in  strength  at  Newcastle.  Kock  was  ordered  not  to  engage 
the  enemy  until  the  Pretoria  column,  under  Erasmus,  then  on  its 


BATTLE  OF  ELANDSLAAGTE 


127 


way  towards  Newcastle,  should  come  up.  It  was  found,  however, 
that  the  English  had  fallen  hack  on  Dannhauser,  and  subsequently 
on  Glencoe,  whereupon  Kock,  pressed  by  the  impatient  spirits  in 
his  command,  moved  ahead  in  the  path  of  the  retiring  enemy.  He 
formed  his  laager  near  Sunday’s  Eiver,  upon  the  southern  slopes 
of  the  Biggarsberg,  and  sent  forward  two  patrols  of  fifty  men  each 
— one  under  Field  Cornet  Potgieter,  of  Schiel’s  command,  and  the 
other  under  Field  Cornet  Pienaar,  of  Viljoen’s  Band  Brigade — with 
strict  injunctions  to  return  to  the  laager,  and  to  engage  in  no  en- 
counter. Potgieter  captured  a provision  train  and  800  cattle  at 
Washbank  on  the  19th,  and,  emboldened  by  this  success,  he  dis- 
regarded orders,  and  went  further  south  in  the  direction  of  Lady- 
smith. He  was  joined  by  Pienaar  on  the  20th,  near  Elandslaagte 
railway  station,  twelve  miles  from  the  British  camp,  in  the  even- 
ing. While  deliberating  what  to  do  next,  a train  was  observed 
steaming  towards  them  from  Ladysmith,  and  the  patrols  resolved 
upon  its  capture.  It  turned  out  to  be  a provision  train  bound  for 
Dundee,  and  carrying  supplies  and  a hand  for  Penn  Symons’  camp. 
The  patrols  took  possession  of  the  railway  station,  and  on  the  train 
arriving  it  was  surrounded,  and  captured  with  very  little  show 
of  force.  The  station-master  and  the  telegrapher  were  made  pris- 
oners; the  latter  being  locked  in  a room  in  the  railway  station,  hut 
it  was  the  room  containing  the  telegraph  instrument! 

The  men  of  the  patrols  were  soon  busy  ransacking  the  train, 
which  they  found  well  stocked  with  brandy,  wine,  and  whisky,  and 
what  happened,  in  consequence,  was  the  cause  of  the  serious  reverse 
which  followed  on  the  morrow.  A large  number  of  the  patrols 
indulged  in  the  dangerous  booty,  not  wisely  but  too  liberally,  the 
result  being  that  many  became,  according  to  report,  intoxicated. 
While  this  was  going  on,  the  imprisoned  telegraph  clerk  used  his 
instrument  with  effect.  He  had  wired  to  Ladysmith  an  account 
of  what  was  occurring  at  Elandslaagte. 

Colonel  Schiel,  who  now  arrived  on  the  scene  with  part  of  his 
men,  realized  the  seriousness  of  the  situation,  and  was  in  the  act 
of  withdrawing  Potgieter  and  his  patrol  from  the  station  when  two 
armored  trains,  carrying  a large  force  of  British  and  some  guns, 
steamed  from  the  direction  of  Ladysmith,  and  commenced  to  shell 
the  station.  After  exchanging  fire  with  the  enemy,  Schiel  retired 
the  patrols  to  a position  a mile  eastward  from  the  station,  and 
remained  there  during  the  night.  A despatch  was  sent  at  once 
to  General  Kock  and  Commandant  Viljoen,  informing  them  of  the 
situation.  Kock  was  always  a better  fighter  than  a cool  general, 
and,  instead  of  ordering  Schiel  to  fall  back  upon  the  main  laager 
and  refuse  battle  within  two  hours’  march  of  5,000  or  6,000 


128 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


British,  he  gave  instant  orders  to  his  men  to  saddle  and  go  forward 
immediately  to  the  support  of  the  imprudent  patrols.  The  motive 
was  chivalrous,  but  the  act  was  most  unwise,  and  the  result  disas- 
trous. 

On  reaching  Elandslaagte  on  Saturday  morning.  General  Kock 
found  that  Schiel  had  taken  up  the  best  position  left  for  the  Boers 
to  occupy.  This  was  a ridge  gradually  rising  from  the  level 
veldt,  and  affording  cover  against  the  eight  guns  which  General 
French  had  already  brought  into  action.  General  Kock  made  a 
hasty  disposition  of  his  men,  in  conjunction  with  Schiel’s  position 
on  the  elevated,  stony  ridge,  and  immediately  opened  fire  with 
his  Maxim-Nordenfelts  upon  the  enemy,  who  occupied  a lower 
ridge  some  4,000  yards  southward,  across  an  intervening  stretch 
of  rough  ground.  Kock’s  two  guns  were  effectively  handled,  and 
soon  compelled  the  British  artillery  to  retire  back  in  the  direction 
of  Modderspruit  railway  station.  This  easy  repulse  of  the  attack- 
ing force  greatly  elated  the  Johannesburg  men.  They  were  con- 
vinced that  the  battle  was  over,  and  that  the  English  had  retreated 
on  Ladysmith,  refusing  to  fight. 

This  over-sanguine  view  was  not  shared  by  either  the  general  or 
Schiel,  who  rightly  conjectured  that  the  British  officer  had  only 
been  engaged  in  a reconnaissance,  and  had  fallen  back  in  order  to 
wait  the  arrival  of  more  guns  and  men.  The  obvious  duty,  how- 
ever, was  for  Kock  and  Viljoen  to  have  fallen  back  also,  after 
having  rescued  Schiel  and  Potgieter  from  their  dangerous  situa- 
tion. Ladysmith  was  only  a dozen  miles  away,  and  both  road  and 
railway  from  that  town  would  enable  General  White  to  rush  for- 
ward an  overwhelming  force  in  a few  hours’  time.  All  this  sane 
consideration  was,  however,  lost  upon  the  Band  fire-eaters.  They 
could  wipe  out  any  number  of  English,  and  they  were  not  going 
to  run  away,  after  having  “ chased  ” the  enemy  back  to  his  camp, 
etc.  It  was  therefore  unwisely  determined  to  remain  in  the  posi- 
tion which  the  commando  had  taken  up  on  its  arrival,  and  to  await 
the  renewal  of  the  fight. 

It  is  of  vital  importance,  in  estimating  the  value  of  the  victory 
gained  by  General  French  in  this  battle,  to  understand  rightly  the 
nature  of  the  ground  on  which  it  was  fought.  All  the  English 
reports  of  the  fight  greatly  exaggerate  the  natural  strength  of 
Kock’s  position;  some  war  correspondents  giving  a pen-picture  of 
a great  hill,  with  steep  and  almost  inaccessible  sides,  from  the 
top  of  which  batteries  of  Boer  artillery  were  represented  as  shelling 
the  dauntless,  charging  Tommies.  The  London  illustrated  papers 
presented  the  public  with  pictures  of  this  imaginary  veldt  Gibraltar, 
as  being  stormed  in  face  of  numerous  guns  belching  forth  their 


9 


GENERAL  KOCK  AND  HIS  COMMANDO  WHICH  FOUGHT  AT  ELANDSLAAQTE,  OCTOBER  20,  1899 


130 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


death-dealing  shells  in  vain  efforts  to  stem  the  resistless  tide  of 
rushing,  British  valor. 

General  Kock  had  only  two  Maxim-Nordenfelts  in  this  battle, 
and  no  other  guns  of  any  class  or  description. 

Fortunately  a real  photograph  of  the  battle-field  of  Eland  slaagte 
is  in  existence,  and  the  sun,  as  an  unerring  witness,  can  be  placed 
in  opposition  to  the  artists  in  exaggeration,  who  have  magnified 
the  height  and  strength  of  the  ridge  on  which  the  desperate  battle 
was  fought,  so  as  to  make  greater  the  victory  won  by  the  English, 
and  to  lessen  the  credit  due  to  the  Boers  for  their  splendid  and 
unequal  combat. 

The  ridge  represented  in  the  picture  on  page  137  rises  from  a 
green  valley,  about  a mile  and  a half  east  of  Elandslaagte  railway 
station,  with  the  open  space  in  which  the  figure  stands  sloping 
down  to  the  level  ground  towards  Ladysmith.  The  man  in  the 
picture  is  looking  in  the  direction  from  which  the  English  ad- 
vanced, and  the  ridge  behind  him  is  that  on  which  the  Boers  made 
their  chief  stand  against  French’s  forces.  Back  of  the  ridge,  at  a 
distance  of  half  a mile,  there  is  a lower  ridge,  or  small  kopje,  and 
the  brief  but  heroic  fight  of  Kock’s  body-guard  when  the  day  was 
lost  was  made  near  this  place. 

To  the  right  of  the  scene  in  the  picture  the  ridge  continues,  and 
slopes  down  in  rough,  stony  ground  to  the  level  veldt,  which  ex- 
tends for  four  or  five  miles  southward,  where  another  stony  ridge 
crops  up  again  from  the  plain.  It  was  behind  this  rising  ground 
that  French  massed  his  men  and  guns  preparatory  to  the  final 
advance  upon  the  Boer  position  in  the  afternoon. 

There  was  no  military  judgment  exercised  by  Kock  in  the  selec- 
tion of  this  position  for  so  small  a force.  Level  ground  lay  to  the 
right  and  left,  while  there  was  no  higher  or  strong  natural  eleva- 
tion immediately  in  the  rear  to  which  men  and  guns  could  retire 
for  another  stand  in  case  the  enemy’s  force  should  carry  out  a 
successful  turning  movement.  There  was  likewise  some  open 
country  at  right  angles  to  the  ridge,  across  which  the  Boers  would 
have  to  retreat  in  the  event  of  failing  to  hold  their  ground,  and 
where  the  enemy’s  cavalry  would  have  the  freest  scope  for  a flank- 
ing attack.  All  these  weak  points  in  Kock’s  position  were  to  be 
defended  by  800  or  900  men  and  two  guns,  against  a combined 
infantry  and  cavalry  force  of  4,000  troops  with  fifteen  field  pieces. 

The  falling  back  of  French’s  cavalry  and  artillery  in  the  morn- 
ing enabled  Kock  to  make  a hasty  preparation  for  the  next  en- 
counter. His  little  force  was  spread  out  more  or  less  over  three 
positions;  his  center  resting  on  the  ridge  represented  in  the  picture, 
and  comprising  Ben  Viljoen’s  Band  commando  and  the  Krugers- 


BATTLE  OF  FLANDSLAAOTF 


131 


dorp  men;  his  left  covered  the  southern  part  of  the  ridge,  where 
the  Hollander  corps  and  Schiel’s  Germans  extended  down  to  where 
the  rising  ground  merged  into  the  veldt;  while  the  right  was  made 
up  of  Free  Staters  and  others,  who  covered  the  camp,  baggage,  and 
ambulance  wagons,  and  took  no  active  part  in  the  fight.  These 
divisions,  however,  only  held  good  until  the  main  English  attack 
was  delivered.  The  various  corps  and  bodies  then  got  mixed  up, 
and  fought  as  a disorganized  unit  to  the  finish.  The  two  guns 
were  placed  first  in  the  center,  near  the  elevation  in  the  picture  of 
the  field,  where  there  was  a strong  natural  rock  protection  for  their 
safety,  but  they  were  moved  to  other  positions  during  the  latter 
part  of  the  engagement. 

Noon  arrived,  and  there  was  still  no  sign  of  a returning  enemy 
on  the  horizon.  Two  scouting  parties  of  a hundred  men  each  were 
sent  forward  under  Field  Cornets  Potgieter  and  Pienaar  to  the 
ridge  southwards  across  the  plain,  to  feel  for  the  foe.  Shots  were 
soon  after  heard,  and  Schiel,  with  most  of  his  Germans,  galloped 
across  the  veldt  to  the  aid  of  Potgieter  and  his  men.  They  found 
the  enemy  advancing  in  great  force  from  Modderspruit,  and  Pot- 
gieter’s  fiery  imprudence  insisted  upon  a stand  being  made  against 
the  tide  of  foes  sweeping  down  upon  them.  Schiel,  unwilling  to 
abandon  the  reckless  Boer  officer,  took  up  position,  and  the  enemy 
were  fired  upon  by  300  men  from  the  cover  of  the  ridge. 

The  little  force  fell  back  at  once  upon  their  base,  followed  across 
the  veldt  by  shells  from  the  British  guns.  Schiel  took  his  Germans 
one  way,  and  Potgieter  and  Pienaar  with  their  men  made  for  the 
ridge  held  by  Lombard  and  the  Hollanders,  at  the  extreme  left  of 
Kock’s  main  position.  The  Germans  wandered  round  by  the  rail- 
way to  the  north,  and  lost  their  way;  finding  it  again  only  as  dark- 
ness was  coming  on,  and  when  the  battle  was  virtually  over,  to  be 
fired  upon  by  the  British,  and  by  the  Free  Staters  also  in  mistake, 
as  Schiel  and  his  followers  cut  into  the  battle-field  in  the  midst 
of  the  Boer  retreat. 

General  French’s  plan  of  attack  was  formed  for  him  by  the 
position  of  his  adversary,  isolated  on  a ridge,  surrounded  by  level 
ground,  and  offering  the  freest  play  for  a combined  force  of  artil- 
lery, infantry,  and  cavalry. 

His  plan  was  to  send  a strong  contingent  of  his  best  troops 
straight  against  Kock’s  left,  composed  mainly  of  the  Hollanders, 
which  was  weakest  in  men  and  natural  strength,  and  b}^  cooperating 
artillery  and  rifie  fire  force  those  who  held  this  end  of  the  ridge 
back  upon  Kock’s  center,  which  could  then  be  assaulted  from  the 
higher  ground  thus  gained.  French’s  guns  with  mounted  protec- 
tion were  to  form  a fianking  support  for  this  attack,  after  shelling 


132 


THE  BOEB  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


the  Boer  left  from  their  position,  while  Lancers,  Dragoons,  and 
Natal  cavalry  were  to  move  by  the  road  from  Ladysmith,  parallel 
with  the  railway,  on  the  left  of  the  guns,  to  bar  the  retreat  of  the 
Boers  after  the  delivery  of  the  British  assault  on.  the  center,  and 
to  deal  the  calculated  crushing  blow. 

The  English  renewed  the  fight  at  about  three  o’clock  with  an 
artillery  attack  upon  Kock’s  entire  lines.  The  Boer  guns  replied 
in  most  accurate  aim,  and  maintained  the  unequal  contest  for  over 
an  hour,  when  it  became  evident  that  French’s  batteries  were 
searching  every  portion  of  the  ridge  with  their  shells.  Kock’s  two 


TUE  GEUMAN  CORPS— BATTLE  OF  ELANDSLAAGTE 


guns  were  soon  temporarily  silenced,  and  immediately  the  enemy 
moved  against  the  portion  of  the  ridge  held  by  the  Hollanders.  A 
force  of  mounted  British  advanced  to  the  left  of  where  Lombard 
clung  to  the  rocks,  as  if  bent  upon  a turning  movement.  The 
advance  was  a screen  for  a large  force  of  infantry  which  French 
had  sent  to  attack  Lombard’s  right,  which  was  being  shelled  by 
the  English  cannon,  now  firing  within  a range  of  3,000  yards. 
Lombard’s  Hollanders  clamored  for  a counter  attack,  which  was 
unwisely  ordered,  and  the  Dutchmen  gallantly  sprang  from  their 
cover  out  into  the  plain,  kneeling  and  aiming  as  they  pressed  for- 
ward to  meet  the  enemy.  They  shot  back  with  great  intrepidity 
the  mounted  troops,  who  retired,  but  their  Mausers  failed  effect- 
ively to  find  the  Tommies  who  were  moving  on  their  right,  as  these 
were  cautiously  taking  cover  behind  stones  and  ant-hills  while 


BATTLE  OF  ELANDSLAAGTE 


133 


creeping  forward  for  the  final  spring  upon  the  ridge.  The  enemy’s 
guns  were  now  trained  upon  the  Hollanders,  who  were  thus  com- 
pelled to  fall  hack,  pursued  by  Lancers,  and  losing  many  of  their 
number.  The  Boer  ISTordenfelts  here  spoke  again  from  a new  posi- 
tion, and  checked  the  further  advance  of  this  attack  upon  Lom- 
bard, enabling  the  Hollanders  to  retire  from  the  extreme  edge  of 
the  ridge,  which  could  no  longer  he  defended  against  the  converg- 
ing fire  of  both  artillery  and  infantry  upon  it. 

It  was  not,  however,  until  near  seven  o’clock  that  French’s  force 
succeeded  in  fighting  its  way  as  far  as  Kock’s  left,  so  gallantly  and 
so  stubbornly  had  that  part  of  the  ridge  been  defended  by  the 
Krugersdorp  men  and  the  Hollanders. 

Once  that  end  of  the  ridge  was  taken,  however,  the  other  end 
became  untenable.  The  entire  commando  now  crowded  upon  the 
part  of  the  ridge  shown  in  the  picture,  while  the  British  were 
mounting  on  to  the  corresponding  bend  of  the  horseshoe-shaped 
field.  The  fighting  from  this  became  hot  and  furious,  as  the  com- 
batants were  nearing  each  other.  The  day,  too,  was  fading  into 
darkness,  and  the  rain  came  down  in  torrents  upon  the  drenched 
battle-field.  It  was  realized  about  this  hour  from  the  center  of 
the  ridge  that  French’s  cavalry  were  advancing  on  the  right  to 
cut  off  retreat,  while  other  mounted  forces  were  working  round 
to  the  east,  and  something  akin  to  a panic  set  in  among  the  Johan- 
nesburg Uitlanders.  They  broke  away  for  their  horses  in  the  rear, 
seeing  that  with  their  two  guns  silenced,  and  the  enemy  on  both 
the  right  and  left  of  their  position  with  his  guns  unopposed,  it 
was  humanly  impossible  for  Kock  to  hold  on  to  the  center  of  the 
menaced  ridge  except  to  be  exterminated.  The  Krugersdorp  men, 
with  about  fifty  Hollanders  and  other  Uitlanders,  held  on  to  the 
position  round  the  two  guns  with  grim  resolve;  firing  steadily 
amidst  the  hail  of  shells  and  bullets  which  swept  in  upon  them 
from  all  sides.  Eetreat  was  almost  cut  off  by  the  encircling  British, 
whose  artillery  was  now  within  a range  of  1,500  yards.  The  first 
of  the  enemy  to  top  the  ridge  nearest  the  guns  were  some  Gordon 
Highlanders,  who  sprang  over  the  boulders,  against  which  the  bul- 
lets of  the  Boers  whistled  their  messages  of  menace  and  death.  The 
kilted  Tommies  had  only  time  to  shout  “Majuba  avenged!  ” when 
they  were  instantly  shot  down  by  Kock  and  his  bodyguard.  The 
deadly  fire  which  these  poured  across  the  field  from  their  cover 
arrested  for  a time  the  final  advance  of  the  English  over  the  level 
ground  shown  in  the  picture  of  the  battle-field.  During  this  pause 
Kock  and  Viljoen  attempted  to  rally  more  of  their  men  behind 
the  ridge,  near  the  camp,  in  a final  effort  to  rescue  the  guns.  The 
ridge,  however,  was  by  this  time  found  to  be  almost  surrounded 


134 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


by  the  enemy’s  troops,  infantry  and  mounted,  and  the  attempt 
had  to  he  abandoned.  Two  bodies  of  the  British  were  rushing  for 
the  abandoned  Nordenfelts,  in  the  belief  that  the  fight  was  all  but 
over,  when  there  occurred  the  most  striking  act  of  heroism  which 
the  day  had  witnessed,  and  which  afterwards  extorted  praise  even 
from  the  enemy’s  officers.  Seven  of  the  fifty  men  who  still  re- 
mained fighting  round  General  Kock,  seeing  the  rush  being  made 
for  the  guns  by  the  enemy,  left  their  position  and  walked  out  de- 
liberately, opening  as  they  went,  to  fire  on  the  advancing  troopers. 
They  stood  in  line,  coolly  aiming  and  bringing  down  riders  at  each 
volley;  the  men  falling  by  return  fire,  until  only  one  of  the  seven 
was  left.  He  fell  wounded,  but  not  before  he  had  spiked  the  two 
guns.  His  name  was  Smit,  and  he  was  the  only  one  of  the  seven 
Krugersdorpers  who  was  not  killed  in  this  heroic  display  of  life- 
giving  courage.  These  devoted  men  thus  nobly  gave  their  lives  in 
a last  attempt  to  save  the  guns,  and  to  allow  their  general  and  his 
guard  to  escape. 

The  final  stand  of  General  Kock  on  the  field,  which  his  splendid 
bravery  could  not  save  from  the  faults  of  his  generalship,  was  well 
and  graphically  described  in  a letter  written  shortly  after  the  battle 
by  the  hurgher-son  of  an  Englishman,  who  fought  by  his  general’s 
side  until  the  last  moment.  The  letter  relating  what  had  occurred 
has  the  natural  frankness  and  some  of  the  boasting  of  a boy,  and 
was  addressed  to  his  mother  at  Johannesburg.  The  writer’s  name 
is  Vyvian  Coghill,  and  his  age  was  19.  He  was  one  of  Ben  Vil- 
joen’s  Band  commando. 

His  story  is  this: 

“ We  kept  firing  till  the  infantry  came  on  and  looked  like  sur- 
rounding us;  then  some  fled.  In  the  flight  the  Germans  suffered 
heaviest.  Some  fifty  of  us,  however,  stuck  to  our  posts  with  the 
officers.  Then  the  fire  from  the  Maxims  and  the  cannon  became 
so  hot  that  we  retreated  to  the  back  of  the  kop,  where  Commandant 
Viljoen  and  General  Kock  rallied  our  men,  and  we  came  forward 
again.  Some  of  the  others  took  the  nearest  horses  and  cleared  off; 
but  twelve  of  us  stuck  to  the  general  and  returned  to  the  guns, 
while  the  balance  went  with  Commandant  Viljoen  to  the  other 
side  of  the  kop.  When  the  English  were  about  500  yards  away 
we  mowed  them  down  like  sheep.  It  was  terrible!  I never  felt 
a little  bit  of  fear.  I prayed  to  God,  and  fired  like  a soldier,  taking 
aim  every  time.  By  this  time  we  were  only  fifty  men  altogether 
left  on  the  kop,  and  the  English  soldiers  were  climbing  up  and 
surrounding  the  kop.  Some  of  the  Highlanders  were  running 
after  our  men,  when  eight  of  us,  including  General  Kock,  opened 
fire  on  them  at  50  yards,  and  not  one  escaped.  Just  then  General 
Kock  was  shot  down  just  at  my  side,  and  three  others  within  five 


BATTLE  OF  ELANDSLAAGTE 


135 


yards  of  me.  I stood  up  and  said  ^ God  help  me,’  and  van  Niekerk 
(detective)  got  a shot  in  his  wrist.  As  his  hand  dropped  he  took 
his  gun  to  the  left,  threw  it  over  his  arm,  and  continued  firing  as 
if  nothing  had  happened.  General  Kock  lay  half-dying  at  our 
feet,  and  we  could  not  help  him.  Then  the  infantry  came  round 
the  other  side  of  the  kop,  and  there  was  only  a space  of  200  yards 
to  go  through  to  get  out,  and  only  about  five  men  standing  on  the 
kop,  with  bullets  and  shells  fiying  round.  None  of  us  would  put 
up  the  white  fiag,  and  we  made  a break  for  safety.  The  English 
turned  a Maxim  on  us,  and  I never  ran  in  all  my  life  like  I did 
then.  When  I got  down  my  horse  was  gone,  but  I found  another, 
and  after  just  escaping  a charge  from  the  Lancers,  got  clean  away.” 

Two  among  the  many  brave  men  who  fell  on  the  Boer  side  in 
the  fight  were  Englishmen — Major  Hall,  and  Mr.  Kichard  Impey, 
of  Johannesburg;  both  of  whom  took  part  in  Lombard’s  charge 
across  the  veldt  early  in  the  engagement,  and  were  shot  dead  in 
defending  the  freedom  of  their  adopted  country  against  the  aggres- 
sion of  their  native  land.  Many  desperate  hand-to-hand  encoun- 
ters took  place  in  the  final  advance  of  the  English  over  the  open 
space  to  where  it  was  thought  the  Boer  guns  would  be  found.  The 
Germans  came  upon  the  field  when  the  fight  was  nearly  over,  hav- 
ing lost  themselves  in  the  retreat  from  the  scouting  encounter  early 
in  the  afternoon,  and  having  suffered  heavily  in  collisions  with 
the  Dragoons.  Colonel  Schiel  was  wounded  and  taken  prisoner. 
Many  Germans  and  Boers  whose  horses  had  been  taken  or  killed 
in  the  capture  of  Kock’s  camp  shot  Lancers  from  their  horses 
and  escaped  on  their  enemies’  mounts.  The  struggle  continued 
until  darkness  came  on,  the  Lancers  and  Dragoons  pursuing  the 
retreating  Boer  commando,  which  had  left  over  one-third  of  its 
number  on  and  around  the  ridge  where  the  unequal  fight  had  been 
waged. 

A complete  list  of  the  Boer  killed  and  wounded  was  published 
by  Dr.  Visser  in  the  Johannesburg  press  of  the  6th  of  November. 
The  list  gives  the  name,  age,  home  address,  nature  of  wound,  and 
name  of  commando  in  which  the  dead  and  wounded  had  served. 
The  publication  of  this  list  disposes  of  the  Jingo  fiction  as  to  “ the 
hundreds  ” of  Boers  who  were  declared  to  have  been  killed  and 
wounded  at  that  battle,  but  not  accounted  for.  Dr.  Visser  was 
on  the  field  while  the  engagement  lasted,  in  charge  of  the  J ohannes- 
burg  ambulance. 

The  killing  of  wounded  Boers  by  Lancers  and  others  at  this  fight 
excited  a widespread  feeling  of  indignation  throughout  the  civilized 
world.  The  American  and  Continental  press  were  especially  out- 
spoken in  condemnation  of  the  brutality  which  disgraced  the  Brit- 


13G 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


ish  soldiers  in  their  treatment  of  beaten  and  wounded  foes,  after 
the  fortunes  of  the  fight  had  fallen  to  the  side  of  the  stronger  com- 
batant. On  the  verj^  same  day  when  an  English  general  and  two 
or  three  hundred  wounded  at  Dundee  had  fallen  into  Boer  hands, 
and  were  humanely  treated,  on  their  own  acknowledgment,  the 
English  victors  at  Elandslaagte  were  boasting  of  their  “ pig-stick- 
ing,” and  of  the  number  of  Boers  to  whom  they  had  denied  quarter. 

Some  of  the  worst  reports  penned  by  these  brutal-minded  Tom- 
mies were  possibly  exaggerated  in  the  savagery  of  their  boasting. 
The  writers  described  themselves  in  the  language  of  bravos  as 
bigger  ruffians  in  print  than  they  probably  were  in  act.  Still,  their 
shameless  self-laudation  for  the  number  of  Boers  they  had  killed 
when  asking  for  mercy  or  quarter  found  a ready  publication  in  all 
the  English  papers,  with  few,  if  any,  editorial  protests  against  the 
inhumanity  which  was  made  the  subject  of  self-praise  by  the 
writers.  One  searches  in  vain  through  any  record  of  Boer  fighting 
to  find  any  moral  or  soldierly  parallel  to  this  disgusting  spirit  of 
British  civilized  savagery. 

A British  officer  was  quoted  in  the  “ Times  ” (15th  of  November, 
1899)  as  saying: 

“ After  the  enemy  were  driven  out  one  of  our  squadrons  pursued 
and  got  right  in  among  them  in  the  twilight,  and  most  excellent 
pig-sticking  ensued  for  about  ten  minutes,  the  bag  being  about  sixty. 
One  of  our  men  stuck  his  lance  through  two,  killing  them  both  at 
one  thrust.  Had  it  not  been  getting  dark  we  should  have  killed 
many  more.” 

In  a score  of  other  versions  of  the  same  performances,  published 
in  other  papers,  proof  is  piled  upon  proof  that  deeds  were  done  at 
this  fight  by  English  soldiers  which  would  do  more  credit  to  the 
banner  of  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  than  to  that  of  a professed  Chris- 
tian nation. 

A I.iancer  writing  home  had  his  letter  published  by  his  admiring 
relative  in  the  Brighton  Argus.”  This  champion  of  Christian 
England  said:  “'We  got  a charge  at  them;  they  asked  for  mercy, 
but  we  were  told  not  to  give  them  any,  and  I assure  you  they  got 
none.  We  went  along  sticking  our  lances  through  them — it  was 
a terrible  thing,  but  you  have  to  do  it  in  a case  like  this.”  Boers 
do  not  stand  in  a row  to  be  stuck  after  a battle;  neither  do  their 
horses  wait  patiently  on  the  field  for  the  approach  of  a galloping 
trooper.  Clearly  what  the  writer  of  this  letter  meant  to  convey 
was  that  he  and  his  companions  “ went  along  sticking  our  lances  ” 
in  men  who  lay  wounded,  or  otherwise  helpless,  on  the  veldt.  This 
view  is  supported  by  another  warrior  of  equal  chivalry,  who  relates: 


BATTLE  OF  ELANDSLAAGTE 


137 


“ "We  charged  them,  and  they  went  on  their  knees  begging  of  us  to 
shoot  them  rather  than  stab  them  with  our  lances,  but  in  vain. 
The  time  had  come  for  us  to  do  our  work,  and  we  did  it.” 

Another  hero  named  Williams  is  his  own  historian  of  how  he 
perpetrated  the  following  deliberate  murder:  “ I got  hold  of  one 
Boer  ” — ^lie  had  taken  an  enemy  prisoner — “ he  did  not  know  what 
I intended  doing,  so  I made  motions  for  him  to  run  for  his  life. 
So  he  went,  and  I galloped  after  him  with  the  sergeant’s  sword, 
and  cut  his  head  right  off  his  body!  ” 

A Lancer  is  reported  as  having  said  to  the  war  correspondent  of 
the  “ Daily  Chronicle  “ We  just  gave  them  a good  dig  as  they 


THE  BATTLE-FIELD  AT  ELANDSLAAGTE 


lay.  Next  day  most  of  the  lances  were  bloody.”  Here,  clearly, 
it  was  a boast  of  stabbing  wounded  foemen  who  were  lying  helpless 
on' the  ground. 

There  were  British  soldiers  of  a more  practical  turn  of  mind 
than  the  boastful  Lancers  at  Elandslaagte,  and  equally  creditable 
to  the  cause  for  which  the  war  was  pro'poked.  They,  too,  were 
willing  narrators  of  their  own  prowess  on  what  used  to  he  known 
as  “ the  field  of  honor  ”;  and  their  letters  were  also  published  in 
the  model  press  of  England  as  indicating  what  brave  men  were 
doing  for  the  flag  at  the  front.  The  “ Liverpool  Daily  Post  ” found 
space  for  the  following  epistle  from  some  local  Bayard  of  the  Jingo 
cult  of  English  soldier  chivalry: 

“ Many  of  our  soldiers  are  quite  rich  with  the  loot  that  has 
fallen  to  them.  The  infantry  regiments  profited  to  the  largest 


138 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


extent.  One  Tommy  secured  a pocket-book  containing  £270  in 
Transvaal  money.  Our  boys  are  parading  about  now  with  gold 
watches,  chains,  and  other  trinkets.” 

All  this  may  be  revolting,  infamous,  cowardly.  But  if  the 
authors  of  a war  which  was  purposely  provoked  for  the  grabbing 
of  the  richest  gold-reefs  in  the  world  are  to  be  considered  as  stand- 
ing high  in  English  religious,  social,  and  political  esteem,  despite 
the  results  of  the  disastrous  conflict  which  their  greed  has  caused, 
how  could  an  English  Tommy  Atkins  be  expected  to  see  either 
shame  or  dishonor  in  picking  the  pocket  of  a wounded  Boer,  or  in 
lifting  a watch  from  a dead  foeman? 

This  inhumanity  was  not  shown  for  the  first  time  in  the  war  on 
the  field  of  Elandslaagte  by  the  British.  The  example  was  given 
in  the  very  first  encounter  with  the  Boers  at  Talana,  and  the  spirit 
which  prompted  such  unsoldierly  conduct  was  the  result  of  the 
calumnies  circulated  in  the  Ehodesian  and  Jingo  press  against  the 
peojile  of  the  Transvaal  before  war  was  declared.  This  malignant 
feeling  was  even  extended  to  doctors  and  others  who  were  attached 
to  the  Boer  commandoes.  The  following  specific  and  detailed 
instances  of  violations  of  the  Eed  Cross  at  Dundee  were  published 
in  the  Boer  press  at  the  time,  and  amply  justified  the  protest  which 
General  Joubert  addressed  to  the  European  Powers  against  such 
violations  of  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare  by  English  troops; 

“ Dr.  Adolf  Vlaskamp,  of  Utrecht,  states  that  in  the  Dundee 
battle,  of  the  20th  of  October,  the  Hussars  attacked  the  horse 
ridden  by  Dr.  van  der  Merwe  (of  Krugersdorp)  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  its  rider  bore  the  insignia  of  the  Eed  Cross.  Not  con- 
tent with  killing  the  doctor's  horse,  an  attack  was  made  upon 
its  rider,  but  a British  officer  galloped  up  and  ordered  the  troopers 
to  cease  dishonoring  the  Eed  Cross  emblem. 

In  the  same  way  Dr.  Watt,  District  Surgeon  of  Wakkerstroom, 
was  taken  prisoner,  despite  the  fact  that  he  explained  his  capacity 
and  asked  the  protection  of  the  Eed  Cross.  Dr.  Watt  was  compelled 
to  ride  round  the  camp  from  noon  till  sundown,  and  was  only 
liberated  on  the  Saturday  following  the  battle. 

“Justus  Dirks,  Eevenue  Officer  at  Volksrust,  and  Bantjes,  Col- 
lector of  Taxes  at  Wakkerstroom,  were  made  prisoners  by  the  Eng- 
lish on  that  fateful  Friday,  while  in  the  act  of  carrying  the  burgher 
wounded  to  the  Eed  Cross  ambulance.  Dirks  and  Bantjes  both 
bore  flags  supplied  to  them  by  the  field  doctors. 

“ Seventeen  of  our  men,’  said  the  doctor,  concluding  an  interview 
with  a representative,  ‘ were  tied  to  a wagon  and  marched,  French 
fashion.  They  were  told  by  the  Britishers  that  if  they  resisted 
they  would  be  shot;  and,  as  a matter  of  fact,  two  men  who  were  more 


BATTLE  OF  ELAND SLAAGTE 


139 


troublesome  than  the  rest  were  actually  wounded.  They  were  after- 
wards liberated  when  we  took  Dundee.’  ” 

These  instances  of  how  the  British  acted  towards  Boer  doctors 
and  prisoners  at  Dundee  show  that  the  more  reprehensible  conduct 
of  the  Lancers  and  others  at  Elandslaagte  was  not  accidental  to  the 
passions  of  that  encounter;  but  is  a proof  that  some  of  the  English 
soldiers  and  officers  were  capable  of  a barbarity  towards  their  foes 
which  Kaffirs  might  hesitate  to  commit. 

The  treatment  accorded  to  General  Kock  was  especially  revolt- 
ing, he  having  been  the  Boer  officer  in  command  at  Elandslaagte, 
and  a man  of  striking  presence  whose  identity  could  not  be  ignored, 
except  by  men  unworthy  to  be  his  foes.  The  following  facts,  sworn 
to  hy  his  nephew  after  the  general’s  death,  gave  the  Africander 
nation  the  true  moral  measure  of  that  superior  civilization  which 
it  was  England’s  mission  to  teach  to  the  benighted  Boer,  through 
the  medium  of  its  truest  missionary,  Mr.  Thomas  Atkins: 

“ I,  the  undersigned,  Philip  Kudolph  Kock,  responsible  clerk 
at  the  Pass  Office,  Johannesburg,  Witwatersrand  Gold  Fields, 
S.  A.  E.,  declare  under  oath  and  say  : 

“ Early  the  same  morning  I again  went  with  Dr.  Visser  to  the 
battle-field.  The  first  of  the  wounded  I happened  on  was  General 
Kock;  he  lay  in  a small  tent,  entirely  naked.  He  told  me  that  an 
English  soldier  had  come  to  him  and  robbed  him  of  all  the  money 
that  was  in  his  trousers  pocket,  of  his  watch,  and  of  all  his  clothes, 
except  one  coat.  He  also  informed  me  that  this  person  stated 
that  he  belonged  to  the  Indian  troops.  He  (the  General)  was 
covered  by  a thin  blanket,  and  lay  on  a small  wet  mattress. 


“ Kot  alone  were  General  Kock  and  the  persons  mentioned  above 
robbed  of  their  clothes,  watches,  and  money,  hut  also  others.  On 
the  battle-field  I saw  the  remains  of  Assistant  Commandant  Boden- 
stein  (Landrost  of  Krugersdorp).  He  had  received  a hullet  in  his 
left  breast,  which  pierced  his  heart.  He  had  been  robbed  of  his 
telescope,  his  rings  had  been  taken  from  his  fingers,  and  all  his 
money  was  gone. 

“ I also  saw  the  remains  of  Piet  Blignaut,  sen.  His  boots, 
watch,  money,  and  snuff-hox  were  gone. 

“ From  the  body  of  Willie  Pretorius  (Eevenue  Collector  at 
Johannesburg)  were  taken  all  his  money,  and  his  ring  from  off 
his  finger. 

“ From  Servaas  De  Wet,  who  was  only  wounded  in  the  left  leg, 
a ring  and  his  money  were  taken.  I hear  that  he  has  now  been 
exchanged,  and  he  will  be  able  to  testify  to  the  same. 

“ J.  A.  Lepeltakkeeft  was  wounded  by  a Lancer ; he  threw  his 
gun  down,  and,  holding  up  his  hand,  surrendered  himself  as 


140 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


prisoner.  He  next  gave  up  his  revolver  and  bandolier.  He  was 
ordered  to  march  ‘ voorwaarts,’  and  took  a turn  to  the  left.  He 
did  not  do  this  quickly  enough  in  the  opinion  of  the  English 
officer,  and  was  then  shot  from  behind  by  the  officer  with  a revolver. 
The  bullet  entered  the  shoulders  and  the  lungs,  where  it  remained. 
I was  subsequently  called  into  the  hospital  to  translate  J.  A.  Lepel- 
takkeeft’s  narrative  to  an  English  officer,  and  this,  in  short,  was 
the  story  he  told.  That  same  night  he  died.  The  reply  of  the 
English  officer  when  the  complaint  was  made  was — ‘ It  is  hard 
lines  on  the  poor  fellow,  but  I will  report  the  matter.’  ” 

Dr.  Hermans  Coster,  the  Transvaal  State  Prosecutor,  was  like- 
wise dishonored  and  robbed  of  his  money  and  watch  while  lying 
where  he  had  nobly  died  fighting  for  the  freedom  of  his  adopted 
country. 

One  short  week  after  these  bandit  proceedings  of  British  soldiers 
the  following  letter  was  addressed  to  the  State  Secretary  at  Pre- 
toria, by  Major  Donegal,  E.A.M.C: 

“ October  28th,  Field  Hospital,  Glencoe. 

“ Sir — I wish  to  convey  to  you  the  thanks  of  all  British  officers 
and  men  of  my  hospital  for  the  extreme  kindness  shown  to  them 
by  officers  and  men  of  the  Boer  forces.  Would  you  notify  to  the 
British  authorities  the  death  of  Sir  William  Penn  Symons,  on  the 
23rd,  and  also  state  that  all  wounded  officers  and  men  are  doing 
splendidly,  and  that  none  of  the  officers  are  likely  to  die? 

“ Will  you  kindly  communicate  the  above  to  the  British  authori- 
ties ? ” 

On  the  very  same  day  that  this  letter  was  written  the  following 
reply  (with  the  many  letters  of  the  alphabet  duly  attached)  was 
forwarded  in  answer  to  a request  sent  in  the  name  of  General  Kock 
by  his  brother  and  son  (both  wounded  and  prisoners)  that  the 
wounded  general  might  be  taken  to  his  home  to  be  nursed  by  his 
family: 

“ From  Lieut.-General  Sir  George  White,  V.C.,  G.C.B.,  G.C.S.I., 
G.C.I.E.,  commanding  the  British  Forces  in  Hatal. 

“ To  General  J.  H.  M.  Kock, 

“ Ladysmith. 

“Head  Quarters,  Ladysmith, 

“ 27th  October,  1899. 

“ Sir — I have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  your  letter  of  this 
date,  and  regret  very  much  that  I cannot  consent  that  you  or  your 
staff  should  leave  for  Pretoria  to-morrow,  as  the  retention  of  a 
general  officer  of  your  rank  and  distinction  as  a prisoner  of  war 
is  of  considerable  value  to  the  State  I represent. 


BATTLE  OF  ELANDSLAAGTE 


141 


“ Personally  I regret  very  much  not  being  able  to  meet  your 
wishes  in  this  matter. — I have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  your  obedient 
servant, 

“ George  S.  White, 

“ Lieutenant-General, 
Commanding  the  British  Forces  in  Natal.” 

General  Koek  died  in  Ladysmith  a few  days  later. 

Ten  days  after  Elandslaagte  the  battle  of  Modderspruit  was 
fought  and  won  by  Joubert,  and  the  following  is  the  testimony 
willingly  borne  by  no  admirer  of  the  Boer  race  or  cause,  the  late 
Mr.  G.  W.  Steevens,  of  the  London  “ Daily  Mail,”  to  the  chivalry 
and  humanity  of  the  Transvaal  burghers,  as  shown  to  the  British 
troops  who  had  fallen  as  wounded  and  prisoners,  into  their  hands: 

“They  gave  the  whole  (unwounded)  men  the  water  out  of  their 
own  bottles;  they  gave  the  wounded  the  blankets  off  their  own 
saddles,  and  slept  themselves  on  the  naked  veldt.  They  were  short 
of  transport,  and  they  were  mostly  armed  with  Martinis;  yet  they 
gave  captured  mules  for  the  hospital  panniers,  and  captured  Lee- 
Metfords  for  splints.  A man  was  rubbing  a hot  sore  on  his  head 
with  half  a crown;  nobody  offered  to  take  it  from  him.  Some  of 
them  asked  soldiers  for  their  embroidered  waist-belts  as  mementos 
of  the  day.  ^ IPs  got  my  money  in  it,’  replied  Tommy — a little 
surly,  no  wonder — and  the  captor  said  no  more.” — (“From  Cape 
Town  to  Ladysmith,”  G.  W.  Steevens,  pp.  79,  80.) 

The  Boer  casualties  numbered  over  one-third  of  General  Kock’s 
commando;  45  killed,  110  wounded,  and  185  taken  prisoner.  The 
British  losses  were  reported  to  be  4 officers  and  31  men  killed,  31 
officers  and  175  men  wounded,  with  10  missing.  The  following 
names  among  the  list  of  prisoners  taken  by  General  French  show 
that  many  Uitlanders  of  English,  Scotch,  and  Irish  extraction 
deemed  themselves  to  be  so  “ oppressed  ” under  the  Kruger  regime 
as  to  take  up  arms  and  risk  their  lives  in  its  defense  against  Mr. 
Chamberlain’s  emancipating  English  army: 

W.  Smith,  J.  H.  M’Kenzie,  A.  K.  Hutchinson,  W.  Ashbrook, 
J.  Quirk,  H.  Andrew,  C.  J.  Smith,  W.  H.  Dixon,  N.  D.  Thompson, 
Z.  Seymour,  H.  Martin,  A.  Brown,  John  Brown,  M.  Smith,  G.  T. 
Robertson,  E.  Devine,  J.  T.  Young,  G.  W.  Marsh,  E.  W.  Holder, 
J.  T.  Webb,  G.  A.  Jones,  J.  G.  Smith,  — Tindall,  F.  Dorey. 


GENERAL  KOCK 

Johannes  Hermanns  Michael  Kock  was  one  of  the  most  popular 
citizens  of  the  Transvaal  Republic.  He  was  born  of  a fighting 


142 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


family,  and  took  part  at  the  age  of  12  in  the  battle  of  Boomplaats 
in  1848.  He  figured  prominently  with  his  two  brothers  in  the  wars 
against  both  natives  and  British  which  occurred  during  his  long 
career.  He  was  62  years  of  age  when  he  received  his  death  wound; 
or,  rather,  when  he  was  stripped  of  his  clothing  and  robbed  of 
his  money,  and  left  for  fourteen  hours  wounded  and  unaided,  by 
his  chivalrous  captors  on  the  unsheltered  veldt.  He  succumbed 
to  the  joint  effects  of  exposure  and  wounds.  The  imposing  funeral 
procession  which  followed  his  coffin  in  Pretoria  testified  to  his 
immense  popularity,  and  to  the  sense  of  the  public  loss  which  his 
death  created  in  the  popular  mind. 

He  was  a man  of  noble  presence,  tall,  handsome,  and  soldier-like, 
and  was  greatly  esteemed  in  private  as  in  laager  life  by  all  who 
knew  him. 

He  filled  the  post  of  Minute  Keeper  to  the  Executive  Govern- 
ment of  the  Transvaal,  and  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  President 
Kruger  as  no  other  burgher  did,  he  being  invariably  the  President’s 
companion  in  the  official  and  other  visits  paid  by  Mr.  Kruger  to 
the  various  districts  of  the  country.  Ko  man  in  the  Transvaal 
was  a nobler  type  of  burgher  citizen  in  his  record  of  patriotic 
service,  his  unblemished  character,  personal  dignity,  and  sterling 
manly  qualities.  A son  and  two  brothers  fought  by  his  side,  and 
w'ere  wounded  on  the  same  field  of  battle. 


Chapter  XIV 


BATTLE  OF  MODDERSPRUIT 

Engagement  at  Reitfontein — Jotjbert’s  and  White’s  armies — Account 

OF  THE  BATTLE  AND  DEFEAT  OF  THE  BRITISH JoUBERT’S  REFUSAL  “ TO 

PURSUE  A FLEEING  CHRISTIAN  FOE  ” — COLONEL  BlAKE’S  BRIGADE — 
Nicholson’s  Nek — General  De  Wet’s  first  brilliant  exploit — 
British  and  Boer  casualties — The  alleged  treachery  of  British 
guides — Character  sketches  of  General  Louis  Botha  and 
Christian  De  Wet. 


REITFONTEIN 

ON  the  Tuesday  (October  24)  following  the  battle  at  Elands- 
laagte,  an  engagement,  mainly  confined  to  a fight  with  guns, 
took  place  between  General  White’s  forces  and  some  Free  Staters, 
about  five  miles  southwest  of  the  scene  of  Saturday’s  encounter. 
The  English  general  had  the  service  of  three  batteries  of  artillery, 
and  of  some  3,000  mounted  troops  and  infantry.  The  Free  Staters 
consisted  of  half  the  commandoes  which  General  Prinsloo  had  led 
across  the  Drakensberg  by  Van  Eeenan’s  Pass  after  the  declaration 
of  war;  1,500  men,  with  two  Krupp  guns  and  a Maxim-Nordenfelt. 

A railway  connecting  Natal  with  the  Orange  Free  State  runs 
from  Ladysmith  northwest  to  the  alpine  range  of  mountains  divid- 
ing the  two  countries,  and  enters  the  Free  State  through  the  fa- 
mous pass.  This  vulnerable  point  in  the  northeastern  frontier  of 
the  Free  State  was  guarded  since  the  1st  of  October  by  the  burghers 
belonging  to  the  districts  of  the  Eepuhlic  from  Winburg  to  Heil- 
bron,  and  from  Harrismith  to  Kroonstad. 

On  the  19th  of  October  the  greater  portion  of  this  force  swept 
down  Van  Eeenan’s  Pass  and  took  possession,  after  a slight  en- 
counter between  outposts,  of  Besters  railway  station;  a point  on 
the  railway  line  from  Ladysmith  to  the  Free  State  about  as  far 
from  the  town  now  famous  in  the  annals  of  the  war  as  Elandslaagte 
is  from  the  same  town,  on  the  line  north  to  Dundee  and  Laing’s 
Nek. 

The  two  lines  travel  northwest  and  northeast  respectively  from 
Ladysmith,  branching  out  somewhat  in  the  form  of  the  letter  V 
for  a distance  of  about  a dozen  miles,  where  Elandslaagte  is  reached 


144 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


on  the  right  hand  branch  of  tlie  letter,  and  Besters  Station  on  the 
left  hand  branch.  The  distance  across  from  west  to  east,  or  point 
to  point,  would  be  some  twelve  or  fifteen  miles,  and  within  this 
Y-shaped  district  ISTicholson’s  Nek  may  be  said  to  occupy  the  cen- 
ter, with  Eeitfontein  and  Pepworth  to  the  right,  near  the  line  going 
from  Ladysmith  to  Elandslaagte,  and  Modderspruit  a little  to  the 
right  still  of  that  line,  and  running  parallel  with  it. 

A patrol  of  fifty  burghers  under  Field  Cornet  Pretorius  preceded 
the  main  force  of  Prinsloo’s  commandoes  on  the  19th,  and  engaged 
a body  of  eighty  men  of  the  Natal  Carbineers  west  of  Besters. 
The  Colonials  were  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  Galway  and 
fought  well,  but  they  were  shot  back  by  the  Free  Staters,  who  took 
possession  of  the  station.  The  British  officer  and  a dozen  of  his 
men  were  wounded  in  the  skirmish,  and  were  taken  prisoners  by 
Pretorius. 

Prinsloo  remained  at  Besters  with  the  main  portion  of  his  force 
from  the  19th  to  the  24th.  He  was  within  fifteen  miles  of  the 
scene  of  the  desperate  fight  of  Saturday,  the  21st,  between  General 
Nock’s  Johannesbnrgers  and  French’s  army,  but  rendered  no  help 
of  any  kind.  This  failure  to  cooperate  in  an  operation  outside  of 
the  immediate  plans  of  a commando,  even  though  the  fight  may 
be  near  at  hand,  as  in  this  instance,  is  more  or  less  incidental  to 
the  Boer  military  system.  It  is  due  to  the  tendency,  in  the  militar)'' 
organization  of  the  Republics, to  predominance  of  local  over  national 
or  central  authority,  and  has  been  one  of  the  chief  sources  of  weak- 
ness in  the  Federal  armies.  It  is  true.  Nock  brought  on  the  fight 
of  Saturday  through  his  imprudence,  and  that  no  intimation  of  his 
plans  was  given  to  Prinsloo.  But  this  officer  could  not  be  ignorant 
of  what  was  taking  place,  a dozen  miles  away,  during  the  whole 
of  the  21st,  two  hours’  ride  eastward  of  his  position,  and  yet 
neither  a man  nor  a gun  was  moved  by  him  in  the  direction  of 
the  fighting.  This,  however,  was  by  no  means  the  most  serious 
instance  of  Prinsloo’s  masterly  inactivity  in  the  war. 

On  Sunday,  the  22nd,  Commandant  Andries  Cronje,  of  Win- 
burg  with  some  1,500  men  moved  across  in  the  direction  of  Elands- 
laagte to  the  north  of  Nicholson’s  Nop,  and  took  up  a position  on 
some  hills  at  Hobbs’  Land  Farm  extending  eastwards  towards  Reit- 
fontein.  Prinsloo  remained  behind  at  Besters.  The  officers  who 
accompanied  Cronje  were  Commandants  Christian  De  Wet,  Nel, 
and  Theunissen,  of  the  Heilbron  and  Nroonstad  commandoes.  The 
objective  of  the  Free  Staters  was  to  intercept  the  Dundee  garrison, 
which  began  its  retreat  under  General  Yule  on  Saturday  night, 
and  toiled  through  the  Biggarsberg  passes  on  Sunday  and  Mon- 
day, on  its  way  to  the  shelter  of  the  British  base  at  Ladysmith. 


BATTLE  OF  MODDEESPBUIT 


145 


General  White  moved  out  from  Ladysmith  with  the  guns  and 
men  at  his  disposal  on  Tuesday  morning  to  meet  Yule’s  retreat- 
ing columns.  On  reaching  a point  west  of  the  railway  line 
near  Eeitfontein  the  British  cavalry  were  fired  upon  and  driven 
back  by  Andries  Cronje’s  Winhurgers,  who  held  a position  about 
a mile  eastward  of  Nicholson’s  Ivop.  North  of  this  position,  on 
a higher  hill,  Commandant  Nel,  with  two  Krupp  seven-pounders, 
was  posted,  while  Commandant  De  Wet,  with  the  Kroonstad  and 
other  burghers,  held  a hill  on  the  left  of  the  Free  State  lines 
nearer  to  Eeitfontein.  The  main  English  column  soon  came  up 
with  its  guns,  and  an  artillery  duel  between  the  enemy’s  batteries 
and  Nel’s  Krupps  continued  for  several  hours.  The  Boer  guns 
were  driven  from  their  first  to  a second  and  more  secure  position 
by  the  fire  of  White’s  batteries,  but  beyond  this  temporary  cheek 
no  injury  was  done.  Two  attempts  were  subsequently  made  by 
White  to  turn  the  Boer  positions,  and  both  ended  disastrously. 
The  Gloucester  Eegiment  endeavored  to  work  round  to  the  left 
hill  occupied  by  De  Wet’s  contingent,  and  were  met  by  such  a 
fusillade  that  over  fifty  of  the  British  fell  before  the  Boer  fire. 
The  remainder  bolted  down  the  hill.  A body  of  Natal  Volunteers 
tried  a similar  movement  against  the  Winburgers  near  Nichol- 
son’s Nek.  They  drove  Cronje’s  burghers  back,  but  only  to  take 
up  a new  position  where  a gun  had  meantime  been  placed  in  readi- 
ness for  the  anticipated  tactics  of  the  enemy,  and  on  this  piece 
opening  fire  upon  the  advancing  Britishers,  a retreat  was  ordered, 
and  White  and  his  force  fell  back  shortly  afterwards  on  Ladysmith. 

White  had  succeeded,  however,  in  forcing  an  engagement  west 
of  the  road  from  Dundee,  thus  clearing  the  way  for  Yule’s  beaten 
forces,  who  streamed  past  .to  the  right  while  the  fight  was  in 
progress,  and  his  object  was  attained.  Some  of  the  men  of  the 
Dundee  garrison  joined  in  the  firing  on  reaching  the  protection  of 
White’s  lines,  while  others,  who  were  moving  nearer  to  the  Boer 
positions,  hoisted  white  flags  while  passing  within  rifle  reach  of 
the  Free  Staters. 

Darkness  came  on  soon  after  the  Englisk  had  retired,  and  those 
who  had  fallen  in  the  fray  were  searched  for  by  the  aid  of  lanterns. 
An  exceptionally  large  number  of  horses  had  been  killed  by  shrap- 
nel; and  their  torn  bodies,  with  those  of  the  men  killed  and 
wounded  on  both  sides,  were  found  mixed  on  the  field  of  death; 
forming  a true  and  ghastly  picture  in  the  flickering  shadows  of 
the  night,  of  the  barbarism  and  horrors  of  modern  warfare. 

The  British  losses  were  reported  at  120  killed  and  wounded, 
while  the  casualties  among  the  Free  Staters  numbered  sixteen  only; 
six  killed  and  ten  wounded. 

10 


146 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


The  intervention  of  General  White  between  the  Free  Staters  and 
Yule’s  demoralized  men  on  their  flight  from  Dundee,  saved  Penn 
Symons’  ill-fated  troops  again  from  disaster.  They  had  escaped 
from  Erasmus  on  Saturday  and  Sunday,  through  the  dilatoriness 
of  himself  and  Joubert;  and  again  on  Tuesday,  when  utterly  worn 
out  after  their  flight  across  the  Biggarsberg,  they  were  rescued 
from  the  perils  which  lay  in  their  path  near  Eeitfontein.  The 
‘‘  victors  ” of  Talana  Hill  must  have  carried  a powerful  mascot 
with  them  in  their  subsequent  adventures. 


MODDERSPHUIT 

The  successful  retreat  of  General  Yule  from  Dundee  added  fully 
5,000  troops  to  General  Wliite’s  army  and  raised  that  officer’s 
force  in  Ladysmith  to  near  12,000  men.  With  these  forces  there 
were  the  batteries  of  artillery  which  had  served  at  Talana  and  at 
Elandslaagte,  and  also  the  guns  that  had  been  retained  in  Lady- 
smith for  the  protection  of  the  chief  base  of  the  British  in  Natal. 
There  would  thus  be,  altogether,  seven  batteries  of  artillery,  with 
some  mountain  guns  and  Maxims,  available  for  whatever  plan  of 
operations  the  arrival  of  Joubert  and  his  commandoes  to  the  north 
and  west  of  White’s  position  might  necessitate. 

On  the  26th  of  October  General  Lukas  Meyer  and  his  column 
marched  south  from  their  laager  behind  Talana  Hill,  and  pro- 
ceeded over  the  Helpmakaar  road,  by  which  Yule  and  his  forces 
had  retreated  four  days  previously.  Erasmus  and  his  Pretoria 
commandoes  followed  from  Dundee.  No  explanation  of  this  delay 
in  pursuing  the  beaten  British  force  has  been  given  except  one — 
the  Commandant-General’s  reluctance  to  press  too  hard  upon  a 
fleeing  Christian  foe  ! 

During  the  march  of  Meyer’s  commandoes  in  the  wake  of  Yule’s 
army  several  dead  Britishers  were  found  on  the  wayside;  men  who 
had  been  overcome  by  the  fatigues  and  trials  of  the  frightful  jour- 
ney through  the  Biggarsberg  passes.  As  many  as  fifteen  bodies 
were  buried  by  the  pursuing  burghers.  The  fiery  Ben  Viljoen 
also  discovered  the  bodies  of  some  of  his  dead  foes  as  he  was  on 
his  way  to  take  part  in  the  fighting  at  Modderspruit.  Crossing 
the  very  scene  of  the  battle  of  Elandslaagte,  where  his  Johannes- 
burgers  had  been  badly  cut  up  in  the  engagement  of  the  21st, 
he  found  ten  Gordon  Highlanders  unburied.  He  at  once  halted 
his  men,  had  graves  dug  for  the  unlucky  Tommies,  and  ordered  a 
salute  to  be  fired  as  a final  token  of  soldierly  respect  for  his  dead 
foemen. 


BATTLE  OF  MODDERSPRUIT 


147 


The  Commandant-General  moved  from  Glencoe  by  Washbank 
on  the  27th,  and  found  himself  on  the  29th  south  of  Elaudslaagte, 
joining  hands  with  Lukas  Meyer’s  men,  and  with  the  Free  Staters 
who  had  been  attacked  by  White  and  the  Ladysmith  army  on  Tues- 
day at  Eeitfontein.  Counting  the  various  burgher  forces  which 
were  thus  within  reach  of  Jouhert’s  immediate  command  on  the 
29th,  the  men  available  for  the  expected  fight  on  the  morrow 
would  he  about  8,000  Boers,  as  against  12,000  English.  The 
British  had  four  times  the  artillery  equipment  of  the  Boers, 
thoiigh  the  Creusots  and  pom-poms  of  the  latter  had  already 
proved  their  great  superiority  over  the  English  guns. 

On  Sunday,  the  29th,  several  balloons  were  busy  over  Ladysmith 
trying  to  discover  the  Boer  locations  to  the  west,  north,  and  east; 
and  this,  together  with  information  conveyed  to  Joubert  from 
friendly  sources  within  the  enemy’s  lines,  gave  warning  to  be 
prepared  for  an  attack  the  following  morning. 

The  Boer  positions,  tho  hastily  chosen,  were  well  selected,  and 
showed  Joubert’s  military  judgment  in  defensive  operations  at  its 
best.  His  center  was  strongly  posted  on  and  near  a flat-topped 
hill,  northeast  of  Ladysmith,  betw'een  the  ]\Iodder spruit  and  the 
railway  line  from  Ladysmith  to  Elandslaagte,  near  Eeitfontein, 
and  distant  six  or  seven  miles  from  the  English  lines. 

The  Ermelo,  Pretoria,  and  others  burghers,  under  Commandant 
Erasmus,  with  the  Irish  Brigade  under  Blake,  about  2,000  in  all, 
were  the  center  forces;  with  Colonel  Trichardt  and  Major  Wol- 
marans  in  charge  of  the  artillery,  which  consisted  of  one  large 
Creusot  (Long  Tom),  two  fifteen-pound  Creusots,  and  three  pom- 
poms. 

The  laager  and  ammunition  wagons  were  to  the  right  of  the 
long  kopje,  on  the  road  to  Eeitfontein. 

The  left  wing,  about  4,000  strong,  extended  eastwards  from  the 
center,  bending  a little  south  at  the  extremity,  where  Lukas 
Meyer,  with  the  men  who  fought  at  Talana,  Commandant  Weil- 
bach  and  his  Heidelbergers,  and  General  Schalk  Burger,  with 
supporting  commandoes,  held  the  kopjes  near  Farquhar’s  Farm, 
directly  north  of  Lombard’s  Kop,  the  nearest  point  of  the  enemy’s 
lines.  Captain  Pretorius  had  charge  of  Meyer’s  guns,  which  he 
served  so  admirably  at  Talana,  and  Schalk  Burger  had  two  Ivrupp 
howitzers  and  a pom-pom,  which  were  under  the  control  of  Lieu- 
tenant Du  Toit,  making,  in  all,  about  one  battery  of  artillery. 

Joubert’s  right  bent  westward  from  the  long  kopje  as  far  as 
Nicholson’s  Nek,  and  was  composed  mainly  of  the  Free  Staters 
who  had  held  these  same  hills  on  Tuesday  against  White’s  attack. 
Some  of  the  Pretoria  commando,  and  Van  Dam  with  his  splendid 


148 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


corps  of  Johannesburg  Police,  were  a little  southeast  of  Nichol- 
son’s Nek  to  watch  for  any  turning  movement  in  that  direction 
by  the  enemy. 

Joubert’s  positions  were  selected  with  the  object  of  inviting  the 
main  British  attack  upon  his  center  near  Pepworth,  which  he  had 
purposely  rendered  comparatively  weak  for  the  special  observation 
of  General  \ATiite’s  Ladysmith  balloons;  his  object  being  to  expose 
the  expected  assaulting  column  to  a flanking  fire  and  attack  by  his 
left  division  under  Meyer,  Weilbach,  and  Burger,  which  was  ren- 
dered exceptionally  strong  in  men  and  guns  for  that  object,  and 
was  partly  concealed  from  the  enemy’s  balloons. 

General  White’s  plan  of  attack  turned  out  to  be  almost  exactly 
what  his  astute  adversary  had  anticipated. 

He  sent  forward  a strong  force  of  Gloucesters,  Koyal  Irish  Fusi- 
liers, and  other  troops  with  a mountain  battery  on  mules,  on  Sun- 
day night,  with  orders  to  envelop  or  turn  the  Boer  right — which 
extended  to  a position  near  Nicholson’s  Ivop — by  the  occupation 
of  this  hill,  and  a surprise  action  at  daylight  on  Monday  morning. 
In  any  case  this  column  was  expected  to  cut  in  between  the  Free 
Staters  and  the  Transvaal  burghers,  and  thus  to  divert  attention 
from  the  scene  of  the  contemplated  main  British  attack  on  Jou- 
bert’s center.  This  force  was  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Carle- 
ton.  It  marched  north  from  Ladysmith  under  cover  of  the  night, 
and  followed  the  railway  leading  to  Besters,  until  reaching  a spruit 
southwest  of  the  Boer  right  wing,  where  a turn  north  was  made 
along  a valley,  so  as  to  reach  the  western  side  of  Nicholson’s  Kop 
unobserved.  Carleton  gained  his  objective,  as  instructed,  but  not 
unobserved,  as  the  sequel  was  to  show. 

General  White  was  equally  busy  with  his  main  forces  on  that 
Sunday  night.  He  pushed  them  forward  under  the  shelter  of 
darkness  to  the  positions  from  which  he  intended  to  strike  Jou- 
bert’s center  on  the  following  morning.  A strong  body  of  cavalry 
and  mounted  infantry  under  General  French  was  sent  eastward, 
round  Lombard’s  Kop,  to  protect  the  advance  of  the  English  right 
column  which  was  to  move  northward  from  Ladysmith,  parallel 
with  the  railway  line  and  under  the  protection  of  intervening  hills. 
With  Lombard’s  Kop  and  Bulwana  Hill  to  his  right,  Ladysmith 
in  his  rear,  and  all  the  elevated  positions  to  the  immediate  north 
and  west  of  the  town  within  the  ambit  of  his  operations,  White  was 
well  prepared  and  equipped  with  his  12,000  men  and  forty  guns 
to  decide  the  issue  of  the  day  with  Joubert  and  his  8,000  burghers. 

The  Commandant-General  was  not  caught  napping  when  the 
dawn  on  that  Monday  morning  partly  revealed  the  rival  positions 
of  the  two  armies  to  each  other.  On  the  descent  of  the  last 


BATTLE  OF  MODDERSPRUIT 


149 


balloon  from  Ladysmith  on  Sunday  night,  which  told  the  English 
general  where  his  adversary’s  men  and  guns  were  located,  Jou- 
bert  moved  his  center  backward  from  the  south  of  Long  Hill  to 
higher  ground,  leaving  a skeleton  force  behind  so  as  to  conceal 
from  the  enemy  the  change  of  position.  A similar  disposition  was 
made  where  Meyer,  Burger,  and  Weilbach  were  posted,  with  the 
result  that  the  attacking  British  columns  would  find  themselves, 
in  carrying  out  White’s  plans,  moving  within  a crescent-shaped 
field  of  operations,  with  both  ends  of  the  Boer  lines  bending  to- 
wards Ladysmith,  and  White’s  entire  force  in  the  center. 

The  battle,  which  the  English  have  named  both  Lombard’s  Kop 
and  Farquhar’s  Farm,  and  the  Boers,  Modderspruit,  began  soon 
after  four  o’clock  on  Monday  morning  in  a fierce  artillery  duel. 
The  enemy  had  sent  forward  two  strong  columns,  with  most  of  his 
guns,  to  a point  near  the  railway  at  Limit  Hill,  from  whence  the 
main  attack  on  Long  Hill  was  to  be  made,  after  the  British 
batteries  had  prepared  the  way.  Joubert’s  guns  on  Long  Hill 
were  only  seven,  but  “ Long  Tom  ” and  his  two  fifteen-pound 
Creusot  consorts  maintained  the  unequal  combat  for  three  or  four 
hours;  the  big  gun  sending  his  shells  occasionally  a distance  of 
9,000  yards  into  the  town  of  Ladysmith. 

While  this  artillery  fight  was  proceeding,  Generals  Lukas  Meyer 
and  Schalk  Burger  had  engaged  both  French’s  mounted  column 
and  White’s  right  wing  so  hotly  that  the  plan  of  assaulting  Jou- 
bert’s center  had  to  be  abandoned  in  order  to  rescue  the  forces 
which  Joubert’s  left  had  furiously  assailed  both  by  Mauser  and 
artillery  fire  south  of  Farquhar’s  Farm.  White’s  right  wing  thus 
attacked  had  previously  succeeded  in  gaining  a spur  of  a hill  which 
the  Heidelberg  burghers  under  Weilbach  had  held  as  an  advanced 
position  of  Lukas  Meyer’s  commandoes.  The  ground  thus  taken 
from  the  Heidelbergers  was  not  long  in  possession  of  the  enemy. 
An  incident  had  happened  which  may  be  said  to  have  decided  the 
fortunes  of  the  day  for  the  Federal  forces. 

General  Meyer  had  been  unwell  since  the  battle  of  Talana  Hill, 
and  became  indisposed  during  the  progress  of  the  fight  at  Modder- 
spruit. Louis  Botha,  who  had  been  attached  to  the  Vryheid  com- 
mando as  member  of  the  Volksraad  for  that  district,  was  at  hand. 
He  held  no  distinct  command,  but  had  been  an  adviser  to  his  friend 
and  colleague,  Lukas  Meyer,  from  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The 
command  of  Meyer’s  force  at  a most  critical  moment  in  the  battle 
of  the  30th  was  virtually  placed  in  his  hands,  and  he  directed  the 
operations  which  largely  helped  to  achieve  the  victory  that  was 
to  be  won  for  the  Vierkleur  before  the  sun  went  down. 

He  urged  a concentration  of  artillery  and  Mauser  fire  upon  the 


BATTLE  OF  MODDEBSPRTJIT 


151 


position  gained  by  a paxt  of  White’s  force  from  the  Heidelbergers. 
Under  cover  of  this  fierce  attack,  a body  of  Meyer’s  men  advanced 
on  the  English  from  their  concealment,  and  drove  them  from  the 
spur  of  the  hill  back  upon  some  of  the  reenforcements  which  White 
was  sending  at  that  very  time  to  the  assistance  of  his  right.  Dur- 
ing this  confusion  among  the  enemy  Pretorius  played  his  pom- 
poms with  deadly  effect  upon  the  troops  which  had  been  forced 
out  into  the  open,  and  the  enemy’s  chief  loss  in  dead  and  wounded 
in  the  battle  occurred  at  this  turning  point. 

This  unexpected  counter  attack  on  his  right  compelled  White 
to  abandon  the  contemplated  blow  at  Joubert’s  center,  which 
General  Hamilton,  with  the  bulk  of  the  British  troops  and  thirty 
guns,  was  to  deliver.  Generals  French  and  Grimwood  had  got 
their  men  into  such  serious  trouble  north  of  Lombard’s  Kop, 
where  they  had  run  up  against  Meyer’s  and  Burger’s  changed  posi- 
tions, that  a large  force  from  the  enemy’s  left  column  had  to  be 
sent  across  to  extricate  White’s  right  from  its  perilous  situation. 
This  change  in  the  English  general’s  plan  of  battle  was  giving  the 
Boer  artillery  splendid  practice  on  the  flanks  of  his  right  and  left, 
and  rapidly  determining  the  fortunes  of  the  combat,  when  two 
events  occurred  in  this  battle  of  surprises  which  changed  and  re- 
changed the  checkered  chances  of  the  fray. 

At  the  time  when  White  was  forced  to  send  a large  part  of  his 
center  column  to  the  help  of  his  right,  and  when  the  Boer  guns 
were  pouring  a most  deadly  fire  into  the  English  lines,  a body 
of  marines  in  charge  of  two  huge  naval  guns  arrived  on  the  scene, 
after  a continuous  journey  from  Durban,  and  joined  at  once  in  the 
fight.  These  guns  were  most  ably  handled,  and  after  a few  trial 
shots  at  the  Boer  artillery,  a shell  fired  at  “ Long  Tom  ” at  Pep- 
worth  killed  and  wounded  half  a dozen  burghers.  This  startling 
intervention  of  the  navals  in  the  battle  arrested  the  tide  of  Jou- 
bert’s artillery  success,  and  enabled  White  to  pull  his  right  wing 
out  of  Botha’s  reach,  and  to  prepare  his  center  again  for  the  desired 
but  delayed  attack  upon  Joubert’s  position  at  Pepworth. 

At  this  juncture  “ Long  Tom  ” became  suddenly  silent,  and 
it  was  believed  in  the  English  lines  that  the  naval  guns  had 
succeeded  in  putting  him  out  of  action.  What  really  happened 
was  this : 

Ammunition  for  the  Boer  guns  at  the  center  had  given  out. 
Supplies  were  to  the  left  of  the  hill  on  which  the  now  silent 
Creusot  stood,  away  in  a location  which  was  being  remorselessly 
shelled  by  the  British  naval  guns.  No  effort  was  being  made  by 
the  men  in  charge  of  the  artillery,  or  by  the  burghers  on  the  hill, 
to  go  for  a fresh  supply.  Every  moment  was  of  vital  value,  and  a 


152 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


suggestion  was  actually  made  to  remove  the  big  gun  to  the  laager 
in  the  rear  so  as  to  save  it  from  possible  capture. 

Colonel  Blake’s  Irish  Brigade  were  on  this  hill,  as  an  extra 
guard  for  “ Long  Tom,”  awaiting  impatiently  a possible  infantry 
advance  by  the  British.  Seeing  the  situation  in  the  matter  of  the 
ammunition,  Blake  instantly  ordered  his  men  to  go  and  procure 
what  was  required.  The  order  was  carried  out  with  pluck  and 
promptness.  They  raced  across  the  zone  of  fire,  and  the  needed 
ammunition  was  soon  brought  for  the  huge  gun.  The  renewed 
activity  of  the  big  Creusot  had  such  a discouraging  effect  upon 
the  English  batteries  and  the  mass  of  infantry  who  were  preparing 
again  to  advance  towards  the  Boer  center  that  both  retired  pre- 
cipitately on  Ladysmith,  and  the  fight  was  over. 

The  British  retreated,  having  doubtless  learned  by  this  time  of 
the  surrender  of  the  Irish  Fusiliers  and  Gloucestershire  regiments 
at  Nicholson’s  Nek,  two  hours  previously. 

In  the  work  of  bringing  up  the  supply  of  ammunition  to  Trich- 
ardt  and  Wolmarans,  two  members  of  the  Irish  Brigade  were 
killed  and  five  wounded.  Colonel  Blake  was  also  wounded  in 
the  left  wrist  by  a shell  splinter.  It  was  the  action  of  the  Irish, 
however,  which  enabled  the  Boer  guns  to  help  materially  in  beat- 
ing back  the  advancing  British,  and  to  force  White  to  retreat  to 
his  base,  and  this  service  is  a proud  memory  with  the  men  of  the 
Brigade.  The  day  following  the  battle  General  Joubert  thanked 
Blake  and  his  men  for  their  gallant  action,  and  spoke  warmly  of 
the  courage  and  devotion  they  had  shown  at  a critical  moment  in 
the  varying  fortunes  of  the  day. 


Nicholson’s  nek 

In  the  meantime  the  attempt  to  turn  the  Boer  right  was  far 
more  disastrous  in  its  results  to  White’s  army  than  his  futile  efforts 
to  envelop  the  left  or  force  the  center  of  J oubert’s  position.  Carle- 
ton,  with  his  Fusiliers  and  Gloucesters,  and  a mountain  battery 
with  a mule-train  of  ammunition,  had  marched,  as  already  related, 
under  cover  of  night  to  occupy  Nicholson’s  Kop,  which  the  enemy’s 
balloon  had  revealed  as  an  advantageous  position  to  gain  on  the 
flank  of  the  Boer  right  wing  some  seven  miles  northwest  of  Lady- 
smith. The  men  and  mules  were  nearing  their  objective  in  the 
silence  of  midnight  when,  in  passing  a steep  kopje  to  their  right, 
within  about  a mile  of  Nicholson’s  Kop,  they  were  observed  by  a 
brandwacht. 

The  Boer  sentinels  fired  down  upon  the  advanced  portion  of 


BATTLE  OF  MODDERSPRUIT 


153 


Carleton’s  column  in  the  darkness  before  taking  to  their  horses, 
and  it  was  this  action  which  caused  the  train  of  mules  to  enliven 
the  midnight  proceedings  of  the  stealthily-marching  Britishers 
with  the  confusion  which  followed.  The  advance  on  the  hill  was 
arrested  for  a time,  but  the  officer  in  command  continued  his  march 
and  negotiated  the  mountain  without  any  further  resistance. 

Carleton’s  force  spread  itself  on  the  mountain  in  three  or  four 
detached  groups;  the  Fusiliers  taking  up  position  nearest  the 
iSTek,  and  the  Gloucesters  and  others  seizing  the  crest  line  of  the 
hill  above,  which  dominated  the  environment,  and  from  whence, 
in  the  daylight,  the  whole  couiitry  south  to  Ladysmith  and  east  to 
Pepworth  was  clearly  visible. 

The  mountain  measures  some  1,500  yards  from  east  to  west, 
and  has  an  average  width  of  500  feet;  narrowing  as  it  approaches 
the  Nek  at  the  eastern  end;  while  its  elevation  is  about  1,000  feet 
above  the  level  of  the  veldt. 

To  the  southeast  of  Nicholson’s  Nop  a somewhat  circular  hill 
of  lesser  elevation  rises,  while  to  the  north,  behind  the  right-hand 
view  in  the  picture  of  the  Nop,  the  crest  of  a similar  hill  can  be 
seen.  As  a result  of  Colonel  Carleton’s  midnight  adventure,  these 
two  hills  were  occupied  during  the  same  night  by  the  Free  Staters, 
and  when  the  morning  awoke  from  its  slumbers  the  English 
column  had  small  Boer  forces  on  the  hills  to  the  right  and  left 
anxiously  peering  across  the  intervening  valleys  to  discover  the 
strength  and  positions  of  the  nocturnal  invaders. 

It  was  fully  believed  that  the  force  which  had  thus  pushed 
itself  into  the  region  of  the  Boer  right  was  to  be  supported  by 
other  troops  between  the  hill  and  Ladysmith,  as  this  was  the  only 
intelligible  supposition  that  could  explain  the  sending  forward  of 
a wing  of  the  enemy’s  troops  out  of  reach  of  support  from  his 
main  strength  and  position.  The  Boer  officers,  therefore,  prepared 
for  a development  of  a plan  of  attack  based  on  this  supposition, 
and  anxiously  awaited  the  friendly  help  of  the  dawn  to  enable 
them  to  discover  the  full  strength  and  purpose  of  the  foe. 

The  task  of  dealing  with  the  forces  from  whom  the  mules  had 
“deserted”  fell  upon  Christian  De  Wet;  that  is,  his  position  on 
the  kopje  to  the  east  of  Nicholson’s  Nek  enabled  him  to  take  such 
measures  as  the  enemy’s  situation  on  the  mountain  demanded. 
It  was  a situation  and  an  opportunity  which  required  a man  of 
De  Wet’s  extraordinary  capacity  and  resource  to  deal  with  in  start- 
ling effectiveness,  and,  tho  the  credit  for  this,  the  greatest  single 
capture  of  the  war  on  the  Boer  side,  was  not  claimed  by  nor 
given  to  him  at  the  time,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  his  was 
the  mind  that  planned  and  carried  out  the  capture  of  the  English 


154 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


column.  It  was  the  earliest  of  a long  list  of  similar  achievements 
on  the  part  of  a man  who  has  taken  more  British  prisoners  on 
the  battle-field  than  anj'  general  who  has  ever  fought  an  English 
enemy  since  the  surrender  of  the  British  at  Yorktown,  Virginia. 

lYhen  da^dight  revealed  the  positions  and  the  forces  of  the 
British  on  the  mountain,  De  "Wet  resolved  upon  a coup  similar 
to  that  of  Commandant  Smit  when  General  Colley’s  troops  were 
found  lining  the  top  of  Majuba  Hill.  Both  movements  showed 
the  superb  courage  of  the  Boer  in  facing  great  odds  and  a formi- 
dable position,  having  nothing  but  his  rifle  with  which  to  meet 
troops  armed  with  both  rifles  and  bayonets.  Charging  up  a hill,  how- 
ever, as  Boers  charge,  is  not  a mere  exhibition  of  reckless  daring.  It 
is  something  better.  It  is  a cool,  deliberate  advance,  not  in  a rushing 
bod}’-,  but  individually;  each  man  taking  cover  as  he  moves,  now 
rapidly,  then  slowly,  as  the  nature  of  the  groimd  permits;  always 
halting  when  a head  appears  above,  and  seldom  missing  his  object 
in  the  aim  which  tells  of  the  deadly  intent  of  the  mounting  foeman. 
Given  average  courage  and  a steady  aim,  the  advantage  is  more  on 
the  side  of  the  man  who  is  seen  climbing  a hillside,  rifle  in  hand, 
than  on  that  of  the  man  who  witnesses  this  fearless  action  on  the 
part  of  his  enemy.  The  moral  prestige  of  the  act  has  its  effect 
upon  the  man  who  has  to  defend  his  position  against  the  approach- 
ing attack  of  the  intrepid  climber,  and  when  moral  courage  stands 
behind  the  physical  in  a fight  on  the  battle-field,  the  possessor  of 
both  is  generally  found  the  victor  in  the  combat.  It  is  also  well 
known  that  troops  firing  down  from  an  elevation — in  rifle  firing — 
show  far  less  accuracy  in  shooting  than  in  the  reverse  position  of 
riflemen  who  fire  upward.  All  this  is  known  to  the  Boer,  who  is 
likewise  aware  that  when  his  foe  on  the  hill  fails  to  hit  him  as  he 
climbs,  and  sees  comrades  falling  by  bullets  coming  from  below, 
he  is  not  likely  to  make  much  of  a stand  when  the  climber  finally 
reaches  the  level  of  his  enemy’s  j^osition.  Another  fact  in  connec- 
tion with  the  capture  of  Xicholson’s  Kop  also  tends  to  explain  De 
AVet’s  eas}"  victory  over  his  numerically  superior  foemen.  The 
smokeless  powder  of  the  Mauser  rifles  did  not  reveal  the  points 
from  whence  the  hissing  missiles  winged  their  deadly  flight.  The 
English  heard  their  enemy’s  fire,  but  did  not  generally  know  from 
what  quarter  they  were  being  shot  at  by  marksmen  not  always 
visible  to  the  eye. 

The  hill  to  the  south  of  Xicholson’s  Kop,  from  whence  the 
Boer  outposts  stampeded  the  mules,  was  held  in  the  early  morning 
by  Andries  Cronje,  of  AAhnburg,  vuth  his  men,  some  300  strong. 
Commandant  Kel,  with  the  Heilbron  burghers,  worked  round 
to  the  left  of  the  mountain  to  cooperate  with  the  Kroonstad 


NICHOLSON’S  NEK,  SCENE  OF  DE  WET’S  FIRST  VICTORY 


156 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


men  under  De  Wet^  who  were  to  cross  the  intervening  valley 
between  Nicholson’s  Kop  and  the  round  hill  seen  to  the  right  of 
the  long  hill  in  the  picture.  Van  Dam  and  his  Johannesburg 
Police  had  gone  south,  nearer  to  Ladysmith,  during  the  night,  to 
discover  whether  Carleton’s  column  was  part  of  a greater  advancing 
force,  or  only  an  independent  wing  of  White’s  army.  De  Wet, 
Cronje,  and  Nel  had  from  700  to  900  men  only  in  the  fight 
with  rifles  which  commenced  between  them  and  Carleton’s  two 
regiments,  and  the  Boer  plan  was  to  shoot  the  enemy  off  Nichol- 
son’s Kop  down  to  where  Van  Dam  and  Cronje  of  Winburg  would 
be  ready  to  receive  them. 

De  Wet’s  plan,  like  all  his  subsequent  successful  modes  of  out- 
witting English  oifieers  and  capturing  English  soldiers,  was  as 
simple  as  it  was  audacious.  Cronje  and  Nel  were  to  spread  their 
men  on  all  points  east  and  south  that  could  command  the  position 
on  the  Kop  on  which  the  Fusiliers  and  Gloucesters  were  posted, 
so  as  to  engage  all  the  attention  of  the  enemy  and  make  him  think 
that  end  of  the  mountain  was  alone  the  object  of  Boer  attack. 
Under  cover  of  this  maneuver,  De  Wet,  with  250  Kroonstad  men, 
was  to  steal  round  to  the  north  of  the  Kop,  scale  the  opposite  side 
to  that  held  by  the  enemy,  and  drive  him  by  rifle  fire  down  in  the 
hollow,  where  Cronje  and  Van  Dam  were  to  catch  him  between 
two  fires  should  he  attempt  to  regain  the  unlucky  track  which 
brought  him  to  Nicholson’s  Kop. 

When  the  morning’s  light  showed  Carleton’s  true  location  on  the 
mountain,  De  Wet  led  his  men  down  from  his  position  and  across 
the  valley  as  secretly  and  silently  as  the  enemy  had  marched  in  the 
dark,  and  the  Kroonstad  burghers  began  the  climb  of  the  Kop  on 
its  northwestern  side.  Not  a sentinel  or  scout  was  found  on  that 
end  of  the  hill  ! While  these  movements  were  in  progress,  Andries 
Cronje  and  his  Winburgers  engaged  in  a long-range  rifle  contest 
with  the  Fusiliers  who  were  on  the  declivity  of  the  Kop  near  the 
Nek.  The  English  were  attacked  from  three  sides,  but  very  little 
injury  was  done  during  the  greater  part  of  the  morning.  De  Wet’s 
men  were  in  the  meantime  slowly  climbing  the  hill  from  behind. 
All  this  time  the  thunder  of  the  English  and  Boer  guns  was  heard 
to  the  east,  where  the  main  battle  was  raging;  the  English  artillery 
belching  forth  his  shrapnel  from  near  Lombard’s  Kop,  and  “ Long 
Tom  ” and  his  companion  Creusots  more  than  holding  their  own 
from  the  hills  near  Pepworth.  The  tide  of  battle  was  being 
watched  with  fluctuating  hopes  from  both  English  and  Boer  posi- 
tions on  the  hills  around  Nicholson’s.  Kop,  while  De  Wet  was 
steadily  carrying  his  men  up  the  steep  side  of  the  mountain  to 
where  the  Gloucesters  held  the  ground.  Finally  the  burghers 


BATTLE  OF  MODDERSPRUIT 


157 


reached  the  top  of  the  hill,  and  the  Gloucesters  soon  began  to  feel 
the  effect  of  their  fire.  The  English  were  behind  stone  sangars, 
hastily  put  up,  while  the  Boers  took  such  shelter  as  the  crest  line 
of  the  mountain  offered  on  the  opposite  side  to  that  occupied  by 
their  enemies.  It  w'as  now  a question  of  shooting  and  cover,  and 
the  British  soon  found  their  sangars  unable  to  protect  them  from 
the  accurate  fire  of  their  assailants.  Shortly  after  the  appearance 
of  the  burghers  opposite  the  position  of  the  Gloucesters,  the  Heil- 
bron  men  topped  the  Kop  to  the  left  of  the  enemy,  and  the  British 
were  now  exposed  to  a converging  fire  before  which  they  soon 
retreated  down  upon  the  positions  held  by  the  Fusiliers  at  the  Nek. 

What  has  taken  only  a few  minutes  to  describe  was  the  result 
of  nearly  four  hours’  deliberate,  careful  advance  by  De  Wet,  and 
of  long-range  firing  on  both  sides  lower  down  the  platberg,  there 
being  no  artillery  engaged  in  the  encounter.  The  British,  how- 
ever, had  suffered  from  the  better  shooting  of  the  Boers,  and 
already  the  wounded  and  dying  on  the  hilltop  were  calling  for 
water  which  was  not  to  be  had.  The  sun  was  pouring  down  its 
scorching  rays  upon  the  mountain,  adding  the  suffering  of  thirst 
to  the  punishment  which  the  Boer  fire  was  steadily  and  continu- 
ously inflicting  upon  the  doomed  column.  The  Boer  officers  were 
still  uncertain  as  to  the  outcome  of  the  main  battle  going  on  six 
miles  to  the  southeast,  and  De  Wet’s  purpose  was  to  force  Carleton 
to  fight  for  his  position  until  Van  Dam  should  return  with  his 
Johannesburgers,  or  until  other  forces  might  come  from  the 
nearest  section  of  Joubert’s  right.  It  was  about  one  o’clock,  and 
the  Boer  fire  was  growing  more  deadly  in  its  effect,  when  the 
British  uplifted  the  white  flag  and  brought  the  fight  of  the  morn- 
ing to  a close.  Colonel  Carleton,  37  officers,  and  over  900  men  laid 
down  their  arms,  and  the  surrender  was  actually  made  to  a force 
less  than  the  number  of  troops  who  had  given  up  the  fight ! In 
fact,  it  was  not  until  Van  Dam  appeared  on  the  scene  from  the 
south,  with  800  Johannesburg  Police,  that  the  work  of  disarma- 
ment was  actively  begun  by  the  victors. 

It  has  been  said  in  every  English  report  of  this  encounter  that 
the  English  fought  until  their  ammunition  gave  out,  and  that 
the  white  flag  was  hoisted  without  the  consent  of  the  senior 
officers  in  command.  The  facts  as  related  by  the  Boer  officers  do 
not  bear  out  this  contention.  The  cartridge  pouches  of  the 
Tommies  were  found  not  alone  not  to  be  empty  after  the  “ Cease 
Fire  ” had  sounded,  but  to  contain  what  could  have  served  for 
further  fighting  if  the  British  had  not  had  enough  of  it.  Whether 
the  white  flag  was  or  was  not  raised  by  the  order  of  senior 
authority,  it  is  an  undoubted  fact  that  no  oflBcer  countermanded 


BRITISH  SOLDIERS  CAPTURED  AT  NICHOLSON'S  NEK  ARRIVING  IN  PRETORIA 


BATTLE  OF  MODDERSPRUIT 


159 


the  order,  or  took  steps  to  recall  the  “ Cease  Fire  ” signal  by  one 
to  call  the  men  again  to  action.  The  surrender  was  made  on  the 
merits  of  the  fight  of  the  morning;  the  English  believing  from 
the  steadier  and  more  widely  extended  fire  of  the  Boers  that  the 
force  arrayed  against  them  was  much  stronger  than  it  actually 
turned  out  to  be.  In  reality,  De  Wet  and  his  250  men  by  his 
admirable  tactics  and  their  splendid  shooting  had  decided  the  fate 
of  the  two  crack  regiments  of  the  British  army  on  the  top  of 
Nicholson’s  Kop. 

Nor  did  the  number  of  killed  and  wounded  of  Carleton’s  men 
offer  any  imperative  reason  for  the  raising  of  the  white  flag. 
Ten  per  cent,  of  casualties  are  supposed  to  give  a reasonable  ground 
for  a surrender  or  a retreat,  when  the  chances  of  victory  are  not 
otherwise  promising.  In  this  instance  the  British  killed  and 
wounded  were  a trifle  over  this  percentage,  but  the  fact  of  their 
being  within  sight  of  their  base,  only  six  or  seven  miles  from 
Ladysmith,  ought  to  have  called  for  a longer  and  more  determined 
stand.  The  casualty  list  of  the  whole  battle  of  Modderspruit  is 
mixed  in  the  English  reports,  and  the  relative  losses  by  White 
and  Carleton  are  not  given  separately. 

The  Boer  losses  in  the  capture  of  the  mountain  and  of  the 
British  column  fell  almost  entirely  upon  Christian  De  Wet’s 
Kroonstaders,  and  these  were  given  in  the  reports  of  the  battle  as 
6 killed;  3 seriously,  and  20  slightly  wounded;  in  all,  29 — a small 
penalty  to  pay  for  the  capture  of  two  whole  British  regiments, 
and  near  forty  British  officers,  plus  some  guns  of  a mountain 
battery. 

After  the  battle,  Boers  carried  water  up  from  the  valley  to  the 
English  wounded  on  the  mountain,  and  showed  every  humane 
attention  to  their  suffering  enemies.  There  was  no  show  of 
triumph  over  beaten  foes,  nor  a single  offensive  word  addressed 
to  the  comrades  and  companions  in  arms  of  the  pig-sticking  ” 
Lancers  of  Elandslaagte.  The  signal  victory  had  been  won  by 
men  who  had  proved,  by  their  valor  in  combat,  and  by  their 
generosity  to  their  vanquished  foes,  their  preeminent  claim  to  the 
liberty  for  which  they  fought. 

General  White  in  his  official  report  of  the  whole  battle  sums 
up  his  known  total  losses  in  the  day’s  engagement  as  follows  : 

Including  under  the  head  of  ‘ missing  ’ those  taken  prisoners, 
our  losses  this  day  amounted  to  63  non-commissioned  officers  and 
men  killed;  10  officers  and  239  non-commissioned  officers  and 
men  wounded,  and  37  officers  and  917  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men  missing.”  A total  of  1,266  British  casualties,  with  a 
battery  of  mountain  guns. 


160 


THU  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


These  figures  are  instructive.  The  number  of  killed  and 
wounded  was  less  than  one-third  of  the  number  who  surrendered, 
and  no  more  than  one  in  forty  of  the  total  men  engaged  in  the 
battle  ! AVhen  it  is  also  taken  into  account  that  the  English  had 
fully  four  guns  for  every  Boer  gun,  and  three  men  for  every  two 
burghers,  it  will  be  seen  how  poorly  the  crack  regiments  of  the 
British  army  upheld  the  vaunted  valor  of  their  records  on  the 
field  of  Modderspruit. 

The  Boer  casualties  were  as  follows  : The  artillery,  3 killed 
and  8 wounded;  Lukas  Meyer’s  commando,  4 dead  and  6 wounded; 
Irish  Brigade,  2 dead  and  5 wounded;  J ohannesburg  Police,  1 dead 
and  13  wounded;  the  Free  Staters,  6 killed  and  23  wounded;  mak- 
ing the  total  Federal  loss  16  men  killed,  and  55  wounded. 

General  J oubert’s  victory  was  signal  and  complete.  He  repelled 
the  attack  upon  him  at  all  points,  and  compelled  his  antagonist, 
despite  his  s'uperior  force  in  men  and  guns,  to  retreat  disorganized 
on  Ladysmith,  leaving  over  1,000  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the 
victors.  There  was,  however,  here,  as  at  Dundee,  the  same  woful 
neglect  of  opportunity  in  allowing  the  enemy  to  retreat  without 
a prompt  and  effective  pursuit.  Colonel  Blake  told  me  that  both 
he  and  other  officers  had  urgently  pressed  the  Commandant- 
General  to  follow  up  the  beaten  British  forces  while  suffering  under 
the  effects  of  the  day’s  severe  punishment,  and  to  deal  them  a 
crushing  blow  before  they  could  recover  their  shattered  morale. 
Joubert  would  not  listen  to  such  appeals.  He  engaged  in  a prayer 
meeting  after  learning  of  White’s  retreat  and  of  the  surrender  of 
Carleton’s  column,  and  remonstrated  with  those  who  pressed  upon 
him  what  was  the  obvious  and  imperative  military  obligation  of  the 
day’s  successful  operations;  his  reply  being,  “ It  would  be  barba- 
rous to  pursue  and  slaughter  a beaten  Christian  foe!  ” 

It  was  widely  reported  in  the  British  press  that  the  disaster 
to  the  English  at  Mcholson’s  Nek  was  due  to  the  treachery  of 
Colonel  Carleton’s  guides.  The  Natal  Government  at  once  denied 
the  statement,  in  the  following  terms  : 

“ Durban,  November  2nd. — The  Colonial  Secretary  (of  Natal) 
telegraphed  last  night:  The  following  authentic  information  has 
been  received  by  the  Governor,  and  is  published  for  general  informa- 
tion: 

“ The  allegation  in  a local  paper  that  Colonel  Carleton’s  column 
was  led  into  a trap  by  treacherous  guides  is  absolutely  without 
foundation.  The  column  was  personally  led  by  a staff  officer, 
thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  locality.  The  two  guides  with 
them  were  Colonial  gentlemen  of  well-known  loyalty  and  repute.” 

This  full  and  prompt  denial  of  the  war  correspondents’  dishonest 


BATTLE  OF  MODDERSPRUIT 


161 


efforts  to  explain  away  the  significance  of  De  Wet’s  first  noted 
exploit  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  guides  in  question  were 
compromised  in  the  fictitious  story,  and  compelled  the  hiatal  Gov- 
ernment to  vindicate  their  honor.  But,  strange  to  say,  no  Jingo 
journal  in  England  published  this  official  and  emphatic  contradic- 
tion of  the  fabricated  story  of  treachery. 

A Boer  doctor  at  Modderspruit  attending  a severely-wounded 
British  soldier,  who  appeared  to  be  exceptionally  intelligent  for 
a Tommy,  asked  him  for  whom  he  thought  he  was  fighting,  coun- 
try or  capitalists?  The  reply  was  significant:  “Well,”  replied  the 
soldier,  “ I won’t  swear  it  is  not  for  the  Mahdi ! I cannot,  after 
what  I have  seen  of  the  Boers  on  the  field,  and  since  I have  been 
wounded  in  this  battle,  believe  I am  fighting  for  the  Queen  of  Eng- 
land.” 

One  of  the  several  startling  incidents  of  the  battle  of  Modder- 
sprnit  was  the  fact  that  the  two  Boer  officers  who  were  mainly 
instrumental  in  winning  it  have  not  yet  been  credited  with  that  dis- 
tinction, nor  have  they  claimed  any  such  credit  for  themselves. 
Xor  is  it  a less  interesting  fact  that  the  two  men  who  thus  modestly 
began  their  triumphs  in  the  second  great  battle  of  the  war  should 
have  shown  themselves  afterward  to  be  two  of  the  most  capable 
generals  in  the  Federal  armies. 

GENERAL  LOUIS  BOTHA 

Louis  Botha  comes  of  a fighting  stock.  His  paternal  grand- 
father was  a captain  in  the  French  Navy,  though  of  German  origin. 
He  emigrated  to  South  Africa  and  settled  down  to  a farming  life, 
married  a Dutch  lady,  and  became  one  with  the  Boers  in  their 
aspirations  for  a national  existence  in  the  land  of  their  adoption, 
and  in  their  distrust  of  English  rule  and  rulers. 

Louis  Botha  was  born  at  Vrede,  in  the  Orange  Free  State.  His 
father  had  fought  in  all  the  native  wars  waged  by  and  against  the 
Dutch  settlers,  and  bequeathed  a patriotic  record  to  his  five  sons, 
who  have  all  held  commands  in  the  present  war.  Louis  is  the 
second  son,  and  is  thirty-six  years  old.  The  head  of  the  family 
was  the  late  General  Philip  Botha,  one  of  the  most  gallant  and 
courteous  men  it  has  ever  been  my  good  fortune  to  meet  and  the 
honor  to  know.  In  physical  appearance  Louis  Botha  is  a faultless 
specimen  of  robust  manhood,  standing  near  six  feet  high,  and  built 
accordingly.  The  handsome  face  is  of  the  German  mold,  with 
bluish  eyes,  strong  nose,  and  intellectual  expression.  He  wears  a 
slight  brownish  mustache  and  beard.  The  figure  is  erect,  striking, 
and  noble,  the  pose  of  the  head  indicating  great  power  and  capae- 
11 


COMMANDANT-GENERAL  LOUIS  BOTHA 


BATTLE  OF  M0DDER8PBUIT 


163 


ity.  The  dominant  feature  of  the  face  is  that  of  combined  manli- 
ness and  kindness,  with  a suggestive  reserve  of  immense  strength; 
he  is  the  kind  of  man  who  would  prefer  the  ordinary  pursuits  of 
peaceful  life  to  the  tumult  and  passions  of  warfare,  but  who  would 
shirk  from  no  danger  nor  sacrifices  to  uphold  a cause  which  would 
command  his  assenting  loyalty. 

In  Great  Britain  or  Ireland  Louis  Botha  would  be  classed  as 
a gentleman  farmer.  His  home  since  manhood  has  been  near  the 
border  of  Zululand,  in  the  ATyheid  district,  which  place  he  repre- 
sented in  the  A'olksraad.  His  farm  is  a very  large  one,  and  was 
worked  by  a number  of  Zulus,  whose  devotion  to  this  Boer  hero  of 
this  war  was  shown  in  a marked  manner.  He  had  been  in  Pretoria 
for  a whole  year  attending  to  his  Parliamentary  duties,  and  unable 
to  visit  his  farm  owing  to  the  crisis  which  Mr.  Chamberlain’s  war- 
making  diplomacy  had  created.  When  war  was  declared  he  had  to 
leave  everything  he  possessed  in  the  hands  of  these  natives,  and 
he  told  me  that  his  farm  had  never  been  better  worked,  or  his 
stock  more  carefully  attended  to,  than  during  the  period  of  his 
(then)  twelve  months’  absence  from  his  home. 

General  Botha  has  had  very  little  military  experience,  and  no 
military  study.  He  is  one  of  nature’s  ready-made  generals,  cut 
and  fashioned  on  lines  of  natural  genius.  He  fought  under 
General  Lukas  Meyer  when  the  latter  went  to  the  assistance  of 
Dinizulu,  as  already  related.  He  also  joined  his  friend  in  the 
founding  of  the  “ Hew  Republic  ” in  1884. 

In  the  same  year,  Meyer’s  little  Utopia  attracted  among  others 
a family  named  Emmet,  from  Smallendeal,  in  Cape  Colony.  Mr. 
John  Emmet,  with  his  four  sons  and  two  daughters,  settled 
in  the  Vryheid  district,  and  became  neighbors  of  Louis  Botha. 
Miss  Emmet,  a handsome  and  accomplished  young  lady,  soon 
attracted  the  ardent  attention  of  young  Botha,  and  some  sixteen 
years  ago  they  became  man  and  wife.  There  are  four  children  of 
this  happy  union,  two  boys  and  two  girls.  Mrs.  Botha  is  of  Irish 
extraction  on  the  father’s  side,  and  is  proud  of  claiming  a blood 
relationship  with  Robert  Emmet.  I found.  General  Botha  thor- 
oughly conversant  with  the  salient  facts  of  Irish  history;  a result, 
of  course,  of  his  marriage  with  a lady  whose  name  recalls  that  of 
one  of  the  “ revolutionary  saints  ” of  Irish  political  martyrology. 
Addressing  the  kreigsraad  of  his  officers  on  the  eve  of  the  battle  of 
Colenso,  Botha  quoted  from  the  speech  of  Robert  Emmet  a senti- 
ment appropriate  to  the  struggle  of  the  Boer  nation  against  the 
enemy  who  had  exacted  the  sacrifice  of  Emmet’s  young  life  in  the 
cause  of  Irish  freedom. 

Geaeral  Botha  is  a man  of  conspicuous  natural  culture,  and  faivly 


1(J4 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


conversant  with  the  trend  of  modern  progress  throughout  the 
world.  He  speaks  English  correctly,  with  a slight  Boer  accent, 
and  has  a soft  and  agreeable  voice.  His  is  a personality  which 
impresses  you  at  once  with  its  magnetic  influence  over  men;  a flgure 
of  striking  potency  and  of  great  strength  of  purpose,  combined 
with  all  the  natural  traits  which  offer  you  a testimony  of  the 
highest  honor  and  personal  integrity  on  behalf  of  the  man  before 
you.  It  was  the  possession  of  all  these  qualities,  together  with 
great  simplicity  of  life  and  character,  which  so  suddenly  gave  to 


GENERAL  LOUIS  BOTHA  AND  WIFE 


Louis  Botha  the  wonderful  hold  upon  the  Boer  nation  that  enabled 
him  to  win  many  brilliant  victories  over  English  generals.  With 
this  war  his  name  will  be  forever  associated  as  that  of  one  of  the 
world’s  greatest  patriot  soldiers. 


GENERAL  DE  WET 

Christian  De  Wet  is  much  more  of  a typical  Boer  than  Louis 
Botha,  in  both  looks  and  manner.  He  possesses  none  of  the 
distinguished  soldierly  appearance  of  the  Transvaal  general,  and 
speaks  no  tongue  but  his  native  Taal.  He  is  some  forty-nine 
years  old,  squarely  built,  standing  about  five  feet  nine  in  height. 


BATTLE  OF  MODDERSPRUIT  165 


and  wearing  mncli  less  of  a darkish  beard  and  mustache  than 
most  of  his  alleged  pictures  gratuitously  adorn  him  with.  The 
face  is  not  one  that  would  arrest  attention  in  virtue  of  any  striking 
feature  or  expression;  though  the  keen  searching  gray  eyes  and 
massive  jaws  speak 
of  a character  for 
dogged  persistency 
and  alertness  of  ac- 
tion which  indicate 
their  relationship  to 
a strong  personality. 

Some  of  De  Wet’s 
Irish  admirers  trace 
a resemblance  — on 
the  evidence  of  one  of 
his  pictures  — be- 
tween him  and  the 
late  Mr.  Parnell,  in 
general  appearance ; a 
comparison  which  may 
have  given  birth  to 
the  legend  (believed 
in  by  some  very  ro- 
mantic souls,  I am 
told,)  that  the  great- 
est guerrilla  general 
of  modern  times  is  no 
other  than  the  late 
leader  of  the  Irish 
Parliamentary  Party 
still  in  the  flesh. 

There  is  a transient 
likeness  to  Mr.  Par- 
nell in  De  Wet,  when 
the  face  is  seen  in 
proflle,  with  the  hat 
on,  and  covering  the  large  head  and  broad  forehead  which  were  not 
conspicuous  features  in  the  physical  structure  of  the  Irish  leader. 
The  head  and  face  are  more  powerful  and  massive  than  Mr. 
Parnell’s,  hut  possess  none  of  the  refinement  or  handsome  lines 
which  gave  to  the  latter’s  looks,  previous  to  his  illness  in  1887, 
their  well-remembered  impress  of  dignified  attractiveness. 

De  Wet  is  of  unmixed  Dutch  extraction,  and  was  born  in  that 
southeastern  district  of  the  Free  State  in  which  he  has  gained 


166 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


so  many  of  his  signal  successes  over  the  British.  He  belongs  to 
the  Boer  farming  class,  and  possesses  all  their  best  qualities;  not 
the  least  of  which  is  a thorough  detestation  of  the  incurable  hypoc- 
risy of  the  English  as  rulers  and  as  the  boasted  guardians  of 
iiberty.  Probably  no  two  men  in  the  Boer  nation  placed  less  faith 
in  the  peace-seeking  professions  of  the  Chamberlain-Milner  diplo- 
macy than  Paul  Kruger  and  Christian  He  Wet,  and  none  have  been 
more  justified  by  time  and  events  in  the  consistency  of  their  dis- 
trust. 

De  Wet  is  more  familiar  with  the  topography  of  the  Free  State 
and  Transvaal  than  any  other  of  the  Federal  generals.  He  fought 
in  the  war  of  1880-81,  and  resided  subsequently  at  Lydenburg, 
which  district  he  represented  for  a time  in  the  Volksraad  at  Pre- 
toria. In  recent  years  he  removed  hack  to  his  native  Free  State, 
and  was  following  an  ordinary  farming  life  near  Kroonstad  when 
M^ar  broke  out;  he  being  at  the  time  a member  of  the  Free  State 
Eaad. 

He  is  by  disposition  a silent  man,  and  took  no  part  in  the  con- 
troversies which  led  up  to  the  war.  In  social  intercourse,  however, 
he  is  genial  and  good-humored,  and  has  the  reputation  of  being  a 
capital  story-teller  of  veldt  life  and  of  Eooinek  peculiarities. 

The  allegation  that  De  Wet  could  act  in  any  way  towards  a 
captured  foeman  except  in  accord  with  the  dictates  of  an  honor- 
able nature,  is  but  a calumny  worthy  of  the  exemplars  of  that 
chivalry  which  could  burn  De  Wet’s  house  in  retaliation  for  the 
defeats  which  he  inflicted  upon  British  troops,  and  thereby  hunt 
his  wife  and  children  from  their  home.  The  whole  character  and 
disposition  of  the  man  are  clearly  seen  in  his  frank  expression  and 
modest  hearing  when  spoken  to,  and  he  leaves  no  doubt  upon  the 
mind  of  friend  or  foe  as  to  the  honesty  and  uprightness  of  his 
motives  in  any  act  or  emergency  in  which  he  plays  the  part  of  a 
soldier  and  a citizen. 

The  secret  of  his  marvelous  successes  in  the  war  is  one  of  these 
phenomena  in  the  sudden  development  of  genius  which  can  be 
more  easily  marveled  at  than  explained.  Possibly  the  parade- 
ground  stupidity  of  his  foes,  rather  than  any  striking  ability  in 
himself,  would-be  his  own  method  of  explaining  how  and  why 
he  was  so  often  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  elephantine  tactics 
and  elaborate  blundering  of  British  generals  and  officers,  whose 
incapacity  has  been  ministering  to  the  scoffing  criticism  of  a 
military  world  for  the  past  two  years.  A few  neatly  expressed  judg- 
ments of  his  upon  three  English  generals  may  offer  an  indication 
of  his  own  conception  of  what  military  qualities  go  to  the  making 
of  a competent  commander  of  forces  in  South  Africa.  Asked  by 


BATTLE  OF  MODDERSPRUIT 


167 


one  of  his  many  English  prisoners  his  opinion  of  Lord  Eoberts,  his 
reply  was : “ I would  rather  hear  yours  as  to  what  generalship  he 
would  be  likely  to  show  if  he  had  to  fight,  say,  200,000  Boers  with 
35,000  British.”  On  General  French  alone  of  all  the  British  offi- 
cers he  passed  a complimentary  judgment;  “ He  is  the  only  ‘ Boer  ’ 
general  in  the  British  army;  ” while  the  modest  and  retiring  de- 
fender of  Mafeking  was  summed  up  in  the  joking  expression: 
“ He  would  make  a most  successful  war  correspondent  for  a comic 
military  journal!  ” 

Xature  endowed  He  Wet  with  a prodigal  share  of  common  sense. 


aiRS.  CHRISTIAN  DE  WET  AND  CHILDREN 

which  has  not  been  spoiled  or  diluted  by  any  university  education, 
or  study  of  Lord  Wolseley’s  military  works.  His  intimate  acquaint- 
ance with  the  topography  of  the  country  he  has  been  defending, 
joined  to  the  possession  of  a clear  head  and  a dauntless  heart, 
explain  why,  as  a result  of  his  innumerable  exploits  in  foiling  and 
fooling  the  generals  of  a universally-detested  Power,  he  has  been, 
in  all  probability,  the  most  popular  living  personality  of  the  civi- 
lized world  during  the  last  two  years. 

De  Wet  is  the  father  of  twelve  children,  and  his  two  eldest  sons 
are  fighting  with  him  in  the  field.  Mrs.  De  Wet  is  still  young- 
looking  and  handsome.  Her  prompt  and  contemptuous  expulsion 
of  Piet  De  Wet  from  her  door  in  Johannesburg  when  he  attempted 
to  enlist  her  influence  in  securing  the  surrender  of  his  great 
brother,  shows  that  the  hero  of  Nicholson’s  Nek  and  of  fifty  other 
victories  has  a wife  worthy  of  his  own  brave  and  unconquerable 
nature. 


Chapter  XV 


ENGLAND’S  KAFFIR  ALLIES 

Kaffirs  employed  as  armed  auxiliaries  in  the  war — Official  recogni- 
tion OF  Kaffir  assistance  in  the  defense  of  Mafeking — Praise 

GIVEN  TO  THE  FiNGO  CONTINGENT A PHOTOGRAPH  OF  BRITISH  KAFFIR 

ALLIES — The  arming  of  Khama’s  and  Linchwe’s  savages — The 
MASSACRE  OF  DeREDEPOORT. 

The  tactics  of  the  enemy  pending  the  arrival  of  reenforcements 
from  England  and  India  were  devised  with  the  object  of  keep- 
ing the  Boer  forces  as  scattered  as  possible,  so  as  to  prevent  concen- 
tration on  Natal  or  the  north  of  Cape  Colony.  In  this  plan  of  cam- 
paign the  English  were  eminently  successful  during  October  and 
November.  The  whole  western  and  northern  border  of  the  Trans- 
vaal had  to  be  watched  against  threatened  attacks  from  Ehodesia, 
and  fully  1,500  men  of  the  Marieo,  Eustenhurg,  and  Zoutpans- 
berg  commandoes  were  required  for  this  task.  A Chartered  Com- 
pany force  from  Bulawayo  menaced  Ehodes  Drift,  in  the  extreme 
north,  while  at  Deredepoort  and  other  points  on  the  northwest  bor- 
der other  Ehodesian  forces,  British  and  Kaffir,  demanded  the  con- 
stant presence  of  guarding  burghers  on  the  frontier.  These  men 
were  hung  up,  as  it  were,  away  from  the  scenes  of  active  hostilities 
in  the  south  and  east,  thus  greatly  reducing  the  strength  with  which 
the  little  State  was  enabled  to  defend  itself  against  large  armies 
advancing  from  Durban  and  the  Cape  on  landing  from  England. 

By  a timely  precaution  on  the  part  of  the  Transvaal,  the  Swazis 
were  prevented  from  becoming  the  tools  of  the  English.  General 
Schalk  Burger,  with  a strong  commando  and  guns,  patrolled  the 
frontier  after  war  was  declared,  assuring  Bunu  and  other  chiefs 
that  the  Boers  were  intent  on  no  movement  against  them,  but  were 
strong  enough  to  chastise  any  force  that  would  attempt  to  aid  the 
British.  English  emissaries  were  specially  watched  by  men  of 
Lieutenant  C.  Botha’s  Swazi  Police,  who  had  instructions  to  deal 
summarily  with  any  of  them  found  instigating  native  disturbances. 
The  British  were  thus  foiled  in  their  intrigues  for  creating  active 
native  hostility  in  the  east  and  south,  hut  they  succeeded,  all  the 


ENGLAND'S  KAFFIR  ALLIES 


169 


same,  in  forcing  the  Eepublics  to  keep  a large  percentage  of  their 
small  forces  watching  for  possible  Kaffir  hostility  in  their  rear. 

In  the  west  Baden-Powell  made  open  use  of  the  Fingoes,  Bara- 
longs,  and  Cape  “ Boys,”  both  in  his  offensive  and  defensive  opera- 
tions at  Maf eking.  This  charge  has  been  indignantly  denied  by  a 
portion  of  the  Jingo  press,  as  have  so  many  other  charges  made  by 
the  Boers,  only  to  he  duly  verified  afterwards.  There  are  two 
pieces  of  evidence  confirming  General  Cronje’s  complaint  against 
the  arming  of  black  auxiliaries  by  Baden-Powell  which  it  will  he 
impossible  to  refute.  One  is  a photograph  published  in  the  “ Cape 
Times  ” on  the  8th  of  August,  1900,  which  I reproduce,  showing 
these  very  Kaffirs,  armed  and  equipped,  under  their  British  officers; 
and  the  other  is  the  actual,  official  recognition  of  their  service  by 
no  less  a person  than  the  defender  of  Mafeking  himself. 

On  the  10th  of  November,  1899,  the  following  “ official 
despatch  ” of  the  4th  of  that  month  was  published  in  the  “ Mafe- 
king Mail  ” : 

“ The  Colonial  contingent  under  Captain  Goodyear  has  done 
splendid  service  to-day  in  occupying  a position  at  the  brickfields. 
The  contingent,  tho  exposed  to  a withering  fire,  maintained  its 
position,  and  was  supported  in  a capital  manner  by  the  Fingo 
contingent  under  Mr.  David  Webster.” 

Further,  in  “ Lloyd’s  Weekly  News  ” of  April  1,  1900,  appears 
the  following  : 

“ On  March  14th  Eeuter  got  through  the  subjoined  message 
from  Mafeking  : ‘ To  cover  our  advance  on  J ackal  Tree  Fort  a 

detachment  of  Baralong  natives  were  despatched  to  make  a feint 
attack  on  Fort  Snyman,  a work  recently  erected  by  the  Boers, 
threatening  our  most  advanced  western  position.  They  succeeded 
in  creeping  to  within  thirty  yards  of  the  enemy,  many  of  whom 
were  sleeping  outside,  and  when  near  the  fort  poured  in  two  or 
three  rapid  volleys.  Trooper  Webb  got  sufficiently  close  to  the 
fort  to  blow  out  the  brains  of  one  of  the  enemy.  The  natives 
then  beat  a rapid  retreat,  in  accordance  with  instructions  previously 
given  to  them,  having  inflicted  some  losses  upon  the  enemy.  In 
the  brickfields  the  Cape  Boys  have  been  reenforced  by  a detachment 
of  Protectorate  troops,  under  Captain  Fitzclarence.’  ” 

In  measuring  out  honors  and  lavish  praise  for  bravery  and  dis- 
tinguished services  in  the  war.  Lord  Eoberts  has  seemingly  over- 
looked the  deeds  of  his  Fingo,  Cape  “ Boys,”  and  Baralong  mer- 
cenaries. Nor  did  the  “Mafficking”  mobs  in  England  act  more 
generously  by  offering  all  their  cheers  to  the  English  defenders 
of  the  besieged  town,  and  forgetting  the  assistance  rendered  by  the 


-I 


ENGLAND’S  KAFFIR  ALLIES 


171 


savage  allies  of  their  troops  to  the  hero  who  enlisted  Kaffir  auxilia- 
ries against  the  Boers. 

Both  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  Mr.  Balfour  had  declared  in  Parlia- 
ment that  no  native  or  colored  allies  would  be  sought  for,  or  ac- 
cepted, by  the^British  in  the  war.  The  records  of  the  siege  of  Mafe- 
king  show  how  that  promise  has  been  redeemed.  But  there  was 
nothing  new  or  startling  in  this  violation  of  an  English  pledge. 
The  entire  history  of  England’s  dealings  with  South  Africa  is  re- 
plete with  a stereotyped  British  double-dealing,  persistent  and  in- 
curable, and  it  was  in  a spirit  of  strict  consistency  with  this  record 
that  the  Colonial  Secretary  should  righteously  insist,, on  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities,  that  President  Kruger  would  he  held  responsible  “ for 
acts  done  contrary  to  the  methods  of  civilized  warfare.”  The  letters 
of  “ pig-sticking  ” Lancers  from  the  bloody  field  of  Elandslaagte, 
and  the  official  despatch  of  the  “ Maf eking  Mail  ” of  November  4th 
— within  three  weeks  of  Mr.  Chamberlain’s  virtuous  demand — were 
but  the  usual  facts  which  invariably  build  a connecting  link  of 
loathsome  hypocrisy  between  British  professions  and  performances 
in  matters  relating  to  the  Dark  Continent. 

There  are,  however,  blacker  deeds  than  the  above  to  be  added 
to  the  discredit  of  the  enemy  of  the  Boer  ere  this  chapter  on 
England’s  Kaffir  allies  is  closed.  I have  yet  to  relate  the  story  of 
Linchwe,  and  how  he  was  instigated  to  join  in  a British  attack 
on  a small  laager  comprising  Boer  women  and  children  at  Derede- 
poort.  There  is  no  more  repulsive  deed  to  be  found  in  the  annals 
of  this  war.  It  happened  in  this  way  : 

A force  of  Ehodesian  troopers  from  Bulawayo,  under  Major 
Wilson,  advanced  on  Ehodes  Drift  on  the  17th  October,  expecting 
little,  if  any,  hostile  effort  to  bar  the  passage  over  the  Limpopo 
at  this  extreme  northern  end  of  the  Transvaal.  The  British  were 
disagreeably  surprised  to  find  the  wooded  hanks  of  the  river  oc- 
cupied by  a body  of  Boers  who  were  prepared  to  meet  them.  These 
men  had  only  finished  a ten  days’  continuous  and  rapid  march  from 
Pietersburg,  under  the  command  of  Field  Cornets  Briel,  Du  Preez, 
Alberts,  and  Kelly.  They  numbered  some  300  burghers.  On 
learning  that  the  English  were  two  miles  north  of  the  river, 
they  resolved  upon  an  attack.  An  engagement  which  lasted  several 
hours  took  place  on  the  21st,  on  the  Ehodesian  side  of  the  river; 
Field  Cornets  Du  Preez  and  Alberts  attacking  one  side  of  the  Eng- 
lish position,  and  Field  Cornets  Briel  and  Kelly  the  other.  The 
special  correspondent  of  the  “Volksstem,”  who  was  fighting  with 
Briel’s  contingent,  reported  that  “ the  enemy  fled  into  the  bush, 
disorganized,  leaving  their  fort  and  stores.  We  captured  17 
prisoners,  8 wagons  loaded  with  provisions  and  ammunition. 


172 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


together  with  mules  and  oxen.  The  enemy’s  fort  (entrenchment?), 
which  was  attacked  by  Du  Preez,  hoisted  a white  flag  twice.  When 
asked  by  Du  Preez,  at  a distance  of  a hundred  yards,  if  they  were 
going  to  surrender,  he  was  answered  by  a volley  which  killed  two 
of  our  men.  We  had  one  Maxim  and  one  Nordenfelt.  The  enemy, 
who  numbered  500  or  600,  retired  in  the  Tuli  direction.” 

A despatch  from  Bulawayo,  via  Beira,  published  by  Eeuter,  ad- 
mitted that  the  British  loss  in  this  encounter  was  4 killed  and  14 
wounded,  with  several  men  missing. 

This  small  victory  appears  to  have  enraged  the  Rhodesian  offi- 
cers, who  had  counted  upon  an  easy  entry  into  the  north  of  the 
Transvaal  for  raiding  purposes.  There  was  a loss  of  prestige, 
too,  incurred  in  the  estimation  of  native  chiefs  like  Khama, 
Linchwe,  and  others  who  would  learn  of  the  Boer  defeat  of  the 
Chartered  forces,  and  it  was  determined  to  send  two  armored 
trains  from  Bulawayo,  with  men  and  Maxims,  to  patrol  the  line 
along  the  Transvaal  border  from  Palapye,  south  to  Gaberones. 
This  Rhodesian  expedition  fared  no  better  than  the  attempt  to 
surprise  the  Boers  at  Rhodes  Drift.  General  Snyman,  with  a 
few  hundred  burghers  from  the  Marico  district,  crossed  the  border 
at  Krokodil  Pool  on  the  24th,  blew  up  the  bridge,  and  awaited 
the  arrival  of  the  trains,  about  whose  movements  he  was  accurately 
informed  by  Dutch  missionaries  in  Khama’s  country.  The  trains 
were  themselves  surprised  at  the  unexpected  attack  by  Snyman, 
and,  after  exchanging  a few  shots  with  the  Boer  guns,  the  officers 
in  charge  of  the  Bulawayo  force  steamed  back  to  the  north. 

Linchwe,  Chief  of  the  Bakathla  tribe,  who  is  the  head  of  the 
natives  inhabiting  the  border  territory  through  which  the  railway 
from  Mafeking  to  Bulawayo  runs  for  a considerable  distance,  was 
astounded  at  the  refusal  of  the  English  to  fight  Snyman,  and  at 
the  retreat  of  the  trains.  The  Bakathla  had  raided  Transvaal 
cattle  under  the  instigation  of  the  Chartered  Company’s  officials, 
and  the  Boers  were  now  showing  themselves  able  to  drive  back  both 
British  and  Kaffirs  with  ease.  This  fact  alarmed  Linchwe,  and 
he  began  to  waver  in  his  adhesion  to  the  English  side.  Command- 
ant Du  Plessis,  of  Eustenburg,  with  whom  Linchwe’s  father  had 
placed  the  present  chief,  when  young,  for  a number  of  years,  was 
sent  by  President  Kruger  to  Deredepoort  in  the  hope  of  counter- 
acting the  efforts  of  the  Chartered  Company  to  enlist  the  Bakathla 
tribe  on  the  British  side.  On  the  arrival  of  Du  Plessis,  General 
Snyman  went  south  to  Mafeking,  taking  most  of  the  Boer  com- 
mando with  him,  in  the  belief  that  Linchwe  would  be  held  neutral 
through  the  friendly  influence  of  his  former  host  and  acquaintance. 

The  Chartered  Company,  however,  had  distributed  rifles  and 


ENGLAND’S  KAFFIR  ALLIES 


173 


ammunition  among  both  Khama’s  tribe  and  the  Bakathla.  Once 
in  possession  of  weapons  and  cartridges,  the  natives  were  only 
too  willing  to  engage  in  any  movement  which  promised  loot  and 
cattle  in  return  for  their  services,  and  they  ranged  themselves  on 
the  side  of  the  British. 

Khama’s  men  were  utilized  by  the  Chartered  Company’s  officers 
to  keep  the  Boers  at  Ehodes  Drift  in  check,  by  assembling  in 
force  at  Selukwe,  a little  to  the  south  of  that  region  on  the  Lim- 
popo, while  an  attack  was  planned  upon  the  Boer  post  at  Derede- 
poort,  where  Linchwe’s  savages  were  to  cooperate  with  the  English. 

On  the  9th  of  Kovember  the  following  despatch  was  received 
and  published  at  Lourenzo  Marquez  from  Beira  : 

“ Tuli  (Eeuter). — Colonel  Plumer  to-day  received  the  following 
from  Palapye  : 

“ ‘ Khama  has  sent  another  regiment  to  Selukwe  Kopje.  Its 
strength  is  370,  comprising  191  Martini-Henry,  and  171  muzzle- 
loaders.  This  makes  the  total  strength  at  the  Selukwe  Kopje 
700.  He  has  also  sent  150  men  to  the  Macloutsie,  comprising  75 
Martini-Henry  and  75  muzzle-loaders.’  ” 

The  northern  Boer  force  being  thus  menaced  by  Khama’s  men, 
it  was  resolved,  on  learning  of  General  Snyman’s  retirement  with 
most  of  his  commando  south  to  Mafeking,  to  attack  the  Boer  post 
at  Deredepoort,  a small  trading  village  on  the  Marico  Elver, 
opposite  Gaberones,  and  about  seventy  miles  north  of  Mafeking. 

The  attack  was  not  resolved  upon  until  the  hero  of  the  enter- 
prise, a Ehodesian  officer  named  Llewellyn,  had  ascertained,  through 
Kaffir  scouts,  that  the  little  garrison  had  been  still  further  denuded 
of  its  men  in  patrols  to  the  north  and  south,  leaving  only  some 
60  burghers  and  about  40  villagers  in  the  place.  The  assault  was 
planned  for  a Saturday  morning  before  daybreak,  with  a Ehodesian 
force  of  200  troopers, with  a Maxim  gun,  and  some  500  of  Linchwe’s 
savages. 

The  Bakathla  warriors  were  not  led  by  Linchwe,  but  by  one  of 
his  subordinate  chiefs.  They  were  ordered  to  cross  the  river  noise- 
lessly, south  of  the  village,  and  to  await  the  action  of  the  Maxim 
by  Llewellyn’s  force  of  Britishers  on  the  north  side ; the  plan  being 
to  drive  the  Boers  from  the  village  by  the  fire  of  the  Maxim,  into 
the  ranks  of  the  crouching  savages  on  the  southern  side. 

It  was  about  three  in  the  morning  of  November  25  when  the 
little  community  were  startled  by  the  fire  of  the  English  gun, 
and  the  Boers  had  barely  time  to  dress  when  they  found  the 
Kaffirs  within  the  village.  Commandant  Kirsten,  in  charge  of 


174 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


the  camp,  and  Mr.  Barnard,  a member  of  the  Volksraad,  who 
chanced  to  be  at  Deredepoort,  took  command  of  the  small  force, 
consisting,  all  told,  of  76  men,  and  so  promptly  did  the  Boer 
fighting  instinct  respond  to  the  startling  situation  that,  in  a very 
few  minutes,  every  Mauser  was  dealing  out  its  deadly  welcome 
to  the  savage  assailants  on  the  one  hand  and  their,  if  possible, 
more  cowardly  British  commanders  and  comrades  on  the  other. 
The  attack,  however,  was  so  sudden  and  unexpected  that  the 
Kaffirs  had  entered  several  houses,  and  had  time  to  butcher  the 


Keproduced  from  the  “Cape  Times  “ (British),  August  8, 1900 

“ THE  BLACK  WATCH  ’’  AT  MAEEKING 


half-awakened  inmates  before  any  resistance  could  be  offered. 
They  killed  a lady,  an  American  by  birth,  in  bed,  and  mortally 
wounded  her  husband,  who  was  in  the  act  of  rising  when  the 
savages  burst  into  the  room.  A German  trader  was  disembowelled 
and  otherwise  tortured,  while  an  English  photographer  named 
Early  was  hacked  to  death  with  spears.  The  brave  Barnard  rallied 
his  little  force,  and  soon  drove  the  Kaffirs  clear  of  the  laager,  while 
another  portion  of  his  men  were  keeping  the  British  troopers  at  bay 
on  the  other  side  of  the  village.  Barnard,  however,  was  shot  dead 
after  the  fight  had  gone  on  for  an  hour,  but  so  coolly  had  the  Boers 
met  the  double  attack  with  their  accurate  rifle  fire  that  over  fifty 
of  the  Kaffirs  lay  dead  around  the  laager,  while  the  valiant  British 
had  retreated  on  finding  that  the  little  post  on  the  river  was  not  so 


ENGLAND’S  KAFFIR  ALLIES 


175 


easily  surprised  and  captured  as  Llewellyn  and  his  brother  officers 
had  planned. 

The  Kaffirs  had  taken  over  a score  of  the  villagers  prisoner  in 
the  first  assault  on  the  place.  Most  of  these  were  women  and 
children,  and  all  of  them  would  have  been  murdered  but  for  the 
intervention  of  a British  soldier  named  Bateson,  who  had  been 
fighting  with  the  savages,  and  who  exercised  much  influence  over 
them. 

No  news  of  this  engagement  found  its  way  into  a British  paper. 
Doubtless  Jingo  organs  will  be  found  who  will  doubt  the  truth 
of  the  story  now  told.  In  that  event  the  following  letter,  dated 
“Mochudie,  29th  November,  1899,”  will  settle  the  matter,  both 
as  to  the  capture  of  the  women  and  children  by  the  Bakathla, 
and  the  fact  of  these  British  allies  having  taken  part  in  the  fight 
of  the  25th  : 

“ To  the  Commandant  of  the  Boer  Laager,  Krokodil  Pool, 
Mochudie,  29th  November,  1899. — I have  here  17  women  and 
children,  who  were  captured  hy  the  Bakathla  on  the  25th  November. 
I enclose  letter  from  one  of  them.  I wish  to  give  them  over  to  you 
safely.  They  have,  since  I received  them,  been  supplied  with  every 
comfort  I could  give,  and  I deeply  regret  that  women  should  have 
been  mixed  up  with  the  attack  by  our  soldiers  of  the  25th  November. 
The  Bakathla  had  instructions  not  to  cross  the  border,  but  got  out 
of  hand  completely.  I have  communicated  the  contents  of  this 
letter  to  the  detachments  of  our  mounted  men  who  may  be  patrol- 
ling in  your  direction,  to  avoid  any  complications. — Signed,  Noel 
Llewellyn,  Capt.  B.  S.  A.  (Police  Commandant  of  advance  armored 
trains).” 

It  was  absolutely  untrue  to  assert  that  the  savages  were  not 
instructed  to  cross  the  border.  This  duty  was  deliberately  assigned 
to  them,  as  a part  of  the  plan  of  attack  which  Llewellyn  had  himself 
devised. 

The  British  and  the  Bakathla  retired  across  the  border  after 
their  exploit. 

As  pointed  out  in  the  chapter  relating  to  the  Boer  advance  on 
Dundee,  armed  Kaffirs  were  employed  by  the  English  from  the 
very  first  days  of  the  war.  British  officers  have  continued  to  so 
use  these  savages  in  the  field,  in  increasing  numbers,  and  with  little 
or  no  disguise,  on  through  the  whole  campaign,  in  shameless  dis- 
regard of  ministerial  declarations  that  their  assistance  would  not 
be  utilized  in  the  conflict  with  the  Eepublies. 

An  official  list  of  the  persons  murdered  by  the  savage  allies  of 
the  British  was  published,  and  included  the  following  names  : 


176 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Murdered — Steplianus  Fouche,  Mrs.  Pieters,  wife  of  the  store- 
keeper at  Deredepoort  (an  American  lady);  Anna  M.  M.  Fourie, 
nee  Kroukamp,  wife  of  W.  J.  Fourie;  Z.  L.  Pretorius,  sen.;  J.  S. 
Pretorius;  G.  Eooseboom;  Early  (an  Englishman),  photographer; 
C.  W.  Potgieter ; Paul  Potgieter,  aged  15. 

Wounded — J.  L.  Kroukamp. 

Missing — Johanna  Potgieter,  nee  v.  d.  Bergh,  with  five  children; 
Carolina,  aged  29;  Emma,  8 to  9;  Jan,  Pieter,  and  Adriaan;  also  her 
granddaughter,  Z.  L.  Pretorius,  about  4;  also  her  daughter  Johanna, 
wife  of  Davis  Smut ; Cornelia  Potgieter,  nee  Eoos,  wife  of  Dr.  D.  J. 
Pretorius,  son  of  Z.  L.  Pretorius;  Adriaan  and  Christiaan,  10  and  8 
years  old,  the  sons  of  widow  J.  C.  Kroukamp,  nee  Eensberg;  E.  A. 
Fourie,  5 years,  son  of  J.  W.  Fourie ; Gert  Coetzee,  Antonie  Kruger ; 
F.  Pieters,  storekeeper  at  Deredepoort. 

Some  of  the  murdered  villagers  were  relatives  of  President 
Kruger. 


Chapter  XVI 

MAFEKING  AND  KIMBERLEY 

Defenses  of  Mafeking — Invested  by  Cronje — Baden-Powell’s  abuse 
OF  THE  Red  Cross  flag — Kaffirs  used  for  cover  by  British  officers 
— Snyman  replaces  Cronje — Baden-Powell  in  sortie  uses  dum- 
dum bullets — Importance  of  Kimberley — Invested  by  Wessels 
AND  De  la  Rey — Chfvalry  of  Du  Plessis — Engagement  with 

ARMORED  TRAIN  AT  MaCKFARLANE’S  SidING DEFENSES  AND  ENVIRONS 

OF  Kimberley — De  Aar  the  base  of  relief — Boers  fail  to  seize  De 
Aar  out  of  regard  for  Cape  Ministry — Preliminary  fight  at 
Belmont — Bombardment  of  Kimberley. 

Skirmishes  of  varying  importance  and  results  continued 
round  Mafeking  after  the  capture  of  the  armored  train  at 
Kraaipan  by  De  la  Rey.  General  Cronje  pushed  his  lines  of  in- 
vestment nearer  the  town,  as  opportunity  otfered,  and  Colonel 
Baden-Powell  showed  much  readiness  and  resource  in  his  methods 
of  defense. 

The  town  stands  on  ground  a little  higher  than  the  veldt  from 
which  the  Boers  had  to  besiege  it,  and  this  fact  was  greatly  to  the 
advantage  of  the  defenders.  Bomb-proof  shelters  had  been  con- 
structed before  war  was  declared,  while  an  adequate  supply  of 
ammunition  (comprising  Mark  lY.  cartridges)  and  food  for  a 
prolonged  resistance  had  been  carefully  provided.  Approaches  on 
all  sides  likely  to  invite  an  attack  were  defended  by  dynamite 
mines,  while  the  garrison  had  the  active  assistance,  in  the  task 
of  vigilantly  guarding  the  place,  of  500  or  600  natives  of  the  Bara- 
long  and  other  Kaflhr  tribes. 

General  Cronje  was  only  obeying  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare 
when  he  notified  Colonel  Baden-Powell  that  he  would  begin  to 
shell  the  place  at  a certain  hour.  The  fact  that  he  gave  such 
notification,  however,  was  not  mentioned  in  the  reports  which 
reached  London  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  siege.  On  the  con- 
trar}y  much  was  made  in  these  despatches  of  a shell  which  had 
hit  the  Mafeking  Hospital.  This  was  denounced  as  a barbarous 
act,  and  adduced  as  proof  that  the  Boers  were  not  inclined  to 
regard  the  usages  of  civilized  custom  in  their  conduct  of  the  war. 
But  what  are  the  facts  ? When  Cronje  learned  that  the  building 
12 


178 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


had  been  hit,  he  wrote  to  regret  the  occurrence,  and  pointed  out 
that  “ the  hospital  bore  no  distinguishing  flag,  such  as  is  usually 
employed  as  a sign  to  the  besieging  forces.”  Cronje  also  proposed 
that  the  women  and  children  should  be  removed  out  of  the  town 
to  a place  beyond  the  reach  of  shells  or  dangers  of  assaults;  but  no 
assent  would  be  given  to  this  proposal.  Eed  Cross  flags  were  soon 
placed  over  the  building  set  apart  for  these  non-combatants,  over 
the  hospital,  the  convent,  the  prison,  and  several  other  places  util- 
ized for  defensive  purposes;  an  arrangement  which  was  far  more 
consonant  with  Baden-Powell’s  ideas  of  fighting  an  enemy  than 
with  the  letter  or  spirit  of  the  Geneva  Convention. 

In  one  of  the  earliest  skirmishes  between  the  besieged  and 
besiegers  a number  of  Kaffirs  got  mixed  in  the  fighting.  Some 
of  these  were  taken  prisoner,  and  they  declared  that  100  of 
them  had  been  placed  in  front  of  the  British,  and  were  compelled 
to  act  as  cover  by  officers,  who  forced  them  to  the  front  with  their 
revolvers.  The  sortie  on  the  Boer  position  failed,  and  the  Kaffirs 
alleged  that  they  were  fired  upon  by  the  officers  during  the  retreat. 

It  was  this  small  encounter  which  inspired  some  modest  English 
war  correspondent  to  herald  it  as  “ a striking  British  victory,” 
while  a reecho  of  this  newspaper  achievement  reached  Australia 
and  caused  the  Kangaroo  Jingoes  to  go  one  very  much  better  with 
the  news  of  the  first  English  triumph.  I find  that  the  Sydney 
(N.S.W.)  “ Daily  Telegraph  ” of  Saturday,  October  21,  announced 
the  great  and  glad  tidings  as  follows  : “ The  Transvaal  War. — 

British  Victory  at  Mafeking  ! — A Feigned  Eetreat  and  a Dashing 
Sortie  ! — 1,500  Boers  Killed  ! ” General  Cronje’s  report  of  this 
skirmish  told  a tale  of  three  Boers  killed  and  of  a dozen  wounded. 

Several  offers  to  storm  the  town  were  made  in  the  early  days 
of  the  siege.  The  Potchefstroom  and  Eustenburg  commandoes 
were  willing  for  the  task,  while  the  Scandinavian  Corps,  a body  of 
about  100  Uitlanders  of  that  race,  who  had  joined  Cronje’s  laager, 
eagerly  volunteered  to  lead  any  general  assault  upon  the  place. 
Ko  consent,  however,  would  be  given  to  these  proposals.  General 
Joubert  would  lend  no  countenance  to  such  a plan.  Cronje  was 
likewise  averse  to  its  adoption.  Both  erroneously  believed  that 
Mafeking,  Ladysmith,  and  Kimberley  would  be  starved  or  shelled 
into  surrender  before  enough  of  troops  could  arrive  from  England 
to  secure  the  relief  of  the  forces  penned  up  in  the  three  besieged 
places.  It  also  appeared  to  their  judgment  as  a great  moral  and 
political  triumph  for  the  little  Eepublics  to  compel  15,000  or  20,000 
British  and  Colonial  troops  to  seek  shelter  from  Boer  commandoes 
within  three  British  towns. 

On  the  31st  of  October  it  was  decided  to  attack  a strong  posi- 


180 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


tion  held  by  Baden-Powell,  at  a spot  called  Cannon  Kopje,  and  a 
niimber  of  Potchefstroom  men  volunteered  for  the  work.  There 
was  absolutely  no  cover  of  any  kind  between  the  Boer  lines  and  this 
part  of  the  British  defensive  outworks.  The  attack  was  planned 
as  a surj^rise  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning,  hut  it  was  the  Boers 
who  were  themselves  surprised.  The  English  were  well  on  the 
alert,  and  allowed  their  foes  to  approach  near  their  position  before 
using  their  guns.  The  men  of  Cronje’s  own  commando  were  shot 
back  with  Maxim  and  rifle  fire,  and  would  have  lost  very  heavily 
in  the  rash  attempt  they  had  made  had  the  British  fire  not  been  so 
badly  directed.  The  casualties  were  only  4 killed  and  some  20 
wounded. 

A counter  attack  of  a most  determined  character  was  made  a 
few  weeks  later  by  Baden-Powell  upon  General  Snyman.  This 
Boer  officer  had  replaced  General  Cronje  in  the  command  of  the 
investing  burghers  when  the  latter  was  appointed  by  the  Federal 
Governments  to  the  head  command  of  the  forces  which  were  to 
bar  Lord  Methuen’s  advance  to  the  relief  of  Kimberley.  Snyman 
was  left  with  2,500  Boers  to  carry  on  the  shortsighted  plan  of  wast- 
ing time  and  men  in  front  of  this  small  place.  He  and  Baden- 
Powell,  in  their  tactics  during  continuance  of  the  siege,  resembled 
a pair  of  pugilists,  fencing  and  ducking,  retiring  and  advancing  in 
a ring;  scientifically  up  in  the  tricks  of  the  “ noble  art,”  but  bent 
more  upon  an  exhibition  of  skill  for  an  applauding  gallery  than 
upon  serious  business.  In  this  style  of  carrying  on  war,  it  must  he 
frankly  admitted  that  the  Marico  Commandant  was  no  match  for 
his  histrionic  British  adversary. 

Once  in  December  (appropriately  enough  on  Boxing  Day)  Baden- 
Powell  planned  and  attempted  a real  attack  upon  Snyman,  and  the 
result,  as  reported  to  the  Executive  at  Pretoria,  was  disastrous  to 
the  assailants.  The  Boer  general’s  account  of  the  affair  reads  : 

“ This  morning  the  enemy  offered  a desperate  assault  upon  one 
of  our  forts.  They  made  a combined  attack  with  cannon,  Maxim, 
and  musketry,  and  they  had  an  armored  train  to  their  rear.  They 
charged  us  with  such  violence  that  some  of  them  were  shot  dead 
right  upon  the  side  of  our  fort,  and  with  God’s  help  we  retained 
our  position  and  our  fort.  We  are  also  in  complete  possession 
of  the  battle-field.  The  number  of  English  dead  is  55,  which  does 
not  include  the  various  human  freights  they  previously  carried 
home  in  their  armored  train  and  in  their  ambulance  wagons. 

“ The  loss  of  the  British  was  so  severe  that  our  burghers  had 
to  assist  them  in  hoisting  their  dead  and  wounded  into  their 
vehicles,  assistance  which  they  most  thankfully  acknowledged. 

“ Our  casualties  are  one  killed,  two  men  seriously  wounded. 


MAFEKING  AND  KIMBERLEY 


181 


and  six  slightly.  The  hurghers  fought  most  courageously.  We 
also  made  three  Britishers  prisoners  of  war.” 

In  a later  report  General  Snyman  remarks  that  the  cartridges 
taken  from  the  enemy  during  the  morning’s  battle  were  Dum-Dum 
(Mark  IV.)  bullets. 

In  a subsequent  despatch  the  Boer  general  said  that  “the  enemy’s 
official  admissions  show  a loss  of  108  dead  and  wounded.”  Along 
with  this  message  to  Pretoria,  Snjunan  sent  the  following  communi- 
cation which  he  had  received  from  Colonel  Baden-Powell: 

“ Mafeking,  27th  December,  1899. 
“To  General  Snyman,  before  Mafeking. 

“ Sir — I wish  to  express  my  thanks  to  those  of  your  burghers 
who  lent  kindly  assistance  yesterday  in  carrying  our  dead  and 
wounded  from  the  battle-field.  Their  friendly  offices  are  most 
highly  valued  by  the  comrades  of  the  fallen. 

“ I have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

“ Baden-Powell, 

“ Colonel  Commanding  H.  M.’s  Troops  at  Mafeking.” 

In  the  “ Volksstem  ” of  Pretoria  and  the  “ Standard  and  Diggers’ 
News  ” of  J ohanneshurg  the  names  and  addresses  of  the  killed  and 
wounded  on  the  Boer  side  in  the  attack  on  the  Platboomfort  on  the 
26th  of  December  were  printed,  and  the  list  consisted  of  1 killed 
and  10  wounded,  only. 


KlilBEHLET 

The  Federal  Governments  attached  an  importance  to  Kimberley, 
both  politically  and  strategically,  which  Mafeking  did  not  possess. 
The  Diamond  City  stood  for  Ehodes  and  Co.,  and  Ehodes  and  Co. 
were  the  primary  authors  of  the  war,  in  having  been  the  plotters 
and  organizers  of  the  Jameson  Eaid,  of  which  the  conflict  that 
commenced  on  the  11th  of  October,  1899,  was  a direct  sequence  and 
result.  Kimberley,  therefore,  was  a factor  in  the  situation  which 
appealed  more  strongly  to  Dutch  feeling  than  did  either  Lady- 
smith or  Mafeking.  It  was  near  the  point  of  junction  between  the 
British  and  Free  State  territories,  and  would  be  a menacing  quan- 
tity on  the  right  flank  of  such  Federal  force  as  would  have  to  con- 
test the  way  of  the  enemy’s  advance  on  Bloemfontein.  Cecil 
Ehodes,  too,  when  hostilities  were  declared,  had  rushed  to  where 
his  immense  interests  were  centered  and  imperiled,  and,  calm 
and  passionless  as  the  Boers  have  shown  themselves  to  he  in  every 
emergency  throughout  the  whole  campaign,  there  was  no  disguising 


182 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


their  bitter  feeling  against  their  arch-enemy  in  the  early  days  of 
the  war,  and  the  eagerness  of  their  wish  to  lay  hands  upon  him. 

Notwithstanding  these  urgent  reasons  for  the  capture  of  Kim- 
berley, the  operations  directed  to  that  end  were  of  a forcibly  feeble 
character  from  the  beginning.  There  was  not  alone  an  inefficient 
military  direction,  but  a divided  one  as  well  ; several  Free  State  Com- 
mandants being  in  charge  of  the  commandoes  in  front  and  to  the 
south  of  the  Diamond  City,  each  very  jealous  of  every  other’s  power 
and  authority.  Mr.  C.  J.  Wessels,  member  of  the  Free  State  Volks- 
raad,  was  made  Commandant-in-Chief  of  the  western  forces,  with 
Mr.  Jacob  Prinsloo,  another  M.V.,  in  charge  of  the  burghers  who 
were  to  defend  the  dangerous  position  north  of  the  Orange  Eiver 
Station,  from  whence  the  main  British  force  was  expected  to  ad- 
vance either  on  Kimberley  or  Bloemfontein.  Had  Commandants 
Andries  Cronje,  of  Winburg,  and  Christian  De  Wet  (both  also  Free 
State  M.V.’s)  been  sent  to  the  west  in  the  first  instance,  instead 
of  Wessels  and  Prinsloo,  Mr.  Cecil  Ehodes  would  have  passed  most 
of  his  time  during  the  war  in  Pretoria  as  a prisoner.  De  Wet’s 
natural  military  talent  would  have  told  him  that  the  one  way  in 
which  to  insure  the  fall  of  Kimberley  was  first  to  secure  the  cap- 
ture of  the  British  position  and  stores  at  De  Aar,  and  that  the 
surest  way  in  which  to  lose  both  places  was  to  pay  more  attention 
to  the  Diamond  City  than  to  the  key  of  the  whole  western  military 
situation.  Wessels  and  Prinsloo,  however,  were  members  of  the 
Free  State  Kriegs  Committee,  and  this  fact  doubtless  explains  their 
appointment. 

The  number  of  men  in  Wessels’  commandoes  was  too  small  for 
a vigorous  investment  of  Kimberley,  and  no  effective  move  was 
made  before  the  5th  of  November  to  subject  the  town  to  a regular 
siege.  General  De  la  Eey  had  been  detached  from  the  forces  in 
front  of  Mafeking  with  1,500  burghers  with  which  to  reenforce  the 
commandoes  further  south  on  the  Bechuanaland  border.  On  his 
way  to  Kimberley  he  crossed  into  British  territory,  and  captured 
the  important  town  of  Vryburg;  considerately  allowing  the 
Colonial  magistrates  and  police  to  retire  from  the  place  without 
molestation.  The  day  after  joining  forces  with  Wessels,  he  suc- 
ceeded in  destroying  a formidable  mine  north  of  Kimberley,  whieh 
had  been  carefully  prepared  so  as  to  invite  a belief  that  it  was  a 
neglected  ammunition  depot,  instead  of  a mine  of  200  cases  of 
dynamite  and  100  of  nitro-glycerine.  Electric  wires  connected 
the  building  with  the  town,  but  De  la  Eey’s  foresight  averted  the 
blow  which  had  been  so  deliberately  planned,  by  standing  off  at  a 
safe  distance  with  his  guns  and  then  blowing  the  place  and  the 
explosives  into  the  air. 


MAFEKING  AND  KIMBERLEY 


183 


There  had  been  one  or  two  encounters  between  small  bodies 
of  both  forces  before  the  arrival  of  De  la  Eey,  in  one  of  which  a 
patrol  under  Field  Cornet  Botha  (of  Boshof)  engaged  an  armored 
train  on  the  south  side  of  Kimberley.  A week  before  this  event 
a train  from  Cape  Town  was  allowed  to  pass  on  its  way,  owing  to 
the  fact  that  some  ladies  were  seen  to  be  aboard.  Commandant 
Du  Plessis,  who  was  at  the  time  in  charge  of  the  small  force 
holding  the  line  at  Belmont,  would  not  consent  to  have  the  train 
fired  upon,  nor  even  searched.  There  was  no  acknowledgment  on 
Colonel  Kekewieh’s  part  of  this  considerate  act  of  courtesy  and 
forbearance.  The  mine  of  nitro-glycerine  and  dynamite  on  the 
line  of  the  Boer  positions  north  of  the  town  was  the  retort  courte- 
ous of  the  British  defenders  of  Kimberley. 

The  engagement  with  the  armored  train  at  Mackfarlane’s  Siding 
on  the  25th  of  October  was  undecisive.  The  train  and  its  occu- 
pants, estimated  at  400  troops  with  four  guns,  steamed  back  to 
Kimberley  after  a two  hours’  contest  with  the  burgher  patrol  under 
Field  Cornet  Botha.  This  brave  ofiicer  and  5 of  his  men  were 
killed,  while  6 more  were  wounded.  The  number  of  English  casual- 
ties was  not  known  in  the  Boer  lines. 

The  combatants  within  Kimberley  were  estimated  at  4,000; 
comprising  500  or  600  regular  troops,  including  men  of  the 
Eoyal  Engineers,  and  about  2,500  Volunteers,  with  companies 
of  Caj^e  Police,  local  forces,  and  mounted  infantry.  Colonel  Keke- 
wich,  an  experienced  officer,  was  in  chief  command,  and  had  a 
battery  and  a half  of  field  guns,  and  ten  Maxims. 

The  mounds  of  “ tailings  ” thrown  up  in  the  course  of  diamond 
mining  were  admirable  ready-made  forts,  on  which  guns  and 
riflemen  secured  the  best  possible  protection,  and  rendered  the 
town  unapproachable  except  to  a formidable  force  prepared  to 
sell  many  lives  for  the  chances  of  a fortunate  assault.  These 
heaps  of  tailings  were  likewise  an  effective  shield  against  Boer 
shells  to  many  of  the  enemy’s  otherwise  vulnerable  positions  with- 
in the  city.  There  was,  therefore,  as  much  of  calculated  confidence 
as  of  Jingo  boasting  in  Mr.  Cecil  Ehodes’  celebrated  message,  that 
he  was  as  safe  in  Kimberley  as  if  he  were  in  Piccadilly,  while  he 
believed  General  Buller  would  be  in  Pretoria  by  Christmas. 

The  Orange  Eiver  is  crossed  by  a splendid  bridge,  a little  to 
the  west  of  the  junction  of  the  Orange  Free  State  with  Cape 
Colony,  and  the  country  from  thence  north  to  Kimberley,  a 
distance  of  about  90  miles,  is  typical  of  South  African  scenery. 
The  railway  line  follows  a course  of  least  climbing,  and  winds  in 
and  out  between  occasional  kopjes  and  ridges,  on  each  hand,  in 
its  progress  north.  These  hills  generally  rise  up  from  the  veldt 


BOEK  COMMANDOES  BESIEGING  KIMBERLEY,  NOVEMBER,  1899 


MAFEKING  AND  KIMBERLEY 


185 


without  the  connecting  “ neks  ” with  other  elevations,  which  are 
a marked  feature  of  the  mountainous  districts  of  Natal,  and  do  not, 
therefore,  offer  positions  quite  as  advantageous  for  Boer  defensive 
lighting  as  those  of  the  eastern  British  colony.  It  was  along  this 
line  of  country  that  the  English  army  was  to  move,  and  the  kopjes 
referred  to  offered  the  only  positions  from  which  a greatly  inferior 
force  could  hope  to  contest  successfully  the  way. 

The  stations  on  the  line  after  the  railway  crosses  the  bridge  are 
Witte  Putts,  Belmont,  Graspan,  Honeynest  Kloof,  Modder  Eiver, 
Merton,  Spytfontein,  Wimbledon,  Kimberley;  roughly  averaging 
a dozen  miles  from  each  other.  Magersfontein  is  situated  between 
Modder  Eiver  and  Spytfontein  a little  to  the  east  of  the  railway 
line.  The  Free  State  border  lies  parallel  with  the  Griqualand  West 
territory,  through  which  the  railway  runs,  and  is  seldom  more  than 
a few  miles  away  from  the  line  the  whole  of  the  distance  from 
Orange  Eiver  Bridge  to  the  Diamond  City.  There  is  neither  river 
nor  mountain  barrier  between  the  Boer  and  British  countries  from 
the  Orange  Eiver  to  Mafeking. 

The  British  base  for  the  relief  of  Kimberley  was  De  Aar,  some 
70  miles  south  of  the  Orange  Eiver,  and  the  Free  State  main 
laager  was  at  Jacobsdal,  on  the  Eeit  Eiver,  near  its  Junction  with 
the  Modder.  The  advanced  posts  of  both  forces  were  on  the 
south  and  north  side  of  the  Orange  Eiver,  respectively. 

As  already  pointed  out,  the  failure  of  the  Free  State  Govern- 
ment to  order  a dash  upon  De  Aar,  and  the  capture  of  the  Orange 
Eiver  Bridge  after  war  had  been  declared,  were  mainly  due  to  the 
existence  of  a Bond  Ministry  at  the  Cape.  These  Ministers  were 
the  loyal  subjects  of  England,  and  the  racial  friends  of  the  Boer 
Eepublics.  The  British  showed  no  consideration  whatever  for  the 
difficulties  of  the  Schreiner  Cabinet  in  this  embarrassing  relation- 
ship, except  to  distrust  them,  and  the  Boers  ought  to  have  equally 
disregarded  the  racial  ties,  and  to  have  dealt  with  the  Cape  as  Eng- 
land did.  This  view,  however,  found  no  favor  with  President 
Stejm  and  his  Government.  They  had  their  own  peculiar,  and  too 
considerate,  ideas  of  the  obligations  which  their  kinship  with  the 
Afrikander  Bond  placed  upon  their  actions  in  the  war,  and,  rather 
than  cause  trouble  to  the  Cape  Ministry  in  their  relations  with 
the  British,  the  latter  were  allowed  to  save  De  Aar  and  to  secure 
the  passage  over  the  Orange  Eiver.  The  capture  of  both  places  by 
the  Boers  in  October  would  have  insured  the  fall  of  Kimberley, 
and  all  which  that  would  have  meant  in  the  fortunes  of  the  Federal 
campaign  from  November  to  May. 

On  the  10th  of  November  a Free  State  commando,  350  strong, 
in  occupation  of  Belmont,  was  attacked  by  some  700  Lancers  and 


186 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


mounted  infantry,  a little  to  the  west  of  the  village.  The  Boer 
officer  in  command  was  Field  Cornet  Van  der  Merwe,  of  Prinsloo’s 
command,  and  his  only  artillery  consisted  of  a single  Krupp  gun. 
The  British  were  under  the  orders  of  Colonel  Gough,  and  had  a 
battery  of  field  artillery.  Van  der  Merwe  took  up  position  on  a hill 
called  Kaffir  Kop,  a few  miles  west  of  Belmont,  dividing  his  small 
force  into  two  parties,  and  awaited  the  attack  of  the  enemy.  The 
Boer  gun  put  itself  out  of  action  after  the  third  shot  had  been  fired, 
and  the  fight  which  followed  was  continued  hy  the  Free  Staters 
with  their  Mausers  only.  The  tactics  of  the  enemy  neutralized  the 
loss  of  the  service  of  the  Krupp,  as  the  British  officer  sent  his 
mounted  men  within  600  yards  of  the  hill  held  by  Van  der  Merwe, 
and  thus  gave  the  burghers,  who  were  posted  on  the  point  nearest 
the  advancing  troopers,  a target  for  rifle  practice,  and  soon  a score 
of  saddles  were  emptied.  The  encounter  continued  for  three  hours, 
the  enemy  foolishly  prancing  round  the  Boer  position,  losing  men 
in  pursuit  of  this  riding  exercise,  and  showing  no  inclination  to 
come  to  closer  quarters.  A fight  between  twelve  of  the  Fauresmith 
burghers  and  a troop  of  mounted  infantry,  to  the  right  of  the  Boer 
position,  ended  the  day’s  engagement.  The  dozen  Boers  were  cut 
off  from  their  main  body,  who  were  away  a couple  of  miles  to  the 
left,  but  so  steady  was  their  stand  and  so  straight  was  their  shooting 
that  they  held  off  over  150  of  their  assailants  until  the  English  re- 
treat was  sounded.  Van  der  Merwe  had  only  two  men  wounded  in 
the  action,  and  a dozen  horses  shot.  The  British  losses  were  not 
known  to  the  Boer  officer,  but  the  estimated  casualties  were  50. 

The  fight  on  the  10th  was  but  a preliminary  to  a formidable 
British  advance,  and  steps  were  taken  by  the  Federal  Governments 
to  make  preparations  more  adequate  to  the  task  of  keeping  back 
the  force  which  was  now  ready  to  spring  forward  from  the  Orange 
Eiver  to  the  succor  of  Kimberley.  It  was  resolved  to  transfer 
General  Piet  Cronje  from  the  lines  before  Maf eking  to  the  south- 
west, in  order  that  he  might  assume  command  as  fighting  general  of 
the  forces  with  which  Methuen  was  to  be  encountered.  The  intention 
of  the  two  Governments  had  been  to  give  Cronje  the  task  of  meeting 
Buller  in  case  the  English  generalissimo,  then  at  sea,  was  to  lead 
an  army  by  Norvals  Pont  to  Bloemfontein,  and  to  delegate  to  De 
la  Rey  the  duty  of  barring  Methuen’s  march  on  Kimberley.  When, 
however,  it  was  found  that  British  feeling  and  prestige  demanded 
Buller’s  first  attention  in  the  plan  of  relieving  Ladysmith,  Cronje 
was  entrusted  with  the  operations  south  of  Kimberley.  Unfortu- 
nately, however,  he  did  not  reach  Jacobsdal  until  after  the  battle 
of  Enslin  was  fought  on  the  25th  of  November,  the  results  of  which 
fight  and  that  of  Belmont  only  emphasized  the  imperative  necessity 


MAFEKING  AND  KIMBERLEY 


187 


there  was  for  relieving  Jacob  Prinsloo  from  the  command  of  the 
most  important  section  of  the  Free  State  forces. 

Previous  to  the  first  battle  fought  by  Methuen  in  his  efforts  to 
reach  Kimberley,  the  Free  State  generals,  Vessels,  Dn  Toit,  and 
Ferreira,  with  De  la  Eey  as  fighting  general,  had  continuously 
bombarded  the  Diamond  City  since  the  arrival  of  the  Transvaal 
contingent  as  a reenforcement.  There  was,  however,  no  effective 
unity  of  action  between  the  generals,  and,  beyond  holding  their 
positions  which  were  occasionally  attacked  in  sorties  and  surprises 
by  the  English  garrison,  and  in  shelling  the  town  in  return,  there 
was  neither  serious  loss  inflicted  nor  sustained  by  either  side  around 
Kimberley  during  Kovember. 


Chapter  XVII 


BATTLE  OF  BELMONT 


Blundeeing  of  Prinsloo — De  la  Rey  joins  him  to  bar  Methuen’s 

ADVANCE  to  KIMBERLEY MeTHUEN’S  ATTACK — PrINSLOO’S  INEXCUS- 

ABLE WITHDRAWAL  GIVES  BRITISH  NOMINAL  VICTORY — DE  LA  Rey’S  RE- 
PORT OF  BATTLE PrINSLOO’S  REPORT — BRITISH  SHOOT  SURRENDERED 

Boers  under  false  charge  of  misuse  of  white  flag. 


RINSLOO,  with  1,500  men,  moved  south  from  Jacobsdal  to 


JL  Join  Van  der  Merwe  near  Belmont  on  the  20th  of  November. 
De  la  Eey  was  to  follow  with  800  Transvaalers,  who  were  detached 
from  the  forces  in  front  of  Kimberley  to  reenforce  Prinsloo’s 
column,  but,  owing  to  the  blundering  of  Prinsloo  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  rapid  advance  of  Methuen  from  the  Orange  River,  De  la 
Rey  had  no  part  in  arranging  the  plan  of  operations  for  the  fight 
which  came  off  on  the  23rd. 

The  Free  State  generals  knew  in  advance  what  were  the  plans 
of  Lord  Methuen,  and  the  extent  of  his  men  and  guns;  facts 
relating  to  all  these  matters  having  been  duly  published  in  the 
Jingo  papers  at  Cape  Town  for  everybody’s  information.  It  was, 
unfortunately,  valuable  information  all  but  disregarded,  as  no 
better  provision  had  been  made  with  which  to  meet  10,000  British 
veterans  than  what  has  been  related.  Wessels,  who  was  in  chief 
command  of  the  whole  forces  operating  before  and  south  of  Kim- 
berley, had  no  more  men  at  his  disposal  than  he  deemed  sufficient 
to  watch  Cecil  Rhodes  and  his  protectors,  and  the  commando  which 
went  south  with  Prinsloo  to  meet  Methuen  was  absurdly  v,^eak  in 
guns  and  men  for  the  task.  De  la  Eey  was  subsequently  allowed 
to  Join  Prinsloo,  and  the  two  columns,  with  a united  force  of  some 
2,500  men  and  four  guns,  comprised  the  strength  of  the  Boer  army 
which  was  to  bar  Methuen’s  advance  until  Cronje  should  arrive 
with  additional  burghers  from  the  north. 

On  Wednesday,  November  22,  the  Free  State  general  received 
information  from  his  scouts  that  the  British  were  to  attack 
him  on  the  following  morning.  His  positions  were  spread  along 
a series  of  small  kopjes,  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  Kimberley 
line,  extending  over  an  area  of  several  miles,  and  offering  cover 


BATTLE  OF  BELMONT 


189 


for  his  men.  Lord  Methuen,  in  his  lengthy  report  of  this  engage- 
ment, dignifies  these  veldt  ridges  with  the  name  of  “ mountain.” 
These  kopjes  were  almost  all  detached,  and  were,  with  their  small 
bodies  of  defending  burghers,  tempting  incitations  to  frontal 
attacks  on  the  part  of  the  officers  who  were  to  carry  out  Lord 
Methuen’s  elaborately  arranged  plan  of  attack.  Prinsloo  held  the 
center  of  his  positions  behind  the  village  to  the  right,  with  the 
Pauresmith  commando,  one  Krupp,  and  one  Maxim-Nordenfelt. 
De  la  Eey  and  his  Transvaalers  were  further  behind,  on  a hill  be- 
tween Belmont  and  Eamdam,  with  a single  Krupp.  Commandant 
Lubbe,  with  the  Jacobsdal  men,  was  west  of  De  la  Eey  with  a 
Maxim-Kordenfelt.  Van  der  Merwe,  who  fought  the  skirmish 
with  Methuen’s  patrol  on  the  10th,  occupied  Kaffir  Kopje,  on  the 
extreme  west  of  the  line,  with  the  Middenvelder  and  Groot  Eiver 
burghers.  The  entire  Boer  artillery  consisted  of  two  seven-pound 
Krupp  guns  and  two  Maxim-Kordenfelts. 

The  British  began  the  battle  shortly  after  daylight  with  a furious 
cannonade  of  all  the  Boer  positions.  They  had  twelve  or  fifteen 
■guns,  some  of  them  throwing  lyddite  shells.  With  the  support  of 
these  batteries,  Methuen  attempted  to  storm  the  center  and  right 
of  the  Boer  positions  simultaneously,  and  to  turn  the  left  by  a 
body  of  Lancers  and  mounted  infantry,  which  was  to  swing  round 
on  Prinsloo’s  rear,  and  capture  his  camp  and  baggage.  His  forces 
included  the  Grenadier,  Coldstream,  and  Scots  Guards,  Northum- 
berland, Yorkshire,  and  Lancashire  Eegiments,  and  a brigade  of 
marines  and  seamen  gunners,  with  Lancer  and  other  mounted 
troops.  The  battle  lasted  from  four  in  the  morning  until  two  in  the 
afternoon,  with  the  advantage  decidedly  on  the  side  of  the  Boers 
until  their  general  in  a moment  of  weakness  gave  up  the  fight 
and  retired  from  the  field.  Prinsloo’s  extraordinary  action  has  been 
described  in  harsher  words  by  warmer  friends,  who  blame  him  ex- 
clusively for  the  loss  of  the  battle.  The  Pauresmith  burghers  had 
fought  splendidly  during  the  day,  having  several  times  shot  back 
bodies  of  British  who  attempted  to  take  their  kopje,  while  all  the 
other  Boer  positions  had  been  held  by  an  equal  courage  and  tenac- 
ity. The  enemy  had  suffered  terribly  in  officers  and  in  men,  when, 
infiuenced  by  a fear  that  he  was  exposing  his  small  force  to  too 
great  loss  in  an  unequal  contest,  and  unaware  of  the  actual  condi- 
tion of  the  combat  in  other  parts  of  the  field,  and  of  De  la  Key’s 
and  Lubbe’s  successful  fighting,  Prinsloo  ordered  a retreat  of  his 
center,  and  thus  gave  the  victory  to  Methuen.  Commandant  Lubbe 
and  General  De  la  Eey  succeeded  in  holding  back  those  of  the 
enemy  who  pursued  Prinsloo,  and  De  la  Key’s  men  then  easily  shot 
their  way  through  the  Lancers  who  had  attempted  to  get  north  of 


•A'H  '*«3  V AVHBO® 


BATTLE  OF  BELMOET 


191 


the  kopje  which  the  Transvaal  burghers  had  successfully  held  all 
the  morning.  The  Boer  forces  fell  back  with  their  guns  and  equip- 
ments, in  perfect  order,  towards  Graspan  and  Eamdam,  and 
Methuen  was  Eft  in  possession  of  the  field.  He  made  no  attempt 
at  a pursuit.  He  was  satisfied  with  the  name  of  a victory  which  he 
had  not  really  won. 

The  highly  rhetorical  report  of  the  battle  written  by  the  English 
general  was  an  anticipation,  in  style  and  sentiment,  of  that  other 
report  which  in  a few  days’  time  was  to  startle  the  military  world 
by  its  extravagance  of  expression  and  comparison.  In  this  report 
of  the  Belmont  fight  he  says  : “ I have  accounted  for  83  killed, 

and  have  23  wounded  in  my  hospital,  and  as  their  wounded  were 
carried  away  I may  assume  their  losses  were  heavier  than  mine.” 
It  is  not  clear  to  which  army  Lord  Methuen  refers  in  this  ambigu- 
ous sentence.  He  was  in  possession  of  the  field  of  battle,  and  had, 
presumably,  both  British  and  Boer  killed  under  the  care  of  his 
ambulance;  yet  there  are  no  particulars  given  in  the  report  from 
which  I quote  of  the  number  of  his  own  casualties.  The  hiatal 
Mercury  ” of  the  25th  of  November  published  a Eeuter’s  despatch 
from  Belmont,  giving  the  total  British  losses  in  Thursday’s  fight 
at  227,  which  number  included  58  killed,  151  wounded,  and  18 
missing. 

General  De  la  Eey’s  official  report  of  the  same  battle  w'as  as 
follows  : 

“ The  enemy  attacked  us  this  morning  from  two  sides,  and  we 
succeeded  in  keeping  them  back  until  2 o’clock  in  the  afternoon, 
when  large  masses  of  infantry  had  reached  a point  near  my  com- 
mando in  the  same  hill  where  I was  situated,  and  which  was  occupied 
by  men  under  Commandant  Lubbe. 

“ The  burghers  defended  themselves  at  this  point  with  great 
determination,  but  ten  of  our  men  were  killed  and  a few  severely 
wounded.  Those  who  were  slightly  wounded  succeeded  in  escaping. 

“We  were  completely  surrounded.  The  English  troops  then 
spread  out  for  a ffistance  of  two  and  a half  hours’  journey,  and 
we  were  compelled  to  retire. 

“ At  the  point  where  we  had  to  pass  on  our  way  out  the  Lancers 
were  stationed,  and  we  were  compelled  to  drive  them  away.  Many 
of  our  horses  are  killed  and  wounded.  Commandant  Lubbe  is 
slightly  wounded,  but  not  before  the  enemy  had  suffered  very 
heavily  from  his  men. 

“ The  overwhelming  force  of  the  enemy  was  too  great  for  our 
small  force,  and  after  a brave  stand,  which  lasted  till  the  after- 
noon, we  were  compelled  to  take  up  other  positions,  and  we  are  now 
at  the  (east)  side  of  the  railway. 

“ General  Cronje  is  hastening  to  our  help.  Cannot  give  the 


192 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


actual  numbers  of  the  killed  and  wounded  on  our  side,  but  the 
loss  is  not  great. 

“ Tim  enemy  had  six  cannon,  while  we  had  only  one.” 

This  report  deals  only  with  the  operations  of  the  Boer  left, 
which  was  composed  of  800  Transvaalers  under  De  la  Eey,  and 
some  250  Free  Staters  under  Commandant  Lubbe,  and  the  refer- 
ence by  De  la  Eey  to  the  number  of  guns  on  both  sides  relates 
only  to  his  own  burghers,  and  to  the  English  troops  who  were 
opposed  to  himself  and  Lubbe  in  their  part  of  the  field. 

General  Prinsloo  sent  his  own  report  of  the  battle  to  Bloem- 
fontein. It  is  a singular  document,  and  shows  the  helpless  incapac- 
ity of  the  officer,  through  whose  timidity  and  want  of  judgment 
a battle  virtually  won  was  turned  over  to  the  enemy  as  a relin- 
quished victory.  Poor  old  Jacobus  actually  believed  that  his  Eng- 
lish opponent  was  none  other  than  General  Buffer,  while  he  had 
heard  that  the  Boer  general  who  was  actually  fighting  all  day  at 
the  left  of  his  own  lines  was  “ in  the  vicinity  of  ” the  battle-field 
during  the  engagement  ! 

“ November  23rd. — This  morning  there  was  a terrible  fight  to 
our  disadvantage,  as  we  had  to  leave  the  field. 

“ According  to  a report  by  Dr.  Voortman,  who  went  over  the 
field  of  battle,  we  lost  about  12  killed  and  40  wounded,  but  the 
names  are  not  known  yet. 

“ The  engagement  lasted  from  daybreak  to  about  midday,  and, 
by  reason  of  the  large  number  of  big  guns  of  the  enemy,  it  was 
impossible  for  our  center  to  retain  its  position. 

“ The  loss  of  the  enemy  must  be  enormous.  Some  of  the  Indian 
troops  were  shot  down  at  six  yards  by  our  burghers.  Their  cannon 
were  all  shot  back,  and  the  draft  cattle  of  other  cannons  were 
killed.  The  number  of  the  enemy  is  very  difficult  to  estimate,  but 
it  was  an  overwhelming  force.  Our  burghers  were  compelled  to 
retreat  in  the  direction  of  Eamdam.  Fighting  General  De  la  Eey 
is  in  the  vicinity.  According  to  trustworthy  information.  General 
Eedvers  Buffer  is  personally  in  command.  Commandant  Serfon- 
tein  is  a prisoner  of  war,  as  he  would  not  leave  his  wounded  son. 
Ten  of  our  wounded  are  in  good  care  with  the  enemy.  The  burghers 
have  in  no  wise  lost  courage.” 

De  la  Eey’s  losses  would  not  be  more  than  those  mentioned  in 
Prinsloo’s  report,  and,  as  there  were  some  20  burghers  taken  pris- 
oner in  the  retreat  of  the  center,  the  total  Boer  casualties  at  Bel- 
mont would  thus  number  about  22  killed,  80  wounded,  and  20 
missing. 

The  effect  on  the  minds  of  the  burghers  of  Prinsloo’s  unfortu- 
nate action  at  this  battle  was  demoralizing,  and  no  such  stand  as 


BATTLE  OF  BELMONT 


193 


that  at  Enslin  would  have  been  made  again  so  soon  after  Belmont 
were  it  not  for  the  knowledge  that  Cronje  was  hastening  to  their 
aid,  and  that  De  la  Eey  was  with  them.  Prinsloo,  who  was  a 
thoroughly  honest,  patriotic,  and  well-meaning  man,  recognized 
his  own  unfitness  for  the  post  of  Vecht  General,  and  asked  Presi- 
dent Steyn  to  relieve  him  of  his  command;  a request  which  was  not, 
unfortunately,  acceded  to  until  after  the  battle  of  Modder  Eiver. 

Lord  Methuen’s  unsoldierly  imputations  upon  the  conduct  of 
his  foes  at  Belmont  were  only  worthy  of  that  eminent  man  and 
general.  The  facts  upon  which  he  based  his  charge  of  firing 
under  cover  of  the  white  flag  were  these  : Near  the  end  of  the 
battle,  and  as  the  Boer  forces  were  retreating,  but  firing  as  they 
retired,  a small  body  of  about  fifteen  Boers,  who  had  been  isolated 
on  a detached  kopje,  were  surrounded  by  troops,  and  were  being 
fired  upon  from  all  sides.  Eetreat  was  hopeless,  and  one  of  the 
party  held  up  a white  flag.  This  man,  according  to  the  Boer  ver- 
sion of  the  story,  was  in  the  rear  of  his  comrades,  on  a higher 
ground,  and  acted  on  his  own  initiative,  seeing  the  hopelessness 
of  the  position.  The  English  ceased  firing,  hut  the  Boers  lower 
down  on  the  ridge  who  had  not  seen  the  flag,  nor  knew  of  its 
being  hoisted,  continued  the  fight.  Some  of  the  enemy  were  hit, 
and  the  British,  in  retaliation,  shot  every  member  of  the  small 
band,  riddling  their  bodies  with  bullets.  It  was  on  this  incident 
that  Lord  Methuen  grounded  a foul  charge,  and  leveled  it  against 
all  the  men  who  had  fought  against  him  at  Belmont.  It  was  a 
charge  made  with  the  object  of  rendering  it  a cover  for  the  mas- 
sacre of  the  fifteen  burghers,  and  was  thoroughly  English  in  mean- 
ing and  motive. 

13 


Chapter  XVIII 


BATTLES  OF  ROOILAAGTE  (ENSLIN)  AND  MODDER 

RIVER 

Boers  fall  back  on  Rooilaagte — De  la  Rey  assumes  real  command — 
Boers  repulse  charge  of  Naval  Brigade — Contrast  between 
British  and  Boer  treatment  of  prisoners — Cronje  joins  De  la 
Rey — Sketch  of  General  Cronje — ^Boer  position  at  Modder  River 
— Repulse  of  British  Guardsmen — Ineffectiveness  of  British 
artillery — Prinsloo’s  retreat  causes  loss  of  battle — De  la  Rey’s 
report — British  bayonet  wounded  Boers — Report  of  Dr.  Lever  on 
British  abuse  of  Red  Cross  service — London  “ Globe’s  ” compari- 
son OF  British  looting  with  Boer  discipline. 


FTEE  the  engagement  at  Belmont  on  Thursday  the  Federals 


fell  back  eight  miles  along  the  Kimberley  line.  The  physical 
features  of  the  country  at  Rooilaagte  resemble  those  around  the 
theater  of  the  fight  on  the  23rd ; a dry  sandy  veldt  or  plain,  broken 
at  intervals  by  kopjes,  stretching  in  detached  positions  from  west 
to  east;  the  railway  seeking  the  easiest  gradient  round  such  hills 
as  are  met  on  its  pathway  towards  the  Diamond  City.  The  kopjes 
slope  upward  in  a graduated  rise  from  the  veldt,  and  while  offering 
good  positions  for  defensive  purposes  they  were  easily  accessible, 
in  the  structure  of  their  formation,  to  any  large  force  advancing 
upon  them  under  the  protection  of  a sufficient  artillery  support. 

General  Prinsloo  was  still  nominally  in  command,  but  De  la 
Rey  assumed  control  of  the  allied  burghers,  and  took  up  position 
at  Rooilaagte,  north  of  Graspan,  between  two  kopjes  which  com- 
manded the  railway.  The  hill  to  the  east,  or  left,  of  his  position 
was  the  better  ground  for  meeting  the  assault  of  the  enemy,  and 
he  placed  his  Transvaalers  there  with  a Krupp  and  pom-pom. 
Further  east,  near  Ramdam,  a body  of  500  burghers,  including  the 
Jacobsdal  commando,  under  Commandant  Lubbe,  were  to  await 
the  development  of  a probable  movement  by  the  enemy  in  that 
direction.  Away  to  the  right,  beyond  the  railway,  the  remaining 
Free  State  burghers,  under  Prinsloo,  were  placed  in  detached 
bodies  on  the  line  of  kopjes  stretching  west  and  south  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Graspan.  They  were  the  same  men  who  had  fought  at 
Belmont. 

At  Rooilaagte,  De  la  Rey  anticipated  Methuen’s  Belmont  plan. 


ROOILAAGTE  AND  MODDEB  RIVER 


195 


and  ably  compelled  the  English  general  to  deliver  his  main  attack 
upon  the  hill  held  by  the  Transvaalers.  The  enemy  advanced  early 
on  Saturday  morning  (the  25th),  and  began  the  battle  by  guns 
from  an  armored  train,  and  by  batteries  which  deluged  the  kopje 
in  possession  of  the  Transvaalers  with  shrapnel  and  lyddite.  The 
hill  was  literally  swept  by  the  enemy’s  guns  on  the  south  side,  but 
this  had  been  fully  expected,  and  it  was  the  rocks  and  not  the 
Boers  that  suffered  from  the  hail  of  shells.  The  burghers  had 
made  good  use  of  their  time  during  Friday,  and  were  well  pro- 
tected behind  their  strong  stone  sangars  from  the  shells  which 
English  war  correspondents  were  laboriously  endowing  with  a kill- 
ing or  wounding  power  of  some  twenty  Boers  per  shell.  The  rate 
was  not  too  liberal  if  the  Boers  had  only  carelessly  lent  themselves 
as  targets  for  the  purposes  of  the  calculation.  They  chose  not  to 
do  so,  however,  and  I am  only  stating  what  has  been  the  universal 
testimony  of  Boer  officers  who  fought  Methuen’s  forces  from  Bel- 
mont to  Magersfontein,  that  not  fifty  of  the  Federals  who  were 
killed  and  wounded  in  the  four  battles  which  ended  in  the  crush- 
ing defeat  of  the  advancing  British,  owed  their  disablement  to  the 
work  of  the  English  artillery.  During  the  play  of  Methuen’s  bat- 
teries upon  a kopje  held  by  the  Transvaal  men,  a strong  mounted 
force  had  been  sent  round  to  the  east  to  menace  the  Boer  left  at 
Eamdam.  De  la  Eey,  however,  had  fully  expected  this,  and 
Lubbe  and  Ventner  had  already  commenced  a counter  turning 
movement  with  their  500  burghers,  which  was  to  shield  the  Boer 
center  in  this  way.  These  men  were  splendidly  mounted,  and 
acted  as  if  their  objective  was  to  work  round  Methuen’s  right  in 
a counter  attack  upon  his  camp  at  Belmont.  The  maneuver  pro- 
duced its  intended  effect,  as  the  English  column  made  no  further 
effort  to  reach  Eamdam. 

Meanwhile  a similar  movement  had  been  made  by  Methuen 
against  Prinsloo  at  the  extreme  west  position.  Here  the  two  forces 
confronted  each  other,  and  maintained  during  the  battle  a rifle 
and  artillery  contest,  neither  side  gaining  any  appreciable  ad- 
vantage. 

The  chief  encounter  of  the  day  took  place  at  the  position  held 
by  De  la  Eey  and  his  Transvaalers.  The  English  general  had  made 
his  most  determined  artillery  onslaught  there,  and,  persuaded  that 
no  force  subjected  to  such  a tremendous  fire  could  retain  their 
morale  sufficiently  to  meet  a frontal  infantry  attack,  he  ordered 
his  naval  brigade  to  face  and  carry  the  hill. 

The  Guards,  who  had  made  a similar  frontal  attack  at  Belmont, 
and  paid  for  the  reckless  encounter  in  150  of  their  men,  were  kept 
in  the  rear  at  Enslin.  The  work  of  carrying  De  la  Bey’s  position 


196 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


was  given  to  the  Naval  Brigade.  These  seamen  were  most  stupidly 
led.  They  were  actually  sent  forward  in  more  or  less  close 
formation  to  charge  an  unknown  number  of  men  entrenched  on 
a hill ! There  can  be  no  denying  the  bravery  shown  by  these 
marines  in  thus  attempting  to  storm  the  kopje.  They  were,  how- 
ever, received  with  a withering  volley  from  the  Transvaal  men,  who 
had  reserved  their  fire  until  the  advancing  marines  almost  reached 
the  foot  of  the  hill.  Over  100  of  them  were  shot  down,  and  the 
assault  was  arrested. 

In  the  meantime  the  reenforcements  which  De  la  Eey  had  ex- 
pected from  Jacobsdal  had  not  arrived,  and,  as  Methuen  was  order- 
ing up  his  reserves  to  support  the  attack  on  the  hill,  the  Boer  general 
fell  back,  taking  his  few  guns  with  him,  being  allowed  to  retire 
by  the  enemy  without  any  attempt  at  pursuit.  As  at  Talana  Hill, 
the  force  which  had  been  shot  back  in  its  attempt  to  take  the  Trans- 
vaalers’  position  found  no  Boers  on  the  kopje  after  having  paid 
so  dear  a price  for  the  fruitless  glory  of  its  capture. 

Methuen’s  loss  in  this  battle  was  about  210  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing. 

I have  been  unable  to  obtain  the  Boer  returns  of  their  casualties 
at  this  fight.  It  was  believed,  however,  that  the  loss  was  not  even 
as  heavy  as  at  Belmont.  The  two  forces  in  this  fight  were  in  the 
following  relative  strength:  Methuen  had  10,000  men  and  three 
batteries  of  artillery ; De  la  Eey’s  and  Prinsloo’s  united  commandoes 
numbered  some  2,500  burghers,  with  four  guns  only. 

Lord  Methuen  repeated  after  the  fight  at  Enslin  the  same  slanders 
upon  his  plucky  foes  which  he  embodied  in  his  report  of  the  battle 
of  Belmont.  To  use  such  expressions  as  “ dastardly  conduct  ” 
towards  an  enemy  on  the  battle-field,  without  due  inquiry  into  the 
facts  on  which  the  charge  is  made  to  rest,  is  thoroughly  English 
in  its  ignorance  of  the  canons  of  elementary  justice,  and  typical 
of  what  Englishmen  call  their  sense  of  fair  play.  It  is  absolutely 
untrue  that  any  fire  was  opened  upon  the  British  ambulance  at 
Enslin.  Such  charges  were  repeated  at  subsequent  battles  only 
to  be  refuted  by  the  evidence  of  true  facts,  and  they  are  as  untrue 
in  their  allegations  against  the  burghers  who  fought  Methuen  as 
against  the  Boers  who  campaigned  against  Buller  on  the  Tugela. 
In  all  their  larger  engagements  the  English  were  in  the  habit  of 
bringing  their  ambulance  wagons  near  the  zone  of  fire,  and  it 
was  not  possible  for  men  of  the  Boer  artillery,  4,000  or  5,000 
yards  away,  to  distinguish  the  Eed  Cross  ensign  on  vehicles,  and 
to  difl’erentiate  between  them  and  the  enemy’s  ammunition  or  other 
wagons,  at  such  a distance.  The  fault  in  the  instance  where  the 
ambulance  may  have  been  under  fire  was  that  of  those  who  brought 


EOOILAAGTE  AND  MODDER  RIVER 


197 


such  wagons  where  they  ought  not  to  be,  and  not  that  of  the  Boers, 
who  never  intruded  their  ambulance  carts  upon  any  section  of  the 
battle-field  until  after  an  engagement. 

In  this,  as  in  so  many  more  instances  in  this  war,  an  English 
charge  against  the  Boers  was  a counter  allegation  to  an  undeniable 
fact  which  reflected  the  utmost  disgrace,  not  upon  Lord  Methuen, 
but  on  those  in  charge  of  his  transport  arrangements,  and  upon 
English  colonists  from  De  Aar  to  Cape  Town.  Twenty  of  Prins- 
loo’s  wounded  and  about  as  many  prisoners  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  British  at  Belmont,  and  were  forwarded  to  Cape  Town  along 
with  wounded  Guardsmen.  They  traveled  in  the  same  train,  but, 
while  the  English  had  the  protection  of  covered  carriages  during 
the  journey  under  a burning  Karoo  sun  by  day  and  the  peculiar 
cold  of  the  early  South  African  summer  by  night,  the  Boer  prison- 
ers, including  the  wounded,  were  placed  in  open  trucks,  and  without 
any  covering  of  any  kind ! The  men  made  no  complaint.  They 
took  off;  their  coats  and  made  pillows  of  them,  and  for  two  days 
and  nights  traveled  in  this  manner,  and  on  the  coarsest  food,  to 
their  destination.  This,  however,  was  not  the  most  reprehensible 
part  of  the  conduct  of  their  enemies.  At  all  the  railway  stations, 
including  Cape  Town,  the  Cape  Kaffirs  and  the  no  less  unmanly 
British  crowded  to  the  trucks  containing  the  Boer  wounded  and 
prisoners,  and  jeered  and  hooted  as  only  people  dead  to  every  sense 
of  chivalry  could  behave.  Probably  no  lower  species  of  civi- 
lized humanity  could  be  found  in  the  wdde  domain  of  the  British 
Empire  than  in  Cape  Town  during  the  war;  the  refugees  from 
Johannesburg  being  added  to  the  ordinary  scum  of  the  city,  and 
the  task  of  insulting  the  men  whom  they  dare  not  meet  in  the 
open  field  was  appropriately  performed  by  this  cowardly  canaille. 
It  is  a testimony  to  the  honor  of  the  Boers  at  Pretoria  willingly 
borne,  by  British  prisoners,  that  neither  by  act  nor  word  was  any 
insult  of  any  kind  given  to  the  thousands  of  English  prisoners  who 
were  forwarded  to  the  Transvaal  capital  from  October  to  May. 
The  conduct  of  President  Kruger,  in  standing  bareheaded  while 
British  prisoners  were  being  marched  to  their  location  past  his 
residence,  was  typical  of  the  spirit  and  the  manner  in  which  the 
Boer  people  treated  their  captured  foes. 

The  second  contest  with  Methuen  ended  in  his  possession  of  the 
battle-field  as  at  Belmont,  and  in  the  retreat  of  the  Boer  com- 
mandoes. Progress  was  being  made  towards  Kimberley,  but  a ter- 
rible toll  was  being  exacted  at  each  contested  stage  of  the  journey, 
and  the  further  the  English  general  advanced  the  weaker  became 
his  power  to  successfully  fight  his  way  through.  Reenforcements 
were  constantly  arriving,  and  the  distance  to  Methuen’s  objective 


198 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


was  decreasing,  it  is  true;  but  on  that  Saturday  afternoon,  when 
De  la  Eey  retired  slowly  and  sullenly  from  Eooilaagte  towards  the 
Modder  Eiver,  a cloud  of  dust  was  seen  on  the  horizon  to  the  north- 
east, in  the  direction  of  Jacobsdal,  and  news  soon  spread  through 
the  British  lines  that  General  Cronje  had  joined  hands  with  the 
forces  which  had  made  so  gallant  a stand  for  nine  hours  that  day 
against  great  odds  in  men  and  guns.  It  was  the  advance  patrol 
of  his  little  column  only,  but  the  old  Lion  of  Potchefstroom  was 
close  behind,  and,  tho  he  was  too  late  for  Belmont  and  Enslin, 
he  would  be  in  good  time  for  Modder  Eiver  and  Magersfontein. 

A man  five  feet  eight  in  height,  vigorously  built,  dressed  in 
a dark  brown  suit  and  hard  bowler  hat — such  as  a skilled  me- 
chanic might  wear — with  a dark,  bronzed  face  of  stern  character, 
having  a slight  beard  and.  full  mustache,  grayish  with  years,  under 
a fine  nose  and  dark,  penetrating  eyes;  a slight  stoop  in  the  rounded 
brawny  shoulders,  and  the  head  thrown  forward,  at  the  age  of  sixty- 
three,  with  a virile  figure  which  might  pass  for  that  of  a man  of 
fifty  years — a strong,  fiercely-earnest,  stubborn  man,  with  absolute 
confidence  in  himself,  and  a relentless  tenacity  of  purpose  stamped 
upon  every  line  of  form  and  feature — this  was  the  general  who,  cov- 
ered with  dust  and  riding  with  500  burghers,  reached  the  north 
bank  of  the  Modder  Eiver  the  Monday  following  the  battle  of 
Enslin,  and  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  the  Boer  forces  which 
had  fallen  back  before  Methuen’s  army  after  two  sanguinary  fights. 

General  Piet  Cronje  had  traveled  almost  continuously  from 
Mafeking  since  being  summoned  by  the  Federal  Governments  to 
take  charge  of  the  operations  against  Methuen’s  advance.  He  had 
“ looked  in  ” at  the  siege  of  Kimberley  en  route,  and  had  compelled 
a more  vigorous  investment  of  the  town,  a circumstance  which  pre- 
vented his  reaching  De  la  Eey  on  Saturday,  as  had  been  expected. 


GENERAL  CRONJE 

General  Cronje  was  born  at  Potchefstroom,  the  old  capital  of 
the  Transvaal  Eepublic.  He  was  descended,  like  De  la  Eey,  from 
French  ancestors,  and  possessed,  like  him,  a strong  trace  of  his 
racial  origin  in  an  easy,  natural  courtesy  of  manner  in  ordinary 
conversation.  There  could  not  well  be  in  one  individual  a greater 
contrast  than  between  the  Cronje  in  the  relations  of  social  inter- 
course and  the  Cronje  of  the  laager  and  kriegsraad.  One  was 
gentle,  polite,  and  agreeable,  considerate  of  another’s  views  and 
pre j udices ; well-informed,  pleasant,  and  obi  iging.  In  the  camp,  how- 
ever, this  polite  and  genial  French  Boer  disappeared,  and  his  place 


ROOILAAGTE  AND  MODDER  RIVER 


199 


was  taken  by  a silent,  taciturn,  determined  man,  who  would  listen 
without  a word  to  the  debate  in  the  Council  of  War,  or  to  the  ex- 
pression of  individual  opinion  on  the  part  of  officer  or  friend,  and, 
without  deigning  to  consider  a single  argument  or  reason  put  for- 
ward by  others,  would  deliver  his  view  in  sharp,  arbitrary  tones,  and 
end  the  discussion.  Any  contradiction  or  opposition,  no  matter 
by  whom,  would  extort  the  remark,  with  a proud,  peremptory 
glance,  Am  I the  General,  or  you  ? ” and  the  opposition  became 
dumb.  When  commanding  in  battle  his  voice  was  loud  and  harsh 
as  he  thundered  out  his  orders  in  sharp,  imperative  tones,  and  rode 
from  one  position  to  another  in 
restless,  watchful  energy,  direct- 
ing everything  and  everybody, 
utterly  regardless  of  bursting 
shrapnel  or  flying  bullets,  as  if 
possessed  of  a charmed  life,  im- 
mune against  danger  or  disaster. 

Cronje,  unlike  other  Boer 
generals,  had  studied  military 
works,  and  was  an  educated  sol- 
dier, in  addition  to  being  an  ex- 
tensive farmer  and,  in  later 
years,  Native  Commissioner  un- 
der the  Transvaal  Kepublic. 

Like  President  Kruger  and 
Christian  De  Wet,  he  had  no 
faith  in  English  promises,  con- 
ventions, pledges,  or  character. 

He  knew  the  race  thoroughly, 
and  was,  of  course,  conversant 
with  all  the  crookedness  which  had  marked  the  relations,  political, 
diplomatic,  and  military,  of  England  with  South  Africa  from  the 
Jugglery  with  which  the  Cape  was  made  a British  Colony  down  to 
the  knavery  of  the  Jameson  Eaid.  He  had  always  been  convinced, 
since  the  mines  of  the  Eand  were  discovered  and  British  capital 
began  to  entrench  itself  there,  that  the  old  predatory  disposition 
of  the  English  nation,  which  had  deliberately  violated  the  Sand 
Eiver  Treaty,  and  the  Aliwal  North  Treaty  over  the  diamond  mines 
of  Kimberley,  would  act  in  the  same  spirit  towards  the  London  Con- 
vention in  order  to  annex  the  country  of  the  Witwatersrand  gold 
mines.  The  war  was  therefore  no  surprise  to  him. 

He  had  gained  considerable  military  experience  in  the  service  of 
the  Transvaal.  He  organized  the  burghers  of  his  native  district 
in  1880,  and  fought  a determined  struggle  with  the  British  garri- 


Copyright  by  Reinhold  Thiele,  London 

GENERAL  P.  A.  CRONJE 


200 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


son  at  Potchefstroom,  vigorously  pushing  the  siege,  and  not  per- 
mitting an  armistice  agreed  upon  at  Pretoria  to  stand  between  his 
burghers  and  the  surrender  of  their  foes.  He  fought  his  adver- 
saries into  submission,  and  in  so  doing  earned  the  long-memoried 
hatred  of  the  British.  He  it  was,  too,  who  at  Doornkop  had  dis- 
posed of  Jameson  and  his  force  so  effectively  and  with  such  small 
loss  on  the  Boer  side,  and  retrieved,  in  the  leniency  of  his  terms 
to  the  surrendered  Eaiders,  the  arbitrariness  of  his  treatment  of 
the  sjarrison  of  Potchefstroom. 

In  religion  Cronje  is  a strong  Calvinist,  and  might  be  truly 
called  a convinced  Fatalist  in  the  intensity  of  his  belief  in  the  pre- 
ordained destinies  of  men.  He  had  a deep,  sincere,  religious  con- 
viction that  he  owed  his  many  remarkable  escapes  from  death  when 
hunting  and  on  many  a battle-field  to  the  special  protective  care 
of  Providence,  and  was  in  the  habit  of  sa3dng  that  no  English  bul- 
let would  ever  end  his  career.  Standing  one  day  in  the  graveyard 
of  Potchefstroom,  in  1880,  during  a contest  with  the  British  forces, 
a shell  burst  at  his  feet,  killing  the  horse  which  he  held  by  the 
bridle  and  that  of  a burgher  named  Labuscagne,  who  stood  by  his 
side;  both  men  escaping  without  a scratch.  Labuscagne  became 
Cronje’s  mascot  companion  afterwards,  and  was  by  his  side  in 
every  emergency,  fighting  or  hunting,  from  that  time  until  both 
surrendered  to  Lord  Eoberts  at  Paardeberg. 

During  the  whole  of  his  campaign,  from  the  commencement  of 
the  siege  of  Mafeking  to  the  date  of  his  surrender,  a religious  ser- 
vice was  conducted  every  day  in  his  laager;  and  in  case  the  predi- 
cant was  absent  the  general  himself  offered  up  prayers. 

Such  was  the  man  who  looked  across  the  Modder  Eiver  on  Mon- 
day, November  27,  at  the  foe  whom  he  was  destined  to  send  reehng 
back  from  the  most  disastrous  field  of  battle  from  which  a British 
army  had  been  driven  in  modern  times. 

A uniform  English  criticism  of  Boer  fighting  has  been  that  their 
stand  was  always  made  on  fortified  hills,  and  never  on  level  ground, 
while  even  when  successful  in  holding  such  positions  they  never, 
or  seldom  ever,  pursued  their  foes  after  a battle.  These  are  state- 
ments containing  a little  of  what  is  true,  so  as  to  make  them  more 
plausible  than  if  they  were  groundless  allegations.  It  was  the 
English,  both  in  Natal  and  on  the  west  border  line,  who  invariably 
selected  the  ground  of  battle  in  their  plans  of  operations,  and  both 
sides  made  the  best  possible  use  of  the  advantages  offered  by  the 
natural  formation  of  the  area  of  combat.  The  implied  charge  of 
want  of  fighting  qualities  in  not  following  up  a British  force  after 
a “ mishap,”  purposely  omits  mention  of  the  fact  that,  except  at 
Modderspruit  and  Dundee,  the  Boers  were  always  in  the  proportion 


ROOILAAGTE  AND  MODDER  RIVER 


201 


of  at  least  one  to  three  or  four  of  their  assailants,  with  guns  in 
similar  ratio.  Now,  3,000  men,  as  a fighting  unit,  may  achieve  a 
creditable  record  in  beating  back  10,000  opponents,  but  when  one 
man  attempts  to  pursue  three  of  his  enemies  he  acts  as  no  soldier 
is  reasonably  expected  to  do. 

On  the  Modder  Eiver  battle-field  there  were  no  hills  or  kopjes. 
The  country  north  to  the  river  from  Kooilaagte  is  almost  a level 
plain.  The  veldt  south  and  north  slopes  gradually  down  to  the 
sprawling  stream,  which  overflows  its  ordinary  channel  in  the 
winter,  but  is  shallow  in  the  summer  time.  As  the  English  war 
correspondents  could  not  utilize  “ semi-impregnable  kopjes  ” in 
their  description  of  this  battle,  where  they  did  not  exist,  they  dis- 
covered instead  “ elaborate  entrenchments,  most  cunningly  con- 
trived,” etc.,  etc.,  while  they  freely  gave  to  General  Cronje  a force 
in  men  and  guns  almost  equal  to  the  English. 

The  real  facts  as  to  the  Boer  positions  and  men  at  the  Modder 
Eiver  fight  are  these : De  la  Eey,  and  not  Cronje,  selected  the  posi- 
tions. He  had  fallen  back  from  Eooilaagte  on  Saturday  evening, 
after  a whole  day’s  fighting.  He  began  his  entrenchments  on 
Sunday,  and  he  was  attacked  at  seven  o’clock  on  Tuesday  morning. 
Not  a single  trench  or  sangar  had  been  built  previously  to  the 
Sunday  before  the  fight,  and  with  such  tools  as  the  Boers  possessed 
it  would  be  impossible  to  construct  the  kind  of  trenches  described 
by  the  correspondents  within  the  period  between  the  two  engage- 
ments. 

De  la  Eey’s  plans  and  dispositions  were  so  well  conceived  that 
General  Cronje  made  no  alteration  on  his  arrival.  Prinsloo,  being 
a Free  State  general,  was  still  in  nominal  chief  command,  but  he 
allowed  his  Transvaal  confreres  to  determine  the  order  of  defensive 
battle  and  the  disposal  of  the  guns.  De  la  Eey  placed  his  Trans- 
vaalers  in  two  sections;  half  opposite  the  drift  across  the  Modder 
Eiver  in  what  was  destined  to  become  the  center  of  the  battle-field, 
and  half  eastward  of  this  position,  on  towards  where  the  Modder 
falls  into  the  Eiet  Eiver  in  its  course  eastward.  Around  the  hotel 
and  west  to  the  railway  bridge  (which  De  la  Eey  had  blown  up), 
the  500  men  whom  Cronje  had  brought  with  him  from  near  Kim- 
berley held  the  village  and  the  north  bank  of  the  river;  while  ex- 
tending further  west  to  a bridle  drift,  about  three  miles  away,  the 
Free  Staters,  some  1,200  strong,  were  posted  in  various  groups. 
The  entire  Federal  forces  numbered  3,000,  with  three  Krupps  and 
two  automatic  Nordenfelts.  Major  Albrecht  had  charge  of  the 
Krupps  in  Prinsloo’s  command,  while  De  la  Key  and  Cronje  had 
the  service  of  the  machine  guns,  near  the  railway  bridge  in  the 
center,  which  were  worked  by  men  of  the  Transvaal  Staats  Artillery. 


202 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


At  two  points  on  the  south  hank  of  the  river,  a little  to  the  west 
of  the  bridge  and  to  the  east  of  the  drift,  rifle-pits  were  dug  among 
the  brushwood  as  part  of  De  la  Eey’s  plan  of  defense,  and  in  these 
some  of  the  best  shots  among  the  Transvaalers  were  placed.  Sharp- 
shooters also  took  up  position  in  the  trees  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
stream  until  the  enemy’s  artillery  rendered  these  posts  too  hot  for 
the  elevated  marksmen. 

The  extreme  left  of  the  Boer  lines  was  well  protected  by  the  Eiet 
Eiver,  which  flows  up  from  the  south  almost  at  right  angles  to  its 
sister  stream,  and  thus  gave  De  la  Eey  a secure  position  from  which 
to  protect  the  left  flank  of  his  center  force. 

Lord  Methuen  had  been  reenforced  since  the  battle  of  Enslin 
by  two  additional  Highland  regiments,  thus  raising  his  effective 
strength  in  men  to  12,000.  His  artillery  had  also  been  increased 
by  an  extra  l)attery,  so  that  the  battle  at  the  river  began  on  that 
early  Tuesday  morning  between  two  armies,  one  of  which  had,  in 
men,  fully  four  to  one,  and  in  guns  about  the  same  proportion. 

The  English  moved  from  their  camp  at  Enslin  at  daybreak,  and 
shortly  before  seven  came  in  touch  with  the  Free  State  outposts. 
These  retired  on  the  river,  and  the  battle  had  begun.  The  enemy’s 
plans  were  soon  apparent.  His  artillery  opened  upon  the  Boer 
center  at  about  5,000  yards,  while  an  entire  brigade  of  troops 
under  General  Pole-Carew  was  sent  westward  to  where  Prinsloo’s 
burghers  guarded  the  bridle  drift.  A body  of  Guardsmen  were 
wheeled  to  the  right  to  turn  or  menace  the  position  which  was  held 
by  the  Transvaal  men.  Long  before  these  attacking  columns  had 
come  within  range  of  the  Mausers  behind  the  river  bank,  the  artil- 
lery of  both  forces  had  commenced  a furious  encounter.  The  fight 
over  the  whole  line  of  four  miles  was  soon  in  full  swing,  Mauser 
and  Maxim,  Lee-Metford  and  Krupp,  every  arm  on  each  side  spit- 
ting Are  and  death  along  the  banks  of  the  sluggish  river.  On  the 
left,  where  De  la  Eey  and  his  Transvaalers  were  posted,  the  Eng- 
lish Guards  were  held  back  from  the  river  by  a terrific  fire  which 
nothing  could  withstand.  They  had  advanced  under  cover  of  the 
scrub  and  bushes  to  within  1,000  yards  of  the  stream,  with  a bat- 
tery of  guns  only  another  1,000  yards  behind,  and  so  overwhelming 
was  the  Boer  fire  which  rained  upon  the  Britishers  that  they  could 
neither  advance  nor  retire.  The  Guards’  battery  was  completely 
silenced  by  the  automatic  Boer  gun,  and  its  service  was  shot  down 
in  a few  seconds.  The  Guards  were  compelled  to  throw  them- 
selves on  the  ground,  and  to  lie  there  for  hours  behind  stumps  of 
trees  and  ant-hills  or  anything  which  offered  a shelter  from  the 
merciless  hail  of  bullets  which  came  like  a blizzard  of  lead  from 
where  De  la  Eey  coolly  directed  the  action  of  his  men.  From  eight 


ROOILAAGTE  AND  MODDEB  RIVER 


203 


to  eleven  o’clock  this  state  of  things  continued.  The  English  were 
driven  back  along  the  whole  line;  the  Free  Staters  on  the  right 
sweeping  the  veldt  in  front  of  their  positions  as  completely  as  the 
Transvaalers  were  doing  at  the  center  and  other  extreme.  The 
enemy  had  suffered  terribly  in  the  encounter  so  far,  while  very  few 
had  been  hit  on  the  Boer  side — the  smokeless  powder  of  the  Mauser 
offering  no  indication  of  where  the  Boer  marksmen  lay,  while  Al- 
brecht, Niekerk,  Stuckenherg,  and  the  other  burgher  artillerists 
had  the  advantage  of  protected  positions  for  the  few  guns  which 
were  matched  against  Methuen’s  naval  and  other  batteries.  The 
English  fire  in  musketry  and  guns  was  wild  and  mostly  ineffective, 
directed  now  at  one  point,  now  at  another,  in  a chance  aim  at  a 
supposed  location  of  a gun  or  a pit  of  Mauser  riflemen.  The  aim- 
ing on  the  Boer  side  was  at  visible  objects,  and  was  deliberate  and 
deadly,  and  by  noon  on  that  burning  hot  day,  with  the  sun  scorch- 
ing the  prostrate  Guards  in  front  of  De  la  Eey’s  men,  over  300  of 
the  enemy  were  already  hors  de  combat  along  the  south  bank  of  the 
Modder. 

Methuen’s  sole  reliance  now  was  on  his  artillery,  as  his  efforts  to 
carry  any  part  of  the  river  front  held  by  Cronje  or  De  la  Eey  by 
an  infantry  advance  was  as  futile  as  would  be  an  attempt  to  row 
a boat  up  Niagara  Falls.  His  naval  guns  were  brought  so  near 
the  zone  of  Mauser  fire  that  gunner  after  gunner  was  shot  down 
at  the  service  of  these  weapons,  but  the  enemy  persevered  despite 
this  loss,  and  the  incessant  play  of  fully  twenty  field  pieces  on  the 
positions  held  by  the  Boer  artillery  silenced  their  guns  about  two 
in  the  afternoon.  This,  however,  in  no  way  checked  the  burgher 
riflemen,  who  continued  to  pour  their  steady,  ceaseless  fire  over  the 
river,  rendering  all  attempts  at  a crossing  impossible. 

Unfortunately  Prinsloo  commanded  on  the  extreme  right  of  the 
Boer  lines.  His  men  had  fought  magnificently  during  the  whole 
day,  easily  holding  the  river  against  the  9th  Brigade  of  British, 
commanded  by  General  Pole-Carew.  There  was  nothing  wanting 
in  the  steadiness  and  courage  which  they  maintained  during  a ten 
hours’  superb  combat,  and  no  blame  for  what  occurred  can  rightly 
be  placed  upon  such  gallant  fighters  as  the  Fauresmith,  Jacobsdal, 
and  other  commandoes,  who  had  stood  so  well  against  big  odds  all 
the  previous  week.  It  was  once  more  the  result  of  nerveless  leader- 
ship. 

A portion  of  Pole-Carew’s  column  had  wandered  down  the  river 
bank  away  from  the  brunt  of  the  encounter  which  had  gone  on  all 
day  between  the  9th  Brigade  and  the  Free  Staters.  This  body  of 
troops  succeeded  in  turning  the  Boer  right  by  crossing  the  stream 
in  face  of  opposition  from  a few  burghers,  and  in  making  a lodg- 


ROOILAAGTE  AND  MODDER  RIVER 


205 


ment  in  and  around  three  or  four  houses  on  the  north  bank.  So 
little  did  the  English  generals  think  of  such  a simple  but  obvious 
movement  westward  of  the  Boer  right  in  the  earlier  part  of  the 
day,  that  the  knowledge  of  this  most  vital  turning  action  was  only 
obtained  by  Methuen  late  in  the  afternoon,  when  the  battle  was 
almost  over.  In  fact,  Pole-Carew’s  artillery  in  the  rear  of  the 
main  portion  of  his  own  brigade  fired  upon  those  troops  who  had 
crossed  the  river,  mistaking  them  for  Boers.  Prinsloo  sent  forward 
about  100  of  his  men  from  a position  lower  down  the  river  to  op- 
pose the  troops  who  had  crossed.  They  succeeded  in  forcing  them 
back  to  the  banks,  and  held  them  there  for  a time  with  their  Mauser 
fire,  but  on  more  troops  coming  up  to  the  support  of  those  who 
had  gained  the  north  bank,  the  Free  Staters  fell  back,  and  Prinsloo 
retired  with  them  from  the  field.  When  Cronje’s  right  had  been 
thus  turned,  the  numerical  weakness  of  his  force  had  to  cede  to  the 
overwhelming  number  of  his  assailants.  Prinsloo  had  again  given 
way,  and  this  movement  communicated  itself  to  the  whole  burgher 
lines,  when  a retreat  became  inevitable.  It  was  an  agonizing  in- 
stance of  another  battle,  actually  won  by  valor  and  sound  general- 
ship, being  lost,  at  the  last  moment,  through  the  ineptitude  of  an 
incompetent  officer.  Cronje  and  De  la  Eey  followed  in  the  wake 
of  Prinsloo’s  Free  Staters,  there  being  no  pursuit  of  the  slowly 
retiring  commandoes,  as  they  fell  back  once  more  with  their  guns 
to  another  position. 

General  De  la  Eey’s  eldest  boy,  a bright  and  brave  lad  of  eighteen, 
was  killed  by  his  father's  side  during  the  day.  The  general’s  report 
of  his  own  part  in  the  battle  was  brevity  itself.  It  reads : 

“ We  had  a very  heavy  engagement  yesterday,  lasting  twelve 
hours. 

“ I had  only  about  800  men  with  me,  and  there  were  also  approxi- 
mately 1,000  Free  Staters  with  us. 

“ We  estimated  the  force  of  the  enemy  at,  at  least,  10,000,  and 
between  one  and  two  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  they  were  driven 
back  by  the  Transvaalers,  whom  they  primarily  attacked. 

“ The  English  then  retired  to  the  west  side  of  the  battle-field, 
where  the  Free  Staters  were  positioned,  and  here  they  were  also 
repulsed  several  times. 

“ My  dead  and  wounded  number  18,  including  my  eldest  son, 
who  expired  this  morning. 

“ llTien  darkness  fell,  we  were  compelled  gradually  to  retreat, 
as  the  Free  State  side  had  been  weakened  to  such  an  extent  that 
it  was  impossible  for  the  rest  of  the  Free  Staters  to  hold  their 
ground,  so  much  so  that  Major  Albrecht,  who  had  fought  so  bravely, 
asked  me  to  protect  his  artillery. 

“ The  Free  State  loss  is  unknown  to  me.” 


206 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


The  total  losses  of  the  enemy,  in  what  Lord  Methuen  claimed  to 
be  “ one  of  the  most  fiercely-contested  battles  in  the  annals  of  the 
British  army,”  amounted  to  close  on  500  men.  Giving  Prinsloo’s 
and  Cronje’s  divisions  each  a loss  equal  to  De  la  Bey’s,  and  coimting 
the  twenty  wounded  who  were  alleged  to  have  been  killed  by  the 
Guards  after  the  battle,  the  total  Federal  losses  would  be  under 
100.  The  artillery  lost  eight  of  its  men,  including  a young  German 
officer.  Lieutenant  Stuckenberg. 

Lord  Methuen’s  contention  that  he  had  been  opposed  by  8,000 
burghers  at  Modder  Biver  was  on  a par  with  his  boastful  compari- 
son between  his  own  and  such  secondary  achievements  as  Welling- 
ton’s at  Waterloo.  The  combined  Federal  commandoes  by  which 
he  was  fought  numbered  no  more  than  3,000  men. 

The  behavior  of  some  of  Methuen’s  officers  and  men  after  the 
battle  of  Modder  Biver  was  an  outrage  upon  almost  every  code  of 
civilized  warfare.  It  was  worthy  of  the  Lancers  at  Elandslaagte. 
In  one  of  the  houses  in  the  rear  of  the  little  village  some  twenty 
Boers  were  lying  wounded.  This  house  was  near  the  center  of 
Cronje’s  position,  and  was  therefore  within  the  zone  of  fire  during 
the  day.  These  wounded  men  were  all  ruthlessly  bayoneted  by  a 
body  of  Guardsmen,  after  the  fight  had  ceased,  on  the  pretence  that 
the  house  where  the  disabled  burghers  lay  must  have  been  fired 
from  while  the  Guards  were  being  badly  cut  up  in  the  heat  of  the 
morning’s  encounter.  Not  a single  shot  had  been  fired  from  the 
building  after  the  wounded  had  been  placed  inside  it,  and  the  kill- 
ing of  the  men  found  within  it  in  the  evening  was  simply  an  act 
of  revengeful  fury. 

An  English  version  of  this  incident,  given  by  the  Daily  Chron- 
icle ” war  correspondent,  reads  as  follows : 

“ While  the  Argylls  were  pushing  across  the  river  they  were  fired 
upon  from  the  house  and  several  fell,  whereupon  a dozen  of  the 
Highlanders  stormed  the  house,  and,  tho  the  enemy  hoisted  the 
white  flag,  no  quarter  was  given.  They  were  all  shot.  The  enemy 
had  acted  most  unscrupulously,  shelling  our  field  hospital,  so  that 
some  of  our  wounded  were  killed,  and  repeatedly  firing  on  our 
stretcher  parties.” 

The  Boer  officer  who  repeated  the  facts  to  me  was  confident  that 
the  deed  was  done,  not  by  Highlanders,  but  by  Guards,  as  related. 
The  counter  allegation  made  by  the  Chronicle  ” correspondent  is 
given  here  in  order  to  have  both  sides  heard.  The  other  charges 
made  by  the  Boers  have  not  been  denied.  There  has  not  been  a 
duly  authenticated  instance  of  an  ambulance  or  Bed  Cross  outrage 


ROOILAAGTE  AND  MODDEB  RIVER 


207 


committed  by  the  Boer  forces  established,  even  by  English  testi- 
mony, throughout  the  whole  war. 

On  the  morning  following  the  battle  seven  doctors  and  thirty 
attendants  were  busy  dressing  the  wounds  of  some  Boers  in  some 
houses  east  of  the  hotel,  where  the  Transvaalers  had  held  the  river 
bank  against  the  attacks  of  the  Guards.  The  Bed  Cross  flag  was 
exposed,  and  two  or  three  ambulance  carts,  also  bearing  the  Cross, 
were  near  by.  An  English  oflBcer  arrived  with  troops,  and  ar- 
rested all  the  doctors  and  their  attendants,  and  claimed  the  wounded 
as  prisoners.  Eemonstrance  was  of  no  avail.  The  doctors  gave 
their  names  and  addresses,  but  they  were  told  “ it  would  all  he  in- 
quired into,”  and  were  forbidden  to  attend  to  the  wounded.  This 
treatment  continued  during  Wednesday  and  Thursday.  On  the 
evening  of  that  day  all  the  medical  staff  were  ordered  to  board  the 
train  for  Cape  Town  as  prisoners.  During  the  journey  to  De  Aar, 
one  of  the  wounded  claimed  the  attention  of  the  doctors.  They 
were  not  allowed  to  go  near  him;  the  officer  to  whom  the  request 

was  made  replied : “ Let  the Boer  die ! ” They  were  locked 

up  in  filthy  cells  during  a night’s  stay  at  De  Aar ; the  prison  guard 
being  instructed  by  this  same  officer : “You  kick  them  if  they  move, 
and  shoot  them  if  they  come  near  the  door.”  Dr.  Charles  J.  Lever 
published  an  account  of  their  subsequent  treatment  by  the  British, 
from  which  I take  the  following  extract : 

“We  arrived  at  Cape  Town,  after  a wearisome  journey,  on 
Monday,  at  noon,  and  were  taken  to  the  New  Military  Hospital, 
or  prison,  where  we  were  detained.  The  Commandant  expressed 
his  opinion  to  the  effect  that  a huge  blunder  had  occurred,  and 
we  were  ordered  to  be  in  readiness  to  leave  by  the  9 o’clock  train 
that  night.  We  were  marched  from  the  docks  to  the  railway 
station  and  sent  back  to  IModder  Eiver. 

“ I do  not  attempt  to  describe  the  indignities  or  the  inconvenience 
to  which  we  were  subjected.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  traveling  in  cattle 
trucks,  confinement  in  that  most  delectable  jail  at  De  Aar,  gratu- 
itous impertinence  from  sundry  officers  and  minor  details  of  heat, 
dirt,  and  general  discomfort,  were  the  main  features  of  our  journey. 

“We  were  captured  without  any  assigned  reason,  returned  with 
the  consolation  that  a huge  blunder  had  been  made,  and  it  is  now 
for  the  civilized  world  to  comment  and  for  high  authorities  to 
adjudicate  upon  the  unwarrantable  treatment  accorded  by  the 
British  military  authorities  to  the  members  of  an  ambulance  staff, 
working  in  the  most  sacred  interests  of  humanity,  under  the  rec- 
ognized auspices  of  the  Geneva  Convention. — I am,  etc., 

“ Charles  J.  Levee. 

“ P.S. — I may  further  mention  that,  on  our  return  to  Modder 
Eiver,  restitution  of  our  ambulance  wagons,  cattle,  horses,  etc.,  was 


208 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


refused,  and  we  had  to  make  our  way  to  our  own  lines  on  foot, 
a distance  of  some  nine  miles. 

“ Jacobsdal,  Orange  Free  State,  December  10,  1899.” 

As  a testimony  to  the  general  conduct  of  the  Boers,  in  contrast 
with  that  of  their  foes,  at  and  after  the  fight  at  Modder  Eiver,  the 
following  evidence,  tendered  by  the  war  correspondent  of  the  iiltra- 
Jingo  “ Globe,”  of  London,  will  sustain  my  general  proposition, 
that  in  all  stages  and  circumstances  of  this  war  the  Boer  has  shown 
himself,  in  every  respect,  the  moral  superior  of  the  Briton : 

“We  learned  that  the  Boers  are  by  no  means  the  undisciplined 
rabble  which  some  people  would  have  us  believe.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  there  was  more  indiscriminate  looting  done  after 
the  Modder  Eiver  fight  in  a few  days  by  the  British  than  was  done 
by  the  Boers  in  the  whole  six  weeks  before  the  fight.  It  is  certainly 
worthy  of  remark  that  the  Boers,  who  are  not  supposed  to  have 
any  discipline  at  all,  have,  in  this  part  of  the  country,  apparently 
behaved  with  exemplary  consideration  for  the  rights  of  private 
property.  While  on  the  subject  of  Boer  discipline  and  behavior, 
I forgot  to  mention  another  important  feature  in  theii  character 
and  mode  of  life.  I have  seen  it  stated  in  some  papers  occasionally 
that  they  have  been  drunk  in  their  trenches  and  in  camps,  having 
looted  wine  and  spirit  stores  in  various  towns  and  villages.  I have 
ascertained  that  this  is  absolutely  untrue.  Drunkenness  is  prac- 
tically unknown  in  their  camps.  They  do  not  drink  wine  or  spirits; 
their  only  intoxicant  is  a mixed  concoction,  of  which  they  drink 
very  little.” 


Chapter  XIX 


BATTLE  OF  M AGERSFONTEIN 


President  Steyn  arrives  with  reenforcements — Steyn  and  De  la  Rey 
OVERRULE  CRONJE,  AND  SELECT  MAGERSFONTEIN  AS  BATTLE-FIELD — 
Description  of  entrenchments — Disposition  of  Boer  forces — - 
Feint  of  Free  State  commandoes  deceives  Methuen — Ineffective 
TWO  days’  artillery  attack  by  British — Cronje’s  speech  to  his 
SOLDIERS — Gives  order  to  fire  on  approaching  Highlanders — ■ 
Their  annihilation — Fate  of  fifty  of  the  Scandinavian  Corps — 
Incidents  of  the  battle — English  and  Boer  losses — Methuen 

MAGNIFIES  HIS  ENEMY’S  FORCE— LONDON  “ STANDARD  ” ON  BOER 
HUMANITY — Burial  of  the  dead. 

HE  three  battles  of  the  week,  terminating  in  the  sanguinary 


1 encounter  at  Modder  Elver,  fixed  the  excited  attention  of  the 
civilized  world  upon  Methuen’s  effort  to  reach  Kimberley.  General 
White’s  reverses  in  Natal  had  prepared  the  public  lor  a similar 
development  of  successful  Boer  resistance  against  another  English 
army,  and,  tho  the  accounts  of  the  Belmont,  Enslin,  and  Mod- 
der Elver  fights  were  mainly  supplied  from  British  sources,  it  was 
plainly  seen  that  Methuen’s  victories  were  of  a Pyrrhic  character, 
and  were  enticing  him  forward  towards  the  growing  risk  of  a serious 


disaster. 


The  main  body  of  the  Boer  forces  retired  eastward  by  the 
north  bank  of  the  Eiet  Eiver  after  the  battle  of  the  28th  of  Novem- 
ber, and  laagered  near  Jacobsdal;  a commando  of  the  Free  Staters 
going  north  along  the  railway  to  Scholtznek  as  a strong  patrol  to 
guard  the  line  to  Kimberley.  Cronje  and  De  la  Eey  remained  at 
Jacobsdal  for  two  days,  and  then  moved  across  the  Modder  and 
reached  Scholtznek,  by  a march  west,  past  Magersfontein. 

Scholtznek  is  an  elevated  fiat-topped  ridge,  connecting  two  higher 
kopjes  which  bend  southward  at  the  extremities;  one  side  sloping 
down  to  the  veldt  north  of  Magersfontein,  and  the  other  descending 
in  a similar  direction  west  of  the  railway;  the  line  running  in  be- 
tween, and  crossing  over  to  the  Nek  to  Spytfontein,  which  is  between 
Modder  Eiver  Junction  and  Kimberley. 

President  Steyn  came  from  Bloemfontein  to  Scholtznek  to  en- 
courage the  burghers  in  their  resolve  to  prevent  the  relief  of 
Ehodes’  headquarters.  He  succeeded  in  obtaining  for  Cronje 


14 


210 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


about  1,500  more  men  from  the  south,  and  from  around  Kimberley; 
the  advent  of  Christian  De  Wet  to  the  lines  before  the  latter  city 
enabling  the  investment  to  be  continued  by  a much  smaller  force. 
In  fact.  Colonel  Kekewich  and  his  garrison  of  4,000  men  were  kept 
within  the  limits  of  their  investment  by  2,000  Boers,  while  Cronje 
and  De  la  Eey  were  fighting  the  battle  of  Magersfontein.  Cronje’s 
entire  force  in  this  battle  amounted  to  close  on  5,000  men,  with  3 
(7.5  c.m.)  Krupp  guns,  3 pom-poms,  and  1 old  Krupp,  under 
the  control  of  Major  Albrecht.  The  Transvaalers  included  men 
of  the  Potchefstroom,  Bloemof,  and  Gatsrand  commandoes,  num- 
bering, with  a small  Scandinavian  brigade,  about  2,500  burghers. 
The  Free  State  Boers  were  chiefly  from  the  Bloemfontein,  Hoop- 
stadt,  Winhurg,  Boshof,  Jacobsdal,  and  Ladybrand  districts;  in  all, 
some  2,000  men,  with  about  500  Afrikander  volunteers,  mainly 
from  Griqualand  West. 

A Kriegsraad  was  held  at  Scholtznek  to  consider  the  plan  of 
action  by  which  the  further  advance  of  Methuen  should  be  met. 
General  Cronje  was  in  favor  of  making  the  position  of  Scholtznek 
the  next  battle-ground.  To  this  proposal  De  la  Eey  was  strongly 
opposed.  He  referred  to  the  fact  that  the  burghers  had  fought 
better  in  the  entrenched  positions  on  the  low  ground  at  Modder 
Eiver  than  on  the  kopjes  at  Belmont  and  Enslin,  and  that  the 
English  had  suffered  greater  loss  at  the  last  than  at  the  previous 
battles.  He  also  insisted  that,  from  a purely  strategical  point  of 
view,  it  would  be  wiser  to  fight  Methuen  with  the  Scholtznek  posi- 
tions to  fall  back  upon  in  the  event  of  a defeat  than  to  select  those 
kopjes  for  the  field  of  a final  encounter,  with  Kimberley  imme- 
diately behind  them.  He  favored  the  stand  being  made  a few  miles 
nearer  the  Modder,  at  some  rands  ” or  ridges  which  ran  west- 
ward from  the  railway,  parallel  with  the  Modder  Eiver,  and  distant 
some  three  miles  north  of  that  stream.  Cronje  was  imperiously 
in  favor  of  his  own  plan,  and  the  intervention  of  President  Steyn 
had  to  be  invoked  to  decide  between  the  rival  proposals  of  the  two 
generals.  Mr.  Steyn  gave  his  decision  emphatically  in  favor  of 
De  la  Eey,  and  Magersfontein  was  accordingly  chosen  for  the  next 
encounter  with  Methuen’s  army. 

Trenches  were  dug  at  the  base  of  the  ridges,  right  across  from 
the  railway,  and  away  east  to  where  the  kopje  slopes  downward  in 
the  direction  of  the  river.  These  entrenchments  were  some  five 
feet  deep  and  three  wide,  and  gave  complete  shelter  to  the  burghers ; 
a screen  of  mimosa-  and  vaal-bushes  being  placed  a few  feet  in  front 
of  the  pits,  to  hide  the  earth  which  the  digging  of  the  deep  trenches 
had  piled  on  the  ground,  and  also  to  conceal  the  entrenched  rifle- 
men from  view. 


MTTLE  OF  MAGERSFONTEIN 


2n 

On  the  top  and  behind  the  ridges,  strong  sangars  and  trenches 
were  likewise  built,  and  with  special  structures  for  the  guns,  which 
commanded  both  the  railway  and  the  pass  running  from  the  plain 
through  the  Boer  position  on  to  Scholtznek.  Behind  the  kopje  the 
ground  dipped  a little  for  a mile  or  two,  and  then  rose  again  in  the 
direction  of  the  higher  hill  at  Spytfontein. 

These  trenches  and  positions  were  constantly  occupied  every  night 
from  the  5th  to  the  10th  of  December  by  Cronje’s  forces,  under 
the  most  rigorous  system  of  inspection.  Every  other  man  in  the 
line  of  trenches  slept  for  two  hours,  while  his  neighbor,  Mauser  in 
hand,  waited  for  the  signal  from  the  sentinels  in  advance  of  the 
lines  which  was  to  tell  of  the  enemy’s  approach.  The  sleepers 
awoke  and  resumed  the  vigil,  while  their  comrades  slept  in  turn. 
At  3.30  each  morning  the  whole  line  was  alert,  and  an  inspection 
of  the  enemy’s  position  at  the  river  Junction  was  made  to  ascertain 
if  any  forward  movement  was  in  preparation.  If  no  sign  of  such 
movement  was  seen,  the  whole  force  left  the  trenches  and  retired 
behind  the  hills,  where  they  either  slept  during  the  daytime  or  at- 
tended to  the  duties  of  the  commandoes.  The  English  balloons 
always  found  Cronje’s  men  in  these  daily  locations,  away  north  and 
east  of  the  concealed  trenches. 

General  Cronje’s  laager  was  five  miles  northeast  of  Magersfon- 
tein,  where  Mrs.  Cronje  and  other  officers’  wives  and  friends  were 
encamped.  He  retired  there  each  night  early,  and  was  found  back 
again  in  the  lines  inspecting  the  positions  regularly  at  two  o’clock 
every  morning. 

The  Federal  forces  were  disposed  as  follows  over  lines  extending 
fully  three  miles:  The  extreme  left  of  Cronje’s  position  reached 
almost  to  the  river,  and  was  held  by  General  De  la  Eey  with  a 
section  of  the  Transvaalers  and  some  Free  State  burghers.  The 
brave  but  ill-fated  Scandinavian  Corps,  under  Field  Cornet  Fly- 
gare,  occupied  a post  of  observation  in  advance  of  De  la  Key,  on 
some  rising  ground.  Next  to  De  la  Key’s  men,  Cronje’s  burghers 
occupied  the  trenches  immediately  under  the  ridge,  and  as  far  as 
the  pass.  The  Hoopstadt,  Kroonstadt,  Bloemfontein,  Boshof,  and 
other  Free  Staters,  with  the  Colonial  Volunteers,  lined  the  ridges 
further  west,  crossing  the  railway  and  extending  to  Basset’s  Farm, 
where  the  old  road  from  Modder  River  J unction  mounted  to  Scholtz- 
nek, on  the  way  to  Kimberley. 

The  guns  were  behind  the  ridges  dominating  the  railway  and 
road,  in  between  the  positions  held  by  the  Free  State  and  Transvaal 
burghers. 

Lord  Methuen  rested  his  forces  at  Modder  Kiver  Junction  from 
the  29th  of  November  to  the  9th  of  the  following  month.  His 


Commandant  Steenekamp  General  Cronje  Commandant 

Van  der  Merwe 


BATTLE  OF  MAGERSFONTEIN 


213 


losses  so  far  had  been  fully  ten  per  cent,  of  his  entire  strength,  and 
the  advance  from  his  base  at  De  Aar  had  rendered  his  line  of  com- 
mimications  longer  and  weaker  as  his  progress  towards  Kimberley 
increased.  There  was,  therefore,  a double  reason  why  he  should 
await  reenforcements  before  making  his  next  attempt  to  get  past 
the  opposing  forces  in  his  front.  Both  general  and  troops  had  also 
learned  something  of  the  fighting  qualities  of  their  opponents,  and 
the  respect  which  these  had  enforced  after  three  stubbornly-con- 
tested  engagements  and  1,000  British  casualties  rendered  additional 
help  in  men  and  guns  a necessity  for  the  task  in  hand. 

Accordingly,  the  Highland  Brigade,  under  General  Wauchope, 
a regiment  of  Lancers,  Australian  and  Canadian  Volunteers,  and 
other  levies,  were  despatched  from  Cape  Town,  together  with  two 
additional  batteries  of  artiller}^  including  a 4.7  naval  gun,  throw- 
ing a fifty-pound  lyddite  shell.  Methuen’s  force,  on  the  eve  of  his 
attack  on  Cronje,  comprised  close  on  14,000  of  the  flower  of  the 
British  army,  including  Guards  and  Highland  regiments.  He  had 
a total  of  38  field  pieces. 

Methuen  has  been  blamed  by  military  critics  for  not  having  made 
his  next  move  forward  over  the  veldt,  west  of  the  railway  line  and 
of  Scholtznek,  rather  than  by  the  way  of  klagersfontein.  Ob- 
viously, other  things  being  equal,  that  would  have  been  the  route 
of  least  difficulties,  in  the  shape  of  kopjes  and  strong  positions; 
and,  for  these  reasons,  the  least  advantageous  for  Cronje,  with  his 
relatively  small  opposing  forces.  The  English  general  was  com- 
pelled, however,  to  make  the  security  of  his  communications  a gov- 
erning factor  in  his  movements,  and  this  fact  enabled  Cronje  and 
De  la  Eey  so  to  maneuver  their  commandoes,  a few  days  previous 
to  the  11th  of  December,  as  to  force  ]\'[ethuen  to  fight  over  the 
ground  on  which  the  Boer  generals  had  planned  the  theater  of  the 
next  encounter. 

On  the  8th  of  December  a column  of  800  burghers  splendidly 
mounted,  composed  of  Free  State  Boers  of  the  Fauresmith  and 
Jacobsdal  commandoes,  with  Colonial  Volunteers,  and  led  by  Com- 
mandant Lubbe,  crossed  the  Modder  and  Eiet  rivers,  east  of  the 
Federal  laager,  under  cover  of  the  night,  and  swept  southward,  as 
a saddle  commando,  on  Enslin.  The  enemy  were  completely  sur- 
prised at  this  appearance  of  a strong  force  south  of  their  camp  at 
Modder  Eiver  Junction,  and  were  induced,  in  consequence,  to 
strengthen  their  position  at  that  point.  This  reconnaissance  also 
compelled  Methuen  to  abandon  all  idea  of  moving  forward  by  any 
route  which  would  leave  his  right  flank  exposed  to  an  attack  by 
what  he  believed  to  be  a cooperating  Boer  force  operating  against 
his  line  of  communications.  After  having  created  this  impression 


214 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


for  the  purposes  of  their  plans,  the  flying  column  was  back  again 
at  Magersfontein  on  the  night  of  the  10th. 

On  the  early  morning  of  Saturday,  the  Eev.  Mr.  Du  Toit,  a 
young  Afrikander  clergyman,  was  conducting  a religious  service 
behind  the  kopje  which  flanked  the  pass  from  the  veldt  over  the 
ridge,  when  the  boom  of  a large  cannon  was  heard  from  the  direc- 
tion of  the  enemy,  and  as  the  word  “ Amen  ” was  pronounced, 
ending  the  service,  a lyddite  shell  burst  just  beyond  the  circle  of 
the  burgher  congregation.  No  one  was  hit.  Methuen’s  4.7  naval 
gun  had  opened  the  battle  of  Magersfontein.  During  the  whole 
of  Saturday  and  Sunday  the  bombardment  of  the  Boer  positions 
continued,  indicating  in  the  stereotyped  manner  of  the  enemy  that 
the  time  for  a general  attack  was  close  at  hand.  There  was  no 
response  of  any  kind  from  Cronje’s  guns.  All  was  still  as  death, 
from  the  top  of  Scholtznek,  in  the  rear,  to  the  sunlit  banks  of  the 
Modder  Eiver,  with  never  a sign  or  a sound  to  speak  of  the  presence 
of  battery  or  Boer,  of  men  or  Mausers,  where  the  rocks  were  rent 
asunder  and  the  veldt  was  plowed  by  a rain  of  shells.  Down  in 
the  trenches  below  the  ridge  men  smoked  their  pipes  in  security, 
clutched  their  rifles,  and  lay  still.  Away  on  the  north  slope  of  the 
ridges,  and  in  the  secure  shelter  of  Scholtznek,  officers  and  men 
viewed  the  English  batteries  in  perfect  safety,  and  awaited  the 
hour  when  the  men  behind  the  English  guns  should  come  within 
reach  of  bullets,  when  accounts  should  be  settled  for  the  killing 
of  the  wounded  at  Modder  Eiver,  and  for  “ the  pig-sticking  ” of 
Elandslaagte.  The  results  of  Methuen’s  two  days’  artillery  attack 
were  three  Boers  killed  and  about  double  the  number  wounded. 

At  midnight  on  Sunday  General  Cronje  was  discovered  in  the 
trenches.  He  had  ridden  over  from  the  laager  in  the  rain  with 
the  intelligence  that  the  attack  by  the  enem5^’s  infantry  was  to  be 
made  in  a few  hours.  The  entire  lines  were  manned  at  once,  and 
every  burgher  and  officer  placed  in  position.  The  general  inspected 
every  point  from  the  east  to  the  west  of  his  lines,  and  had  every 
necessary  preparation  made  long  before  the  dark  shadows  of  the 
doomed  Highlanders  were  to  be  seen  carelessly  marching  into  the 
jaws  of  awaiting  death. 

The  evening  previously  Cronje  had  received  a telegram  from  Com- 
mandant-General Joubert  reporting  the  progress  of  events  in  Natal, 
and  sending  a message  of  encouragement  to  the  western  comman- 
does, urging  them  to  fight  bravely  for  “ Land  un  Volk.”  General 
Cronje  read  the  message  to  his  officers  and  men,  after  which  he 
addressed  them  in  the  following  few  characteristic  wmrds : 

“ Burghers — You  have  listened  to  the  general’s  telegram.  Before 


BATTLE  OF  MAGERSFONTEIN 


315 


you  stands  here  Cronje.  You  know  him.  From  the  early  days  he 
was  classed  among  the  forelighters.  How  many  bombs  went  over 
his  head,  or  fell  before  his  feet  ? How  many  bullets  whistled 
right  and  left  of  him  ? And  here  he  still  stands  before  you,  un- 
harmed ! Where  is  your  faith  ? Believe  that  no  bullet  will  hit  you 
or  do  you  any  harm,  without  the  will  of  God  ! Where  is  your 
faith  ? You  must  not  continue  to  lie  in  the  trenches,  but  when 
it  is  necessary  you  must  upsaddle  your  horses,  and  storm  the  Eng- 
lish in  the  flats.” 

There  has  been  much  controversy  in  Boer  as  in  English  circles 
as  to  the  nature  of  the  signal  which  warned  the  burghers  of  the 
approach  of  the  Highland  Brigade.  The  theory  of  a “ flashing 
light  ” carried  by  Boer  scoiits  who  marched  with  the  Highlanders, 
is  too  absurd  for  any  but  British  war  correspondent  purposes. 
Such  scouts  would  have  been  shot  down  along  with  the  enemy  by 
their  own  friends  in  the  entrenchments.  It  has  been  claimed  for 
three  of  the  Hoopstadt  commando,  Cornelis  Greyling  and  two  Mag- 
nus brothers,  that  they  were  the  first  to  discern  the  forms  of  the 
Tommies  in  the  mist,  and  to  warn  the  burghers  with  the  fire  of 
their  rifles.  I was  assured,  however,  by  both  President  Steyn, 
Judge  Hertzog,  and  the  Eev.  ]\Ir.  Marquardt,  who  were  present 
during  the  battle,  that  the  first  discovery  of  the  enemy’s  movement 
was  made  by  General  Cronje  himself,  who,  on  going  his  rounds  in 
that  direction,  saw  the  troops  approaching,  and  gave  the  order  to 
fire  which  sealed  the  fate  of  the  Black  Watch  and  of  their  brave 
general. 

It  has  been  related  in  English  versions  of  this  battle  that  a barbed 
wire  fence  formed  part  of  General  Cronje’s  defenses,  and  that  it 
was  a contact  with  this  obstruction  in  the  darkness  of  the  early 
morning  of  December  11  by  the  Black  Watch  which  gave  the  alarm 
to  the  Boer  lines.  There  was  no  such  special  wire  fence  in  existence. 
Any  such  obstacle,  at  the  point  where  Wauchope  and  his  High- 
landers were  first  fired  upon,  would  have  tended  to  frustrate  the 
design  for  which  the  trenches  were  so  well  concealed.  This  plan 
was  to  allow  the  enemy  to  approach  as  near  as  possible  to  the  base 
of  the  ridge,  without  suspecting  the  presence  of  the  burghers  in  the 
rifle-trenches  below,  and  it  is  obvious  that  a fence  of^  any  kind 
built  across  the  veldt  300  or  400  yards  from  the  entrenchments 
would  defeat  this  purpose.  There  was  an  ordinary  wire  fence  on 
the  farm  of  Magersfontein,  hut  it  had  been  there  for  years,  and 
was  intended  to  enclose  a sheep  and  cattle  ranch,  and  not  to  serve 
as  part  of  a plan  of  battle.  This  boundary  fence  played  nothing 
save  an  accidental  part  in  the  events  of  the  11th  of  December. 

The  enemy’s  plan  of  attack  was  to  move  the  Highland  Brigade 


216 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


forward  on  Sunday  night,  parallel  with  the  Modder,  and  then 
wheel  to  the  left  towards  one  of  two  passes  which  led  from  the  veldt 
through  the  ridges,  on  towards  the  eastern  slope  of  Scholtznek;  the 
object  evidently  being  to  clear  and  hold  the  ridges  for  the  advance 
of  the  artillery  and  supporting  columns,  by  which  the  hills  ahead 
were  to  be  assailed,  and  the  Boers  driven  from  the  way  to  Kim- 
berley. Keither  Methuen  nor  Wauchope  had  calculated  upon  find- 
ing Cronje’s  center  entrenched  where  they  believed  his  outposts  or 
brandwachts  would  alone  be  met  with,  and  hence  the  fate  of  the 
Highland  Brigade  was  sealed. 

This  brigade  was  made  up  of  the  Black  Watch,  the  Highland 
Light  Infantry,  the  Argylls,  Seaforths,  and  Sutherlands.  From 
the  English  accounts  of  Wauchope’s  advance  towards  the  passes  in 
the  ridge,  it  appears  that  his  men  were  kept  in  quarter  column 
formation  until  they  Avere  fired  upon.  This  fact  reflects  no  blame 
upon  the  general,  under  the  circumstances.  The  darkness  of  the 
early  morning,  the  difficulty  of  keeping  a large  body  of  men  in 
touch  with  each  other  while  moving  over  strange  ground,  coupled 
Avith  the  ignorance  of  Methuen’s  intelligence  officers  as  to  the  true 
location  of  the  Boer  lines,  explain  the  otherAvise  culpable  negligence 
of  the  order  of  march.  The  ridges  ahead  Avere  manifestly  intended 
to  be  the  cover  for  the  first  operations  of  Wauchope  and  his  men, 
and  the  open  space  immediately  south  of  these  ridges  would  have 
giA’en  him  the  occasion  and  opportunity  for  deploying  his  brigade 
previous  to  the  ascent  of  the  pass,  had  he  not  been  surprised.  It, 
hoAA'ever,  shoAved  on  the  unfortunate  general’s  part  a strange  ig- 
norance of  Boer  methods  of  Avarfare  to  approach  within  a couple 
of  hundred  yards  of  elevated  ground,  presumably  only  a feAV  miles 
in  front  of  his  enemy’s  main  position,  without  preparing  for  a pos- 
sible attack,  even  by  outposts. 

It  was  about  half-past  three  in  the  morning  of  Monday  when 
General  Cronje,  on  making  his  rounds,  noted  the  silent  approach 
of  the  enemy.  The  space  in  front  of  the  trenches  Avas  open  south- 
ward to  the  river,  with  nothing  but  the  level  veldt  between  the 
Boers  and  their  foes,  except  here  and  there  a vaal-bush  or  a clump 
of  mimosa  shrubs.  The  falling  rain  obscured  the  struggling  ef- 
forts of  the  dawn  to  spread  itself  oA^er  the  landscape  Avith  the  light 
that  heralds  the  morning,  and  the  forms  of  the  marching  soldiers 
were  not  discernible  in  the  gloom;  but  the  heavy  tramp  of  4,000 
men  could  be  heard  coming  nearer  and  nearer,  until  the  mass  of 
troops  looming  out  of  the  mist  like  a Avail  of  moving  matter,  ap- 
proached Avithin  100  yards  of  the  entrenchments.  Then  a hurri- 
cane of  pelting  leaden  hail  leaped  out  of  the  darkness,  SAveeping  from 
right  to  left,  and  the  black  animated  wall  fell  doAvn,  and  groans  and 


BATTLE  OF  MAGEBSFONTEIN 


217 


cries  from  wounded  men  rent  the  air.  Out  from  under  the  ridges 
and  from  the  trenches  to  the  right  came  a ceaseless  and  merciless 
torrent  of  lead,  the  bushes  concealing  the  flashes  from  the  Mausers, 
but  the  missiles  plowing  their  way  through  the  now  falling  and 
wildly  rushing  ranks  of  the  doomed  brigade.  In  half  a minute 
after  the  signal  to  fire  had  been  given  by  Cronje,  over  700  of  the 
Highlanders  were  strewn  like  swaths  of  grass  before  the  mowers 
on  the  plain;  among  them  being  the  ill-fated  Wauchope,  who  was 
shot  dead  in  the  first  volley.  The  fiction  woven  around  a dying 
message  was  absurd  on  the  face  of  it.  Three  bullets  had  passed 
through  his  body,  and  no  sound  ever  escaped  his  lips  that  could  be 
heard  amidst  the  detonating  storm  of  the  biirgher  fire. 

JSTo  man  born  of  woman  could  stand  against  such  a fusillade  from 
out  of  the  unknown  positions  beyond,  and,  with  the  whole  first  and 
second  lines  of  their  column  striTck  down  as  by  an  earthquake, 
the  Highland  Brigade  broke  and  fled  from  the  field.  IMany  had 
thrown  themselves  prostrate  on  the  veldt  after  the  first  shock,  and 
escaped  the  fate  of  their  comrades  for  a ti:ne;  but  as  the  moving 
hours  began  to  lift  the  mist  from  the  plain  these  Tommies  became 
visible  objects  to  the  fierce  eyes  behind  the  vaal-bushes,  and  death 
continued  to  tell  the  bead-roll  of  his  British  victims  that  early 
morning.  Pit}^  it  was  that  Celtic  blood  should  have  paid  so  dear 
a penalty  for  so  ignoble  a cause,  and  that  men  from  Highland 
glens  and  isles,  sons  of  once  liberty-loving  clans,  should  be  the 
fallen  foemen  of  a brave  little  Protestant  nation,  fighting  for  life 
and  liberty  against  the  hereditary  enemy  of  “ the  Celtic  Fringe.” 

The  troops  in  the  rear  of  the  Black  AYatch  rushed  back  in  the  dis- 
order of  a panic  from  the  scene  of  so  terrible  a reception.  Attempts 
were  made  to  rally  them  again,  but  it  could  be  seen  from  the 
trenches  as  the  light  of  the  growing  day  increased  that  these  efforts 
were  in  vain.  The  lesson  of  that  awful  minute  or  two  had  done  its 
work.  The  battle  of  Magersfontein  had  already  been  fought  and 
won. 

The  Seaforth  Highlanders  were  rallied  about  seven  o’clock 
through  the  imprudent  action  of  the  Scandinavian  Corps.  Some 
fifty  of  this  body,  under  Field  Cornet  Flygare,  were  about  1,000 
yards  in  advance  of  He  la  Eey’s  trenches,  on  a piece  of  rising  ground 
with  some  vaal-bushes  upon  it.  They  had  occupied  that  position 
as  an  outpost  to  watch  against  any  turning  movement  by  the  river 
against  He  la  Eey’s  trenches,  during  Saturday  and  Sunday.  On 
seeing  the  Highlanders  decimated  and  demoralized,  after  the  fire 
from  the  entrenchments,  Fl3^gare,  Baron  Helge  Fagerskold,  and 
other  young  members  of  the  corps,  believing  the  enemy  were  quit- 
ting the  field,  moved  from  their  position  out  into  the  veldt,  and 


SHOOTING  BACK  THE  BRITISH 


1 


BATTLE  OF  MAGEE8F0NTEIN 


219 


opened  fire  upon  the  nearest  body  of  Scotchmen.  These  chanced 
to  be  Seaforths,  and,  seeing  how  few  their  assailants  were,  they 
immediately  advanced  upon  the  Scandinavians.  It  was  fully  800 
against  half  a hundred,  but  the  Norsemen  nobly,  if  rashly,  held  their 
ground,  and  were  surrounded  and  cut  to  pieces;  39  out  of  53  being 
killed  and  wounded,  seven  taken  prisoners;  the  other  seven,  who 
were  in  charge  of  the  horses,  escaping  into  De  la  Eey’s  lines  in 
the  rear. 

The  gallant  Scandinavians  fought  like  lions,  many  of  them  being 
found  the  following  day  with  three  or  four  dead  or  wounded  Eng- 
lishmen around  them,  showing  how  dearly  they  had  made  the 
enemy  pay  for  the  lives  taken.  Both  Field  Cornet  Flygare  and 
Baron  Fagerskold  were  found  stripped  and  robbed.  According  to 
a statement  made  by  Charles  Uggla,  President  of  the  Scandinavian 
Organization  in  the  Transvaal,  “ the  rifle  of  Carl  Albers  Olsson  lay 
by  his  side,  and,  in  addition  to  several  bayonet  wounds,  he  had  also 
three  rifle  wounds.  Fifty  of  our  corps  took  part  in  the  fight,  and 
only  seven  came  out  unscathed.  We  found  that  the  bodies  of  our 
men  were  all  rol)bed,  and  Commandant  Flygare  was  stark  naked; 
even  his  spectacles  had  been  removed.” 

The  Scandinavians  did  not  fall  unavenged.  News  of  the  un- 
equal encounter  they  were  waging  was  brought  to  the  Boer  lines 
by  the  men  in  charge  of  the  horses,  whereupon  the  Ficksburg  men 
and  100  other  burghers  under  De  Villiers  leaped  into  their  saddles 
and  dashed  across  the  field,  taking  the  Seaforths  in  the  flank  when 
retiring  after  the  fight  with  the  brave  but  impetuous  Flygare  and 
his  decimated  corps.  The  burghers  returned  to  the  ridges,  bring- 
ing about  thirty  Highlanders  as  prisoners,  having  shot  the  others 
back  from  the  field. 

Another  daring  feat  was  carried  through  in  the  midst  of  the 
terrific  bombardment  by  the  enemy’s  entire  artillery  when  the  Gor- 
dons were  sent  forward  to  attack  De  la  Eey’s  position.  This  point 
was  held  by  some  of  the  Fauresmith,  Boshof,  and  Ladybrand  men, 
along  with  Transvaal  burghers,  and  Cronje  ordered  300  men  from 
the  ridges  behind  the  center  to  ride  to  De  la  Eey’s  assistance. 
This  they  did,  right  across  the  space  which  was  being  swept  by 
!Methuen’s  guns,  but,  before  they  had  reached  the  men  whom  they 
were  intended  to  reenforce,  the  converging  Mauser  fire  from  the 
center  and  flank  entrenchments  had  driven  the  Gordons  pell-mell 
back  behind  their  artillery,  in  a veritable  sauve  qui  pent. 

One  of  the  most  remarkable  features  of  the  fearful  struggle  in 
front  of  the  ridges  was  the  silence  of  the  Boer  guns.  Not  a.  shot 
had  been  fired  by  them  from  the  time  the  Black  Watch  were  mowed 
down  until  the  enemy  commenced  to  retire  from  the  battle-field 


220 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


with  ranks  hopelessly  shattered  and  broken.  There  were  the  crouch- 
ing lines  of  demoralized  troops,  scattered  over  the  face  of  the  veldt 
200  or  300  yards  away;  unable  to  go  further  back,  afraid  to  ap- 
proach any  nearer  the  circle  of  fire  and  death  which  the  Mausers 
behind  the  vaal-bushes  had  drawn  in  the  blood  of  England’s  soldiers 
across  the  impurpled  plain.  Three  pom-poms  and  three  Krupps 
were  awa}^  a little  to  the  west,  guarding  the  Boer  right,  the  rail- 
way, and  the  road  to  Scholtznek,  but  near  enough  to  sweep  the 
open  space  now  dotted  with  khaki-colored  prostrate  forms.  Not  a 
shot  nor  a sign  came  from  Major  Albrecht’s  artillery ! The  Eng- 
lish guns  thundered  from  behind  the  enemy’s  lines;  battery  after 
battery  raining  shells  upon  the  ridges,  the  hills  behind  them,  upon 
the  entire  length  of  Cronje’s  lines  from  where  at  Basset’s  Farm 
the  gallant  Hoopstadt  burghers  under  Commandant  Greyling  fired 
from  the  cover  of  their  sangars,  to  where  the  marksmen  of  the 
Gatsrand  and  Potchefstroom  had  strewn  the  ground  in  front  of 
their  trendies  with  British  dead — naval  guns  and  howitzers,  field 
pieces,  mountain  batteries,  and  Maxims  rained  shrapnel,  lyddite, 
and  bullets  for  hours.  But  no  Boer  gun  spoke  in  reply.  There 
lay  the  lines,  unshaken  and  unbroken,  where  Cronje’s  6,000  farmers 
held  at  bay  13,000  foemen  and  forty  guns,  with  no  weapon  but  the 
Mauser  rifle.  It  was  a magnificent  and  unparalleled  display  of 
superb  coolness;  that  reliance  upon  calm  courage  and  steady  nerves 
and  ready  aim  to  beat  back  so  great  a force  from  the  ridge  they 
had  confidently  and  proudly  hoped  to  cross  over  the  broken  ranks 
of  the  Boers. 

After  this  state  of  things  had  continued  for  several  hours,  and 
ineffectual  attempts  had  been  made  by  Guards  and  Gordons  and 
Lancers  to  make  some  impression  on  the  Boer  lines.  General  Cronje, 
with  seven  adjutants  or  members  of  his  staff  took  a stand  on  the 
extreme  east  of  De  la  Eey’s  position  to  judge  of  the  possibility  of 
an  attack  upon  the  enemy’s  right  flank  along  the  river.  At  that 
very  time  the  Lancers  were  feeling  the  way  for  a similar  movement 
round  De  la  Eey’s  left.  Suddenly,  on  rounding  a stony  elevation, 
about  a mile  eastward  of  the  Boer  entrenchments,  a troop  of  some 
200  Lancers  were  sighted  only  400  yards  away.  The  distance  to 
De  la  Eey’s  position  was  too  far  for  any  thought  of  immediate  help 
from  there,  and  the  Ijancers  had  seen  the  mounted  burghers  emerge 
from  the  back  of  the  small  kopje.  Eetreat  was  possible  and  easy, 
but  Cronje’s  voice  rang  out  in  his  peremptory  tones : “ Schiet  hulle 
terug ! ” — Shoot  them  back ! ” The  seven  burghers  dismounted, 
spread  themselves  over  the  stony  hillock,  and  opened  fire  upon  the 
Lancers,  emptying  saddles  at  every  shot.  Cronje,  with  his  in- 
separable karwats  in  hand,  sat  his  horse  while  his  body-guard  held 


BATTLE  OF  MAGEBSFONTEIN 


221 


off  the  Lancers,  who,  thinking  that  the  hill  was  hiding  a big  force 
of  Boers  behind  those  who  were  firing,  wheeled  round  and  galloped 
back  to  their  lines. 

The  remnants  of  the  Black  Watch  and  Seaforths  absolutely  re- 
fused to  advance  again  into  the  death-trap  of  the  open  space,  where 
their  comrades  lay  stark  in  death,  and  others  cried  in  vain  for 
water  and  help.  It  is  no  reflection  on  their  courage  that  they  left 
the  field  cursing  the  authors  of  the  disaster.  The  Gordons  had 
been  led  away  round  to  the  right  from  the  place  where  Wauchope 
and  his  men  had  fallen  in  the  first  onset  of  the  fray.  So  had  the 
Guards,  in  order  that  they  should  not  be  unnerved  by  the  sight  of 
the  heaps  of  their  slain  and  stricken  comrades;  but  the  way  they 
were  taken  so  as  to  escape  this  unmanning  spectacle  landed  them 
where  Be  la  Bey's  entrenchments  were  on  the  right  flank  and 
where  Boos  with  his  Potchefstroomers  held  them  in  front.  It  was  a 
greater  blunder  than  that  into  which  had  direction  had  led  the 
unfortunate  Wauchope  and  his  men  in  the  early  morning,  and,  on 
a converging  fire  being  opened  upon  them,  the  Guards  first  and 
Gordons  after  turned  and  ran  from  the  foes  they  could  neither 
see  nor  face. 

While  this  panic  lasted  some  field  pieces  of  the  enemy’s  artillery 
which  had  been  moved  forward  to  within  2,000  yards  of  the  Boer 
entrenchments,  to  support  the  advance  of  the  Guards  and  Gordons, 
were  left  on  the  veldt,  after  these  regiments  had  retreated.  The 
men  who  served  them  were  caught  in  the  rush  of  the  Guards  back- 
ward, and  were  swept  along.  The  guns  remained  there  between 
both  forces  for  hours;  Cronje  unable  with  the  fewness  of  his  men 
and  guns  to  bring  them  in,  with  30  other  British  guns  1,000  yards 
or  so  in  their  rear,  while  the  enemy’s  forces  were  too  demoralized 
to  attempt  their  rescue.  Finally,  batteries  in  the  rear  came  up  be- 
hind the  abandoned  guns,  while  ambulance  wagons  were  placed  in 
front,  and  in  the  full  view  of  the  burghers  on  the  ridges  the  guns 
were  thus  rescued,  the  mules  from  one  Bed  Cross  wagon  being  un- 
hitched and  attached  to  the  limber  of  one  of  the  guns. 

It  was  now  well  on  in  the  afternoon,  and  it  was  evident  to  Cronje 
and  De  la  Bey  that  the  enemy  was  thoroughly  Ijeaten  all  along  the 
line.  The  renewed  activitv'  of  Methuen’s  guns  was  meant  as  a cover 
for  the  retreat  of  the  forces  on  Modder  Biver,  and  IMajor  Albrecht 
was  at  last  permitted  after  the  impatience  of  the  day  to  let  loose 
his  few  guns  to  hasten  the  departure  of  the  beaten  British  army 
from  the  most  disastrous  field  English  troops  had  fought  upon  for 
fifty  years.  Thus,  after  a silence  of  fully  eight  hours  in  so  san- 
guinary a battle,  did  the  final  act  in  Cronje’s  plan  of  defensive  ag- 
gression develop  itself,  in  the  use  of  his  few  guns  upon  a retreating 


222 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 

enemy  when  the  fire  of  Krupp  and  pom-pom  could  no  longer  direct, 
by  the  evidence  of  their  positions  in  the  Boer  lines,  the  enemy’s 
overwhelming  artillery  to  the  places  where  the  deadlier  weapon  of 
the  rifie  with  its  fifteen  shots  per  minute  built  an  impregnable  wall 
of  fire  and  death  before  the  British  legions.  There  on  the  ridge, 
close  to  the  pass  through  which  Wauchope  was  to  have  marched  his 
men  on  that  fateful  morning,  Piet  Cronje  stood,  whip  in  hand, 
with  the  fierce  light  of  triumph  in  his  eyes,  gazing  exultingly  across 
the  plain  as  13,000  or  13,000  of  England’s  best  troops  and 
seven  batteries  of  her  guns  were  driven  from  the  field  by  the  de- 
fenders of  Transvaal  liberty.  Turning  to  his  secretary,  Cronje 
dictated  the  following  brief  message  to  President  Kruger: 

“ God  has  given  a great  victory  to  the  Federal  forces.  The 
enemy  were  repulsed  three  times  with  fearful  losses.  Our  casual- 
ties were  small.  The  Scandinavian  Corps  lost  heavily. 

“ Cronje.” 

A full  and  complete  account  of  the  total  Boer  losses  in  the  battle 
of  Magersfontein  was  published,  name  by  name,  on  January  15, 

1900,  in  the  Free  State  and  Transvaal  press;  the  number  of  killed 
being  71,  and  of  wounded  165.  Of  these  no  less  than  19  killed  and 
20  wounded  belonged  to  the  heroic  little  band  of  Scandinavian 
Uitlanders  who  fell  before  the  onslaught  of  the  Seaforth  High- 
landers. 

The  English  losses  have  been  variously  given  at  figures  ranging 
from  1,000  to  1,500.  The  Highland  Brigade  alone  left  700  men 
on  the  field.  Wauchope’s  Black  Watch  lost  300  men  and  20  officers. 

Lord  Methuen’s  puerile  attempt  to  minimize  the  significance  of 
his  defeat  by  asserting  that  there  were  “ 16,000  Boers  in  front  of 
him”  at  Magersfontein  stands  ridiculed  in  absolute  refutation  by 
the  Blue  Book  “ African  Despatches  (Vol.  I.,  pp.  17, 18),  February, 

1901, ”  where  Lord  Eoberts  gives  the  names  of  Commandants  and 
Field  Cornets,  and  names  and  numbers  of  commandoes  of  Cronje’s 
army  on  its  surrender  at  Paardeberg,  two  months  after  Magers- 
fontein. The  total  strength  is  given  at  3,919  men,  with  150 
wounded.  Adding  to  these  figures  the  number  of  killed  and 
wounded  at  Paardeberg,  and  the  casualties  at  Magersfontein,  it  will 
be  found  that  they  correspond  with  the  estimate  of  5,000  men  which 
I have  given  of  Cronje’s  united  forces  at  the  battle  of  the  11th 
December,  allowing  for  500  or  600  Colonial  Volunteers  and  Trans- 
vaalers  who  took  part  in  both  battles,  but  were  not  caught  in  the 
trap  of  Paardeberg. 

The  (London)  “ Standard  ” war  correspondent,  writing  from  the 


BATTLE  OF  MAGERSFONTEIN 


223 


battle-field  (January  8,  1900),  bore  the  following  testimony  to  the 
humanity  of  the  victorious  Boers: 

“ In  the  intervals  of  armistice  which  were  subsequently  arranged, 
the  enemy  behaved  with  great  courtesy.  They  had  given  water 
to  our  wounded  of  the  Highland  Brigade  early  in  the  morning  after 
the  battle.  These  poor  fellows  had  lain  all  day  Monday  under  heavy 
fire  and  hot  sun,  and  all  Monday  night,  which  was  particularly  cold, 
without  water,  and  they  had  had  no  food  since  Sunday  evening. 
The  Boer  Commander,  General  Cronje,  was  exceedingly  courteous 
and  kind,  assisting  in  every  way  possible.  He  further  offered 
50  burghers  to  help  to  bury  our  dead.  Lord  Methuen  sent  a letter 
of  thanks  to  General  Cronje  for  his  courtesy.” 


On  the  day  after  the  battle,  as  the  Boers  were  in  the  act  of  assist- 
ing the  burial  of  their  dead  enemies,  the  naval  gun  at  Methuen’s 
camp  opened  fire  upon  the  Boer  positions,  despite  the  armistice  which 
Cronje  had  granted.  The  English  chaplain  had  to  ride  back  to 
the  British  lines  to  have  the  firing  stopped. 

The  English  dead  were  very  badly  buried,  and  General  Cronje 
had  to  communicate  with  Lord  Methuen  on  Wednesday  to  point 
out  that  the  work  was  so  hastily  done  that  limbs  were  protruding 
from  the  too  shallow  pits  in  which  the  bodies  had  been  interred.  I 
was  solemnly  assured  by  the  Eev.  Mr.  Marquardt,  of  the  Dutch 
Eeformed  Church,  wEo  was  present  during  the  scene,  which  he 
described  with  a shudder,  that  the  second  burial  party  sent  by 
Methuen  were  all  intoxicated  while  performing  the  gruesome  task 
of  re-burying  their  comrades.  Drink  was,  it  appears,  deemed  to  be 
necessary  for  the  bur3dng  party,  owing  to  the  rapid  decomposition  of 
the  bodies  after  lying  some  days  in  the  broiling  sun.  Some  of  the 
Tommies  jumped  on  the  covering  of  the  pits  so  as  to  press  down  the 
bulging  carcases  of  the  dead.  A horrible  and  sickening  scene,  truly  ; 
but  it  is  only  by  the  painting  of  war  in  its  true  and  ghastly  char- 
acter, and  not  in  its  tinsel  trappings,  that  the  victims  of  war — the 
working  men — may  be  induced  not  to  lend  their  support  to  those 
who  wage  war  for  other  than  noble  and  patriotic  ends. 

The  tragic  but  true  soldierly  death  of  General  Wauchope  greatly 
impressed  the  entire  Federal  forces,  officers  and  men.  Every  mark 
of  respect  was  shown  to  the  body  on  the  battle-field;  his  dirk  and 
other  personal  belongings  being  reverently  preserved  until  they  could 
be  forwarded  to  the  dead  chieftain’s  family.  The  Landrost  of 
Hoopstadt,  into  whose  custody  they  were  given  for  safety,  authorized 
me  to  say  in  my  letters  to  the  Dublin  “ Freeman’s  Journal”  that 
these  mementoes  of  a gallant  foeman’s  fall  would  be  sent  by  him 


224 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREED031 


to  General  Wanchope’s  relatives  whenever  applied  for.  Intimation 
to  this  effect  was  made  after  my  returnr  from  the  Transvaal  to  the 
British  Secretary  for  War,  through  the  medium  of  a question  in 
the  House  of  Commons. 

I must  now  leave  General  Cronje  and  his  great  victory  until,  in 
the  course  of  this  story,  the  fatal  retreat  to  Paardeberg  has  to  be 
related. 


Chapter  XX 


BATTLE  OF  STORMBERG 

The  Free  State  frontier — English  forces  under  Gatacre  and  French 
—Disposition  of  Boer  forces— Boers  restrained  from  invading 
Cape  Colony  by  political  reasons — Colonials  join  Boers — Eng- 
lish CONFIDENCE  IN  GatACRE — HiS  SEVERE  MILITARY  MEASURES — 
Night  expedition  of  British  against  Stormberg — Their  reception 
BY  THE  Boers — Panic  flight  of  the  British — Comparison  of 
British  with  Boer  losses — Sketch  of  General  Ollivier — Roll  of 
Colonial  recruits  of  the  Boers. 


‘TX'XHILE  Joubert  and  his  commandoes  were  driving  the  British 
V V troops  before  them  in  Xatal,  and  Cronje  and  De  la  Eey  were 
holding  a second  British  force  in  check  at  Modder  Eiver,  two  other 
English  armies  were  advancing  from  the  south  to  the  Free  State 
frontier.  The  objects  of  these  forces  were  to  defend  certain  stra- 
tegic positions  south  of  the  Orange  Eiver,  and  to  compel  the  Fed- 
eral Governments  to  detach  burghers  from  the  two  main  Boer  forces 
operating  in  the  east  and  west  to  defend  the  way  to  Bloemfontein. 
One  of  these  was  commanded  by  General  Gatacre,  and  had  its  base 
at  East  London.  From  this  port  a railway  runs  northwest  to  the 
Orange  Free  State  border,  a distance  of  some  150  miles,  reaching 
at  about  two-thirds  of  that  way  the  Stormberg  range  of  hills.  South 
of  this  range,  at  Queenstown,  the  British  camp  was  formed.  The 
line  crosses  the  hills  from  thence,  and  reaches  Molteno  and  Storm- 
berg junctions.  From  this  latter  place  one  branch  line  goes  west- 
ward, to  Eosmead,  where  it  connects  with  the  main  line  from  Port 
Elizabeth,  which,  in  turn,  branches  out  at  Xaauwpoort;  one  line 
going  west,  to  join  the  Cape  Town  to  Kimberley  line  at  De  Aar, 
and  the  other  striking  due  north  and  crossing  the  Orange  Eiver 
at  Xorvals  Pont,  running  in  a straight  course  from  thence  to 
Bloemfontein.  The  other  branch  from  Stormberg  Junction  goes 
north  and  divides  again  at  Albert  Junction,  some  twenty  miles 
nearer  the  river;  one  branch  going  east  to  Aliwal  Xorth,  where  it 
ends,  and  the  other  going  northwest  over  the  river  at  Bethulie,  and 
joining  the  line  from  Xaauwpoort  at  Springfontein  in  the  Free 
State. 

There  were  three  positions  of  importance  ahead  of  General  Gat- 
15 


226 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


acre’s  camp  which  were  occupied  hy  British  troops  in  October: 
Stormherg,  Albert  Junction,  and  Aliwal  North,  all  in  a strong 
pro-Boer  district,  which,  being  immediately  south  of  the  Orange 
Eiver,  contained  a large  percentage  of  Dutch  colonists  who  had 
intermarried  with  their  kindred  over  the  border. 

The  fourth  British  army,  which  was  largely  composed  of  mounted 
men,  was  under  the  command  of  General  French,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded in  breaking  away  from  Ladysmith  after  the  battle  of  Mod- 
derspruit;  narrowly  escaping  the  experiences  of  the  siege  of  that 
town  which  followed  on  White’s  defeat  on  the  30th  of  October. 
This  force  had  Port  Elizabeth  as  its  base,  and  held  the  railways 
at  Eosmead  Junction,  some  80  miles  south  of  the  Orange  Eiver, 
and  a similar  distance  west  of  Gatacre’s  headquarters  at  Queens- 
town. Between  the  river  and  French’s  camp  there  was  Norvals 
Pont,  with  its  bridge  over  the  stream,  Colesberg,  Arundel,  and  the 
important  Junction  of  Naauwpoort;  each  place  being  in  the  occu- 
pation of  small  British  forces  during  October,  and  containing,  as 
in  the  corresponding  districts  in  front  of  Gatacre’s  division,  num- 
bers of  active  sympathizers  with  the  cause  of  the  Eepublics. 

On  the  north  side  of  the  Orange  Eiver  the  Boer  forces  were 
situated  as  follows : 

The  Free  State  Government,  as  pointed  out  in  a previous  chapter, 
had  to  divide  its  small  army  into  three  main  divisions:  one  under 
Martinus  Prinsloo,  defending  the  northeastern  border  at  Van 
Eeenan’s  Pass,  and  cooperating  with  Joubert  in  Natal;  another  in 
the  west,  subdivided  into  the  force  besieging  Kimberley,  under 
Vessels,  and  the  commando  under  Jacobus  Prinsloo,  in  front  of 
]\Iethuen ; the  third  being  in  the  south,  guarding  the  Orange  Eiver 
and  the  two  lines  of  railway  from  East  London  and  Port  Eliza- 
beth wNere  they  crossed  into  the  Free  State  at  Bethulie  and  Norvals 
Pont,  respectively. 

I have  dealt  with  the  operations  of  the  eastern  and  western  Free 
State  commandoes  up  to  the  victories  of  Modderspruit  and  Magers- 
fontein,  and  I purpose  in  this  chapter  to  give  a brief  account  of 
the  doings  of  the  remaining  division  of  the  little  Free  State  army 
up  to  the  brilliant  triumph  of  Stormherg. 

The  southern  commandoes  were  mainly  recruited  from  the  coun- 
try south  of  Fauresmith  and  Wepener,  and  consisted  of  burghers 
from  the  Caledon  Eiver,  Eouxville,  Bethulie,  and  Philippolis  dis- 
tricts. There  were  some  500  Transvaalers  with  these  commandoes, 
while  volunteers  from  the  Cape  Colony  joined  in  large  numbers 
after  the  Boers  had  crossed  the  river.  The  total  force  of  the  divi- 
sion before  the  invasion  of  the  Colony  was  3,500  men,  with  a mixed 
battery  of  Krupp  guns  and  ]\raxim-Nordenfelts.  The  head  com- 


BATTLE  OF  STOEMBEEG 


227 


niand  TN'as  vested  in  General  E.  E.  Grobler,  Vice-Chairman  of  the 
Free  State  Yolksraad,  while  Commandants  John  Hendrik  Ollivier 
of  Eouxville,  Swanepoll  of  Smithfield,  and  Dn  Plooy  of  Bethulie, 
were  the  chief  officers  of  their  respective  commandoes.  General 
Schoeman  of  the  Potchefstroom  district,  with  J.  D.  Celliers  of 
Pretoria,  as  adjutant,  was  in  charge  of  the  Transvaal  burghers  in- 
cluded in  this  third  or  southern  division  of  the  Free  State  forces. 

From  the  declaration  of  war  until  the  12th  of  November,  fully 
a whole  month,  this  strong  body  of  fighting  burghers  lay  immedi- 
ately north  of  the  Orange  Eiver,  doing  nothing,  while  the  British 
were  sending  troops  forward  from 
East  London  and  Port  Elizabeth  on 
the  landing  of  every  contingent  from 
England.  Naauwpoort  and  He  Aar 
could  have  been  taken  in  a week  by 
1,500  men  up  to  the  20th  of  October, 
and  by  Grobler's  force  any  time  be- 
fore the  1st  of  November.  No  move, 
however,  was  made  on  either  of  these 
strategically  important  junctions,  and 
the  enemy  was  permitted,  unmolested, 
to  strengthen  his  weak  garrisons  in 
the  two  most  vital  points  for  him  to 
be  able  to  hold  south  of  the  Orange 
Eiver.  I have  referred  to  the  cause 
of  this  most  culpable  act  of  irreso- 
lute policy  in  previous  chapters,  as 
being  found  in  the  existence  of  the  Schreiner  Ministry  at  the 
Cape.  This  Government  attempted  to  sit  on  a British  and  a Boer 
stool,  and  thereby  to  keep  in  office.  Unfortunately  for  the  Boer 
cause  they  succeeded  in  the  performance  long  enough  to  induce 
the  Free  State  Government,  through  an  over-scrupulous  regard  for 
Boer  political  kinship  with  the  Afrikander  Bond,  to  allow  the 
English  to  rescue  De  Aar  and  Naauwpoort,  by  large  reenforee- 
ments,  from  their  perilous  weakness.  To  every  request  made  by 
the  burghers  on  the  river  for  permission  to  cross  in  October,  the 
reply  from  Bloemfontein  was — “ Wait.” 

The  English  fell  back  from  their  garrisons  immediately  south 
of  the  Free  State  border  after  the  Boer  victories  in  Natal,  and  the 
Colony  to  the  north  of  Stormberg  and  Naauwpoort  was  left  without 
a single  British  soldier.  This  evidence  of  British  weakness  im- 
pressed the  population  greatly,  and  the  prestige  of  the  Eepublics 
increased  correspondingly.  During  the  previous  occupation  of  Ali- 
wal  North,  Albert,  Colesberg,  and  other  places,  the  British  had 


328 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


played  havoc  with  the  fences  and  crops  of  both  Diitch  and  Colonial 
farmers,  and  their  departure  south,  on  the  strength  of  growing 
rumors  of  a Boer  invasion,  gave  satisfaction  to  most  of  the  people 
in  these  districts.  Young  Afrikanders  had  commenced  to  cross  the 
river  and  to  join  the  commandoes  on  the  other  side,  and  finally,  on 
the  12th  of  November,  orders  were  sent  at  last  from  Bloemfontein 
to  General  Grobler  to  march  across  and  occupy  the  places  vacated 
by  the  enemy’s  troops. 

On  the  13th,  Commandant  Ollivier  took  possession  of  Aliwal 
North,  Commandant  Du  Plooy  of  Burghersdorp,  while  Generals 
Grobler  and  Schoeman  crossed  over  the  bridge  at  Norvals  Pont, 
and  hoisted  the  Free  State  flag  at  Colesberg.  The  invaders  were 
received  without  protest  by  the  Afrikander  colonists,  no  opposition 
of  any  kind  being  offered,  even  by  the  British  farmers,  whose  prop- 
erty was  in  no  way  interfered  with.  The  Free  State  officers  for- 
mally commandeered  the  available  Afrikander  youth,  and  others  of 
maturer  years,  for  the  service  of  the  Eepublican  armies,  and  during 
the  months  of  November  and  December  a splendid  fighting  force 
of  over  3,000  men  were  thus  added  to  the  strength  of  the  Federal 
ranks.  The  whole  northern  region  of  the  Cape  Colony,  from 
Barkly  East  to  Prieska  in  the  west,  gave  a passive  recognition  to 
the  cause  of  the  allied  Eepublics.  Schoeman  was  elected  General 
for  the  Colesberg  district,  and  found  himself  at  the  head  of  3,000 
men.  He  was  urged  to  advance  on  Naauwpoort  and  to  attack  the 
growing,  but  as  yet  weak,  garrison  in  charge  of  that  important 
junction  before  it  was  reenforced  with  more  troops.  He  dallied 
at  Colesberg,  wasted  time,  and  allowed  General  French  with  10,000 
men  to  secure  the  place  against  any  attack  from  the  Free  State. 
This  inaction  of  Schoeman  created  much  discontent  among  the 
burghers  and  Colonial  volunteers,  and,  when  General  French  began 
the  offensive  against  his  most  irresolute  adversary,  it  became  neces- 
sary for  the  Free  State  Government  to  summon  to  the  aid  of  the 
Colesberg  Boers  the  sound  military  judgment  and  splendid  fighting 
qualities  of  De  la  Eey.  A record  of  the  brilliant  campaign  waged 
by  this  great  general  against  French  and  his  legions  will,  however, 
require  a separate  chapter,  and  I must  turn  back  again  to  this  part 
of  my  story  after  dealing  with  the  battles  of  Stormberg,  Colenso, 
and  Spion  Kop. 

Commandants  Ollivier,  Swanepoll,  Du  Plooy,  and  Steenekamp, 
with  the  Eouxville,  Smithfield,  Bethulie,  and  Burghersdorp  men, 
moved  forward  in  the  latter  part  of  November  upon  Stormberg 
Junction,  which  was  distant  only  seventeen  miles  due  north  from 
Putterskraal,  where  General  Gatacre’s  headquarters  were  then  lo- 
cated. Three  weeks  before  the  advent  of  Ollivier,  a garrison  of  700 


BATTLE  OF  STOEMBEBG 


229 


British  troops  had  held  Stormberg.  These  fell  back  on  Molteno 
and  then  on  Putterskraal,  and  Ollivier  advanced  from  Burghers- 
dorp  and  occupied  the  place  which  Gatacre  resolved  to  attack  on 
the  10th  of  December. 

General  Gatacre’s  expedition  along  the  shortest  and  most  direct 
line  from  the  coast  to  Bloemfontein  excited  very  sanguine  hopes  in 
England.  He  was  spoken  of  as  one  of  the  ablest  of  British  officers, 
and,  in  view  of  the  demands  made  upon  the  Boer  armies  by  the 
operations  in  Hatal  and  south  of  Kimberley,  it  was  felt  as  likely, 
and  believed  in  as  probable,  that  the  prize  of  Bloemfontein  might 
be  snatched  by  a dash  on  the  Free  State  capital,  while  Buller  and 
^Methuen  were  engaging  the  two  most  capable  generals  of  the  Fed- 
eral forces.  One  Jingo  paper  spoke  enthusiastically  of  what  the 
Gatacre  column  was  destined  to  achieve,  in  the  following  glowing 
terms : 

“ This  is  perhaps  the  most  important  expedition  in  the  campaign, 
and,  as  the  Boers  have  spent  their  stren,^h  upon  the  eastern  and 
western  frontiers.  General  Gatacre  may  be  able  to  make  a dash 
over  the  open  country  upon  Bloemfontein,  which,  if  it  does  not 
' stagger  humanity,’  will  at  least  astonish  the  world.” 

That  was  one  week  before  Stormberg. 

Before  the  advance  was  decided  upon,  which  certainly  did  aston- 
ish the  world  in  its  result.  General  Gatacre  had  resorted  to  the 
sternest  military  measures  for  the  intimidation  of  Dutch  sympa- 
thizers with  his  foes  on  the  line  of  his  progress  north.  A letter 
received  from  one  of  the  soldiers  in  this  expedition,  published  after 
the  news  of  the  battle  of  the  10th  of  December  had  reached  Eng- 
land, related : “ Somehow  the  place  is  alive  with  spies,  and  almost 
every  day  one  or  two  are  shot.  Kot  much  time  is  wasted  with  them. 
Once  captured,  they  are  brought  in,  tried  by  drumhead  court-martial, 
and  are  almost  invariably  shot  at  once.”  All  this  was  proof  that 
the  general  who  sanctioned  these  executions  was  a most  capable 
officer,  and  would  leave  his  mark  on  the  records  of  the  war.  So  he 
has.  His  measures  of  justice  to  alleged  spies  were  the  best  recruit- 
ing agencies  south  of  the  Orange  Eiver  for  the  Federal  armies,  and 
the  men  who  were  driven  by  such  brutal  and  unwarranted  military 
executions  into  the  Boer  commandoes  from  Cape  Colony  were 
among  those  who  chased  this  great  British  general  and  his  troops 
out  of  Stormberg  and  put  an  end  to  the  English  hope  of  a capture 
of  Bloemfontein  by  the  Gatacre  genius  and  dash. 

Around  very  few  of  the  series  of  British  “ mishaps  ” in  this  war 
has  the  war  correspondent’s  fertile  inventiveness  woven  a greater 
number  of  plausible  theories  with  which  to  account  for  a stagger- 


BATTLE  OF  STORMBERG 


231 


ing  defeat  otherwise  than  how  and  why  it  was  really  inflicted,  than 
that  of  Stormberg.  The  world  was  told  of  an  unknown  and  diffi- 
cult country  to  march  over;  a wild,  dark  night;  a wretched  road; 
overworked  Tommies;  too  rigid  discipline;  treacherous  guides; 
plans  revealed  to  the  Boers,  and  all  the  rest;  all  with  the  patent 
purpose  of  concealing  the  truth  for  a time  which  was  bound  to 
assert  itself  in  the  publication  of  the  real  facts  some  day.  The 
circumstance  that  700  British  troops  had  been  for  six  weeks  in 
Stormberg  itself,  and  had  remained  there  until  twenty-one  days 
previous  to  the  attack  by  Gatacre,  and  had  built  the  very  sangars 
and  fortifications  used  by  the  Boers  on  the  10th  of  December,  never 
found  any  mention  in  the  English  reports  of  the  battle.  These 
details  were  not  interesting;  they  were  all  concealed  from  the  pub- 
lic, so  as  to  lessen  the  significance  of  the  defeat,  and  to  minimize 
the  consequent  injury  to  British  military  prestige. 

Early  in  the  month  of  October  a correspondent  of  the  (Cape 
Colony)  “ East  London  Despatch  ” visited  the  then  British  camp 
at  Stormberg,  and  duly  recorded  his  impressions  of  the  soldiers 
who  were  garrisoned  there,  under  Colonel  Gordon’s  command,  as 
follows : 

“ They  have  been  actively  exercised  at  scouting  work,  and  report 
has  it  that  they  have  been  drilled  into  the  most  perfect  efficiency. 
As  nearly  as  I can  gather,  there  are  between  700  and  800  men  in 
camp,  including  infantry,  mounted  infantry,  artillery.  Army  Service 
Corps,  Medical  Corps,  and  either  engineers  or  sappers.  The  sur- 
rounding country  has  been  carefully  examined,  and,  should  hostili- 
ties suddenly  break  out,  the  Berlis  would  be  able  to  find  their  way 
everywhere.  The  disposal  of  guns  and  the  ground  plan  of  the  camp 
is  such  that  the  situation,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  is  strongly 
fortified,  and  certainly  the  line  cannot  be  turned  to  inimical  ad- 
vantage by  the  enemy  while  the  Berks  remain  where  they  are.” 

This  was  the  place  and  position  which  was  so  difficult  for  British 
forces  to  discover  just  twenty-one  days  after  the  Berkshire  Eegiment 
had  retired  on  Gatacre’s  camp,  seventeen  miles  south ! 

The  British  general  had  a choice  of  three  roads  for  his  move- 
ment on  Stormberg  from  Molteno,  and  he  selected  the  best  one  for 
his  purpose.  The  old  road,  to  the  right,  leaves  the  railway  track 
after  a mile  from  Molteno,  and  passes  on  three  or  four  miles  east 
of  Stormberg,  through  some  mountain  gorges  and  kloefs,  and  con- 
tinues to  Burghersdorp.  That  route  would  have  presented  great 
difficulties  in  a night  march,  and  would  have  made  a “ surprise  ” 
attack  on  the  Boer  positions  impossible.  The  new  road,  constructed 
twenty  years  ago,  runs  almost  straight  from  Molteno  to  Stormberg 
Junction,  crossing  the  railway  track  twice  in  its  course,  and  skirt- 


233 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


ing  for  the  last  two  miles  the  base  of  the  hills  on  which  General 
Ollivier  and  Commandant  Swanepoll  were  posted  with  their  men. 
This  road  would  have  been  even  more  hazardous  for  the  object  of 
the  midnight  march  of  the  English  than  the  old  road,  as  it  passed 
in  between  two  of  the  very  ridges  guarded  by  the  Boers.  The  third 
way  was  by  the  main  road  from  Molteno  to  Steynsburg,  and  for 
every  object  of  Gatacre’s  purpose,  strategical  and  otherwise,  it  was 
the  best  and  only  practicable  route  to  take.  When  three  miles  out- 
side of  Molteno,  it  turns  suddenly  to  the  west,  dipping  south  at  the 
bend  and  sweeping  round  in  a semicircle  the  farm  of  Klipfontein. 
approaching  again  to  Stormberg,  almost  at  right  angles,  and  going 
within  a mile  of  the  railway  station  before  bending  west  again, 
and  then  south,  to  Stejmsburg.  The  farm  of  Klipfontein  is  south- 
west of  the  hills  on  which  the  burghers  were  placed,  and  it  was  on 
this  farm  where  the  English  were  themselves  surprised,  but  not 
before  they  had  reached  within  500  yards  of  the  ridge  on  which 
the  Smithfield  burghers  were  posted ; a fact  demonstrating  that  the 
troops  had  been  well  and  accurately  guided  all  the  way.  This  route 
was  three  miles  longer  than  the  new  or  center  road,  owing  to  the 
semicircular  detour  round  Klipfontein,  and  it  is  manifest  that  it 
was  this  extra  distance  by  way  of  the  longer  and  safer  route  for 
the  advance  from  Molteno  which  tended  to  disarrange  the  plan  for 
a surprise  through  the  miscalculated  time-duration  of  the  march. 

The  story  of  the  false  guides  is  a pure  invention,  and  only  one 
of  the  many  sorry  expedients  resorted  to  by  the  English  war  corre- 
spondent when  a disaster  has  to  be  explained  away  in  any  or  every 
manner  which  may  for  a time  tend  to  disguise  the  ugly  facts  of  a 
defeat.  That  Gatacre  and  his  men  should  have  reached  their  ob- 
jective Avithout  observation  disposes  completely  of  the  theory  of 
treachery.  As  already  pointed  out,  the  whole  locality  of  the  Boer 
position  was  known  to  officers  of  Gatacre’s  staff,  who  had  them- 
selves been  located  at  Stormberg  for  six  weeks,  and  had  actually 
built  its  fortifications.  The  extra  guides  selected  for  the  column  were 
Kaffir  policemen  of  the  Fingo  and  Tambu  tribes,  who  were  friendly 
to  the  English  and  hostile  to  the  Boers,  and  who  knew  every  inch  of 
the  road.  There  were  only  a few  pro-Boers  at  Molteno,  which  was  a 
strong  English  center,  and  it  is  the  lunacy  of  absurdity  to  suppose 
that  Gatacre  dispensed  with  the  services  of  his  own  officers  and  of 
the  British  Colonial  Police  in  order  to  get  a Boer  sympathizer  as  a 
guide  for  his  column  on  such  an  occasion.  As  a matter  of  fact, 
one  of  the  Kaffir  Police  guides  was  killed  in  the  fight  by  the  Boer 
fire;  the  other  fired  on  the  Boers  after  the  British  had  hoisted  the 
white  flag,  and  would  haA^e  been  shot  had  not  General  Ollivier  saved 
his  life,  and  sent  him  as  a prisoner  to  Pretoria.  Like  a similar 


BATTLE  OF  STOBMBEEG 


233 


story  about  treacherous  guides  at  Nicholson’s  Nek,  this  one  was  in- 
vented with  the  object  of  hiding  the  ugly  facts,  which  would  tell 
a plain  tale  of  crass  stupidity  on  the  part  of  British  officers,  and  of 
panic  and  a white  flag  on  the  side  of  men  who  are  trained  to  look 
to  such  officers  for  every  order  and  direction  in  every  contingency 
and  situation  in  the  soldier’s  disciplinary  life,  from  barrack-room 
existence  to  the  actualities  of  a battle-field. 

The  Boer  forces  at  Stormberg  when  Gatacre’s  attack  was  deliv- 
ered comprised  400  men  of  the  Eouxville  commando,  under  General 
Ollivier,  and  350  men  of  the  Smithfield  burghers,  under  Com- 
mandant Swanepoll.  Of  the  latter  body,  only  sixty  actually  par- 
ticipated in  the  engagement  all  through;  the  others  being  some 
miles  east  of  the  hill  guarding  the  left  of  the  Boer  positions  against 
possible  surprise  by  the  old  road  to  Burghersdorp.  Swanepoll  held 
the  crest  of  the  hill  looking  down  upon  the  Klipfontein  Farm.  A 
hundred  of  those  of  his  men  who  were  eastward  watching  for  the 
enem3^s  movements  in  that  direction  arrived  after  the  enemy  had 
been  knocked  into  confusion  by  Ollivier’s  and  Swanepoll’s  first  at- 
tack, and  only  helped  to  drive  the  British  back  on  their  line  of 
march. 

West  of  Stormberg,  a distance  of  nine  miles,  at  a place  called 
De  Kop,  on  the  road  from  the  J unction  to  Steynsburg,  the  Burghers- 
dorp (Colonial)  contingent,  400  strong,  was  in  laager,  under  Com- 
mandant P.  A.  Steenekamp.  There  were  also  300  of  the  Bethulie 
commando  in  the  same  place,  under  Field  Cornet  Du  Plooy,  General 
Grobler  being  in  chief  command. 

The  four  commandoes  were  in  two  divisions;  the  one  in  occupa- 
tion of  Stormberg  being  composed  of  the  Eouxville  and  Smithfield 
burghers;  and  the  other,  at  De  Kop,  comprising  the  Bethulie  men 
and  the  Burghersdorp  volunteers.  The  separation  of  the  two 
laagers  by  that  distance  was  the  result  of  a quarrel  as  to  which  divi- 
sion should  have  the  solitary  gun,  a Krupp  twelve-pounder,  in  pos- 
session of  the  entire  force ; the  Smithfield  men  claiming  and  holding 
it,  whereupon  the  Burghersdorp  and  Bethulie  burghers  moved  away 
nine  miles  nearer  Steynsburg,  where  they  were  in  laager,  and 
asleep,  when  Gatacre’s  guns  were  heard  in  the  early  morning  of  the 
10th  of  December  at  the  Stormberg  Junction. 

A report  of  the  differences  between  the  two  Boer  laagers  probably 
reached  the  British  camp,  and  may  have  induced  General  Gatacre 
to  plan  the  bold  stroke  for  the  10th  of  December,  which  so  signally 
failed  when  so  near  success.  In  any  case,  it  was  a movement  which 
both  military  and  political  considerations  fully  justified  the  Eng- 
lish general  in  planning.  Stormberg  was  a very  important  position, 
standing  as  it  did  right  across  the  line  which  was  the  shortest  and 


234 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


most  direct  route  by  rail  from  the  coast  to  Bloemfontein.  It  was 
also  near  Burghersdorp,  the  chief  center  of  active  pro-Boer  sym- 
pathy in  the  north  of  Cape  Colony.  A stunning  blow  delivered  at 
such  a spot,  at  that  particular  period,  would  have  all  but  arrested 
the  recruiting  for  the  Federal  armies  vdiich  the  ignominious  failure 
of  the  attack  only  correspondingly  stimulated. 

On  the  night  of  Deceml)er  9 the  British  column  which  was  to 
surprise  the  Boers  at  Stormberg  marched  north  from  Molteno. 
The  force  consisted  of  jSTorthumberland  Fusiliers,  Irish  Eifles, 
mounted  infantry,  and  Cape  Mounted  Eifles.  There  were  also  the 
men  and  guns  of  two  batteries  of  field  artillery  and  two  Maxims; 
in  all,  close  upon  3,000  troops,  and  fourteen  guns.  A local  news- 
paper eulogist  of  the  Gatacre  division,  who,  by  an  intelligent  an- 
ticipation of  events,  had  heralded  the  preparations  for  this  for- 
midable expedition,  added  that  “ five  special  war  correspondents  ” 
were  to  accompany  the  conquering  column.  There  was,  therefore, 
nothing  left  undone  to  inspire  a confident  anticipation  of  a brilliant 
British  triiimph. 

The  night  was  pitch  dark,  and  thus  favored  the  purposes  of  the 
first  aggressive  movement  of  Gatacre’s  force.  The  gun  carriages 
M'ere  provided  with  muffled  tires,  and  all  other  precautions  against 
alarming  the  Boers  too  soon  were  taken.  The  road  for  three- 
fourths  of  the  distance  was  well  sheltered  by  ridges  and  kopjes 
against  observation  from  the  direction  of  the  Junction,  and,  except- 
ing the  miscalculation  as  to  distance,  there  had  been  no  mistake 
in  the  march  of  the  column. 

During  the  last  two  miles  of  the  journey  the  road,  in  approach- 
ing the  Junction,  passed  near  to  a farm  which,  fortunately  for 
the  burghers  who  were  asleep  in  their  laagers  ahead,  possessed  a 
dog.  The  animal  barked  at  the  passing  troops  and  awoke  two  men, 
who,  on  looking  out  on  the  veldt,  beheld  the  moving  masses  of 
Tommies.  They  rushed  with  their  guns  to  a stone  wall  some  200 
yards  from  the  road,  and  opened  fire  into  the  rear  of  the  column. 
Half  the  troops  had  passed  on  before  this  incident  occurred.  The 
sixty  Smithfield  burghers  with  their  Krupp  were  on  the  crest  of 
the  hill  about  a mile  away,  to  the  right  front  of  the  column,  and 
were  aroused  by  the  shooting.  So  were  the  Eouxville  burghers 
further  ahead,  to  the  left,  at  the  Junction,  who  rushed  from  their 
laager  up  the  side  of  the  same  hill  a little  to  the  west,  and  placed 
themselves  in  position  behind  the  fortifications  built  by  the  British 
soldiers  when  in  possession  of  the  ridge. 

The  I^orthumber lands  were  at  the  head  of  the  column,  and  had 
passed  on  nearer  to  the  Junction  when  the  two  Afrikanders  had 
fired  upon  the  Irish  Eifles,  who  were  near  the  rear.  The  front  part 


BATTLE  OF  STOBMBEBG 


235 


of  the  column  was,  therefore,  only  some  500  or  700  yards  from 
Commandant  Swanepoll’s  position  on  the  top  of  the  ridge  when  the 
two  shots,  ringing  out  their  warnings  in  the  morning  air,  told  the 
tale  of  the  enemy's  stealth}'  advent  right  on  to  the  farm  at  Klip- 
fontein.  On  the  Smithfield  men  firing  down  on  the  more  or  less 
massed  Tommies,  a panic  was  created;  the  belief  obtaining  among 
them  that  the  shots  from  behind  came  from  a large  concealed  force 
in  that  direction,  and  that  the  column  had  landed  itself  into  a trap. 
The  panic,  however,  did  not  last  long.  The  true  state  of  things 
in  the  rear  was  soon  discovered,  and  the  enemy's  guns  were  brought 


SERVICE  OF  THE  SOLITARY  BOER  GUN  AT  STORMBERG  VICTORY 


up  and  trained  upon  the  ridge  to  the  right  front,  some  1,500  5"ards 
distance.  This  steadied  the  Britishers  for  a time,  but,  as  they 
failed  to  secure  any  adequate  cover,  Avhere,  strange  to  say,  an  abun- 
dance of  it  obtained,  the  Mausers  from  the  heights  where  the  Eoiix- 
ville  men  were  now  in  secure  position  l^egaii  to  tell  with  terrible 
effect  upon  the  enemy.  ]\Ien  dropped  all  round,  while  not  a single 
Boer  was  visible  at  any  point.  It  finally  occurred  to  some  of  Gat- 
acre’s  officers  to  attempt  to  get  round  the  ridge  by  going  a little 
west  of  the  road,  below  where  it  bends  sharply  to  the  left  and  turns 
again  due  west  to  Steynsburg,  and,  by  taking  the  road  again  after 
the  turn,  come  on  to  the  Junction  from  the  direction  of  Steynsburg. 
Whoever  thought  of  this  movement  must  have  been  accurately  in- 
formed of  the  topography  of  the  place,  and  were  it  not  for  the  rapid 


236 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


riding  of  Du  Plooy  from  De  Kop,  along  this  very  road,  the  troops 
would  have  turned  the  position  held  by  Ollivier,  and  probably  have 
captured  Stormberg. 

What  prevented  this  and  saved  the  situation  was  the  arrival  on 
the  scene  of  some  of  the  Bethulie  burghers.  The  guns  at  Storm- 
berg were  heard  at  De  Kop,  and  the  Burghersdorp  and  Bethulie 
men  were  roused  with  orders  of  “ Opsal ! ” which  soon  saw  them 
flying  along  the  Steynsburg  road ; 50  of  the  Bethulie  men,  with  Du 
Plooy  at  their  head,  galloping  in  advance,  and  arriving  at  the  bend 
of  the  road  west  of  the  Junction  Just  as  the  Northumberlands  had 
reached  the  same  point  from  across  the  Molteno  branch  of  the  same 
road.  These  Tommies  were  thrown  into  utter  confusion  by  this 
unexpected  encounter,  and  by  the  fierceness  of  the  Bethulie  men’s 
assault.  Finding  themselves  between  two  fires,  and  thinking,  in 
the  confusion  and  the  semi-darkness  of  the  early  morning,  that 
the  50  men  were  a bigger  force,  they  hoisted  the  white  flag  and 
went  through  the  unprecedented  battle-field  ceremony  of  surrender- 
ing their  arms — 8 officers  and  300  men — to  Commandant  Du  Plooy 
and  his  50  burghers ! 

Some  of  the  Bethulie  and  Burghersdorp  burghers,  coming  on 
behind  Du  Plooy,  had  crossed  from  the  Ste}m.sburg  to  the  Molteno 
road,  below  where  the  Northumberlands  had  surrendered,  and  at- 
tacked the  Irish  Eifles  in  the  flank.  This,  together  with  the  num- 
ber of  troops  who  had  already  been  shot  down,  re-created  the  panic 
of  the  first  contact  with  the  Smithfield  men,  and  Gatacre  and  his 
utterly  broken  column  fled  back  to  Molteno,  pursued  for  five  miles 
by  the  Burghersdorp  men,  who  succeeded  in  capturing  two  of  the 
enemy’s  Armstrong  guns  and  an  ammunition  wagon  on  the  way. 
These  guns  had  been  most  clumsily  handled  in  the  fight,  and  were 
fired  in  the  most  disorderly  manner ; Colonel  Eager  being  mortally 
wounded,  along  with  several  more  of  his  men,  by  the  wild  fire  of 
their  own  artillery.  The  solitary  Boer  Krupp,  in  charge  of  Ser- 
geant Muller,  had,  on  the  other  hand,  played  havoc  with  its  shells 
down  among  the  enemy  during  their  confusion  and  flight.  Had 
the  whole  of  the  Smithfield  men  been  with  the  sixty  burghers  who 
were  with  this  gun  on  the  hill  above  the  Klipfontein  Farm,  Gat- 
acre’s  loss  would  have  been  much  heavier  in  killed  and  wounded 
than  it  turned  out  to  be. 

What  was  absolutely  astounding  in  the  conduct  of  the  British 
was  their  hopeless  and  helpless  demoralization,  even  after  the  full 
light  of  the  morning  had  revealed  the  true  positions  of  their  foes, 
and  had  shown  Gatacre  a choice  of  strong  counter  positions  on  the 
west  side  of  the  Molteno  road,  where  the  nature  of  the  ground 
afforded  ample  cover.  Ko  stand  worthy  of  the  name  was  made 


BATTLE  OF  STORMBERG 


237 


by  tbe  enemy  after  the  white  flag  had  been  hoisted  by  the  first  batch 
of  troops,  and  Du  Plooy,  who  took  their  surrender,  then  dashed 
down  the  road  and  helped  in  the  capture  of  the  two  Armstrongs 
with  150  men. 

The  actual  Boer  combatants  in  the  fight  numbered  less  than  800 
men,  and  to  these  618  soldiers  and  14  officers  surrendered,  out  of  a 
total  British  force  of  near  3,000  troops.  Gatacre’s  losses  in  killed 
and  wounded  were  very  slight  in  comparison  with  the  loss  in  prison- 
ers. He  had  26  dead  and  70  disabled,  only. 

The  Boer  casualties  amounted  to  4 killed  and  13  wounded  in 
General  Ollivier’s  commando;  1 killed  and  3 wounded  of  General 
Grobler’s  contingent  (from  De  Hop),  and  Commandant  Swanepoll, 
of  the  Smithfield  burghers,  slightly  wounded;  total,  5 killed  and 
17  wounded.  With  a loss  of  less  than  25  men,  800  actual  Boer 
combatants,  out  of  a total  force  of  1,100,  killed  and  wounded  96 
of  their  enemies,  captured  632,  pursued  over  2,000  more  for  several 
miles,  and  secured  in  the  chase  two  guns  which  were  abandoned  by 
the  flying  column. 

In  an  envelope  addressed  to  a British  resident  at  Stormberg  and 
found  on  the  battle-field,  there  was  a letter  which  was  to  be  for- 
warded to  one  of  the  English  prisoners  at  Pretoria,  which  read  as 
follows : 

“ Dear  Henry — The  Boers  seem  afraid  of  us.  One  good  fight 
will  demoralize  them  completely.  In  my  opinion  they  have  the 
courage  of  women,  and  can  fight  all  right  when  they  are  safe  them- 
selves; and,  when  their  courage  fails,  they  have  to  resort  to  strategy.” 

Commandant  Swanepoll  wrote  the  following  across  the  letter, 
and  ordered  it  to  be  sent  to  its  owner: 

trust  you  will  disillusion  this  lady  now,  as  regards  our 
courage.  Very  striking  that  on  the  very  day  the  letter  was  ad- 
dressed to  you  (10th  December)  the  courageous  English  were  hidden 
behind  the  rocks  at  Stormberg  and  taken  prisoners.  Do  let  the 
lady  know  that  we  were  only  a few  hundred  against  3,000.” 


GENERAL  OLLIVIER 

John  Hendrik  Ollivier,  who  took  a prominent  part  in  the  inflic- 
tion of  this  smashing  blow  on  Gatacre,  was  47  years  old  when  the 
war  broke  out.  He  is  of  French  origin,  and  was  born  at  Eouxville, 
in  the  south  of  the  Orange  Free  State.  He  was  a wealthy  farmer, 
and  immensely  popular  with  the  burghers  in  that  beautiful  region 
of  the  Eepublic.  Being  a neighbor  of  the  Basutos,  whose  lovely 


238 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


country  adjoins  the  district  of  Eouxville  on  the  east,  General  01- 
livier  had  acquired  considerable  influence  over  the  former  native 
allies  of  the  English  against  the  Boers.  This  influence  was  success- 
fully utilized  when  war  had  been  declared  to  counteract  the  British 
intrigues  which  attempted  to  incite  the  Basuto  chiefs  to  harass  the 
Free  State  frontier. 

Oliivier  is  a very  fine  type  of  manhood,  standing  over  six  feet, 
athletically  built,  with  a strong,  handsome  face,  large  black  beard, 
and  jovial  expression.  He  had  three  sons  fighting  by  his  side  at 
Stormberg.  His  grandfather  had  married  three  times,  and  left 
to  the  Boer  nation  a fine  legacy  of  thirty-six  children.  His  grand- 
son, John  Hendrik,  like  almost  all  the  Boer  generals,  was  a member 
of  the  Volksraad  when  hostilities  began. 

As  with  most  other  contentions  and  statements  anent  the  Federal 
forces,  various  and  conflicting  estimates  have  been  given  of  the 
number  of  Afrikanders  who  went  over  as  combatants  to  the  Boer  side 
during  the  war.  These  estimates  were  based  chiefly  on  sensational 
statements  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  conflict.  It  became  neces- 
sary to  account  for  the  alleged  presence  of  from  “ seventy  to  one 
hundred  thousand  Boers  ” and  allies  in  the  field  in  December,  and, 
as  not  more  than  half  these  numbers  could  be  found  in  the  male 
population  of  the  two  Kepublics,  auxiliaries  from  Cape  Colony  and 
Europe  were  thrown  in  by  the  exertions  of  a liberal  imagination,  in 
order  to  make  up  the  conjectured  Eepublican  strength.  “ Ten 
thousand”  volunteer  and  commandeered  Afrikanders  were  declared 
by  English  and  Colonial  critics  to  have  thus  joined  the  Federal 
standards.  In  the  light  of  the  figures  given  below,  and  which  are 
from  a most  reliable  source,  that  of  one  of  the  chief  organizers  of 
these  “ rebels,”  this  estimate  is  a great  exaggeration.  The  number 
of  actual  combatants  from  each  district  in  the  north  and  northwest 
of  Cape  Colony,  up  to  the  date  of  the  battle  of  Stormberg,  were 
as  follows : 


Colesberg,  town  and  district 150  men 

Venterstad 120  “ 

Burghersdorp 480  “ 

Aliwal  North,  and  Ladygrcy 500  “ 

Barkly  East  and  Dordrecht  (district  of 

. Wodehouse) 550  “ 

Griqualand  West,  comprising  Barkly  West, 
and  districts  of  Hay,  Herbert,  and 

Vryberg 1,000  “ 

Casual  Afrikander  volunteers  . . . 500  “ 


3,300 


BATTLE  OF  STOBMBEEG 


JJ39 


About  2,000  more  fighters  could  have  been  “ commandeered  ” in 
the  Steynsburg,  Somerset  East,  Craddock,  Middelburg,  and  other 
districts  had  these  places  been  proclaimed.  Boer  sympathizers  in 
Cape  Colony  and  ISTatal  wanted  this  kind  of  “ coercion  ” as  a 
justification  for  their  enlistment.  They  were  nominal  British  sub- 
jects, and  unless  their  desire  to  help  the  Federals  was  assisted  in 
this  way  they  refused  to  volunteer.  E'o  such  encouragement  as 
that  suspected  was  at  first  tendered  by  the  Free  State  authorities 
to  these  potential  allies  across  the  Orange  Eiver.  On  the  contrary, 
the  tendency  during  the  early 
weeks  of  the  war  was  to  prevent 
the  combat  from  penetrating  too 
far  from  the  Free  State  bor- 
der, and  the  conditions  of  proc- 
lamation and  commandeering 
required  by  the  political  con- 
sciences of  Cape  Colony  Afri- 
kanders were  only  sanctioned  in 
places  and  districts  lying  close 
to  where  the  Free  State  ex- 
pected its  territory  would  be 
first  attacked  by  the  British. 

The  estimated  number  of 
casual  volunteers  (500)  in- 
cludes the  men,  chiefly  young 
Afrikanders,  who  went  over  iu 
small  bodies  from  Steynsburg. 

Molteno,  Middelburg,  Somerset 
East,  Craddock,  and  other  places, 
without  the  stimulus  of  commandeering.  The  total  number  thus 
made  tip  will  come  very  near  the  actual  figure  where  absolute 
accuracy  is  in  the  nature  of  things  impossible,  hlo  record  of 
these  auxiliary  forces  exists,  but  the  information  upon  which 
this  statement  of  their  numbers  is  based  is  obtained  from  sources 
which  are  most  reliable.  Subsequent  to  the-  victories  of  Colenso 
and  Spion  Kop,  probably  700  or  1,000  more  volunteers  found  their 
way  over  the  Orange  Eiver.  Griqualand  West  districts  supplied 
the  largest  number  of  Afrikander  allies  of  any  portion  of  the 
Colony.  The  men  from  this  locality  fought  with  Cronje  at  Magers- 
fontein,  and  joined  De  Wet  Avhen  he  assumed  command  of  a section 
of  the  western  forces.  The  volunteers  from  the  Colesberg  districts 
joined  SchoemaWs  commandoes,  while  those  from  the  more  eastern 
localities  of  Burghersdorp,  Aliwal  Worth,  Barkly  East,  and  Wode- 
house  ranged  themselves  with  Oliivier’s  army.  Of  Colonial  Volun- 


240 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


teers  who  may  have  joined  Christian  De  Wet,  following  the  disaster 
of  Paardeberg,  and  Hertzog,  George  Brand,  Kritzinger,  Scheepers, 
Letter,  and  other  leaders  subsequently,  after  Lord  Roberts  had  is- 
sued his  home-burning  proclamation,  no  reliable  data  can  yet  be 
obtained.  It  is  probable  that  the  resort  to  British  Weylerism 
brought  10,000  more  Cape  volunteers  to  the  Boer  commandoes 
during  1900-1901. 


Chapter  XXI 


THE  DASH  ON  ESTCOURT 

Louis  Botha  relieves  General  Meyer — Botha’s  popularity — He  gains 
Joubert’s  consent  for  raid  in  British  territory — Derails  armored 
train  at  Blaaukrantz — Capture  of  Winston  Churchill — “ How 
I Escaped  from  the  Boers  ” — David  Joubert  with  one  thousand 
MEN  JOINS  Botha — British  fall  back  to  Estcourt — Engagement 
at  Mooi  River  (Willow  Grange  or  Beacon  Hill) — British  kill 
more  British  than  Boers — Botha’s  report — A “ Times  ” corre- 
spondent ON  devastation  by  the  Boers — General  Piet  Joubert’s 
DISGUST  AT  raiding  CHARACTER  OF  THE  EXPEDITION — He  LEAVES 
Botha  to  oppose  Buller  and  retires  to  invest  Ladysmith 

IEETVRN  again  to  the  progress  of  events  in  Xatal. 

General  Lukas  Meyer  obtained  leave  of  absence  a week  after 
the  engagement  at  Modderspruit,  owing  to  illness  brought  on  by 
the  fatigues  of  the  campaign,  and  Louis  Botha  was  selected  as  a 
temporary  Commandant  of  the  Southeastern  Transvaal  forces. 
This  appointment  gave  general  satisfaction  to  the  burghers.  They 
had  been  quick  to  discern  the  capable  qualities  of  the  man  who 
had  shown  such  skill  in  handling  men  at  Modderspruit,  and  whom 
they  believed  to  he,  tho  holding  but  a subordinate  position,  the 
military  brains-carrier  of  that  brief  but  glorious  campaign.  He 
had  already  won  confidence  all  round  by  the  clearness  of  his  views 
and  the  intrepidity  of  his  actions,  and  his  promotion  to  the  com- 
mand in  question  became  exceedingly  popular,  especially  among 
the  younger  and  more  ardent  Boers. 

The  choice  thus  made  was  not  long  in  proving  itself  worthy  of 
the  popular  recognition  it  obtained.  Botha  infused  a more  aggres- 
sive fighting  spirit  into  the  men  under  his  control.  He  had  no 
power  to  overrule  the  decision  of  Joubert,  hacked  as  this  was  by 
President  Kruger,  to  sit  down  before  Ladysmith,  but  he  resolved  to 
exercise  what  authority  he  possessed  in  the  task  of  forcing  the 
fighting  elsewhere. 

He  at  once  prepared  a flying  column  for  a dash  towards  the 
advancing  British  at  and  below  Colenso,  with  the  double  object  of 
showing  the  Afrikanders  as  far  as  Maritzburg  the  resolute  con- 
fidence of  the  Transvaal  levies,  and  to  inflict  such  punishment 
16 


243 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


upon  the  enemy  in  his  own  country  as  the  fortunes  of  the  con- 
templated raid  might  enable  him  to  do. 

Joubert  was  got  to  consent  to  this  proposed  reconnaissance  in 
force,  and  resolved  to  accompany  it;  more,  it  was  believed,  with 
the  object  of  restraining  the  ardor  of  the  column  and  its  com- 
mander than  from  any  belief  in  the  wisdom  of  the  too  daring 
adventure. 

The  British  had  occupied  and  fortified  the  river  hanks  at 

Colenso  before  the  declaration  of 
war.  Two  forts  had  been  built, 
one  commanding  the  railway, 
and  the  other  the  wagon  bridge 
which  spanned  the  stream,  and 
these  were  held  by  some  Natal 
troops  and  Fusiliers.  An  ad- 
vanced patrol  of  Free  Staters, 
under  Commandant  De  Villiers, 
engaged  a body  of  the  Colenso 
garrison  a few  miles  north  of 
the  village  on  the  7th  of  No- 
vember, and  drove  them  back 
upon  their  main  body.  Colonel 
Cooper,  who  was  in  command  of 
the  troops  in  the  place,  believ- 
ing he  was  about  to  be  attacked 
by  a large  force,  retired  from 
his  position  and  fell  back  on 
General  Hild3'ard’s  camp  at  Est- 
court.  The  evacuation  was  carried  out  under  cover  of  the  night, 
the  enemy  retreating  in  a panic. 

On  the  14th  of  November  the  invading  column  marched  south 


Copyright  byK&iubold&  Thiele,  Louuon 
LOUIS  BOTHA 


from  Colenso.  Joubert  and  Botha  were  now  between  two  English 
armies;  one  near  12,000  strong,  in  Ladysmith,  and  the  other,  sup- 
posed to  he  20,000  strong,  moving  towards  them  from  Durban  to 
Estcourt,  and  to  he,  within  the  brief  space  of  ten  days,  under  the 
immediate  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  who  was  to  eat  his 
Christmas  dinner  in  Pretoria- — according  to  the  boasts  of  the  Jingo 
authors  of  the  war.  It  was  in  every  sense  a daring  and  dashing 
exploit  thus  to  leave  a formidable  army  in  the  rear,  held  in  check 
only  by  a few  thousand  farmers,  and  to  push  forward  into  the 
very  heart  of  the  enemy’s  country  in  face  of  an  advancing  army 
six  times  numerically  stronger  in  men  and  guns  than  Botha's  com- 
mando. But  the  Boer  general  knew  his  men  and  the  country 
thoroughly.  Greytown,  where  he  had  lived  when  young,  was  near 


243 


THE  DASH  ON  ESTCOURT 

Estcourt,  and  the  Johannesburg  Police,  the  Wakkerstroom,  Ermelo, 
Krngersdorp,  Vryheid,  and  Free  State  burghers  were  in  their 
saddles,  as  cool  and  as  brave  a body  of  mounted  men  as  ever  rode 
against  an  advancing  foe. 

The  commando  encumbered  itself  with  very  little  baggage.  It 
was  organized  for  purposes  of  the  swiftest  movements,  and  all 
impediments  were  discarded.  Two  poni-jDoms,  a Creusot  fifteen- 
pounder,  and  a seven-pound  Krupp  were  the  only  guns  it  was  safe 
to  take  au'ay  from  the  siege  of  Ladysmith.  The  column  was 
equipped  so  that  nothing  could  hamper  its  mobility  during  the 
ten  days’  foray  in  the  center  of  Natal  which  had  been  decided 
upon. 

On  the  day  after  the  start  south  from  Colenso  an  armored 
train  was  observed  engaged  in  running  from  Estcourt  to  Chieveley 
and  back,  on  reconnaissance  purposes,  and  it  was  determined  to 
lay  a trap  for  the  “ mobile  fort  ” and  effect  its  capture.  Botha 
arranged  his  plans  for  this  purpose  as  follows  : On  the  morning  of 
the  loth  a hundred  of  the  "Wakkerstroom  commando  were  posted 
on  the  side  of  a high  cutting  through  which  the  railway  line 
north  to  Colenso  and  Ladysmith  passes,  near  Erere.  Another 
force  was  concealed  two  miles  lower  down  the  line,  with  instruc- 
tions to  allow  the  train  to  pass  them  unmolested  towards  the  ridges 
where  the  first  body  were  posted,  who  had  orders  to  attack  it. 
These  dispositions  made,  the  train  was  in  due  course  seen  steaming 
northward.  It  consisted  of  three  armored  trucks,  two  ordinary 
carriages,  and  some  wagons.  The  engine  pushed  the  train  along, 
so  that  in  the  event  of  danger  it  might  the  more  easily  run  back  to 
Estcourt. 

The  first  body  of  ambushed  Boers  permitted  it  to  pass  and  to 
proceed  on  to  the  ridge,  where  a Mauser  fire  was  at  once  opened 
upon  it.  This  brought  it  to  a standstill,  and  the  men  in  charge 
turned  a Maxim  upon  their  assailants.  The  contest  lasted  a few 
minutes  only,  when  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  train  ordered  the 
driver  to  steam  back  to  Estcourt. 

Meanwhile  the  Boers  in  the  rear  of  the  train  had  displaced  a 
rail  in  the  line,  and  on  reaching  this  spot  the  front  trucks  jumped 
the  track  and  brought  the  train  to  a stand.  The  occupants  were 
now  fired  upon  by  the  second  force  of  Boers,  and  a lively  en- 
gagement took  place.  Some  of  the  troops  in  the  train  defended 
themselves  with  spirit,  while  others  were  employed  in  trying  to 
replace  the  derailed  trucks  on  the  track.  After  firing  had  gone 
on  for  an  hour,  the  locomotive  and  two  of  the  carriages  got  free, 
and  started  for  Estcourt,  leaving  the  dismantled  portion  of  the 
train  behind,  with  2 men  killed,  10  wounded,  and  56  prisoners. 


244 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Mr.  Winston  Churchill  was  found  to  he  one  of  the  occupants  of  the 
train.  He  claimed  that  he  was  a non-combatant,  and  ought  not  to 
he  taken  prisoner.  He  took  no  part  whatever  in  defending  the  train. 

The  official  report  of  the  encounter  with  the  train,  and  of  the 
capture  of  Mr.  Churchill,  appeared  in  the  following  terms  in  the 
Boer  press  : 

“Pretoria,  Monday  (Special). — Mr.  Winston  Churchill  declares 
that  at  the  time  of  his  capture,  near  Estcourt,  he  was  armed  only 
with  a reporter’s  note-hook  and  pencil.  He  was  busy  recording 
impressions  of  armored-train  warfare  and  its  effects  on  modern 
formations,  when  the  ironclad  on  wheels  was  derailed,  and  hurled 
him  and  56  others  into  space.  He  was  hopelessly  involved  with 
Jack  Tars,  regulars,  and  volunteers  in  the  ^ melee,’  and  was  slightly 
wounded  in  the  hand. 

“ The  Government  is  considering  representations  made  on  his 
behalf,  and  it  is  believed  that  his  enforced  detention  is  only 
temporary.” 

Apropos  of  Mr.  Winston  Churchill’s  arrest  and  subsequent 
escape  from  Pretoria,  and  the  various  dramatic  accounts  which 
have  been  published  of  that  exploit,  the  following  correspondence 
may  not  he  without  some  interest : 

“ From  Churchill,  to  Editor  ‘ Standard  and  Diggers’  Hews.’ 

“ Am  now  writing  ^ How  I Escaped  from  the  Boers  ’ ; but  regret 
cannot,  for  obvious  reasons,  disclose  many  interesting  details.  Shall 
be  happy  to  give  you  any  you  may  require  when  next  I visit 
Pretoria,  probably  third  week  in  March.” 

“ The  ‘ Standard  and  Diggers’  Hews  ’ has  been  honored  by  Mr. 
Winston  Churchill’s  evident  desire  to  become  a contributor  to  its 
columns,  where,  in  about  the  third  week  of  March,  he  would  relate 
his  experiences  under  the  title  of  ‘ How  I Escaped  from  the  Boers.’ 
We  are  sorry  indeed  to  have  to  disappoint  so  promising  a youth; 
but  unless  Mr.  Churchill  can  offer  something  much  more  interesting 
to  the  general  public,  we  must  decline  the  promised  contribution. 
Mr.  Churchill  is  a very  young  man  who  has  his  way  to  make  in 
the  world,  and  we  would,  from  our  maturer  experience,  venture 
to  suggest  that  it  would  he  advisable  to  bear  in  mind  the  old  adages, 
‘ A still  tongue  makes  a wise  head,’  ‘ Least  said,  soonest  mended.’ 
And  to  demonstrate  to  our  journalistic  fledgling  the  true  apprecia- 
tion of  his  particular  desire  we  would  recommend  that  he  alter 
the  title  of  his  lucubration  to  ‘ How  I Was  Allowed  to  Escape  from 
the  Boers,’  a precis  of  which  would  read  : A moonlight  night, 
easy-going  guards,  Hetherlands  Bail  way  Station.  A coal  truck. 
Eessano  Garcia  Station.  Begrimed  and  miserable  object.  Arrived 
at  Lourenzo  Marquez.  Admittance  to  British  Consulate.  De- 
parture by  French  steamer.  Typewritten  telegrams.  And  the  key 


THE  DASH  ON  ESTCOURT 


245 


to  the  whole  : Scene  : Pretoria  War  Office  ; 9 a.m.,  Mr.  Churchill 
reported  missing;  orders  of  arrest  issued  to  police  authorities. 
11  a.m.,  Eeeeipt  of  official  letter  by  morning’s  mail  from  Com- 
mandant-General J oubert,  ordering  release  of  Mr.  Churchill  as  non- 
combatant.  Orders  to  police  authorities  not  to  execute  warrant  of 
arrest.” 

In  a letter  addressed  to  Mr.  De  Souza,  Secretary  to  the  War 
Office  at  Pretoria,  and  left  on  his  bed  in  the  Model  Schools  in 
which  he  had  been  detained,  Mr.  Churchill  stated  that,  being  a 
non-combatant  press  correspondent,  he  considered  his  detention 
unjustified  and  had  decided  to  escape.  He  expressed  his  keen 


Mr.  Churchill 


WINSTON  CHURCHILL,  WITH  OTHER  PRISONERS  OF  WAR,  AT  PRETORIA 


appreciation  for  the  kind  treatment  shown  to  him  and  his  fellow- 
prisoners  by  the  authorities,  and  said  further  that,  on  reaching 
the  British  lines,  he  would  give  a true  and  impartial  report  of  his 
experiences  while  here.  He  concluded  by  expressing  his  admira- 
tion for  the  humane  and  chivalrous  conduct  of  the  Republican 
forces. 

After  the  adventure  with  the  armored  train  at  Blaaukrantz, 
the  column  proceeded  by  a circuitous  route  towards  the  west 
through  the  hills,  and  climbed  a ridge  of  the  Drakensberg  which 
commanded  the  English  lines  in  and  around  their  fortified  camp 
at  Estcourt.  ■ Information  was  soon  obtained  from  friendly  sources 
as  to  the  exact  strength  of  the  enemy,  number  of  guns,  and  prob- 
able plans.  There  were  8,000  troops  commanding  the  approaches 
by  the  Ladysmith  road,  and  some  4,000  more  in  the  vicinity  of  Est- 


246 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


coiirt  at  Mooi  Eiver,  with  batteries  which  included  several  naval 
guns. 

David  J oubert,  of  Carolina,  nephew  of  the  Commandant-General, 
with  1,000  men,  had  swept  eastward  from  Frere  as  far  as 
Weenan,  where  he  hoisted  the  Vierkleur,  and  then  marched  south 
to  Mooi  River,  between  Estcourt  and  Maritzburg.  The  main  divi- 
sion, under  Botha,  moved  westward  to  White  Mountain,  and 
passed  Estcourt,  joining  hands  with  the  smaller  column,  about 
ten  miles  due  south  of  the  British  forces.  The  English  army  was 
now  cut  off  from  its  base,  and  consternation  was  created  in  Durban; 


SCHOOL  BUILDING  AT  PRETORIA,  WHERE  BRITISH  PRISONERS  WERE  KEPT 


some  of  the  citizens  being  reported  as  seeking  safety  on  board  some 
ships  in  the  harbor.  Botha  took  up  positions  at  the  Mooi  River 
which  Avere  a challenge  to  the  English  general  for  a combat  south 
of  his  headquarters,  but  the  challenge  was  declined.  The  location 
of  the  Boer  force  Avas  reconnoitered  by  some  of  Hildyard’s  troops, 
and  they  refused  battle  on  seeing  the  burghers  prepared  to  meet 
them.  They  fell  hack  again  on  Estcourt. 

The  English  Avere  very  strongly  entrenched  here  behind  prepared 
positions,  on  a circle  of  surrounding  hills.  Naval  guns  were  placed 
on  the  kopjes  commanding  the  approaches  by  the  Ladysmith  road, 
and  the  toAvn  AA^as  deemed  to  be  impregnable  to  attack  from  the 
north.  Yet,  despite  this  circumstance,  and  the  fact  that  General 


THE  DASH  ON  ESTCOURT 


247 


Hildyard  must  have  been  aware  of  the  relative  weakness  of  Jou- 
bert’s  column,  he  refused  to  fight  until  compelled  to  do  so  by  the 
menacing  action  of  the  Boers  in  actually  raiding  the  country  south 
of  the  British  general’s  camp. 

On  Tuesday,  November  22,  and  early  on  the  morning  of  the 
23rd,  an  engagement,  variously  called  that  of  Mooi  Eiver,  Willow 
Grange,  and  Beacon  Hill,  was  fought  seven  miles  south  of  Estcourt, 
which  has  been  claimed  as  a victory  by  both  sides. 

General  Hildyard’s  report  says  : 

“ It  was  not  my  intention  to  remain  in  the  position,  a course 
which  would  have  entailed  a division  of  forces  at  Estcourt.  The 
role  of  the  supporting  troops  was,  therefore,  restricted  to  covering 
the  withdrawal  of  the  assaulting  battalions.  Most  of  the  losses 
occurred  during  the  retirement;  they  were  chiefly  in  the  2nd  Batta- 
lion West  Yorkshire  Eegiment,  which  was  the  last  regiment  to 
retire.  . . . The  troops  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Martyn, 

after  holding  a party  of  some  300  Boers  south  of  Willow  Grange, 
moved  to  the  support  of  Colonel  Kitchener’s  left  flank,  where  they 
did  valuable  service  in  keeping  back  the  enemy  and  assisting  to 
get  the  wounded  of  the  2nd  Battalion  West  Yorkshire  Eegiment 
down  the  hill.” 

This  language  is,  clearly  enough,  the  language  of  British  “ victo- 
ries ” as  “ she  is  wrote  ” in  the  English  records  of  the  South 
African  War,  hut  it  does  not  in  any  sense  bear  out  the  case  put 
forward  by  General  Buller  in  his  despatch  in  support  of  Hildyard’s 
claim  of  a victory  for  his  army. 

General  Hildyard’s  report  is  significantly  silent  upon  one  very 
serious  incident  in  the  attack  on  Beacon  Hill,  an  incident  which 
has  been  repeated  in  connection  with  British  bungling  in  several 
subsequent  battles. 

The  hill  was  scaled  by  men  of  the  Yorkshires  and  East  Surreys, 
in  pitch  darkness,  during  the  night  of  the  22nd,  and,  for  a time, 
in  a frightful  storm  of  hail  and  lightning.  Some  men  of  the 
East  Surrey  Eegiment,  moving  round  an  angle  of  the  hill,  came 
suddenly  upon  troops  which  they  believed  to  be  Boers,  and  im- 
mediately opened  fire  upon  the  supposed  enemy  at  close  quarters. 
About  a dozen  of  the  Yorkshire  men  fell  before  the  rifles  of  their 
comrades,  and,  as  Boer  accounts  show,  the  British  actually  killed 
more  of  their  own  men  than  of  their  enemies  in  the  “great  victory’^ 
at  Willow  Grange. 

General  Botha’s  report  of  the  battle  is  as  follows  : 

“ We  located  a big  force  of  British  troops  around  Estcourt  and 
Mooi  Elver,  on  fortified  positions,  with  plenty  of  artillery. 


248 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


“ We  combined  with  the  Free  State  commando  and  a squadron 
of  the  Johannesburg  Mounted  Police  on  the  22nd,  and  advanced 
on  the  British  position  towards  Mooi  Eiver,  amidst  fearful  weather. 

During  a heavy  thunder-storm  one  Free  Stater  and  six  horses 
were  killed  by  lightning. 

“ Shortly  after,  great  activity  was  observed  among  the  enemy’s 
troops,  who  stormed  a mountain  battery  held  by  the  Free  Staters, 
under  heavy  rifle  fire,  with  great  losses. 

“ The  infantry  was  about  2,000  strong. 

“ On  reaching  the  top  they  gave  loud  ' Hurrahs  ! ’ and  yelled. 
‘ Majuba  is  now  wiped  out,’  while  we  maintained  a heavy  and 
steady  fire  on  them. 

“We  had  two  men  killed  at  this  stage. 

“ Meanwhile  the  Band  Police  and  the  Free  Staters  had  retired 
in  the  direction  of  the  Krugersdorp  commando,  while  reenforce- 
ments were  sent  for. 

“ These  turned  up  in  the  shape  of  a strong  commando  and 
artillery,  personally  led  by  Commandant-General  Joubert,  who 
occupied  a splendid  position  close  by,  and  opened  fire. 

“ Under  cover  of  his  guns  we  re-formed  with  the  Free  Staters 
and  the  Police,  and  stormed  the  position  held  by  the  English  troops, 
and  drove  them  off,  with  apparent  heavy  loss.  They  retreated  in 
disorder  towards  Estcourt. 

“ The  engagement  was  very  hot. 

“ Ambulance  reports  to  me  were  that  the  British  losses  were  120 
killed  and  wounded. 

“ Our  losses  were  one  killed  and  four  wounded — Krugersdorp 
men. 

“ My  horse  was  shot  under  me.” 

The  London  “ Times  ” of  the  7th  of  December  published  the 
following  letter  from  an  Englishman  in  Natal  which  tends  to 
confirm  the  Boer  claim,  and  strongly  to  deny  that  put  in  in  favor 
of  a British  triumph  at  Willow  Grange : 

For  four  days  a small  force  of  Boers  held  a track  of  country 
with  a frontage  roughly  25  miles  either  way,  and  held  it  at  their 
leisure,  raiding  cattle,  driving  about  with  traps  and  horses,  mule- 
wagons,  etc.,  picking  up  what  they  wanted;  killing  time  buck 
shooting  and  guinea-fowl  shooting — all  this  with  13,000  British 
troops  within  eight  or  ten  miles  of  their  main  camp  on  either  side 
of  them. 

“ The  Boers,  during  their  occupation  here,  did  no  damage  to 
occupied  property,  but  have  utterly  wrecked  all  homesteads  that 
had  been  vacated.  By  this  time  our  troops  had  been  reenforced 
to  about  18,000  men  (Mooi  Eiver  and  Estcourt  combined),  the 
Boers  were  traveling  with  a convoy  eight  miles  long  with  men 
whose  maximum  speed  is  three  miles  an  hour;  two-thirds  of  our 


THE  DASH  ON  E STOOD RT 


24:9 


force  was  ahead  of  them  in  the  direction  they  were  supposed  to 
be  taking,  and  eventually  did  take;  the  remaining  one-third  was 
only  12  miles  behind  their  rear  column,  which  could  hardly  have 
got  under  weigh  when  my  message  got  to  camp.  The  Boers  had 
to  pass  out  of  a deep  valley  some  24  miles  in  length,  with  very 
steep  hills  on  either  side — that’s  the  position — and  yet  our  general 
let  this  Boer  army,  convoy  and  all,  get  out  on  to  the  main  road 
beyond  Estcourt,  cross  the  Tugela  at  Colenso,  and  blow  up  the 
bridge  behind  them.” 

After  the  battle  of  the  23rd  the  Boer  column  moved  leisurely  on 
its  way  hack  to  Colenso,  where  it  arrived  after  a ten  days’  most 
successful  reconnaissance;  Hildyard  making  no  attempt  to  follow. 
The  casualties  in  the  fights  with  the  armored  train  and  near  Est- 
court were  less  than  a dozen,  while  the  enemy  had  suffered  to  the 
extent  of  over  100  killed  and  wounded,  and  of  50  prisoners. 

General  Joubert  returned  from  the  raid  in  a gloomy  spirit.  He 
openly  regretted  having  participated  in  it.  It  was  not  his  method 
of  fighting.  Some  horses  were  taken  from  pro-English  farmers, 
6,000  head  of  cattle  were  captured,  and  other  things  were  com- 
mandeered contrary  to  his  instructions  and  ideas.  This  angered  the 
old  general  more  than  it  ought  to  have  done,  and  when  asked  on  his 
return  to  the  laager  at  Ladysmith  what  he  thought  of  the  results 
of  the  reconnaissance,  his  reply  was  : 

“ J a,  die  Engelschen  zal  zeg : ‘ Heir  was  J oubert  langs  met  zyn 
roovers  bende.’  ” * 

Botha,  with  his  characteristic  generosity,  gave  Joubert  the 
credit  of  having  personally  led  the  reenforcements  which  enabled 
a successful  assault  to  be  made  on  the  enemy  at  Willow  Grange, 
but  the  Commandant-General  was  little  more  than  a passive 
spectator  of  the  fight.  He  either  felt  that  he  was  being  forced  to 
engage  in  methods  of  warfare  which  were  not  to  his  liking,  or 
that  he  had  neither  the  military  capacity  nor  the  energy  to  direct 
a great  army  of  30,000  men  engaged  in  what  was,  in  comparison 
with  the  War  of  Freedom,  a gigantic  conflict,  and  he  became 
dispirited.  On  the  other  hand,  Louis  Botha’s  masterful  character, 
great  energy,  and  natural  genius,  the  spirit  and  dash  with  which 
he  carried  out  his  plans,  joined  to  his  growing  popularity  among 
the  burghers,  all  impressed  Joubert  with  the  conviction  that  the 
younger  man  was  the  man  whom  the  army  required  to  lead  it.  This 
conviction  was  forced  upon  his  mind  during  the  raid,  and  it  re- 
mained there  afterward.  He  left  to  General  Botha  the  task  of 
barring  Buller’s  way  at  the  Tugela,  and  retired  himself  to  the  task 

* “ The  English  will  say  ; ‘ Here  was  Joubert  with  a band  of  robbers.’  ” 


250 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


of  watching  the  working  of  his  pet,  hut  fatal,  plan  of  keeping  6,000 
or  7,000  burghers  wasting  ammunition,  food,  and  time  in  the  all 
but  fruitless  siege  of  Ladysmith. 

On  the  return  from  the  reconnaissance  to  Estcourt  his  horse 
stumbled  while  crossing  some  very  rough  ground,  and  caused  a 
hurt  to  be  inflicted  from  which  he  did  not  recover  before  his 
death.  His  end  came  in  Pretoria,  March  27,  1900,  one  month 
after  the  withdrawal  of  the  Boers  from  the  investment  of  Lady- 
smith, on  the  capture  of  which  place  the  old  hero  had  set  his  whole 
heart,  and,  as  it  were,  staked  his  very  life. 


FUNERAL  OF  COiiaiANDAJ^T-GENERAL  PIET  JOUBERT,  IN  PRETORIA 


Chapter  XXII 


BATTLE  OF  COUENSO 

Bttlleb  advances  to  relief  of  Ladysmith — Botha  withdraws  to  north 

BANK  OF  the  TUGELA BRITISH  EXAGGERATION  OF  STRENGTH  OF  BOER 

POSITION — Disposition  of  Boer  forces — Spectacular  advance  of 
British — Their  reception  at  Langwani — The  repulse  at  the 

BRIDLE  drift HiLD YARD’S  DIVISION  BEATEN  BACK  AT  CENTER BrAVE 

but  fatal  rally  of  Hart’s  brigade — Boers  capture  Colonel  Long’s 

BATTERIES — BOTHA’S  REPORT  OF  THE  BATTLE— IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  VIC- 
TORY, 

aEXEEAL  BULLER  reached  Natal  on  the  25th  of  November, 
and  lost  no  time  in  ordering  an  advance  of  all  the  forces  he 
could  collect  to  the  relief  of  Ladysmith.  The  plan  of  operations 
which  he  was  compelled  to  adopt  to  this  end  was  not  the  plan  of 
campaign  which  he  had  contemplated  being  able  to  carry  out.  The 
Orange  Free  State,  rather  than  Natal,  had  been  the  way  which  he 
had  intended  to  take  to  Pretoria.  It  was  the  line  of  advance  marked 
out  by  all  the  military  critics,  and  by  general  anticipation,  as  the 
most  favorable  for  the  British  forces  to  follow.  The  English  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  found  himself,  therefore,  forced  to  face  a situa- 
tion which  had  been  the  result  of  the  political  and  military  blun- 
ders committed  in  North  Natal,  and  which  rendered  the  relief  of 
General  White  and  his  beleaguered  garrison  in  Ladysmith  the 
paramount  undertaking  of  the  moment.  All  other  plans  hut  this 
one  had  to  he  put  on  one  side,  and  the  British  general  faced  the 
task  thus  forced  upon  him  with  determined  promptness. 

Meanwhile  Botha  had  withdrawn  his  commandoes  to  the  north 
of  the  Tugela.  He  lost  no  time  in  making  ready  for  the  attack 
which  was  to  be  delivered  by  his  antagonist.  The  railway  bridge 
had  been  destroyed;  the  wagon  bridge  over  the  river  being  left 
intact,  with  care  taken  to  have  its  approaches  from  the  Colenso 
side  commanded  from  well-selected  positions  on  the  northern  hank. 

From  the  30th  of  November  until  the  eve  of  the  battle  the 
opposing  forces  were  virtually  in  sight  of  each  other,  the  British 
tents  between  Frere  and  Chieveley  being  visible  from  the  kopjes 
to  the  north  of  the  river,  where  the  positions  of  Botha’s  burghers 
could  be  easily  seen  from  the  level  country  south  of  Colenso.  In 
fact.  General  White,  fourteen  miles  in  Botha’s  rear,  was  able  to 


252 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


communicate  with  General  Buller  at  Chieveley,  eight  miles  south 
of  Colenso,  by  flash-light  at  night  and  heliograph  hy  day,  so  that 
Botha  and  his  force  were  almost  midway  between  two  British 
armies  having  a combined  strength  of  33,000  men,  and,  at  least, 
12  batteries  of  artillery. 

Colenso  itself,  which  has  given  a name  to  one  of  the  most  dis- 
astrous battles  for  the  English  in  the  war,  is  a little  village  with 
only  a dozen  houses,  and  stands  a few  hundred  yards  south  of  the 
river,  in  the  direction  of  Chieveley.  Chieveley  is  some  eight  miles 
further  south,  on  the  railway  line  to  Estcourt,  the  veldt  rising  a 
little  from  the  river  in  a slope  upward  for  about  three  miles, 
when  it  dips  again  on  nearing  Chieveley.  Between  Colenso  and 
the  river  the  ground  is  level  and  is  covered,  but  not  thickly,  with 
clumps  of  mimosa  trees  and  other  scrubby  plants.  These  trees, 
however,  offered  no  effective  shelter  for  the  attacking  army,  as 
the  kopjes  overlooking  the  Tugela  dominated  the  entire  ground 
. from  the  river  outward,  on  to  hills  around  Chieveley. 

The  Tugela  near  Colenso  is  a steep-banked  river  150  yards  wide, 
and  was  about  four  feet  in  water  at  the  time  of  the  battle.  It  was 
crossed  by  two  bridges,  a railway  and  a wagon  bridge — about  three- 
quarters  of  a mile  apart — the  former  being  destroyed  by  Botha 
after  Buller  had  advanced  from  Estcourt,  leaving  the  latter  as  the 
only  structural  means  of  passage  from  the  south  to  the  north  side. 

There  was,  however,  a bridle  drift  some  three  or  four  miles  to 
the  west  of  the  wagon  bridge,  fordable  when  the  river  was  not  in 
flood.  These  two  vulnerable  points  were  carefully  and,  as  the 
sequel  showed,  adequately  guarded  in  the  plan  of  defense  which 
Botha  had  prepared  after  his  return  from  the  reconnaissance  to 
Estcourt. 

The  northern  bank  of  the  Tugela  at  Colenso  offered  no  such 
formidable  obstacle  to  General  Buller  as  his  own  and  the  British 
war  correspondents’  descriptions  would  indicate.  There  is  a con- 
sistent exaggeration  of  the  natural  strength  of  the  positions  held 
by  Botha’s  small  army  in  all  the  English  reports  of  the  battle; 
the  obvious  purpose  being  to  magnify  the  difficulties  which  General 
Buller  had  to  face  in  a fight  which  proved  so  disastrous  to  his 
own  generalship  and  to  the  prestige  of  the  British  army.  In  all 
the  accounts  of  this  war,  positions  are  made  formidable  or  other- 
wise as  a general  required  them  to  appear  in  reporting  a victory 
or  a reverse.  In  explaining  the  military  considerations  which  in- 
duced General  White  to  remain  at  Ladysmith,  after  his  failure  to 
arrest  Joubert’s  march  southward,  rather  than  to  fall  back  on  the 
Tugela,  Lord  Eoberts  (South  African  Despatches,  Vol.  II.,  p.  13) 
wrote  ; “ As  Sir  George  White  explains  in  his  despatch,  the 


BATTLE  OF  CO TEN  SO 


253 


Tugela,  at  that  time  of  the  year,  was  not  a formidable  defensive 
obstacle.”  Yet,  when  General  Botha  held  this  same  river  at 
Colenso  with  5,000  Boers  against  General  Buller  and  23,000 
British,  it  became,  in  the  military  view  of  all  the  British  generals 
and  all  the  war  correspondents,  one  of  the  most  formidable  posi- 
tions which  English  troops  could  possibly  face. 

Botha’s  lines  were  undoubtedly  strong,  but  more  through  the 
ability  with  which  he  had  planned  their  defense  than  from  the 
natural  advantages  which  they  offered  to  his  small  force.  The 
two  photographic  views  on  the  following  pages  will  enable  the 
reader,  who  may  have  read  General  Buller’s  despatch,  or  some 


BOER  TRENCH  NEAR  THE  BRIDLE  DRIFT— BATTLE  OP  COLENSO 


other  English  account  of  the  battle,  to  contrast  the  actual  scene 
of  the  battle-field  of  Colenso,  drawn  by  the  sun,  with  the  picture 
of  “ mountains,”  hills,  and  kopjes  which  figured  in  the  descriptive 
details  of  British  chroniclers  of  the  engagement.  Behind  (north 
of)  the  river,  at  a distance  of  four  or  five  miles,  a high  range  of  hills 
bar  the  way  to  La’dysmith,  but  these  mountains  were  not  occupied 
by  the  Boers  in  the  fight  at  Colenso.  They  offered  a strong  defen- 
sive line  to  fall  back  upon,  in  the  event  of  a reverse  at  the  river, 
but  they  were  otherwise  of  no  advantage  to  Botha  in  the  battle  of 
the  15th  of  December.  These  hills,  however,  are  represented  in 
most  of  the  English  pictures  of  the  battle-field  as  “ the  formidable 
positions  ” which  General  Buller  attempted  to  storm  and  carry  with 
his  troops  ! 

The  Tugela  at  Colenso,  as  all  along  its  course,  flows  in  a zigzag 


254 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


channel,  the  banks  on  both  sides  being  somewhat  serrated  in 
their  formation.  The  land  on  both  the  north  and  south  sides 
falls  abruptly  to  the  level  of  the  bed  of  the  stream,  and,  while 
this  fact,  coupled  with  the  width  of  the  river  opposite  the  village, 
would  expose  a force  endeavoring  to  cross  to  great  disadvantage 
during  the  attempt,  on  the  day  of  the  battle  there  was  no  such 
insuperable  obstacle  either  in  the  depth  of  the  river  or  in  the  nature 
of  its  banks  as  has  been  so  graphically  described  in  the  British  ver- 
sion of  the  fight,  a fact  which  will  be  proved  conclusively  in  the 
story  of  the  engagement. 

The  hog-backed  hill  seen  immediately  north  of  the  broken 
bridge  in  picture  No.  1 was  “ Fort  Wylie  ” in  the  accounts  of  the 
fight.  It  was  deeply  trenched  on  the  top  and  on  both  sides,  which 
work,  however,  was  done  by  the  English  when  in  occupation  of 
Colenso  in  October  and  the  early  part  of  November.  The  character 
of  these  fortifications  will  be  noted  in  the  view  of  the  west  side 
of  Fort  Wylie  in  picture  No.  2. 

Botha’s  center  extended  from  Fort  Wylie  to  the  wagon  bridge, 
about  a mile  west  from  the  railway  bridge.  On  Fort  Wylie  he 
placed  men  of  the  Ivrugersdorp  commando,  under  Field  Cornet 
Van  Wyk,  and  Vryheiders  (Botha’s  own  commando),  under  his 
brother-in-law,  Clierrie  Em^met.  These  men  lined  the  trenches 
on  the  sides  and  the  top  of  the  hill  overlooking  the  river.  The 
Heidelberg  commando  came  next  in  position,  westward.  Next 
to  these,  and  about  midway  between  the  two  bridges,  Acting- 
Commandant  Oosthuizen,  of  Krugersdorp,  and  Field  Cornet  Kemp 
were  posted  on  a round  ridge,  with  another  picked  body  of  riflemen. 
Near  this  latter  position  Pretorius  had  two  quick-firing  Ivrupp 
guns.  It  was  from  the  right  of  his  center,  near  the  positions 
held  by  Oosthuizen,  that  Botha  directed  the  operations  of  his 
small  army. 

His  right  extended  further  west  from  the  wagon  bridge  to  the 
bridle  drift,  three  miles  down  the  river.  The  Tugela,  near  this 
point,  forms  a bend  north  of  a complete  half  circle,  the  drift  being 
near  this  bend.  Entrenchments  were  dug  each  side  of  the  bend,  a 
little  back  from  the  banks,  so  as  to  place  any  force  attempting 
to  ford  the  river  between  a cross-fire.  The  Swaziland  commando, 
under  Christian  Botha,  and  a force  of  Zoutpansberg  burghers 
held  the  left-hand  side  of  the  bend,  while  the  Johannesburg  and 
Boxburg  men,  under  Ben  Viljoen,  lined  the  opposite  side.  North 
of  these,  on  the  Ladysmith  road,  the  Middelburg  men  and  the 
Free  Staters  were  posted,  to  guard  against  any  attempted  turning 
movement  west  of  Viljoen’s  position.  They  took  no  active  part 
in  the  fight.  Northeast  of  these,  some  5,000  yards  back  from 


or  COLENSO,  DECEMBER  15,  1899.  POSITION  OF  THE  BOER  CENTER 
(Fort  Wylie  is  behind  the  broken  railway  bridge) 


256 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


the  river,  two  fifteen-pound  Creusot  guns  were  placed,  which  com- 
manded the  river  front  from  the  wagon  bridge  to  the  bridle  drift. 

The  left  wing  of  Botha’s  lines  extended  to  Langwani  Hill,  about 
four  miles  east  of  Fort  Wylie.  This  hill  is  on  the  south  side  of 
the  Tugela,  and  was  therefore  detached  from  the  main  line  of 
Boer  defense.  The  river  at  this  point  turns  sharply  north  and 
cuts  the  range,  separating  Langwani  from  the  parent  formation 
north  of  the  river.  This  commanding  hill  was  the  key  of  the 
positions  on  the  Tugela  at  Colenso,  and  had  General  BulleFs 
tactical  capacity  enabled  him -to  recognize  this  fact,  and  to  have 
ordered  his  plan  of  battle  with  the  turning  and  capture  of  Lang- 
wani as  his  first  and  governing  operation,  instead  of  making 
a frontal  attack  on  the  Boer  left  and  center,  Botha’s  position 
between  the  two  bridges  would  have  been  rendered  untenable. 

Colonel  Villebois-Mareuil  has  mentioned  in  his  diary  that  it 
was  he  who  drew  General  Botha’s  attention  to  the  vital  importance 
of  securing  Langwani  against  a possible  plan  of  attack,  such  as  its 
position  would  invite  from  any  force  strong  enough  to  carry  the 
hill,  and  ably  led.  This  may  be  the  correct  explanation  of  the 
Boer  general’s  precautions,  tho  he  claims  credit  to  himself  for  hav- 
ing foreseen  the  strategical  value  of  the  hill,  and  it  is  almost 
impossible  to  imagine  so  capable  a general  as  Botha  has  shown 
himself  to  be  overlooking  in  any  sense  the  vital  necessity  of  hold- 
ing Langwani  so  as  to  cover  and  secure  his  left  flank  from  the 
certain  attack  to  which  it  would  be  open  from  there. 

A dramatic  incident  in  connection  with  this  position  forms 
part  of  the  story  of  Colenso.  With  Colonel  Villebois-Mareuil  as 
a spectator  of  the  battle  was  another  French  officer.  Lieutenant 
Galapaud,  of  the  9th  Chasseurs,  who  acted  as  military  correspond- 
ent to  Le  Matin,”  of  Paris.  He  wrote  a brief  account  of  the 
great  Boer  victory,  and  embodied  in  his  report  Villebois-Mareuil’s 
view  of  the  vital  value  of  Langwani  to  any  attempt  on  the  part  of 
Buller  to  cross  the  Tugela  at  or  near  Colenso.  This  view  appeared 
in  the  “ Matin  ” early  in  February,  and  the  next — that  is,  the  fifth 
— attempt  of  Buller  to  reach  Ladysmith  was  made  with  Langwani 
Hill  as  the  pivotal  point  in  his  plan  of  operations,  and  was  success- 
ful. So  convinced  was  General  Botha  that  Buller  had  been  advised 
by  cable  of  the  opinion  thus  expressed  within  the  Boer  lines,  that 
he  caused  the  following  letter  to  be  published  in  the  Boer  press  : 

“ Sir — In  your  issue  of  the  29th  of  March  last  there  appears  a 
translation  of  an  extract  from  a description  of  the  battle  of  Colenso, 
which  took  place  on  the  15th  of  December,  1899,  and  which  was 
published  in  February  last  in  the  French  paper  ‘ Le  Matin.’ 
. . . The  extract  reads:  ‘An  important  point,  and  where 


BATTLE  OF  CO TEN SO 


257 


the  main  attack  was  expected,  was  the  Langwani  Hill,  on  the  south- 
ern bank  of  the  Tugela,  which  was  occupied  by  only  some  800 
Boers,  who  were,  however,  selected  from  the  best  shots.  Had  the 
British  made  themselves  masters  of  this  position,  they  would  have 
commanded  all  the  Boer  positions  on  the  flank.  A couple  of  British 
cannon  there  would  mean  a flight  to  us,  and  a victory  to  the  British. 
As  they  were  unacquainted  with  the  weakness  of  this  position,  we 
watched  it  with  the  greatest  anxiety.’ 

“ In  February  this  report  was  published  in  the  Paris  newspaper 
by  some  one  who  knew  of  the  weak  points  of  our  position  in  this 
hill,  and  it  was  not  till  the  11th  of  that  month  that  Buller  made 
his  attack  upon  the  position,  which  he  had  formerly  and  for  some 
time  afterward  carefully  avoided,  as  witness  Spion  Kop,  Pont 
Drift,  etc. 

“ I wish,  therefore,  through  the  medium  of  your  paper,  to  impress 
most  seriously  upon  correspondents  the  great  need  of  caution  in 
the  furnishing  of  reports,  so  that  the  possibility  of  advantage  being 
thereby  afforded  to  the  enemy  may  be  entirely  excluded.  I am,  etc., 
C.  Sandberg,  IMilitary  Secretary  and  Adjutant  of  the  Act.  Com.- 
General.  Smaldeel,  5th  April,  1900.” 


Eight  hundred  men,  made  u])  of  Wakkerstroom  burghers,  with 
lesser  proportions  of  crack  shots  from  the  Utrecht,  Standerton, 
Zoutpansberg,  and  Ermelo  commandoes,  were  entrenched  on  Lang- 
wani,  under  the  joint  command  of  Joshua  Joi;bert  and  Com- 
mandant Swart,  two  most  capable  officers  who  had  already  dis- 
tinguished themselves  for  capacity  and  bravery.  This  body  of 
picked  men  had  one  Maxim  gun,  and  no  other  artillery  of  any 
kind.  The  river  bank  between  Langwani  and  Fort  Wylie  was 
not  entrenched,  but  was  watched  by  the  forces  at  Botha’s  center. 
Any  attempt  on  the  enemy’s  part  to  effect  a crossing  betAveen  the 
center  and  left  Avings  Avoid d have  exposed  both  his  flanks  to  a 
destructive  fire. 

In  the  dip  of  the  ground  behind  Botha’s  center,  men  of  several 
commandoes  Avere  in  reserve  aAvaiting  the  development  of  the 
enemy’s  attack,  and  available  for  emergencies.  Among  these 
were  some  of  the  Johannesburg  Police,  under  Pohlman,  and  a feAV 
men  of  Blake’s  Irish  Brigade,  Avho  had  come  from  the  lines  around 
Ladysmith  to  assist  in  the  defense  of  the  Tugela  230sitions. 

The  guns,  numbering  tAvo  fifteen-pound  Creusots,  tAvo  quick- 
firing  seven-pound  Krupps,  and  two  pom-poms — one  irregular 
battery — were  distributed  over  the  lines  from  the  kojije  near  the 
wagon  bridge  to  the  hill  north  of  the  bridle  drift,  on  the  wagon 
road  to  LadA'smith,  Captain  Pretorius  being  in  chief  charge.  There 
were  no  guns  on  Fort  Wylie,  despite  the  number  of  times  they  were 
17 


258 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


“ silenced  ” there,  in  the  English  reports,  by  Buller’s  batteries. 
This  strong  position  was  held  exclusively  l)y  riflemen. 

Every  preparation  having  been  made  for  the  coming  battle, 
the  order  was  given  by  Botha  that  no  response  of  any  kind  should 
be  made  to  the  enemy’s  artillery  until  the  actual  assault  by  his 
infantry  should  be  delivered.  Not  a shot  was  to  be  fired  by  gun 
or  Mauser,  no  light  was  to  he  shown  at  night,  nor  movement  of 
men  by  day,  that  could  reveal  to  English  ears  or  eyes  at  what 
place  in  the  seven  miles  of  defensive  Boer  positions,  from  Lang- 
wani  to  the  bridle  drift,  guns  or  men  would  be  ready  for  the  final 
challenge  to  the  possession  of  the  way  to  Ladysmith.  Confident 
in  the  strength  of  his  position,  and  in  the  determination  and  capac- 
ity of  his  small  force  to  stop  effectively  the  English  at  Colenso 
and  to  turn  them  back,  Botha  awaited  the  onset  of  his  antagonist. 

At  one  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the  15th  of  December  scouts 
brought  word  to  General  Botha’s  tent  that  the  enemy  were  about 
to  advance.  The  whole  laager  was  alert  in  a few  moments,  and 
final  orders  were  given  to  the  various  officers  who  were  to  he  in 
immediate  command  at  the  anticipated  points  of  attack.  The 
morning  was  beautifully  clear,  with  a cloudless  South  African 
sky,  as  the  men  from  Botha’s  laager,  with  bandoliers  well  filled 
and  Mausers  charged,  took  up  their  allotted  positions  behind  the 
Tugela.  Away  south  at  Chieveley  the  countless  lights  of  the 
enemy’s  camp  could  be  seen,  as  the  British  were  preparing  their  for- 
ward movement.  Gradually  these  lights  began  to  fade  as  the 
brightening  dawn  stole  across  the  Zululand  border,  and  eager  eyes 
scanned  the  far-stretching  veldt  in  anxious  watchfulness  for  the 
active  foe.  The  hours  moved  slowly,  as  it  seemed,  until  the  fuller 
light  of  the  awakened  day  revealed  the  forward  lines  of  Buller’s 
army  marching  steadily  over  the  intervening  plain.  The  whole  of 
the  enemy’s  forces  could  be  clearly  seen  when,  at  about  five  o’clock, 
they  began  to  take  the  form  of  well-defined  columns  of  huge  pro- 
portions, four  or  five  miles  south  of  the  village;  three  of  the  divi- 
sions swinging  in  the  direction  of  the  Boer  left,  center,  and  right, 
along  the  river. 

The  scene,  as  viewed  from  the  threatened  kopjes  behind  the 
river,  was  one  of  unparalleled  attraction,  as  the  sun  peeped  over 
the  eastern  hills  and  sent  its  rays  down  upon  the  embattled 
British  legions  proudly  marching  on  their  way  to  the  combat. 
There  would  be  death  to  many,  possibly  defeat  to  all,  in  that 
huge  disproportionate  array  of  England’s  might  and  military  pride, 
now  sweeping  on  in  majestic  motion,  like  a resistless  flood,  over 
the  resounding  veldt.  It  was  war  in  all  its  spectacular  glory,  as 
seen  from  where  the  little  force  of  warrior  farmers  and  beardless 


Where  the  British  ^uns  were  taken 


260 


TEE  BOEE  FIGHT  FOE  FEEEDOM 


boys  behind  the  Tugela  gazed  with  fascinated  but  fearless  eyes, 
upon  the  wondrous  living  picture  of  20,000  marching  men;  and 
war  with  all  its  horrors  to  the  fathers  and  sons  of  families  who 
looked  upon  these  thousands  of  their  country’s  foes  whom  they  must 
in  a few  moments  meet  in  the  shock  of  deadly  strife. 

Suddenly  there  came  from  the  Boer  positions  a deep  volume  of 
thrilling  sound,  rolling,  as  it  were,  like  peals  of  muffled  thunder 
down  from  the  hills,  on  towards  the  river,  along  which  it  swept 
as  if  in  echoing  response  to  some  chant  of  giants  from  the  moun- 
tain tops  behind,  and  then  died  away,  leaving  a more  deathlike 
stillness  in  the  morning  air.  It  was  the  morning  hymn  of  the  Boer 
camp;  the  invocation  of  Divine  help  for  the  cause  of  “ Land  un 
Yolk,”  sung  by  the  older  burghers  as.  rifle  in  hand,  and  hearts  and 
minds  set  on  victory,  they  stood  ready  to  do  or  die  for  Transvaal 
freedom. 

“ General,  the  enemy  is  about  to  attack  ! Where  are  your  men  ?” 
The  speaker  was  Colonel  Villebois-Mareuil,  who  had  ridden  rapidly 
from  his  tent  behind  the  laager  to  where  Louis  Botha  was  standing, 
midway  between  the  two  bridges,  glass  to  eyes,  intently  looking  at 
the  movements  of  the  British  troops  as  they  were  beginning  to 
separate  into  independent  columns. 

“ All  right.  Colonel,”  smilingly  replied  the  Boer  general.  “ Bul- 
ler  will  find  my  men  in  their  places,  at  the  right  time,  have  no 
fear  ! ” 

It  was  to  be  Louis  Botha’s  day;  a day  forever  memorable  in 
the  annals  of  true  military  renown,  and  no  general  ever  looked 
more  confident  of  victory  than  did  the  handsome  young  farmer  as 
he  stood  there  in  the  early  morning  facing  his  foes  with  men  into 
whom  he  had  infused  his  own  dauntless  spirit  and  cool  determina- 
tion. 

In  a few  moments  a cloud  of  smoke  puffed  forth  from  the  rising 
ground  between  Chieveley  and  Colenso,  and  ten  guns  of  Buller’s 
batteries  had  opened  the  fray  in  a cannonade  upon  the  Boer 
center.  Fort  lYylie  was  the  objective  of  the  enemy’s  artillery, 
and  lyddite  shells  and  shrapnel  commenced  to  pound  the  river 
bank  and  the  surrounding  ground.  The  half-formed  columns  of 
the  advancing  troops  seemed  to  pause  in  their  movement  to  note 
the  effects  of  their  artillery  fire.  The  guns  continued  to  roar  their 
thunderous  challenge  to  the  sunlit  kopjes  7,000  yards  away,  but 
there  was  no  response.  The  echoes  of  the  naval  battery  rever- 
berated over  the  plain,  and  up  among  the  hills  beyond  the  Tugela, 
but  no  sound  came  back  from  the  belabored  entrenchments  to  indi- 
cate the  presence  there  of  a solitary  foeman  or  a single  gun.  All 
was  still  in  front  and  beyond  the  river.  Neither  sign  nor  sound 


BATTLE  OF  CO LEE SO 


261 


gave  any  evidence  of  life  or  motion  where,  like  a tiger  crouching 
in  his  lair  ready  for  the  deadly  spring  at  an  approaching  elephant, 
the  little  burgher  army  awaited  the  coming  nearer  of  Britain’s 
hosts. 

For  half  an  hour  the  enemy’s  guns  played  upon  the  center  of 
Botha’s  position,  and  then  the  English  right  wing,  screened  by  a 
large  force  of  mounted  infantry  and  cavalry,  swung  to  the  east, 
and  went  straight  for  Langwani.  This  was  Barton’s  and  Dun- 
donald’s  division,  and  was  accompanied  by  a battery  of  field 
artillery.  Simultaneously  another  division  of  the  enemy,  composed 


LAXGWAXI  HILL— BATTLE  OF  COLENSO 


of  infantry,  and  estimated  by  Botha  to  he  -1,000  strong,  also  with 
artillery,  swept  southward  from  Buller’s  center  column,  and  di- 
rected its  course  for  the  bridle  drift,  where  Botha’s  right  lay  con- 
cealed. 

The  first  contact  came  from  Langwani.  The  enemy’s  horsemen, 
in  advance  of  the  infantry,  trotted  across  the  veldt  as  if  engaged 
in  a riding  parade  over  Salisbury  Plain.  On  they  came,  halted; 
a few  shots  from  some  Armstrongs  at  the  hill  ahead,  with  no 
reply;  then  another  move  forward,  in  careless,  almost  close,  forma- 
tion. Then,  when  at  about  200  yards  distance  from  the  base  of 
Langwani,  a murderous  hail  of  lead  belched  forth,  sudden  as 
lightning,  and  swept  the  first  line  of  riders  out  of  their  saddles. 
Again  and  again  the  shots  rang  out  from  somewhere  in  front — 
from  exactly  where  could  not  be  seen — and  the  entire  column  was 
hurled  upon  its  rear  and  knocked  into  utter  confusion.  The 


262 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


enemy  raced  back  behind  his  gnns,  leaving  over  150  of  his  men 
weltering  on  the  veldt.  The  shock  was  terrific,  and  the  more  so 
as  the  smokeless  powder  of  the  Mauser  cartridges  rendered  the 
deadly  marksmen’s  exact  position  invisible  to  the  troops  sent  reel- 
ing rearward  on  their  battery  and  supports. 

Meanwhile  the  engagement  had  become  general  all  along  the 
line.  General  Hart’s  division,  composed  mainly  of  three  crack 
Anglo-Irish  regiments  and  the  Border  Eegiment,  directed  its  course 
across  from  the  rising  ground  southwest  of  the  village  to  the  bend 
in  the  Tugela,  west  of  the  bridge,  where  a crossing  at  the  bridle 
drift  “ was  ” to  be  made,  according  to  General  Clery’s  order.  In- 
credible as  it  may  seem,  the  men  marched  along,  with  officers  l^y 
their  side  and  generals  in  command,  in  quarter-column  forma- 
tion ! The  line  of  the  advance  was  almost  level;  there  was  no  shel- 
ter in  the  character  of  the  ground  except  a few  mimosa  bushes 
between  the  marching  men  and  the  bank  across  the  river  where 
an  enemy  might  be  found,  but  notwithstanding  all  this  the  obedient 
Tommies  swung  along  with  rifles  on  their  shoulders,  as  if  the  occa- 
sion was  one  of  an  Easter  Monday  maneuver  near  Brighton,  and  not 
that  of  a deadly  game  of  actual  war  in  South  Africa. 

On  the  Britishers  came  towards  the  drift,  the  Fusiliers  and 
Connaught  Bangers  in  front,  and  the  Border  Eegiment  and  Innis- 
killings  behind.  Their  pace  was  being  watched  in  breathless  ex- 
citement by  eyes  now  inflamed  with  the  passion  for  killing,  which 
war  feeling  begets  even  among  psalm-singing  Christians,  and  sights 
were  being  adjusted  to  fire  when  the  troops  should  reach  a certain 
spot  on  their  way  to  the  river  bank,  some  300  yards’  distance 
from  the  Tugela.  Like  the  men  of  Buller’s  right  wing,  they 
appeared,  as  seen  from  the  Boer  trenches,  to  be  oblivious  of  real 
danger.  They  came  along  in  careless  gait,  nearer  and  nearer  in 
their  fateful  march,  until  about  600  yards  only  separated  them 
from  the  men  with  leveled  rifles  behind  the  river. 

There  are  two  explanations  given  of  the  mistake  which  the 
officer  in  charge  of  the  Boer  Krupp  to  the  left  of  Christian  Botha’s 
position  here  made’ in  discharging  his  weapon  before  the  enemy 
had  approached  nearer  to  the  river.  One  is  that  he  saw  a move- 
ment in  the  enemy’s  column  as  if  the  more  or  less  close  formation 
of  the  approaching  Tommies  was  about  to  be  changed  in  conse- 
quence of  the  fire  Avhich  was  heard  from  fhe  direction  of  the  Boer 
left,  and  he  was  afraid  of  lo.sing  so  teTiipting  a target  as  the  blunder- 
ing English  officers  had  tlius  creafed.  The  other  explanation  is, 
that  the  Boer  center  had,  as  he  thought,  given  the  signal  for  attack 
by  their  fire  upon  fhe  forces  in  front  of  them.  The  temptation 
theory  is  the  more  probable,  under  the  circumstances.  The  dis- 


BATTLE  OF  COLENSO 


263 


obedience  of  orders  was  only  too  natural  in  face  of  so  inviting  an 
occasion,  but  it  saved  the  advancing  English  from  what  would  have 
otherwise  been  a far  more  deadly  fire  had  they  been  allowed  to 
approach  a few  hundred  yards  nearer  the  entrance  to  the  drift. 

The  Boer  gunner  had,  however,  done  his  work  well.  His  first 
shell  exploded  in  the  midst  of  the  Dublin  Fusiliers,  as  they  were 
in  the  act  of  obeying  the  belated  orders  of  the  officer  in  command, 
and  deploying;  twenty  of  them  being  killed  or  wounded  on  the 
spot.  The  Krupp  shell  was  instantly  supplemented  by  repetitions 
and  by  volleys  of  rifle  fire,  and  in  a few  minutes  the  whole  front 
line  of  the  advancing  brigade  was  swept  down.  Like  the  splutter- 
ing of  hail  on  a glass  roof  came  the  “ ping-pings  ” of  the  Mausers, 
and  troops  were  falling  and  tumbling  all  round.  It  was  all  the 
work  of  a couple  of  minutes,  but  within  that  time  Buller’s  left 
column,  which  was  to  have  crossed  the  Tugela  at  the  drift  and  to 
have  turned  Botha’s  right,  was  utterly  demoralized.  The  Border 
Eegiment  and  the  Inniskillings  turned  back  and  fled,  pursued  by 
the  winged  messengers  of  the  deadly  Mauser,  until  beyond  the 
range  of  accurate  aim.  The  Dublin  Fusiliers  and  Connaught 
Bangers  lay  flat  on  the  ground  to  evade  the  hail  of  lead  flying 
round  them,  and  the  fate  of  Hart’s  brigade  of  famous  British 
troops  was  sealed  for  the  day.  Spasmodic  efforts  on  the  parts  of  a 
few  hundred  men  separated  from  the  main  body  of  Hart’s  column 
were  made  to  find  some  kind  of  shelter  froin  Boer  bullets  better 
than  the  bare  veldt  offered,  and  some  of  these  detached  troops 
reached  the  banks  of  the  Tugela  in  their  attempts  to  escape  the 
galling  fire  from  over  the  river,  hut  at  no  time  after  the  attack 
was  opened  hy  the  Swaziland  burghers  on  the  first  line  of  advance 
was  any  serious  attempt  again  made  to  ford  the  bridle  drift. 

Buffer’s  center  had  in  the  meantime  joined  in  the  fray,  which 
now  extended  along  the  whole  line  from  Langwani  to  the  drift. 
Hildyard,  with  a force  estimated  from  the  Boer  positions  at  8,000 
men,  advanced  in  front  of  his  batteries  of  naval  guns  and  field 
artillery,  and  opened  fire  upon  Botha’s  positions  between  the 
bridges.  This  attacking  force  was  handled  with  better  judgment 
than  either  Buffer’s  right  or  left  columns.  It  advanced  in  open 
order,  in  line  with  the  railway;  the  naval  guns  and  twelve-pounders 
searching  the  Boer  lines  with  a ceaseless  cannonade  of  lyddite  shells 
and  shrapnel. 

Botha’s  anticipation  as  to  the  tactics  that  would  be  employed 
hy  his  adversary  was  fully  realized.  Buffer’s  main  object  seemed 
to  be  to  make  tha  attacks  on  Botha’s  right  and  left  positions 
synchronize  with  Hildyard’s  frontal  attack  in  great  force  upon 
the  Boer  center  near  the  wagon  bridge;  in  the  expectation  that  if 


264 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


he  could  obtain  footing  under  the  cover  of  Fort  Wylie  the  key 
of  the  Boer  positions  would  be  won,  and  with  it  the  battle.  Botha 
relied  upon  the  coolness  of  the  select  men  he  had  placed  in  his 
center  to  smash  any  attemj^t  to  cross  the  river  at  or  near  either  of 
the  bridges. 

Hildyard’s  division  came  along  in  two  main  columns;  the 
artillery  and  its  supports  to  the  right  of  the  railway  (Scene  II.), 
and  the  infantry  about  1,000  yards  to  the  left,  opposite  to  a 
6trongl)^-entrenched  kopje  where  Pretorius,  with  a Krupp  and  pom- 
pom and  concealed  riflemen,  were  posted.  As  at  Magersfontein, 
the  Boer  j^lan  was  to  depend  entirely  upon  the  Mauser;  the  few 
guns  being  reserved  for  use  after  the  enemy  had  been  allowed  to 
approach  near  enough  for  the  most  effective  play  of  rifle  Are. 
Hildyard’s  guns  had  belabored  Fort  W3die  from  the  back  of  the 
village  without  elicting  any  response,  and  thus  encouraged  by  the 
silence  across  the  river  both  artillery  and  infantry  continued  to 
advance  until  about  1,500  yards  only  separated  their  front  lines 
from  the  river  bank.  Then  the  men  in  the  trenches  let  themselves 
go,  and  out  from  the  lines  between  Fort  Wylie  and  the  wagon 
bridge  leaped  sheets  of  horizontal  Are  from  1,500  rifles,  with  their 
fifteen  shots  per  minute,  into  the  ranks  of  the  stricken  British  in 
front.  Pretorius  added  the  fury  of  his  pom-pom  to  this  storm  of 
bullets,  and  in  a few  minutes  no  living  object,  man  or  horse,  re- 
mained standing  round  Hildyard’s  batteries  behhid  the  village.  The 
troops  forming  the  brigade  advancing  to  the  right  of  the  railway 
were  held  back  as  by  a resistless  hurricane,  and  they  fell  on  the 
veldt  and  lay  there  at  the  mercy  of  the  invincible  marksmen 
across  the  Tugela.  Xo  force  could  face  that  leaden  storm,  and, 
as  in  the  case  of  Hart’s  and  Barton’s  broken  columns,  Hildyard’s 
division  of  Devons,  Surreys,  and  Yorkshires  and  the  rest,  had  to 
yield  before  the  pitiless  hail  of  bullets  which  swept  through  their 
ranks  from  the  Boer  lines. 

Already  the  day  had  been  won  for  the  Vierkleur.  Buller  was 
compelled  to  send  help  to  General  Hart  to  bring  his  far-famed 
regiments  back  from  their  hopeless  position  in  front  of  some 
1,000  cool-headed,  steady-firing  farmers,  and  the  crossing  of 
the  bridle  drift  was  abandoned.  Sporadic  attacks  had  been  made 
by  some  of  the  Dublin  Fusiliers  after  the  first  attempt  to  cross 
had  so  signally  failed,  but  they  were  of  no  avail  against  the 
overpowering  Are  of  the  defenders.  The  Swaziland  commando, 
which  formed  part  of  the  Boer  right  wing,  at  this  point  allowed  a 
party  of  the  enemy  to  approach  quite  near  to  the  river  without 
firing.  The  few  daring  Tommies  stood  out  in  this  action  in  strong 
contrast  to  the  thousands  who  had  fled  on  the  first  onslaught. 


BATTLE  OF  CO LEE BO 


2G5 


and  who  could  not  be  induced  by  entreaty  or  by  threats  to  form 
again  for  attack.  They  raced  forward  for  the  river  bank,  pluckily 
disregarding  the  fate  that  had  befallen  their  dead  comrades  lying 
around,  and  were  quite  close  to  the  entrance  of  the  drift  when  the 
Swaziland  burghers  poured  a deadly  volley  into  them  from  the 
other  side  of  the  river,  killing  or  wounding  the  whole  party  except 
six.  Fully  100  of  the  British  troops  went  down  in  this  one  short 
hut  decisive  encounter  at  the  river.  This  was  the  last  rally  of  the 
men  of  Hart’s  brigade. 

The  troops  in  this  column  had  been  stupidly  led  to  a place  where 
they  were  so  many  helpless  human  targets,  and  from  which  no 
officer  showed  ability  to  extricate  them  with  soldierly  credit. 
Officers  pranced  about,  shouting  ridiculous  orders,  and  calling 
out  “ Forward  ! Charge  ! ” in  an  impotent  display  of  courage 
without  judgment,  and  of  rank  without  capacity  to  inspire  confi- 
dence. The  men  ran  back,  or  lay  down,  as  seemed  best  for  their 
safety,  in  a condition  of  absolute  demoralization  from  the  galling 
fire  which  poured  into  their  ranks  from  invisible  foes  over  the 
river.  There  were  enough  of  them,  in  all  conscience,  to  have 
made  a human  bridge  across  the  Tugela,  and  to  storm  the  trenches 
held  by  only  1,000  farmers  on  the  other  side,  but  there  was  neither 
the  generalship  to  direct  nor  the  true  military  spirit  to  lead  such  a 
movement  in  the  officers  of  the  brigade.  They  had  all  lost  their 
heads  early  in  the  fight,  and  Mr.  Thomas  Atkins  is  not  trained  or 
expected  to  act  independently  of  his  superiors  in  any  emergency. 
In  this  instance  the  troops  were  mainly  Anglo-Irish,  and  whatever 
initiative  and  courage  was  shown  by  the  groups  or  companies  of  the 
Dublin  Fusiliers  or  Connaughts  who  rushed  for  the  river  bank  in 
face  of  the  Mauser  fire  was  exhibited  in  the  spirit  of  desperate  men 
who  saw  themselves  helplessly  led  and  hopelessly  beaten.  It  was 
men  like  these  in  the  three  attacking  and  beaten  British  columns 
who  won  the  generous  praise  of  Louis  Botha.  His  judgment  upon 
their  officers  and  upon  the  mass  of  Buller’s  23,000  fighters  on  the 
field  of  Colenso  was  of  a totally  different  character. 

At  the  Boer  left  similar  detached  attempts  were  also  made  to 
turn  the  position,  but  with  a like  result.  One  of  these  efforts 
assumed  the  character  of  a renewed  attack  by  the  major  part  of 
Barton’s  brigade.  The  column  partly  re-formed  behind  its  bat- 
teries after  the  first  shock  and  retreat,  and  went  forward  more 
tentatively  under  cover  of  its  guns.  The  Imperial  Light  Horse, 
Xatal  Carabineers,  Thorne3^croft’s  and  Bethune’s  Mounted  In- 
fantry, all  South  African  levies  and  steady  fighters,  together  with 
other  sections  of  Buller’s  right  wing,  joined  in  the  second  attempt 
on  Langwani,  but  the  burghers  remained  as  firm  as  the  rock  on 


266 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


which  they  grimly  held  their  ground,  and  poured  volley  after 
volley  of  decimating  fire  into  their  foes.  The  supporting  British 
artillery  was  of  no  avail.  Its  shells  hit  the  hill  and  missed  the 
Boers,  while  the  800  marksmen  behind  their  sangars  and  en- 
trenchments continued  to  send  their  steady  and  resistless  rifle  fire 
into  the  mass  of  beaten  Tommies  before  them. 

This  magnificent  performance  of  Botha’s  left  wing  in  with- 
standing all  attempts  by  artillery,  infantry,  and  cavalry  assault 
to  shake  its  hold  on  Langwani  was  above  all  praise.  The  men 
merited  in  every  way  the  confidence  which  had  been  placed  in 
their  grit  and  accurate  shooting  when  they  were  selected  to  hold 
the  hill  against  all  comers.  Commandant  Joshua  Joubert  and 
Field  Cornet  Swart  were  both  slightly  wounded,  and  had  the  satis- 
faction of  losing  only  some  six  men  in  killed  and  wounded  dur- 
ing the  whole  fight,  as  against  the  hundreds  of  the  enemy  who 
went  down  before  the  fire  of  their  intrepid  commandoes. 

Upon  witnessing  the  comi^lete  failure  of  Hildyard’s  attempts  to  get 
near  the  wagon  bridge,  General  Buller  resolved  uj)on  a retreat  from 
the  field  on  which  he  had  been  so  completely  and  so  easily  beaten. 

It  was  at  this  stage  of  the  battle,  and  when  Botha’s  victory  was 
all  but  complete,  that  an  English  officer  with  two  batteries  of 
artillery  and  their  support  was  seen  dashing  like  fury  into  the 
very  center  of  the  battle-field,  in  a mad  gallop  to  save  the  day 
and  turn  the  tide  of  triumjih  for  the  Boers  before  it  spelled  com- 
plete disaster  to  the  British.  It  was  a splendid  exhibition  of 
daring  and  courage  of  that  bold  and  reckless  kind  which  is  always 
deserving  of  praise  for  its  heroism,  no  matter  what  may  be  said 
of  the  judgment  which  impels  or  of  the  consequences  which  follow 
from  it.  Possibly  Colonel  Long  believed  that  his  batteries  and 
his  lyddite-throwing  navals  had  really  silenced  the  Boer  artillery 
west  of  Fort  Wylie,  and  that  a rush  forward  with  some  of  his 
guns  at  this  juncture  would  give  him  a freer  and  fuller  range  at 
which  he  might  overwhelm  the  Boer  center  with  a raking  fire 
from  a few  hundred  yards’  distance.  It  may  be,  also,  that  as 
generalship  had  completely  failed  to  gain  the  prize  of  victory,  he 
thought  that  a forlorn  hope  of  an  artillery  attack  might  possibly 
succeed. 

Colonel  Long’s  brigade  division  had  been  previously  engaged 
in  helping  the  right  flank  of  Hildyard’s  attacking  columns  in 
their  effort  to  reach  the  wagon  In-idge  near  the  Boer  center. 
His  giins  had  moved  while  thus  employed  within  the  zone  of 
Mauser  fire,  and  were  driven  back,  des]fite  all  the  fury  of  their 
fire,  which  Villebois-Mareuil  described  derisively  as  “much  money 
expended  in  smoke,  without  any  results.”  Beaten  from  this  point 


BATTLE  OF  COLENSO 


267 


in  the  English  plan  of  attack,  Long,  for  some  reason  not  yet  fully 
explained,  went  one  worse  in  artillery  recklessness  by  galloping 
his  two  batteries  from  his  previous  position  across  the  open  space, 
right  in  front  of  the  village  of  Colenso,  and  within  some  500 
yards  of  the  spot  from  whence  the  Krugersdorp  and  Yryheid  com- 
mandoes had  already  decimated  the  foremost  lines  of  Hildyard’s 
column  with  their  fire.  The  exact  spot  is  marked  X in  Scene  II. 
of  the  battle-field. 

In  a word,  the  daring  Colonel  had  raced  his  guns  far  beyond 
the  covering  forces  of  Hildyard’s  infantry,  and  had  taken  them 
right  under  the  noses  of  the  riflemen  on  Fort  Wylie.  Men  had 
been  lying  flat  on  their  faces  here  for  hours  among  the  dead  and 
wounded,  afraid  to  lift  a head  or  move  a limb,  so  completely  was 
the  place  dominated  and  swept  by  the  Boer  riflemen  behind  the 
river.  But  it  was  into  this  jaw  of  death  that  Colonel  Long 
rushed  with  his  smoking  teams  and  twelve  Armstrongs.  Nor  were 
the  men  who  worked  the  doomed  batteries  wanting  in  the  wild 
courage  of  their  too  daring  leader.  They  served  their  guns  with 
splendid  pluck  and  marvelous  coolness,  executing  every  order  with 
admirable  discipline,  and  the  twelve  guns  were  soon  engaged  again 
in  what  had  been  for  them  during  the  whole  day  but  a noisy,  in- 
effectual pounding  of  rocks  and  ridges.  A few  rounds  only  had 
been  delivered  at  Fort  Wylie,  and  the  adjacent  Boer  trenches, 
when  Botha’s  center  directed  its  fire  with  deadly  precision  upon  the 
ill-fated  batteries,  and  their  doom  was  sealed. 

The  Boer  general  had  been  quick  to  note  the  extraordinary 
blunder  of  the  British  officer  in  bringing  his  guns  to  so  dangerous 
a length  from  protecting  infantry,  and  instantly  availed  himself 
of  the  chance  which  was  thus  given  him.  He  ordered  up  reen- 
forcements to  the  positions  of  the  Krugerdorp  men  at  once,  and 
directed  a concentrated  fire  upon  the  British  batteries,  while  his 
pom-pom  and  Krupp  were  trained  upon  all  points  in  the  rear 
and  around  the  doomed  guns  from  whence  succor  might  arrive. 
The  attention  of  the  center  forces  of  the  two  armies  was  now 
absorbed  in  the  fight  for  the  imperiled  Armstrongs.  No  braver 
efforts  could  have  been  made  to  rescue  the  guns  than  were  at- 
tempted again  and  again  by  British  officers  and  men,  but  almost 
all  were  shot  down  who  engaged  in  the  perilous  task.  Lieutenant 
Eoberts,  son  of  Lord  Eoberts,  was  mortally  wounded  in  an  attempt 
which  was  partially  successful  in  the  ultimate  dragging  away  of 
two  of  the  twelve  guns.  Colonel  Long  had  been  severely  wounded 
in  the  early  part  of  the  fray  around  the  batteries,  and  several  other 
officers  had  also  been  shot  down  in  their  frantic  endeavors  to  ex- 
tricate the  guns  from  their  desperate  situation. 


268 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


There  occurred  in  connection  with  Colonel  Long’s  action  a tragic 
incident,  similar  to  that  recorded  in  the  account  of  the  battle  of 
Talana  Hill,  and  which  cost  twenty  lives  to  the  enemy  by  the  bun- 
gling fire  of  his  own  guns.  A body  of  men  of  Hildyard’s  column 
who  had  taken  part  in  the  attack  upon  the  Boer  center,  and  had 
advanced  further  than  their  fellows,  were  compelled  to  lie  flat  on  the 
ground  within  a couple  of  hundred  yards  of  the  river  for  several 
hours  after  their  comrades  had  been  shot  back  or  shot  down.  They 
could  neither  advance  nor  retire.  The  general’s  orders  to  retire 
did  not  reach  them,  nor  could  they,  without  risk  of  being  “ potted,” 
have  obeyed  had  they  heard  and  attempted  to  comply.  They  lay 
where  a few  mimosa  bushes  or  a chance  hole  in  the  veldt  gave  them 
some  kind  of  protection  against  the  fire  of  their  watchful  foes  over 
the  river.  The  burning  sun  beat  down  upon  their  parched  bodies. 
Thirst  assailed  them  with  a horrible  mockery  of  the  fact  that  the 
waters  of  the  Tugela  were  only  a few  yards  away,  and  that  Death 
stood  as  a sentinel  to  invite  them  towards  this  tantalizing  offer  of 
relief.  It  was  under  these  trying  conditions  that  some  fifty  soldiers 
heard  the  welcome  sound  of  Long’s  guns  only  300  yards  behind 
where  they  had  lain  in  agony  all  that  horrible  morning.  The  bat- 
teries had  been  placed  immediately  in  the  rear  of  where  the  pros- 
trate British  lay,  and  were  already  barking  in  furious  challenge 
at  the  ceaseless  rifle  fire  from  over  the  river.  The  prostrate  Tom- 
mies rose  to  their  feet  and  made  directly  for  the  welcome  shelter 
of  Colonel  Long’s  batteries.  It  was  here  where  the  horrible  blunder 
of  the  English  gunners  was  committed.  These  men  had  no  knowl- 
edge of  the  position  of  their  unfortunate  comrades.  They  had 
galloped  from  another  part  of  the  battle-field  in  obedience  to  the 
orders  of  their  officers,  and  were  unaware  of  the  fact  that  between 
them  and  the  river  were  numbers  of  their  own  troops  in  such  con- 
finement and  shelter  as  the  veldt  could  afford  them.  On  seeing, 
therefore,  a body' of  fifty  men,  rifle  in  hand,  leaping  up  from  near 
the  bank  of  the  river  and  making  towards  the  guns  as  if  to  rush 
them  by  assault,  two  of  the  Armstrongs  were  trained  upon  the  un- 
fortunate men  and  twenty-five  of  them  were  shot  down  by  the  fire 
of  their  own  artillery. 

This  incident  gave  rise  to  the  rumor  that  British  soldiers  were 
fired  upon  by  their  officers  for  running  away  and  for  refusing  to 
charge  at  the  position  beyond  the  river.  This  was  a widespread 
belief  among  all  the  burghers  who  fought  at  Colenso,  but  my 
own  conviction  is  that  the  tragedy  occurred  in  the  manner  I have 
explained. 

Meanwhile  continuous  but  ineffectual  attempts  were  being  made 
to  recover  the  British  batteries.  Bodies  of  the  Devonshire  and 


BOER  PATROL,  COLENSO,  DECEMBER,  1899 


270 


THE  BOEB  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


West  Surrey  Eegiments  had  been  sent  by  General  Buller’s  orders, 
earlier  in  the  day,  to  assist  in  the  task  on  which  all  the  British 
energies  and  anxieties  were  now  centered.  Nothing,  however,  could 
live  near  the  guns.  The  sjjot  was  the  target  for  a continuous  hail 
of  Mauser  and  pom-pom  tire,  and  numbers  of  troops  thrown  forward 
to  retrieve  Long’s  courageous  blunder  of  the  morning  were  shot 
down  before  they  could  reach  the  spot  where  dead  and  wounded 
men  and  dying  horses  lay  heaped  around  the  luckless  batteries. 

Two  bodies  of  the  Devonshire  and  West  Surrey  Eegiments  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  near  to  where  the  guns  lay,  but  were  compelled 
to  shelter  themselves  in  two  dongas  or  large  holes  from  the  tire  of 
the  Boers.  Colonel  Bullock  w^as  in  command  of  the  Devons,  and, 
not  having  received  the  order  to  retire,  held  his  ground  in  the 
shelter  of  a hollow,  prepared  to  dispute,  as  far  as  possible,  the 
possession  of  the  Armstrongs  until  darkness  might  enable  the  other 
forces  driven  back  from  the  field  to  attempt  their  rescue. 

General  Botha  had  resolved,  however,  to  frustrate  this  obvious 
plan.  After  seeing  the  enemy  shot  back  from  every  position  they 
had  attempted  to  occupy,  he  ordered  a couple  of  hundred  burghers 
to  cross  the  river  and  bring  in  the  guns.  These  men  were  led  by 
Field  Cornet  Cherrie  Emmet,  brother-in-law  of  General  Botha, 
and  Lieutenant  Pohlman,  of  the  Johannesburg  Police,  “ the  bravest 
of  the  brave,”  as  they  have  been  deservedly  called  for  their  many 
feats  of  heroism  during  the  war.  Most  of  the  men  swam  the  river 
with  their  horses,  while  others  who  were  unmounted  waded  across 
the  stream,  holding  their  rifles  above  their  heads ; a crossing  which 
showed  that,  had  the  British  an  equal  determination  to  reach  the 
north  side  of  the  Tugela  in  the  fight  of  the  morning,  there  was  no 
insuperable  difficulty  in  the  depth  of  the  river  to  prevent  them. 

Pohlman  arid  his  Police  advanced  on  the  first  donga,  occupied 
by  fifty  British  officers  and  men,  and  called  upon  them  to  surrender, 
which  they  did  without  firing  a shot.  They  were  sent  across  to  the 
Boer  lines.  Emmet  waited  for  the  return  of  Pohlman  and  his  men 
before  advancing  upon  the  second  donga,  nearest  the  abandoned 
batteries,  in  which  Colonel  Bullock  and  some  forty  of  the  Devon- 
shire Eegiment  were  concealed.  On  receiving  the  required  aid. 
Emmet  and  the  Krugersdorp  contingent  rushed  at  the  donga,  and 
called  upon  the  British  to  hold  up  their  hands  or  they  would  be  shot. 
The  troopers  laid  down  their  arms  at  once,  but  Colonel  Bullock 
refused  to  comply  with  the  Boer  officer’s  command,  and  fired  his 
revolver,  wounding  one  of  Emmet’s  burghers.  This  act  would  have 
met  with  instant  chastisement  at  the  hands  of  the  enraged  Boers 
had  Emmet  not  prevented  further  firing,  so  as  to  save  Bullock’s 
life.  The  English  officer  then  attempted  to  parley,  in  order  to  gain 


BATTLE  OF  COLENSO 


271 


time.  This  conduct,  however,  could  not  he  tolerated,  and  Bullock 
was  instantly  knocked  down  with  the  butt-end  of  a rifle  by  an 
elderly  Boer,  and  the  last  stand  for  the  Englisli  batteries  had  been 
made.  The  Devons  and  their  officers  were  taken  prisoner  and  sent 
across  the  river,  while  Emmet  with  the  Krugersdorp  men  seized  the 
prize  of  the  day,  and  carried  ten  British  guns  in  triumph  to  where 


Photo  l)j’  Mr.  Davitt 


ADJUTANT  ROBERT  EilJIET 

Of  General  Louis  Botha’s  Staff 


(reneral  Botha  awaited  this  final  proof  of  the  complete  victory 
which  he  had  won  for  Transvaal  Independence  on  that  memorable 
1.5th  of  December. 

General  Botha’s  report  of  the  battle  to  President  Kruger  was 
wired  from  Colenso  at  seven  in  the  evening,  after  the  enemy  had 
been  driven  back  and  had  retreated  to  Chieveley.  It  was  a brief 
report,  and  will  live  in  military  history  as  worthy  of  the  Christian 
hero  who  had  gained  the  great  triumph  so  simply  recorded  : 

“ The  God  of  our  fathers  has  to-day  granted  us  a brilliant 


■272 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


victory.  We  repulsed  the  enemy  on  every  side,  and  from  three 
different  points.  We  allowed  them  to  place  twelve  of  their  cannons, 
amidst  a heavy  bombardment,  right  alongside  the  river,  and  soon 
as  their  horses  were  detached  we  opened  fire  upon  them  with  our 
Mauser  musketry,  and  killed  their  cannon-service,  and  shot  them 
so  completely  out  of  their  position  that  they  only  succeeded  in 
rescuing  two  of  their  guns. 

“ We  captured  the  remaining  ten — big,  beautiful  cannons — to- 
gether with  twelve  ammunition  wagons,  filled  to  the  brim. 

“ We  have  also  made  prisoners  of  war  of  about  170  of  their  best 
men,  who  stormed  us  so  pluckily  time  after  time. 

“ There  are  various  officers  among  our  prisoners  of  war. 

“ The  enemy’s  loss  must  have  been  terrible.  Their  dead  are 
lying  upon  each  other,  and  I think  the  British  loss  must  have 
been  2,000  men. 

“ Our  loss  is  confined  to  about  30  killed  and  wounded.  I will 
send  fuller  report  later. 

“ We  have  l)ronght  the  enemy’s  captured  cannon  through  the 
river. 

“ The  English  were  continually  stationing  their  ambulance 
wagons  in  unauthorized  positions  in  front  of  their  cannons  and 
troo2)s.” 

On  Monday,  the  18th,  the  following  additional  particulars  of 
the  great  fight  of  Friday  were  wired  to  the  Government  at  Pretoria 
by  Botha: 

“ The  battle-field  was  carefully  visited  by  our  men,  and  all  that 
remained  upon  it  in  the  way  of  war  implements  was  collected  and 
taken  possession  of. 

“ Of  the  enemy’s  force  we  made  180  prisoners  of  war,  and  we 
killed  at  least  200  of  their  artillery  company. 

“ During  the  whole  period  of  battle,  the  enemy  continued  to  run 
its  ambulance  wagon  in  and  about  the  firing  line. 

“ The  English  were  yesterday  engaged  in  interring  their  killed 
until  late  in  the  afternoon,  and  to-day  there  are  still  numbers  of 
unburied  dead  on  the  battle-field. 

“ I am  unable  to  send  you  accurate  returns  of  the  dead  and 
wounded  on  the  English  side,  but  T am  certain  my  estimate  which 
I previously  wired  you  is  by  no  means  exaggerated. 

“ The  English  Bed  Cross  officials  told  me  that  on  the  one  battle- 
field there  were  alone  760  wounded,  and  that  when  the  roll-call 
took  place  yesterday  morning  3,000  of  the  enemy  failed  to  answer 
to  their  names. 

“ This  being  the  case,  an  armistice  was  asked  for  by  the  British 
general  for  the  purpose  of  finding  and  burying  his  dead,  and  we 
granted  this  under  certain  specific  conditions  for  a period  of  twenty- 
four  hours,  from  Saturday  morning,  7 o’clock. 


BATTLE  OF  CO LEX SO 


373 

" At  an  adjacent  kop  there  are  still  lying  21  unburied  dead.  I 
have  instructed  our  people  to  go  and  inter  these  poor  fellows. 

“ The  British  Bed  Cross  officials  also  state  that  many  of  the 
enemy’s  officers  fell,  and  that  this  broke  the  courage  of  the  rank 
and  file. 

“ I found  the  counting  of  the  English  dead  too  inhuman  a 
problem;  but  their  loss  was  severe,  and  this  is  sufficiently  proved 
by  their  retreat  in  confusion,  their  loss  of  cannon,  their  surrender 


Photo  by  Mr.  Davitt 

THE  BOEU  “rOM-POM*’  WHICH  DID  SUCH  EXECUTION  AT  COLENSO,  CALLED  “ HELL-FIRE  ” BY 

ENGLISH  TOMMIES 


of  their  positions,  the  removal  of  their  camp,  and  their  request  for 
a twenty-four  hours’  armistice. 

“ The  ten  cannons  and  gun-wagons,  together  with  the  12  fully- 
laden  ammunition  wagons  we  captured,  are  all  in  perfect  order. 

“ The  enemy  has  pulled  up  all  his  tents  and  broken  camp  entirely. 

“ In  the  documents  found  in  the  pockets  of  the  dead  and  cap- 
tured officers  it  appears  that  there  was  a force  of  23,000  of  the 
enemy  on  the  battle-field.” 

The  completeness  of  the  Boer  victory  cannot  be  fully  measured 
by  the  mere  recorded  results  of  the  battle.  These  results  were 
18 


274 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


damaging  onongh,  in  all  conscience,  to  British  generalship  and 
martial  i)restigc.  They  si)oke  to  an  astounded  military  world  of 
an  army  of  23,000  men  and  50  guns  being  beaten  by  a force  which 
consisted  of  less  than  5,000  farmers  and  a single  battery  of  artillery. 
Over  four  times  the  number  of  men  and  eight  times  the  number 
of  guns  were  hurled  back  with  ease,  and  with  comparatively  little 
loss  to  the  victors,  by  a small  Transvaal  force  of  no  military  train- 
ing, led  by  a young  farmer  who  had  never  studied  a book  on  the 
science  of  war  in  his  life. 

The  capture  of  the  ten  Armstrong  guns  was  even  a more  decisive 
evidence  of  the  thorough  defeat  and  demoralization  of  General 
Buller’s  army  after  a few  hours’  fighting  than  the  retreat  which 
followed  its  failure  to  cross  the  Tugela.  The  facts  relating  to  the 
action  of  Colonel  Long,  and  to  the  various  attempts  that  were  made 
to  recover  the  two  batteries,  have  been  related  above.  The  manner 
in  which  Emmet  and  Pohlman  with  a couple  of  hundred  burghers 
were  permitted  to  take  the  guns  over  the  river  is  more  extraordi- 
nary still.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  was  the  river  which 
English  correspondents  and  soldiers,  writing  subsequently  about 
the  battle,  declared  to  be  “ impassable,”  and  to  be  “ staked  with 
barbed  wire.”  Field  Cornet  Emmet  and  his  men  rode  their  horses 
through  this  very  stream,  with  ease,  and  carried  back  the  10 
Armstrong  guns,  12  wagons  of  ammunition,  and  150  prisoners 
across  this  identical  river,  without  the  loss  of  a man  or  a horse,  and 
without  encountering  the  imaginary  barbed  wire. 

While  these  200  Boers  rode  into  the  Tugela,  and  dashed  at 
dongas  where  an  unknown  number  of  the  enemy  lay  concealed,  six 
or  eight  naval  guns,  and  at  least  as  many  batteries  of  field  artillery, 
could  not  be  further  away  than  7,000  or  8,000  yards  during  the 
whole  proceeding  ! Nay,  more,  20,000  of  the  flower  of  England’s 
army,  commanded  by  the  very  ablest  of  her  generals,  were  still 
actually  on  or  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  battle-field,  with 
arms  in  their  hands.  And  yet,  in  view  of  these  astounding  facts, 
General  Buller’s  despatch  relating  to  the  battle  of  Colenso,  is 
mainly  remarkable  for  the  amount  of  praise  which  he  therein  be- 
stows upon  every  one  engaged  in  the  fight,  with  one  exception — the 
one  officer  who,  whatever  may  be  said  of  his  judgment,  exhibited 
some  of  the  same  daring  courage  which  sent  Emmet  and  Pohlman 
and  their  burghers  into  the  still  smoking  battle-field  to  carry  back 
prisoners  and  batteries  under  the  very  eyes  of  half  a hundred  Eng- 
lish guns  and  of  an  army  which  its  general  has  declared  (after  the 
battle)  was  “ capable  of  going  anywhere  and  doing  anything.” 


Chapter  XXIII 


BOTHA’S  GREAT  VICTORY 

British  conceai,  extent  of  disaster — The  Boer  Identity  Department 
— Its  report  of  Boer  casualties — IYhy  British  lost  the  battle — 
How  the  Tugela  could  have  been  crossed — Artillery  lessons  of 
the  fight — Captain  Pretorius — Sltperiority  of  the  individual 
Boer — Buller’s  exaggeration  of  Botha’s  strength — Villebois- 
jMareuil’s  part  in  the  battle — Heroism  of  Irish  contingent 

IX  his  report  of  the  victory  of  Colenso,  General  Botha  com- 
plained of  the  misuse  of  ambulance  wagons  by  the  British  dur- 
ing the  engagement.  In  several  instances  while  the  fight  was 
fiercest  these  wagons  were  driven  right  into  the  firing  line,  one 
wagon  coming  within  500  yards  of  the  river,  and  offering  cover  to 
men  who  were  actively  engaged  in  the  conflict.  Worse  than  this, 
however,  was  the  deliberate  action  of  certain  officers,  wbo  took  the 
horses  from  one  of  these  ambulance  wagons  to  harness  to  the 
Armstrong  batteries,  round  which  the  desperate  struggle  for  repos- 
session of  Colonel  Long’s  guns  waged.  It  was,  in  fact,  a matter  of 
Boer  belief  that  the  two  rescued  guns  were  got  away  in  this  manner 
by  means  of  English  ambulance  horses.  This  was  a glaring  and 
deliberate  violation  of  the  Bed  Cross  ensign.  The  action  was  seen 
by  every  Boer  officer  of  Botha’s  center,  as  the  whole  proceeding 
took  place  within  700  yards  of  where  they  were  witnesses  to  the 
act. 

Xo  battle  was  ever  fought  between  armies  of  civilized  nations 
which  showed  such  an  astounding  disparity  both  in  the  number  of 
combatants  on  each  side,  and  of  casualties.  On  the  British  side 
it  was  admitted  that  1,147  men  were  killed  and  wounded,  with 
close  upon  200  taken  prisoners.  This  was  not,  however,  an  ac- 
curate account  of  General  Buller’s  losses.  General  Botha  estimated 
these  at  2,000,  all  told,  and  it  was  confidently  asserted  by  Boer 
officers  and  press  men  who  were  present  on  the  battle-field  when  the 
killed  and  wounded  were  being  removed  that  the  English  had  con- 
cealed the  real  extent  of  their  casualties  in  their  published  rejiorts 
of  the  fight.  A similar  charge  has  been  made,  it  is  true,  against  the 
Boers  by  English  war  correspondents.  It  is  a fact,  however,  that  on 


276 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


October  19,  1900  ten  months  after  the  battle  of  Colenso,  a list  of 
casualties  was  published  by  the  British  War  Office,  which  included 
several  names,  followed  by  the  statement,  “ Killed  at  Colenso, 
December  15,  1899.”  If  it  is  allowed  that  the  total  casualties  on 
the  English  side  amounted  to  1,500 — including  prisoners — this 
figure  would  represent  a loss  for  General  Buller’s  army,  in  this  one 
battle,  equal  to  nearly  one-third  of  the  total  Boer  fighting  force 
which  inflicted  it. 

The  Boer  losses  at  Colenso.  were  so  small  that  many  friends  of 
the  Federal  cause  were  increduloiis  as  to  the  correctness  of  the 
returns.  The  British  press  loudly  protested  that  the  truth  was 
being  eoncealed,  declaring  that  Botha’s  casualties  would,  at  least, 
be  equal  to  those  of  Buller’s.  Had  not  the  Boer  positions  been 
bombarded  with  lyddite  and  other  shells  for  two  whole  days  pre- 
vious to  the  actual  battle?  And  were  there  not  forty  or  fifty  guns 
employed  against  the  same  positions  for  the  six  hours  -during  which 
the  fight  continued  on  the  15th  ? How,  therefore,  could  the  Boers 
escape  with  so  few  killed  and  wounded  ? 

I was  told  by  General  Botha,  when  discussing  these  and  other 
facts  relating  to  this  battle,  that  he  had  ordered  one  of  his  officers 
to  count  the  number  of  shells  which  were  fired  by  Buller’s  batteries 
at  the  Boer  positions  during  the  two  days  preceding  the  main  attack 
upon  the  Boer  lines.  “ Nineteen  hundred  and  sixty  shells  were  so 
fired,”  said  the  general,  “ without  a single  man  on  our  side  being 
hit.” 

General  Botha  would  be  absolutely  incapable  of  resorting  to 
so  paltry  and  unsoldierly  a subterfuge  as  that  of  concealing  the 
number  of  his  killed.  The  attempt  could  not  succeed,  even  if 
made.  The  Boer  military  system  renders  such  deception  practically 
impossible.  Men  in  commandoes  group  themselves  in  tents,  either 
as  chums,  as  neighbors  when  at  home,  or  otherwise;  the  com- 
mandoes being  organized  territorially,  not  indiscriminately.  These 
men  fight  side  by  side,  and  return  to  their  laagers  and  tents  to- 
gether, if  not  killed  or  v'ounded.  The  absence  of  a single  man 
would,  therefore,  be  known  immediately  after  an  engagement,  and 
his  fate  as  killed,  wounded,  or  missing  could  not  be  concealed  from 
his  comrades  or  family. 

Another  word,  however,  remains  to  be  said  on  this  point.  There 
was  in  Pretoria  from  the  commencement  of  hostilities  an  Identity 
Department,  whose  duties  consisted  in  ascertaining  the  names  of 
the  Boer  dead  on  each  battle-field,  the  number  of  the  killed  and 
wounded,  and  all  other  necessary  information.  Professor  Molen- 
graaff  was  the  head  of  this  Department,  which  was  a Transvaal 
Branch  of  the  Eed  Cross  Society  of  Geneva.  He  issued  cards  at  the 


BOTHA’S  GBEAT  TICTOBY 


277 


outbreak  of  hostilities  to  all  burghers  in  the  Federal  armies.  These 
cards  were  headed,  “ Identity  Department  of  the  Transvaal  Branch 
of  the  Bed  Cross  Societ}^,  Pretoria,”  and  contained  specified  space 
for  the  following  information:  “ aSTame  of  bearer.  Age.  Eesidence. 
Commando.”  On  the  side  of  the  card  there  was  printed  in  very 
plain  type  the  following  direction  : “ In  case  of  the  bearer  being 

killed  or  wounded,  you  are  requested  to  send  this  card  through 
the  nearest  commanding  officer  or  responsible  official  to  the  Iden- 
tity Department  above  mentioned.”  ' The  card  also  contained  the 
words  : “ The  Identity  Department  of  the  Bed  Cross  Society  will 
forward  to  English  authorities  information  about  wounded  English 
soldiers  who  might  be  made  prisoners.  Telegraphic  address — 
i\Iolengraaff,  Pretoria.” 

I had  the  advantage  of  meeting  at  Osspruit  Camp,  0.  F.  S.,  the 
officer  of  the  Pretoria  Bed  Cross  Society  who  reported  to  Professor 
IMolengraaff  the  number  of  killed  and  wounded  on  the  Boer  side 
at  the  battle  of  Colenso.  He  was  present  during  tbe  whole  of  the 
fighting.  His  credentials  read  as  follows  : 

“ H.  S.  Osterhagen,  member  of  Professor  Molengraaffs  Identity 
Department,  Bed  Cross  Society  of  Geneva,  Transvaal  Branch, 
Head  Committee  : We  hereby  certify  that  bearer,  H.  S.  Oster- 
hagen, is  an  active  and  enrolled  member  of  the  Identity  Department 
of  this  Society,  and  is  entitled  to  the  mark  of  neutrality  and  the 
privilege  of  the  Geneva  Convention. 

“ Pretoria,  8th  November,  1899. 

“ H.  H.  Sheppard, 

“ Acting  Secretary. 

“ Dr.  P.  M.  Molengraaff, 

“ Chief  of  the  Identity  Department.” 

Mr.  Osterhagen  showed  me  his  report  book,  containing  the 
figures  of  the  Boer  killed  and  wounded  at  Colenso.  The  entry 
read  as  follows  : “ Battle  of  Colenso,  December  15,  1899.  Number 
of  Federal  wounded,  27;  number  of  killed,  6 !” 

There  are  four  reasons  why  the  British  lost  the  battle  of  Colenso 
and  with  it  so  many  men  more  than  the  Boers:  The  incredible  in- 
capacity of  the  enemy’s  generals;  the  astounding  inefficiency  of 
the  English  artillery;  the  absence  of  real  fighting  capacity  in  the 
“crack”  regiments  under  Buller’s  command;  and  the  play  of  the 
very  opposite  qualities  on  the  side  of  the  Boer  forces.  The  bare 
facts  of  the  battle  conclusively  establish  these  four  propositions. 

There  was  only  one  way  in  which  the  Tugela  could  have  been 
crossed  under  Buller’s  plan  where  he  attempted  and  disastrously 
failed  in  his  effort  to  get  over.  That  was  by  a reckless  courage 


278 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


akin  to  that  of  Colonel  Long’s  in  his  daring  but  unsustained  effort 
to  retrieve  the  fortunes  of  the  day  with  his  twelve  guns.  These 
l)atteries  might  have  told  a different  story  of  the  fight  had  they  and 
the  other  thirty-four  guns  been  effectively  utilized  in  covering  a 
really  determined  resolve  on  the  part  of  Buller’s  army  first  to  seize 
and  hold  Langwani^  and  then  to  cross  the  river  at  all  cost  at  the 
bridle  drift.  It  would  probably  have  added  a loss  of  1,000  more 
men  to  the  already  heavy  loss  of  the  British,  but  this  would  have 
been  a loss  that  would  have  won  a battle,  in  place  of  a battle  lost 
in  humiliating  defeat. 

It  has  been  demonstrated  again  and  again  in  this  war,  and  no- 
tably at  Colenso,  that  a few  quick-firing  guns,  admirably  served  by 
capable  artillerists,  were  more  effective  in  their  work  than  an  im- 
posing array  of  batteries  badly  handled.  The  primary  object  of 
artillery  in  a war  may  be  to  demoralize,  rather  than  to  kill,  the 
enemy;  to  unnerve  his  riflemen  in  their  fire,  and  to  cover  with  the 
shield  of  flying  and  bursting  shells  the  application  of  the  weapon 
which  does  most  of  the  killing  and  wounding  in  battle.  The  Boer 
gunners,  however,  handled  their  few  cannon  with  as  keen  an  aim 
as  that  which  enabled  the  burghers  to  make  their  Mauser  fire  the 
deadliest  ever  recorded  of  rifle  work  in  war.  In  no  single  engage- 
ment from  Talana  to  Dalmanutha,  excepting  Modderspruit,  had 
the  Boers  more  than  one  gun  to  six  of  their  enemy’s,  and  it  has 
frequently  happened  that  a solitary  pom-pom  or  quick-firing  Krupp 
has  engaged  and  silenced  a whole  British  battery.  The  explanation 
is  not  flattering  to  the  British  military  system  or  to  the  individual 
worth  of  the  English  soldier,  but  the  facts  of  this  war  will  make  it 
impossible  to  ignore  the  striking  superiority  of  the  Boer  marksman 
over  Tommy  Atkins,  whether  in  rifle  or  artillery  practise,  or  in  any 
other  soldierly  quality. 

It  was  not  by  Mauser  fire  alone  that  Buller’s  guns  were  silenced 
and  driven  off  the  field  at  Colenso.  The  Mauser  had  to  attend  to 
the  three  attacking  divisions,  and  dealt  only  with  the  British  bat- 
teries when  these  came  within  the  zone  of  rifle  fire,  as  in  the  case 
of  Colonel  Long’s  guns.  It  was  the  single  pom-pom  and  the  four 
Creusots  and  Krupps,  so  magnificently  worked  by  Pretorius  and 
his  men, which  fought  the  British  naval  guns  and  the  eight  batteries 
of  field  artillery  for  five  hours,  and  finally  enabled  200  Boers  to  ride 
through  the  impassable  ” Tugela,  and  bring  ten  of  the  British 
guns  as  a tro]dTy  for  Pretorius’  skill  and  daring  in  triumph  across 
the  same  river,  within  less  tlian  7,000  yards  of  the  other  five  or 
six  batteries  of  English  artillery. 

There  will  be  food  for  military  critics  to  digest  in  the  artillery 
records  of  this  war.  A book  by  Captain  Pretorius  on  his  labors 


THE  BRITISH  GUNS,  CAPTURED  AT  COLENSO,  ARRIVING  AT  PRETORIA  STATION 


380 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


and  experience  in  the  campaign  from  Talana  to  Dalmanutha  would 
l)e  an  invaluable  contribution  to  military  studies.  His  general 
])lan  was  simplicity  itself,  but  it  was  common  sense  in  action.  His 
few  guns  were  of  the  best,  thanks  to  the  Avisdom  of  the  Boer  Gov- 
ernment. He  relied  more  ujAon  tAvo  or  three  guns,  with  an  abun- 
dance of  ammunition  in  any  emergency,  than  upon  a larger  number 
that  would  attract  too  much  responsive  tire  by  their  play,  and  re- 
C[uire  also  too  large  a supply  of  ammunition  to  ensure  a safe  and 
rapid  service.  Mobility,  too,  Avas  an  essential  feature  of  his  plans, 
and  the  practical  immunity  which  he  secured  for  his  guns  Avas  due 
to  a constant  shifting  of  them  from  one  to  another  position  during 
the  progress  of  the  battle, thereby  foiling  the  range  of  his  adversary’s 
fire.  The  vast  superiority  of  the  young  Boer  gunners  in  clearness 
of  vision,  extreme  quickness  in  finding  correct  range,  and  in  ac- 
curacy of  aim  over  their  English  adversaries,  was  apparent  in  every 
engagement.  All  these  conditions  prevailed  in  favor  of  the  Boer 
artillery,  and  Avhen  they  Avere  applied  against  the  lumbering  British 
system  of  numerous  guns  badly  served,  and  the  tempting  targets  of 
massed  Tommies,  often  ordered  to  AAdiere  there  Avas  neither  cover 
nor  a tenable  position,  it  is  no  Avonder  that  at  Modderspruit,  Willow 
Grange,  Colenso,  Stormberg,  Spion  Kop,  Magersfontein,  and 
Paardeberg  the  loss  of  the  Thiglish  in  killed  and  wounded  Avas  so 
enormously  disproportioned  to  the  casualties  on  the  Boer  side. 

But  the  real  determining  factor  in  the  great  fight  at  Colenso  was 
the  marked  superiority  of  the  Boer,  as  a :nan,  OA'er  the  individual 
English  soldier.  Physically,  mentally,  and  morally  the  veldt 
Dutchman,  reared  on  the  farms  of  the  country  for  which  he  was 
fighting  as  head  of  a family,  Avas,  for  a South  African  campaign, 
as  much  more  capable  than  the  uniformed  anemic  product  of  British 
city  and  slum  life,  trained  under  a brainless  military  system  Avhich 
teaches  a soldier  to  do  nothing  except  as  he  is  ordered  by  “ his 
superiors,”  as  a finished  athlete  is  in  strength  and  muscle  above  a 
factory  operative  disguised  in  Tommy  Atkins’s  toggery.  In  health 
and  strength,  in  poAvers  of  endurance,  in  clearness  of  vision  and  con- 
sequent accuracy  of  aim,  in  nerves  free  from  the  shaky  effects  of 
dissipation,  in  the  capacity  of  individual  initiative,  and,  above  all, 
in  the  consciousness  of  moral  manhood  sustained  by  religious  con- 
viction, the  average  Boer  of  Botha’s  little  army  on  the  Tugela  was 
a match  for  any  five  of  the  kind  of  men  whom  Buller  had,  tho 
these  Avere  accounted  the  crack  regiments  of  the  British  army. 

General  Buller,  folloAving  the  example  of  Lord  Methuen,  grossly 
exaggerates  the  strength  of  his  antagonist  at  Colenso  in  his  report 
of  the  battle.  He  says : “ I think  the  force  opposed  to  us  must 
altogether  have  equaled  our  own!  ” The  British  force  engaged  in 


BOTHA’S  GBEAT  VICTORY 


281 


the  fight  has  been  estimated  at  23,000;  and  this  is  an  English  es- 
timate. Other  accounts  put  down  Butler’s  total  strength  at  21,000 
men,  with  30  field  pieces  (the  7th,  14th,  63rd,  64th,  and  66th  bat- 
teries of  artillery)  and  16  naval  guns,  including  fourteen  twelve- 
pounders  and  two  4.7  pieces  throwing  a 50-lb.  lyddite  shell. 

As  a matter  of  absolute  fact,  Botha  had  no  more  than  half  the 
commandoes  which  fought  against  White  at  Modderspruit  on  the 
30th  of  October,  the  other  moiety  being  engaged  in  the  siege  of 
Ladysmith.  His  men  would  not  at  the  utmost  exceed  5,000;  and 
of  these  the  jMiddelburg  and  Free  State  burghers — numbering  close 
on  2,000  men — were  not  in  the  engagement;  their  position  on  the 
Ladysmith  road  not  having  been  attacked  in  any  way  by  the  enemy, 
and  not  a single  shot,  consequently,  being  fired  by  them  in  the 
battle. 

General  Botha  has  declared  in  an  interview  that  he  had  only  five 
guns.  “ My  artillery  consisted  of  four  guns  and  one  Maxim  (pom- 
pom), under  Captain  Pretorius,  and  while  I am  talking  I would 
like  to  give  the  highest  praise  to  that  officer.  He  is  the  son  of 
Henning  Pretorius,  formerly  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  Transvaal 
Artiller}'.  The  courage  he  displayed  is  almost  past  belief.  He 
rode  in  the  most  fearless  fashion  up  and  down  our  lines,  from  one 
gun  to  another,  exposed  every  minute  to  death,  and  the  inspiriting 
effect  he  had  on  his  men  was  something  to  remember.  Such  cour- 
age I have  never  seen  excelled.”  Generous  praise,  indeed,  but  no 
more  than  what  wms  deserved  by  the  man  who  with  a single  battery 
fought  and  beat  thirty  English  field  pieces  and  sixteen  naval — 
lyddite-throwing — guns.  Pretorius  is  aged  about  thirty-five  years, 
is  as  dark  as  an  Italian,  with  deep,  hashing  eyes;  stands  five  feet 
ten  inches  in  height,  straight  as  a lance,  and  looks  the  very  figure 
of  an  ideal  soldier.  He  speaks  no  English.  His  father  was  one  of 
the  founders  of  the  Transvaal  Artillery. 

In  each  English  acount  of  this  battle  it  is  affirmed  that  the 
Boers  occupied  rifle-pits  on  the  south  side  of  the  river.  This  is 
untrue.  Except  at  Langwani,  there  was  not  a single  burgher  on 
that  side  of  the  Tugela  until  the  Krugersdorp  men  and  Johannes- 
burg Police  went  over  for  the  British  guns.  Pits  had  been  dug 
south  of  the  river  by  the  English  when  in  occupation  of  Colenso  in 
November,  and  on  these  being  seen  by  British  correspondents  after 
the  battle  on  the  15th  December,  it  was  assumed  that  they  had  been 
occupied  by  Boer  riflemen. 

There  were  no  guns  on  Fort  Wylie : no  barbed  wire  in  the  Tugela ; 
no  damming  of  the  river  at  the  bridle  drift,  and  no  guns  nearer 
where  Hart’s  brigade  attempted  to  cross  the  stream  than  the  twm 
Creusot  fifteen-ppun4ers  on  each  side  of  the  Ladysmith  road,  and 


282 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEHOM 


a Kruj^p  howitzer  midway  between  the  drift  and  the  wagon  bridge. 
] t was  this  latter  gun  -which  sent  the  shells  into  the  Dublin  Fusi- 
liers when  nearing  the  drift  in  the  morning.  The  Krupp  quick- 
firer  and  solitary  pom-pom  were  on  the  small  kopje,  next  to  Fort 
^Vylie,  serving  at  Botha’s  center. 

Another  English  fiction  gives  to  Colonel  Villebois-Mareuil  the 
credit  of  jdanning  the  Boer  lines  of  defense  at  Colenso,  and  with 
l)eing  the  active  military  assessor  of  Louis  Botha  during  the  battle. 
It  flattered  British  military  vanity  to  think  that  Buller’s  army  was 
beaten  by  French  tactics  and  not  by  Boer  generalship.  Colonel 


FEKRY  ACROSS  THE  TUGELA  RIVER 


Villebois  only  arrived  on  the  Tugela  on  the  evening  of  the  13th 
of  December,  and  did  not  see  or  meet  General  Botha  until  the  fol- 
lowing morning,  the  eve  of  the  battle.  He  says  in  his  diaiy  that 
it  was  he  who  advised  Botha  to  occupy  Langwani.  This  hill,  how- 
ever, had  already  been  prepared  for  occupation,  as  the  existence  of 
its  deep  trenches  and  strong  sangars  on  the  15th  amply  demon- 
strated. No.  Colenso  was  a Boer  victory  in  every  sense,  and  its 
hero  was  Louis  Botha. 

When  the  English  guns  were  caught  within  the  circle  of  ]\Iauser 
fire  from  the  Krugersdorp  men,  Botha  sent  for  reenforcements  for 
this  position,  and  men  galloped  in  from  the  right,  where  Hart’s 
brigade  had  been  made  to  bite  the  dust  by  the  Swaziland  Imrghers. 
Twenty  jueii  of  Blake’s  corps  were  with  Colonel  Trichardt  in  the 
rear,  near  the  position  held  by  the  ]\Iiddelburg  Boers,  and  the 


BOTHA’S  UUEAT  VICTORY 


283 


Irishmen  were  among  the  first  to  ride  over  the  space  swept  by  the 
other  English  batteries  to  the  aid  of  the  Krugersdorp  commando. 
Some  of  them  also  formed  part  of  the  mixed  body  of  Krugersdorp 
men,  Johannesburg  Police,  and  otlier  burghers  who  crossed  the 
Tugela  and  brought  the  Armstrong  guns  in  triumph  through  the 
“ imj^assable  ” river.  The  two  men  wlio  had  the  honor  of  reaching 
the  guns  first,  and  who  were  wounded  by  Bullock’s  Devons,  were 
Adjutants  Grey  and  Ackerman,  of  Ward  2,  Krugersdorp  commando. 
It  was  Cherrie  Emmet  who  commanded  the  contingent  sent  by  Botha 
to  bring  in  the  guns,  and  who  saved  Colonel  Bullock  from  the  con- 
sequences of  his  action  in  firing  on  the  contingent  after  the  English 
had  complied  witli  Emmet’s  “ Hands  up  ! ” Eobert  Emmet,  brother 
of  Cherrie,  was  with  difficulty  restrained  from  shooting  Bullock  for 
his  conduct.  The  Emmets  are  brothers-in-law  of  General  Botha, 
and  claim  a blood  relationship  with  the  family  of  Eobert  Emmet, 
the  Irish  hero-martyr. 


Chapter  XXIV 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

Boer  victory  at  Tatham’s  Farm — Joubert  grants  Wmite’s  requests 

FOR  ARMISTICE  AND  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  HOSPITAL  CAMP — BRITISH 

FORCES  IN  Ladysmith — Description  of  Ladysmith — Joubert’s  mis- 
taken POLICY  IN  investing  PLACE PLAN  OF  INVESTMENT BOER 

VISITORS — Mr.  Steevens’  description  of  town’s  condition — • 
Skirmish  between  Blake’s  brigade  and  the  Royal  Irish — Joubert 
vetoes  Blake’s  proposition  to  drop  dynamite  bombs  into  town — 
Natal  Volunteers  disable  Boer’s  Long  Tom — Other  sorties — 
Repulse  of  Boer  attack  on  the  Platband — General  ’IV'^hite’s 
report — Incidents  of  the  fight. 


SOME  attempts  to  prevent  the  investment  of  Ladysmith  had 
been  made  by  General  “White  after  his  defeat  at  Modderspruit 
on  the  30th  of  October.  They  were  in  the  nature  of  reconnaissances 
in  force  to  find  out  the  disposition  of  J ouberEs  lines,  and  to  obstruct 
as  far  as  possible  the  obvious  intention  of  the  Boer  general  to  work 
round  to  the  south  of  the  town,  and  cut  the  British  connection  with 
Colenso.  The  first  of  these  efforts  was  made  the  day  following  the 
Modderspruit  battle,  and  resulted  in  an  artillery  duel  between  the 
English  naval  guns  and  Trichardt’s  CTeusots,  with  little  or  no  loss 
to  either  side  except  in  shells  and  ammunition.  On  the  2nd  of 
Xovember  a large  force  of  Lancers  and  other  cavalry  advanced  as 
far  as  Tatham’s  Farm,  near  Besters,  where  they  encountered  the 
Free  Staters  under  Martinus  Prinsloo  and  Commandant  Xel.  A 
brief  but  fierce  fight  ensued,  the  Free  Staters  crying,  “ Xo  quarter 
to  the  butchers  of  Elandslaagte ! ” as  they  shot  down  their  foes. 
The  Lancers  suffered  heavily,  and  were  ultimate!}"  driven  back  to 
Ladysmith.  Both  sides  have  claimed  the  victory  in  this  engage- 
ment; the  English  reports  asserting  that  the  Boer  camp  had  been 
captured,  while  the  Free  Staters  declared  they  had  only  fallen  back 
for  a time  to  entice  the  Lancers  into  a tight  place.  This  has  been 
a favorite  maneuver  of  the  Boers  throughout  the  war,  and  it  was  its 
adoption  on  this  occasion  which  induced  the  English  to  claim  the 
honor  of  the  fight.  After  this  encounter  VTiite  and  his  army  be- 
came isolated,  and  the  siege  of  Ladysmith  began. 

The  British  general  asked  for  and  olitained  an  armistice  after 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 


285 


the  three  daj's’  fighting  around  Ijadysniith  which  began  at  Modder- 
spruit  and  ended  at  Tatham’s  Farm.  It  was  a cool  request  in  view 
of  the  rough  handling  which  his  forces  had  received,  and  was  not 
altogether  justified  by  the  number  of  British  killed  and  wounded. 
Had  Lord  Eoberts  been  in  Joubert’s  place,  with  a Boer  request  for 
a similar  cessation  of  hostilities,  it  would  not  have  been  granted. 
His  reply  would  have  been,  “ We  must  fight  it  out,”  and  this  ought 
to  have  been  Joubert's  answer,  as  it  was  the  advice  of  all  his  younger 
officers.  Joubert  also  agreed  to  a proposal  to  transfer  the  sick  and 
wounded  from  Ladysmith  to  a neutral  position  four  miles  south- 
east of  the  town.  To  this  hospital  camp  a train  ran  every  day 
during  the  siege,  and,  as  the  site  of  the  camp  was  near  to  Bulwana 
Hill,  where  the  Boers  held  their  most  important  position,  White  had 
a means  in  this  arrangement  by  which  he  could  be  informed  daily 
of  the  movements  of  his  opponents  at  the  one  point  in  the  Boer 
investment  of  the  town  which  was  the  most  vulnerable  to  attack 
from  a relieving  force  from  the  south.  Louis  Botha  and  all  the 
other  Boer  officers  were  strongly  opposed  to  so  dangerous  a con- 
cession being  made  to  so  unscrupulous  a foe,  but  Joubert’s  word  in 
military  matters  was  law  with  President  Kruger.  General  White’s 
proposal  was  therefore  agreed  to,  and  the  English  hospital  camp 
near  the  Intombi  Sjiruit  remained  a source  of  vexation  and  weak- 
ness to  the  Boer  forces  during  the  whole  time  of  the  siege. 

The  following  forces  in  men  and  guns  were  comprised  in  the 
Ladysmith  garrison:  The  13th,  21st,  42nd,  53rd,  67th,  and  69th 
batteries  of  Eoyal  Field  Artillery,  with  a battery  of  naval  guns, 
and  Xo.  10  Mountain  Battery;  in  all,  48  guns. 

The  cavalry  and  infantry,  with  local  Xatal  Volunteers,  included 
the  4th  and  5th  Dragoon  Guards,  5th  and  16th  Lancers,  11th,  18th, 
and  19th  Hussars,  1st  Battalion  Eoyal  West  Surrey  Eegiment,  1st 
(King’s)  Liverpool  Eegiment,  1st  Devonshire  Eegiment,  Somerset- 
shire Light  Infantry,  1st  Leicestershire  Eegiment,  1st  Scottish 
Eifies,  1st  King’s  Eoyal  Eifle  Corps,  2nd  King’s  Eoyal  Eifle  Corps, 
1st  Manchester  Eegiment,  2nd  Gordon  Highlanders,  1st  Eifle  Bri- 
gade, 2nd  Eifle  Brigade,  Imperial  Light  Horse,  Xatal  A^olunteer 
Force,  2nd  Eoyal  Irish  Eegiment,  2nd  West  Eiding  Eegiment,  1st 
Eoyal  Irish  Fusiliers,  Eoyal  Engineers,  Army  Service  Corps,  etc.; 
in  all,  according  to  Boer  estimates,  between  12,000  and  13,000 
troops,  not  including  civilian  combatants. 

Ladysmith  was  the  third  most  important  place  in  Xatal,  ranking 
next  after  Durban  and  ilaritzburg.  It  had  a white  population  of 
some  3,000,  with  2,000  natives  and  some  East  Indians.  The  town 
is  situated  on  Klip  Eiver,  a tributary  of  the  Tugela,  and  lies  part 
in  a hollow  and  part  on  the  side  of  a ridge  within  a semicircle  of 


28G 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


surrounding  lulls.  The  Klip  winds  its  way  from  the  west  hy  the 
south  and  east  side  of  the  town,  with  hanks  standing  twenty  or 
thirty  feet  aljove  the  level  of  the  stream.  These  steep  hanks  natu- 
rally played  an  important  part  in  General  White's  plans  for  the 
defense  of  his  garrison.  Hills  and  ridges  encircle  the  town  at  a 
distance  of  four  or  five  miles  towards  each  point  of  the  compass. 
The  hills  dominated  the  place  and  gave  to  Jouhert’s  two  large 
Creusot  six-inch  guns  positions  from  which  it  was  easily  shelled 
with  such  long-range  pieces.  The  open  character  of  the  ground, 
however,  within  the  perimeter  of  the  actual  lines  of  investment, 
offered  the  English  general  every  protection  against  the  fear  of 
assault  by  surprise,  while  affording  him  ample  latitude  for  defensive 
and  offensive  siege  operations  as  well.  Eidges  south  and  west  of 
the  town  gave  him  strong  natural  positions  on  which  to  build  re- 
doubts and  other  protection  for  his  naval  guns,  while  equally  well- 
sheltered  places  were  found  for  the  smaller  field  artillery.  Huge 
stores  of  ammunition  and  other  war  material  had  been  accumu- 
lated, along  with  adequate  food  provision  for  emergencies,  and, 
thus  situated  and  provided  for.  General  White  was  enabled  to  with- 
stand even  the  long  siege  to  which  his  well-equipped  garrison  was 
subjected. 

This  siege  has  been  one  of  the  few  real  British  triumphs  of  the 
war ; but  a triumph  by  virtue  of  endurance  rather  than  by  any  strik- 
ing military  performance,  and  chiefly  owing  to  the  lamentable 
blunder,  military  and  political,  by  which  General  Joubert  played 
into  the  hands  of  his  adversary’s  purpose.  General  White  has 
clearly  explained  what  his  governing  object  was  in  consenting  to 
so  large  a force  of  British  troops  submitting  to  so  long  a siege : “ I 
was  confident  of  holding  out  at  Ladysmith  as  long  as  might  he 
necessary,  and  I saw  clearh'^  that  so  long  as  I maintained  myself 
there  1 could  occupy  the  great  mass  of  the  Boer  armies,  and  prevent 
them  sending  more  than  small  flying  columns  south  of  the  Tugela, 
with  which  the  British  and  Colonial  forces  in  my  rear,  aided  by 
sucli  reenforcements  as  might  be  shortly  expected,  could  deal 
without  much  difficulty.” — (liieutenant-General  Sir  George  White 
to  Field  Marshal  Lord  Eoberts,  South  African  Despatches,  Vol.  XI., 
p.  15.) 

Joubert  deluded  himself  with  the  notion  that  the  successful  keep- 
ing of  12,000  soldiers  of  the  Queen  inside  of  Ladysmith  would  re- 
sult in  a second  post-MaJuba  peace  compact.  He  died  broken-hearted 
with  the  knowledge  that  his  policy  had  been  the  means  of  tying  up 
“ the  great  mass  of  the  Boer,  armies  ” in  the  task  of  watching  one 
English  general,  while  Botha,  Cronje,  and  De  la  Eey  had  to  fight 
three  armies,  one  of  them  four  times  as  large  as  General  White’s, 


THE  SIEGE  OP  LADYSMITH 


287 


with  “ the  small  flying  columnr  ” which  were  spared  from  the  field 
of  siege  operations  in  Natal. 

Joubert’s  chief  positions  in  his  lines  of  investment  are  roughly 
indicated  in  the  points  of  the  compass.  Pepworth  Hill,  north  of 
the  town;  Lombard's  Kop,  east;  Onderbroek  Kop,  south;  and  a 
series  of  strong  ridges  to  the  west — the  average  distance  from  Lady- 
smith being  four  or  five  miles.  Bulwana  Hill,  to  the  southeast, 
and  Surprise  Hill,  to  the  northwest,  were  a little  out  of  the  compass 
bearings,  but  the  guns  on  each  of  these  hills  played  a very  prominent 
part  in  the  siege,  being  some  7,000  or  8,000  yards’  distance  from 
the  town. 

Jonbert’s  head  laager  was  at  Modderspruit  Station,  behind  Pep- 


BOER  HOWITZER  SHELLING  LADYSMITH 


worth  Hill,  and  a system  of  field  telegraphy  organized  by  Lieutenant 
Palf  enabled  him  to  keep  in  constant  touch  with  all  points  of  the 
besieging  lines.  His  commandoes  were  those  with  which  he  had 
invaded  Natal,  and  fought  the  engagement  at  Modderspruit  on  the 
31st  of  October;  less,  however,  by  the  forces  lent  to  Botha  for  the 
dash  on  Esteourt,  and  for  the  subsequent  and  brilliant  campaign 
on  the  Tugela  against  Buller.  It  is  almost  incredible  that  so  astute  a 
general  as  Joubert  could  have  delegated  the  task  of  opposing  the  ad- 
vance of  an  army,  first  of  20,000  and  then  of  30,000  men  and  fifty 
guns,  to  a body  never  stronger  than  5,000  burghers,  with  six  or  seven 
guns  at  the  most,  while  retaining  an  equal  number  of  men,  and  fully 
seventeen  of  the  best  guns  of  the  Transvaal  artillery  for  the  task 
of  hemming  in  General  WTiite  and  the  British  field  force  of  Natal. 


288 


THE  BOEE  FIGHT  FOB  FBEEDOM 


Such,  however,  were  tlie  measures  to  which  the  ill-advised  siege 
of  Ladysmith  committed  the  Eepublics  in  face  of  three  other  ad- 
vancing armies  having  Pretoria  as  their  ultimate  objective. 

Two  “ Long  Toms,”  two  fifteen-pound  Creusots,  four  seven-pound 
Krupps,  two  Krupp  howitzers,  and  seven  pom-poms — in  all,  seven- 
teen guns — were  in  the  service  of  the  besiegers  during  the  early 
part  of  the  investment.  The  two  six-inch  guns  were  first  placed 
on  Pepworth  and  Bulwana  hills,  the  former  being  subsequently 
removed  to  Lombard’s  Kop.  The  entire  artillery  forces  were  under 
the  control  of  Colonel  Trichardt,  Majors  Wolmarans  and  Erasmus, 
Captain  Pretorius,  and  Lieutenant  Du  Toit;  Pretorius  leaving  the 
lines  round  Ladysmith  with  General  Botha  when  the  Tugela  cam- 
paign was  decided  upon  in  iSTovember,  and  Wolmarans  taking  charge 
of  Botha’s  guns  at  Spion  Kop. 

The  besieging  forces  were  roughly  divided  into  four  main  laagers, 
corresponding  in  location  more  or  less  to  the  points  of  the  compass, 
the  guns  being  distributed  accordingl}' — Joubert  to  the  north, 
Schalk  Burger  east,  Lukas  Meyer  south,  and  Prinsloo,  with  the 
Free  State  contingent,  to  the  west.  These  divisions,  however,  were 
more  nominal  than  otherwise,  as  the  splendid  mobility  of  botli 
mounted  men  and  artillery  enabled  Joubert  to  quickly  concentrate 
his  forces  at  any  point  where  an  emergency  demanded  such  a 
measure.  It  was  this  feature  of  the  Boer  tactics  which  deceived 
General  White  into  believing  he  was  opposed  by  “ 25,000  men ! ” 
— a modest  estimate  of  his  opponent’s  strength  which  left  Buller, 
Gatacre,  Eoberts,  French,  and  ]\Iethuen  almost  without  Boers  to 
fight. 

The  only  serious  injury  done  to  Ladysmith  during  the  siege  was 
by  the  Long  Toms  from  Bulwana  and  Lombard’s  Kop.  Those 
magnificent  siege  guns  were  placed  on  these  elevated  hills  under 
the  superintendence  of  ]\rr.  Sam  Leon,  of  the  firm  of  Leon  and 
Grunberg,  engineers,  formerly  agents  of  the  famous  Creusot  Com- 
pany. 

During  Kovember  the  Boer  laagers  around  Ladysmith  attracted 
visitors  of  both  sexes  from  the  Transvaal;  non-combatants  who 
traveled  down  to  witness  the  siege.  The  prowess  of  “ Long  Tom,” 
which  was  a legendary  rather  than  actual  record  of  his  doings 
against  the  imprisoned  Eooineks,  made  the  two  guns  on  Lombard’s 
Kop  and  Bulwana  objects  of  almost  religious  regard  for  the  holiday- 
seekers.  Ladies  by  the  hundred  came  from  Johannesburg  and 
Pretoria  to  enjoy  the  sensation  of  besieging  an  English  army,  and 
to  experience  the  satisfaction  of  touching  the  big  Creusot  gun.  The 
natural  pride  of  the  Boer,  always  strongly  felt  if  seldom  expressed 
in  speech  or  act,  was  impossible  to  disguise  in  those  who  witnessed 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 


289 


the  plight  of  the  Ladysmith  garrison,  hemmed  in  by  the  brothers, 
husbands,  and  sons  of  the  patriotic  women  of  the  Transvaal.  The 
bravery  of  the  sons  of  the  veldt  was  borne  testimony  to  in  the  plight 
of  the  English  troops  cooped  up  within  the  British  town,  and 
mothers  returned  home  to  repeat  the  story  of  what  they  had  seen 
to  the  young  lads,  whose  longings  were  thereb}"  excited  to  go  like- 
wise and  fight  the  Eooinek  foe. 

The  condition  to  which  Ladysmith  had  been  reduced,  even  as 
early  as  hfovember,  has  been  pithily  described  by  the  late  Mr.  G.  W. 
Steevens,  the  noted  war  correspondent,  who  died  subsequently  as 
a fever  victim  of  the  siege : 

“ Deserted  in  its  markets,  repeopled  in  its  wastes,  here  ripped 
with  iron  splinters,  there  again  rising  into  rail-roofed,  rock-walled 
caves;  trampled  down  in  its  gardens,  manured  where  nothing  can 
ever  grow;  skirts  hemmed  with  sandbags,  and  bowels  bored  with 
tunnels — the  Boers  may  not  have  hurt  us,  but  they  have  left 
their  mark  for  years  on  Ladysmith.  They  have  not  hurt  us  much, 
and  yet  the  casualties  mount  up.  Three  to-day,  two  yesterday,  four 
dead  or  dying,  and  seven  wounded  with  one  shell — they  are  nothing 
at  all,  but  they  mount  up.  I suppose  we  stand  at  aborrt  fifty  now 
(ISTovember  26),  and  there  will  be  more  before  we  are  done  with 
it.”  (“From  Cape  Town  to  Ladysmith,”  p.  131.) 

With  a garrison  which  did  not  hope  to  effect  its  own  unaided 
relief,  and  an  investing  force  which  was  not  allowed  to  attempt 
to  carry  the  town  by  assault,  there  were  few  serious  engagements 
which  require  recording  in  the  story  of  the  siege.  The  investment 
was  carried  on  in  the  most  leisurely  and  routine  manner  possible 
from  day  to  day,  Sunday  being  regularly  observed  as  a holiday 
for  the  gunners.  So  methodical  became  the  work  of  penning  in 
White  and  his  forces  that  the  burghers  in  large  numbers  were  in 
the  habit  of  visiting  their  families  hundreds  of  miles  away,  of  going 
home  to  attend  to  farms  and  business  matters,  and  returning  again 
for  a spell  of  besieging  Ladysmith.  In  fact,  the  shutting  up  of  an 
English  army  in  a British  town  was  turned  into  a military  picnic 
by  the  investing  Boers. 

The  Irish  Brigade,  saving  the  portion  who  volunteered  to  assist 
in  the  battle  of  Colenso,  was  attached  to  Joubert’s  main  laager, 
under  the  direction  of  Colonel  Trichardt,  of  the  Artillery,  through- 
out the  whole  of  the  siege.  The  men  had  therefore  taken  part  in  only 
a few  of  the  regular  engagements  previous  to  the  advance  of  Eoberts 
on  Pretoria.  Blake’s  men  amused  themselves  occasionally  by  send- 
ing challenges  to  the  Anglo-Irish  in  the  enemy’s  ranks,  kindly  in- 
forming them  what  the  “ boys  ” with  the  Boers  were  intent  on 
doing  with  their  recreant  countrymen  should  they  intrude  their 
19 


290 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


noses  outside  the  lines  of  Lad_ysmith.  Eesponsive  messages  in  a 
similar  strain  came  back,  and,  according  to  an  account  given  by 
one  of  Blake’s  officers,  chance  brought  about  “ a meeting  ” between 
the  challenging  Irishmen  during  one  of  the  sorties  from  the  town. 
The  narrative  relates  that  Blake  and  his  brigade  were  in  charge 
of  a small  hill  which  flew  the  green  flag,  in  advance  of  Colonel 
Trichardt’s  camp,  when  a large  body  of  the  Eoyal  Irish  were  seen 
to  be  making  for  the  kopje,  where  a gun  had  previously  been  placed. 
Blake  enjoined  his  men  to  resort  to  the  following  stratagem  so  as 
to  bring  the  “ Eoyals  ” as  near  as  possible  to  the  hilltop  before 
firing:  A third  of  the  brigade  showed  themselves  under  the  flag 
and  fired  rather  wildly  at  the  advancing  troops;  then,  on  these 
reaching  the  bottom  of  the  kopje,  the  men  with  the  flag  were  seen 
to  run  to  the  rear.  The  Irish  Tommies  came  panting  up  the  side, 
shouting  for  the  “ flying  Fenians  ” to  stand.  They  stood ; the  Tom- 
mies came  on  to  the  very  crest  of  the  hill,  when  up  sprang  Blake 
and  his  command,  and  sent  the  contents  of  their  Mausers  almost 
point  blank  into  the  ranks  of  the  “ Eoyals,”  who  raced  down  the 
kopje  much  quicker  than  they  had  mounted,  leaving  a dozen  of  their 
comrades  to  the  subsequent  attention  of  the  Boer  ambulance. 

Colonel  Blake’s  plan  for  forcing  an  issue  with  the  garrison  in 
the  early  days  of  the  siege  was  to  fly  from  Lombard’s  Kop,  Bulwana, 
and  other  hills,  huge  kites  having  as  weights  for  tails  small  dyna- 
mite bombs  which  could  be  dropped  perpendicularly  on  to  gun 
redoubts,  trenches,  and  the  town.  To  this  proposal  Joubert 
would  lend  no  sanction  whatever.  He  pointed  out  that  the 
English,  tho  very  unscrupulous,  had  made  no  use  of  dynamite 
bombs  from  their  balloons,  while,  in  addition,  he  declared  that  he 
had  searched  the  Scriptures  in  vain  for  any  record  of  the  use  of 
dynamite  in  the  fighting  related  in  the  Old  Testament.  This  last 
objection  was  conclusive. 

Three  times  during  November  something  more  than  the  regula- 
tion daily  bombardment  came  off  in  small  engagements;  in  the 
first  of  which  the  Boers  claimed  the  honors  of  the  day,  and  the 
English  the  other  two.  In  December  the  garrison,  learning  doubt- 
less of  the  departure  of  several  commandoes  southward  to  meet 
Buller,  developed  more  daring  in  their  night  adventures  towards 
the  Boer  positions.  They  had  a very  justifiable  grudge  against  the 
Long  Tom  on  Lombard’s  Kop  for  its  constant  attention  to  the  citi- 
zens and  soldiers  of  the  beleaguered  town.  It  was  resolved  to  make 
a midnight  attack  upon  the  gun,  and  the  comparative  smallness 
of  the  force  which  undertook  the  dangerous  task  testifies  to  the 
belief  in  Boer  circles  that  the  uEole  affair  was  suggested  by  treach- 
ery on  the  part  of  some  enemy  in  the  Pretoria  laager.  It  is  evident 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 


291 


anyhow  that  the  guarding  of  the  big  gun  was  most  carelessly  con- 
ducted, or  such  a humiliating  stroke  against  its  protection  could 
not  have  rejoiced  the  hearts  of  the  successful  assailants. 

A large  number  of  these  were  N’atal  Volunteers,  who,  on  being 
challenged  by  burgher  sentinels  at  the  foot  of  the  hill,  replied  in  the 
Taal,  “ All  right,”  and  were  stupidly  allowed  to  proceed.  They 
climbed  the  hill,  shot  down  the  few  burghers  who  were  in  imme- 
diate attendance  on  the  gun,  and,  in  the  most  cool  and  daring 
manner,  not  only  smashed  the  breech  mechanism  of  “ Tom,”  but 
punched  the  date  of  the  transaction  into  the  side  of  the  monster. 
A howitzer  on  the  same  hill  was  likewise  injured,  while  part  of  a 
Maxim  gun  was  carried  back  as  a trophy  by  the  triumphant  troops. 
This  exploit  created  great  indignation  in  the  Boer  laagers,  and  the 
officer  who  was  then  in  charge  of  the  gims  on  Lombard’s  Kop  was 
court-martialed,  and  suspended  for  a short  time  for  the  careless- 
ness which  had  contributed  to  the  success  of  General  Hunter’s  mid- 
night adventure.  “ Long  Tom  ” was  disabled,  and  had  to  be  sent 
to  Pretoria  for  repairs.  Messrs.  Leon  and  Grunberg  soon  fixed 
him  all  right  again,  and  in  the  course  of  a fortnight  he  was  on  his 
way  to  Kimberley  to  make  things  a little  more  lively  for  Cecil 
Ehodes’  city. 

Three  days  after  the  surprise  at  Lombard’s  Kop,  another  attempt 
of  a similar  nature  was  made  on  a hill  north  of  the  town,  where  a 
howitzer  was  located,  but  the  attempt  only  partly  succeeded  in  this 
case,  no  real  injury  being  done  to  the  gun,  while  the  600  troops 
who  had  taken  part  in  the  enterprise  were  surrounded  on  coming 
down  the  hill,  and  driven  with  a loss  of  some  seventy  of  their  num- 
ber back  to  Ladysmith. 

A week  later  a still  less  successful  but  equally  daring  exploit  was 
attempted  in  a surprise  attack  upon  a small  outpost  of  the  Stander- 
ton  commando.  The  night  was  pitch  dark,  and  this  aided  the 
purpose  of  the  attacking  party.  They  were  unobserved  by  the  pos- 
sibly dozing  sentinels  until  within  a distance  of  fifty  yards  of  the 
sangars  behind  which  the  burghers  were  lying.  The  startling  cry 
of  “ Hands  up  ! ” was  answered,  however,  by  five  shots  from  the 
awakened  Boers.  They  were  surrounded  by  some  500  of  their 
enemies,  and,  finding  retreat  cut  off,  they  neither  asked  for  quarter 
nor  did  anything  else  but  pour  the  contents  of  their  rifies  into  the 
ranks  of  the  foes.  The  laager  near  by  was  aroused  by  the  fire, 
and  the  attacking  party  hastily  retired  on  Ladysmith.  On  the 
aiTival  of  the  burghers  who  were  defending  the  gun,  which  was 
the  main  object  of  the  sortie  from  the  town,  the  five  men  of  the 
brandwacht  were  found  dead,  but  around  them  in  a circle  also  lay 
the  dead  bodies  of  fifteen  British  soldiers. 


292 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


These  adventures  on  the  part  of  a garrison  believed  to  be  re- 
duced to  a state  of  privation  by  the  siege  created  so  strong  a feeling 
among  the  burghers  for  something  more  effective  being  attempted 
against  the  town  than  the  routine  attentions  of  Long  Tom,  that 
Joubert's  objections  to  a direct  assault  were  swept  aside.  The 
victories  of  Stormberg,  Magersfontein,  and  Colenso  were  deemed 
to  be  so  many  reflections  upon  the  inactivity  of  5,000  or  6,000  men 
around  Ladysmith,  and  it  became  necessary  to  show  the  Eepublics 


Pholo  hy  Mr.  DrtVitt 

COLONEL  VILLEBOIS-MAREUIL  AND  BARON  VAN  DEDEM 

The  Colonel  is  the  man  in  riding-breeches;  on  his  left  is  the  Baron;  on  his  right,  the  Landrosts 
of  Hoopstad  and  Kroonstad 

what  the  men  of  Modderspruit  could  do.  Colonel  Villebois-Mareuil 
had  arrived  on  the  scene,  and,  after  making  himself  acquainted 
with  White’s  plan  of  defense  in  an  inspection  of  the  English  lines, 
strongly  urged  the  Commandant-General  to  sanction  the  demand 
in  the  laagers  for  the  delivery  of  a decisive  blow.  He  drew  up  a re- 
port on  the  enemy’s  positions  and  of  how  the  assault  should  be  made, 
and  this  was  in  due  course  submitted  to  a kriegsraad  for  considera- 
tion. Joubert  still  strongly  objected  to  the  proposal,  tho  not 
to  the  extent  of  absolutely  vetoing  it.  His  reasons  for  refusing  to 
sanction  the  assault  after  the  first  great  chance  which  followed 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 


293 


the  battle  of  Modderspruit  was  neglected,  were  sound  and  unassail- 
able. The  conditions  were  all  favorable  for  such  an  action  then. 
The  two  forces  were  almost  equal  in  strength,  and  the  enemy  were 
disheartened  over  the  loss  of  Dundee  and  the  defeat  of  the  30th  of 
October.  These  conditions  did  not  again  prevail  after  White  had 
had  time  enough,  unwisely  given  to  him  in  a three  days’  armistice 
— and  in  a Sunday  every  week — to  entrench  himself  on  the  Plat- 
rand,  and  in  the  steep  sides  of  the  Klip  Elver.  He  had  also  been 
allowed  to  disembarrass  himself  of  his  sick  and  wounded,  and  to 
erect  a “ neutral  ” hospital  under  the  protection  of  Bulwana  Hill, 
from  whence  his  spies,  under  the  giuse  of  sick  patients,  could  send 
him  daily  reports  of  the  Boer  movements  in  and  around  the  most 
important  point  of  Joubert’s  line  of  investment.  Moreover,  the 
besieging  forces,  after  the  termination  of  the  armistice  following 
Modderspruit,  were  numerically  unequal  to  the  work  of  carrying 
Ladysmith  by  storm.  Such  a task,  to  promise  reasonable  chances 
of  success,  should  not  be  faced  with,  at  least,  less  than  twice  the 
number  of  the  defending  garrison,  and  Joubert  never  again  had 

8.000  burghers  before  Ladysmith  after  the  Tugela  column  under 
Louis  Botha  had  been  deducted  from  the  forces  which  won  the 
battle  of  Modderspruit.  In  fact,  the  average  strength  of  the 
Commandant-General’s  army  surrounding  White,  from  the  1st 
of  December  to  the  raising  of  the  siege,  would  not  he  more  than 

6.000  men,  while  at  times  it  was — unknown  to  the  garrison,  pre- 
sumably— down  as  low  as  4,000  burghers. 

These  facts  were  not  fully  appreciated  by  Villebois-Mareuil  when 
lie  pressed  so  urgently,  in  his  report  to  Joubert,  for  the  storming 
of  the  town.  He  had,  however,  found  that  White’s  officers  relied 
more  upon  their  belief  in  the  Avell-known  objections  of  Joubert  to 
sanction  hazardous  enterprises  than  upon  their  strength  and  re- 
sources against  any  determined  assault,  and  the  prevalence  of  this 
feeling  of  moral  security  on  the  enemy’s  part  was  Villebois’  strong- 
est ground  for  urging  a well-planned  attack  by  way  of  a double 
surprise. 

Villebois  felt  keenly  the  apparent  want  of  confidence  in  his  mili- 
tary judgment  shown  by  Joubert  and  Schalk  Burger.  He  looked 
on  their  reluctance  to  act  on  his  report  upon  the  Ladysmith  de- 
fenses as  a mistrust  of  his  capacity.  In  this  he  was  mistaken. 
Ko  foreign  officer  who  had  come  to  the  Transvaal  commanded  as 
much  confidence  and  respect,  and  the  ultimate  adoption  of  his 
scheme  showed  how  unfounded  were  his  suspicions. 

In  judging  rather  severely  the  military  shortcomings  of  Boer  gen- 
erals, he  forgot  to  place  himself  in  their  position,  and  to  obtain  thus 
a fairer  standpoint  for  his  criticism  of  their  methods.  They  had 


294 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


beaten  the  English  at  Dundee,  Modderspruit,  Magersfontein,  Storm- 
berg,  Willow  Grange,  and  Colenso  by  Boer  tactics.  They  had  lost 
at  Elandslaagte,  largely  through  Uitlander  tactics  and  imprudence, 
while  the  Scandinavian  methods  at  Magersfontein,  heroic  and  mag- 
nificent tho  they  undoubtedly  were,  would  have  meant  another 
defeat,  if  generally  followed,  where  the  cooler  and  better-calculated 
Boer  methods  achieved  a brilliant  victory  over  immense  odds.  It 
was  these  considerations  which  influenced  Joubert  and  Burger  when 
weighing  Villebois’  plans  and  proposals,  and  not  any  want  of  con- 
fidence in  his  own  earnestness  and  military  judgment.  In  fact, 
what  Tacitus  said  of  the  Batavian  ancestors  of  the  Boers  applied 
to  the  farmer  generals  of  the  little  Eepublics : “ Others  go  to  battle, 
these  go  to  war ! ” 

It  was  finally  agreed  to  make  a surprise  attack  upon  the  Platrand 
which  was  the  key  to  Ladysmith.  This  elevated  ridge  is  flat-topped 
in  formation,  two  or  three  miles  long,  600  or  700  feet  high,  sloping 
up  from  the  town  in  the  southeastern  direction,  with  the  Klip 
Eiver  running  between  its  eastern  end  and  the  two  hills  of  Lom- 
bard’s Kop  and  Bulwana.  It  was  strongly  fortified  with  redoubts, 
chanzas,  and  rifle-pits,  and  defended  by  the  naval  guns,  and  by 
White’s  strongest  posts.  On  the  reverse,  or  southern  side,  it  sloped 
down  in  the  direction  of  one  of  the  Boer  laagers,  and  was  ap- 
proached by  a deep  spruit  running  north  from  Grobler’s  Kloof  into 
the  Klip  Eiver,  and  also  by  several  narrow  valleys  formed  by  the 
southern  spurs  of  the  “ Platkop,”  as  the  Boers  named  the  long  hill. 
Villebois-Mareuil’s  practised  military  eye  had  noted  the  cover  for 
a movement  by  a surprise  force  thus  offered  in  the  bed  of  the  spruit 
and  the  kloofs  of  the  Platrand,  and  his  plan  of  attack  was  suggested 
accordingly.  A body  of  men  from  Lombard’s  Kop,  on  the  east, 
was  to  move  south  of  the  English  hospital  camp,  cross  the  railway, 
and  make  for  the  Eouries’  Spruit  alluded  to,  where  another  force 
from  the  laager  at  Grobler’s  Kloof,  and  also  from  Botha’s  camp 
on  the  Tugela,  would  be  met.  These  men  would  ascend  the  spruit 
behind  Caesar’s  Camp,  and  rush  the  first  English  entrenchments, 
which,  if  gained,  would  mask  the  assailants  against  the  English 
guns  further  west  on  the  hill.  Simultaneously  the  Free  Staters 
of  the  west  laager,  under  De  Villiers  and  Nel,  were  to  advance  on 
Wagon  Hill,  the  extreme  western  height  of  the  Platrand,  and  re- 
peat the  attack  to  be  made  at  the  other  extremity.  The  Pretoria 
laager,  to  the  north  of  Ladysmith,  was  to  cooperate  as  occasion 
might  require,  the  object  being  to  carry  the  assault  from  positions 
south  and  west  which  offered  the  best  cover  for  the  advancing 
burghers.  The  assault  was  to  be  delivered  under  the  shelter  of 
darkness  on  the  early  morning  of  the  6th  of  January,  and  every 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 


295 


precaution  was  taken  against  knowledge  of  the  intended  coup  leak- 
ing out. 

The  two  extremes  of  the  Platrand  were  usually  held  by  a few 
detachments  of  AVhite’s  men,  secure  in  the  belief  that  the  Boers 
would  only  continue  their  long  range  artillery  fire  in  the  day,  and 
would  not  attempt  to  storm  at  night  without  bayonets.  On  the 
night  previous  to  the  attack  being  delivered,  both  the  positions  at 
Caesars  Camp  and  Wagon  Hill  were  reenforced  by  guns  and  men ; 
indicating  that  General  AA’hite  had  learned  of  the  contemplated 
assault  on  his  southern  defenses.  His  spies  in  the  hospital  camp 


PRETORIA  TOWN  BURGHERS  AT  THE  FRONT 


near  Bulwana  must  have  obtained  the  information  in  some  way 
from  the  Boer  lines  close  by. 

By  two  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  of  January  the 
burghers  chosen  for  the  assault  had  all  reached  their  respective 
rendezvous.  The  Utrecht  men,  with  some  Standerton  and  Wakker- 
stroom  burghers,  under  the  east  slope  of  the  Platrand;  Villehois- 
Mareuil  being  a spectator,  but  not  a participator;  the  men  from 
Heidelberg  were  round  to  their  right,  a mile  from  the  English  hos- 
pital; and  1,000  of  the  Yryheid  commando  and  100  German  Uit- 
landers  had  marched  from  Colenso  to  the  spruit  below  Bester’s 
Farm,  having  the  Free  State  contingent  under  Wagon  Hill,  to  their 
left. 

The  attack  was  made  at  the  three  points  almost  simultaneously, 
the  Yryheiders  leading  and  advancing  up  the  slope  of  the  hill 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


2y(j 

from  the  south.  The  enemy  was  in  no  way  taken  by  surprise, 
and  the  first  burghers  who  cleared  the  crest  fell  before  a well- 
directed  fire  from  behind  the  outer  lines  of  the  British  positions. 
But  the  burghers  did  not  waver.  They  fired  lying  in  many  places 
within  fifty  yards  of  the  Tommies,  making  gaps  behind  the  chanzas 
wherever  a head  offered  a target  for  an  aun.  The  Utrecht  men 
rushed  the  trenches  in  front  of  them,  and  poured  a volley  into  the 
troops  behind,  who  fied  to  the  rear  and  were  shot  down  as  they  ran, 
the  burghers  taking  and  holding  the  vacated  trenches.  Both  here 
and  in  front  of  the  Yryheid  men  Colonial  troops  were  located. 
They  hailed  the  hrtrghers  in  the  Taal,  and  told  them  “ Not  to  shoot 
at  your  own  people.”  This  ruse  did  not,  however,  succeed,  as  the 
answering  rifles  gave  the  rejfiies  which  in  each  place  decided  the 
immediate  occupation  of  the  crest-line  of  the  Platrand. 

The  Free  Staters  had  likewise  captured  the  west  end  of  Wagon 
Hill,  led  by  the  brave  De  Villiers,  of  Harrismith,  and  by  four 
o’clock,  as  the  light  began  to  make  all  things  visible,  the  lower  part 
of  the  Platrand  from  east  to  west  was  in  possession  of  the  burghers. 
Thus  the  first  line  of  the  enemy’s  position  on  the  hill  was  gallantly 
captured  and  held,  hut  the  English  were  by  no  means  beaten  off. 
They  fell  hack  to  other  entrenchments,  nearer  their  guns,  and 
clung  to  them  with  dogged  tenacity  until  reenforcements  came 
from  the  town  below,  and  from  other  posts  within  the  besieged 
area. 

The  flat  top  of  the  hill  became  a scene  of  the  most  determined 
fight  which  had  taken  place  since  the  siege  began,  the  com- 
batants in  several  places  being  separated  by  only  a few  yards.  The 
defenders  of  the  hill  had  the  service  at  close  range  of  their  naval 
and  field  guns,  and  it  was  this  great  advantage,  coupled  with  a 
failure  on  the  part  of  the  Pretoria  commando  to  succor  the  Free 
Staters  on  Wagon  Hill,  which  enabled  White  ultimately  to  beat 
off  the  determined  assault  of  his  opponents.  The  fight  at  this  end 
of  the  Platrand  had  been  hot  and  furious  from  the  beginning,  the 
Free  Staters  repulsing  every  attempt  made  to  break  their  hold  on 
the  hill.  White  hurled  several  detachments  of  Highlanders,  King’s 
Eoyal  Kifles,  and  Imperial  Light  Horse  against  Commandant  Nel 
and  his  brave  Heilhron  men — the  men  who  had  gallantly  helped 
to  storm  Nicholson’s  Nek — hut,  tho  subjected  to  a terrific  fire  from 
two  batteries,  a naval  gun,  and  fully  2,000  of  White’s  garrison,  the 
Harrismith,  Heilhron,  Vredefort,  and  Kroonstad  burghers  hero- 
ically withstood  the  onslaught,  and  maintained  their  position  for 
fully  ten  hours.  Four  times  in  succession  during  the  continuous 
struggle  on  and  around  Wagon  Hill  did  the  English  pluckily 
rush  forward  to  recapture  their  ground,  only  to  be  shot  hack 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 


297 


remorselessly  by  the  intrepid  burghers,  until  the  hill  in  front  of 
them  was  almost  covered  with  dead  and  wounded  Tommies. 

The  Boer  guns  from  Bulwana  rendered  very  little  effective 
service  to  the  burghers  engaged  in  holding  the  west  end  of  the 
Platrand.  The  distance,  except  to  the  eastern  slope,  where  the 
Utrecht  men  easily  held  their  ground  under  cover  of  Long  Tom’s 
shells,  was  too  great  for  accurate  shooting,  while  the  enejny’s 
whole  batteries  were  on  and  around  the  Platrand  within  close 
reach  of  the  men  who  had  climbed  and  held  the  hill. 

During  the  afternoon  a furious  storm  of  rain  swept  across  the 
battle-field,  drenching  both  sides,  but  in  no  way  abating  the  fury 
of  the  fight  for  the  possession  of  the  hill. 

There  can  be  no  denying  the  courage  and  tenacity  with  which 
the  garrison  fought  for  the  retention  of  the  Platrand.  Their 
fifty  guns  were,  however,  almost  all  employed,  and  to  this  over- 
whelming artillery  fire  was  mainly  due  the  repulse  of  the  attack. 
The  conviction  is  general  among  the  Boer  officers  who  led  the  as- 
sault, that,  had  the  needed  assistance  from  the  north  laager  been 
given  to  the  Free  Staters,  they  could  have  held  that  end  of  the  hill, 
and  from  thence  have  captured  the  town. 

The  moral  effect  of  the  storming  of  the  Platrand  was  very 
marked  on  the  English,  who  were  cured  by  it  of  the  superstition 
about  Boers  dreading  a close  encounter,  and  fearing  to  face  fixed 
bayonets.  Both  the  Utrecht  men  on  the  east,  and  the  Harrismith 
burghers  on  the  west  side  of  the  hill,  rushed  trenches  and  shot 
down  Tommies  armed  with  bayonets  at  a few  yards  distance. 

The  lesson  learned  on  the  Boer  side  from  the  fight  was  con- 
firmatory of  Joubert’s  view,  that  the  Boer  forces  were  not  numer- 
ically strong  enough  for  plans  of  assault  requiring  big  battalions 
for  the  success  of  most  risky  enterprises,  and  for  the  certain  losses 
which  victory  or  defeat  in  attempting  them  always  demand. 

The  attempt  to  storm  the  Platrand  was  the  last  serious  en- 
gagement in  or  around  Ladysmith  until  its  relief  was  effected  in 
February. 

General  White’s  report  of  his  casualties  in  this  battle  says  : 

“ Our  losses,  I regret  to  say,  were  very  heav}'',  consisting  of  14 
officers  and  135  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  killed,  and  31 
officers  and  244  men  wounded.” 

This  very  large  percentage  of  killed  as  against  wounded  tells  the 
story  of  the  fierce  character  of  the  Boer  attack.  General  White 
continues  by  saying: 

“ I have  not  been  able  to  ascertain  the  actual  loss  of  the  Boers, 
but  79  bodies  found  within  our  lines  were  returned  to  them  next 


298 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


day  for  burial,  and  native  spies  report  that  their  total  casualties 
could  not  be  less  than  700.” 

As  against  this  Kaffir  estimate  of  the  injury  inflicted  on  the 
Boers,  the  official  lists  of  their  losses,  as  published  in  the  “ Volks- 
stem  ” of  January  10  and  12,  1900,  give  the  killed  as  55,  and  the 
wounded  as  135.  The  lists  are  exhaustive  in  supplying  the  names, 
full  home  address,  and  the  commandoes  of  the  men  killed  and 
wounded.  The  Free  Staters  were  the  heaviest  losers,  the  Utrecht, 
Wakkerstroom,  and  Heidelberg  burghers  coming  next  in  propor- 
tionate losses. 

There  are  numerous  heroes  where  all  were  brave  in  the  Boer 
accounts  of  the  Platrand  fight.  One  old  burgher,  however,  is 
accorded  the  palm  hy  universal  testimony  among  the  commandoes 
for  a magnificent  display  of  daring,  which  unfortunately  cost  him 
his  life.  He  was  old  Signatius  Vermaak,  of  Ward  4,  Vryheid, 
but  was  fighting  with  the  Utrecht  men  in  their  attack  on  Caesar’s 
Camp.  He  was  Acting  Field  Cornet,  a man  of  herculean  propor- 
tions, and  over  sixty  years  of  age.  He  dashed  ahead  of  his  men  in 
the  first  rush  for  the  enemy’s  trench,  and  in  the  half  light  of  the 
dawn  found  himself  confronted  by  three  soldiers,  who  had  missed 
him  in  their  fire. 

The  old  Boer  knocked  their  bayonets  aside  with  a sweep  of  his 
clubbed  Mauser,  and  handed  the  three  men  over  to  his  followers 
as  prisoners.  He  was  shot  dead  a few  moments  afterward  as  the 
burghers  of  his  ward  were  clearing  the  trenches  of  their  occupants. 
These  were  mainly  Natal  Volunteers  and  Police,  who  had  tried  in 
the  darkness  to  make  the  advancing  Boers  believe  they  were 
friends  and  not  enemies.  The  fight  which  ensued  at  that  spot 
was  of  the  most  furious  kind,  and  very  few  of  the  British  Colonials 
lived  to  tell  the  tale  of  that  short  hut  sanguinary  encounter  round 
old  Vermaak’s  body  on  that  early  Saturday  morning  on  the  slope  of 
Caesar’s  Camp. 

The  Harrismith  burghers  had  to  lament  the  death  of  two  of 
their  splendid  young  officers.  Field  Comets  He  Villiers  and  Lyon. 
He  Villiers  had  scorned  all  screen  and  danger  in  his  eagerness  to 
come  to  close  quarters  with  the  enemy,  and  had  several  hand-to- 
hand  combats  with  foemen  during  the  morning.  He  was  ultimately 
killed  in  one  of  the  British  attempts  to  regain  the  slope  of  Wagon 
Hill. 

During  the  brief  lull  in  the  firing  on  Wagon  Hill  in  the  morning, 
the  Harrismith  men,  under  De  Villiers,  had  made  a dash  across  the 
open  space  between  the  trench  they  had  taken  and  a redoubt 
from  which  a gun  had  been  hurling  shrapnel  at  the  Boers  along 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 


299 


the  crest  of  the  hill.  The  distance  to  the  gun  was  no  more  than 
150  yards,  and  it  was  resolved  to  try  and  silence  its  harking. 
Already  several  of  the  Tommies  who  were  serving  the  piece  had 
been  picked  off  by  the  burghers,  as  head  or  hand  or  body  showed 
an  object  for  a Mauser  to  fire  at.  De  Villiers  gave  the  word,  and 
a dozen  other  men  leaped  out  and  ran  to  the  redoubt,  shouting 
“ Hands  up  ! ” to  the  twelve  Tommies  who  were  left  out  of  those 
who  had  worked  and  defended  the  piece  diiring  the  morning.  The 
gun,  an  Armstrong,  was  spiked,  the  rifles  were  taken,  and  the  Tom- 
mies released;  De  Yilliers  and  his  companions  returning  back  to 
their  comrades  without  the  loss  of  a single  man. 


Chapter  XXV 


FOREIGN  VOLUNTEERS 

Colonel  Count  Villebois-Makeuil — Bikth  and  Cabeer — Joins  the 
Transvaal  army — His  services  and  death  at  Boshof — How  the 
Boer  armies  were  served  by  two  Frenchmen — Satisfaction  fob 
Fashoda 

The  number  of  foreign  volunteers  who  rendered  service  to  the 
Boer  armies,  and  the  military  value  of  such  aid,  have  been 
greatly  exaggerated  in  the  English  press.  The  purpose  of  this 
exaggeration  was  obvious  from  the  beginning.  British  pride  and 
prestige  were  hurt  at  the  ludicrous  failure  of  the  boastful  pre- 
dictions about  only  a two  months’  campaign  being  required  to 
dictate  England’s  terms  to  President  Kruger  at  Pretoria.  Then 
il  was  seen  that  the  astounding  reverses  experienced  by  superior 
British  forces  in  the  early  stages  of  the  campaign  offered  unmiti- 
gated satisfaction  almost  to  every  nation,  in  the  same  way  that  a 
good  licking  received  by  a big  bully  at  the  hands  of  a small  an- 
tagonist delights  every  right-thinking  onlooker.  All  this  made 
the  Jingo  papers  utilize  the  resources  of  fiction  to  explain  these 
defeats,  as  they  had  already  resorted  to  falsehoods  in  order  to  pro- 
voke the  war.  “ We  are  not  fighting  the  Boers,  but  all  Europe,” 
was  the  modest  view  of  some  Government  organs,  while  others 
declared  that  “ hundreds  ” of  Continental  officers  and  artillery 
experts  had  gone  to  South  Africa  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities 
to  prepare  the  Transvaal  forces  for  the  conflict  against  Great 
Britain. 

I made  a special  study  of  the  foreign  volunteer  element  while 
in  the  Transvaal  and  Orange  Free  State,  and  I can,  therefore, 
speak  with  first-hand  information  upon  one  of  the  most  interesting 
phases  of  the  war.  I have  already  dealt  generally  with  the  disputed 
point  as  to  the  number  of  men  of  Uitlander  and  foreign  extrac- 
tion who  volunteered  to  fight  for  the  Eepublics,  and  I will  attempt 
in  this  and  the  following  chapter  to  give  a brief  account  of  each 
corps,  together  with  some  particulars  of  the  actual  services  ren- 
dered by  them  in  the  field. 


FOBEIGN  VOLUNTEERS 


301 


COLONEL  VILLEBOIS-MAREUIL 

The  most  prominent,  and  by  far  the  ablest,  European  officer 
who  fought  with  the  Federals  was  Colonel  Count  Villebois-Mareuil, 
whom  I had  the  honor  of  meeting  shortly  after  my  arrival  at 
Kroonstad.  I found  him  to  be  a man  of  fifty  or  thereabouts,  of 
medium  height,  strongly  built,  with  a strangely  fascinating  face. 
The  forehead  was  high,  the  eyes  light  blue,  deep-set  and  penetrat- 
ing in  their  glance,  and  overhung  by 
finely-marked  eyebrows;  the  nose  was 
well  formed,  with  large  nostrils,  and 
the  mouth  was  almost  concealed  by 
a prominent,  whitish  mustache  ex- 
tending across  the  face;  all  combin- 
ing to  impart  a handsome  and  dis- 
tingue expression  to  a most  magnetic 
personality.  There  was  the  impress 
of  a nobility  conferred  by  nature  up- 
on the  man  and  his  manner  which 
did  more  than  his  rank  or  record  to 
win  for  him  on  the  instant  an  ob- 
server’s favorable  judgment.  In  de- 
meanor and  speech  he  possessed  all 
the  charm  of  a chivalrous  soldier 
w'ithout  the  least  suspicion  of  any 
motive,  except  of  the  highest  pur- 
pose, animating  his  unselfish  devotion 
to  the  cause  which  he  had  espoused. 

He  spoke  with  the  greatest  contempt  colonel  villebois-mareuil 
of  England’s  objects  in  provoking  the 

war,  and  considered  that  British  officers  had  shown  an  astounding 
incapacity  in  each  branch  of  the  military  service — infantry,  cavalry, 
and  artillery — throughout  the  whole  campaign. 

Count  Georges  de  Villebois-Mareuil  was  born  at  Nantes  of  an 
old  Breton  family  some  fifty-two  years  ago.  At  the  age  of  nine 
he  was  placed  under  the  Jesuit  Father  Olivaint,  at  the  noted 
College  of  Vaugirard.  He  graduated  as  Bachelor  of  Arts  at  the 
age  of  sixteen,  and,  being  intended  for  a military  career  by  his 
parents,  he  entered  upon  the  preparatory  studies  necessary  for 
admission  to  the  College  of  St.  Cyr.  From  all  accounts  he  was  a 
spirited  student  of  his  profession,  and  a leader  in  all  athletic  and 
manly  exercises  during  his  probation,  and  had  no  difficulty  in 
acquiring  the  knowledge  and  proficiency  which  saw  him  leave  the 


302 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


famous  military  academy  in  1868  with  the  epaulets  of  a Sous- 
Lieutenant. 

His  first  military  duty  was  rendered  in  Cochin  China,  whither 
he  had  been  sent  largely  in  obedience  to  his  own  desire  for  travel 
and  adventure.  After  a brief  service  with  the  Colonial  forces,  he  was 
selected  as  aide-de-camp  by  his  uncle,  Rear-Admiral  Cornulier,  then 
in  command  of  the  French  Squadron  in  Eastern  waters.  Shortly 
afterward  war  between  France  and  Germany  was  declared,  and 
Villebois  at  once  demanded  to  be  allowed  to  go  home.  The  admiral 
refused  his  permission,  and  the  young  lieutenant  grew  desperate 
at  the  thought  that  France  was  in  deadly  combat  with  a formidable 
foe  while  he  was  only  a distant  spectator  of  the  conflict.  One  day, 
on  seeing  a French  mail  steamer  ready  to  sail  for  Marseilles,  he 
bluntly  told  his  uncle  that  he  would  be  passenger  for  France  on 
board  of  that  ship,  and  a consent  which  could  no  longer  be  re- 
fused was  reluctantly  given,  Villebois  leaving  on  the  boat  without 
five  minutes’  preparation. 

On  landing  at  Marseilles  he  found  that  the  third  Empire  had 
fallen,  and  that  whatever  Government  existed  in  France  was 
located  at  Bordeaux.  He  proceeded  at  once  to  that  city,  demanded 
instant  employment  at  the  front,  and  in  a few  days’  time  found 
himself  at  the  head  of  a company  of  young  recruits,  attached  to  the 
command  of  General  Pourcet,  to  Join  whose  forces  he  immediately 
started  for  Blois.  At  the  battle  of  Blois,  where  the  Germans  were 
strongly  posted  behind  street  barricades,  Villebois,  in  heading  a 
bayonet  charge  for  which  he  was  specially  selected  by  the  general, 
so  distinguished  himself  by  coolness  and  conspicuous  bravery  in 
rescuing  some  guns  and  in  capturing  an  important  position  that  he 
was  made  captain,  and  decorated  with  the  Cross  of  the  Legion  of 
Honor  on  the  field  of  battle.  He  had  been  severely  wounded  in 
leading  the  dashing  charge  which  cleared  the  enemy  from  behind 
the  barricades,  but  fought  on  until  the  day  was  won,  when  he  had 
to  be  carried  from  the  battle-field  to  hospital.  The  day  following, 
an  armistice  was  signed,  and  the  war  was  terminated.  The  heroic 
young  captain’s  victory  was,  in  fact,  the  final  action  of  the  war.  He 
was  at  this  time  only  twenty-three  years  old.  He  served  subse- 
quently in  Algiers,  and  took  part  in  the  Kroumirie  expedition, 
when  he  again  earned  distinction  for  combined  courage  and  capac- 
ity. He  was  very  popular  with  the  men  of  his  various  commands, 
and  had  the  unique  honor  of  being  the  youngest  colonel  in  the 
French  Army  in  lais  time. 

Dissatisfied  with  the  conduct  of  the  various  War  Ministers  of 
changing  Governments,  by  whom  he  believed  the  French  Army 
was  being  ruined,  he  resigned  active  service,  retaining  his  rank 


FOREIGN  VOLUNTEERS 


303 


as  colonel.  He  dropped  the  sword  to  take  up  the  pen,  and  soon 
established  another  reputation  as  a clear  and  convincing  writer 
in  “ Le  Kevue  des  Deux-Mondes,”  “ Le  Correspondent,”  “ La  Plume 
et  L’Epee,”  and  in  various  pamphlets,  on  topics  such  as  the  Russian 
Army,  Russia  and  England  in  Asia,  Organization  of  the  Higher 
Commands  in  the  French  Army,  Organization  of  Colonial  Troops, 
Military  Tradition  and  Vitality,  Courts-Martial,  Gallieni  and 
Madagascar,  the  Centenary  of  Napoleon’s  Expedition  to  Egypt, 
The  Sorrows  of  Spain,  As  Others  See  Us,  The  Colonial  Achieve- 
ments of  the  Third  Republic,  Our  French  Military  Institutions  and 
their  Future,  etc.  He  attended  the  re-trial  of  Captain  Dreyfus  at 
Rennes,  and  wrote  his  reflections  upon  that  complicated  case  for 
“ L’ Action  Frangaise.” 

On  the  outbreak  of  war  in  South  Africa  he  offered  his  services 
to  the  Boers,  an  offer  which  was  readily  accepted  by  Dr.  Leyds, 
and,  after  committing  his  only  child  to  the  care  of  his  brother. 
Viscount  de  Villebois-Mareuil,  he  sailed  for  Lourenzo  Marquez, 
and  reached  Pretoria  on  the  1st  of  December,  1899. 

By  this  time  the  English  war  correspondents  had  succeeded  in 
placing  “hundreds”  of  French,  German,  Russian,  and  other  mili- 
tary officers  and  experts  at  the  heads  of  Boer  commandoes  and  in 
charge  of  Boer  artillery,  and  had  relegated  rustic  burgher  generals 
to  the  background  in  the  direction  of  such  operations  as  had  ex- 
hibited British  troops  flying  from  Dundee  and  surrendering  by  the 
thousand  at  Nicholson’s  Nek.  Rumor  had,  however,  reached  the 
truth  in  the  person  of  Villebois-Mareuil.  There  was  soon  woven 
around  his  attractive  personality  a legendary  romance  which  repre- 
sented him  as  the  minister  of  poetic  justice  in  the  task  of  avenging 
Fashoda.  He  had  reorganized  the  whole  Boer  plan  of  campaign, 
had  planned  the  battle  of  Magersfontein,  had  actually  commanded 
the  burghers  at  Colenso,  and  was  the  military  genius  who  was  in- 
strumental in  making  the  Tugela  a name  of  everlasting  memory 
and  of  no  little  disgrace  in  British  military  annals.  This  was  what 
the  British  press  were  saying  of  him  in  preference  to  admitting 
that  their  ablest  generals  and  best  troops  were  being  beaten  by 
Dutch  farmers  at  the  head  of  civilian  fighters. 

After  staying  a few  days  in  Pretoria,  where  he  had  been  shown 
very  marked  attention,  Villebois  left  for  Natal  to  pay  his  respects 
to  General  Joubert.  He  arrived  in  front  of  Ladysmith  about  the 
7th  of  December,  and  was  cordially  welcomed  by  the  old  Com- 
mandant-General, who  at  once  boasted  of  his  own  Breton  ancestry 
and  French  blood.  Villebois  was  not  favorably  impressed  by  Jou- 
bert. He  saw  in  the  head  of  the  Boer  army  a candidate  for  the 
Presidency,  a powerful  politician,  a man  with  a party,  rather  than  a 


304 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


soldier  conscious  of  the  responsibility  involved  in  the  direction  of  a 
force  of  30,000  men  engaged  in  a campaign  against  a huge  Empire. 
He  was  probably  more  influenced  in  the  formation  of  this  view  by 
his  experiences  of  political  generals  in  France  than  by  Joubert’s 
actual  military  shortcomings.  In  any  case,  the  old  man’s  noncha- 
lant manners,  his  want  of  touch  with  the  fighting  commandoes  in 
the  South,  and  a seeming  fatalistic  dependence  upon  chance  rather 
than  upon  aggressive  and  intelligent  activity,  disillusioned  the 
expert  military  mind  of  the  accomplished  soldier,  and  caused  him 
to  form  an  opinion  of  Joubert’s  unfitness  for  the  task  he  had  in 
hand  which  subsequent  intercourse  and  events  turned  into  a per- 
manent conviction. 

He  left  Joubert’s  laager  for  the  Tugela,  and  reached  General 
Botha’s  camp  on  the  13th  of  December,  a fact  which  completely 
disposes  of  the  English  theory  that  the  battle  of  Colenso,  on  the 
15th  of  that  month,  was  fought  upon  Villebois’  plans  and  sugges- 
tions. As  a matter  of  fact  he  did  not  see  Botha  until  the  following 
day,  when  Buller’s  guns  had  commenced  to  bombard  the  positions 
in  which  the  Boer  general  had  already  determined  to  meet  and  fight 
his  antagonist.  On  the  morning  of  the  battle,  as  already  related, 
he  rode  in  an  excited  manner  up  to  Botha,  pointing  to  the  enemy 
in  actual  motion  across  the  plain,  and  anxiously  exclaiming, 
“ Where  are  your  men.  General  ? The  enemy  is  about  to  attack.” 
He  soon  learned  that  he  had  a man  nearer  to  his  own  conception 
of  an  ideal  Boer  general  in  the  young  farmer  than  in  the  old 
commandant;  and  his  confidence  in  and  admiration  of  Botha 
increased  with  the  progress  of  the  campaign  along  the  now  famous 
river  banks. 

He  reconnoitered  the  whole  line  of  positions  at  the  Tugela  at 
Botha’s  express  request,  and  expressed  the  opinion  that  it  would 
require  a force  of  50,000  men  to  man  properly  and  hold  successfully 
so  extensive  a line  of  defensive  ground.  In  his  report  to  the 
Boer  general  he  advised  the,  seizure  and  occupation  of  Mounts 
Alice  and  Zwartskop,  south  of  the  river,  near  Potgieter’s  Drift,  as 
positions  which  the  enemy  would  probably  make  the  pivots  of 
their  next  attempt  to  reach  Ladysmith.  His  advice  was  not  acted 
upon,  and  within  four  days  of  the  giving  of  it  Buller’s  naval  guns 
were  firing  from  the  two  identical  hills  upon  the  burgher  lines 
across  the  river. 

Previous  to  this  he  had  revisited  the  head  laager  at  Ladysmith, 
and  had  made  himself  acquainted  with  the  disposition  of  General 
White’s  forces,  and  the  weak  points  in  the  English  plan  of  defen- 
sive positions  facing  Joubert’s  lines  of  investment.  He  submitted 
a scheme  for  an  attack  upon  the  garrison,  which  he  backed  with  a 


FOREIGN  YOLUNTEEES 


305 


strong  expression  of  opinion  in  favor  of  a determined  assault  with- 
out delay.  Joubert  hesitated,  delayed,  vacillated,  and  Villebois 
returned  to  Colenso.  Finally  J oubert  was  induced  to  give  his  con- 
sent to  the  proposal,  and  I have  related  in  the  chapter  on  Lady- 
smith how  near  the  plan  was  to  being  successful  on  the  6th  of 
January.  Villebois  accompanied  the  Utrecht  burghers,  who  rode 
from  Colenso  to  take  part  in  the  storming  of  the  Platrand,  and  was 
a spectator  of  the  fight  at  Caesar’s  Camp  during  the  progress  of  the 
general  attack  on  the  Platrand.  He  asserted  afterward  that  sug- 
gestions which  would  have  averted  the  blunders  made  in  the  carry- 
ing out  of  the  plan  of  attack  were  disregarded  in  its  execution; 
otherwise,  the  assault  would  have  been  successful. 

He  remained  with  Botha  until  the  middle  of  January,  when  he 
left  hiatal  to  visit  Cronje’s  army  at  Magersfontein,  rightly  divining 
that  the  west  was  soon  to  witness  the  great  act  of  the  war.  This 
was  his  first  visit  to  the  scene  of  the  battle  which  had  been  fought 
and  won  on  the  11th  of  December,  and  the  credit  for  the  planning 
of  which  had  been  given  to  him  by  British  papers.  Cronje’s 
military  knowledge,  as  seen  in  the  superior  construction  of  his 
entrenchments  and  in  the  discipline  of  his  camp,  impressed  Ville- 
hois  very  favorably.  He  was  not  slow,  however,  to  recognize  the 
autocratic  manner  and  incurable  obstinacy  of  the  old  Lion  of  Pot- 
chefstroom.  He  found  him  as  polite  and  as  grateful  as  J oubert  for 
proffered  suggestions,  hut  even  more  slow  and  more  proudly  re- 
luctant in  the  acceptance  of  any  extraneous  advice.  This  fatalistic 
stubbornness  and  Old  Testament  military  pride  filled  him  with 
forebodings  of  evil,  as  he  saw  clearly  that  the  masterful  inactivity 
which  relied  entirely  upon  this  spirit  and  on  defensive  action  would 
spell  ruin  to  the  small  Federal  armies  in  the  end.  He  visited  the 
forces  in  front  of  Kimberley,  and  was  warmly  welcomed  by  Gen- 
erals Ferreira,  Du  Toit,  and  Kolbe,  who  treated  him  with  marked 
respect,  and  showed  more  disposition  to  follow  his  advice  than  the 
officers  with  larger  commands  had  exhibited.  He  was  admitted  to 
their  kriegraads,  and  acted  generally  while  in  the  lines  there  as 
military  adviser  to  General  Du  Toit.  After  reconnoitering  the  whole 
of  the  English  positions  he  prepared  a plan  for  the  delivery  of  an 
assault  upon  the  city,  which  was  fully  discussed  and  agreed  upon  at 
a Council  of  War,  the  assault  to  be  delivered  after  the  arrival  of  the  - 
Long  Tom  which  had  been  damaged  at  Ladysmith  and  repaired  by 
Leon  and  Grunberg.  General  Cronje,  however,  was  demanding  the 
big  Creusot  for  his  own  position  at  Magersfontein,  and  on  the  score 
of  a quarrel  among  the  generals  over  the  possession  of  “ Tom  ” 
came  Du  Toit’s  final  refusal  to  assent  to  the  projected  assault. 
Villebois  offered  to  lead  an  attacii.  with  fifty  men,  but  could  obtain 
20 


306 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


no  sanction  for  his  proposal.  He  left  the  lines  in  front  of  Kim- 
berley for  Bloemfontein,  where,  after  an  interview  with  President 
Steyn  in  which  he  forcibly  expressed  his  fears  of  the  consequences 
of  Cronje’s  resolution  to  remain  at  Magersfontein  in  the  face  of 
Lord  Eoberts’  obvious  plans,  he  went  to  Colesberg  to  visit  General 
He  la  Eey.  He  remained  only  a few  days  in  Cape  Colony.  He 
formed  a very  high  opinion  of  De  la  Key’s  natural  military  ability, 
followed  him  to  Bloemfontein  when  the  news  of  Cronje’s  surrender 

arrived,  and  fought 
under  him  at  Poplars 
Grove  and  Abram’s 
Kraal;  and  remained 
with  his  commando 
until  the  Federal  gen- 
erals abandoned  the 
Free  State  capital 
and  retreated  to  the 
hills  around  Brand- 
fort. 

President  Steyn 
told  me  in  Kroonstad 
that,  “had  Cronje  fol- 
lowed the  advice  which 
was  given  him  by  Vil- 
lebois-Mareuil  after  he 
had  inspected  our  lines 
at  Magersfontein  he 
would  have  reached 
Bloemfontein  before 
the  English,  and  have 
saved  himself  and  us 
the  disaster  of  Paar- 
deberg.” 

Following  the  fall 
of  Bloemfontein,  Villebois,  tired  of  offering  advice  which  was 
generally  disregarded,  resolved  to  form  a regiment  of  disciplined 
men  out  of  the  various  bodies  of  foreign  volunteers  scattered  among 
the  Federal  armies.  All  were  willing  to  serve  under  him — Ger- 
mans, Eussians,  Hollanders,  Italians,  Americans,  Irish- Americans, 
and  French — and  his  spirits  rose  at  the  prospect  of  having  a body 
of  European  soldiers  under  his  command  with  whom  he  could  do 
the  kind  of  work  which  found  little  favor  with  the  Federals  at  that 
time — attacking  the  enemy,  harassing  his  lines  of  communication, 
and  charging  with  bayonets  when  opportunity  should  offer.  Both 


FOBEIGN  VOLUNTEERS 


307 


Governments  approved  of  liis  plan,  and  the  rank  of  Acting  General 
was  conferred  upon  him. 

He  selected  his  staff  from  the  officers  in  command  of  the 
small  bodies  into  which  the  foreign  volunteers  were  divided. 
Colonel  Maximoff,  Captain  Lorentz,  Baron  Von  Wrangel,  Lieu- 
tenants Eeineke,  He  Breda,  Gallopaud,  and  Smorenberg  being  so 
chosen. 

While  his  regiment  was  being  recruited  and  volunteers  were 
arriving  at  his  camp  at  Kroonstad  to  join  his  command,  he 
intimated  to  President  Steyn  a wish  to  carry  out  some  work  which 
he  had  planned,  and  the  execution  of  which  would  not  brook  of 
delay.  He  asked  for  and  obtained  a carload  of  dynamite,  and 
with  only  85  men — comprising  30  Frenchmen,  with  two  lieutenants, 
30  Hollanders,  and  the  balance  made  up  of  various  nationalities — 
he  left  Kroonstad  at  midnight  on  the  26th  of  March,  for  an 
unknown  destination. 

President  Steyn  alone  knew  that  he  had  gone  west  to  Hoopstad, 
but  where  he  was  to  proceed  from  thence,  and  what  to  do,  he 
had  not  confided  to  a single  one  of  his  officers  or  friends. 

Two  days  after  Villebois  left  Kroonstad,  Baron  Van  Dedem  ar- 
rived from  France  with  despatches,  and  on  a mission  from  the 
Count’s  friends.  It  being  important  that  the  letters  from  home 
should  be  delivered  without  delay.  President  Steyn  wired  to  Hoop- 
stad and  arranged  that  Villebois  was  to  meet  the  visitors  from 
Europe  at  a wayside  store,  midway  between  the  two  towns.  He  was 
found  there  on  the  evening  of  the  30th  of  March,  and  was  urged  to 
return  at  once  to  France  and  endeavor  to  organize  a European 
intervention;  or,  failing  this,  to  band  together  2,000  or  3,000  ex- 
legionnaires  whom  he  had  served  with  in  Algiers,  and  sail  openly, 
in  a French  ship,  which  would  be  provided,  from  Marseilles  to 
Delagoa  Bay.  The  view  was  strongly  put  before  him  that  the 
moral  and  military  effects  of  Cronje’s  surrender,  coupled  with  the 
continued  increase  of  the  English  forces,  would  render  the  opera- 
tions of  such  a small  foreign  legion  as  he  could  organize  out  of 
difficult  materials,  of  comparative  little  value  against  overwhelm- 
ing odds.  It  was  urged  that  the  political  effect  of  his  presence  in 
France,  in  the  work  of  organizing  European  assistance,  with  his 
acquired  knowledge  of  the  Boer  people  and  familiarity  with  their 
splendid  fighting,  would,  on  the  contrary,  be  of  enormous  im- 
portance, and  would  far  outweigh  any  help  which  he  and  his  regi- 
ment could  possibly  render  in  the  field.  The  true  state  of  Con- 
tinental feeling  was  explained  to  him;  the  growing  militant  indig- 
nation of  the  peoples  at  the  naked  baseness  of  the  British  in  the 
war;  the  unity  of  German  and  French  opinion  in  favor  of  the  Boer 


308 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


cause;  and,  especially,  the  strong  current  of  popular  hostility 
against  England  which  was  running  through  the  public  life  of  his 
own  country.  He  listened  with  a keen,  interested  attention  to  all 
. that  was  thus  urged,  and  replied  slowly  and  decisively  : 

“ Had  this  proposal  been  placed  before  me  six  weeks  ago,  I 
would  have  acted  upon  it.  Now  it  is  impossible.  The  Boers  have 
met  with  a first,  but  a vital,  reverse.  Cronje’s  surrender  means  the 
defeat  of  the  Eepublics.  The  war  will  be  over  in  July.  I could 
do  nothing  in  Europe  within  that  time,  as  the  journey  is  very  long. 
Moreover,  the  Boers,  as  you  will  learn,  are  a suspicious,  people. 
They  are  very  liable  to  misunderstand  the  actions  of  their  best 
friends.  They  would  not  comprehend  my  going  away  now,  so  soon 
after  the  great  misfortune  of  Paardeberg.  I might  be  thought 
capable  of  leaving  them  when  their  prospects  are  clouded  with  the 
shadow  of  the  enemy’s  first  real  triumph  over  them  in  the  field. 
No;  I came  to  offer  my  services  to  these  people.  They  have  won 
my  affectionate  admiration.  They  are  half  French  in  origin,  and 
with  them  I shall  remain  to  the  end.” 

And  in  this  fatal  decision  ended  the  hopes  and  the  labors  of  the 
mission  from  France. 

The  motives  which  inspired  this  doubly  unfortunate  refusal 
were  above  question.  They  were  worthy  of  a high-minded, 
chivalrous  soldier,  morally  afraid  of  having  the  sincerity  of  his 
ardent  sympathies  subjected  to  the  ordeal  of  suspicion,  and  the 
unkind  Fates  determined  the  rest,  to  the  great  injury  of  the  Boer 
cause,  and  to  the  permanent  loss  of  the  French  nation. 

As  he  could  not  be  persuaded  to  return  to  Europe  to  organize 
a Continental  intervention,  and,  if  necessary,  a really  effective 
French  legion,  he  was  induced  to  address  a manifesto  to  the 
legionnaires  who  had  served  under  him  in  Algiers.  To  this  sug- 
gestion he  readily  assented,  and  wrote  the  following  appeal  : 

‘'To  the  Legionnaires  Who  Have  Enow7i  Me! 

“ Comrades,  Officers,  Non-commissioned  officers,  and  Soldiers — I 
know  that  you  have  not  forgotten  me.  You  have  been  in  my  memory 
and  affection.  We  understand  each  other,  and,  therefore,  I address 
this  appeal  to  you. 

“ There  lies  beyond  the  Vaal  Eiver  a brave  people,  small  in 
numbers,  who  are  threatened  with  the  deprivation  of  their  liberties, 
their  rights,  and  their  belongings,  in  order  that  greedy  and  grasp- 
ing capitalists  may  prosper. 

“ These  people  in  a large  proportion  have  French  blood  running 
in  their  veins.  France,  therefore,  owes  them,  in  their  hour  of  need, 
a striking  manifestation  of  its  assistance. 

“ Comrades  ! Your  natural  temperament,  your  true  soldierly 
instincts,  impelled  you  to  range  yourselves  beneath  the  flag  of 


FOREIGN  VOLUNTEERS 


309 


France,  even  without  the  impulse  of  national  obligation,  and  it 
is  to  you  I look  for  the  aid  which  is  due  from  France  to  a kindred 
race  manfully  fighting  against  overwhelming  numbers  for  the 
preservation  of  its  independence. 

“ You  have  remained  to  me  the  perfect  type  of  troops,  always 
ready  and  eager  for  attack  without  a moment’s  self -consideration ; 
troops  without  rivals  in  impetuosity  for  an  assault. 

“ Such  soldiers  trained  to  these  methods  are  wanting  here.  We 
have  unrivaled  shooters  for  a deadly  defense.  We  do  not  possess 
the  disciplined  force  necessary  to  complete  a victory  when  the 
enemy  has  been  repulsed  or  beaten;  troops  to  rush  in  and  deliver 
a crushing  blow. 

“ Comrades  ! Come  to  me.  You’ll  find  your  colonel  as  ready 
to  lead  you  as  you  have  known  him  always  to  be,  and  your  coming 
will  give  him  that  supreme  satisfaction  in  fighting  this  just  cause 
which  your  absence  from  his  side  on  the  field  of  battle  has  alone 
denied  him,  the  honor  of  leading  you  within  striking  distance 
of  the  enemy. 

“ Group  3^ourselves  according  to  military  rules.  Leave  France 
as  citizens  traveling  for  their  own  purposes.  I will  receive  you 
here,  and  I promise  you  that  very  few  days  will  elapse  before  we 
shall  show  the  world  the  mettle  of  which  the  French  Legionnaire 
is  made. 

Villebois-Maeeuil. 

“Kroonstad,  March  30,  1900.” 

The  general,  attended  by  a solitary  guide,  rode  back  to  Hoop- 
stad  on  the  following  day,  and  rejoined  his  small  force  at  Brief on- 
tein.'  Yo  one  knew  his  plan  or  ultimate  objective.  He  was  anxious 
to  know  what  the  enemy’s  strength  was  near  Boshof,  and  marched 
in  that  direction  after  being  informed  that  the  English  in  that 
town  numbered  only  300.  The  help  of  a body  of  200  men  who 
were  in  laager  north  of  Driefontein  was  promised  him  at  Hoop- 
stad.  Later  and  more  accurate  information  represented  the  Eng- 
lish as  being  in  much  greater  force  on  his  front;  hut  this  seems 
to  have  been  disregarded  by  him  as  an  invention  by  the  burghers 
who  were  reluctant  to  accompany  him.  He  was  warned  after  this 
not  to  proceed,  and  the  Boers  who  had  promised  him  refused  to  go 
with  his  little  band.  Nothing,  however,  would  deter  him  from 
advancing  to  where  Fate  had  reserved  for  him  a soldier’s  death  and 
grave.  The  troop  rode  forward,  and  halted  for  the  evening  at  the 
bottom  of  a small  wooded  kopje,  to  which  he  had  been  led  by  two 
guides  procured  at  Hoopstad.  After  a while,  on  asking  for  the 
guides,  he  was  told  they  had  vanished  ! He  then  saw  he  had  been 
betrayed  and  led  into  a trap.  Before  he  had  time  to  realize  the  full 
gravity  of  the  situation,  British  troops  were  observed  at  a distance 


310 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


in  the  act  of  surrounding  the  position  where  the  volunteers  had 
intended  to  bivouac  for  the  night.  The  general  at  once  disposed 
of  his  men  in  two  sections,  placing  the  Hollanders  on  one  ridge 
and  the  Frenchmen,  with  himself  among  them,  on  the  wooded 
kopje.  Sangars  were  hastily  erected,  such  as  the  nature  of  the 
ground  offered,  and  the  attack  was  awaited. 

Accounts  of  what  followed  vary  in  their  details,  but  all  reports 
agree  that  the  example  of  Yillebois  in  his  coolness  and  utter  dis- 
regard of  danger  stimulated  the  little  troop  to  keep  up  a contest 
for  over  three  hours  with  Lord  Methuen’s  3,000  or  4,000  troops 
and  six  guns.  The  Hollanders,  on  seeing  the  utter  hopelessness  of 
the  situation,  surrendered  hy  laying  down  their  arms.  Villebois 
scornfully  refused  to  make  any  such  appeal  to  a British  force,  and 
he  sternly  rebuked  all  suggestion  of  surrender  around  where  he 
stood.  The  fight  continued,  shells  exploding  against  the  positions 
on  which  the  little  legion  loyally  remained  with  the  general.  Sud- 
denly a portion  of  a shell  struck  him  in  the  head,  and  he  was  in- 
stantly killed,  falling  dead  without  a word.  The  English  now 
rnshed  the  kopje,  and  the  seventy  survivors  were  taken  prisoner. 
Three  French  volunteers  besides  the  general  were  killed,  while  ten 
others  were  wounded;  the  enemy  losing  about  as  many. 

English  officers  admitted  to  some  of  the  prisoners  that  they 
had  been  informed  of  the  strength  of  Villebois’  force  and  of  the 
direction  of  his  march  after  he  had  left  Hoopstad;  confirming 
the  general  belief  which  obtained  among  the  Boer  laagers  that  the 
legion  had  been  the  victim  of  some  one’s  treachery. 

This  ending  of  the  general’s  scheme  of  a European  legion  and 
of  his  own  career  made' a deep  impression  on  the  burghers.  They 
had  a profound  respect  for  him  personally,  and  were  grateful  for 
his  earnest  efforts  to  give  them  all  the  help  in  his  power.  The 
Boer  officers  saw  clearly  that  he  was  wedded  to  European  ideas 
of  warfare,  in  a country  and  under  conditions  where  these  ideas 
did  not  always  apply,  and  this  fact,  coupled  with  a stranger’s 
ignorance  of  the  Boer  language  and  of  the  regions  which  were  the 
theater  of  operations,  made  it  impossible  for  him  to  give  all  the 
assistance  which  he  was  passionately  desirous  of  rendering  to  a 
cause  that  had  won  his  heart. 

Much  surprise  has  been  expressed  by  those  who  knew  of  his 
customary  careful  and  even  cautious  disposition  that  he  should 
have  erred  so  much  in  judgment  and  tact  in  venturing  towards 
where  he  ought  to  have  known  that  large  forces  of  the  enemy  must 
be  located.  This  view,  hoAvever,  has  been  taken  Avithout  fully  con- 
sidering the  part  which  treachery  had  played  in  the  catastrophe 
of  the  6th  of  April,  and  in  ignorance  of  his  actual  plans  and  inten- 


FOREIGN  VOLUNTEERS 


311 


tions.  The  most  far-seeing  of  human  judgments  are  not  proof 
against  the  mysterious  agencies  of  fate  nor  the  accidents  of  fortune, 
and  the  true  French  spirit  and  heroic  resolve  which  he  proudly 
exhibited,  to  die  as  a soldier  rather  than  live  as  an  English  prisoner, 
will  more  than  redeem  in  the  national  recollection  of  Frenchmen, 
and  in  the  grateful  memory  of  the  Boer  generation,  the  incautious 
action  which  led  to  the  death  of  Villebois-Mareuil. 

The  following  documents  speak  with  two  English  voices  of  the 
memorable  death  thus  recorded  : 

“ Boshof,  May  10,  1900. 

“ Mademoiselle — I am  forwarding  you  a photograph  of  a marble 
stone  which  I have  placed  in  the  churchyard  at  Boshof  in  memory 
of  your  father.  I hope  I have  found  the  ring  he  wore,  and  if  it 
proves  to  be  so  it  shall  also  be  sent  to  you.  I could  not  place 
your  father’s  body  in  a Eoman  Catholic  churchyard,  as  I feel  sure 
you  would  have  wished,  but  the  funeral  rites  were  carried  out  by 
M.  le  Comte  de  Breda,  and  military  honors  were  accorded  to  the 
colonel.  We  all  regret  the  death  of  an  accomplished  and  gallant 
soldier,  but  he  preferred  death  to  becoming  a prisoner.  Let  me 
convey  to  you  my  sAunpathy  and  the  s}Tnpathy  of  my  comrades 
in  your  sorrow.  Very  truly, 

jMethuen",  Lt.-Gren.,  Cmdg.  5th  Division.” 

“ The  Daily  News,”  October  30,  1900. 

“The  shell  which  killed  General  de  Villebois-Mareuil  near  Boshof 
has  been  mounted  as  a trophy  in  an  ebony  case,  and  is  to  be  pre- 
sented to  Lord  Galway  and  the  officers  of  the  Sherwood  Dangers, 
Imperial  Yeomanry,  to  commemorate  their  first  engagement.  It 
is  now  on  view  at  Macmichael’s  42  South  Audley  street,  W., 
London.” 

On  the  eve  of  my  departure  from  Pretoria  I received  the  follow- 
ing message  from  General  Botha  : 

“ Van  Hoofed  Commandant-General  Botha,  Standerton. 

“ Aan  Michael  Davitt,  Pretoria. 

“ VTien  are  you  leaving  and  what  will  be  your  address  in  Europe  ? 
I would  very  much  like  to  send  you  a letter  for  Mademoiselle  de 
Villebois-Mareuil,  which  I should  be  glad  if  you  would  deliver 
personally.  Please  reply  to  Standerton.” 

When  the  reply  reached  Standerton  the  general  had  left  for  the 
Free  State  to  meet  the  advance  of  Lord  Eoberts’  army. 

MESSRS.  GRUNBERG  AND  LEON 

In  1895  a young  Frenchman,  by  name  Leon  Grunherg,  a grad- 
uate of  L’£cole  Centrale  of  Paris,  was  sent  to  South  Africa  by  the 


312 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


great  French  firm  of  Schnieder  and  Co.  as  their  representative. 
This  famous  company  was  the  manufacturer  of  mining  machinery 
of  all  kinds,  as  well  as  the  makers  of  the  celebrated  Creusot  guns 
and  other  artillery.  Leon  Grunberg's  mission  to  Johannesburg  was 
entirely  pacific,  in  being  confined  to  the  sale  of  material  required 
in  the  working  of  the  Band  mines.  In  December  of  that  year  the 
Jameson  Eaid  occurred,  revealing,  in  its  naked  purpose  of  deliberate 
plunder  under  the  protection  of  the  British  fiag,  an  English  design 
to  .grab  the  mines  and  to  annex  the  Eepublic  to  the  Empire.  The 
Transvaal  Executive  saw  at  once  the  necessity  for  arming  the 

Eepublic  against  the  eventual- 
ity of  a greater  raid  than 
Jameson’s,  and  two  batteries  of 
artillery  were  ordered  in  1897 
from  the  Creusot  works  in 
France. 

With  these  guns  there  came 
to  Pretoria  M.  Sam  Leon,  a 
schoolfellow  of  Grunberg’s,  also 
an  engineer,  and  on  taking 
stock  of  the  situation  Leon  and 
Grunberg  formed  themselves 
into  a firm  of  military  engi- 
neers, and  offered  their  services 
to  the  Boer  Government.  They 
were  readily  accepted. 

General  Joubert’s  reluctance 
to  embark  in  any  large  scheme 
of  armaments  was  overcome  by 
the  more  apprehensive  and  more  alert  members  of  the  Executive, 
backed  by  warnings  from  Europe,  and  Mauser  and  Lee-Metford 
rifles,  with  additional  artillery,  were  bought  in  England  and  on 
the  Continent  in  1897-98.  Forts  were  constructed  round  Pre- 
toria, and  one  to  dominate  Johannesburg;  three  being  built  under 
the  direction  of  Colonel  Schiel,  and  the  Fort  Daspoortrand,  to  the 
west  of  the  capital,  by  Grunberg  and  Leon. 

When  war  was  declared  in  1899,  it  became  the  task  of  the  two 
Frenchmen  to  instruct  the'Staats  Artillery  officers  in  the  use  of  the 
large  and  small  ordnance  which,  chiefly  on  their  advice,  the  Boer 
Executive  had  acquired,  and  Sam  Leon  became  an  indispensable 
adjunct  to  the  gunnery  staff  of  Joubert’s  army.  He  organized  the 
service  for  each  piece,  taught  the  artillerists  how  best  to  place  their 
guns  where  positions  were  to  be  held,  and  to  build  scientifically- 
constructed  protection  for  the  less  mobile  pieces  required  for  siege 


FOREIGN  VOLUNTEERS 


313 


purposes.  All  the  guns  employed  round  Ladysmith  were  so  fixed 
under  his  superintendence;  platforms  were  erected  on  his  plans, 
and  all  other  needful  details  attended  to  as  he  advised. 

He  accompanied  Pretorius  and  Wolmarans  in  the  charge  of 
Botha’s  guns  during  part  of  the  Tugela  campaign,  and  arranged 
the  positions  held  by  the  five  pieces  which  did  such  execution 
against  the  English  at  Colenso.  He  went  from  the  Tugela  to  the 
siege  of  Kimberley  to  erect  the  platform  for  the  “ Long  Tom  ” 
which  had  been  “ knocked  out  ” at  Ladysmith  in  the  midnight 
sortie  of  the  British,  as  related;  the  huge  gun  having  been  fully 
repaired  subsequently  at  Pretoria  by  Grunberg  and  himself. 

It  was  on  the  12th  of  February,  1900,  while  engaged  in  sighting 
this  gun  during  a duel  with  the  Kimberley  artillery,  that  a bullet 
struck  him  in  the  head  and  maimed  him  for  life.  His  eye  was 
destroyed,  and  he  was  compelled  to  return  to  France. 

Meanwhile,  as  far  back  as  November,  the  store  of  artillery  am- 
munition ordered  by  Joubert  before  the  commencement  of  hostili- 
ties was  running  out,  owing  to  the  enormous  waste  occasioned  by 
the  sieges  of  Ladysmith,  Mafeking,  and  Kimberley;  operations 
which  did  not  enter  into  Boer  calculations  when  the  original  orders 
were  being  placed.  The  situation  was  most  alarming,  as  no  fur- 
ther supply  of  shells  for  Creusots,  howitzers,  or  pom-poms  could 
be  imported,  and  Joubert  was  confronted  with  the  appalling  pros- 
pect of  a famine  in  projectiles,  and  the  consequent  uselessness  of 
all  his  artillery. 

At  this  critical  juncture  President  Kruger’s  wisdom  and  fore- 
sight in  preserving  the  dynamite  monopoly  for  the  Transvaal  was 
fully  realized,  when  Grunberg  assured  the  Government  that  cor- 
dite and  all  kinds  of  smokeless  ammunition  could  be  made  at  the 
factory  at  Modderfontein.  A terrible  fear  was  thus  dispelled,  and 
those  who  had  doubted  the  old  President’s  wisdom  in  resisting  Mr. 
Chamberlain’s  audacious  demand  for  the  abolition  of  the  explosives’ 
monopoly,  now  rendered  a grateful  tribute  of  admiration  to  the 
prescience  of  Oom  Paul. 

Two  foundries  owned  by  Begbie  and  by  Wright  and  Co.  in 
Johannesburg,  which  were  used  for  the  making  and  repairing  of 
mining  machinery,  were  at  once  commandeered  by  the  Government, 
and  Grunberg  set  to  work  to  turn  these  places  into  ammunition 
factories.  His  difficulties  were  enormous,  in  the  want  of  proper 
machinery,  tools,  and  molds,  but  especially  in  skilled  mechanics. 
Nothing,  however,  seemed  impossible  to  the  resourceful  engineer, 
who  had  thrown  a warm  French  heart  into  the  work  of  serving  a 
people  who  were  largely  French  in  their  origin,  and,  with  the 
exercise  of  untiring  industry,  marvelous  skill,  and  a creative  enthu- 


314 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


siasm,  all  difficulties  were  fought  down.  By  the  end  of  November, 
1899,  Grunberg  had  already  despatched  his  first  1,000  shells  from 
J ohannesburg  to  the  front.  Smokeless  powder  and  other  explosives 
were  supplied  from  the  State  factory,  and  the  workshops  of  the 
city  of  sinister  omen  were  soon  enabled  to  turn  out  better  projectiles 
for  all  the  guns  than  those  which  had  been  imported  from  Europe. 

Five  hundred  hands,  mostly  Italians,  with  French,  Austrian, 
and  a few  American  workmen  added,  were  gradually  instructed  by 
Grunberg,  and  so  efficient  did  he  render  his  men  and  means  in 
supplying  the  Federal  artillery  with  ammunition  that  1,000  shells 
per  day  were  finished  during  the  six  months  from  November,  1899, 
to  May,  1900.  Shells  for  the  English  Armstrong  guns,  taken  at 
Colenso  and  elsewhere,  and  for  the  Maxim-Nordenfelts,  were  pro- 
duced as  required;  the  supply  being  continued  for  the  Free  State 
forces  as  well  as  for  those  of  the  Transvaal. 

This  work,  which  had  saved  the  Federal  armies  from  finding  all 
their  artillery  without  ammunition  early  in  the  conflict,  was  not 
carried  on  without  attracting  the  malevolent  attention  of  British 
citizens  and  partisans  who  had  been  permitted,  under  various  pre- 
texts and  guises,  to  remain  in  Johannesburg  and  Pretoria  during 
the  whole  period  of  the  war,  under  the  futile  obligation  of  an  oath 
of  allegiance.  In  January  a Reuter’s  message  from  Lourenzo  Mar- 
quez reported  in  some  detail  “ the  complete  destruction  of  Begbie’s 
foundry  ” by  dynamite,  the  deed  being  attributed  to  anti-Boer  ac- 
tion. The  news  was  only  a too  previous  anticipation  of  events,  as 
no  explosion  took  place  at  that  time.  The  plot  had  miscarried, 
probably  owing  to  imperfect  preparations.  This  circumstance 
naturally  alarmed  M.  Grunberg,  who  demanded  a better  surveillance 
of  the  works  for  the  protection  of  the  employees;  but,  strange  to 
relate,  very  little  was  done  to  satisfy  his  request,  the  plea  being  that 
all  the  burghers  were  at  the  front  fighting. 

In  addition  to  the  numerous  spies  Avho  were  disguised  under 
protective  callings,  there  were  scores  of  families  of  English  and 
Colonial  citizenship  allowed  to  stay  in  Johannesburg  all  through 
the  war,  partly  owing  to  the  necessity  of  working  those  mines 
which  the  Government  had  commandeered  in  order  to  obtain  from 
their  operations  money  with  which  to  prosecute  the  war.  There 
were  few  burghers  available  for  this  labor,  and  many  potential 
enemies  of  sinister  and  unscrupulous  reputation  remained,  in  con- 
sequence, as  actual  residents  in  the  city  upon  which  the  Boer  armies 
were  dependent  for  their  entire  artillery  ammunition.  All  these 
had  sworn  an  oath  of  neutrality  after  war  had  been  declared,  but 
oaths  lie  with  light  moral  obligation  upon  consciences  absolved 
of  such  trifles  by  the  inherent  righteousness  which  always  vindicates 


FOEEIGN  VOLUNTEERS 


315 


the  acts  of  a certain  class  of  Englishmen  when  engaged  in  the 
beneficent  work  of  teaching  other  peoples  the  blessings  of  British 
rule  to  the  destruction  of  their  own. 

M.  Grunberg  called  Commandant  Shutte’s  attention  to  these 
facts,  and  to  the  absence  of  all  intelligent  inspection  of  houses  in 
Marshall  street,  opposite  Begbie’s  foundry,  all  to  no  purpose.  So, 
about  five  in  the  afternoon  of  April  24,  an  explosion  which  shook 
the  whole  of  Johannesburg  occurred  at  the  shell  factory,  and  it 
was  thought  that  the  entire  place  was  destroyed.  The  authors  of 
the  fell  deed  had  not,  however,  killed  M.  Grunberg,  as  they  had  suc- 
ceeded in  killing  a number  of  poor  Italian  working  men,  who  were 
blo'rni  to  atoms  in  the  explosion.  Experts  in  explosives  estimated 
that  1,000  pounds  of  dynamite  must  have  been  used  to  do  the 
damage  which  followed,  and  to  dig  a huge  pit  twenty  feet  deep  in 
the  ground  where  the  main  force  of  the  dynamite  had  expended 
itself.  Xo  dAmamite  had  been  stored  by  Grunberg  or  the  Govern- 
ment in  or  near  the  foundry.  The  agency  of  destruction  had  been 
placed  by  the  plotters  from  time  to  time  in  an  empty  house  oppo- 
site the  works,  and  had  been  carried  there  after  dark  from  some  of 
the  mines  in  which  English  agents,  disguised  and  designated  as 
“ Americans,^’  were  employed.  A storage  of  powder  which  stood 
between  the  empty  house  and  the  main  yard  of  Begbie’s  works  was 
blown  up  as  a result  of  the  fire  caused  by  the  dynamite  explosion, 
and  the  theory  advanced  against  the  charge  of  direct  English  agency 
attempted  to  attribute  to  the  effect  of  the  powder  explosion  the  cause 
and  explanation  of  the  main  disaster. 

M.  Grunberg  had  a miraculous  escape,  being  at  the  time  in  the 
office,  which  was  only  about  200  feet  from  where  the  house  which 
had  been  used  by  the_  dynamitards  had  stood,  and  receiving  only 
a few  bruises  from  falling  timber.  The  whole  foundry  and  build- 
ings appeared  to  be  in  ruins,  save  the  stone  walls  of  the  sheds  and 
the  machinery.  These  had  withstood  the  terrific  shock,  and  inside 
of  one  week  this  wonder-working  Frenchman  had  overcome  all  the 
difficulties  and  discouragement  caused  by  the  explosion  and  the 
killing  of  so  many  of  his  workmen,  and  was  again  turning  out  an 
ample  supply  of  ammunition  for  the  guns.  And  so  the  work  con- 
tinued until  Lord  Eoberts’  army,  in  its  advance  on  Johannesburg 
at  the  end  of  May,  forced  one  of  the  truest  heroes  of  the  Boer  war 
to  lay  down  his  task  and  to  take  his  seat  in  the  last  (Boer)  train 
which  left  Pretoria  for  Lourenzo  Marquez. 

I^I.  Grunberg  can,  if  he  wishes,  console  himself  with  the  refiec- 
tion  that  he,  at  any  rate,  has  very  amply  avenged  Fashoda.  After 
Cronje’s  surrender,  while  depression  had  sent  thousands  of  Boers 
from  the  laagers  to  their  homes,  the  Boer  artillery  remained  in  the 


316 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


front  line  keeping  the  enemy  at  a distance  until  the  patriotism  of 
the  Boer  women  had  compelled  husbands  and  sons  and  brothers  to 
shoulder  their  Mausers  again  and  quit  their  farms  in  defense  of 
these  homes  and  of  Transvaal  independence.  Grunberg’s  work  in 
that  improvised  factory  in  Johannesburg  had  enabled  the  fighting 
burghers  to  hold  the  field  until  the  combative  spirit  which  had  been 
discouraged  by  the  calamity  of  Paardeberg  had  returned  again  to 
the  people;  and  thus  the  memorable  campaign  of  De  Wet,  De  la 
Rey,  Botha,  Hertzog,  Brand,  Viljoen,  and  others  may  be  said  to 
have  grown  out  of  the  labors  of  a single  Frenchman’s  genius  and 
devotion — as  well  as  the  cost  in  taxes,  lives,  injury,  and  prestige 
which  it  has  entailed  upon  the  hereditary  enemy  of  France. 


Chapter  XXVI 


BLAKE’S  IRISH  BRIGADE 

The  Second  Irish  Brigade — The  Chicago  Irish-American  Corps — • 
American  volunteers — The  Hollander  Corps — The  German  Corps 
— The  Italian  Corps — The  Scandinavian  Corps — Russian  scouts 
— Ambulance  help  for  the  Boer  armies 

I HAVE  no  intention  of  writing  a narrative  of  Blake’s  Irish 
Brigade,  or  of  doing  more  than  giving  my  readers  a bare  out- 
line of  its  organization  and  record.  The  task  of  recounting  its 
labors  in  the  war  belongs  to  some  member  of  the  corps,  intimate 
with  the  personnel  of  its  members  and  with  the  part  they  have 
played  in  the  campaign.  I have 
not  had  that  advantage,  and 
cannot,  therefore,  do  justice  to 
this  small  body  of  Irishmen, 
who,  in  helping  to  prevent  the 
consummation  of  one  of  the 
greatest  and  most  sordid  crimes 
of  human  history,  have  rendered 
an  honorable  service  to  the  race 
to  which  they  belong. 

Xot  alone  every  commando 
and  brigade,  but  every  company 
in  an  army  has  its  own  indi- 
viduality in  the  military  or- 
ganism, and,  necessarily,  its 
own  story  of  its  deeds,  adven- 
tures, triumphs,  and  reverses, 
as  a fighting  unit  of  the  general 
body.  To  recount  all  that  is 
thus  achieved  in  a detail  which  would  do  even  bare  justice  to 
every  section  of  the  Boer  armies,  would  need  not  one  but  fifty 
volumes,  and  this  is,  I hope,  a sufficient  reason  why  I do  not  here 
attempt  to  relate  all  that  Blake’s  men  did  for  liberty  in  the  name 
of  Ireland  in  South  Africa.  The  little  which  I have  to  say,  more- 
over, is  not  written  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  brigade,  but  from 


318 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


that  of  the  Boer  officers  and  officials  from  whom  my  information 
about  the  corps  has  been  almost  exclusively  derived. 

The  Irish  Brigade  was  organized  in  Johannesburg  chiefly  by  the 
exertions  of  Mr.  J ohn  M’Bride,  a native  of  Mayo,  who  was  at  the 
time  employed  as  assayer  in  one  of  the  Band  mines.  He  was 
warmly  supported  by  other  prominent  Irishmen  on  the  Band.  A 
manifesto  was  issued  appealing  to  Irishmen  to  remember  England’s 
manifold  infamies  against  their  own  country,  and  on  this  account 
to  volunteer  the  more  readily  to  fight  against  a common  enemy  for 
the  defense  of  Boer  freedom.  Meetings  were  held,  and  recruiting  be- 
gan; the  Boer  Executive  lending  its  encouragement  to  the  proposed 

formation  of  a corps 
other  than  the  field  cor- 
netcies  and  commandoes 
provided  for  in  the  regu- 
lar burgher  military  sys- 
tem. The  colonelcy  was 
given  to  Mr.  John  Frank- 
lin Blake,  an  ex-West 
Point  graduate  and  offi- 
cer, who  had  seen  service 
in  the  Sixth  U.  S.  Cav- 
alry Eegiment  in  Ari- 
zona. Colonel  Blake  re- 
sided for  a few  years  in 

The  mascot  of  the  Irish-American  Brigade,  missing  since  Michigan  after  resigning 
the  fight  at  Sand  River,  hut  sure  to  tarn  up  from  the  army,  End  en- 

gaged in  a railroad  busi- 
ness. His  life  in  this  occupation  v/as  not  what  his  adventurous 
disposition  demanded,  and  he  made  his  way  to  South  Africa  in 
search  of  a more  exciting  career  than  that  of  managing  railway 
traffic.  He  was  attracted  to  Ehodesia  after  the  grabbing  of  that 
country  from  the  Matabele,  and  the  subsequent  press  laudation  of 
its  alleged  mines  and  resources  by  Mr.  Cecil  Ehodes’  various  boom- 
ing agencies.  Blake  rode  over  most  of  the  country,  studied  it 
thoroughly,  and  wrote  a series  of  descriptive  letters  in  American  and 
London  papers  of  what  he  had  seen  and  learned,  which  made  the 
barrenness  of  the  Chartered  Company’s  territories  so  widely  known 
that  the  boom  did  not  realize  all  that  its  authors  expected  to  reap 
from  the  gullible  public. 

Blake  arrived  in  Johannesburg  shortly  before  the  Jameson  Baid, 
and  attracted  attention  at  once  by  the  reputation  which  his  ex- 
posure of  the  Ehodesian  fictions  had  made,  and  by  his  genial  charac- 
ter and  many  accomplishments.  He  is  a man  of  forty  or  fifty,  six 


BLAKE’S  IRISH  BRIGADE 


319 


feet  high,  athletic  in  hnild,  -n-ith  a slight  suggestion  of  Buffalo 
Bill  in  his  general  appearance  and  bearing.  He  is  the  best  of  “ jolly 
good  fellows  ” in  a social  sense,  a great  favorite  with  the  ladies, 
and  a fine  all-round  type  of  an  American  soldier. 

The  chief  duH  assigned  to  the  Brigade  in  the  operations  before 
Ladysmith  was  that  of  a guard  to  the  artillery  imder  Commandant 
Trichardt,  and  I have  already  made  reference  to  the  signal  service 
rendered  by  Blake’s  men  in  discharging  that  duty  at  the  battle  of 
Hodderspruit.  Sections  of  the  corps  took  part  in  many  of  the 
engagements  during  the  Hatal  campaign,  volunteers  being  always 
ready  for  any  fighting  which  Boer  plans  or  British  attacks  de- 
manded. 

Had  the  Transvaal  Eepublic  an  equivalent  decoration  to  the 
English  Tictoria  Cross,  that  distinction  would  have  been  conferred 
upon  one  of  Blake’s  men,  named  O’Eeilly,  for  his  action  during 
the  battle  of  Colenso.  The  occasion  of  this  exceptional  bravery 
has  been  briefly  described  by  Villebois-Mareuil  in  his  diary.  It 
was  during  the  desperate  efforts  which  were  being  made  by  Hild- 
yard’s  officers,  under  Buller’s  own  immediate  incentive,  to  save  the 
twelve  guns  which  Colonel  Long  had  rushed  in  towards  the  Boer 
fighting  lines,  in  a frantic  attempt  to  stop  the  tide  of  burgher  tri- 
umph, then  sweeping  along  the  entire  battle-field.  The  enemy’s 
other  guns  were  turned  upon  that  part  of  Botha’s  center  from 
where  the  Kruger sdorp  men  were  directing  a concentrated  fire  upon 
Long’s  batteries.  Villebois-Hareuil,  who  was  witnessing  the  fine 
performance  of  the  burghers,  relates  how  he  became  anxious  about 
a vacant  position  to  the  left  of  the  men  who  were  attacking  the 
service  of  the  English  guns,  and  was  about  to  suggest  to  the  general 
that  the  place  should  be  occupied  as  a support  to  the  Krugers- 
dorpers,  when  he  found  his  idea  anticipated  by  Botha,  who  had 
ordered  some  of  the  Middelburg  men  to  strengthen  the  lines  at  that 
place.  These  men  swept  across  the  open  space  to  the  right,  which 
was  being  literally  raked  by  the  British  guns  at  the  time,  and  took 
up  the  required  position  “ in  a superb  manner,”  as  Villebois  de- 
scribed it.  A few  men  of  Blake’s  Brigade  were  included  in  these 
reenforcements,  and,  as  they  were  in  the  very  act  of  crossing  the 
zone  of  fire.  Major  M’Bride’s  horse  stumbled,  and  threw  him  to 
the  ground.  O’Eeilly  wheeled  round  amidst  the  hail  of  shells,  and 
put  his  horse  between  M’Bride  and  the  English  gunners  until  his 
friend  had  regained  the  saddle,  both  escaping,  as  if  by  a miracle, 
without  a scratch.  It  was  as  courageous  an  act  as  ever  won  a hero’s 
reward. 

WTien  Eoberts  began  his  great  movement  north  from  Bloemfon- 
tein, General  Botha  ordered  the  Irish  Brigade  from  Katal  to 


320 


THE  BOEE  EIGHT  FOE  FEEEDOM 


Brandfort,  and  the  men  took  part  in  whatever  fighting  occurred 
during  the  disheartening  retirement  of  the  burgher  forces  from 
thence  to  Pretoria.  Again,  in  the  actions  fought  by  Botha  between 
Pretoria  and  Dalmanutha,  along  the  Delagoa  Bay  Eailway,  the 
Irishmen  performed  their  share  of  the  work  of  holding  the  British 
forces  hack.  After  the  prolonged  battle  of  Dalmanutha  the  Bri- 
gade disbanded,  the  majority  returning  to  America.  Blake,  how- 
ever, remained  behind,  resolved  to  see  the  conflict  through  to  the  end. 
He  has  been  engaged  during  the  recent  and  present  campaign  of 
guerrilla  warfare  in  work  which  appeals  to  his  love  of  daring  adven- 
ture and  contempt  for  climatic  difficulties,  and  the  cheery,  optimis- 
tic, warm-hearted  ex-frontiersman  will  be  found  to  be  one  of  the 
last  men  to  lay  down  his  arms  against  England  while  a shot  can 
be  fired  or  a deed  can  be  done  in  legitimate  warfare  against  the 
enemy  of  Transvaal  and  of  Irish  independence. 

A few  other  members  of  the  Brigade  have  also  remained,  and 
are  fighting  with  De  la  Eey  and  Ben  Viljoen.  Those  who  returned 
to  America  were  in  no  way  tired  of  the  war  or  wishful  to  leave 
the  service  they  had  gratuitously  rendered  to  the  cause  of  Boer 
freedom.  Both  State  Secretary  Eeitz,  General  Botha,  and  General 
Ben  Viljoen  gave  Major  M’Bride  and  his  companions  very  hand- 
somely worded  testimonials  of  appreciation  and  of  thanks  for  their 
gallant  work,  and  they  have  returned  to  their  homes  with  the  con- 
sciousness of  having  unselfishly  fought  for  as  noble  a cause  and 
as  heroic  a people  as  ever  appealed  to  and  obtained  the  hearty  help 
of  liberty-loving  Irishmen. 

There  were  many  more  men  of  Irish  blood  scattered  through  the 
Transvaal  and  Free  State  commandoes  than  were  included  in 
Blake’s  corps.  I have  found  Irish  names  in  the  records  of  almost 
all  the  engagements  fought  over  the  wide  field  of  the  two  Eepublics. 
President  Steyn  told  me  that  “all  the  Catholics  and  Irishmen  of 
the  Free  State  were  loyally  with  the  Federal  cause  from  the  be- 
ginning,” and  I am  therefore  encouraged  in  the  belief  that  the 
number  of  my  fellow-countrymen  who  honored  our  race  in  offering 
to  shed  their  blood  for  the  freedom  of  two  little  Protestant  Eepublics 
is  larger  than  the  numerical  strength  of  Blake’s  and  Lynch’s  Bri- 
gades wmuld  indicate. 

The  Brigade  lost  about  ten  killed  during  the  campaign,  and  a 
small  number  are  among  the  prisoners  in  Ceylon  or  St.  Helena. 
Each  member  entered  the  Boer  army  as  a burgher  of  the  Transvaal ; 
a special  law  having  been  passed  by  the  Yolksraad  fully  enfranchis- 
ing every  Uitlander  who  volunteered  to  defend  the  Eepublic.  The 
few  Irishmen  who  are  in  the  hands  of  the  English  are,  therefore, 
protected  by  the  recognized  rules  of  civilized  warfare  against  what 


21 


BLAKE'S  IRISH  BRIGADE  AT  LADYSMITH 


322 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 

would  otherwise  be  a savage  resort  to  British  vengeance  against 
“ rebels  ” to  the  authors  of  the  war. 

Blake’s  Brigade  had  an  average  muster  roll  of  120  men.  It 
numbered  some  200  at  one  time,  and  was  under  100  after  the  siege 
of  Ladysmith. 


THE  SECOND  IRISH  BRIGADE 


A second  brigade  was  formed  in  January,  1900,  by  a few  of 
Blake’s  corps,  in  conjunction  with  Mr.  Arthur  Lynch,  an  Irish- 
Australian  who  had  gone  to  the  Transvaal  as  war  correspondent 
for  “ Le  Journal,”  of  Paris.  Like  Colonel  Maximoff  and  several 

American  journalists,  Mr. 
Lynch  was  captivated  by 
the  heroic  character  of  the 
Boer  struggle  against  such 
cruel  odds,  and  he  threw 
away  the  pen  for  a Mauser 
rifle.  A few  officers  of 
Blake’s  corps  were  desir- 
ous of  creating  another 
Irish  Brigade,  with,  doubt- 
less, the  laudable  ambition 
of  increasing  the  number 
of  bodies  with  Irish  names 
in  so  good  a cause,  and 
Mr.  Lynch  was  induced  to 
join  in  the  enterprise.  He 
was  elected  to  the  post  of 
colonel,  and  being  an  able  linguist,  speaking  French  and  German 
with  fluency,  he  succeeded  in  enlisting  about  150  “ Irishmen  ” from 
several  European  nationalities,  not  hitherto  reckoned  as  subordinate 
members  of  the  Celtic  racial  family.  Colonel  Lynch  soon  earned 
such  a reputation  for  capacity  and  for  looking  carefully  after  the 
comforts  of  his  men  that  numbers  of  volunteers  from  other  com- 
mandoes were  induced  to  join  the  second  “ Irish  ” Brigade,  which 
in  this  way  became  at  one  time  as  strong  numerically  as  that  organ- 
ized by  Major  M’Bride. 

Colonel  Lynch  is  a young  man  aged  about  thirty-five,  tall,  hand- 
some, and  accomplished.  He  is  a graduate  of  the  Melbourne  Hni- 
versity,  and  is  in  every  sense,  physically  and  intellectually,  a worthy 
representative  of  the  Australian-born  sons  of  Ireland.  He  proved 
himself  to  be  an  able  commander,  and  enjoyed  the  confidence  of 
General  Botha,  who  spoke  of  him  to  me  as  “ one  of  the  very  best 


COLONEL  AKTHUB  LYNCH  (STANDING),  CAPTAIN  OATES 

(on  horseback) 


COLONEL  LYNCH’S  (THE  SND  IRISH)  BRIGADE 


324 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


of  my  officers.”  The  part  which  the  second  Irish  Brigade  played 
in  the  campaign  is,  I believe,  to  be  told  by  Colonel  Lynch  in  a narra- 
tive of  the  war  as  he  witnessed  it,  both  as  a war  correspondent  and 
as  an  officer,  and  I must  therefore  leave  to  his  better-informed 
knowledge  the  task  of  recording  the  full  story  of  the  corps  which 
he  commanded. 

In  the  retreat  of  Joubert  from  Ladysmith  to  Glencoe,  Lynch  and 
his  men  fought  in  the  rear  guard,  and  were  several  times  in  action. 
The  Brigade  remained  attached  to  General  Lukas  Meyer’s  command 
in  Natal  until  the  whole  of  what  had  been  the  army  of  the  Tugela 
and  of  the  siege  of  Ladysmith  retired  north  through  Laing’s  Nek; 
Lynch  and  his  men  on  one  occasion  being  instrumental  in  saving 
some  of  Ben  Viljoen’s  guns  from  capture  by  Buller’s  forces.  After 
the  re-entry  of  Meyer’s  commandoes  into  the  Transvaal,  Lynch’s 
Brigade  were  ordered  to  Vereeniging,  but  became  disbanded  in 
Johannesburg  when  passing  through  that  city.  Lynch  and  the 
few  Irishmen  who  were  in  his  corps  went  to  the  Vaal  Kiver,  and 
joined  the  remnants  of  the  various  commandoes  and  brigades  who 
were  fighting  with  Botha,  Steyn,  and  De  la  Rey  to  resist  the  ad- 
vance of  Roberts’  huge  army.  Ail  fell  back  first  on  Johannesburg, 
then  on  Pretoria. 

It  being  now  resolved  to  change  the  whole  character  of  the 
campaign  into  a system  of  warfare  in  which  Europeans  with  no 
intimate  knowledge  of  the  Transvaal  could  render  little  or  no  as- 
sistance in  separate  military  organizations.  Colonel  Lynch  left  for 
Europe  with  many  other  volunteers,  and  has  since  his  return  to 
Paris  continued  to  render  excellent  service  to  the  Boer  cause  in 
letters  and  articles,  full  of  first-hand  information,  to  the  French 
press  and  magazines. 

In  the  fall  of  1901  Colonel  Lynch  was  selected  by  the  Nationalist 
leaders  of  Ireland  as  a candidate  for  Parliament.  He  stood  to 
represent  Galway  and  was  overwhelmingly  elected,  receiving  three 
votes  to  every  one  cast  for  his  opponent.  He  has  not  yet  (March, 
1902)  been  advised  to  attempt  to  take  his  seat.  This  election,  to- 
gether with  the  involuntary  cheers  in  Parliament  given  by  some  of 
the  Irish  members  on  receipt  of  the  news  of  Lord  Methuen’s  cap- 
ture and  defeat  by  De  la  Rey,  has  exasperated  the  British  Govern- 
ment beyond  measure.  These  demonstrations  of  Irish  sympathy 
with  the  Boer  cause  have  arrested  universal  attention,  and  awakened 
a wide  European  interest  in  the  relations  existing  between  Ireland 
and  England. 

Colonel  Lynch’s  chief  officers  were  Major  Mitchel,  a Galway  man, 
and  Captain  Oates,  of  Kerry,  whose  fine  boy,  Tom,  was  killed  at 
Modderspruit.  In  subordinate  posts  this  unique  brigade  had  repre- 


BLAKE’S  IRISH  BRIOABE 


325 


sentatives  of  every  European  country,  with  one  or  two  Americans, 
completing  the  most  thoroughly  cosmopolitan  body  which  was  ever 
commanded  by  an  Irish  or  any  other  officer.  There  was  Ireland, 
America,  Australia,  the  Transvaal,  Free  State,  Cape  Colony,  France, 
Germany,  Holland,  Italy,  Austria,  Eussia,  Greece,  and  Bulgaria 
represented  in  this  second  “ Irish  ” corps,  which,  to  complete  its 
unprecedented  representativeness,  embraced  a solitary  Englishman, 
who  fought  for  right  and  justice  against  his  own  country’s  forces. 
I visited  Colonel  Lynch’s  laager  while  in  Natal  early  in  May,  1900, 
and  can  bear  personal  testimony  to  the  true  soldierly  manner  in 
which  his  well-equipped  camp  was  organized,  and  to  his  popularity 
as  an  officer  among  his  Continental  and  universal  “ Irishmen.” 

THE  CHICAGO  lEISH-AMERICAN  VOLUNTEERS 

This  small  contingent  of  volunteers  was  spoken  of  in  Pretoria 
as  the  “ finest-looking  ” body  of  men  that  had  yet  reached  the 
Transvaal  capital  from  abroad.  They  numbered  about  forty,  ex- 
cluding the  medicos  and  non-combatants,  and  were  all  young  men 
of  splendid  physique  and  of  the  best  soldierly  qualities.  They  were 
under  the  command  of  Captain  O’Connor,  of  the  Clan-na-Gael 
Guards,  and  joined  Blake’s  Irish  Brigade.  President  Kruger  ex- 
tended a special  reception  to  the  company,  and  addressed  them  in 
complimentary  terms  before  they  started  for  the  front. 

Lord  Eoberts  was  on  the  point  of  advancing  from  Bloemfontein 
when  the  Chicago  men  arrived,  and  they  were  hurried  forward  to 
Brandfort  along  with  other  reenforcements  for  He  la  Eey,  who  was 
in  command  until  the  arrival  of  Botha.  O’Connor  and  his  men 
acquitted  themselves  most  creditably  in  all  the  rear-guard  actions 
fought  from  Brandfort  to  Pretoria;  Yiljoen’s  Eand  Brigade,  Blake’s 
and  O’Connor’s  men,  with  Hassell’s  scouts,  doing  their  share  of 
fighting  in  all  the  engagements  during  events  and  occurrences  which 
were  well  calculated  to  damp  the  enthusiasm  of  the  allies  of  the 
Boer  cause.  It  is,  however,  under  trying  circumstances,  offering 
little  or  no  compensation  for  services  or  sacrifice,  save  what  comes 
from  the  consciousness  of  a duty  well  performed,  that  men  are  best 
tested  in  mind  and  metal,  and  the  work  done  during  that  most  dis- 
heartening time  was  worth  man}'^  a more  successful  campaign 
fought  under  brighter  hopes  for  the  cause  of  liberty. 

During  the  several  engagements  which  led  up  to  the  three  or 
four  days’  fighting  around  Dalmanutha,  two  members  of  the  corps 
were  killed,  Messrs.  O’Hara  and  Egan;  the  former  nobly  sacrific- 
ing himself  to  save  his  comrades  in  a critical  moment.  He  was  a 
native  of  West  Limerick. 


BLAKE’S  IRISH  BRIGADE 


327 


The  names  of  the  members  of  the  Chicago  corps  are  as  follows, 
tho  the  list  is  not  given  as  being  accurate : 

Captain  Patrick  O’Connor,  Lieutenant  Michael  Enright,  J ohn  J. 
Quinn,  William  Dwyer,  Hugh  B.  Eyan,  Thomas  Murray,  Patrick  J. 
Griffin,  James  E.  Coyne,  Edward  G.  Healy,  W.  MacTeigue,  Thomas 
Cashel,  John  Costello,  Daniel  Daley,  Hubert  O’Hara,  James  Slat- 
tery, John  A.  Murphy,  Edward  Hawkins,  John  Welsh,  John  Duff, 
William  Hurley,  Joseph  Eickard,  Patrick  Carroll,  Eichard  Morris- 
sey, Daniel  Foley,  John  J.  Eogers,  Edward  M.  Egan,  Michael  C. 
O’Hara,  Eichard  J.  Cahill,  James  Hill,  Daniel  MacHugh,  Frederick 
Varslius,  E.  Linchloter,  Michael  Davy,  Thomas  Haughten. 

The  doctors  who  accompanied  the  corps  in  an  ambulance  capacity, 
and  rendered  professional  service  to  both  Boer  and  volunteer  forces 
were:  Messrs.  H.  E.  Macaulay,  A.  F.  Conroy,  Eoss  D.  Long,  J.  J. 
Slattery,  and  E.  Aderholdt.  These  medical  gentlemen  brought 
with  them  to  Pretoria  a splendidly-equipped  ambulance  service, 
which  had  been  supplied  bj^  the  generous  action  of  the  United  Irish 
Societies  of  Chicago  and  their  friends. 


AMERICAN  VOLUNTEERS 

America  contributed  very  few  volunteers  to  the  Boer  cause,  if 
those  of  German  and  of  Irish-American  origin  are  not  included. 
There  were,  I believe,  a larger  number  on  the  English  side,  espe- 
cially in  the  later  stages  of  the  war.  Probably  100  would  repre- 
sent the  total  number  of  American  citizens,  not  counting  Irish  or 
German- Americans,  in  the  Transvaal  service.  After  the  relief  of 
Ladysmith  most  of  these,  along  with  some  naturalized  Germans, 
were  organized  into  a scouting  corps  by  Captain  John  Hassell,  a 
native  of  Hew  Jersey.  Hassell  had  fought  through  the  whole  of 
the  Natal  operations,  and  was  twice  wounded.  "Wlien  I visited  his 
camp  at  Brandfort  in  May,  1900,  he  had  some  Texan  cowboys,  four 
or  five  newspaper  correspondents  who  “ had  come  to  write  and  who 
remained  to  fight,”  as  they  expressed  it,  together  with  several  celeb- 
rities in  his  command,  whose  war  and  scouting  adventures  would 
in  themselves  make  excellent  copy  for  half-a-dozen  chapters.  Has- 
sell was  a smart,  soldierly-looking  young  fellow,  as  resourceful  and 
courageous  as  Americans  of  the  true-grit  brand  are  known  to  be 
wherever  the  best  qualities  of  a sturdy  manhood  are  called  for. 

And  the  disinterestedness  of  these  brave  spirits  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  they  gave  aid  to  a seemingly  hopeless  cause  at  a time  when 
England,  to  quote  Kipling, 

“ Fawned  on  the  Younger  Nations  for  the  men  who  could  shoot  and  ride.” 


‘628 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


THE  HOLLANDER  CORPS 

This  body  of  volunteers  was  the  largest  of  the  foreign  legions, 
and  was  mostly  recruited  from  the  Eand.  Jan  Lombard,  member 
of  the  Second  Eaad  for  Johannesburg,  was  its  Commandant,  and, 
as  he  and  his  compatriots  desired  to  fight  an  English  army  by  them- 
selves, they  fared  very  badly  in  consequence  on  the  field  of  Elands- 
laagte.  The  corps  gained  in  that  engagement  a deserved  reputation 
for  pluck  but  not  for  Judgment,  and  scarcely  recovered  again,  as 


THE  HOLLANDER  CORPS  LEAVING  PRETORIA  FOR  THE  FRONT 


a separate  fighting  force,  the  fine  morale  with  Avhich  it  commenced 
its  career.  A good  number  of  Hollanders  were  included  in  the 
“ Zarps,”  or  J ohannesburg  Police,  the  bravest  fighters  of  the  war, 
and  the  parent  land  of  the  Boers  probably  rendered  more  effective 
help  through  its  representatives  in  that  splendid  body  of  men  than 
through  the  more  assertive,  if  less  renowned,  corps  which  was  so 
badly  mauled  by  General  French  on  the  20th  of  October,  1899. 
The  valiant  Zarps  were  mainly  young  Boers,  but  included  a strong 
Hollander  element,  a good  number  of  Germans,  and  a few  Irish. 

The  Hollander  Corps  itself  had  a strength  of  about  500.  Many 
of  these,  however,  were  employed  in  guarding  British  prisoners  at 
Pretoria  and  Waterval,  and  in  other  non-combative  capacities. 


BLAKE’S  IRISH  BRIGADE 


329 


Fully  200  additional  Hollanders  would  be  found  in  the  other 
commandoes,  and  in  Viljoen’s  Eand  Brigade.  Then  there  were 
telegraphists,  cycle  despatch  riders,  and  clerks,  who  rendered  most 
useful  service  to  the  active  forces  in  the  field.  Probably  200  volun- 
teers, chiefiy  non-commissioned  officers,  went  out  expressly  from 
Holland  to  join  the  Transvaal  forces.  Altogether  Hollanders  to 
the  number  of  1,000  must  have  rendered  help  in  the  various  ways 
mentioned  to  the  Boer  armies  during  the  war. 

General  Botha’s  military  secretary  during  the  Tugela  campaign 
and  up  to  the  battle  of  Dalmanutha  was  a most  able  young  Hol- 
lander, J.  C.  Sandberg,  a brave  soldier,  an  accomplished  linguist, 
resourceful  organizer,  and  an  all-round  indefatigable  worker,  to 
whom  I am  under  many  obligations  for  facts  and  information  re- 
lating to  the  Tugela  campaign. 

It  was  a Hollander  officer  in  charge  of  the  soldiers  who  sur- 
rendered at  Nicholson’s  Nek  that  told  me  the  excellent  story  of 
the  good-natured  Tommy  whom  he  found  one  morning  doing 
“ sentry  go  ” over  his  ovm  comrades.  “ Don’t  yer  blime  that  kid, 
mister,”  said  the  soldier,  saluting  the  officer,  and  pointing  to  a 
boy  of  18  fast  asleep,  who  had  been  on  duty  over  the  prisoners;’ 
“ I seen  he  wor  reglar  done  up,  and  I sez,  Look  heer,  youngster, 
you  take  a snooze,  and  I’ll  do  sentry  go  for  j^er,  never  you  mind. 
Honor  bright,  I shan’t  give  yer  away ! ’ It’s  all  right,  mister ; 
I hope  as  yer  won’t  punish  the  poor  little  chap.”  Neither  the 
kind-hearted  soldier  nor  the  “ little  chap  ” suffered  over  the  unique 
incident  of  an  English  prisoner  doing  sentry  duty  over  himself 
and  companions  out  of  a feeling  of  humanity  for  his  Boer  guard. 


THE  GERMAN  CORPS 

I have  made  reference  to  the  German  Corps  in  the  chapter  deal- 
ing with  the  battle  of  Elandslaagte.  They  were  equally  as  unfor- 
tunate as  their  Holland  and  Scandinavian  kinsmen  in  experiencing 
a bad  cutting  up  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war.  Colonel  Schiel, 
the  founder  of  the  corps,  was  wounded  and  taken  prisoner  on  the 
20th  of  October,  1899,  and  ended  his  actual  war  experience  in  his 
first  battle.  His  services  to  the  Transvaal  army  have  been  greatly 
exaggerated.  There  were  but  two  matters  on  which  the  Boers 
needed  the  aid  of  military  experts- in  European  methods  of  warfare; 
namely,  artillery,  and  the  construction  of  forts  for  Pretoria  and 
Johannesburg.  The  burghers  had  placed  all  their  reliance  during 
previous  wars  in  their  rifles  and  mobility,  and  most  of  them  were 
skeptical  about  the  value  of  ordnance,  except  for  siege  operations. 


330 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


after  Jameson  and  his  Eaiders,  with  their  ten  guns,  had  been 
beaten  and  captured  at  Doornkop  by  half  their  number  of  burghers, 
armed  only  with  Martini-Henry  rifles.  Still,  an  artillery  corps  was 
organized,  as  already  related,  and  young  burghers  were  drilled  and 
instructed  in  gunnery  practise.  This  was  not  the  work  of  Colonel 
Schiel,  as  the  British  press  have  industriously  attempted  to  make 
out.  The  Staats  Artillery  were  organized  and  drilled  by  Majors 
'Wolmarans  and  Erasmus,  two  burghers  who  had  been  sent  to  Europe 

by  General  Joubert  to  study  and  re- 
port upon  the  latest  improvements  in 
Continental  gunnery;  and  to  these  two 
officers  belongs  the  sole  credit  which 
English  critics  would  prefer  to  assign 
to  German  or  French  anti-British  ser- 
vice in  the  work  of  the  Boer  artillery. 

Colonel  Schiel  very  probably  ren- 
dered assistance  in  the  planning  and 
construction  of  the  much-vaunted 
forts  at  Pretoria  and  the  prison  fort 
at  Johannesburg;  but,  as  these  were 
not  put  to  any  use  in  the  fighting 
which  took  place  round  the  two  cities 
in  May,  1900,  the  benefit  rendered  to 
the  Boer  cause  is  not  easily  seen. 

After  the  disaster  of  October  20  the 
German  Brigade  was  reorganized  and 
placed  under  the  control  of  Comman- 
dant Krantz,  of  Pretoria,  and  mem- 
bers of  the  corps  rendered  excellent 
service  on  several  occasions  subse- 
quently, notably  in  the  fighting  against  Buller  and  Warren  on  the 
Upper  Tugela,  in  January,  1900. 

Associated  with  the  corps  in  its  second  stage  of  active  operations 
under  Krantz  were  a number  of  young  Europeans  of  some  note, 
such  as  Baron  Von  Goldek,  a Hungarian;  Captain  Max  Schiflb  and 
Lieutenant  Simon,  Austrians;  Lieutenant  Badicke,  Baron  Koth- 
arch,  and  others.  They  were  almost  all  looking  for  commissions, 
and,  finding  none,  owing  to  the  reasonable  hesitancy  of  the  Boers 
to  entrust  strangers  who  could  not  speak  their  language  with  posts 
of  military  responsibility,  fought  in  the  ranks  in  the  Eand  com- 
mandoes. 

There  were  half-a-dozen  German  officers  of  experience  and  of 
some  distinction  indirectly  associated  with  Krantz,  who  had  also 
come  out  to  the  Transvaal  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  commands,  and 


ADJUTANT  J.  C.  SANDBERG 

General  Louis  Botha’s  Military  Sec- 
retary during  the  Natal  campaign 


BLAKE’S  IRISH  BRIGADE 


331 


these  fought  for  a time  in  various  corps  and  commandoes;  some 
returning  to  Europe,  disappointed  at  their  failure,  others  fighting 
and  d}'ing  during  the  campaign. 

Baren  Yon  Keitzenstein  fought  with  General  De  la  Eey  in  his 
brilliant  operations  against  French  around  Colesberg.  Colonel  Yon 
Braun  and  a small  number  of  German  volunteers,  including  Lieu- 
tenant Brausinitz,  fought  with  Yiljoen’s  brigade  on  the  Tugela, 
and  showed  conspicuous  bravery  at  Yenter’s  Spruit,  Spion  Kop, 
and  Yaal  Krantz;  the  latter  officer  being  killed,  and  Yon  Braun 
taken  prisoner  at  one  of  these  engagements. 

Yon  Braun  was  an  experienced  cavalry  officer,  and  his  views  on 
the  British  cavalry  forces  in  the  wmr  were  freely  expressed  on  his 
release  and  return  to  Berlin  in  July,  1900.  He  spoke  as  follows 
in  an  interview: 

“ I am  compelled  to  say  that  I never  saw  anything  more  miserable 
than  the  way  the  British  used  their  cavalry.  Never  once  have  I 
seen  outpost  duty  or  reconnaissance  properly  carried  out  by  Eng- 
lish cavalry.  The  handling  of  several  regiments  combined  showed 
not  the  faintest  trace  of  the  knowledge  of  the  employment  of  a 
cavalry  division. 

“ The  Boers  might  well  say  that  the  English  cavalry  were  mutes; 
that  is,  there  are  no  generals  capable  of  leading  them.  How  use- 
ful cavalry  would  have  been  in  all  fights  on  the  Upper  Tugela 
by  threatening  the  Boers’  line  of  retreat,  tho,  of  course,  they  would 
also  have  had  to  fight  on  foot.” 

A grandson  of  Harshal  Yon  Wrangel  was  numbered  among  the 
numerous  Barons  and  Counts  who  belonged  to  Yillebois-Mareuil’s 
foreign  legion. 

At  Elandslaagte,  Count  Zeppelin,  a very  fine  young  fellow,  fought 
with  General  Kock’s  body-guard,  and  was  leader  in  one  of  the 
counter-charges  upon  the  Gordon  Highlanders,  armed  only  with  a 
whip,  with  which  he  struck  the  first  man  who  mounted  the  ridge. 
He  was  found  dead  the  following  morning  with  ten  bayonet  wounds 
in  his  body.  Another  German  who  rendered  very  special  service 
was  Otto  Yon  Loosberg,  an  American  citizen.  He  had  charge  of 
one  of  Christian  De  Wet’s  guns  at  Sannas  Post,  and  gave  a very 
good  account  of  himself  and  his  piece  at  that  sensational  encounter. 

Major  Eichard  Albrecht,  who  was  the  head  of  the  Free  State 
Artillery,  is  probably  the  only  German  officer  who  can  really  claim 
a share  of  the  lavish  credit  which  English  writers  have  freely 
bestowed  on  his  country  for  wmrk  done  by  the  Boers  themselves. 
Albrecht,  who  was  a native  of  Berlin,  had  served  in  an  infantry 
regiment  during  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  and  was  promoted  for 


332 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


his  bravery  during  the  siege  of  Paris.  He  subsequently  went  to 
the  Orange  Free  State,  took  service  under  its  Government,  and 
organized  the  small  artillery  force  of  the  little  Eepublic,  of  which 
he  was  the  recognized  chief  during  the  war.  He  was  attached  to 
the  Wessels^  commandoes  in  front  of  Kimberley,  but  had  a roving 
commission  to  render  assistance  where  it  was  most  required.  He 
had  charge  of  Cronje’s  few  guns  at  Modder  Eiver,  Magersfontein, 
and  Paardeberg,  and  earned  the  special  thanks  of  his  general  and 
of  President  Steyn  for  the  valuable  work  done  by  him  on  the  occa- 
sion of  the  two  earlier  battles.  Previous  to  the  war  he  had  been 
despatched  to  Germany  to  purchase  a few  guns  of  the  newest  char- 
acter, and  the  six  Krupps  .and  two  automatic  pieces  in  possession 
of  the  Free  State  forces  when  war  was  declared  had  been  purchased 
by  Major  Albrecht  during  this  tour.  He  was  a strict  disciplina- 
rian, but  very  popular  with  his  corps.  There  were  two  subordinate 
officers  of  German  nationality  under  Albrecht,  whose  names  I have 
been  unable  to  obtain.  A Lieutenant  Stuekenberg,  who  was  killed 
at  the  battle  of  Bnslin,  was,  I think,  one  of  them.  At  no  time  dur- 
ing the  war  would  the  number  of  German  volunteers  exceed  500 
men  of  the  Federal  forces.  Albrecht  surrendered  with  Cronje  at 
Paardeberg. 


THE  ITALIAN'  CORPS 

The  Italian  Corps  numbered  about  100,  and  were  attached  to 
the  army  of  the  Tugela  under  Lukas  Meyer’s  command.  With  the 
exception  of  a few  of  the  officers  who  arrived  from  Italy  after  the 
war  had  been  some  time  in  progress,  the  members  had  been  miners 
in  Johannesburg  who  volunteered  to  'fight  for  the  Eepublic.  Most 
of  them  had  served  in  the  Italian  army,  and  a few  had  taken  part 
in  the  disastrous  Abyssinian  expedition.  Their  colonel  was  Camillo 
Eicchiardi,  a very  handsome,  soldierly  young  fellow,  and  as  brave 
as  he  was  good-looking.  He,  too,  had  been  in  Abyssinia,  and  had 
likewise  gone  to  the  Philippines  to  offer  his  sword  to  Aguinaldo. 
Campaigning  in  the  Far  East  was  not  very  attractive,  for  climatic 
and  other  reasons,  and  he  returned  again  to  Europe  after  a very 
brief  experience  of  Filipino  warfare.  He  sailed  for  Lourenzo 
Marquez,  and  arrived  in  Pretoria  shortly  after  hostilities  began. 
Joined  by  Major  Termini  Merese  and  Lieutenant  Count  Pecci  (a 
nephew  of  Pope  Leo),  an  Italian  Brigade  was  soon  formed  out  of 
the  men  who  had  previously  Joined  Viljoen’s  Band  commandoes. 

Colonel  Eicchiardi  took  part  in  all  the  battles  along  the  Tugela, 
and  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  General  Botha.  While  the  battle 
of  Colenso  was  in  progress  he  exposed  himself  to  danger  in  a most 


BLAKE’S  IRISH  BRIGADE 


333 


reckless  manner,  sitting  on  a sangar  on  the  top  of  Fort  Wylie 
during  the  fury  of  the  English  artillery  attack,  and  smoking  cigar- 
ettes in  contemptuous  disregard  of  the  British  gunners.  “ Always 
keep  near  the  Boers  in  battle,  if  you  do  not  want  to  be  hit  by  the 
English  artillerists,^’  was  the  favorite  advice  of  the  young  Italian 
to  newcomers. 

A true  soldier’s  experience  of  war,  with  its  risks  and  adventures, 
dangers  and  hardships,  was  rewarded  in  this  instance  in  the  fullest 
poetic  manner  with  the  guerdon  of  a romantic  love  and  the  happi- 
ness of  a bride  won  on  the  field  of  battle.  The  handsome,  dashing 
Camillo,  tall  and  dark,  quite  a woman’s  ideal  soldier-hero  in  ap- 
pearance, was  slightly  wounded  during  the  Tugela  fighting,  and  went 
for  a short  time  to  hospital,  where  he  met  Mademoiselle  G-uttman, 
a relative,  through  her  sister’s  marriage,  of  the  Kruger  family. 
Miss  Guttman  was  a Bed  Cross  nurse.  The  convalescent  colonel 
contracted  a very  violent  heart  malady  on  meeting  in  such  a capac- 
ity one  of  the  belles  of  Pretoria.  He  saw  the  young  lady  again  in 
that  city,  and  then  returned  to  Italy.  Last  November  I had  the 
pleasure  of  meeting  him  at  Marseilles  when  President  Kruger  ar- 
rived in  Europe.  The  Presidential  party  included  Miss  Guttman, 
and  on  the  5th  of  June,  1901,  the  beautiful  nurse  of  Pretoria 
became  the  wife  of  Colonel  Camillo  Eicchiardi  at  Brussels. 

A large  number  of  Italians  were  employed  in  the  Boer  ammuni- 
tion factory  at  Johannesburg,  under  the  direction  of  M.  Leon 
Grunberg,  when  the  place  was  destroyed  by  dynamite  in  April,  1900. 
Their  comrades  in  the  city  held  a vendetta  meeting,  at  which  the 
cry  of  “ Death  to  the  English  ” in  Johannesburg  was  raised,  and 
would  have  been  carried  out  by  the  infuriated  Italians  against  the 
suspected  authors  of  the  dastardly  crime  had  President  Kruger  not 
sent  Camillo  Eicchiardi  to  calm  down  the  vengeful  passion  of  his 
fellow-countrymen.  In  this  he  succeeded. 


THE  SCANDINAVIAN  CORPS 

The  story  of  the  Scandinavian  Corps  has  already  been  told  in 
the  brief  account  I have  given  of  the  gallant  part  played  by  them 
in  the  battle  of  Magersfontein,  where,  in  a fight  between  fifty  of 
them  and  the  Seaforth  Highlanders,  they  were  all  but  annihilated. 
The  corps  was  organized  before  war  broke  out,  and  numbered  about 
eighty  men.  These  were  Hitlanders,  miners,  and  others  employed 
on  the  Eand,  and  the  cause  of  the  Eepublic  strongly  appealed  to 
their  support  in  what  appeared  to  them  a war  of  aggression  and 
of  simple  plunder  on  the  part  of  the  English. 


334 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


The  leader  of  the  corps  was  Field  Cornet  Flygare,  with  a young 
Swede,  Baron  Helge  Fagerskold,  Captain  Barendsen  (an  ex-Danish 
officer),  and  one  Carl  Albers  Olssen  as  adjutants.  The  corps  joined 
General  Cronje’s  laager  in  the  west,  and  took  part  in  the  early 
operations  of  the  siege  of  Mafeking.  Like  other  impatient  Euro- 
peans, accustomed  to  other  than  Boer  methods  of  warfare,  the 
Norsemen  were  more  eager  for  dashing  actions  and  daring  enter- 
prises than  the  slow,  psalm-singing  burghers,  and  were  importunate 
in  their  requests  to  be  allowed  to  put  an  end  to  Baden-Powell’s 
exasperating  siege-show.  The  Boers  listened,  were  politely  grateful 
for  such  offers,  and  always  refused,  with  a kind  of  fatherly  feeling 
of  pity  for  young  men  whom  they  looked  upon  as  children  in  the 
knowledge  of  such  fighting  as  successful  methods  of  warfare  in 
South  Africa  required. 

When  General  Cronje  was  given  the  command  of  the  Federal 
forces  organized  to  meet  Methuen,  the  Scandinavians  were  allowed 
to  accompany  him,  and  they  foi:ght  in  the  battles  of  Modder  Eiver 
and  Magersfontein.  The  fate  which  befell  the  brave  but  impetuous 
little  band  on  the  11th  of  December  excited  the  admiration  of  the 
burghers,  but,  like  the  similar  recklessness  of  the  Hollanders  and 
Germans  at  Elandslaagte,  it  tended  to  confirm  Boer  officers  in  the 
conviction  that  while  it  was  doubtless  very  magnificent  it  was  also 
very  unlike  the  rational  system  of  warfare  which  should  be  waged 
by  a small  army,  having  no  men  to  spare,  against  huge  legions  of 
mercenaries  whose  lives  were  valued  at  the  price  of  their  service. 

There  were  about  fifty  or  sixty  more  Scandinavians  scattered 
among  the  Band,  Boxburg,  Pretoria,  and  other  commandoes,  who 
preferred  to  serve  under  Boer  officers,  as  in  the  case  of  numbers  of 
Irish,  American,  German,  and  other  nationalities  included  in  the 
Uitlander  population  of  Johannesburg. 


RUSSI.A.N’  SCOUTS 

A small  number  of  Eussians  were  among  the  Europeans  who 
joined  the  Boer  forces  in  October,  1899.  They  were  not  at  first 
sufficiently  numerous  to  form  a distinctive  corps,  and  were  scattered 
among  the  Johannesburg  commandoes.  After  the  Natal  campaign 
had  virtually  ended  in  the  relief  of  Ladysmith,  some  thirty  of  the 
Eussians  who  had  taken  part  in  the  siege  of  that  town  formed 
themselves  into  a body  of  scouts  and  joined  General  Philip  Botha’s 
command.  I was  witness  to  some  of  their  scouting  work  in  the  south 
of  the  Orange  Free  State  while  staying  with  Philip  Botha  at  Os- 
spruit  Camp,  and  right  useful  work  it  was.  On  one  occasion  three 


BLAKE’S  lEISH  BRIGADE 


335 


of  them  actually  penetrated  into  the  British  lines  near  Bloemfon- 
tein and  returned  with  a most  accurate  plan  of  Eoberts’  great  en- 
campment near  the  Free  State  capital.  Philip  Botha,  who  was 
himself  an  ideal  chief  of  scouts,  and  Christian  De  Wet’s  right-hand 
man  during  his  most  successful  enterprises  in  the  Free  State,  held 
a very  high  opinion  of  his  Eussian  pupils,  and  placed  great  con- 
fidence in  their  reports.  They  were  all  Cossacks  from  the  Don 
Eiver  region  of  Eussia. 

Count  Alexis  de  Ganetzky,  a one-time  gay  young  Eussian  in 
Paris,  Prince  Morgaff,  and  Colonel  Eugene  Maximotf  were  officers 
of  Villehois-Mareuil’s  foreign  legion,  rather  than  actual  chiefs  of 
a Eussian  Corps.  Maximoff  was  described  by  some  of  his  Eussian 
compatriots  as  an  ex-police  ofiicer,  and  this  statement,  whether 
founded  on  fact  or  on  fiction,  tended  to  create  a prejudice  against 
him  in  the  minds  of  the  French  legionnaires.  Even  if  true  it 
could  still  be  consistent  with  a thorough  loyalty  to  the  Boer 
cause.  He  was  an  able  military  organizer,  and  was  for  a short 
time  Yillebois-MareuiFs  chief  lieutenant.  He  succeeded  to  the 
leadership  of  the  legion  after  its  chief  had  been  killed  at  Boshof, 
but  upon  jealousies  breaking  out  among  the  numerous  would-be 
successors  of  the  gallant  French  officer,  Maximoff  relinquished  the 
command  and  fought  in  the  ranlvs  until  he  returned  to  Eussia. 


AWBULANCE  HELP 

The  external  help  in  Eed  Cross  ambulance  labor  given  to  the 
Boer  armies  was  considerable;  almost  all  the  Continental  countries 
being  represented  in  this  humane  work.  Two  completely  equipped 
field  hospitals,  of  100  beds  each,  were  contributed  by  French  so- 
cieties through  the  French  Consul  at  Pretoria.  A German  Ambu- 
lance Corps,  including  doctors  and  nursing  sisters,  rendered  valuable 
service,  as  did  those  of  the  Netherlands,  Belgian,  Italian,  and  Eus- 
sian corps,  under  competent  medical  men,  nurses,  and  administra- 
tors. Pretoria,  Johannesburg,  and  other  large  Boer  centers  organ- 
ized Eed  Cross  Societies  out  of  private  and  public  donations;  and, 
with  the  cooperation  of  the  friends  of  the  Eepublics  in  Europe,  the 
Federal  armies  were  thus  fairly  well  equipped  in  the  surgical, 
nursing,  and  general  ambulance  requirements  of  the  campaign. 
The  Burke  Hospital  of  Pretoria  was  the  gift  of  an  Irish  merchant 
of  that  city.  He  was  neutral  in  the  war  as  between  Boer  and 
Briton,  and  rendered  generous  help  to  the  wounded  on  both  sides 
through  his  well-equipped  ambulance  service.  There  were  no  scan- 
dals connected  with  the  hospital  management  of  the  Boer  field 


336 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


forces,  such  as  Mr.  Burclett-Coutts,  M.P.,and  others  were  compelled 
to  expose  in  the  case  of  the  English  hospitals,  and  British  wounded 
have  borne  generous  testimony  to  the  humane  manner  in  which 
their  enemies  treated  them  while  under  their  care.  No  such  dis- 
graceful incident  as  that  which  occurred  at  Modder  Eiver  can  be 
laid  at  the  door  of  the  Eepublican  generals.  It  remained  for  Mr. 
Chamberlain’s  military  representatives  to  violate  the  Eed  Cross 
ensign  by  interfering  with  doctors  engaged  in  attending  to  wounded 
burghers,  treating  them  like  common  prisoners,  and  actually  con- 
fiscating their  equipments  when  compelled  to  acknowledge  the 
wrong  of  the  arrest. 

Similar  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  British  in  their  treatment  of 
Belgian,  Dutch,  and  other  pro-Boer  ambulance  organizations  will 
have  to  be  recorded  in  the  full  narrative  of  the  war. 


Chapter  XXVII 


SPION  KOP 


Buller  jorr^ED  by  WAREEisr — Thirty  thousand  British  against  six  thou- 
sand Boers — Li YTTELTON  CROSSES  TuGELA  AT  POTGIETER’S — WaRRENAT 
Trichardt’s — Five  days’  fighting  without  advance  of  British — 
Description  of  Spion  Kop — British  seize  the  summit — Penned  in 
BY  Boers — Terrible  execution  by  Boer  artillery — Botha’s  account 
OF  battle — British  raise  white  flag — Surrender  repudiated  by 
Colonel  Thorneycroft,  and  advancing  Boers  shot  down — British 
retreat  under  cover  of  darkness — Drieling  Kop  saved  to  Boers 
BY  Utrecht  men — Why  Botha  did  not  shell  retreating  British — 
Boer  casualties — Horrors  of  the  battle-field — Exploit  of  The- 
ron’s  scouts. 


ULLER  retired  upon  Chieveley  and  Frere  after  the  battle  of 


■ I J Colenso,  and  awaited  the  arrival  of  reenforcements  before 
making  another  attempt  to  reach  Ladysmith.  He  devoted  a month 
to  the  task  of  preparing  for  his  second  effort  to  cross  the  Tugela, 
and,  on  being  joined  by  General  Warren  and  another  division,  this 
raising  his  army  to  a strength  of  30,000  men  and  ten  batteries  of 
artillery,  he  was  ready  to  try  again.  He  found  himself  at  the  head 
of  the  largest  and  best  equipped  army  which  the  British  Empire 
had  put  in  the  field  in  this  generation,  and  from  the  boastful  tone 
of  his  address  to  this  fine  force  on  the  eve  of  its  second  advance,  he 
felt  confident  that  he  could  fight  his  way  this  time  past  the  burghers 
who  had  driven  him  back  from  the  river  on  the  15th  of  December. 

During  this  interval  Botha  had  watched  and  waited  at  Colenso, 
ready  for  the  next  move  of  his  adversary.  His  force  had  varied  in 
strength  according  to  the  situation  around  Ladysmith.  Men  were 
constantly  riding  from  one  position  to  the  other,  and  regular  helio- 
graphic  communication  was  kept  up  between  Joubert  and  his  young 
lieutenant  while  holding  two  English  armies  at  bay.  When,  as  on 
the  occasion  of  the  assault  on  the  Platrand  on  the  6th  of  January, 
the  entire  Yryheid  commando  left  the  Tugela  to  cooperate  in  the 
attack,  Buller  had  no  more  than  4,000  men  in  front  of  his  30,000. 
The  British  general  was  only  ten  miles  south  of  the  river,  while  a 
third  of  his  opponents  had  gone  fifteen  miles  north  to  attack  the 
garrison  which  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  Xatal  was  to  rescue 
from  its  investment.  Xo  thought  of  or  attempt  at  a dash  forward, 
however,  suggested  itself  to  the  general  who  was  to  have  eaten  his 


23 


338 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Christmas  plum-pudding  in  Pretoria.  So  the  Vryheiders  returned 
after  their  unsuccessful  mission,  and  continued  to  wait  for  the 
development  of  their  enemy’s  further  plans. 

Botha’s  and  Meyer’s  commandoes  had  been  augmented  by  some 

1.000  more  burghers  since  Colenso.  It  was  with  a force  of  about 

6.000  men  that  they  had  to  guard  the  extended  lines  of  the  Tugela 
Kiver  and  their  forty  miles  of  frontage  southward.  True,  these  6,000 
men  were  the  finest  horsemen  in  the  world,  and  the  best  rifle  shots. 
They  could  concentrate,  owing  to  their  magnificent  mobility,  upon 
any  threatened  point  in  one-fourth  the  time  of  their  enemies,  and 
they  were  able  to  fire,  if  necessary,  60,000  shots  each  minute,  thanks 
-to  the  best  rifle  which  modern  improvements  have  produced.  Still, 
it  was  a very  inadequate  body  of  men  with  which  to  defend  the 
vulnerable  river.  Villebois-Mareuil,  who  was  with  Botha  all  this 
time,  and  who  had  examined  the  whole  line,  declared  that  the  posi- 
tions from  Langwani  Hill,  east  of  Colenso,  to  Honger’s  Poort,  west 
of  Spion  Kop,  would  require  50,000  men  to  hold  them  securely, 
and  of  these  Botha  had  only  the  number  given  above  at  his  disposal. 

By  the  14th  of  January  General  Buller,  with  at  least  25,000 
men  and  50  guns,  advanced  to  the  two  drifts  fifteen  or  twenty  miles 
west  of  Colenso.  His  army  was  divided  into  two  unequal  divisions; 
the  lesser  one  apparently  intending  to  cross  the  river  at  Potgieter’s 
Drift,  and  the  other  at  the  second  drift,  still  further  west.  This 
second  division  was  the  stronger  in  men  and  guns,  and  it  was  soon 
apparent  that  it  was  this  force,  which  was  under  the  command  of 
General  Warren,  that  would  give  most  trouble  to  the  vigilant  com- 
mandoes looking  down  from  the  hills  upon  the  two  columns  seeking 
a common  road  to  Ladysmith. 

Under  the  protection  of  Buller’s  guns  on  Mount  Alice,  General 
Lyttelton  crossed  the  river  at  Potgieter’s  and  occupied  some  low 
hills  on  the  north  bank  without  opposition.  On  the  following  day 
General  Warren  threw  a pontoon  bridge  over  the  Tugela  at  Trich- 
ardt’s,  and  succeeded,  tho  not  without  some  opposition,  in  carry- 
ing his  men  and  guns  over.  The  Boers  in  front  retired,  firing. 
Both  divisions  attempted  to  advance  from  their  respective  locations, 
but  found  the  ground  stubbornly  contested  by  an  unknown  force, 
which  seemed  to  be  ubiquitous,  and  to  be  found  ready  and  seemingly 
entrenched  at  whatever  point  the  British  attacked  it. 

On  the  18th  and  19th  Warren  attempted  to  work  his  way  by  a 
detour  northeast  from  the  river,  so  as  to  turn  the  Boer  extreme 
right  at  Acton  Homes.  Botha  countered  this  movement  by  threat- 
ening Warren’s  communications  with  the  river  and  Springfield,  and 
the  Englishman  turned  back  with  his  tenacious  adversary  hanging 
like  a bulldog  on  his  left  flank.  On  the  20th  Botha  found  his  lines 


SPION  KOP 


339 


on  Tabanamyana  Hill  and  on  the  adjoining  kopjes  attacked  by 
Warren’s  whole  artillery  and  by  an  infantry  advance  before  which 
he  slowly  retired  back  to  higher  and  stronger  positions,  prepared 
for  such  an  eventuality.  Here  the  two  forces  remained,  and  fought 
what  was  chiefly  an  artillery  combat  during  the  21st  and  22nd. 
On  the  evening  of  the  latter  day,  after  another  similar  encounter, 
the  Boers  moved  east  again,  slowly,  doggedly,  to  the  very  positions 
they  had  occupied  round  Spion  Ivop  when  Warren  had  crossed  the 
river  on  the  17th.  It  had  been  a five  days’  continuous  fight,  and 
the  enemy  found  himself  at  the  end  of  it  just  where  he  had  started, 
and  not  a yard  nearer  to  Ladysmith. 

The  two  divisions  of  Buller’s  army  were  now  so  located  that 
the  Boer  main  force  was  midway,  between  but  north  of,  their  posi- 
tions. Botha’s  pickets  and  brandwacht’s  were  extended  east  and 
west  along  the  hills  from  Brakfontein  to  Tabanamyana.  His  center 
was  behind  Spion  Kop,  and  was  entrenched  there,  with  this  hill 
standing  between  him  and  Bailer’s  guns  across  the  river. 

Botha’s  real  strength  lay  in  the  complete  concealment  of  his 
guns,  and  in  the  mystery  which  he  most  skilfully  succeeded  in 
throwing  round  the  ]'eal  location  and  number  of  men  under  his 
command.  As  at  Colenso,  he  made  Buller  fight  an  unknown  quan- 
tity, and,  whether  they  really  believed  it  or  not,  his  adversaries  de- 
clared they  had  almost  as  many  men  in  front  of  them  as  they 
themselves  commanded.  This  was  how  matters  stood  under  the 
shadow  of  Spion  Kop  when  Briton  and  Boer  had  ended  the  sixth 
day’s  running  battle,  and  lay  down  to  try  and  snatch  a dubious  rest 
near  the  spot  where  the  fight  had  first  begun. 

Botha  was  unwilling  to  occupy  the  summit  of  Spion  Kop  with 
any  large  force,  owing  to  its  being  dominated  by  the  naval  guns 
on  Mount  Alice  from  the  south,  which  was  in  possession  of  the 
enemy.  He  held  lower  hills  behind,  to  the  east  and  west  of  Spion 
Kop ; wisely  leaving  himself  and  guns  free  to  move  backward  to 
the  mountains  west  and  south  of  Ladysmith,  if  compelled  still  to 
give  way  before  the  enemy’s  superior  forces. 

Spion  Kop  slopes  up  from  the  banks  of  the  Tugela  to  a height 
of  about  2,000  feet,  the  reverse,  or  north,  side  not  being  so  steep 
as  that  facing  the  river.  There  is  a deep  indentation  in  the  south 
side  of  the  mountain,  extending  through  the  whole  of  its  upper  half, 
while  all  the  approaches  on  the  north  side  to  the  top  of  the  hill 
are  over  a rough  ridge  without  any  cover  of  any  kind.  The  crown 
of  the  hill  is  quite  bare  and  of  a stony  character,  having  an  area 
of  some  five  or  six  acres,  with  boulders  strewn  about.  There  is  a 
slope  from  the  southwest  to  the  northwest  side  of  the  summit  with 
a “ hump  ” on  the  crest  of  the  eastern  extremity. 


340 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


A brandwacht  of  sixteen  men  of  the  Vryheid  commando  were  on 
the  mountain  on  the  night  of  the  23rd  of  January.  The}^  were 
the  remnant  of  a larger  force  which  had  held  the  hilltop  previous 
to  Warren’s  advance  westward  after  crossing  the  river,  when  every 
available  burgher  had  to  be  sent  to  strengthen  Botha’s  right  wing. 
The  brandwacht  remained  for  observation  purposes  only,  and  were 
surprised  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning  of  Wednesday,  the  24th. 
The  enemy  had  advanced  silently  up  the  hill,  under  cover  of  a night 
of  inky  darkness,  and  easily  rushed  the  sangars  behind  which  the 
few  burghers  had  kept  guard.  Two  of  the  picket  ’ivere  bayoneted 
after  fire  had  been  opened  on  the  British,  and  the  others  succeeded 
in  making  their  way  down  the  northeastern  slope  of  the  hill  to 
General  Burger’s  laager.  The  alarm  had  already  spread  through 
the  Boer  lines,  as  it  was  divined  from  the  firing  on  the  summit  of 
the  kop  that  the  enemy  had  succeeded  in  seizing  it.  General  Burger 
acted  with  prompt  decision.  lie  ordered  ninety  men  of  the  Caro- 
lina burghers,  under  Commandant  Prinsloo  (of  Carolina),  to  scale 
the  hill  up  the  way  the  brandwacht  had  come  down,  and  obtain 
a lodgment  on  the  northeast  side  of  the  open  space  on  the  top  be- 
fore the  light  should  enable  the  enemy  the  easier  to  occupy  the 
whole  of  the  hill.  At  the  same  time  fifty  Heidelbergers  were  des- 
patched to  a kopje  farther  west  of  the  hill  from  whence  they  could 
reach  the  flank  of  the  English  across  an  intervening  valley  with 
rifle  fire.  A kindly-disposed  fog  which  fell  over  the  scene  in  the 
early  morning  enabled  these  orders  to  be  carried  out  without  a hitch, 
and  so  close  were  the  opposing  forces  to  each  other  when  the  sun 
rolled  up  the  curtain  of  mist  from  the  crown  of  Spion  Kop  for  the 
war  tragedy  to  commence  that  the  Carolina  men  sprang  at  the 
nearest  British  troops  and  actually  wrested  the  rifles  from  them 
before  they  had  recovered  from  the  surprise  which  the  unexpected 
presence  of  the  Boers  created.  The  English  were  driven  back  at 
once  from  that  point  of  the  crest  thus  taken  by  the  burghers,  and 
the  fight  for  the  possession  of  the  plateau  began.  The  crest  line 
thus  seized  gave  shelter  to  the  Carolina  men  in  shooting  back  the 
enemy,  and  enabled  them  to  extend  right  and  left,  so  as  to  open 
as  wide  a circle  of  fire  upon  their  foes  as  the  position  would  allow. 

The  enemy  were  in  possession  of  the  sangars  which  had  been 
built  by  the  Boers  who  had  previously  held  the  hill,  and  their 
solid  character  can  be  seen  from  the  picture,  taken  during  the 
fight,  which  represents  the  English  in  the  act  of  firing  across  the 
open  space  at  the  Carolina  l)urghers.  These  latter,  however,  were 
the  cooler  combatants,  and  the  better  shots,  and  the  duel  with  rifles 
which  began  early  that  morning  soon  avenged  the  bayoneted  senti- 
nels of  the  midnight  surprise.  It  was  to  be  a fight  to  a finish 


The  English  ascended  the  mountain  from  the  south  (the  right-hand)  side 


342 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


where  pure  grit  and  pluck  must  determine  whether  Boer  or  Briton 
should  hold  the  hill. 

The  English  on  the  plateau  numbered  eight  companies  of  Lanca- 
shire Fusiliers,  six  companies  of  the  Eoyal  Lancaster  Eegiment, 
with  some  200  more  men,  including  sappers.  As  against  these  900, 
the  ninety  Carolina  burghers  held  their  crest  of  the  hill.  General 
Botha  directed  the  battle  from  the  slope  of  a ridge  rising  north- 
ward behind  Spion  Kop,  from  whence  he  could  clearly  see  with 
his  glasses  how  the  fight  on  the  summit  was  proceeding.  He  soon 
recognized  that  the  men  sent  up  by  Schalk  Burger  were  greatly  out- 
numbered, and  he  ordered  up  some  400  more  to  the  support  of  the 
Carolina  burghers.  These  were  volunteers  from  various  comman- 
does who  climbed  the  hill  in  separate  bodies.  There  were  thirty  of 
the  Pretoria  Village  commando,  under  Field  Cornet  Zeederberg;  also 
men  from  the  Pretoria  District  commando,  Viljoen’s  Eand  Brigade, 
the  German  Corps,  and  a Krugersdorp  contingent  under  Field 
Cornet  Kemp.  General  Smuts,  of  Ermelo,  was  senior  in  command 
of  the  united  burgher  force  who  volunteered  to  help  the  men  on  the 
summit  of  the  kop  to  keep  it. 

After  Botha  had  thus  strengthened  the  Carolina  men  by  as  many 
burghers  as  the  space  in  possession  of  the  Boers  would  offer  reason- 
able room  and  cover  for,  he  disposed  of  his  seven  guns  so  that 
the}''  should  cooperate  with  the  men  engaged  in  the  deadly  combat 
on  the  kop,  and  prevent  as  far  as  possible  the  moving  of  any  of 
the  enemy’s  guns  on  to  the  mountain.  He  saw  the  stupid  blunder 
which  Warren  had  committed  in  sending  so  large  a force  of  men 
up  to  a position  where  there  was  not  space  for  more  than  500  on 
each  side  to  fight  in,  and  he  prepared  to  take  advantage  of  the 
crowding  of  the  unfortunate  Tommies  on  the  portion  of  the  plateau 
where  the  steady  fire  of  the  burghers  was  keeping  them  penned  in 
as  effectively  as  a barbed  wire  fence  encloses  a flock  of  sheep. 

Almost  every  English  report  of  this  battle  leads  the  reader  to 
believe  that  the  Boers  had  one  or  more  pom-poms  on  the  hilltop 
during  the  fight.  There  was  no  gun  of  any  kind  there.  The  Boer 
artillery  were  placed  as  follows:  To  the  extreme  right  of  Botha’s 
position,  some  5,000  yards  away,  on  the  west  end  of  the  plateau 
of  which  Spion  Kop  was  part,  there  was  a fifteen-pound  Creusot; 
still  nearer,  but  on  a lower  elevation,  there  was  a Krupp  of  the  same 
caliber;  still  yet  to  the  west  on  a round  kopje,  about  2,000  yards 
from  Spion  Kop,  a pom-pom  was  placed ; the  kopje  being  very  ex- 
posed to  the  British  fire  and  being  held  by  50  Heidelbergers.  Mid- 
way between  this  hill  and  Spion  Kop  there  Avas  another  fourteen- 
pound  Krupp  for  a couple  of  hours  in  the  morning,  but  it  was 
removed  by  Botha’s  orders  and  put  on  the  ridge  behind  Spion  Kop ; 


SPION  KOP 


343 


the  second  pom-pom  was  located  on  the  side  of  a small  hill  eastward 
about  2,000  yards  from  the  top  of  the  big  kop,  while  still  eastward 
of  this  a “ smoke-powder  ” Krupp  was  worked  from  the  Free 
Staters’  position  on  Drieling  Hill.  It  was  the  Krupp  back  of 
Spion  Kop,  and  the  two  pom-poms  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  hill, 
which  helped  the  Mausers  on  the  plateau  to  do  the  terrible  execution 
among  the  Lancashire  men  during  the  battle.  Keither  of  these 
guns,  however,  was  nearer  than  2,000  Awards  to  the  summit  where 
the  fight  raged,  Avhile  the  three  pieces  were  fired  up  from  a level  of, 
at  least,  500  feet  lower  than  the  scene  of  the  encounter.  The  other 
four  guns  Avere  employed  in  guarding  the  approaches  on  the  east 
and  west  sides  of  Spion  Kop,  up  which  the  English  would  have 
to  send  their  reenforcements  from  their  main  lines  below  on  the 
Tugela. 

Major  Wolmarans,  with  Lieutenants  Yon  Wichmann  and  Groot- 
huizen  were  in  charge  of  Botha’s  seven  pieces,  and  no  guns  Avere 
ever  better  served  or  ever  fought  a more  unequal  or  more  brilliantly 
successful  artillery  combat.  Opposed  to  them  on  the  other  side  of 
the  plateau  down  by  the  river,  on  the  high  hills  beyond  the  Tugela, 
on  every  available  position  between  Warren’s  and  Lyttleton’s  co- 
operating forces,  Avere  no  less  than  fifty  field  pieces,  including  Iavo 
4.7  guns,  and  a battery  of  twelve-pound  navals.  The  scene  of  the 
sanguinary  fight  on  the  mountain  was  loAver  than  the  position 
occupied  by  the  two  huge  4.7  guns,  Avhich  Avere  thus  able  to  rake 
the  summit  of  Spion  Kop  from  beyond  the  river. 

In  giving  me  an  account  of  this  battle  from  which  this  narrative 
is  largely  drawn.  General  Botha  said,  in  dealing  Avith  the  artillery 
employed  on  both  sides: 

“ Our  salvation  in  the  fighting  on  and  around  Spion  Kop  was 
the  astounding  inefficiency  of  Buller’s  artillery.  Our  feAV  guns, 
on  the  contrary,  were  splendidly  served.  The  positions  were  most 
unfavorable  to  us,  after  the  enemy  had  taken  the  Kop.  We  had 
left  it  in  possession  of  only  a few  men,  owing  to  the  dominating 
location  in  which  some  of  Buller’s  batteries  were  placed.  They 
could  fire  down  on  the  hill,  whereas  we  had  to  fire  up  from  where 
our  guns  were  placed,  in  loAver  positions  on  the  side  of  the  ridge. 
I had  an  officer  on  the  side  of  the  Kop  who  heliographed  the 
exact  situation  of  the  enemy  on  the  hill,  and  where  each  shell 
struck.  Kot  a single  one  of  our  shots  fell  among  our  own  men. 
Our  Krupp  and  pom-poms  told  with  terrible  effect  upon  the 
unfortunate  massed  Tommies  on  the  narrow  ledge  of  the  hill. 
The  English  guns,  on  the  contrary,  were  responsible  for  a large 
number  of  the  casualties  on  their  side;  shell  after  shell  missing 
the  mark  and  falling  among  the  men  who  were  fighting  bravely 
against  us;  some  of  whom  at  one  part  of  the  fight  actually  ran 


344 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


across  to  our  positions  to  save  themselves  from  the  badly-directed 
fire  from  their  own  guns  ! ” 

Meanwhile  the  combat  on  the  mountain  top  continued  fast  and 
furious  as  the  morning  advanced.  The  arrival  of  the  reenforce- 
ments from  the  burgher  lines  below  gave  the  immediate  advantage 
to  the  less  numerous  but  more  careful,  cautious,  and  more  deadly 
marksmen  behind  the  ring  of  500  Mausers  on  the  Boer  end  of  the 
plateau.  Boers  naturally  extend  their  lines  when  firing.  They 
need  no  orders  to  do  what  common  sense  dictates.  The  burghers 
slowly  spread  themselves  to  the  right  and  left,  moving  on  their 
bodies  without  rising  to  their  feet,  and  building  some  kind  of  cover 
for  their  heads  as  they  gradually  worked  their  way  round  so  as  to 
be  able  to  cross-fire  their  foes.  At  one  point,  to  the  left  of  the  Boer 
position,  those  who  remained  of  the  Carolina  men  managed  to 
creep  round  in  this  way  until  they  got  almost  in  line  with  the  right 
of  their  opponents’  sangars,  where  they  were  enabled  to  enfilade 
their  enemies.  The  men  on  the  British  right  were  thus  made  to 
suffer  far  more  severely  than  those  at  the  other  extremity.  Almost 
all  their  officers  had  been  shot  before  noon,  whereupon  a white  flag 
was  raised  from  behind  a sangar.  The  act  was  not  seen  lower  down 
the  Boer  entrenchments,  and  the  fire  continued.  Again  the  white 
flag  was  raised,  whereupon  Jan  Colliers,  of  Pretoria,  cried  out, 
“ Hands  up ! Come  out.”  The  Tommies,  who  belonged  to  the 
Lancashire  Fusiliers,  stood  up  in  their  trench  with  reversed  arms, 
and  Colliers  ran  across  to  their  lines,  followed  by  some  fifty  of  his 
men.  Firing  had  now  ceased  on  both  sides  at  the  British  right, 
and  about  150  of  the  Fusiliers  had  moved  over  to  the  Boer  end  of 
the  battle-field  in  the  act  of  surrender,  when  a British  officer  from 
the  English  left  position  arrived  with  reenforcements  which  had 
been  sent  up  from  below.  He  advanced  to  Celliers,  declaring  he 
would  not  recognize  the  act  of  surrender,  and  shouting,  “ I am  the 
officer  in  command;  back  to  your  positions,  men;  the  fight  must  go 
on.”  The  officer  turned  out  to  be  Colonel  Thorneycroft,  who  had 
led  the  advanced  section  of  Woodgate’s  men  up  the  hill  in  the  morn- 
ing. He  assumed  the  command  of  the  British  which  General  Wood- 
gate’s  mortal  wound  had  left  vacant  on  the  field.  All  this  action 
on  the  part  of  Thorneycroft,  who  had  only  just  reached  that  part 
of  the  field,  may  have  been  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  war, 
so  far  as  his  own  personal  proceedings  were  concerned;  but  it  is 
an  undeniable  fact  that  200  or  300  of  the  men  whom  Woodgate 
had  commanded  until  struck  down  had  several  times  asked  to  sur- 
render by  exhibiting  the  white  flag,  and  had  at  last,  to  the  number 
of  150,  actually  handed  over  their  arms.  Thorneycroft  learned 


SPION  EOF 


345 


all  this  from.  Celliers,  and  yet  he  not  only  ordered  the  fight  to 
continue,  hut  saw  without  protest  the  men  whom  he  had  brought 
with  him  jump  behind  the  trenches  and  open  fire  upon  Celliers 
and  his  men  before  these  could  get  back  to  the  protection  of  their 
own  lines.  The  Boers  who  had  remained  in  their  positions  could 
not  return  the  fire  at  once,  as  their  own  comrades  and  some  of  the 
surrendered  English  were  in  front;  several  of  both  being  shot 
down  by  Thorneycroft's  men.  These  are  the  true  facts  of  the  white 
flag  incident  on  Spion  Kop,  as  related  by  Mr.  Celliers  and  others 
who  witnessed  the  whole  proceedings,  and  yet  it  was  all  but  univer- 


THE  NORTHEAST  SIDE  OF  SPION  KOP,  UP  WHICH  THE  BOERS  CHARGED.  A GROUP  OF  HEROES 

OF  THE  FIGHT 


sally  reported  in  the  English  press,  in  the  war  correspondents’  nar- 
rative of  the  fight,  that  it  was  the  Boers  who  had  “treacherously 
misused  the  white  flag  ” on  the  summit  of  the  hill  in  order  to  enable 
them  to  fire  under  its  cover  into  the  British  trenches.  The  charge 
was  consistent  with  the  customary  rule  of  bluffing  resorted  to  by 
the  English,  when  an  ugly  incident  on  their  side  could  neither  be 
truthfully  defended  nor  explained.  As  a matter  of  fact,  it  was 
during  the  cessation  of  firing  at  the  right  of  the  British  position, 
caused  by  the  hoisting  of  the  white  flag  on  the  part  of  150  of  the 
enemy’s  men,  that  Thorneycroft  arrived  with  reenforcements,  and 
that  Celliers  and  his  men  were  fired  upon  by  the  new  arrivals. 

Back  to  their  positions  went  the  Boers,  and  the  fight  of  the 
morning  recommenced,  with,  if  possible,  a deadlier  spirit  on  the 
part  of  the  burghers  to  drive  their  foes  off  the  mountain.  It  was 
resolved  that  no  more  attention  would  be  given  to  British  white 


346 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


flags  or  emblems  of  surrender.  One  hundred  more  men  were  helio- 
graphed  for  to  Botha,  and  these  came  gallantly  up  the  hill,  and 
joined  the  indomitable  band  on  the  north  and  east  crest  in  the  deadly 
combat  for  the  possession  of  the  plateau.  Coats  were  off  each 
burgher,  shirt-sleeves  were  rolled  up,  and  the  steady,  deadly  work 
of  the  Mauser  fire  continued  to  thin  the  ranks  behind  the  opposite 
lines.  Thorneycroft’s  reenforcements  made  a poor  fight  of  it, 
compared  with  the  pluck  with  which  the  Lancashire  men  had 
withstood  the  terribly  galling  fusillade  and  the  shelling  by  the  Boer 
pom-poms  during  the  morning.  The  mass  of  Tommies  who  had 
been  brought  up  to  replace  the  men  who  had  been  disabled  were 
badly  handled  by  their  officers.  They  were  thrust  in  upon  the  men 
who  had  sustained  the  Boer  attack  all  the  day,  and  thus  offered 
their  foes,  in  the  closer  formation  caused  by  their  crowding,  human 
targets  which  only  the  worst  of  shooting  could  miss.  The  burghers 
did  not  miss,  and  the  victims  of  British  blundering  continued  to  fall 
in  greater  numbers  as  the  hours  sped  on. 

Here  there  could  be  no  possible  pretense  that  the  English  were 
held  back  by  “ formidable  entrenchments  ” or  by  “ Boers  behind 
rocks.”  The  British  had  tlie  best  protection  on  the  hilltop,  and 
the  choice  of  positions,  having  captured  the  summit  from  the  Vry- 
heid  brandwacht  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning.  The  Boers 
had  no  gun  on  the  hill,  and  were  never  more  in  numbers  than  one 
to  six  of  their  foes  from  the  commencement  of  the  fight  to  the  finish. 
Only  an  average  distance  of  some  200  yards  separated  the  two  lines; 
the  space  narrowing  at  one  point  to  seventy  yards.  The  British  had 
bayonets,  as  the  English  accounts  of  the  march  of  the  reenforcing 
troops  up  the  mountain-side  spoke  of  steel  “ flashing  in  the  sun,” 
as  the  khaki-clad  regiments  made  their  way  to  the  scene  of  battle 
up  above.  Colonel  Thorneycroft,  therefore,  had  every  inducement 
which  an  officer  could  desire  to  charge  across  that  small  open  space, 
and  overwhelm  his  opponents  with  the  mere  overpowering  strength 
of  numbers.  He  did  not  do  so.  The  Boers  in  shirt-sleeves  across 
the  way  barred  the  road,  with  a dauntless  pluck  which  has  never 
been  excelled,  if  it  ever  was  equaled,  on  any  battle-field.  Their 
victory  was  complete  in  every  feature  and  detail  of  the  fiercest  fight 
of  the  war,  when  the  2,000  or  3,000  British  troops  on  the  hill,  by 
the  orders  of  Thorneycroft,  seized  the  cover  of  darkness  under 
which  to  retreat.  Botha’s  600  burghers  thus  remained  victors 
on  the  summit  of  the  historic  kop  after  a fight  of  fourteen  hours’ 
duration. 

While  the  encounter  on  the  hilltop  was  proceeding  several  minor 
engagements  took  place  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  mountain 
where  if  sloped  down  to  lower  ground,  and  then  descended  south- 


SPION  KOP 


347 


ward  to  the  river.  The  main  stream  of  British  reenforcements 
came  up  on  the  western  side,  and  had  to  run  the  gauntlet  of  the 
Heidelberg  riflemen  to  their  left;  these,  with  Viljoen’s  men  and 
the  Pretoria  commandoes,  bearing  the  brunt  of  the  fighting  at  this 
point.  Warren’s  artillery  from  the  hills  below,  especially  his  howit- 
zer battery,  covered  the  march  of  these  British  reenforcements,  but 
not  sufficiently  to  shield  them  completely  from  the  fire  of  their  foe- 
men  in  front  and  flank.  Over  100  of  the  enemy  were  killed  and 
wounded  on  this  side  of  Spion  Kop.  Every  attempt  made  to 
advance  up  the  ridge  from  whence  the  Boer  guns  pelted  their  piti-. 


BRITISH  FIRING  ON  BOERS  AT  SPION  KOP 


less  shells  on  to  the  top  of  Spion  Kop  was  beaten  back  by  Botha’s 
men,  with  superb  ease  and  effect. 

On  Drieling  Kop,  east  of  Spion  Kop,  the  Carolina  commando, 
ninety  of  whose  men  were  up  above,  were  almost  overwhelmed  about 
four  in  the  afternoon  by  a large  force  which,  had  advanced  up  that 
way  to  turn  the  position  of  the  men  on  the  summit.  General  Botha 
was  at  his  wits’  end  for  men  when  a panting  rider  from  Schalk 
Burger  reached  him  with  an  urgent  message  for  help.  He  instantly 
ordered  all  his  adjutants  to  go  and  keep  back  the  enemy  until  he 
could  detach  the  Utrecht  burghers  from  their  position  behind  him, 
and  send  them  to  Drieling  Kop.  He  was  left  absolutely  alone  until 
his  secretary,  Sandberg,  rode  back  with  the  tidings  that  the  splendid 
rush  of  the  Utrechters  across  to  the  aid  of  the  Carolina  men  discon- 
certed the  advancing  Tommies,  who  descended  the  hill  and  fell 
back  upon  their  main  body  below. 


348 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Colonel  Thorneyeroft  has  been  blamed  by  Lord  Roberts  and  the 
critics  for  having  retired  from  Spion  Kop  after  the  battle  of  the 
24th;  the  contention  being  that  the  Boers  would  have  given  way 
if  the  fight  had  been  renewed  on  the  following  morning.  The 
true  facts  do  not  sustain  this  view.  Those  troops  who  had  fought 
most  bravely  on  the  hilltop  without  food  or  water  during  the  whole 
day,  and  without  sleep  the  previous  night,  were  physically  unable 
to  continue  the  combat,  and  they  retired  down  the  hill,  without 
orders,  when  darkness  had  put  a stop  to  the  battle.  It  was  under 
these  circumstances  that  the  order  to  retreat  was  given.  Thorney- 
croft  had  no  other  alternative.  It  was  the  generals  who  did  not 
visit  the  scene  of  the  battle  upon  the  mountain  that  blundered  in 
not  sending  up  fresh  troops  and  half-a-dozen  Maxim  guns  under 
cover  of  darkness  to  replace  the  demoralized  Tommies  during  the 
night  of  the  24th.  That  would  have  ended  the  contest  for  the  pos- 
session of  the  hill  early  on  the  morning  of  the  25th,  but  the  victors 
in  such  a problematical  triumph  would  have  had  to  run  the  gantlet 
of  Botha’s  guns  for  the  barren  glory  of  holding  Spion  Kop.  In 
either  case  the  English  death-roll  would  have  told  a tale  of  rela- 
tively proportionate  slaughter. 

A dramatic  story  has  been  related  in  connection  with  Warren’s 
retreat  acrosS  the  Tugela  on  the  25th  and  26th  without  molestation 
from  Botha’s  guns.  It  has  been  alleged  that  Botha  was  urged  to 
let  his  artillery  play  upon  the  retreating  enemy,  especially  when 
they  were  repassing  the  river  on  a pontoon  bridge,  but  that  the 
Boer  general  had  replied,  he  was  restrained  from  any  such  action 
by  heliographic  instructions  from  Joubert  “not  to  fire  upon  a flee- 
ing foe.”  This  story  is  without  any  foundation  except  the  circum- 
stance on  which  it  was  built.  Ko  such  instructions  had  been  re- 
ceived, or  would  have  been  acted  upon  if  received,  had  the  actual 
situation  encouraged  such  action  on  Botha’s  part.  It  did  not,  and 
for  two  very  substantial  reasons.  His  small  force  had  fought  every 
day,  and  had  worked  at  trench  building  every  night,  from  the  17th 
to  the  24th,  almost  without  cessation,  and  with  very  little  food. 
They  were  utterly  exhausted  after  so  prolonged  a struggle,  and  it 
was  simply  impossible  to  order  men  so  worn  out  to  forego  sleep 
and  rest  on  the  eighth  night  in  order  to  attack  an  enemy  so  enor- 
mously stronger  in  numbers,  even  on  retreat.  At  nine  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  24th,  while  the  firing  still  continued,  an  officer  wishing 
to  see  General  Botha  was  told  he  was  in  the  tent  of  Major  Wol- 
marans,  writing  his  report  of  the  day’s  battle  for  President  Kruger. 
On  entering  the  tent,  the  general,  his  secretary,  and  Wolmarans 
were  found  with  a half-written  report  before  them,  and  with  heads 
leaning  on  the  table,  in  sheer  esliaustion,  overcome  with  sleep. 


350 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Botha’s  main  reason  for  not  attacking  Warren’s  retreating  col- 
umns was  the  fewness  of  his  men  and  guns.  He  would  have  had 
to  reveal  his  real  weakness  when  once  he  took  the  aggressive,  and 
removed  from  the  positions  which  best  enabled  him  to  mask  his 
forces  and  to  maintain  the  delusion — which  was  a formidable  moral 
factor  in  favor  of  the  Federal  forces — that  the  Boers  were  twice  or 
three  times  as  strong  in  burghers  and  in  artillery  as  they  were 
in  reality.  The  Boer  generals  were  compelled  to  maintain  this 
tactical  deception  as  part  of  their  militar}''  operations;  for  if  Builer 
at  Colenso,  Methuen  at  Magersfontein,  and  Warren  at  Spion  Kop, 
had  known  or  believed  there  were  no  more  than  5,000  foemen  and 
half-a-dozen  guns  in  front  of  armies  of  three  or  four  times  that 
strength  in  men  and  artillery,  the  results  of  these  battles  might 
have  been  less  disastrous  to  British  military  prestige,  if  no  less 
worthy  of  Boer  generalship  and  bravery.  The  origin  of  the  story 
of  Joubert’s  interdiction  was  the  occurrence  related  in  connection 
with  the  battle  of  Modderspruit,  when  the  Commandant-General 
did  forbid  a pursuit  of  a retreating  force,  and  under  circumstances 
which,  unlike  those  at  Spion  Kop,  warranted  and  called  for  the 
delivery  of  a smashing  blow  at  a beaten  foeman.  Had  Botha  pos- 
sessed the  relatively  equal  force  which  was  under  Joubert’s  com- 
mand on  the  30th  of  October,  when  Warren  fell  back  from  Spion 
Kop  on  the  25tli  of  January,  no  possible  orders  would  have  re- 
strained him  from  hurling  his  opponent’s  columns  into  the  Tugela. 
He  had  beaten  3,000  of  Warren’s  men  on  Spion  Kop  into  pulp. 
He  could  not,  with  5,000  or  6,000  burghers,  who  had  been  fighting 
for  eight  days  continuously,  engage  20,000  men  and  50  guns  in  an 
aggressive  action  the  day  following  without  inviting  both  defeat 
and  disaster. 

General  Botha  declared  the  Federal  loss  in  the  battle  of  Spion 
Kop  to  be  50  killed  and  120  wounded.  Of  these  casualties  the 
brave  ninety  Carolina  men  who  retook  the  hill  in  the  fog  numbered 
no  less  than  fifty,  or  over,  sixty  per  cent,  of  the  valiant  little  band. 
These  ninety  held  the  hilltop  against  all  the  men  brought  up  by 
General  Woodgate  in  the  early  hours  of  that  memorable  morning 
until  they  were  reenforced  by  the  volunteers  from  the  several  com- 
mandoes and  corps  down  below;  one  man  against  ten,  and  the 
ten  holding  the  stronger  shelter.  But  the  Carolina  men  knew  how 
to  shoot.  They  were  the  heroes  of  Spion  Kop,  tho  the  Pretoria, 
Krugersdorp,  Heidelberg,  Rand  men,  and  the  Germans  were  alike 
conspicuous  for  their  bravery. 

The  total  British  losses  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners  were 
fully  1,500,  nearly  400  being  killed.  At  no  time  during  the  battle 
on  the  mountain  top  did  the  Boers  number  fully  600  men.  Every 


SPION  KOP 


351 


Boer,  therefore,  aecoiinted  for  over  two  of  his  enemies,  in  probably 
the  best  fight  ever  made  by  white  men. 

The  names  of  the  dead  heroes  of  the  two  Carolina  wards,  or  com- 
panies, who  fought  so  magnificently  on  Spion  Kop  were: 

Ward  1. — Breeder  W.  Prinsloo,  Theunis  Breytenbach,  Barend 
de  Koker,  C.  Potgieter,  L.,  son,  Jacob  Malan. 

The  following  were  wounded:  A.  de  Lange,  A.  M’Callum,  Jun.; 
E.  Haenert,  hT.  Harries,  Paul  ]\Ieyer  (severely),  Frans  van  Heerden, 
Johannes  Pretorius,  J.  H.  Kilian,  Cornelius  Breytenbach,  C.  du 


BRITISH  DEAD  ON  SPION  KOP 


Ploop,  Izak  Smit  (slightly),  C.  J.  Davel,  W.  Pinaham,  P.  N. 
Viljoen. 

Ward  3.-~Killed : Louw  van  der  Merwe,  T.  van  iSTiekerk,  0.,  son, 
Cornelius  Crobler,  D.  Botha,  0.  Bothina,  F.  Mare,  A.  W.  van 
Kraaienburg,  Cornelius  Meyer,  jun.,  Treurfontein;  J.  J.  Bredtveld. 

Wounded:  P.  de  Winnaar,  Piet  Mare,  Hermanns  J.  Botha,  C.  J. 
Coetzee,  Gert  Smit,  C.  G.  Smit,  H.  Smit,  F.  Kraft,  C.  Kraft,  P.  van 
Eeenan,  L.  du  Plessis,  F.  van  Kiekerk,  J.,  son;  Gert  Strydom, 
Stefanus  Foure,  H.,  son;  W.  J.  Gernitsen,  F.  Jongbloed  Bondon, 
J.  K.  Woest,  J.  H.  Maas,  J.  E.  [Maas?]  J.  J.  Knegscheld,  A.  J. 
Viljoen  (V.C.). 

Ko  other  battle-field  of  the  war  had  yielded  the  harvest  of  horrors 
which  Spion  Kop  presented  to  the  ambulance-bearers  and  others 
the  morning  after  the  murderous  combat  of  the  24th.  Over  1,500 


352 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


men  lay  dead  and  wounded  within  the  confined  area  of  the  moun- 
tain top.  They  were  almost  all  on  the  side  of  the  hill  which  had 
been  occupied  by  the  English,  and  where  the  Ivrupp  and  pom-pom 
shells  had  burst  with  their  rain  of  missiles.  Heads  were  found  a 
dozen  yards  from  their  ghastly  trunks;  hands  and  legs  were  scat- 
tered over  the  rocky  surface;  torn  and  mangled  bodies  were  lying 
in  all  directions,  with  scores  of  dead  faces  upturned  with  staring 
eyes  in  the  sun  as  if  upbraiding  high  Heaven  for  permitting  such 
murderous  work  among  men  belonging  to  God-fearing  nations.  A 
gruesome,  sickening,  hideous  picture,  which  the  brush  of  a Verest- 
chagin,  with  all  its  powers  of  realistic  portraiture,  could  not  match 
in  painted  horrors  from  the  limitless  domain  of  artistic  creations. 
“ I wished,”  said  General  Tobias  Smuts,  in  giving  me  his  impres- 
sions of  the  awful  scene  which  met  his  view  after  the  battle  had 
ended,  “ that  I had  had  the  power  of  transporting  a dozen  of  these 
poor,  brave,  mangled  fellows  lying  there  with  headless  bodies  and 
shattered  limbs,  to  a certain  bedroom  in  Birmingham  or  in  Govern- 
ment House,  Cape  Town,  so  that  the  two  chief  authors  of  this  un- 
natural war  should  see  some  of  the  results  of  their  policy  on  wak- 
ing from  sleep  in  their  safe  and  luxurious  homes.  It  might  induce 
them  to  bring  this  dreadful  conflict  to  a close.” 

General  Botha,  in  further  reference  to  this  battle,  told  me : 

“ Again,  there  was  an  unaccountable  delay  in  the  burying  of 
the  English  dead,  as  at  Colenso.  Several  hundred  men  lay  un- 
buried at  the  top  of  the  hill,  in  very  hot  weather,  too,  for  three  or 
four  days.  I had  granted  an  armistice  of  twenty-four  hours  to 
General  Warren  for  the  purpose  of  attending  to  the  wounded  and 
of  burying  the  dead,  but  it  looked  by  the  delay  which  occurred 
as  if  he  were  more  anxious  to  march  his  big  force  back  across  the 
Tugela  than  to  attend  to  the  duties  for  which  the  armistice  had 
been  agreed  to  by  me.  I sent  in  a request  twice  for  any  wounded 
of  mine  who  might  have  fallen  into  the  enemy’s  hands,  offering  to 
deliver  over  all  his  wounded  who  were  with  us,  without  obtaining 
any  response.  At  last  he  sent 'me  four  men,  and  I returned  him 
300.” 

The  delay  in  burying  the  British  dead  on  Spion  Kop  induced 
the  Kaffirs  of  the  locality  to  loot  the  battle-field,  carrying  off  belts, 
boots,  and  other  articles  belonging  to  the  slain.  A number  of 
these  natives  were  seen  marching  about  with  helmets  on  their 
heads  mimicking  the  fallen  British  soldiers.  A witty  Boer  officer 
named  them  “The  South  African  Native  Lancers,”  out  of  contempt 
for  the  pig-sticking  heroes  of  Elandslaagte. 

A scouting  corps  composed  of  young  men,  bank  clerks,  shop 
assistants,  and  artisans,  chiefly  from  the  Band  and  Krugersdorp, 


sriox  Kop 


353 


rendered  invaluable  assistance  to  General  Botha  during  the  whole 
Tugela  campaign.  Their  captain,  Daanie  Theron,  was  a young 
Afrikander,  of  Krngersdorp.  They  dogged  every  movement  of  the 
enemy’s  forces,  now  at  Brakfontein,  next  day  west  at  Acton  Homes, 
next  across  the  river,  prowling  round  Warren’s  camp-fires  at  night, 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  SPION  KOP 
How  the  British  buried  their  dead 


in  the  most  daredevil  manner;  always  reporting  some  valuable 
intelligence  to  the  general  about  impending  movements  against 
some  point  in  the  chain  of  Boer  positions  along  the  Tabana 
mountains.  On  the  20th  of  January  three  of  them — Boos,  Slecht- 
kimp,  and  Hinton — diverted  the  fire  "of  five  batteries  of  Warren’s 
artillery  from  a spot  where  Major  Wolmarans  was  erecting  a protec- 
23 


354 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


tion  for  a pom-pom,  on  to  the  top  of  a high  spur  overlooking  the 
Tugela,  by  climbing  this  hill,  which  Botha  had  evacuated  the  day 
before,  and  unfurling  the  Transvaal  flag  on  the  summit.  The  three 
remained  on  the  hill,  with  a dozen  guns  playing  upon  it,  until  they 
were  satisfied  that  their  tactics  had  achieved  their  object,  when  they 
succeeded  in  regaining  the  Boer  lines. 

Theron  was  boyish  in  appearance,  of  slight  build,  with  a frank, 
even  merry,  expression  on  his  face  which  invited  confidence.  This 
facial  evidence  of  a gentle  and  jovial  disposition  was,  however,  an 
admirable  mask  for  as  daring  and  as  resourceful  a spirit  as  any 
chief  of  scouts  ever  possessed.  His  ability  to  disguise  himself  was 
due  largely  to  his  clean-shaven,  youthful  looks,  and  powers  of 
mimicry.  Pie  spoke  English  without  a trace  of  Afrikander  accent, 
and  to  this  fact  was  largely  due  his  many  successes  in  obtaining 
information  from  within  the  enemy’s  lines;  one  story  of  his  prowess 
alleging  that  he  penetrated  into  Ladysmith  the  night  before  the 
Boer  attack  on  the  Platrand. 

The  country  along  the  Tugela  was  an  ideal  one  for  the  work  of 
scouting,  deep  valleys  running  in  between  steep-sided  hills,  with 
dongas  on  the  slopes  of  mountains  from  which  every  motion  of  the 
enemy  on  both  banks  of  the  river  could  be  seen  without  attracting 
attention.  Innumerable  nooks  and  corners,  sheltered  by  trees 
or  clumps  of  mimosa,  or  huge  rocks,  enabled  these  young  scouts 
to  stalk  the  clumsy  movements  of  the  British,  blundering  and 
fioundering  in  labyrinthian  mazes,  in  and  out  of  the  paths  and 
spoors  which  led  upward  from  the  winding  Tugela  to  the  frown- 
ing ramparts  of  the  barrier  ridges  which  shut  the  way  to  Lady- 
smith. It  was  an  ideal  country  also  for  Boer  fighting,  and  no 
general  ever  made  better  use  of  his  men  and  of  Nature’s  coopera- 
tion in  offering  positions  in  defense  of  a just  cause  than  did  Louis 
Botha  in  that  wonderful  six  days’  running  fight  which  ended  so 
gloriously  in  the  victory  of  Spion  Kop. 

A story  is  told  of  an  old  burgher,  aged  seventy,  who  was 
among  the  first  to  volunteer  in  the  reenforcement  sent  up  the 
mountain  by  the  Boer  general.  He  was  accompanied  by  his  grand- 
son, a boy  of  fourteen.  No  other  Mauser  on  Spion  Kop  dealt  out 
a more  steady  and  effective  fire  during  the  carnage  of  the  24th 
than  that  of  Oom  Piet.  “ One  more  Eooinek  down,  grandpapa,” 
would  be  exultingly  shouted  by  the  boy  as  his  keener  eyes  noted  the 
gaps  made  behind  the  sangars  across  the  open  space,  and  so  the 
scene  continued.  Finally  Oom  Piet’s  bandolier  was  emptied  of  its 
cartridges,  and  no  other  supply  was  near  at  hand.  The  lad,  how- 
ever, was  equal  to  the  occasion.  Outside  the  entrenchments  lay  a 
burgher  who  had  been  shot  through  the  head  early  in  the  day,  and 


SPION  KOP 


»55 


before  the  boy  could  be  prevented  he  vaulted  over  the  boulders, 
possessed  himself  of  the  dead  burgher’s  bandolier,  and  sprang  back 
again  to.  the  side  of  the  old  warrior  with  the  ammunition.  On  the 
dead  being  counted  the  following  day  the  old  man  and  his  grandson 
were  found  among  the  slain,  lying  side  by  side. 

Another  record  of  conspicuous  bravery  will  live  in  the  recollec- 
tion of  the  burghers  who  helped  to  gain  and  who  may  survive  the 
victory  of  Spion  Kop.  This  was  the  death  of  old  Nicholas  Mentz, 
a Field  Cornet  of  the  Heilbron  burghers,  forming  part  of  the  Free 
State  contingent  with  Botha’s  force.  On  the  18th  a patrol  of  200 
men  were  sent  across  the  river  above  Spion  Kop  to  find  out  the 
main  positions  of  the  English  west  of  Moimt  Alice.  A few  of  the 
patrol  were  riding  ahead  of  the  body,  and  were  told  by  a Kaffir 
that  there  were  no  British  in  front,  where  a kopje  obscured  the 
view  in  advance.  Mentz  and  some  fifty  men  rode  ahead,  and  found 
themselves  under  a hill  held  by  a large  force  of  the  enemy.  They 
resolved,  unwisely,  to  storm  the  hill,  hut  were  shot  back  by  the 
troops  who  had  been  concealed  behind,  and  who  were  in  over- 
whelming numbers.  The  burghers  retired,  hut  old  Mentz,  his  son 
Nicholas,  and  another  would  not  turn  from  any  number  of  Eooi- 
neks,  so  they  put  their  backs  to  a rock  and  faced  the  entire  force 
in  front  of  them,  firing  point  blank  at  their  foes.  Young  Mentz 
fell  wounded;  so  did  his  companion,  Theron.  Old  Nicholas  was  shot 
in  both  legs,  hut  he  still  fired,  refusing  to  surrender.  A British 
officer,  in  admiration  of  the  old  man’s  pluck,  called  upon  him  three 
times  to  stop  firing,  and  prevented  his  men  from  killing  their 
valiant  foe.  He  refused  to  stop,  and  was  killed  in  the  act  of  firing 
his  last  bullet. 


Chapter  XXVIII 

CAMPAIGN  AROUND  COLESBERG 


General  Schoeman’s  commando  occupies  Colesberg — Description  of 
DISTRICT — Inactivity  of  Schoeman — Tactics  of  General  French, 
HIS  opponent — Piet  De  Wet  assumes  Boer  command — Five  days’ 

FIGHTING  FOR  POSITION BOERS  RETIRE  TO  COLESBERG  DEFENSES — 

Defeat  of  the  Suffolks — De  la  Rey  assumes  Boer  command — 
Defeats  British  rear-guard  at  Rensburg  Siding — Drawn  battle  at 
Slingusfontein — British  forced  south  to  Naauwpoort  Junction 
— De  la  Rey  goes  north  with  Rand  Police  to  join  Cronje — Ex- 
ploit OF  Dan  Viljoen. 


^VT'XE  will  leave  the  scene  of  operations  on  the  Tugela  for  a brief 
VV  space  in  order  to  deal  with  the  campaign  in  the  Colesberg 
District  of  Cape  Colony. 

I have  summarized  the  course  of  events  south  of  the  Orange 
Eiver  in  the  early  part  of  a previous  chapter,  and  told  how  the 
occupation  of  the  Colesberg,  Burghersdorp,  and  Aliwal  districts 
by  Free  State  forces  under  Generals  Grobler,  Ollivier,  and  Schoe- 
man led  to  the  attempt  on  the  part  of  General  Gatacre  to  surprise 
Ollivier  and  his  men  at  Stormberg  Junction,  on  the  10th  of  Decem- 
ber. The  results  of  this  disastrous  adventure  to  the  British  have 
been  related  in  the  same  chapter. 

Following  the  Boer  victory  at  Stormberg,  the  English  general 
retired  dispirited  to  the  camp  at  Putterskraal,  and  the  fighting 
between  the  British  and  Boer  forces  in  the  north  of  Cape  Colony 
was  transferred  to  the  Colesberg  district,  some  eighty  miles  north- 
west of  Stormberg,  and  about  thirty  south  of  the  Orange  Eiver. 

General  Schoeman,  a wealthy  Transvaaler  of  some  military 
experience,  was  elected  Commandant  of  the  Transvaal  and  Free 
State  Burghers  and  Cape  Colony  Volunteers  who  formed  the  mixed 
commando  which  took  possession  of  Colesberg,  in  November,  1899. 

This  body  numbered  some  2,000  men.  The  Volunteers  from  the 
surrounding  country,  who  knew  the  entire  district  and  had  reli- 
ance upon  the  sympathies  of  the  Dutch  population,  urged  an  im- 
mediate march  southward  with  the  object  of  seizing  the  railway 
junction  at  Naauwpoort,  which  was  held  at  the  time  by  a weak 
British  garrison. 


CAMPAIGN  ABOUND  COLESBERG 


357 


Schoeman  would  not  sanction  any  such  forward  movement, 
tho  the  distance  was  no  more  than  fifty  miles  along  the  rail- 
road. He  made  Colesberg  his  headquarters,  and  there  he  insisted 
on  remaining  for  fully  a month,  during  which  time  British  troops 
were  despatched  from  Cape  Town  to  strengthen  Naauwpoort,  while 
to  General  French  was  entrusted  the  task  of  holding  the  railway 
and  the  country  south  of  where  Schoeman  was  engaged  in  his 
role  of  masterly  inactivity. 

The  arrival  of  French  with  reenforcements  at  this  important 
junction,  compelled  the  Federal  governments  to  pay  attention  to 
the  complaints  urged  by  the  burghers  against  General  Schoeman’s 
tactics,  and  Commandant  Piet  De  Wet  was  appointed  fighting 
general  to  the  forces  in  the  locality. 

In  addition  to  this  change,  200  of  the  Johannesburg  Police  were 
added  to  the  Colesberg  garrison.  Subsequently  additions  were  also 
made  from  General  Grobler’s  command,  and  when  the  English 
forces  were  increased  later  still  in  men  and  guns  to  close  upon 
12,000  troops  and  four  or  five  batteries  of  artillery.  General  De  la 
Eey  was  detached  from  the  Magersfontein  army  early  in  January,  to 
assume  command  of  the  Federals,  and  bar  French’s  way  in  any 
attempt  to  carry  the  enemy’s  force  across  the  Orange  Eiver  at 
Isorvals  Pont,  on  the  direct  road  to  Bloemfontein. 

Colesberg  is  a picturesque  village  with  about  1,500  inhabitants, 
lying  in  a valley  surrounded  by  bare  hills.  It  was  noted  in  the  last 
generation  as  a rendezvous  for  hunters  and  for  diamond  dealers. 

It  is  claimed  to  the  credit  of  the  little  town  that  the  man  who 
found  the  first  diamond  at  New  Bush  (Kimberley)  was  John 
O’Eeilly,  a citizen  of  Colesberg. 

The  railway  from  Port  Elizabeth  to  the  Free  State  border 
passes  near  to  Colesberg,  on  to  Norvals  Pont,  where  it  crosses  the 
Orange  Eiver.  South  of  Colesberg,  the  villages  of  Eensburg, 
Arundel,  and  Teesdale,  each  with  a railway  station,  intervened  be- 
tween Schoeman’s  headquarters  and  the  junction  at  jSTaauwpoort 
which  was  General  French’s  base  for  his  operations  against  the 
Boer  commandoes  at  Colesberg. 

The  plan  of  the  British  in  their  marches  and  countermarches 
through  the  Colesberg  district,  from  November  until  February, 
when  French  was  transferred  to  Modder  Eiver  to  carry  out  Lord 
Eoberts’  plan  for  a cavalry  dash  on  Kimberley,  was  to  keep  engaged 
as  large  a number  of  burghers  as  possible,  with  the  object  of  pre- 
venting their  cooperation  with  Botha  on  the  Tugela  or  with  Cronje 
at  Magersfontein,  and  of  stopping  their  further  movement  south- 
ward into  Cape  Colony. 

Fully  5,000  Boers  were  thus  engaged  during  December  and  Jan- 


358 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


uary.  This  number  represented  nearly  one-sixth  of  the  entire 
Federal  forces  in  the  field,  and  the  work  of  the  12,000  troops 
who  forced  these  commandoes  to  defend  the  British  districts  which 
they  had  invaded,  was  worth  more  to  the  general  plan  of  operations 
against  the  Federals  than  the  defeats  to  which  French  and 
Clements  were  repeatedly  subjected  at  the  hands  of  De  la  Eey  and 
Piet  De  Wet. 

French’s  troops  included  Scots  Greys,  Inniskillings,  Hussars, 
Household  Cavalry,  several  mounted  Colonial  regiments,  Yorkshires, 
Suffolks,  Berkshires,  Wiltshires,  Eoyal  Irish,  Worcesters,  Dragoon 
Guards,  and  other  forces,  together  with  four  batteries  of  field  and 
horse  artillery. 

The  forces  on  both  sides  assumed  their  maximum  strength  in 
J anuary;  there  having  been  no  more  than  half  the  numbers  given 
above  present  in  tbe  field  up  to  Christmas.  General  French  was  in 
supreme  command  of  the  British,  until  he  left  for  the  Modder 
Eiver  early  in  February,  1900. 

Schoeman  commanded  the  Boers  until  about  the  middle  of 
December,  when  Commandant  Piet  De  Wet  assumed  the  control, 
aided  by  Generals  Grobler  and  Lemmer,  and  Commandant  Fouche. 
On  January  7,  General  De  la  Eey  was  delegated  to  take  over  the 
supreme  command,  and  he  left  the  Magersfontein  lines  for  that 
purpose.  He  remained  in  chief  control  until  French  was  trans- 
ferred to  another  command,  and  until  General  Clements  was  com- 
pelled to  retreat  with  this  fourth  British  army  back  to  Arundel. 

Ho  important  engagement  occurred  around’Colesberg  before  the 
1st  of  January,  1900.  Skirmishes,  affairs  with  outposts,  and  scout- 
ing operations  occupied  the  energies  of  both  armies  during  the 
six  weeks  which  elapsed  from  the  seizure  of  Colesberg  by  the 
Boers,  until  a six  days’  contest  began  between  French  and  Schoe- 
man, and  Piet  De  Wet  on  December  31,  which  resulted  in  the  re- 
tirement of  the  advanced  burgher  outposts  from  Eensburg  to  Coles- 
berg. During  this  running  fight,  the  object  of  the  English  was,  to 
get  round  the  right  flank  of  the  extended  Boer  line,  southwest  of 
Colesberg,  turn  Schoeman’s  flank,  and  occupy  the  hills  immediately 
surrounding  the  town,  from  which  positions  of  advantage,  the 
holding  of  the  village  by  the  Boers  would  be  rendered  impossible. 

The  Boer  tactics  were  those  of  aggressive  defense  which  inferior 
forces  are  induced  to  adopt,  when  the  nature  of  the  terrain  enables 
strong  positions  to  be  held  by  a few  men,  while  the  greater  number 
have  to  be  employed  in  preventing  the  outflanking  maneuvers  of 
the  enemy. 

The  hilly  country  southwest  of  Colesberg  was  adapted  to  the 
emjdoyment  of  these  tactics,  and  enabled  the  Boers  to  hold  their 


CAMPAIGN  AROUND  C0LE8BERG 


359 


own  against  French’s  greatly  superior  forces  in  men  and  guns. 
Fighting  was  continued  along  a very  extended  line,  over  an  area  of 
fifteen  or  twenty  miles,  and  partook  largely  of  surprise  attacks 
upon  detached  bodies  or  posts  engaged  in  turning  or  scouting 
operations. 

During  the  first  week  of  January  General  French  employed  all 
his  command  in  a series  of  attempts  to  drive  his  opponents  off  the 
hills  south  of  Colesberg  into  the  village,  and  to  capture  a prominent 
and  symmetrical  hill  which  dominated  the  entire  country  from  its 
position,  some  four  or  five  miles  southwest  of  the  town. 

A secondary  position  on  a kopje  west  of  the  town  was  held  by 
the  German  corps  of  fifty  men,  with  as  many  Johannesburgers 
under  Jacob  Celliers,  cooperating. 

These  were  attacked  from  right  to  left  by  a large  force  of  the 
enemy  with  guns.  A spirited  encounter  followed  for  several  hours 
when,  after  repulsing  a charge  by  500  or  600  of  the  enemy,  Celliers 
retired  to  another  position,  allowing  his  foes  to  occupy  the  vacated 
hill.  That  night  Commandant  Piet  De  Wet  with  a body  of  200 
Free  Staters  went  to  the  support  of  Celliers,  and  the  combined 
forces  gained  a footing  nearer  the  captured  hill  and  awaited  the 
morning’s  light  to  attack  and  retake  it.  The  English  had,  how- 
ever, also  strengthened  their  hold  on  the  kopje  by  additional  men 
and  four  guns,  and  a determined  fight  which  lasted  for  several 
hours,  on  the  4th  of  J anuary,  was  the  result. 

During  the  engagement.  General  Schoeman  attempted  to  co- 
operate w'ith  Piet  De  Wet  by  attacking  the  enemy’s  right  with  a 
relieving  force  of  500  men.  The  effort  was  not  successful,  as 
French  succeeded  in  throwing  a superior  force  with  a battery  of 
guns  in  between  the  two  Boer  positions,  with  the  result  that  De 
Wet  and  Schoeman  were  forced  back  nearer  Colesberg,  after  five 
hours’  fighting,  with  a loss  of  50  or  60  men. 

A combat  with  some  of  the  features  of  the  old  style  of  warfare 
took  place  during  the  fight  for  the  hill,  which  riveted  the  attention 
of  both  forces  while  it  lasted.  Thirty  burghers  retiring  from  the 
kopje  held  by  Piet  De  Wet  were  crossing  the  field  of  battle  to  a 
ridge  where  the  Johannesburg  Police  were,  as  usual,  more  than 
holding  their  own,  and  were  making  vigorous  use  of  their  auto- 
matic guns.  The  movement  of  the  mounted  burghers  was  observed 
by  two  companies  of  Lancers,  who  immediately  galloped  towards 
them  over  the  level  ground.  The  Boers  seeing  the  dusty  horse- 
men coming  from  near  a position  which  had  been  held  by  some 
of  Schoeman’s  men  earlier  in  the  morning,  believed  them  to  be 
friends,  and  did  not  fully  discover  their  mistake  until  a space  of 
100  yards  alone  divided  the  two  mounted  forces.  On  recognizing 


360 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


the  enemy’s  men,  the  Boers  leaped  from  their  horses  and  opened 
fire  upon  the  Lancers,  almost  at  point-blank  range.  The  first  line 
of  horses  was  shot  and  the  gallojD  of  the  English  was  arrested, 
Avhen  the  superior  Boer  rifie  and  more  accurate  aim  of  the  burghers 
soon  decided  the  issue  of  the  combat.  Only  six  of  the  70  or  80 
Lancers  were  seen  riding  hack  to  their  lines  from  the  scene  of  the 
brief  but  decisive  encounter. 

The  result  of  the  four  or  five  days’  desultory  fighting  was  the 
gradual  retirement  of  Piet  De  Wet  and  Schoeman  nearer  to  the 
town,  but  to  the  occupation  of  stronger  positions  more  immediately 
around  it.  One  of  these  was  a hill,  three  miles  north  of  the  village, 
which,  next  to  Coleskop,  was  deemed  by  French  to  be  the  key  of 
his  opponent’s  strong  lines  of  defense  at  Colesberg. 

It  was  resolved  by  French  to  attempt  to  carry  this  hill  by  a 
surprise  attack  under  cover  of  darkness,  and  some  200  of  the  Suffolk 
liegiment,  led  by  Colonel  Watson,  were  charged  with  the  carrying 
out  of  this  daring  enterprise. 

The  hill  being  so  far  north  of  the  British  lines  was  thought  by 
the  Boers  to  he  safe  from  assault,  and  it  was  only  held  by  a body 
of  100  Free  Staters,  Heilbron  men,  on  that  Saturday  morning,  the 
Cth  of  January.  Away  on  another  ridge,  distant  about  three  miles, 
a detachment  of  Johannesburg  Police  were  located,  and  while  these 
were  in  at  the  finish  of  the  fight  which  followed,  the  honors  of  the 
signal  victory  won  in  the  early  morning  hours  belonged  to  the  Heil- 
bron burghers  alone,  who  have  scored  so  many  more  triumphs 
since  then  under  General  Christian  De  Wet. 

Watson  and  his  Suffolks  set  out  from  their  lines  about  midnight. 
The  men  had  muffled  their  shoes  with  soft  covering  so  as  to  steal 
silently  along  on  their  daring  errand  with  as  little  noise  as  pos- 
sible. Guides  from  the  locality  were  employed  who  knew  every 
yard  of  the  distance,  and  so  well  carried  out  was  the  plucky  plan 
to  seize  the  kopje  that  Watson  and  his  men  had  reached  the  very 
slope  of  the  coveted  hill  just  before  dawn  in  the  morning,  and 
before  a single  Boer  had  heard  or  seen  anything  of  the  advancing 
Suffolks. 

The  sentinel’s  Mauser  ahead  of  the  Heilbron  men  rang  out  its 
startling  signal  of  danger,  and  in  an  instant  the  enemy’s  further 
progress  up  the  side  of  the  kop  was  arrested  by  fire  of  the  alert 
biirghers.  The  fighting  took  place  in  the  semi-darkness  of  the 
early  summer  morning,  but  so  cool  and  well  directed  was  the  work 
of  the  Heilbroners  that  half  of  the  storming  Tommies,  including 
Colonel  Watson,  were  shot  down  in  a few  moments.  Most  of 
those  who  were  not  hit  raced  down  the  hill,  only  to  be  met  a short 
time  afterward  by  the  Eand  Police  to  whom  those  of  the  Suffolks 


CAMPAIGN  AROUND  COLESBEEG 


361 


who  were  not  hit  surrendered  as  soon  as  the  full  light  of  the  morn- 
ing revealed  the  full  dangers  of  the  situation. 

The  English  lost  a hundred  killed  and  wounded  in  this  engage- 
ment, while  the  other  hundred  hoisted  the  white  flag  and  laid 
down  their  arms. 

The  Heilbron  men’s  loss  in  the  flght  was  7 men  killed  and  12 
wounded. 

So  close  were  the  English  in  formation  when  they  were  first 
fired  upon  that  twenty-seven  dead  bodies  were  found  within  an 
area  of  twenty  yards. 

When  the  task  of  the  ambulance  began  one  of  these  Tommies 
was  found  riddled  with  bullets  from  his  knees  upward,  so  near 
were  the  combatants,  and  so  deadly  was  the  burgher  fire. 

Colonel  Watson  was  shot  through  the  head  at  the  very  front  of 
his  men;  a Boer  whom  it  is  believed  the  English  officer  had  himself 
killed  being  found  close  to  the  body  of  the  dead  colonel. 

Following  the  defeat  of  the  Suffolks,  Piet  De  Wet  and  Schoeman 
took  the  aggressive  in  a two  days’  series  of  detached  engagements, 
and  forced  the  enemy  back  again  southward  over  the  old  ground 
in  the  direction  of  Eensburg.  On  the  9th  of  January  General  De 
la  Bey  arrived  from  Magersfontein  as  fighting  general,  and  the 
presence  of  this  splendid  officer  with  his  cpiiet,  self-confident 
bearing  and  magnetic  qualities  infused  greater  confidence  into  the 
Federal  forces.  Commandant  Tan  Dam  with  the  remainder  of  the 
Johannesburg  Police  Corps  arrived  also  as  a reenforcement,  and 
De  la  Bey  lost  no  time  in  forcing  the  fighting. 

French  had  likewise  been  reenforced,  but  by  a much  larger 
body  of  troops  and  guns;  still  the  great  prestige  of  De  la  Bey  and 
his  reputation  for  a series  of  triumphs  gained  without,  as  yet,  a 
single  defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  put  the  burghers  and 
Cape  Volunteers  in  the  best  fighting  spirit,  and  soon  the  lines  round 
Colesberg  were  held  in  greater  confidence  than  before,  with  the 
English  forced  into  the  adoption  of  defensive  tactics. 

On  the  15th  of  January  a body  of  Australian  troopers  with  some 
English  cavalry  surprised  and  took  a hill  called  the  Zwartsrand 
which  had  been  held  by  a few  burghers.  The  attacking  force  was 
300  strong,  and  they  easily  gained  and  held  the  position  for  a time. 
What  occurred  in  the  incident  I am  about  to  relate  will  not  be 
doubted  by  those  of  the  enemy  who  may  have  fought  during  the 
war  against  the  Band  Police. 

Eight  men  of  Van  Dam’s  renowned  Police  Corps,  believing  that 
the  Zwartsrand  was  occupied  by  no  more  than  20  or  30  of  the 
enemy,  rode  at  the  position  in  a spur  gallop,  dismounted  at  the 
bottom  of  the  hill,  and  deliberately  charged  the  kopje;  coolly 


362 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


mounting  and  firing  into  the  ranks  of  the  Colonials  and  British 
on  the  top.  On  discovering  the  extent  of  the  force  which  was  thus 
audaciously  attacked,  the  eight  “ Zarps  ” beat  a hasty  retreat,  leav- 
ing one  killed  and  three  of  their  number  wounded ; the  other  four 
succeeding  in  making  good  their  escape ; owing,  in  all  human  prob- 
ability, let  us  hope,  to  the  fact  that  the  300  Britishers  were  none 
too  willing  to  fire  further  upon  men  capable  of  attempting  so 
plucky  an  exploit. 

A small  body  of  burghers,  numbering  only  thirty  men,  believing 
a jmsition  held  by  some  New  Zealanders  was  not  in  possession  of 
more  than  fifty  of  the  enemy,  charged  it  and  fell  into  an  ambush 
of  Yorkshires  and  New  Zealand  troopers,  150  strong.  Three- 
fourths  of  the  burghers  were  killed  or  captured. 

A few  days  following  this  Boer  mishap,  an  almost  indentical 
encounter  took  place,  with  the  fortunes  of  war  reversed;  a score  of 
Australian  horsemen  finding  themselves  surrounded  by  superior 
forces  and  compelled  to  surrender  to  Piet  De  Wet’s  men. 

On  the  5th  of  February  a detachment  under  De  la  Eey,  who 
were  hotly  engaged  with  a body  of  British  near  a place  called 
Polfontein  resorted  to  a stratagem  borrowed  from  the  military 
tactics  of  the  ancients.  Being  in  greatly  inferior  numbers,  and 
as  the  English  held  the  stronger  position,  the  burghers  collected 
about  100  horses  from  spare  mounts  and  neighboring  farms,  and, 
driving  them  into  something  like  a line,  whipped  them  straight 
across  the  open  space  between  the  opposing  forces.  The  enemy 
fired  on  the  galloping  horses,  but  this  in  no  way  arrested  their 
frantic  career  over  the  veldt.  Behind  the  flying  steeds  the  burghers 
charged  safely  over  the  ground  and,  taking  advantage  of  the  con- 
fusion caused  by  the  horses,  shot  the  enemy  back  upon  French’s 
main  lines  at  Basfontein. 

De  la  Eey  now  pushed  his  lines  southward  towards  Eensburg, 
adopting  against  the  enemy’s  right  a turning  movement  similar  to 
that  which  the  British  had  been  attempting  for  a month  towards 
the  corresponding  right  of  their  opponents.  General  French,  how- 
ever, left  the  English  lines  round  Colesberg  early  in  February,  for 
Cape  Town,  from  whence  he  joined  Lord  Eoberts  for  his  great  move- 
ment against  Cronje  at  Magersfontein,  leaving  the  British  army 
at  Eensburg  in  command  of  General  Clements.  A few  days  sub- 
sequently De  la  Eey  caught  up  with  the  rear  guard  of  the  retiring 
enemy  north  of  Eensburg  Siding,  and  in  a short  but  brilliant  en- 
counter forced  over  150  of  the  Wiltshire  Eegiment  to  surrender, 
after  some  forty-nine  of  the  British  had  been  killed. 

This  action  was  followed  in  a few  days  by  a desperate  fight 
between  Colesberg  and  Eensburg  in  which  the  honors  were  claimed 


CAMPAIGN  ABOUND  COLESBERG 


363 


on  both  sides.  Some  500  of  De  la  Eey’s  men  made  a night  attack 
upon  a regiment  which  held  a hill  at  Slingusfontein.  It  was  an 
action  similar  to  that  in  which  Colonel  Watson  and  the  Suffolks 
suffered  so  severely  in  January.  The  burghers  gained  the  enemy’s 
position  at  midnight,  and  pushed  their  way,  under  the  darkness, 
close  to  the  Worcestershire  men,  some  700  strong,  who  were  well 
sheltered  by  stone  sangars.  The  first  of  the  enemy’s  lines  was 
carried,  the  Boers  shooting  with  great  accuracy  even  in  the  dark. 
As  the  morning  light  appeared,  however,  the  comparative  weakness 
of  the  attacking  force  was  seen,  and  the  defending  British  began 
to  make  it  exceedingly  warm  for  the  midnight  visitors. 

Guns  were  brought  into  play  on  the  British  side  from  the  nearest 
of  the  enemy’s  lines,  and  a large  number  of  the  burghers  were  shot 
down  as  they  advanced.  The  men  held  their  ground  with  great 
tenacity  until  De  la  Eey  was  enabled  to  send  up  reenforcements 
from  the  Eand  Police.  With  these  the  burghers  on  the  hill  main- 
tained the  combat  all  the  day.  When  night  came  on  again,  both 
sides  resolved  to  abandon  the  hill,  in  the  mutual  belief  that  the 
other’s  hold  upon  it  could  not  be  shaken.  On  the  following  morn- 
ing the  British  were  found  to  have  evacuated  the  position  and  fallen 
back  again  upon  Eensburg.  The  losses  during  this  twelve  hours’ 
fighting  were  almost  equal;  about  100  men  being  killed  and 
wounded  on  each  side. 

From  this  time  forth  De  la  Eey  beat  his  opponents  at  every 
engagement,  capturing  small  bodies  of  Australian  troops,  of  Innis- 
killings,  and  others  of  Clements’  somewhat  disorganized  army.  The 
absence  of  French  seemed  to  have  dispirited  the  enemy’s  troops, 
and  they  made  but  a poor  stand  against  the  increasing  attacks 
and  dash  of  the  inspirited  biirghers.  The  English  were  compelled 
to  even  evacuate  Eensburg,  and  to  retreat  still  further  south 
towards  ISTaauwpoort  Junction. 

Meanwhile,  events  were  shaping  themselves  150  miles  further 
northwest  where,  at  this  very  time.  General  French  at  the  head 
of  5,000  horsemen  was  making  his  famous  dash  from  Eamdam  on 
Kimberley,  with  Lord  Eoberts  following  in  his  wake  with  40,000 
men  with  whom  to  smash  Cronje’s  commandoes  and  bar  their  way 
eastward  to  Bloemfontein. 

De  la  Eey  was  called  from  the  scene  of  his  month’s  brilliant 
campaign  round  Colesberg  to  the  theater  of  impending  disaster 
near  Paardeberg.  He  left  Generals  Grobler,  Lemmer,  Ollivier,  and 
Schoeman  with  the  Free  State  burghers  and  Cape  Volunteers  to 
guard  the  positions  which  had  been  so  successfully  held  against 
French  and  Clements,  taking  only  Van  Dam  and  the  Eand  Police 
force  with  him  to  the  Modder  Eiver,  near  Koedesrand,  where  he 


3G4 


THE  BO  EE  FIGHT  FOE  FEE  EDOM 


expected  to  meet  the  combined  Magersfontein  and  other  Boers  of 
the  western  Federal  army  in  position  to  stop  Eoberts’  movement  on 
the  Free  State  capital. 

The  story  of  how  and  why  De  la  Eey  did  not  find  his  anticipa- 
tions realized,  will  be  told  in  the  chapter  dealing  with  the  dramatic 
surrender  of  General  Cronje  near  the  place  where,  had  De  la  Eey 
been  at  the  head  of  the  men  under  Cronje’s  command.  Lord 
Eoberts’  huge  army  would  have  met  with  its  Sedan. 

A story  of  the  prowess  of  one  Daniel  Viljoen,  of  Germiston,  has 
gone  the  round  of  the  Free  State  laagers,  and  was  told  me  by  so 
many  narrators  that  it  merits  recording.  In  the  running  fight 
between  De  la  Eey’s  men  and  the  Wiltshire  regiment,  near  Eens- 
burg,  Dan  Viljoen,  a quiet,  modest  burgher  of  herculean  build,  and 
a dead  shot,  found  himself  on  a turn  of  a road  in  front  of  seventeen 
of  the  Wiltshire  Tommies.  He  instantly  shouted,  “ Hands  up,  my 
men  are  behind  ! ” and  the  seventeen  Britishers  believed  him, 
threw  down  their  arms,  held  up  their  hands,  and  were  marched 
into  De  la  Eey’s  ranks  as  prisoners  by  the  Germiston  hero. 

We  return  again  to  the  progress  of  events  on  the  Tugela. 


Chapter  XXIX 


SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  ABANDONED 


British  demonstration  in  force — Battle  of  Vaal  Krantz — How  Vil- 

JOEN  SAVED  the  POM-POM — BOERS  RETAHE  VaaL  KRANTZ BOTHA’S 

REPORT  OF  BATTLE BULLER  SEIZES  LaNGWANI  HilL — AgAIN  CROSSES 

THE  Tugela — Battle  of  Grobler's  Ki.oof — Battle  of  Pieter’s  Hill 
— Surrender  of  the  Inniskillings — Buller’s  use  of  armistice — 
Evacuation  of  Pieter’s  Hill — Botha’s  masterly  retreat — 
Kruger’s  proclamation — End  of  invasions  of  Natal. 

X Sunday  night,  February  4,  patrols  returned  from  across 


the  river  with  the  information  that  another  forward  move- 


ment  was  about  to  take  place  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  General 
Botha  was  in  Pretoria  on  a visit  to  his  family,  and  General  Lukas 
Meyer  was  in  command  at  Colenso.  General  Schalk  Burger  was, 
therefore,  in  charge  of  the  burghers  on  the  Upper  and  Middle 
Tugela,  with  General  Tobias  Smuts  of  Ermelo,  and  Commandants 
Viljoen  and  Andries  Cronje  as  most  prominent  officers  next  in 
rank.  The  British  were  found  massing  behind  Mount  Alice  and 
the  Swartzkop,  which  the}’  still  held,  with  the  apparent  intention 
of  crossing  again  at  Potgieter’s  Drift,  where  Lyttleton’s  forces  had 
gone  over  previously  as  a feint  to  mask  Warren’s  operations  further 
west.  Cycle  despatch-riders  were  sent  at  once  to  all  the  Boer  posi- 
tions east  and  west  of  Burger’s  laager  at  Brakfontein,  while  tele- 
grams were  forwarded  to  Botha  and  Meyer. 

Early  on  ]\Ionday  morning  the  naval  guns  on  Mount  Alice  opened 
tire  upon  the  hills  north  of  Potgieter’s,  while  a large  body  of  British 
troops  passed  over  by  the  Drift  and  advanced  tentatively  towards 
the  high  ridges,  immediately  east  of  Spion  Kop,  held  by  the  Senekal 
commando.  This  movement  was  soon  found  to  be  more  of  a recon- 
naissance and  of  a containing  effort  than  a frontal  attack;  the  object 
being  to  locate  the  Boer  guns  and  forces.  There  was  no  response 
to  the  enemy’s  artillery,  nor  any  sign  of  occupation  on  the  plateau, 
until  the  British  had  advanced  to  within  some  1,500  yards  of  the 
entrenched  burghers.  Then  the  ]\Tausers  and  Krupps  sang  out 
their  defiant  reply  to  the  thunder  of  lyddite  batteries  and  field  guns, 
and  so  well  directed  was  the  fire  of  the  Federals  that  the  enemy’s 
movement  was  arrested.  The  English  guns  across  the  river  eon- 


3GG 


THE  BOEE  FIGHT  FOB  FBEEDOM 


tinned  to  play  upon  the  hills  in  front,  lint  nothing  conld  shake  the 
burghers’  hold  upon  their  positions,  and  the  enemy  fell  back  on  the 
Drift,  shelled  by  the  two  Boer  Krupps  from  Brakfontein  in  their 
retreat. 

This  demonstration  in  force  Avas,  howe\'er,  only  intended  to  mask 
a determined  attack  ujjon  the  hills  east  of  Brakfontein,  three  or 
four  miles  nearer  Colenso,  where  tAvo  drifts  crossed  the  Tugela, 
leading  through  the  defile  of  Patrol  Spruit  which  is  the  shortest 
road  from  the  rh^er  to  Ladysmith.  These  drifts  AA^ere  immediately 
under  SAA^artzkop,  and  the  English  had  carried  a battery  of  tAveLe- 


COMMANDANT  BEN  VILJOEN  AND  STAFF 


pound  naAml  guns  on  to  this  hill  during  Sunday  night.  A pontoon 
bridge  was  also  thrown  across  the  river  on  Monday  at  the  most 
eastern  passage,  Skiet  Drift,  while  no  less  than  fifty  additional 
guns  AA'ere  so  placed  that  they  commanded  all  the  positions  occupied 
by  the  burghers. 

These  operations  on  Monday  morning  did  not  find  the  burghers 
unprepared.  Opposite  SAvartzkop,  to  the  east  of  Brakfontein,  a high 
hill  called  Doom  Kop  was  occupied  by  a Long  Tom,  while  the 
guns  which  had  been  so  AA’ell  serA'ed  at  Spion  Kop  were  in  position 
along  the  ridge  each  side  of  the  defile  through  which  the  road 
passed  on  to  Ladysmith.  To  the  left  of  where  the  pontoon  bridge 
Avas  throAAm  over  the  river,  a small  kopje  called  Vaal  Krantz  stood, 
under  the  shadow  of  a higher  hill  to  its  left,  with  Doom  Kop  again 


SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  ABANDONED 


3G7 


to  the  left  of  that.  Tlie  chief  Boer  positions,  therefore,  extended 
from  Spion  Kop  eastward  to  the  hills  to  the  left  of  Doom  Kop,  and 
the  crossing  of  the  Tugela  by  the  English  at  Skiet’s  Drift  was  to 
mean  a direct  attack  upon  the  low  hill  of  Vaal  Ivrantz,  which  was 
occupied  by  50  men  of  Ben  Yiljoen’s  Band  Brigade,  and  some  30 
of  the  Standerton  commando.  This  small  force,  with  a single  pom- 
pom, held  this  more  or  less  isolated  position  in  accordance  with  the 
iisnal  tactics  of  the  Boers.  These  plans  invariably  invited  the 
enemy’s  first  attack  upon  a secondary  Boer  position — one  held  well 
within  range  of  concealed  guns  behind,  or  to  the  left  or  right,  as 
the  nature  of  the  terrain  would  suggest.  The  British  would  con- 
centrate artillery  fire  and  troops  upon  this  secondary  position,  in 
response  to  a challenging  fire,  and  if  the  burghers  were  driven  out 
hj''  numbers  or  guns,  the  British  woxild  rush  the  place  only  to  be 
found  within  closer  range  of  a combined  rifie  and  artillery  fire  from 
the  hitherto  masked  main  force  of  their  adversaries. 

This  was  what  happened  at  Yaal  Krantz,  but  the  fight  which  was 
there  made  by  Ben  Yiljoen  and  his  handful  of  Band  burghers  and 
Uitlanders  is  probably  a feat  of  sheer  indomitable  pluck  which  has 
never  been  surpassed  in  the  history  of  civilized  warfare.  This  hill, 
which  was  neither  high  nor  precipitous,  stood  back  about  a mile 
from  a sharp  bend  in  the  river,  and  was  within  range,  if  not  within 
actual  vision,  of  no  less  than  seventy  English  guns,  including  all 
the  navals  on  Swartzkop.  Under  cover  of  these  ten  batteries  a 
force  of  some  3,000  troops,  advancing  in  extended  order,  attacked 
this  hill,  and  for  fully  seven  hours  the  eighty  men  under  Yiljoen 
held  their  ground  in  magnificent  defiance  of  that  combined  attack. 

The  fight  with  the  Johannesburgers  began  with  the  construc- 
tion of  the  pontoon  bridge  in  the  morning.  A contingent  of  Yil- 
joen’s Brigade  and  Du  Preez  on  one  side,  and  a small  body  of  the 
same  command  led  by  Field  Cornet  Mostert  on  the  other,  harassed 
the  enemy  with  a brisk  rifie  fire  while  the  bridge  was  being  erected. 
The  English  guns,  however,  cleared  the  way  for  the  infantry  after 
several  hours’  bombardment,  when  the  real  attack  on  Yaal  Ivrantz 
commenced.  This  was  made,  as  already  mentioned,  by  some  3,000 
of  the  enemy’s  troops,  who  extended  out  right  and  left  with  the 
object  of  completely  enveloping  the  hill  where  Yiljoen  and  his 
handful  of  heroes  were  entrenched.  It  reads  as  a record  of  an 
almost  impossible  action  to  speak  of  so  small  a body  withstanding 
such  an  attack  from  so  overwhelming  a force,  but  there  is  no  better 
authenticated  fact  in  the  whole  story  of  the  war  than  that  which 
attests  the  unsurpassed  gallantry  of  Yiljoen  and  his  men  at  Yaal 
Ivrantz,  for  “ Not  even  the  ranks  of  Tuscany  could  scarce  forbear 
to  cheer  ” the  spectacle  of  such  a brilliant  feat  of  determined  valor. 


368 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEHOM 


coolness,  endurance,  and  resource  as  was  sliown  on  that  Monday  by 
the  Eand  men. 

Three  direct  infantry  attacks  on  Viljoen’s  position  were  repulsed, 
when  he  found  it  no  longer  possible  to  hold  his  own  ground  with- 
out surrender  or  extermination.  Of  his  force  of  eighty  men  one- 
third  had  been  killed  or  wounded;  the  first  of  the  killed  being  an 
Irishman  named  Michael  Fahey.  By  this  time,  too,  the  enemy’s 
right  were  within  300  yards  of  Viljoen’s  left.  How  was  the  pom- 
pom to  be  saved  ? This  was  the  problem  to  be  solved  amidst  that 
torrent  of  lyddite,  shrapnel,  and  bullets  which  had  rained  upon  that 
kopje  during  the  seven  hours’  contest.  Away  to  Viljoen’s  right, 
at  a distance  of  half  a mile,  behind  a projecting  ridge,  there  was 
shelter,  but  to  reach  this  place  an  open  space  of  some  500  or  600 
yards  had  to  be  crossed  under  all  this  incessant  fire.  Viljoen  re- 
solved at  all  costs  to  save  his  gun.  He  directed  the  remnant  of  his 
men  to  concentrate  their  fire  on  the  enemy’s  lines  nearest  the  route 
which  he  and  the  service  of  the  gun  were  to  take,  and  then  at  the 
given  signal  out  dashed  the  limber,  with  horses  lashed  into  a furious 
gallop,  tearing  over  the  open  space,  in  a wild  and  frantic  rush  for 
safety.  Shells  burst  now  in  front,  now  behind,  all  round  the  fly- 
ing horses;  bullets  pursued  the  drivers  and  escort  as  with  backs 
bent,  but  with  reins  held  in  the  hands  of  heroes,  the  burghers  in 
charge  cleared  the  space  with  lives  and  gun  intact,  only  to  halt 
round  the  first  protecting  ridge,  to  unlimber  again,  face  round  and 
ply  once  more  their  deadly  pom-pom  shells  upon  the  enemy’s  lines. 
To  the  credit  of  human  nature  be  it  recorded  that  some  of  the 
English  Tommies  who  witnessed  this  thrilling  act  of  bravery 
cheered  the  foemen  who  had  thus  displayed  a feat  which  made  all 
men  proud  that  such  acts  could  be  performed  in  contempt  of  all 
the  perils  that  lay  athwart  the  path  of  duty.  The  remnant  of  the 
Eand  men  vacated  Vaal  Krantz,  and  the  English  occupied  it  with 
a feeling  that  all  the  credit  and  glory  of  the  day  had  gone  with  the 
defenders  of  the  hill,  save  where  the  dead  and  the  wounded  lying 
around  shared  in  the  triumphs  of  a misnamed  defeat  for  Viljoen 
and  his  eighty  heroes. 

Traveling  night  and  day  from  Pretoria  Louis  Botha  reached 
the  field  of  battle  on  Tuesday  at  noon,  and  took  immediate  charge 
of  the  burgher  forces.  He  brought  with  him  some  of  the  men 
from  round  Ladysmith,  and,  on  making  himself  acquainted  with 
the  enemy’s  lines  and  dispositions,  assumed  the  aggressive  in  a sus- 
tained artillery  fire  upon  the  troops  who  had  taken  possession  of 
A’aal  Ivrantz.  This  fight,  mainly  with  guns,  lasted  Tuesday  and 
Wednesday;  the  English,  despite  their  enormous  preponderance  of 
men  and  cannon,  failing  to  advance  a single  step  nearer  Ladysmith 


SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  ABANDOXED 


369 


than  the  hill  so  clearly  won  on  Monday  afternoon.  So  well  directed 
was  Botha's  fnrious  fire  from  all  his  splendidly  mobile  commandoes, 
that  Buller's  huge  force  was  made  powerless  for  all  aggressive  pur- 
poses, and  had  to  put  itself  in  a defensive  attitude  against  the  plan 
of  battle  ■which  the  level-headed  young  farmer  had  evolved  out  of 
the  mistakes  made  by  his  opponent.  Once  on  Tuesday  a Boer  force 
attempted  to  recapture  Yaal  Krantz,  but  the  effort  was  not  success- 
ful. Again,  on  Wednesday  night  an  attack  was  delivered  against 
a body  of  reenforcements  sent  over  the  river  by  the  enemy  to  relieve 


viljoen’s  commando  defending  vaal  krantz 


the  troojis  who  had  been  on  the  hill  since  Monday.  These  aggres- 
sive attentions  of  Botha’s  were  intended  to  show  the  enemy  that 
the  burghers  Avho  barred  the  road  to  Ladysmith  were  confident  in 
their  capacity  to  defend  their  lines  even  to  the  extent  of  charging 
those  of  their  foemen.  Once  more  victory  rested  with  the  Vierk- 
leur.  The  general  who  had  cabled  to  England  after  Spion  Ivop 
that  he  had  found  the  key  to  Ladysmith,  and  Avould  be  there  in  a 
week,  had  to  amend  his  message  on  Thursday,  Febricary  8,  and  say 
that  the  key  would  not  turn,  and  that  he  was  once  more  south 
of  the  Tugela  with  his  31,000  men  and  72  guns;  his  force  having 
been  increased  following  the  reverse  of  the  24th  of  January. 

When  the  birrghers  regained  the  slopes  of  Yaal  Krantz  on 
Thursday  they  found  the  bodies  of  twenty-two  of  the  Band  men 
24 


370 


THE  BO  Eli  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


who  had  Ijeen  killed  on  Monday  lying  unhnried;  while  six  wounded 
burghers,  among  them  being  a young  son  of  ex-President  Brand, 
of  the  Free  State,  were  also  found,  who  related  that  they  had  neither 
been  ottered  food  nor  drink  nor  attention  by  the  British  on  the  hill 
during  the  two  days  and  nights  they  had  lain  there  exposed! 
General  Botha  expressed  himself  in  the  strongest  terms  of  indigna- 
tion at  this  evidence  of  callous  British  conduct  towards  helpless 
and  disabled  foes,  while  George  Brand,  an  elder  brother  of  one  of 
the  men  thus  baiFaronsly  neglected,  told  me  afterward,  when  I was 
sharing  his  tent  in  the  Orange  Free  State,  that  he  would  remember 
that  inhuman  treatment  of  his  brother  as  long  as  the  war  would 
last. 

On  the  reoccupation  of  the  hill  a number  of  broken  Lee-Metfords 
were  found  in  the  English  trenches.  These  damaged  rifles  gave 
rise  to  a Boer  story  that  a number  of  the  Tommies  who  had  held 
the  kopje  from  Monday  to  Wednesday  had  refused  to  Are  or  fight 
any  longer  in  a position  which  they  deemed  to  be  as  hopeless  as 
Spion  Kop,  and  that  it  was  this  state  of  feeling  among  the  soldiers 
on  Vaal  Ivrantz  which  compelled  Buller  to  ferry  them  again  to  the 
south  bank  of  the  Tugela. 

The  British  losses  in  the  attempt  to  get  past  Vaal  Krantz  were 
light  in  comparison  with  the  duration  of  the  contest;  a fact  due 
to  the  careful  cover  taken  by  the  troops  in  their  advance  upon  Vil- 
joen’s  positions.  BulleFs  casualties  amounted  to  about  300  all  told. 
The  Boer  losses  were  largely  those  of  Viljoen’s  brigade,  and  are 
referred  to  in  the  following  brief  account  of  the  battle  sent  by 
General  Botha  to  Mrs.  Botha,  on  Friday,  February  9 : 

“ From  Monday  to  yesterday  evening  there  has  been  heavy  fight- 
ing. I arrived  on  the  scene  early  on  Tuesday.  Commandant  Ben 
Viljoen  had  a fearful  heavy  day  on  Monday,  on  account  of  himself 
and  50  burghers  being  subjected  to  a terrible  bombardment  at  their 
position,  under  cover  of  which  the  enemy  succeeded  in  crossing  the 
river,  and  attacked  the  kop  guarded  by  the  Band  commando.  These 
klompje  ’ burghers  stood  gallantly  in  defense,  until  quite  two- 
thirds  of  them  were  killed  and  wounded. 

“ We  have  resisted  the  British  attacks  along  the  whole  line  from 
Tuesday  to  last  night,  during  which  the  enemy,  while  retreating 
south,  also  completely  destroyed  the  three  bridges  recently  made 
by  them. 

“ Our  loss  up  to  last  night  was  30  killed  and  15  wounded. 

“Again  we  must  thank  God  that  the  powerful  British  enemy 
has  had  to  retreat  in  front  of  our  small  number.” 


The  tide  of  Boer  victory  was  destined,  however,  to  ebh  soon 


SIEOE  OF  LADYSMITH  ABANDONED 


371 


after  the  l)rilliaut  action  of  the  Band  men  at  Vaal  Krantz.  The 
unequal  tight,  so  long  and  so  successfully  waged  between  forces 
more  unequal  in  men  and  guns  than  ever  contended  in  civilized 
warfare,  could  not  long  continue  after  four  months’  duration,  with- 
out the  side  having  the  huge  legions  making  headway  by  sheer  force 
of  numbers.  England  had  poured  her  men  into  South  Africa  from 
almost  all  parts  of  her  world-wide  Empire.  I recollect  General 
Botha  handing  me  a telegram  at  Glencoe  in  May  which  had  just 
reached  him  from  General  De  la  Eey  at  Brandfort,  announcing 
Lord  Eoberts’  advance  over  the  veldt  from  the  hills  above  the 
Modder  Eiver.  The  message  said,  in  pathetic  eloquence,  “ They 
are  swarming  over  like  locusts ! I cannot  shoot  them  back ! ” 
And  so  it  was  with  Botha  and  his  little  army  of  5,000  burghers  in 
Xatal.  Their  ranks  had  been  thinned  in  every  fight,  and  no  re- 
cruits came  to  fill  the  gaps.  The  Eepublics  had  put  their  last  fight- 
ing men  in  the  field,  while  the  British  levies  were  rolling  on  over 
the  seas  in  endless  processions  of  transport  ships,  leaving  a trail  of 
smoke  on  the  horizon  almost  from  London  to  Cape  Town,  as  an 
army  of  stokers  raced  the  fieets  and  steamers  along  with  their 
crowded  cargoes  of  men  and  munitions. 

Cronje  had  not  followed  up  the  great  victory  at  Magersfontein 
by  any  action  of  any  kind  that  would  lessen  the  strain  upon  Botha, 
or  make  for  the  better  safety  of  Bloemfontein  in  face  of  Lord 
Eoberts’  arrival,  and  of  his  preparations  for  an  advance  on  the 
Tree  State  capital.  This  supreme  movement  of  the  British  would, 
if  successful,  render  the  position  of  the  Federal  forces  in  Katal 
perilous,  and  the  news  of  Eoberts’  presence  at  the  Modder  Eiver 
on  the  9th  of  Febniary  was  ominous  information  for  the  valiant 
little  army  of  the  Tugela,  which  had  for  two  months  been  the  only 
portion  of  the  Federal  armies,  excepting  De  la  Eey’s  and  Ollivier’s 
commandoes  around  Colesberg,  engaged  in  a continuous  field  cam- 
paign against  the  enemy. 

On  Monday,  the  l‘3th  of  February,  300  of  the  Middelburg  com- 
mando patrolling  near  the  Blaaukrantz  Spruit,  south  of  Colenso, 
were  engaged  by  a force  of  some  800  of  the  enemy  who  had  ridden 
north  from  Chieveley  on  reconnaissance  purposes.  The  British  re- 
tired after  some  firing,  and  the  burghers  returned  with  information 
that  preparations  were  being  made  for  another  attack.  Large  bodies 
of  Buller’s  troops  were  observed,  on  the  two  following  days,  moving 
northeastward  towards  the  ridges  south  of  Langwani,  but  beyond 
skirmishes  between  patrols  on  both  sides,  and  a repetition  of  the 
old  cannonading  by  the  British  naval  guns,  no  serious  engagement 
occurred.  The  old  positions  at  Colenso  were  fully  reoccupied  by 
the  burghers  withdrawn  from  the  Upper  Tugela,  and  by  the  18th 


3r2 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Botha  and  Meyer  were  again  prepared  with  the  same  force  to  dis- 
pute Buller’s  fourth  attempt  to  pass  the  river. 

It  was  seen,  however,  as  the  movements  of  the  enemy  were  de- 
veloped, that  his  immediate  objective  was  not  Colenso,  but  Lang- 
wani  and  the  hills  still  further  eastward.  These  latter  hills  u'ere 
only  held  by  small  parties  of  burghers,  and  any  large  movement 
of  the  enemy  on  these  positions,  with  the  object  of  turning  the 
extreme  Boer  left,  would  render  Langwani  Hill  untenable  in  its 
isolated  location  south  of  the  Tugela.  Events  were  to  show  on 
the  early  morning  of  Sunday,  February  18,  that  Buller  had  at  last 
found  the  key  to  the  door  which  might  unlock  the  way  to  Lad}^- 
smith. 

Once  the  Federal  left  was  turned  cast  of  Langwani,  the  reten- 
tion of  that  hill  by  the  small  Boer  force  which  held  it  became  im- 
possible. There  was  also  the  doubt  as  to  whether  the  enemy  would 
attempt  to  cross  the  river  at  a drift  west  of  Pieter’s  Station,  in  the 
north  bend  of  the  Tugela,  or  force  a way  by  Colenso  with  Lang- 
wani in  his  possession.  Tacticall}'',  Buller  ought  to  have  done  both 
— to  have  crossed  simultaneously  with  his  huge  force,  as  he  might 
have  done — but  his  former  experiences  deterred  him  from  follow- 
ing up  the  advantage  gained  by  his  right  in  the  seizure  of  the 
Boshrand  and  Eandges  Hills. 

The  possession  of  these  hills  and  of  Langwani  was  spiritedly 
contested  by  the  Middelburg,  Swaziland,  Bethel,  and  Ermelo  com- 
mandoes, on  the  18th,  but  the  forces  against  them  were  fully  twenty 
to  one,  while  the  loss  of  the  positions  on  their  extreme  left  made 
a continued  effort  to  hold  the  lines  south  of  the  river  a mere  sacri- 
fice of  burgher  life;  so  Botha’s  men  fell  back,  and  crossed  to  the 
north  side  of  the  stream.  The  loss  in  the  fighting  on  and  around 
the  hills  was  not  heav}^,  but  the  loss  of  the  possession  of  Langwani 
was  felt  as  a stunning  blow  to  the  operations  in  Natal.  The  fire 
of  the  big  Creusot  gun  from  near  Pieter’s  Eailway  Station  during 
the  attack  on  the  Boer  commandoes  across  the  river  was  very  ef- 
fective, as  was  also  the  action  of  the  pom-poms,  and  the  British 
losses  numbered  more  than  150  in  the  engagement  of  the  18th. 

On  the  21st  Buller  resolved  to  try  his  luck  at  Colenso  again, 
having  now  the  whole  south  bank  of  the  Tugela  in  his  possession ; 
his  object  being  to  force  a way  past  Grobler’s  Kloof,  which  would 
be  the  easiest,  if  not  the  shortest,  way  to  the  lines  south  of  Lady- 
smith, where  he  could  receive  the  assistance  of  White’s  guns  at 
Caesar’s  Camp.  Eeports  had  doubtless  reached  the  English  lines 
that  Prinsloo’s  Free  Staters  had  left  the  defending  positions  north 
of  Colenso,  and  had  retired  through  Van  Eeenan’s  Pass  to  meet  the 
invasion  of  their  own  country  by  Eoberts’  army,  and  this  news  may 


SIEGE  OF  LADY8MITE  ABANDONED 


373 


have  determined  Buller  to  resolve  upon  making  a second  Colenso 
redeem  the  disaster  of  the  first.  But  the  burghers  of  Colenso  first, 
and  of  Spion  Eop,  tho  reduced  in  numbers,  were  still  a body 
of  fighters  to  he  reckoned  udth,  and  as  the  English  negotiated  the 
Tugela  by  two  pontoon  bridges  on  that  Wednesday  morning,  they 
found  the  ridges  in  front  held  by  Botha’s  men,  with  never  a sign 
that  they  were  going  to  allow  untoward  events  to  slacken  their  fire 
or  unnerve  their  souls  in  the  fight  against  the  enemy  of  their  homes 
and  country. 

The  British  crossed  the  river  in  large  force  east  and  west  of 
Colenso,  covered  by  guns  from  the  hills  eastward;  no  opposition 
being  offered  beyond  a rifle  attack  by  the  Boxburg  and  Heidelberg 
men,  who  were  posted  in  the  river  bed.  These  retired  on  the  posi- 
tions along  the  Onderbroek  Spruit  road,  the  British  following. 
They  were  allowed  to  approach  near  to  where  the  Middelburg  and 
Ermelo  men  were  located,  wdien  these  opened  such  a terrific  fire 
upon  them  that  they  retreated  back  to  the  river,  leaving  150  killed 
and  wounded  behind,  and  no  further  attempt  was  made  that  day 
to  get  past  a spot  so  well  defended.  On  Thursday  the  Boer  guns 
were  located  where  they  commanded  the  two  roads  by  Pieter’s  Sta- 
tion and  Grobler’s  Kloof,  and  wdth  Buller’s  immediate  intentions 
now  pretty  well  understood,  it  w'as  resolved  that  he  should  only  pass 
to  Ladysmith  over  the  bodies  of  the  burghers  in  front  of  him. 

The  tw'o  positions  most  strongly  held  by  Botha  and  Meyer  were 
Pieter’s  Hill  and  Grobler’s  Kloof;  the  railway  and  a roadway  to 
Ladysmith  running  in  between.  The  Middelburg  men,  under  the 
gallant  Commandant  Eourie,  w-ere  on  the  east  slope  of  Grobler’s, 
and  the  Krugersdorp  and  Eustenburg  men  holding  the  western 
slope  of  Pieter’s  Hill  opposite,  under  two  men  as  brave  as  any  who 
ever  fought  for  freedom— Commandant  Potgieter,  of  Eustenburg, 
who  took  the  surrender  of  Jameson  and  his  Eaiders  in  1896,  and 
Sarel  Oosthuizen,  a hero  of  fifty  fights,  the  valiant  Field  Cornet 
of  Krugersdorp. 

The  first  direct  attack  of  the  enemy  on  Thursday  was  upon  Com- 
mandant Fourie’s  position,  after  the  hill  had  been  subjected  for 
two  hours  to  a continuous  cannonading.  The  English  crept  for- 
ward under  cover  of  this  fire,  slowdy  and  cautiously,  in  a widely 
extended  line.  They  were  men  of  Lancashire  regiments,  some  of 
■whom  had  been  on  Spion  Kop.  No  enemy  of  the  hated  cause  they 
fought  for  will  think  them  less  brave  for  feeling,  as  they  must 
have  felt,  that  they  were  marching  to  death  or  disablement  two 
miles  ahead  of  20,000  other  troops  down  by  the  river,  who  were 
not  allowed  to  climb  these  heights  in  the  might  of  numbers  and 
sweep  the  few  Boers  in  front  before  seven  times  their  force  of 


374 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


British  adversaries.  On  they  came,  until  within  400  yards  of 
Fourie’s  Middelburgers,  when  there  was  a crash  of  leaden  thunder, 
and  down  went  the  Lancashire  lads  in  scores  before  the  wall  of  rifles 
in  front.  They  wavered,  rallied  again  like  the  plucky  “ Lancs  ” 
of  their  fighting  county,  but  there  would  be  no  taking  of  that  hill- 
side on  that  da)^  with  Fourie  and  his  burghers  to  defend  it.  Back 
again  to  the  river  went  the  broken  lines  of  the  enemy’s  battalions, 
beaten  once  more  by  fewer  but  braver  men. 

Night  came  on;  the  English  dead  and  wounded  lay  out  under 
the  starry  heavens,  with  no  hands  to  minister  to  the  wants  of  those 
still  needing  human  care;  the  enemy  in  his  thousands  down  below 
at  the  river,  careless  or  indifferent,  thinking  only  of  a possible  vic- 
tory by  a further  sacrifice  of  more  hired  troops  on  the  morrow. 
The  Boers  were  in  their  trenches,  rifles  in  hand,  as  if  never  in  need 
of  sleep,  in  their  vigilant  guardianship  of  the  ground  committed 
to  their  protection. 

Friday  morning  woke  serene  and  bright  over  the  still  smoking 
battle-field.  Again  began  the  bloody  program  of  the  previous  day. 
Lyddite  and  shrapnel  from  navals,  howitzers,  and  field  pieces  del- 
uged the  ridges  which  crossed  the  path  to  Ladysmith,  after  which 
the  usual  advance  of  infantry  was  to  come.  The  Boers  adopted 
their  invariable  common-sense  tactics,  and  remained  silent,  waiting 
for  the  real  assault  when  their  enemies  should  arrive  within  the 
range  of  rifles.  The  Middelburgers  were  once  more  the  object 
of  the  enemy’s  first  attention  as  on  the  previous  evening,  but  there 
is  only  the  same  stor}^  to  tell  of  the  attempt  to  take  the  ridge,  and 
what  followed.  Fourie  and  his  burghers  held  their  ground,  and 
their  foes  were  driven  back  after  repeated  charges,  hundreds  of  dead 
and  wounded  being  left  behind,  as  on  the  day  before. 

This,  however,  was  only  the  first  item  in  this  Friday’s  program. 
Three  attacks  by  English  regiments  had  been  delivered,  and  had 
failed  on  the  Middelburg  position.  It  was  now  resolved  by  Buller 
to  assail  the  position  to  the  left,  Pieter’s  Hill,  and  the  troops 
selected  for  the  task  consisted  mainly  of  General  Hart’s  5th  Brigade. 
Inniskillings,  Dublin  Fusiliers,  and  Connaught  Bangers  were  the 
chief  regiments  of  this  brigade,  with  other  troops  added  to  increase 
the  weight  of  numbers  for  the  task  in  hand. 

Pieter’s  Hill,  where  the  Krugersdorp  burghers  were  in  position, 
rises  gradually  to  a height  of  1,000  feet  above  the  north  bank  of  the 
Tugela,  in  a slope  which  can  be  negotiated  easily  on  horseback. 
To  the  left  (looking  south  from  the  Boer  positions)  there  is  a drift 
over  the  river;  to  the  immediate  right  tlie  railway  and  a road  to 
Ladysmith  passes,  with  the  Onderbroeck  ridges  and  Grobler’s  Kloof 
rising  parallel  on  the  west ; and  north,  or  back,  of  Pieter’s  Hill  the 


376 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOE  FBEEDOH 


raihva}'  station  is  located.  The  Boer  lines,  somewhat  crescent- 
shaped in  formation,  extended  over  these  points;  a hill  east  of  the 
waterfall  being  Botha’s  left,  and  the  ridges  along  the  Onderhroeck 
Spruit  being  the  right — the  two  roads  and  the  railway  to  Lady- 
smith running  in  between,  througli  long  and  narrow  valleys. 

Langwani  Hill,  south  of  the  river,  is  immediately  opposite  Pieter’s 
Hill,  at  a distance  of  some  7,000  yards,  and  the  entire  Boer  posi- 
tions were  open  from  there  to  Buller’s  artillery  attacks;  the  naval 
guns  being  able  to  rake  every  point  of  ground  occupied  by  Botha’s 
men.  The  other  English  batteries,  numbering  sixty  more  guns, 
were  mostty  on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  and  all  within  range 
distance  of  the  places  held  by  the  burghers.  Every  advance  by 
infantry  upon  any  point  of  attack  was  preceded  by  a bombardment 
of  Buller’s  entire  artillery,  and  this  fact  has  to  he  borne  in  mind 
when  the  reader  is  asked  to  judge  on  the  relative  claims  to  admira- 
tion of  the  men  who  charged  and  those  who  defended  the  positions 
on  Pieter’s  Hill  on  the  23rd  of  February.  Xo  finer  exhibition  of 
endurance,  pluck,  and  nerve  has  ever  been  made  in  warfare  than 
that  of  the  400  burghers  who  held  that  hill  against  fully  fifty  guns 
and  repeated  attacks  of  Hart’s  5th  Brigade. 

The  morning  had  been  signalized  by  the  repulse  of  the  troo^js 
sent  against  the  positions  on  the  Boer  right,  and  early  in  the  after- 
noon of  that  memorable  Friday,  the  three  regiments  named,  along 
with  two  English  regiments  as  supports,  were  advanced  against 
Pieter’s  Hill. 

The  Inniskillings  had  been  sent  in  a night  march  up  from 
Colenso  along  the  river  to  assail  the  hill  from  the  east  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  Connaughts,  who  followed;  the  Duhlins’  duty  being 
to  protect  the  flank  of  the  attacking  force.  The  troops  were  dis- 
covered early  in  the  morning  by  the  Ermelo  men,  who  accounted 
for  aborit  fifty  of  their  foemen.  This  attack  was  made  from  a small 
hill  above  the  waterfall,  near  the  Boer  left.  The  object  of  Hart’s 
men,  however,  was  to  assault  the  position  on  Pieter’s  Hill,  west  of 
where  they  had  been  fired  upon,  and,  after  leaving  some  men  to 
protect  their  rear,  they  moved  over  some  ridges  to  where  the  attack 
on  Pieter’s  was  to  he  delivered. 

At  this  point  the  Inniskillings  and  Connaughts  were  joined  by 
the  Duhlins,  and  the  whole  awaited  the  order  to  charge  the  hill  to 
their  right,  up  the  sloping  sides  of  which  they  would  have  to  move 
after  crossing  an  intervening  space  of  a few  hundred  j^ards,  which 
place  alone  in  the  work  before  them  would  bring  them  under  the 
fire  of  the  Boer  guns  to  the  north. 

It  was  well  on  in  the  afternoon  when  the  order  to  advance  was 
given,  and  the  three  fam.ed  British  regiments  swept  westward 


SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  ABANDONED 


377 


from  the  hills  they  had  gained  down  to  the  hollow  from  which 
they  were  to  climb  the  eastern  and  southern  sides  of  the  hill  in 
front  of  them.  They  went  over  the  ground  in  wide  order,  seeking 
cover  where  available,  while  in  front  of  them — but  perilously  near 
their  own  leading  ranks — the  shells  from  Buller’s  guns  shrieked 
and  burst  over  the  heads  of  Boer  and  Briton  alike.  The  Inniskill- 
ings  were  on  the  left  of  the  advancing  brigade,  the  Dublins  in  the 
center,  and  the  Connaughts  in  the  back  and  on  the  right;  the  first 
of  these  regiments  being  in  advance  in  the  movement  up  the  hill. 
On  they  came,  the  Boer  guns  north  being  unable  to  fire  on  to  the 
reverse  side  of  the  intervening  hill  up  which  the  English  were 
mounting.  But  it  was  not  a day  or  a case  for  guns,  but  for  men 
and  rifies,  and  there  amidst  that  inferno  of  bursting  shells,  facing 
these  2,000  trained  soldiers  with  bayonets  gleaming  in  the  sun, 
the  400  young  farmers  lay  waiting,  picking  out  their  targets  from 
among  those  sons  of  English  and  Irish  mothers  slowly  climbing  that 
hill  to  find  a grave  beneath  its  grassy  slopes.  Suddenly  from  the 
left  flank  of  the  Inniskillings  a fusillade  was  opened,  before  the 
Krugersdorpers  in  front  had  yet  tired.  It  was  some  of  the  Ermelo 
men  under  Tobias  Smuts  Avho  had  followed  up  the  enemy  from 
the  left,  and  no  sooner  had  these  opened  upon  the  Inniskillings  than 
crash  went  the  hail  of  bullets  from  the  400  Mausers  into  the  troops 
in  front  of  them,  again  and  again,  as  with  an  exulting  cheer  of 
deflance  and  contempt  for  bayonets  the  men  under  Sarel  Oosthuizen 
and  Potgieter  sprang  over  their  sangars,  tiring  almost  point  blank 
into  their  foes,  and  rolling  them  doAvn  the  hill  broken  and  dismayed. 
Back  again  to  the  trenches  w'ent  the  Boers,  and  up  again,  under 
persuasion,  example,  and  threats  of  officers,  came  the  Inniskillings ; 
this  time  the  Dublins  being  in  front,  the  Connaughts  remaining 
below;  all  moving  over  ground  on  which  hundreds  of  their  felloAvs 
were  lying,  many  never  to  advance  or  retreat  again.  Once  again 
the  English  guns  miscalculated  the  distance ; Boer  officers  and  men 
allege  other  grounds  for  what  happened  : but,  be  that  as  it  may, 
there  was  again,  as  at  Talana  Hill — also  in  the  case  of  Irish  regi- 
ments— shells  falling  in  their  ranks;  as  happened  likewise  at 
Colenso,  Spion  Kop,  klagersfontein,  and  other  battles.  With  deadly 
riflemen  in  front  and  inexpert  gunners  behind,  the  British  troops 
moved  forward  resolutely,  bravely,  only  to  And  an  impossible  bar- 
rier of  fire  and  death  before  them,  which  no  men  in  khaki  should 
pass  that  day.  Down  the  hill  once  more  Avent  some  of  those  aaAio 
came  up ; this  time  the  retreat  being  a veritable  race  betAA^een  Innis- 
killings, Dublins,  and  others  Avho  should  reach  the  river  first.  Six 
hundred  men  of  Hart’s  Brigade  remained  on  Pieter’s  Hill,  dead 
and  wounded.  A feAv  hundred  who  Avere  unAvounded  could  not  get 


378 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


away  from  the  ring  of  fire  drawn  round  them.  They  remained  on 
the  field  all  night;  fired  at  from  front  by  the  Boers,  and  from  be- 
hind by  their  own  guns;  while,  as  Lieutenant  Best,  of  the  Innis- 


GENERAL  TOBIAS  SMUTS 


killings,  related  in  an  interview  after  surrender,  “ On  Friday  night, 
at  dusk,  appreciating  the  hopelessness  of  our  position  and  with 
tlie  view  of  saving  our  wounded  from  unnecessary  exposure,  I 
hoisted  the  white  fiag.  There  were  so  few  of  us  left!  It  being 


SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  ABANDONED 


379 


dusk,  your  people  in  the  trenches  did  not  see  our  signal,  and  they 
continued  shooting  during  the  night.  My  conjecture  is  they  sus- 
pected treachery.  Our  own  artillerists  on  Monte  Christo  and  else- 
where, probably  not  knowing  we  were  there,  so  close  upon  you, 
poured  shell  after  shell  into  us — those  that  fell  a little  short  of 
j^our  entrenchments,  you  know — and  in  this  way  some  of  ours  were 
also  unwittingly  maimed  and  killed.  Oh,  it  was  ghastly!  At  dawn 
I raised  the  white  flag  again  and  again,  and  your  people  finally 
came  down  and  disarmed  us,  and  here  we  are — those  that  are  left 
of  us.” 

On  Saturday  morning  the  fight  was  renewed,  hut  mainly  by 
artillery ; the  Boer  guns  having  been  removed  to  better  ground  dur- 
ing the  night  time,  and  being  thus  able  to  shell  those  who  held  the 
valley  south  to  Colenso,  as  well  as  the  troops  who  clung  to  the 
river  bank  below  the  shambles  on  Pieter’s  Hill.  All  this  time  the 
wounded  were  unattended  to.  Scores  of  them  bled  to  death;  others 
less  severely  hit  suffered  agonies  from  thirst;  while  over  and  above 
all  this  horror  the  British  shells  came  pitilessly  on  to  the  sides  of 
Pieter’s  Hill,  aimed  at  the  Boer  positions,  and  still  falling  among 
the  English  dead  and  disabled. 

The  artillery  combat  of  Saturday  was  succeeded  by  a cessation 
of  hostilities  on  Sunday,  following  the  invariable  custom  of  the 
Boers  not  to  fight  on  the  Sabbath  unless  attacked.  The  Boer 
general  agreed  to  an  armistice,  which,  like  that  granted  after  Spion 
Kop,  was  used  by  Buller  for  military,  and  not  alone  for  humane, 
purposes.  Under  cover  of  this  truce  Buller  took  his  forces  once 
more  over  the  river,  and  registered  his  fourth  defeat  at  Botha’s 
hands. 

ISTo  less  than  1,600  British  were  killed,  wounded,  and  taken  pris- 
oner during  the  continued  fight  from  the  18th  to  the  23rd;  over 
1,000  of  those  falling  before  the  rifles  of  the  burghers  defending 
Pieter’s  Hill.  The  Boer  loss  was,  as  usual,  comparatively  small,  tho 
on  this  occasion  it  was  relatively  high  for  the  number  of  burghers 
who  had  borne  the  brunt  of  Buller’s  artillery  fire,  and  of  the  attack 
by  Hart’s  Brigade.  Thirty-one  killed  and  130  wounded  were  given 
as  representing  the  united  losses  of  the  whole  Boer  forces  engaged 
from  the  18th  to  the  25th,  Commandant  Potgieter  being  included 
among  the  severely  wounded.  The  Krugersdorp  men  lost  14  killed 
and  31  wounded,  the  Middelburg,  Ermelo,  and  Eustenburg  com- 
mandoes coming  next  in  the  list  of  casualties,  which  was  officially 
published  in  the  Boer  press  on  the  2nd  of  March,  1900. 

Buller  made  good  rise  of  the  armistice.  Eealizing  how  unshake- 
able  was  the  hold  which  Botha  held  of  the  two  roads  passing  from 
Colenso  to  Ladysmith,  the  English  general  abandoned  the  task  of 


380 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


forcing  a passage  there,  and  directed  liis  fifth  attempt  by  the  way 
it  had  been  feared  he  would  have  carried  his  first  effort  to  cross 
on  the  15th  of  December.  He  held  Colenso  and  Langwani  Hill, 
and,  pretending  to  withdraw  his  forces  south  of  the  river  again  for 
rest  and  recuperation,  he  swung  his  whole  left  round  to  the  bend 
in  the  Tugela  east  of  Colenso,  threw  pontoons  over  the  river,  and 
carried  the  bulk  of  his  force  to  the  north  bank,  thus  turning  Botha’s 
left  completely,  and  menacing  the  Krugersdorpers’  hold  on  Pieter’s 
Hill.  It  was  a tactical  movement,  and  the  only  one  left  for  him  to 
adopt  after  repeated  and  unsuccessful  attempts  at  frontal  attacks 
and  showy  demonstrations  with  bayonets  had  only  cost  him  soldiers’ 
lives  and  continued  defeats  in  his  many  attempts  to  reach  Lady- 
smith. Buller  had  at  last  inserted  the  ke}^  in  the  lock  which  was 
to  open  the  door  to  White  and  his  imprisoned  army. 

On  Tuesday,  the  27th  of  February,  General  Cronje  surrendered 
to  Lord  Eoberts  at  Paardeberg  with  his  army  of  -1,000  burghers. 

On  the  following  day  Lord  Dundonald  with  a cavalry  force  rode 
north  from  General  Puller’s  lines  below  Helthorpe,  swept  past 
General  Botha’s  left,  and  raised  the  siege  of  Ladysmith. 

The  Krugersdorp  men  still  held  on  to  Pieter’s  Hill ; the  Middel- 
burg,  Ermelo,  and  Zoutpansberg  burghers  were  yet  in  position  on 
what  was  the  right  of  Botha’s  lines  on  tire  23rd.  On  the  27th  both 
these  positions  were  fiercely  attacked  by  overwhelming  and  fresh 
forces  of  the  enemy.  All  the  British  guns  had  again  been  brought 
to  bear  upon  the  ridges,  where  the  Boers  still  held  on  tenaciousty, 
while  the  troops  who  had  been  thrown  across  the  river  and  had 
turned  Botha’s  left  took  the  Krugersdorpers’  position  in  flank,  and 
finally  forced  them  from  the  hill.  During  the  renewed  attack  on 
this  position  by  the  English,  a body  of  forty  of  the  Johannesburg 
brigade,  under  Du  Preez,  were  sent  from  the  right  to  relieve  the 
Krugersdorp  men,  who  were  engaged  with  twenty  times  their  num- 
ber. The  Band  men,  in  rounding  a kopje  to  reach  the  north  of 
Pieter’s  Hill,  found  themselves  surrounded  by  the  enemy,  and  were 
forced  to  surrender.  The  burghers  on  the  hill  were  compelled  to 
evacuate  it,  but  they  had  again  rendered  a good  account  of  them- 
selves before  yielding  their  position,  as  seen  in  the  numbers  of 
British  lying  around  where  tlieir  few  foemen  had  so  stubbornly 
maintained  their  ground. 

It  was  now,  however,  a matter  of  a rear-guard  action,  as  the 
disastrous  news  from  the  Free  State  had  produced  its  effect  on 
many  of  the  burghers,  who  had  already  retired  towards  the  Biggars- 
berg.  The  men  who  had  fought  for  twelve  or  fourteen  days  almost 
continuously  had  now  to  face  round  and  keep  the  pursuing  foe  at 
a distance,  to  save  the  guns  and  to  secure  the  way  of  retreat  past 


SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  ABAEDOEET) 


381 


LadA’smith.  Botha  was  everywhere,  front,  rear,  and  flank,  encour- 
aging his  worn-out  burghers,  looking  cheery  and  confldent  as  usual, 
trying  to  inspirit  the  men,  and  ever  ready  with  rifles  and  artillery 
to  turn  round  and  teach  the  British  behind  that  the  men  who  were 
retiring  were  those  of  Colenso  and  Spion  Kop.  He  extricated  his 
little  force  out  of  its  perilous  situation  with  snperb  coolness  and 
complete  success;  develoj^ing  new  powers  of  successful  generalship 
in  facing  his  pursuers  again  and  again,  so  that  General  Buller  was 
slow  to  allow  his  big  legions  to  follow  too  soon  in  the  wake  of  so 
daring  and  desperate  a foe.  Thus  every  gun  and  ammunition 


THE  BOER  “long  TOM**  IN  RETREAT  FROM  LADYSMITH 


Avagon  belonging  to  the  army  of  the  Tugela  was  Avithdrawn,  and 
taken  with  safety  past  Ladysmith  to  the  Biggarsberg  hills. 

It  Avas  on  the  night  of  the  1st  of  Marcli  that  a feAv  Aveary,  drenched 
men  rode  along  in  the  rain  on  horses  scarcely  able  to  carry  their 
riders,  with  the  evil-omened  toAvn  to  their  left,  the  siege  of  Avhich 
had  been  the  ill-starred  enterprise  of  the  Avhole  Federal  campaign. 
IVagons,  carts,  men,  guns  had  gone  before,  in  the  rear  of  J oubert’s 
retreat  on  Glencoe.  These  few  horsemen  Avere  Generals  Botha 
and  Meyer,  Avith  their  adjutants,  bringing  up  the  last  men  of  the 
force.  The  men  were  utterly  exhausted  after  fully  fourteen  days 
of  ceaseless  fighting,  in  which  mauA'’  of  the  bravest  burghers  had 
fallen.  They  AA'ere  rounding  a hill  east  of  Ladysmith,  on  their  Avay 
to  Modderspruit.  AA'hen  sounds  of  pursuing  cavalry  Avere  heard  front 
the  direction  of  the  toAAUi.  Suddenly.  hoAvever,  a small  body  of 
men  were  seen  to  emerge  from  beneath  the  shadoAV  of  Lombard’s 


382 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Kop,  to  spread  themselves  out  right  and  loft  of  the  road  over  which 
the  rear  of  the  retreating  column  had  passed,  and  open  tire  upon  the 
advancing  Engiisli.  They  were  Init  seventy  men  who  had  thus 
thrown  themselves  across  what  can  well  be  imagined  to  have  been 
the  vengeful  resolve  of  some  of  General  White’s  garrison,  sallying 
forth  to  make  reprisal  for  their  long  and  humiliating  captivity  in 
the  fever-stricken  town.  The  cavalry  force,  thus  foiled,  wheeled 
round,  and  returned  to  Ladysmith.  Botha,  who  had  been  a wit- 
ness of  the  little  fight,  awaited  the  arrival  of  the  officer  in  com- 
mand of  the  body  which  had  thus  given  him  such  timely  support, 
and  hailed  him  as  he  drew  near:  “ Hello,  Blake,  is  that  you?  That 
was  well  done;  I am  thankful  to  your  men  for  their  action.”  These 
men  of  Blake’s  Brigade  had  been  the  special  guard  of  “ Long 
Tom”  during  most  of  the  siege,  and  had  secured  his  removal  from 
Lombard’s  Kop  on  that  very  evening  when  chance  also  gave  them 
the  opportunity  of  serving,  and  perhaps  also  saving,  the  one  man 
in  whom  the  hopes  of  Boer  nationality  were  most  centered  after 
his  brilliant  exploits  in  the  Tugela  campaign. 

President  Kruger  came  from  Pretoria  to  Glencoe  to  encourage 
the  burghers  to  persevere  in  the  fight  against  the  enemy;  the  Gov- 
ernment having  already  issued  a proclamation  to  the  Kepublic  re- 
lating to  General  Cronje’s  surrender,  from  which  I give  the  fol- 
lowing extract: 

“ Notwithstanding  that  various  rumors  were  afloat  concerning 
Assistant-General  Cronje  and  his  men,  and,  altho  the  Government 
received  no  further  official  information  with  respect  to  this  matter, 
the  Government  understands  that  the  surrender  must  be  accepted 
as  a fact. 

“ However  disappointing  this  may  be,  the  Government  is  assured 
that  this  incident  will  not  discourage  our  fighting  forces  in  the 
defense  of  our  independent  national  existence. 

“ The  conflict  as  waged  up  to  this  point  has  abundantly  testi- 
fied that  both  Eepublics  have  been  able  to  justify  their  existence  as 
a self-subsisting  nation,  and  this  reverse  will  by  no  means  cause  us 
to  waver  in  the  struggle  for  our  cherished  rights. 

“ We  believe  that,  whatever  may  occur,  the  Lord  our  God  will 
continue  to  govern. 

“ In  consequence  of  the  invasion  of  the  Free  State  by  the  enemy’s 
main  forces,  and  owing  to  other  circumstances,  it  was  necessary 
to  take  up  other  positions.  This  principally  occurred  in  Natal. 
We  withdrew  to  the  Biggarsberg,  and  all  our  commandoes  have 
arrived  there  safely.” 


Chapter  XXX 


PAARDEBERG 


Cronje’s  over\vt;ening  sense  oe  security — Roberts  deceives  him  by 

FEINT  AT  KOEDESBERG  WHILE  FRENCH  DASHES  FOR  KiMBERLEY De 

Wet  CAPTURES  British  convoy — Cronje  surrounded — Escapes 
THROUGH  British  lines — French  wins  in  race  with  De  Wet  for 
Koedesrand  Drift — Cronje  caught  at  Paardeberg — Stubbornly 
i’etoes  plan  of  Ferreira — Repulses  attack  of  Kitchener — De 
Wet’s  counter  attack — British  commandeer  Boer  hospital  ser- 
vice— ■Accidental  death  of  Chief  Commandant  Ferreira — De 
Wet  succeeds  him — Escapes  from  cordon — Bombardment  of 
Cronje’s  laager — Exploit  of  Theron — Cronje  calls  kriegsbaad — 
It  votes  to  give  up  the  fight — Cronje  surrenders — Roll  of  sur- 
rendered forces  and  officers. 

EXEEAL  CEOXJE  remained  virtually  inactive  for  over  six 


VJT  weeks  following  the  victory  of  Magersfontein.  He  strength- 
ened his  positions,  elaborated  trenches,  and  took  all  possible  pre- 
cautions against  any  repetition  of  the  surprise  which  failed  through 
his  vigilance  in  December,  and  then  waited  for  Methuen  to  move. 
"While  waiting  for  Methuen  he  forgot  Eoberts  and  England’s  re- 


sources. 


Villebois-Mareuil  records  his  high  praise  of  Cronje’s  laagers, 
trenches,  and  protected  positions,  but  bears  testimony  to  the  over- 
weening sense  of  false  security  which  concerned  itself,  almost  en- 
tirely, with  the  problematical  action  of  an  opponent  manifestly 
held  under  restraint  by  the  new  Commander-in-Chief.  Visions 
of  another  attack  like  that  led  by  General  Wauehope,  and  of  an 
even  greater  defeat  of  the  enemy  than  on  that  occasion,  occupied 
Cronje’s  mind,  and  obscured  a consideration  of  the  obvious  fact 
that  other  roads  led  to  Kimberley  as  well  as  the  one  by  which 
]\Iethuen  had  failed  to  reach  that  city.  There  were  numerous 
petty  encounters,  small  fights  between  patrols,  reconnaissances, 
and  various  excursions  and  alarms  provided  for  the  Federals  by 
Methuen’s  tactics,  or  orders;  but  there  was  no  opportunity  offered 
for  another  pitched  battle.  The  next  encounter  was  to  be  Lord 
Eoberts’  show,  and  Methuen  was  not  to  be  in  it. 

Changes  had  been  made  in  the  command  of  the  Free  State 
forces  in  the  west  which  are  interesting  to  consider  now  in  the 


384 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


light  of  their  possible  effect  upon  the  fortunes  of  the  campaign 
which  ended  at  Paardeberg.  AVessels  had  resigned  the  Chief 
Commandantship,  and  Ignaas  Ferreira,  a very  popular  officer,  was 
appointed  his  successor.  Villebois-Marenil  strongly  urged  Presi- 
dent Steyn  to  give  the  position  to  General  De  la  Rey.  This  was 
not  done.  He  Avas,  instead,  transferred  from  the  western  comman- 
does to  take  charge  of  the  forces  operating  against  French  around 
Colesberg,  while  Christian  De  Wet  replaced  Prinsloo,  and  was  co- 
operating Avith  Cronje  at  the  time  Avhen  Roberts  had  prepared 
his  plans  for  an  advance  against  both  Cronje  and  Bloemfontein. 

The  English  Commander-in-Chief’s  scheme  of  operations  Avas 
skilfully  conceiA^ed,  and  ably  executed.  He  succeeded  in  creating 
the  impression,  both  in  England  and  among  the  Boers,  that  he 
Avas  to  strengthen  the  British  army  at  the  Modder  River,  and 
from  thence  to  attack  Cronje  and  cut  his  Avay,  Avestward  of  Scholtz- 
nek,  to  Kimberley.  He  accordingly  ordered  General  Macdonald  to 
attack  the  Boer  right  Avith  the  Highland  Brigade,  in  the  early  days 
of  February,  hut  not  to  press  the  fight  beyond  Avhat  might  folloAV 
from  a reconnaissance  in  force.  This  Avas  done  at  Koedesherg  on 
the  7th  of  February;  the  Highlanders  falling  back  after  the  en- 
gagement to  Methuen’s  encampment.  This  tactical  action  left  a 
conviction  in  the  Boer  mind  that  the  English  had  been  engaged 
in  a movement  to  discover  the  strength  of  the  Federal  right  Aving, 
and  the  difficulties  of  the  ground  at  and  around  Koedesherg  for  an 
advance  in  that  direction  by  the  AA'hole  of  Methuen’s  reenforced 
army  under  Roberts’  supreme  command. 

Under  cover  of  this  impression  Roberts  AvithdreAV  General  French 
from  Colesberg,  massed  a huge  cavalry  force  between  Methuen  and 
the  Orange  River;  Avhere  their  real  destination  was  not  suspected; 
and,  Avhen  the  plans  Avere  complete,  let  England’s  best  cavalry 
officer  go  Avith  his  5,000  horsemen  and  30  guns,  in  a dash  for 
Kimberley.  It  was  the  first  evidence  of  real  common-sense  general- 
ship on  the  English  side  during  the  war. 

Kothing  could  well  have  been  more  careless  than  the  scouting 
for  Cronje’s  little  army  during  the  seven  days  following  the  fight 
with  Macdonald  lAp  to  the  eve  of  French’s  advance.  News  had 
reached  the  Federal  lines  that  suspicious  movements  Avere  going 
on  south  of  Methuen’s  encampment,  but  Cronje  Avould  not  believe 
there  Avas  anything  serious  to  be  expected  except  by  the  way  of 
Koedesherg.  Roberts  had,  in  fact,  secretly  Avithdrawn  a great 
portion  of  the  Modder  River  army  southward  to  Belmont,  for  the 
purposes  of  his  big  plan  of  action;  leaA'ing  Methuen  with  the 
remainder  to  carry  on  the  tactical  deception. 

The  position  in  which  the  Federal  generals  found  themselves 


PAARDEBEEG 


385 


when  their  left  was  turned  by  French  and  Kelly-Kenny  was  this : 
Cronje’s  lines  extended  for  a distance  of  about  twenty-five  miles 
west  to  east,  facing  the  Eiet  and  Modder  rivers;  Magersfontein 
being  midway  between  the  two  extremes.  His  headquarters  were 
near  Eondavels  Drift,  on  the  Modder  Eiver,  at  his  extreme  left. 
About  a dozen  miles  east  of  this  the  road  from  Jacobsdal  to  Kim- 
berley passes  over  the  river  at  Klip  Drift.  Some  ten  miles,  still 
east,  another  drift  takes  a road  from  Jacobsdal  to  Boshof  over  the 
same  river,  while  east  of  a fiat-topped  hill,  called  Paardeberg,  rising 
from  the  south  bank  of  the  Modder,  another  drift  is  situated 
through  which  a road,  branching  north  from  one  between  Bloem- 
fontein and  Jacobsdal,  goes  from  Petrusburg  to  Koedesrand;  this 
latter  “ rand  ” or  ridge  being  north  of  the  river,  and  commanding 
the  passage  of  this  last  drift.  The  distance  from  this  last  drift  to 
Cronje’s  headquarters,  westward  on  the  same  river,  would  be  about 
thirty-five  miles. 

North  of  Cronje’s  lines,  behind  Magersfontein,  Generals  Ferreira, 
Kolbe,  and  Du  Toit  were  in  command  of  the  burghers  investing 
Kimberley.  A “ Long  Tom  ” which  had  been  erected  only  a fort- 
night previously  under  the  direction  of  Sam  Leon  and  Villebois- 
Mareuil  was  at  Kampersdam,  near  the  waterworks  which  supplied 
the  Diamond  City. 

By  a singular  coincidence  Christian  De  Wet  was  at  Jacobsdal, 
about  twenty  miles  due  south  of  Cronje’s  head  laager,  on  February 
the  11th,  and  moved  south  towards  Waterfall  Drift,  on  the  Eiet 
Elver,  that  nightwith  500  men;  almost  at  the  very  time  that  General 
French  commenced  his  dash  north  for  Kimberley  with  his  5,000 
horsemen,  by  the  way  of  the  very  same  drift.  De  Wet’s  unerring 
military  instinct  took  him  on  this  reconnaissance  without  any  defi- 
nite knowledge  of  Eoberts’  design,  and  without  orders  from  Cronje. 
He  had  heard  of  suspicious  movements  on  the  Free  State  border, 
west  of  Kofiyfontein,  and  set  out  for  that  place.  He  reached  the 
drift  a few  hours  only  before  a patrol  ahead  of  French’s  flying 
column  arrived  on  the  south  side  of  the  river.  On  the  English 
general  learning  that  the  drift  was  defended  he  swung  to  the  right 
to  another  drift,  a few  miles  eastward,  leaving  some  troops  at 
Waterfall  Drift  to  contain  the  opposing  Boer  force,  while  the  main 
body  of  the  column  should  cross  over  the  more  eastern  passage. 
French  took  his  whole  column  over  here  without  opposition,  and 
sending  patrols  ahead  to  guard  against  possible  attacks  on  his  left 
flank  when  passing  Jacobsdal,  he  directed  his  course  towards  Klip 
Drift. 

Christian  De  Wet  held  the  Waterfall  Drift  on  the  Eiet  Eiver 
successfully,  and  the  detaining  body  of  troops  left  behind  by  French 


25 


386 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


retired  eastward,  after  learning  of  the  siiccessful  passage  of  the 
river  by  the  flying  column,  and  went  north  in  its  wake.  De  Wet 
understood  clearly  now  what  the  enemy’s  movement  was,  and  all 
which  it  meant  to  the  Federal  forces,  and  not  possessing  men 
enough  to  attack  Eoberts’  flank  on  his  march  to  Klip  Drift,  he 
resolved  to  Avait  and  Avatch  for  the  convoy  which  was  bound  to  he 
somewhere  in  the  rear  of  a huge  army  moving  over  a section  of  a 
country  Avhich  could  not  be  reached  by  railwa3's,  for  commissariat 
purposes.  He  soon  saw  the  English  main  column,  division  after 
division,  on  its  Avay  towards  Jacobsdal,  and,  hiding  his  time,  he 
SAVooped  doAvn  upon  the  huge  convoy  of  near  200  Avagons  and  1,800 
cattle  as  the  long  straggling  train  was  split  in  tAvo  by  crossing  the 
Eiet  Eiver,  near  Blaubank.  He  shot  the  draft  oxen,  and  brought 
the  whole  string  of  vehicles  and  carts  to  a standstill.  Troops  were 
sent  back  from  the  rear  of  the  English  divisions  to  extricate  the 
convoy  from  its  situation,  but  De  Wet  had  also  been  reenforced  by 
Andries  Cronje,  of  Potchefstroom,  and  200  men  with  a pom-pom; 
Cronje  having  come  up  from  Koffyfoutein,  and  passed  in  between 
the  tail  of  French’s  column  and  the  head  of  Eoberts’  force.  The 
700  Boers  under  De  Wet  took  positions  on  some  kopjes  at  Blau- 
bank, and  the  convoy  was  therefore  at  their  mercy.  After  an  en- 
gagement in  AA'hich  some  fifty  of  the  English  Avere  killed  and 
wounded,  the  enemy  retired,  leaving  nearly  half  a million  pounds 
worth  of  provisions,  ammunition,  and  necessaries  in  the  hands  of 
De  Wet’s  small  commando.  He  appropriated  what  could  he  taken 
away,  and  left  the  remainder  to  the  farmers  in  the  locality.  He 
then  wheeled  roiind,  and  folloAved  in  the  rear  of  the  British  forces 
to  Jacobsdal,  drove  the  small  English  garrison  out  of  the  town 
which  had  occupied  it  the  day  before,  and,  believing  that  Cronje 
would  try  and  get  possession  of  the  drifts  eastAvard  on  the  Modder 
on  finding  his  left  Aving  turned,  he  rode  as  rapidly  as  tired  horses 
Avould  alloAV  across  country  toAvards  Paardebreg  in  the  hope  of  form- 
ing a junction  AA'ith  the  IMagersfontein  army  south  of  the  river  at 
that  place,  or  north  of  it,  with  Ferreira  and  the  burghers  from 
Kimberley. 

Cronje  had  been  informed  on  Monday  the  12th  of  February, 
that  the  enemy  was  in  commotion  south  of  Methuen’s  camp.  It 
was  rumor  of  this  news  Avhich  took  De  Wet  south  to  Waterfall 
Drift.  Cronje  refused  to  believe  in  any  serious  movement  of  the 
English  otherwise  than  westward  of  or  along  the  railway  line 
going  to  Kimberley.  His  right  wing  had  been  engaged  with 
General  Macdonald,  and  was  this  not  evidence  that  the  advance 
of  Eoberts  was  to  be  against  his  western  positions  ? On  Tuesday 
Commandant  Froneman  went  to  Klip  Drift  with  about  fifty  men. 


PAARDEBERG 


387 


but  the  general  made  no  move.  On  Wednesday  despatch  riders 
dashed  into  the  head  laager  with  the  news  that  the  enemy  had 
seized  the  two  drifts  to  the  east,  and  that  other  troops  were  coming 
up.  “ They  will  be  in  our  possession  to-morrow,”  was  the  general’s 
reply  and  comment,  and  not  a move  was  made.  On  Thursday, 
however,  when  the  reality  of  the  situation  was  forced  upon  him 
by  the  information  that  a huge  cavalry  force  had  swept  northwest 
to  Kimberley,  while  other  forces  had  come  up  from  Jacobsdal  and 
held  Klip  Drift  right  between  him  and  Bloemfontein,  he  began 
to  realize  the  peril  in  which  he  was  placed,  with  his  left  turned  by 
French,  Methuen  still  in  front  of  his  center,  and  Lord  Eoberts 
advancing  to  throw  himself  between  the  Federal  forces  and  the 
Free  State  capital. 

These  two  days’  fatal  delay,  and  that  unfortunate  delusion  which 
considered  the  English  movement  on  his  left  as  the  feint  and  that 
on  his  right  as  the  actual  intention  of  the  enemy  were  to  cost  the 
two  Eepublics  their  independence — for  a time. 

On  the  evening  of  Thursday,  the  15th  of  February,  with  all 
this  deadly  menace  around  his  jjosition  present  to  his  mind,  the 
old  general  was  found  calmly  smoking  and  superintending  the 
greasing  of  his  wagon  preparing  for  the  momentous  trek  through 
the  enemy’s  lines.  He  had  called  in  his  right  wing  during  the 
day,  limbered  up  his  guns,  disposed  of  a number  of  his  wagons 
and  of  needless  baggage,  and  made  all  ready  for  a retreat  eastward 
during  the  night. 

At  nine  o’clock  that  night  the  head  of  the  commandoes  moved 
northeast,  and  passed  within  three  miles  of  General  Kelly-Kenny’s 
headquarters.  The  extreme  right  of  the  Magersfontein  army  did 
not  reach  the  place  where  the  head  of  the  column  started  from  until 
after  midnight.  The  long,  straggling  line  of  burghers,  wagons, 
cattle,  guns,  etc.,  traveling  necessarily  at  the  slow  pace  of  the  oxen, 
must  have  taken  fully  five  hours  to  crawl  through  the  gap  unac- 
countably left  open  for  its  passage  by  the  English.  It  was  not  until 
about  three  in  the  morning  of  Friday  that  the  rear  of  the  serpentine 
column  was  observed  and  attacked.  This  rear-guard  formed  laager 
at  once,  sending  the  cattle  and  baggage  ahead,  and  from  within  a 
square  formed  by  their  wagons,  in  the  good  old  fighting  style, 
not  alone  held  back  the  attacks  of  Kitchener’s  Horse  and  other 
mounted  troops,  but  kept  the  enemy  resolutely  at  bay  with  con- 
siderable loss  for  hours  until  the  commandoes  ahead  had  time  to 
secure  position.  IMajor  Albrecht  was  with  the  rear-guard,  and  his 
single  pom-pom  played  havoc  with  the  horses  of  the  attacking 
cavalry.  Kight  coming  on,  the  burghers  inspanned,  and  followed 
after  the  main  column  along  the  river  to  Paardeberg  Drift. 


388 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Duripg  this  Friday  three  men  whose  names  will  occupy  a fore- 
most place  in  the  annals  of  this  war  were  rushing  for  the  hill  of 
Koedesrand,  and  the  drift  over  the  Modder  which  the  hill  com- 
mands : Cronje,  De  Wet,  and  French,  and  it  was  the  latter  who 
won.  After  finding  that  Cronje  had  passed  through  Kelly-Kenny’s 
lines  French  must  have  been  wired  to  by  Kitchener  to  race  from 
Kimberley  with  his  cavalry  force  for  all  they  were  worth  so  as 
to  forestall  the  Federals  in  the  possession  of  the  hill  and  drift  east 
of  Paardeberg.  Almost  without  rest  for  men  or  horses,  after  the 
long  march  from  Eamdam,  this  most  able  ofiicer  rode  out  of  Kim- 
berley with  a portion  of  his  great  column,  and  in  a thirty  miles’  ride 
succeeded  in  reaching  the  goal  of  the  ridge  and  drift  as  Christian 
De  Wet,  with  his  700  or  800  exhausted  horsemen,  appeared  on  the 
south  side  of  the  river,  to  see  the  prize  in  the  possession  of  his 
British  rival. 

Cronje,  encumbered  by  baggage,  women,  and  children,  had  taken 
the  course  along  the  river,  and  off-saddled  on  Friday  night  at 
Wolfe  Spruit,  midway  between  Paardeberg  and  the  drift  opposite 
Koedesrand.  French  passed  him  on  the  north  early  on  Saturday 
morning,  and  blocked  the  way  eastward,  so  that  when  the  old 
general  scanned  the  veldt  ahead  at  sunrise  on  the  17th  of  February 
he  saw  the  enemy’s  guns  in  position,  and  found  himself  caught 
between  two  divisions  of  Eoberts’  army.  Cronje’s  rear-guard 
had  reached  Paardeberg  on  Friday  night  after  the  successful  fight 
with  some  of  Kelly-Kenny’s  cavalry.  Commandant  Froneman, 
with  some  Cape  Colony  Volunteers  and  Free  Staters,  finding  that 
the  general  had  gone  ahead,  crossed  the  river  with  200  wagons  at 
Paardeberg  Drift,  insisting  that  this  was  the  right  movement  to 
take  in  view  of  the  immense  forces  of  the  enemy  behind,  and  of 
the  straight  line  of  march  leading  from  there  to  Bloemfontein. 
They  were  right,  and  succeeded  in  joining  hands  with  Christian 
De  Wet  the  following  morning  on  the  south  of  where  Cronje  was 
now  shut  in  between  French  in  front.  Kitchener,  Kelly-Kenny,  and 
Smith-Dorrien  behind,  and  other  forces  available  to  block  the  way 
through  the  drift  at  Paardeberg.  The  day’s  delay  in  starting  lost 
Cronje  the  position  of  Koedesrand,  and  the  neglect  to  pass  over  the 
river  at  Paardeberg  Drift  closed  the  last  avenue  of  safe  escape  for 
the  army  of  Magersfontein. 

Cronje’s  retreat  from  Magersfontein  left  Chief  Commandant 
Ferreira  and  the  forces  round  Kimberley  in  a position  of  peril, 
with  Methuen  to  the  south  and  French  within  the  city.  Ferreira 
acted  with  promptness  and  ability,  and  extricated  his  men  and 
guns  out  of  the  danger  with  success.  Generals  Du  Toit  and  Kolhe 
were  ordered  to  retire  north  to  Eiverton;  the  former  to  remain  at 


PAARDEBERG 


389 


that  point  and  block  the  railway  from  Kimberley  to  Mafeking; 
Kolbe  and  his  commando  to  march  round  by  Boshof,  and  unite 
with  Cronje,  as  was  expected,  at  Koedesrand.  Ferreira  himself, 
with  about  1,000  men,  went  through  the  gap  between  Kelly- 
Kenny’s  force  and  French’s  cavalry;  following  the  latter  for  some 
miles  in  their  race  eastward  for  the  possession  of  Koedesrand  Drift 
and  Hill,  but  remaining  south  of  Boshof  and  north  of  Kelly- 
Kenny’s  and  French’s  lines,  where  he  was  to  try  in  vain  to  induce 
Cronje  to  attempt  to  join  him,  and  where  he  met  his  tragic  death 
on  the  morning  after  the  defeat  of  Kitchener  in  his  first  attack 
on  Cronje’s  laager. 

On  discovering  that  the  enemy  held  the  Koedesrand  and  the 
drift  opposite,  Cronje  was  compelled  to  turn  back  towards  another 
part  of  the  river  bank,  where  the  rear  of  his  retreating  army  was 
found  after  its  almost  continuous  fight  during  Friday’s  march. 
The  reunited  force  of  some  4,000  men,  finding  themselves  com- 
pletely surrounded,  began  to  entrench  themselves  on  both  sides  of 
the  river,  but  mainly  on  the  north  bank;  the  bed  of  the  stream, 
which  was  in  shallow  condition  at  the  time,  being  also  used  for 
baggage,  and  the  shelter  of  the  women  and  children. 

This  work  was  begun  only  on  Sunday,  and  had  to  be  continued 
under  a constant  fire  from  the  enemy’s  guns,  firing  from  the 
northwest  and  northeast,  supplemented  by  a cavalry  attack  in 
the  afternoon,  which  was  repulsed  by  the  burghers  despite  the 
fatigue  of  the  previous  day’s  fight  and  arduous  night’s  march. 
Major  Albrecht  had  placed  his  few  guns  on  the  left  of  the  hastily 
made  entrenchments,  and  he  gave  such  a good  account  of  himself 
that  the  enemy  paid  heavily  for  the  fruitless  attempt  to  rush 
that  part  of  the  Boer  lines. 

On  that  Saturday,  after  the  laager  had  beaten  off  two  attacks 
upon  its  left  flank.  General  Ferreira,  who  was  behind  the  British 
lines,  northwest  of  Paardeberg,  with  the  burghers  who  had  re- 
treated from  around  Kimberley,  sent  a message  to  Cronje  urg- 
ing him  to  break  through  the  English  line  in  that  direction  before 
all  their  forces  should  come  up  from  the  south  and  west,  and 
informing  him  that  the  enemy  would  be  attacked  from  the  north- 
west by  Kolbe  and  himself  at  the  same  time;  while  two  other  forces 
east  of  Paardeberg,  one  under  Commandant  De  Beer  and  one  com- 
manded by  De  "Wet,  would  cooperate  in  a diverting  movement. 
This  was  a thoroughly  sound  and  practicable  plan,  but  Cronje  re- 
plied bluntly  refusing  to  act  as  advised.  The  plan  had  the  de- 
merit of  having  been  suggested  by  Chief  Commandant  Ignaas  Fer- 
reira. The  victor  of  Magersfontein  had  beaten  off  two  assaults 
of  the  British  that  day,  and  he  resolved  to  hold  his  ground.  Com- 


390 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


mandant  De  Beer  came  in  through  the  British  lines  late  in  the  night 
of  Saturday,  and  personally  appealed  to  the  general  to  act  in  con- 
junction with  Ferreira  and  the  other  generals,  assuring  him  that 
there  -were  reenforcements  coming  from  Bloemfontein  under  Philip 
Botha  and  De  la  Eey,  which  would  sustain  the  carrying  out  of 
Ferreira’s  plan,  and  enable  the  combined  commandoes  north  and 
east,  with  De  Wet  on  the  south,  to  put  themselves  between  Eoberts 
and  Bloemfontein.  He  w'as  told  that  Villebois-Mareuil  also 
strongly  advised  this  course,  and  that  there  was  no  time  to  be  lost. 

I was  a general  before  you  were  born,”  was  the  reply  of  the  fierce 
old  warrior,  “ and  I shall  hold  my  ground  against  any  number  of 
English  until  stronger  forces  come  up  from  the  east  ! ” 

Early  on  Sunday  morning  Eield  Cornets  Grobblaar  and  Dou- 
thaite  came  through  the  lines  with  a message  from  De  Wet  and 
Philip  Botha  that  there  were  enough  men  to  the  east,  south  of 
the  river,  to  sustain  the  sortie  if  Cronje  would  only  leave  his  bag- 
gage, women,  and  children,  sally  forth,  and  fight  his  way  through. 
The  minor  officers  in  the  laager,  who  were  made  aware  of  these 
messages,  joined  in  backing  up  this  suggestion,  but  were  turned 
upon  and  told:  “Are  you  afraid  of  the  English?  If  you  are, 
you  may  go!  ” Nothing  would  move  him  from  his  resolution  to 
stay  where  he  was. 

He  had  intended  moving  his  right  eastward,  to  a deeper  place 
on  the  bank,  at  Makous  Drift,  but  he  learned  early  on  that  Sunday 
that  the  spot  had  been  occupied  in  an  advance  westward  during 
the  previous  night  by  the  enemy.  That  morning  he  heard  guns 
directly  south,  and  it  was  rumored  in  the  laager  that  De  Wet  had 
cut  his  way  through  from  Petrusburg,  and  was  hastening  to  their 
relief.  A dust-covered  column  was  seen  rapidly  advancing  from 
that  direction,  and  they  were  allowed  to  take  up  position  southwest 
of  Paardeberg  Hill,  when,  too  late,  they  were  discovered  to  be  Eng- 
lish. The  circle  of  foes  was  now  complete.  The  victors  of  Magers- 
fontein  were  enclosed  on  all  sides  by  a force  of  fully  40,000  men 
and  100  guns. 

Cronje’s  courage  and  determination  never  wavered.  He  ad- 
dressed the  burghers  at  a religious  service  early  that  Sunday  morn- 
ing, and  urged  them  to  fight  resolutely,  that  God  was  on  their  side, 
and  that  a relieving  force  from  Bloemfontein  would  be  sure  to 
attack  the  English  in  the  east,  and  clear  a way  out  for  the  entire 
laager.  He  then  sent  men  across  the  river  to  entrench  the  south 
bank,  and  awaited  the  attack  which  was  coming.  Down  in  the  river 
bed,  and  in  a hollow  or  donga  to  his  right,  the  women,  children,  and 
transport  were  placed,  while  shelters  were  being  dug  in  the  banks  of 
the  river  which  were  to  offer  better  protection  than  the  trenches 


PAARDEBEBG 


391 


on  the  top  when  the  enemy’s  guns  came  into  action.  Nothing 
that  could  be  done  to  enable  the  small  force  to  defend  itself  was 
left  undone  by  the  indomitable  old  Boer,  on  whose  fight  against 
odds  and  fortune  combined  the  whole  civilized  world  was  gazing 
in  astonished  admiration. 

It  was  on  the  afternoon  of  this  Sunday  (February  18)  that 
Kitchener’s  famous  attack  was  ordered  on  what  was  believed  by 
him  to  be  a force  and  a position  that  could  not  possibly  stand 
before  such  an  absolutely  overwhelming  body  of  troops  as  he 
commanded.  The  enemy  were  conscious  of  being  the  masters 
of  Cronje’s  doom,  and  it  Avas  resolved  to  lend  a dramatic  spirit 
of  vengeance  to  the  expected  defeat  and  capture  by  employing  the 
Highland  regiments  in  the  delivery  of  the  main  attack,  in  retalia- 
tion for  the  terrible  punishment  inflicted  upon  them  at  Magers- 
fontein.  It  Avas  not  a spirit  worthy  of  a true  soldier,  and  re- 
sembled more  that  of  a hunter  Avho,  failing  to  bring  doAvn  a lion 
In  his  path,  succeeds  in  driving  him  into  a cage,  and  then  takes 
an  unworthy  sportsman’s  pleasure  in  potting  his  imprisoned  adver- 
sary from  the  vantage  ground  of  safety.  It  deserved  to  fail,  and 
did. 

After  fully  fifty  guns  from  all  sides  had  shelled  the  laager  for 
hours,  in  such  an  incessant  storm  of  lyddite  and  shrapnel  as  no 
modern  battle-field  has  ever  Avitnessed,  the  Highlanders  and  other 
regiments  were  let  loose  like  bloodhounds  from  the  leash  upon 
the  cornered  quarry  from  the  north,  Avest,  east,  and  south.  On 
they  came  with  bayonets  glinting  in  the  sun,  in  all  the  confidence 
of  vast  numbers  and  inspired  by  the  belief  that  it  would  be  a 
short  rush,  and  then  an  Elandslaagte  of  British  revenge.  But 
the  men  in  the  trenches,  tho  only  a handful  in  comparison  Avith 
Kitchener’s  legions,  AAnre  not  to  lend  themselves  to  pig-sticking 
on  that  Sunday,  so  easily  as  the  Kitcheners  and  Kelly-Kennys 
believed.  The  old  lion  AA'as  caged,  but  he  could  strike  through  his 
bars,  and  the  sun  went  down  that  Sabbath  day,  the  18th  of  Febru- 
ary, after  witnessing  one  of  the  most  unequal  battles  ever  fought; 
the  Highlanders,  balked  of  their  vengeance,  beaten  again,  and 
again  demoralized,  and  the  other  regiments  driven  back  Avith 
almost  equal  loss,  Avith  the  enemy  magnificently  repulsed  all  along 
the  line.  The  grim  old  lion  of  Potchefstroom  had'  once  again 
made  a South  African  battle-field  run  red  Avith  the  blood  of  his 
country’s  malignant  foe.  He  had  sustained  the  record  even  of 
Magersfontein,  for  his  4,500  Boers  had  faced,  fought,  and  repulsed 
on  that  Sunday  seven  times  their  number  of  English  assailants, 
having  twenty  guns  to  the  Boers’  one. 

During  the  progress  of  the  main  battle  on  the  18th,  De  Wet 


392 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


had  made  a furious  onslaught  upon  the  troops  who  had  been  sent 
south  of  the  river  to  carry  out  Kitchener’s  plan  of  an  all-round 
rush  upon  Cronje.  He  thus  diverted  a great  deal  of  the  enemy’s 
attention  from  the  laager  to  himself,  and  had  in  the  end  to  sustain 
a counter  attack  of  a dozen  guns  upon  his  position  and  several 
attempts  by  infantry  forces  to  dislodge  him.  He  held  his  ground 
until  night  time,  and  was  thus  largely  instrumental  in  helping 
Cronje  successfully  to  resist  Kitchener’s  movement  to  crush  him  by 
sheer  weight  of  numbers  and  guns. 

The  Boers  had  lost  very  few  in  this  battle,  but  a relatively 
large  number  had  been  wounded.  For  these  there  were  no  doctors 
or  ambulance  attendance.  They  were  lying  in  the  bed  of  the  river 
or  in  the  dongas,  and  this  spectacle,  with  women  and  children 
close  by,  naturally  tended  to  demoralize  some  of  the  burghers. 
Cronje  asked  Kitchener  on  Monday  morning  for  an  armistice  to 
bury  the  dead,  and  to  send  his  wounded  to  the  Boer  ambulance  at 
Petrusburg.  Joubert  had  accorded  an  even  more  accommodating 
armistice  to  General  White  after  Modderspruit.  It  is  believed 
that  Kitchener  was  inclined  to  accede  to  these  requests,  but  that 
Lord  Eoberts,  who  had  now  arrived  on  the  scene,  would  not 
consent  to  either.  This,  however,  was  not  the  worst  side  of  the 
English  general’s  actions.  His  forces  had  arrested  the  whole 
of  the  Hollander  ambulance  at  Jacobsdal,  and  had  refused  to 
allow  the  doctors  serving  under  the  Eed  Cross  ensign  to  pass 
through  the  lines  to  the  Boer  laager;  the  British  actually  using 
the  Federal  hospitals  and  ambulance  appliances  at  Jacobsdal  for 
their  own  Avounded,  while  denying  to  their  foemen  the  services 
of  their  own  medical  assistants  and  nurses!  It  is  true  that  Lord 
Eoberts  offered  to  take  Cronje’s  wounded  over  to  his  own  lines  for 
treatment  by  the  English  doctors,  but  no  self-respecting  foe  could 
consent  to  this  in  face  of  such  conduct  as  that  at  Jacobsdal, 
and  while  he  still  had  a resolve  to  continue  the  combat.  So 
the  fight  went  on  all  Monday;  Eoberts,  however,  keeping  his 
troops  at  a respectful  distance  from  the  range  of  the  rifles  Avhich 
had  driven  back  Kitchener’s  legions  the  previous  day.  The  enemy 
turned  all  his  batteries  upon  the  laager  by  the  river,  and  awaited 
the  double  agency  of  an  artillery  fire  Avhich  could  not  be  answered 
by  the  Boer  guns,  and  of  the  horrible  conditions  under  which 
Cronje  had  to  hold  his  ground,  to  effect  what  frontal  attacks  and 
revengeful  charges  had  failed  disastrously  to  achieve. 

Early  on  Monday  morning,  while  General  Ferreira  was  making 
the  rounds  of  his  position  ontside  the  enemy’s  lines,  north  of 
Koedesrand,  he  found  one  of  his  sentinels  asleep  at  his  post.  He 
prodded  him  Avith  the  butt  of  his  Mauser  to  rouse  him,  Avhen  the 


PAARDEBERG 


393 


burgher,  startled  from  his  slumber,  and  prompted  by  the  thought 
that  he  was  attacked  by  the  enemy,  seized  the  general’s  gun  at  the 
breach,  when  the  weapon  went  off,  killing  the  Commandant- 
General;  the  bullet  passing  through  his  heart  as  he  was  leaning 
over  the  frightened  burgher.  Ferreira  was  one  of  the  best  of 
men,  loved  by  all  who  knew  him,  and  his  brief  head  commandant- 
ship  of  the  western  Free  State  forces  in  succession  to  General 
^Vessels,  who  had  resigned,  was  very  popular  with  all  the  burghers. 
His  tragic  death  was  a severe  blow  to  the  already  sorely-tried  de- 
fenders of  Cronje’s  laager.  General  Christian  De  "Wet  was  im- 
mediately appointed  Chief  Commandant  of  the  Free  State  army, 
in  succession  to  Ferreira. 

On  Tuesday  Major  Albrecht’s  five  guns  were  rendered  useless 
by  the  breakdown  of  the  artillery  service  and  the  want  of  ammuni- 
tion. All  the  enemy’s  guns  being  beyond  the  range  of  rifle  fire, 
and  there  being  no  further  danger  from  Cronje’s  single  battery. 
Lord  Eoberts  saw  that  his  opponent’s  situation  was  rendered  quite 
hopeless,  and  he  began  to  push  his  lines  a little  nearer. 

A message  was  heliographed  to  Cronje  from  Petrusburg  on  Tues- 
day afternoon  by  Commandant  Froneman,  saying  that  Christian 
De  Wet  and  Philip  Botha  were  near,  had  beaten  a portion  of  the 
enemy’s  force,  and  were  in  possession  of  a strong  position  to  the 
southeast  of  the  laager.  They  were  expecting  De  la  Eey  and 
reenforcements,  and  would  be  able  to  render  effective  help  if  the 
laager  would  hold  out.  This  intelligence  revived  the  drooping 
spirits  of  the  men,  who,  on  finding  their  positions  attacked  again 
that  afternoon  by  infantry  charges  from  the  northwest,  fusilladed 
the  troops  back  in  the  best  Magersfontein  manner.  This  was 
virtually  the  last  assault  delivered  by  Eoberts.  His  100  unanswered 
guns,  the  shambles  in  the  bed  of  the  Modder  Eiver,  and  the  un- 
nerving presence  of  women  and  children  within  an  area  where 
every  shell  that  exploded  compelled  every  one  to  seek  shelter,  would 
do  what  bayonet  charges  could  not  effect. 

All  this  time  De  Wet  was  hanging  on  to  the  flank  of  the  enemy 
southeast  of  the  river.  He  had  gained  a small  kopje,  from  which 
a Krupp  and  a pom-pom  enabled  him  to  harass  the  English  on 
both  sides  of  the  river  considerably.  A huge  force  was  therefore 
directed  against  him  on  Wednesday,  with  the  object  of  surrounding 
the  hill,  and  captiiring  guns  and  men.  Firing  his  two  pieces  up  to 
the  last  moment,  he  called  in  his  men,  some  1,200  strong,  sent  out 
two  lines  of  screening  horsemen  to  the  right  and  left,  and  then, 
forming  his  force  into  a wedge-like  column  with  the  guns  in  be- 
tween, shot  clean  through  the  opening  still  left  between  the  horns  of 
the  closing  English  circle.  An  dries  Cronje,  of  Potchefstroom,  with 


394 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


only  50  men,  riding,  firing,  and  retiring,  as  sharp-shooters,  held 
back  the  enemy’s  horsemen  until  De  Wet  and  his  guns  were  safe  at 
Poplars  Grove. 

The  following  night  the  same  force  of  burghers,  led  by  their 
general,  rode  back  again  under  cover  of  darkness,  lay  in  wait 
until  dawn  enabled  them  to  see  the  enemy’s  location  on  the  hill 
which  had  been  vacated  on  the  previous  day,  and  in  a spur-gallop 
over  the  intervening  ground  attempted  to  retake  the  kopje.  But 
the  troops  in  position  were  too  strong,  and  De  Wet,  losing  only 
a very  few  men,  wheeled  back  and  regained  his  former  ground. 

On  Thursday  the  pitiless  bombardment  of  Cronje  recommenced 
with  the  dawn,  and  was  maintained  throughout  the  whole  day.  In 
the  evening  100  men  left  the  laager  and  crossed  over  to  the  British 
to  surrender. 

Alternate  hope  and  depression  came  to  the  trenches  during 
the  23rd.  Froneman  heliographed  from  the  east  to  be  of  good 
cheer,  and  to  hold  out;  that  3,000  burghers  were  about  to  attack 
the  enemy  to  Cronje’s  left.  ISlo  action  followed  the  sending  of 
the  message,  however,  and  a week’s  continuous  combat  in  one 
of  the  most  trying  and  desperate  fights  ever  fought  ended  with 
more  deaths,  wounds,  and  desertions,  as  the  night  of  Friday  shut 
out  the  two  forces  from  each  other’s  view.  But  the  nights  did 
not  stop  the  fighting.  The  English  pushed  their  trenches  from 
the  east  nearer  and  nearer  until  the  British  rifles  were  able  to 
supplement  the  fire  of  their  batteries  with  Lee-Metfords  against 
Mausers  from  shelters  which  were  built  under  cover  of  darkness. 

Saturday  ushered  in  the  fiercest  storm  of  projectiles  yet  turned 
upon  the  unfortunate  laager.  General  Cronje  estimated  the  num- 
ber of  guns  at  work  against  him  that  day  at  twenty-five  batteries, 
all  driving  their  shells  and  stinking  lyddite  into  an  area  of  about 
a mile  within  which  the  lines  of  the  small  army  were  now  con- 
tracted. Not  a move  could  safely  be  made  in  the  trenches  or  holes 
in  w'hich  the  men  had  to  crouch  for  protection,  yet  whenever  an 
attempt  was  made  to  rush  the  trenches  the  Mausers  were  there  with 
the  old  death-dealing  accuracy  of  fire.  Dead  men  lay  unburied, 
dead  horses  floated  in  the  river,  the  wounded  were  uncared  for,  the 
water  of  the  Modder  was  no  longer  drinkable;  and  it  seemed  as 
if  no  other  trials  could  possibly  be  added  to  the  sum  of  indescrib- 
able misery  under  which  these  few  men  still  faced  the  fate  of  in- 
evitable defeat  rather  than  hoist  the  white  flag.  This  Saturday 
evening  Captain  Daanie  Theron  reached  the  laager  after  having 
passed  through  the  English  lines,  swimming  the  river  in  his  jour- 
ney. He  had  gone  on  hands  and  knees  for  two  miles  after  leaving 
his  horse,  so  as  to  evade  the  patrols  of  the  enemy  before  reaching 


PAARDEBERG 


395 


the  river’s  bank,  being  frequently  within  a few  yards  of  British 
sentinels  on  his  perilous  mission.  He  brought  messages  from  De 
Wet,  Froneman,  Botha,  and  Commandant  Cronje,  of  Potchef- 
stroom,  in  combined  command  of  4,000  or  5,000  men  to  the  east, 
begging  of  General  Cronje  to  attempt  to  cut  his  way  through  in 
that  direction  before  all  was  lost.  They  pointed  out  that  the 
enemy  was  commencing  to  feel  the  strain  of  the  day  and  night 
fighting  since  the  14th,  that  their  rations  were  not  what  would 
sustain  the  troops  in  a combative  spirit,  and  that  a dash  through 
the  line  beyond  which  De  Wet’s  forces  were  ready  for  a responsive 
attack  would  stand  a good  chance  of  succeeding. 

Early  the  following  morning  a British  patrol  south  of  General 
French’s  lines  were  startled  at  seeing  a nude  figure  riding  like  the 
wind  on  a dark  horse,  as  if  he  were  the  spirit  of  a soldier  on  some 
mission  from  the  dead  within  the  doomed  laager.  They  were  too 
frightened  to  fire,  and  Theron  thus  got  safe  away  after  swimming 
the  river  on  his  return  journey  to  De  Wet’s  camp. 

Cronje  now  assented  to  the  proposal  which  he  had  hitherto 
refused  to  entertain,  and  the  burghers  began  to  build  a chain 
bridge  over  the  swollen  river — a rain-storm  having  helped  the 
British  shell-storm  to  drive  the  Boers  from  the  shelter  of  the  bed 
of  the  Modder — and  a sortie  to  the  southeast  was  to  be  attempted 
on  Monday  night.  But  fate  had  determined  that  the  blunders 
of  the  previous  week  should  entail  their  penalty.  Some  Kaffirs, 
who  had  attended  to  the  horses  and  cattle,  deserted  to  the  British 
on  Sunday  morning  while  the  Boers  were  engaged  at  prayers 
in  the  most  protected  part  of  the  laager.  The  officers  who  had 
been  in  favor  of  the  sortie  all  the  previous  week  now  seemed 
inclined  to  consider  the  whole  situation  absolutely  hopeless,  and 
to  whisper  the  word  “ surrender.”  A prayer  supplication  to  the 
Almighty  was  suggested  in  order  to  find  inspiration  as  to  which 
course  was  best,  and  this  was  supplemented  by  an  impassioned 
appeal  from  the  general  to  the  burghers  to  fight  on,  and  trust 
in  God  and  in  the  efforts  of  their  friends.  On  Sunday  night  the 
drooping  spirits  of  the  laager  had  been  raised  again,  and  all  were 
ready  to  stake  their  last  hope  on  the  attempt  which  was  to  be 
made  on  the  following  night. 

Monday  morning,  however,  dashed  this  hope  to  the  ground. 
The  Kaffirs  had  informed  the  British  of  the  work  going  on  at 
the  point  in  the  river  where  the  chain  bridge  was  being  made,  and 
all  the  enemy’s  guns  were  turned  upon  this  spot,  making  it  im- 
possible to  carry  on  the  task.  Two  shells  aimed  at  this  place 
fell  among  a group  of  burghers  and  literally  blew  the  son  of 
Commandant  Andries  Cronje  to  pieces,  killing  eight  or  ten 


396 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


more  at  the  same  time.  This,  together  with  the  destruction  of 
the  chain  bridge,  deadened  the  spirit  of  further  resistance  in 
banishing  the  hope  of  any  successful  help  from  outside,  and  the 
burghers  clamored  to  Cronje  to  hoist  the  white  flag.  His  men 
had,  at  last,  lost  faith  in  his  power  to  beat  back  the  English, 
and  he  had  to  consent  to  the  calling  of  a kriegsraad  to  decide 
the  question  of  surrender.  As  a last  resort  he  heliographed  in 
the  direction  of  Aasvogel  Kop,  where  Theron  had  told  him  He 
Wet  and  Botha  were  waiting  to  help  him,  that  it  had  been  decided 
at  a council  of  war  to  surrender  on  Tuesday  if  the  outside  assist- 
ance could  not  cut  its  way  through.  No  answer  came  back.  The 
council  had  voted  for  surrender,  all  excepting  the  general  and 
Commandant  Boos.  Fate  was  doubly  unkind  to  Cronje  in  making 
him  lower  the  hitherto  triumphant  Boer  flag  on  the  37th  of  Febru- 
ary, Majuba  Day!  But  so  it  had  occurred. 

The  morning  was  beautifully  flne,  the  sun  rising  bright  and 
clear  over  the  fearful  scene  which  met  the  gaze  of  the  old  hero 
of  Potchefstroom,  whose  own  sun  of  military  renown  had  set  in 
a halo  of  glory  which  a whole  world  was  to  salute  in  boundless 
admiration  for  an  unparalleled  resistance.  The  white  flag  was 
hoisted  over  the  general’s  tent,  and  Cronje  and  his  secretary  rode 
over  to  Lord  Eoberts  and  his  staff,  and  gave  up  the  flght. 

The  total  loss  of  the  Federals  in  all  the  engagements  from 
Klip  Drift  to  Paardeberg,  amounted  to  no  more  than  97  killed 
and  345  wounded. 

On  Sunday,  February  18,  when  Kitchener  ordered  his  attack 
by  four  divisions  on  as  many  sides  of  a position  which  had  been 
taken  up  after  a thirty  miles’  march,  and  put  in  a state  of  defense 
in  one  night’s  work,  these  4,500  farmers  shot  down  over  1,000 
of  their  enemy,  and  drove  the  other  assailants  back  behind  their 
artillery.  In  the  ten  days’  flghting  the  British  casualties  were  at 
least  1,500  men. 

This  victory  of  Lord  Eoberts  sent  the  British  Empire  into  a 
delirium  of  exultation.  Majuba  had  at  last  been  avenged.  Brit- 
ain’s military  might  had  again  asserted  itself.  But  the  world,  which 
knew  of  the  disproportion  in  men  and  means  between  the  victors 
and  the  vanquished,  saw  no  triumph  in  a battle  fought  for  ten 
days  by  5,000  farmers  and  flve  guns  against  40,000  trained  soldiers 
and  35  batteries  of  artillery.  And,  at  last,  the  English  press 
was  compelled  to  tell  the  truth  about  the  strength  of  “ the  army 
of  16,000  Boers  and  of  batteries  of  Long  Toms  ” which  had 
defeated  Methuen  at  ]\Iagersfontein.  Lord  Eoberts  could  count 
only  the  men  and  guns  found  in  the  alleged  army  ''of  16,000.” 

The  guns  captured  were  : three  7.5  c.m.  Krupps;  one  (old  pat- 


PAABDEBERG 


397 


tern)  12-poimcler  q.f.  Krupp,  and  one  3.7  c.m.  Vickers-Maxim 
(pom-pom) — 5 guns. 

The  men  who  surrendered  numbered  3,919.  Adding  to  these 
the  number  killed  (97)  and  wounded  (245)  in  the  fighting  up  to 
the  time  of  surrender,  Cronje’s  total  force  on  taking  up  position 
at  Paardeberg  was  4,261  men. 

He  had,  however,  according  to  my  information,  a body  of  some 
500  Cape  Colony  Volunteers,  who  were  part  of  the  force  with 
which  he  had  beaten  Methuen  on  December  11.  There  is  no  ac- 
count of  these  in  the  details,  Boer  or  British,  of  the  men  who 
laid  down  their  arms  to  Lord  Eoberts  on  the  27th  of  February. 
They  crossed  the  Modder,  to  the  south,  on  Saturday  night,  the 
17th,  after  the  rear-guard  action  with  some  of  Kelly-Kenny’s  divi- 
sion, and  made  their  way  towards  Bloemfontein,  where  they  joined 
De  Wet  and  Philip  Botha.  Some  200  Free  Staters  had  also  left 
the  column  on  its  retreat  after  passing  Klip  Drift.  They  went 
north  towards  Boshof,  and  joined  General  Ferreira’s  men  on  their 
retreat  from  the  Kimberley  investment.  Had  Cronje  taken  either 
of  these  courses,  on  finding  that  French  had  passed  him  to- 
wards Kimberley,  and  that  Kelly-Kenny  and  Kitchener  were 
coming  up  to  Klip  Drift,  he  could  have  easily  escaped  destruc- 
tion. If  he  had  followed  the  burghers  who  crossed  at  Paardeberg 
Drift,  and  formed  a junction  with  De  Wet,  Philip  Botha,  Frone- 
man,  and  De  la  Eey,  he  would  soon  have  had  10,000  men  with 
whom  to  fight  Eoberts  for  the  possession  of  Bloemfontein,  and  any 
one  who  knew  of  the  utterly  demoralized  plight  in  which  the  British 
army  staggered  into  the  Free  State  capital  after  its  month’s  march- 
ing, fighting,  and  starving,  will  not  hesitate  to  say  that  three  such 
capable  generals  as  De  la  Eey,  Cronje,  and  De  Wet,  with  one- 
fourth  of  Eoberts’  strength,  would  have  easily  smashed  him  and 
his  40,000  half-famished  troops. 

A generous-minded  world,  lost  in  admiration  at  the  example  of 
heroic  patriotism  which  was  thought  to  have  entirely  died  out 
of  a materialistic  age,  overlooked  faults  of  generalship  which  were 
redeemed  by  the  virtues  of  dauntless  courage.  Tho  pride  and  over- 
confidence  had  lost  to  Cronje  opportunities  which  would  otherwise 
have  saved  the  cause  of  the  two  Eepublics  from  destruction,  critics 
who  are  not  English,  but  are  fair  and  just,  will  say  that,  if  ever 
error  was  atoned  for  in  acts  that  thrill  the  hearts  and  fire  the 
imaginations  of  mankind,  the  unsurpassed  bravery  of  the  “ Lion  of 
Potchefstroom  ” and  his  4,000  farmers  at  the  banks  of  the  Modder 
Eiver  will  deaden  the  recollection  of  the  blunders  which  gave  Eng- 
land the  material,  but  the  Boers  the  moral,  triumph  of  Paardeberg. 

The  Federal  officers  who  surrendered  to  Lord  Eoberts  after  their 


398 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


brilliant  resistance  during  the  ten  days’  battle  were  ; General 
Cronje,  Commandant  M.  J.  Wolmarans,  Commandants  Boos  and 
J.  L.  Martins,  Assistant  Commandants  E.  Woest,  J.  P.  G.  Vorster, 
and  W.  L.  Jooste;  Field  Cornets  Albert  Naiide,  J.  H.  L.  Bosman, 
W.  A.  Lemmer,  H.  G.  Badenhorst,  Frills  (Scandinavian),  D. 
H.  Hattingh,  Venter,  D.  J.  Terblanche,  P.  V.  de  Villiers,  G.  J. 
du  Plessis,  Assistant  Field  Cornet  P.  W.  Snyman,  War  Com- 
missioner Arnoldi,  Assistants  P.  J.  Jooste,  and  A.  K.  Esselen, 
Adjutants  J.  T.  A.  Wolmarans,  A.  D.  W.  Wolmarans,  E.  A.  Ning, 
G.  S.  Maree,  J.  B.  Botha,  G.  H.  Grobler,  Bomas,  and  Moodie ; 
Commandants  J.  P.  J.  Jordaan,  J.  K.  Kok,  J.  C.  Villiers,  E.  J. 
Snyman,  L.  Meiutjes,  J.  Greyling ; Field  Cornets  J.  Cronje,  C. 
Oostbuizen,  C.  van  Zyl,  J.  Nieuwenha,  N.  K.  Hick,  J.  N.  van  der 
Walt ; Major  Albrecht,  Commander  of  the  Artillery  ; Lieutenants 
V.  Heester,  Vondewitz,  and  Van  Angesten. 


Chapter  XXXI 


AFTER  PAARDEBERG 


President  Kruger  arrives  at  Bloemfontein — With  President  Steyn 

VIEWS  FIGHT  AT  POPLARS  GROVE — RETREAT  OF  BOERS— GENERAL  DESER- 
TION OF  BURGHERS — BATTLE  OF  AbRAM’S  KrAAL — FALL  OF  BLOEM- 
FONTEIN— British  annexation  of  Free  State — Presidents  Kruger 
AND  Steyn  appeal  to  Lord  Salisbury  for  peace — Salisbury’s  reply 
• — Secretary  Reitz’s  rejoinder — Boer  casualties  up  to  Paarde- 
BERG — Roberts’  advance  to  Pretoria — Obstacles  in  his  way — • 
Concentration  of  Boer  troops  impossible — De  Wet’s  plan  of 
guerrilla  warfare. 


lEESIDEXT  KEUGER  came  from  Pretoria  to  Bloemfontein 


Jl  to  encourage  the  Federals  after  the  defeat  and  surrender  of 
Cronje.  General  De  la  Rey  had  hastened  up  from  Colesberg  with 
all  the  burghers  he  could  muster,  which  comprised  a few  squadrons 
of  the  Johannesburg  and  Pretoria  Police,  some  of  the  Rand  com- 
mandoes, and  the  remnants  of  other  scattered  corps  and  bodies. 
The  Eicksburg,  Ladybrand,  and  Winburg  burghers  were  with  De 
Wet  and  Philip  Botha.  The  third  Free  State  army,  which  had  been 
operating  across  the  Orange  River,  was,  at  the  time,  retreating 
north  to  Kroonstad  under  Generals  Ollivier,  Lemmer  and  Grobler. 
This  force  was  between  5,000  and  6,000  strong,  and  was  largely 
composed  of  Cape  Volunteers.  It  was  moving  so  slowly  with  a 
train  of  500  or  600  wagons  that  it  did  not  reach  its  destination 
until  some  weeks  after  the  fall  of  Bloemfontein. 

Lord  Roberts  had  been  reenforced  from  Methuen’s  army,  and 
from  the  eternal  arrivals  from  England  and  elsewhere;  so  that 
it  became  virtually  an  advance  of  50,000  troops  against  5,000 
burghers.  The  Federals  fell  back  to  Poplars  Grove,  a dozen  miles 
eastward  of  Paardeberg,  where  they  were  attacked  by  Roberts  on 
the  7th  of  March.  Presidents  Kruger  and  Steyn  were  spectators 
of  the  encounter,  and  were  gone  from  a place  at  which  they  had 
witnessed  the  tight  only  ten  minutes  when  the  enemy  was  in  occupa- 
tion of  the  spot.  Roberts  succeeded  in  turning  the  Federal  position 
at  the  Modder  River  by  sending  a strong  cavalry  force  across  lower 
down  the  stream,  and  in  this  way  compelled  De  Wet  to  fall  back 
again  eastward.  In  moving  his  position  a strong  force  of  Roberts’ 
cavalry  all  but  surrounded  the  escort  of  the  Boer  guns,  quite 


400 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


near  to  where  the  tAvo  Presidents  had  been  in  consultation  with 
the  Federal  generals.  De  Wet’s  men  fought  superbly,  contesting 
the  ground  with  the  enemy’s  mounted  troops  in  the  finest  manner 
possible.  General  Philip  Botha  and  100  men  threAv  themselves 
between  the  guns  and  the  British,  and  held  the  Lancers  back  with 
consummate  courage  and  shooting  capacity  until  the  artillery  and 
the  Presidents  were  at  a safe  distance. 

In  the  retreat  from  Poplars  Grove  the  mass  of  the  burghers 
understood  that  it  had  been  determined  to  make  no  further 
stand  west  of  Bloemfontein,  and  that  the  campaign  for  the  defense 
of  the  capital  was  ended.  This  impression  was  by  no  means  an 
unreasonable  one  after  the  events  of  the  previous  fortnight.  The 
crushing  blow  of  Cronje’s  surrender,  followed  immediately  as  it  was 
by  the  relief  of  Ladysmith  and  the  retreat  of  Joubert,  had  broken 
the  long  and  extraordinary  spell  of  Boer  success  which  had  been 
piously  attributed  to  the  protecting  care  exercised  by  Providence 
over  the  cause  of  the  Eepublics.  Then  came  the  appeal  for  peace 
on  the  part  of  the  Presidents,  which  encouraged  a delusion  that 
there  was  to  be,  at  least,  a truce  that  would  enable  burghers  to 
visit  homes  from  which  they  had  been  absent  in  most  instances 
since  the  war  began  in  October.  Owing  to  the  wide  prevalence  of 
this  state  of  feeling  large  numbers  of  burghers  went  straight  to 
their  homes  in  the  retreat  toward  Abram’s  Kraal.  President  Steyn, 
De  Wet,  and  Philip  Botha  did  their  Aitmost  by  entreaty  and  per- 
suasion to  induce  them  to  stand,  but  it  was  well  known  that  it  had 
already  been  decided  not  to  risk  any  serious  injury  to  the  city  in 
a hopeless  effort  to  defend  it,  and  the  disheartened  farmers  whose 
hemes  were  far  away  felt  no  inclination  after  six  months’  cam- 
paigning to  repeat  the  fruitless  performance  of  Poplars  Grove.  Ko 
authority  can  compel  a burgher  to  fight  against  his  will,  and  fully 
two-thirds  of  the  men  who  were  ready  and  eager  to  fight  in  the  old 
form  for  the  rescue  of  Cronje’s  laager,  had  he  only  consented  to  act 
as  he  had  been  entreated  to  do,  trekked  homeward,  and  left  the 
Free  State  capital  to  its  fate. 

The  hill  at  Abram’s  Kraal,  therefore,  had  to  be  occupied  by  De 
la  Eey  and  Celliers,  whose  united  forces  of  police  and  Eand  men 
at  this  position  numbered  no  more  than  300.  Celliers  had  the. 
name  of  being  one  of  the  most  indomitable  fighters  of  the  Federal 
commandoes.  In  the  campaign  around  Colesberg  he  had  displayed 
a valor  and  an  eagerness  for  surprise  attacks  with  small  forces  upon 
superior  numbers  of  the  enemy  that  had  earned  for  him  the  reputa- 
tion of  having  a charmed  life.  Six  times  during  the  9th  of  March 
the  positions  held  by  himself  and  De  la  Eey  were  attacked  by  huge 
forces  hurled  against  them  by  Eoberts.  Men  fell  by  the  score  out  of 


AFTER  PAARDEBERG 


401 


this  intrepid  band  of  Band  fighters,  assailed  on  all  sides,  but  the 
attacking  columns  were  driven  reeling  back  each  time  with  ranks 
thinned  and  broken.  It  was  to  be  the  last  fight  for  Bloemfontein, 
and,  tho  the  burghers  had  no  delusions  as  to  being  able  to  stop 
thirty  times  their  number  of  foes  after  the  disheartening  event  of 
the  2 ‘7th  of  February,  in  no  engagement  during  the  whole  campaign 
has  there  been  a finer  display  of  courage  or  a more  stubborn 
resistance  shown  than  by  the  Pretoria  and  Johannesburg  Police 
and  by  Celliers’  Fordsburg  and  Jeppstown  burghers  at  Abram’s 
Kraal.  In  one  of  these  attacks  upon  De  la  Eey  the  English 
advanced  within  fifty  yards  of  his  men,  but  were  forced  back  by 
the  unflinching  valor  of  the  heroic  policemen.  So  sustained 
and  effective  was  the  fire  which  Celliers’  men  directed  upon  a 
battery  which  was  attacking  De  la  Key’s  position,  that  the  guns 
were  abandoned  for  a time  in  the  middle  of  the  battle-field  with 
all  their  service  shot  down  around  them.  In  face  of  Koberts’ 
whole  force  Celliers  was  ready  to  rush  out  and  take  them,  only  he 
had  neither  oxen  nor  horses  with  which  to  carry  them  away.  From 
six  in  the  morning  until  darkness  came  on  the  battle  raged — from 
where  De  Wet  and  Philip  Botha  with  only  a few  hundred  burghers, 
tried  to  stop  the  progress  of  the  resistless  wave  of  numbers  east  of 
Petrusburg,  to  where  De  la  Eey  and  Celliers,  with  that  sturdy  old 
campaigner  Kolbe,  were  standing  as  it  were  across  the  road  to 
Bloemfontein,  fighting  fully  twenty  to  one  in  a battle  of  hopeless 
but  dogged  resistance.  Ninety  men  of  the  immortal  300  Police  and 
Eand  men  were  killed  at  Abram’s  Kraal.  Altogether,  out  of  a force 
variously  estimated  at  between  900  and  1,500  men,  De  la  Eey,  De 
Wet,  and  Celliers  lost  some  390  in  killed  and  wounded  in  this 
battle  with  Eoberts’  huge  army. 

De  la  Eey  fell  back  again  slowly,  De  Wet  and  himself  fighting 
and  retiring,  and  compelling  the  English  to  keep  at  a cautious 
movement  towards  their  objective;  the  Boer  plan  being  not  to 
make  any  final  stand  within  the  town,  but  to  gain  time  in  which 
to  remove  north  to  the  hills  above  the  river  toward  Brandfort 
such  stores  and  ammunition  as  could  be  carried  away.  On  the 
13th  of  March  Lord  Eoberts  took  possession  of  Bloemfontein, 
almost  without  opposition. 

The  fall  of  the  Free  State  capital  marked  a strong  turning  of 
the  tide  against  the  Federal  forces  in  the  field,  while  cutting 
the  Eepublics  adrift  from  the  lingering  hope  of  European  inter- 
vention, Lord  Eoberts  annexed  the  Free  State,  by  proclamation, 
to  the  British  Empire  without  a protest  from  any  Continental 
Power,  and  the  two  little  Christian  States  were  thus  left  at  the 
mercy  of  the  rapacious  Empire  whose  statesmen  had  connived  at 
26 


AFTER  PAARDEBERG 


403 


the  Jameson  Eaid.  The  situation  was,  therefore,  one  well  calcu- 
lated to  encourage  despondency  and  despair  in  the  Boer  mind,  and 
it  was  under  the  weight  of  this  depression  that  more  than  half 
of  the  remaining  Free  State  forces  gave  up  the  fight  for  a time  and 
went  to  their  farms. 

Presidents  Kruger  and  Steyn  had  already  addressed  a dignified 
appeal  for  peace  to  Lord  Salisbury,  on  the  5th  of  March,  pointing 
out  the  evils  which  the  war  had  already  occasioned  on  both  sides, 
in  loss  of  lives  and  in  injury  to  property  ; reiterating  their  previous 
declarations,  that  the  Eepublics  took  up  arms  solely  to  defend 
their  liberties,  and  not  with  any  aggressive  intent  or  purpose 
against  the  British  Empire  in  South  Africa;  and  solemnly  assev- 
erating their  earnest  desire  for  peace.  They,  however,  made  it  clear 
that,  if  England’s  policy  in  pursuing  the  war  was  to  be  one  of  con- 
quest, there  was  nothing  left  for  the  allied  Eepublics  “ but  to  con- 
tinue in  their  present  struggle  to  the  end,  in  spite  of  the  over- 
whelming might  of  the  British  Empire.”  Lord  Salisbury’s  reply, 
as  was  fully  expected,  was  the  negation  of  the  assurance  which  at 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities  he  had  publicly  and  purposely  given  to 
the  Powers  of  Europe,  that  England  in  the  conflict  with  the  Trans- 
vaal sought  neither  gold  mines  nor  the  acquisition  of  territory, 
but  only  the  full  protection  of  British  subjects.  He  had  nothing 
better  to  base  bis  refusal  of  the  offers  of  peace  upon  than  the 
Jingo  legends  of  ambitious  Boer  coalitions  against  the  Empire, 
“ the  accumulation  for  many  years  past  of  military  stores  on  an 
enormous  scale  which  could  only  have  been  intended  for  use  against 
Great  Britain,”  and  the  fallacy  that  it  was  the  Eepublics,  and  not 
the  British  Empire,  which  began  the  war.  Lord  Salisbury  ended 
his  reply  by  declaring  that  the  British  Government  “ were  not 
prepared  to  assent  to  the  independence  of  either  the  South  African 
Eepublic  or  the  Orange  Free  State.” 

Lord  Salisbury’s  reply  elicited  the  following  unanswerable  re- 
joinder from  State  Secretary  Eeitz : 

“ Lord  Salisbury  asserts  that  at  the  time  of  the  Ultimatum  none 
of  the  rights  guaranteed  by  the  Convention  had  been  broken,  and 
that  our  declaration  of  war  had  been  the  first  step  towards  hostili- 
ties. 

“ What  is  really  the  truth? 

“ As  the  Ultimatum  expressed  it.  Her  Majesty’s  Government 
had  pressed  and  threatened  to  enforce  changes  in  the  internal 
Government  of  the  Eepublics  since  the  Bloemfontein  Conference, 
altho,  according  to  Conventions,  such  matters  were  exclusively 
within  the  control  of  our  own  Governments. 

“ Further,  during  these  threatening  negotiations  British  troops  in 


404 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


abnormal  numbers  were  sent  to  South  Africa  and  stationed  upon 
our  borders,  and  the  High  Commissioner  assured  President  Steyn 
that  these  troops  Avere  not  intended  for  the  Free  State,  but  alone 
for  the  South  African  Eepublic. 

“ Finally,  the  negotiations  were  suddenly  broken  olf  by  Her 
Majesty’s  Government,  with  the  threat  that  Her  Majesty’s  Govern- 
ment would  take  its  own  steps  to  remove  the  grievances  of  her 
subjects. 

“ After  that,  we  waited  another  fourteen  days,  while  an  Army 
Corps  was  mobilized  in  England  and  prepared  for  despatch  to 
South  Africa,  and  also  the  Eeserves  called  out — both  being  meas- 
ures of  an  indisputable  belligerent  tendency. 

“ After  the  inquiry  of  President  Steyn  as  to  the  object  of  these 
threatening  proceedings,  the  High  Commissioner  gave  no  reply, 
but  Mr.  Chamberlain,  in  his  speeches  in  England,  demonstrated 
clearly  to  the  world  that  England  had  firmly  resolved  to  bring 
about  drastic  changes  at  once. 

“ Upon  this  we  addressed  a communication  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment, falsely  named  an  ultimatum,  which  was  not  a declaration  of 
war,  but  simply  declared  that,  unless  Her  Majesty’s  Government 
stopped  the  further  despatch  of  troops  to  our  borders,  and  would 
settle  all  points  at  dispute  by  means  of  impartial  arbitration,  this 
Eepublic  would  be  obliged  to  view  the  action  of  the  Britisli  Govern- 
ment as  a hostile  act  and  cause  of  war. 

“ The  communication  was,  therefore,  more  of  a peace  message, 
and  was  not  intended  as  a provocation  for  war  from  our  side. 

“ Under  these  circumstances,  what  could  we  do  other  than  that 
which  we  did  ? As  Mr.  Leonard  Courtney,  a British  statesman, 
said : ‘ England  acted  like  a man,  who,  in  the  middle  of  friendly 
negotiations  with  another  person,  and  with  whom  he  found  it 
impossible  to  agree,  suddenly  said,  “ Wait  a bit,  until  I have  got 
my  revolver,  then  I will  continue  to  argue  with  you.”  ’ 

“ In  connection  with  the  statement  of  Lord  Salisbury,  that  the 
Eepublics  had  secretly  armed,  and  in  a most  amazing  manner, 
I only  wish  to  say  that  we  purchased  our  weapons  and  ammunition 
in  an  open  manner,  without  any  secrecy,  from  English  and  Euro- 
pean firms,  and  that  we  had  a perfect  right  to  do  this,  so  that  the 
High  Commissioner  at  the  Conference  at  Bloemfontein  could  boast 
that  Her  Majesty’s  Government  was  perfectly  aware  of  our  arm- 
ing, and  the  British  military  authorities  were  enabled  to  issue  a 
secret  pamphlet  to  their  officers  (found  by  us  in  the  camp  at 
Dundee),  in  which  full  particulars  of  the  state  of  our  arms  were  set 
forth.  The  arming  was  only  commenced  after  the  Jameson  Eaid 
had  taken  place,  and  it  had  been  made  plain  to  us  by  means  of 
intercepted  telegrams,  and  the  investigation  by  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, that  not  alone  highly  placed  British  officials,  but  also  mem- 
bers of  the  Government  were  behind  the  treacherous  conspiracy. 

“ Before  this  time  the  British  officer  who  was  employed  as  a spy 


AFTER  PAARDEBERG 


405 


(.White)  says,  with  a semblance  of  truth,  that  the  arming  of  the 
population  was  such  that  the  South  African  Kepublic  could  be 
taken  with  five  thousand  men  without  difficulty. 

“ From  this  it  is  evident  that  both  our  arming  and  our  ultimatum 
were  designed  as  defensive  measures,  in  order  to  protect  and  pre- 
serve the  independence  of  this  Eepublic.  The  concluding  declara- 
tion of  Lord  Salisbury,  that  Her  Majesty’s  Government  is  not  pre- 
pared to  agree  to  the  independence  of  the  South  African  Eepublic 
or  that  of  the  Orange  Free  State,  makes  it  evident  to  every  burgher, 
of  these  Eepublics,  and  to  the  whole  world,  that  Her  Majesty’s 
Government  has  in  view  nothing  else  than  the  total  destruction  of 
our  independent  national  existence.  How  that  all  doubt  upon  that 
point  is  removed,  the  burghers  know  why  they  fight,  and  they  will 
proceed  with  the  struggle  for  their  national  existence  to  the  end, 
in  the  firm  confidence  (as  both  of  our  State  Presidents  have  ex- 
pressed it)  Hhat  that  God  who  has  implanted  in  our  hearts  and 
in  the  hearts  of  our  fathers,  the  unquenchable  fire  of  love  of 
liberty,  will  not  forsake  us,  but  will  complete  His  work  in  us  and 
in  our  posterity.” 

The  casualties  in  the  Federal  forces  from  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
up  to,  but  not  including,  the  surrender  of  General  Cronje’s  army 


were : 

Killed  677 

Wounded  2,129 

Accidentally  killed 24 

Accidentally  wounded 171 

Died  of  sickness  . 99 

Sick  who  had  recovered  or  who  were  still 
under  treatment 1,251 


Total 4,351 


These  figures  are  given  on  the  authority  of  Dr.  MollengraafF, 
chief  of  the  Identity  Department  of  the  Eed  Cross  Society  of 
Pretoria.  To  them  must  be  added  the  number  of  prisoners  taken 
by  the  enemy  at  Elandslaagte  and  other  engagements,  and  the 
total  losses  at  Paardeberg.  I estimate  the  number  of  prisoners 
up  to  Paardeberg  to  have  been  350.  Adding  to  these,  and  to  the 
above  figures  the  total  recorded  Boer  casualties  on  the  27th  of 
February — namely,  97  killed,  245  wounded,  and  3,919  who  sur- 
rendered— the  grand  total  would  be  8,962  men.  That  is,  more  than 
one-fourth  of  the  total  effective  forces  of  the  two  Eepublics  had 
been  knocked  out  of  the  fight  with  the  British  Empire  the  day 
Cronje  laid  down  his  arms.  Allov/ing  for  a return  to  the  field  of 
two-thirds  of  the  wounded  and  of  the  sick,  say  2,000  men,  the 
burghers  and  volunteers  remaining  as  available  for  the  continuation 


406 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


of  the  war  at  the  time  Christian  De  Wet  began  his  movement  from 
Brandfort,  would  number  about  26.000.  This  number  corre- 
sponded with  the  strength  of  the  combined  armies  when  the 
Kepuldics  took  the  field  on  the  12th  of  October,  1899;  the  losses  in 
the  five  months  of  the  war  balancing  the  additions  made  to  the 
commandoes  within  the  same  period.  But  whereas,  while  the 
enemy  had  only  between  30,000  and  40,000  troops  in  South  Africa 


Photo  by  Mr.  Davitt 

OrnCERS  OF  general  PHILIP  BOTHA’S  CAMP,  OSSPRUIT,  EASTER,  1900 
George  Brand  (now  Commandant)  on  extreme  left,  on  white  horse 


the  day  Joubert  crossed  over  Laing’s  ISTek  in  the  invasion  of  Natal, 
Lord  Eoberts  was  in  supreme  command  of  armies  numbering  more 
than  150,000  soldiers,  with  fully  300  guns,  when  Christian  De  Wet 
gazed  down  on  the  British  camp  at  Bloemfontein  from  the  hills 
above  the  Modder  Eiver,  early  in  March,  1900. 

The  British  advance  from  Bloemfontein  to  Pretoria  was  destined 
to  be  a great  surprise  to  all  who  had  counted  upon  Eoberts  having 
to  meet  the  combined  force  of  Transvaal  and  Free  State  resistance 
in  a most  determined  form  at  the  Vaal  Eiver.  It  was  believed  all 
round  that  when  the  Federals  were  compelled  to  draw  in  their  scat- 
tered lines  of  observation  and  defense  from  the  borders  of  the  two 


AFTER  PA ARDEBER G 


407 


Eepublics,  and  concentrate  the  full  strength  of  the  allied  States 
upon  one  great  operation,  results  would  follow  which  “ would 
stagger  humanity.”  But  in  war,  as  in  many  other  affairs  of  men, 
it  is  the  unexpected  which  frequently  happens.  The  popular  belief 
in  Europe  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Franco-German  conflict  was  that 
France  would  dictate  her  terms  to  Germany  in  Berlin  within  a few 
weeks’  time.  The  same  confidence  obtained,  in  October,  1899,  with 
reference  to  the  English  army,  and  an  occupation  of  Pretoria  by 
Christmas;  and,  once  more,  in  the  British  invasion  of  the  Trans- 
vaal after  the  surrender  at  Paardeberg,  the  expected  was  destined 
not  to  materialize  into  fact. 

The  explanation  of  this  falling  off  in  the  resisting  capacity  of 
the  Boers  before  the  English  advance  between  the  two  capitals  is 
found  in  a rational  view  of  the  situation  as  revolutionized  by  the 
disaster  of  February  27.  One  kind  of  campaign  had  come  to  an 
end,  and  another  was  called  for  in  the  surrender  of  a Federal  army 
and  of  the  ablest  fighting  general  on  the  Boer  side.  This  surrender 
was  determined  by  an  overwhelming  body  striking  at  a point  where 
Cronje’s  tactical  weakness  and  the  entanglement  of  the  Kimberley 
investment  created  an  opportunity  for  Lord  Eoberts  of  which  he 
skilfully  availed  himself.  Without  a huge  outflanking  force  of 
troops  this  movement  could  never  have  been  carried  through  as 
it  was.  There  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  on  that  point.  Then,  had 
the  Boer  general’s  over-confidence  in  himself  and  unreasoning 
contempt  for  his  foes  not  tied  him  down  to  his  cherished  positions 
at  Magersfontein  for  two  days  longer  than  ordinary  prudence 
should  have  counseled  after  French’s  turning  movement,  the  in- 
ferior fighting  qualities  of  Eoberts’  troops,  as  seen  in  the  subse- 
quent ten  days’  combat  around  Paardeberg,  would  have  given 
Cronje,  De  la  Eey,  and  De  Wet,  with  a combined  force  of  10,000 
burghers,  the  greatest  victory  ever  gained  over  an  English  army. 
This  conclusion  is  also  warranted  as  an  unhesitating  deduction 
from  the  facts  of  the  battles  previously  fought. 

It  was  not  possible,  however,  after  the  surrender  of  February 
27,  to  effect  any  concentration  at  any  point  between  the  two  capi- 
tals adequate  to  the  task  of  keeping  back  50,000  troops.  J oubert’s 
commandoes,  comprising  some  8,000  men,  were  held  at  the  Biggars- 
berg  by  the  British  army  in  Xatal  under  Buller,  while  fully  4,000 
burghers  had  to  be  retained:  between  Fourteen  Streams;  continuing 
the  farcical  siege  of  Wafeking;  guarding  the  northwest  boundary 
line  against  the  operations  of  the  Ehodesian  forces,  British  and 
Kaffir;  and  policing  the  Zulu  and  Swaziland  borders.  Grobler’s 
and  Ollivier’s  Colesberg  commandoes,  consisting  of  Free  State 
burghers  and  rebels,  were  the  strongest  Federal  unit  remaining  in 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


408 

the  Free  State  after  Cronje’s  surrender.  It  was  found  impossible, 
however,  to  obtain  the  immediate  cooperation  in  the  work  of  holding 
Roberts’  legions  back,  of  even  half  of  the  5,000  who  had  carried 
out  one  of  the  most  successful  retreats  in  modern  military  history. 

Like  thousands  of  other  burghers,  mainly  the  elder  and  more 
responsible  family  men,  they  went  to  their  farms,  and  the  task 
of  attempting  to  arrest  the  progress  of  the  English  from  one 
Boer  capital  to  the  other  was  left  solely  to  the  available  younger 
Boers,  to  the  Cape  Volunteers,  and  to  the  foreign  brigades.  All  the 
facts  and  conditions  of  the  situation  demanded,  therefore,  a new 
plan  of  operations  which  would  give  to  the  mobility  of  the  fighting 
burghers,  to  their  intimate  knowledge  of  the  countr}^,  their 
splendid  shooting  power,  and  their  unique  capacity  for  endurance, 
opportunities  for  asserting  such  an  advantage  over  the  enemy 
as  would  neutralize  to  some  extent  the  effectiveness  of  his  numbers 
in  pitched  battles.  These  opportunities  could  only  he  found  in 
such  a system  of  warfare  as  Christian  De  Wet  had  initiated  after 
Paardeherg. 


Chapter  XXXII 

SANNAS  POST 


De  Wet  rallies  disheartened  burghers — Retreat  of  third  Free  State 

ARMY  FROM  COLESBERG  TO  KROONSTAD De  WeT  LEAVES  BrANDFORT 

mTH  1,000  MEN  TO  JOIN  IT — WAYLAYS  BrOADWOOD’S  COMMAND  AT 
Sannas  Post  (Koorn  Spruit)- — Reckons  safely  on  British 
STUPIDITY — Heroism  of  British  captain — Death  of  Lieutenant 
Nix — complete  rout  of  British — De  Wet  captures  British 
force  near  Reddersburg — Unsuccessful  siege  of  Wepener — 
Botha’s  narrow  escape. 

The  first  effective  blow  struck  at  the  enemy  after  the  capture  of 
Bloemfontein  was  the  work  of  Christian  De  Wet.  He  had  set 
to  work  after  the  British  occupation  of  the  Free  State  capital  to 
mobilize  his  commandoes  again,  visiting  villages  and  farms  in  the 
Brandfort  and  surrounding  districts,  and  rallying  the  burghers  to 
the  field.  His  influence  was  very  great,  especially  among  the  Boer 
women,  who  reverenced  him  for  his  steadfast  loyalty,  and  for  his 
many  striking  triumphs  over  the  enemies  of  their  homes  and 
country,  and  it  was  largely  due  to  the  cooperating  patriotism  of 
the  noblest  race  of  women  who  have  ever  encouraged  the  cause 
of  freedom  that  he  owed  the  successful  recruiting  of  the  body  of 
burghers  who  enabled  him  to  win  the  brilliant  victory  of  Sannas 
Post.  He  had  fought  like  a lion  from  Blaubank  to  Bloemfontein 
with  his  Free  State  burghers.  No  defeats  discouraged,  no  disasters 
dismayed  him,  and  when  large  numbers  of  men  had  retired  to 
their  farms,  sullen  and  dispirited  over  the  collapse  of  Cronje’s 
army,  he  who  was  to  be  henceforth  the  doughtiest  champion  of 
his  country  in  the  field,  left  Bloemfontein  by  the  road  to  the  north 
only  as  the  English  were  entering  the  city  at  the  other  side. 

He  retired  to  the  hills  between  the  capital  and  Brandfort,  and 
from  there,  as  the  newly  appointed  Chief  Commandant  of  the 
Free  State  army,  issued  a brief  appeal  to  his  countrymen  to  face 
the  enemy  again,  and  to  battle  with  him  for  every  inch  of  Free 
State  soil.  , In  this  address  he  gave  an  indication  of  the  plan  of 
campaign  which  he  had  decided  upon,  and  which  was  destined  to 
meet  with  such  striking  success.  “ We  need  not  be  downhearted,” 
he  wrote,  “as  the  most  wonderful  acts  which  God  has  done  for 


410 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


us  before,  and  also  in  this  war,  were  accomplished  by  small 
bodies.  We  trust  in  God  under  this  trial,  and  hope  that  He  may 
strengthen  our  officers  and  burghers  through  this  to  do  their 
duty  to  Him,  the  Government,  country,  and  people  even  more 
than  before.” 

Hear  the  end  of  March  he  left  Brandfort  with  a force  of  about 
1,000  men  and  five  guns,  under  the  joint  command  of  Piet  He 
Wet  (his  brother),  and  his  faithful  Lieutenant,  Andries  Cronje. 
The  Chief  Commandant’s  objective  was  to  try  and  effect  a junc- 
tion with  the  third  Free  State  army  under  Generals  Ollivier, 
Grobler,  and  Lemmer,  which  had  commenced  its  retreat  north 
from  Colesberg  after  the  catastrophe  of  Paardeberg.  This  huge 
column  of  over  5,000  men,  800  wagons,  with  guns,  ammunition, 
cattle,  and  some  women  and  children — refugees  from  Cape  Colony — 
extended  to  a length  of  twenty  miles,  and  had  to  retreat  in  between 
Eoberts’  huge  army  at  Bloemfontein  and  the  Basuto  border  on  the 
east.  During  a period  of  seventeen  days  this  unwieldly  mass  of 
men,  cattle,  and  baggage  struggled  over  a most  difficult  country, 
intersected  by  spruits,  rivers,  and  other  obstacles,  with  fully  50,- 
000  British  troops  on  its  left  flank,  midway  on  its  journey,  and  ulti- 
mately succeeded  in  reaching  Kroonstad  without  the  loss  of  a 
single  man,  gun,  cart,  or  wagon.  The  marvelous  achievement  of 
carrying  such  a force  for  a distance  of  fully  200  miles  (counting 
the  detours  occasioned  by  the  difficulties  of  the  route)  was  only 
equaled  by  the  astounding  inability  of  Lord  Eoberts  to  send  a 
sufficient  force  of  troops  across  fifty  miles  of  country,  directly  east- 
ward from  Bloemfontein,  to  intercept  Grobler’s  column  and  pin 
it  in  between  the  British  legions  and  the  Basuto  border.  No  other 
fact  connected  with  the  operations  of  Eoberts’  great  army  in  the 
Free  State  bears  more  eloquent  testimony  to  the  wretched  con- 
dition to  which  the  British  troops  were  reduced  after  Paardeberg, 
than  this  failure  of  the  English  Commander-in-Chief  to  intercept 
this  long,  straggling  procession  during  its  seventeen  days’  toilsome 
journey  from  Cape  Colony  to  Kroonstad. 

A force  of  some  2,000  British  troops  had,  however,  been  sent  to 
occupy  Ladybrand  and  Thabanchu,  eastwards  towards  the  Basuto 
border,  and  across  the  route  which  Grobler’s  and  Ollivier’s  forces 
had  to  take  on  their  Avay  to  Kroonstad.  A portion  of  these  troops 
had  come  in  contact  with  the  advance  guai’d  of  Ollivier’s  army 
under  General  Lemmer,  north  of  Commissie  Drift,  and  were  so 
roughly  handled  that  the  main  body  in  Ladybrand  and  Thabanchu 
were  at  once  recalled  by  Eoberts,  who  feared  their  capture  by  the 
retreating  Free  Staters  and  Cape  Colony  Volunteers.  It  was  these 
troops  so  recalled  which  Christian  De  Wet  encountered  at  Sannas 


BOflMAV  & CO.,  H.r 


412 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Post  while  on  his  way  to  succor  Ollivier’s  and  Grobler’s  retreating 
commandoes. 

The  road  from  Thahanchu  to  Bloemfontein  runs  into  a valley 
a few  miles  before  it  crosses  the  Modder  Eiver,  close  to  the  reservoir 
at  Saunas  Post,  from  which  the  Free  State  capital  is  supplied  with 
its  water.  This  valley,  with  the  river  running  through  it,  gradually 
widens  in  a southwesterly  direction  until  it  merges  into  the  open 
country  east  of  the  city.  Two  miles  west  of  the  Waterworks  the 
valley  is  some  three  miles  wide,  having  irregular  ridges  to  the  north 
and  south.  At  this  part  of  the  valley  the  road  from  Saunas  Post 
to  Bloemfontein  crosses  by  a drift  over  a spruit  which  has  worn  so 
deep  and  wide  a channel  in  the  veldt  that  a large  force  of  men 
could  conceal  themselves  and  their  horses  in  the  bed  of  the  stream, 
in  line  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  drift,  without  being  seen  100 
yards  away  from  either  bank.  This  deep  channel  is  known  as 
Koorn  Spruit.  It  runs  south  of  the  road,  from  east  to  west,  almost 
parallel  with  the  roadway  for  the  two  miles  from  Saunas  Post  to  the 
drift,  and  then  bends  north,  where,  at  a distance  of  about  three 
more  miles,  it  leads  into  the  Modder  Eiver. 

The  English  who  were  on  their  way  to  Bloemfontein  were  a 
portion  of  General  French’s  division,  and  were  under  the  command 
of  General  Broadwood.  The  British  officer  was  in  charge  also  of 
an  enormous  baggage  train  of  ammunition,  forage,  cattle,  and  other 
belongings  of  the  garrisons  of  Ladybrand  and  Thahanchu,  and  his 
progress  was  necessarily  hampered  by  this  very  cumbersome  charge. 

De  Wet  learned  from  his  scouts  that  the  enemy  had  left  Tha- 
banchu  on  Friday,  the  30th  of  March,  and  would  be  likely  to  reach 
the  Waterworks  at  Saunas  Post  that  night.  The  strength  of  the 
British  in  men  and  guns  was  also  communicated,  together  with  the 
appetizing  facts  regarding  the  baggage,  provisions,  and  ammuni- 
tion, and  the  man  who  had  so  easily  captured  Lord  Eoberts’  huge 
convoy  at  Blaubank  resolved  to  repeat  the  operation  at  General 
Broadwood’s  expense. 

He  had  outspanned  for  the  night  of  March  30  at  a farm  near 
Osspruit,  some  fourteen  miles  due  north  of  Saunas  Post,  and  about 
midway  between  Brandfort  and  Thahanchu.  His  force  had  been 
augmented  by  400  or  500  men  since  leaving  Brandfort.  On  learn- 
ing the  news  brought  by  his  scouts,  he  gave  immediate  orders  to 
saddle  horses  and  prepare  for  a night  march.  The  enemy’s  force, 
only  one-third  stronger  than  his  own  command,  and  the  oppor- 
tunity for  attack  which  the  convoy  would  offer,  made  him  resolve 
to  throw  his  men  across  Broadwood’s  path  in  a surprise  engage- 
ment, and  deliver  a smashing  blow  at  some  of  Eoberts’  troops 
almost  at  the  gates  of  Bloemfontein. 


SANNAS  POST 


413 


With  De  Wet  to  resolve  was  to  execute,  and  without  yet  fully 
considering  his  plan  in  any  detail,  the  commando  directed  its  march 
southward  past  Osskopje,  towards  the  Bloemfontein  Waterworks. 
His  officers  were  his  brother  Piet,  Commandants  Andries  Cronje 
and  iSTel  (the  two  officers  who  had  cooperated  in  the  capture  of  the 
Dublin  and  Gloucester  regiments  at  Nicholson’s  Nek)  and  Com- 
mandants Froneman,  Wessels,  Theron  (of  Bethlehem),  and  Gert 
Van  der  Merwe.  The  burghers,  who  numbered  about  1,500  men, 
belonged  mainly  to  the  Kroonstad,  Brandfort,  Heilbron,  Winburg, 
Ladybrand,  and  Dewetsdorp  districts.  The  guns  consisted  of  three 
Krupp  quick-firers  and  two  Maxim-Nordenfelts;  the  latter  pieces 
being  in  charge  of  a German- American  named  Yon  Losberg.  The 
American,  French,  and  Netherlands  military  attaches  accompanied 
the  commando,  and  were  spectators  of  the  sensational  engagement 
which  followed. 

De  Wet  off-saddled  in  the  middle  of  the  night  when  within 
about  five  miles  of  where  the  English  were  encamped,  and  he 
explained  to  his  officers  the  plan  which  he  had  decided  upon 
during  the  march  from  Osspruit.  The  plan  was  this  : Broad- 
wood’s  troops  were  in  bivouac  at  Sannas  Post,  in  between  two 
drifts;  one  over  the  Modder  Eiver,  through  which  the  road  from 
Thabanchu  to  Sannas  Post  passed,  and  the  other,  about  two  miles 
ahead,  where  the  same  road,  after  leaving  Sannas  Post,  descended 
into  the  deep  recess  of  Koorn  Spruit  on  its  way  to  Bloemfontein. 

The  scheme  of  action  was,  to  divide  his  men  into  two  divisions : 
one,  400  strong,  under  himself,  to  be  concealed  in  the  bed  of  the 
Spruit;  and  the  other,  1,000  men,  under  his  brother  Piet  and 
Andries  Cronje,  to  post  themselves  north  and  south  of  the  Water- 
works, from  whence  they  were  to  attack  the  enemy  at  daybreak, 
and  drive  the  troops  towards  the  drift  over  the  Spruit,  where  the 
ambush  was  laid.  Like  the  smooth  movement  of  oiled  clockwork, 
these  places  were  occupied  in  the  early  hours  of  Saturday  morn- 
ing without  a hitch;  neither  men  nor  guns  being  seen  or  heard 
where,  only  two  miles  away,  2,000  British  troops  and  their  convoy 
reposed  oblivious  of  danger ; there  being  no  scouting,  nor  patrol,  nor 
sentries,  nor  anybody  ahead  of  or  around  the  sleeping  Tommies! 
De  Wet’s  most  daring  plan  thus  placed  him  with  his  back  to 
Eoberts’  huge  army  at  Bloemfontein,  and  his  flanks  open  to  attack 
by  any  force  which  might  be  on  the  road  from  the  city  to  meet 
Broadwood’s  convoy.  He  staked  everything  upon  the  enemy’s 
customary  stupidity  and  want  of  military  common  sense,  and  he 
won  the  prize,  as  he  deserved  to  do. 

The  mules  and  baggage  of  the  commandoes  were  left  four  or  five 
miles  north  of  the  river,  near  a valley  through  which  it  had  been 


SANNAS  POST 


415 


decided  to  retire  with  the  convoy  and  guns  if  the  coup  should 
succeed,  and  by  which  way  a retreat  towards  Osspruit  should  he 
made  if  the  enemy  were  reenforced  from  Bloemfontein  before  a 
decisive  result  could  be  obtained. 

It  was  about  two  o’clock  in  the  morning  when  an  adjutant 
reported  to  the  general  down  at  the  drift  that  all  the  positions 
in  the  plan  of  attack  had  been  occupied  as  ordered,  and  that  every- 
thing was  in  readiness.  Piet  De  Wet  and  Andries  Cronje  were  to 
open  the  attack  with  their  guns  on  Broadwood’s  camp  when  the 
light  should  reveal  its  exact  position,  and  at  such  time  as,  in  their 
judgment,  the  greatest  confusion  might  be  caused  thereby  to  the 
convoy.  Strict  orders  were  given  by  the  Chief  Commandant  to 
his  own  men  that  no  shot  should  be  fired  from  the  bed  of  the  Spruit 
until  he  gave  the  signal  by  firing  first.  And  thus  under  the  great 
tension  of  the  daring  enterprise  in  which  the  commando  was  en- 
gaged, the  burghers  smoked  their  pipes  and  waited  for  the  light 
which  was  to  give  them  sterner  occupation. 

It  was  about  half-past  four  when  the  boom  of  Piet  De  Wet’s 
Krupps  eastward  rent  the  oppressive  stillness  of  the  early  morn- 
ing, and  instantly  the  whole  British  camp  was  thrown  into  the 
wildest  commotion.  Teams  were  hurriedly  yoked,  carts  were  driven 
off,  and  in  a short  time  a column  of  wagons  was  sent  on  its  way 
down  the  road  towards  the  drift,  where  nothing  could  be  seen  to 
indicate  the  presence  of  a single  Boer.  The  Krupps  and  pom-poms 
continued  to  shell  the  camp  from  the  rear  and  sides  of  the  valley, 
and  horses  and  men  had  already  been  hit,  while  vehicles  were 
knocked  over,  and  a portion  of  the  baggage  set  on  fire.  Meanwhile 
wagons  and  carts  were  approaching  the  drift,  followed  by  mounted 
men. 

These  came  along  the  road  without  any  patrol  or  scouts  in 
front ! The  first  drivers  to  reach  the  drift  came  down  the  slop- 
ing road,  finding  rifles  pointed  at  their  heads  from  the  right 
and  left  as  they  reached  the  bottom.  They  were  ordered  down, 
and  burghers  jumped  up  and  took  their  places,  whipping  the 
teams,  and  carrying  the  wagons  up  the  opposite  side  of  the  Spruit 
without  any  delay.  Several  teams  were  treated  in  this  way  without 
apparently  creating  any  suspicion  in  the  line  behind  that  anything 
had  gone  wrong.  Slowly,  however,  a score  of  horsemen  came  mov- 
ing along,  in  between  other  wagons,  and  upon  descending  into  the 
Spruit  they  were  met  with  the  stern  demand  of  “ Hands  up!  ” 
Seeing  how  things  stood  they  quietly  surrendered,  without  a word, 
were  disarmed,  and  placed  to  the  right  in  the  bottom  of  the  Spruit. 
These,  however,  were  not  seen  b}''  their  officers  behind  to  emerge  again 
from  the  hollow,  and  one  of  these  officers,  with  the  rank  of  captain. 


416 


THE  BOEB  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


rode  quickly  down  towards  the  drift  to  find  out  the  cause  of  the  halt 
by  his  men.  He  was  instantly  covered  with  rifles,  and  General  De 
Wet,  recognizing  his  rank,  and  seeing  that  the  ambush  could  not 
be  much  longer  concealed,  addressed  the  officer,  telling  him  that 
he  (De  Wet)  had  a large  force  surrounding  the  British  con- 
voy, and,  being  wishful  to  save  life,  desired  him  to  return  to  the 
troops  advancing  towards  the  drift,  explain  matters  to  them,  and 
induce  them  to  surrender.  The  captain  appeared  to  assent  to  the 
general’s  suggestion,  and  turned  ])ack,  riding  up  the  steep  incline 
to  where  fully  a hundred  or  more  mounted  men  were  approaching 
along  the  road.  De  Wet  followed  him  up  the  sloping  bank,  rifle  in 
hand,  raising  the  weapon  to  his  shoulder  as  the  English  officer 
reached  his  troops.  There  was  a half  minute’s  pause  as  the  cap- 
tain was  seen  talking  to  his  men.  Suddenly  these  men  were  seen 
to  wheel  round  and  dash  back  upon  the  column.  Instantly  Chris- 
tian De  Wet,  dropping  on  one  knee,  took  careful  aim,  and  the 
English  officer  rolled  from  his  saddle  with  a bullet  through  his 
body.  No  Victoria  Cross  could  adequately  reward  an  act  which  was 
deliberately  done  with  the  knowledge  that  death  might  demand 
an  instant  penalty  for  the  spoken  warning;  for  the  officer,  whose 
name  is  still,  I believe,  not  associated  with  this  piece  of  antique 
heroism,  knew  right  well  what  the  stern  Boer  officer  behind  him 
with  the  rifle  meant  to  do  if  a signal  of  danger  was  given.  It  was 
a superb  act  of  noble  self-sacriflce,  and  the  English  who  survive 
him,  assuming  he  was  killed,  are  unworthy  of  such  deeds  being 
done  in  their  service,  if  his  name  is  allowed  to  remain  in  oblivion. 

The  general’s  signal  to  Are  had  been  given  in  this  sensational 
incident,  and  instantly  the  rifles  of  the  burghers  were  pouring 
bullets  into  the  column  along  the  bank  of  the  Spruit.  Broad- 
wood’s  guns  were  at  the  rear  of  his  forces,  and  had  not  yet  started 
from  Sannas  Post  when  the  fight  had  begun.  These  guns,  some 
twelve  in  number,  were  quickly  answering  the  Boer  pieces  from 
Piet  De  Wet’s  position  to  the  southeast,  and  the  forces  on  both 
sides  were  soon  engaged  in  a spirited  encounter,  all  within  a radius 
of  some  two  miles.  The  Boers,  as  is  their  habit,  shot  down  the 
oxen  and  teams  attached  to  all  the  wagons,  and  completely  crippled 
the  convoy  in  this  way;  the  vehicles  being  left  on  the  road  in  a long 
line  extending  almost  all  the  way  between  the  two  drifts.  After 
the  first  panic  the  English  were  rallied  somewhat  by  their  officers 
to  protect  the  guns,  and  at  a few  other  points  where  groups  could 
be  assembled.  Each  of  these  groups,  however,  was  attacked  by 
the  burghers  who  followed  every  twist  and  turn  of  the  enemy’s 
frantic  efforts  to  find  cover  from  which  to  beat  them  back.  The 
burghers  in  the  Spruit  advanced  eastward  towards  where  Broad- 


SANNAS  POST 


417 


wood’s  artillery  were  positioned,  with  the  purpose  of  assailing  the 
service  of  the  guns  and  of  capturing  the  pieces.  The  cover  of  the 
Spruit  enabled  them  to  get  due  south  of  Saniias  Post,  in  between 
Piet  De  Wet's  Ivrupps  and  the  British  artiller}^,  and  in  a very  few 
minutes  the  whole  entourage  of  the  enemy’s  batteries  was  shot 
down  or  scattered.  A few  of  the  guns  had  been  removed  by  some 
mounted  men  shortly  before  the  rifle  attack  from  the  Spruit  had 
opened,  and  these  escaped  with  their  escort;  but  the  others,  seven 
in  number,  were  pounced  upon  by  a rush  of  men,  and  the  place 
where  the  English  had  bivouacked  during  the  night  was  soon  in 
possession  of  the  burghers. 

Midway  between  the  drifts  two  sections  of  De  Wet’s  men,  one 
under  Andries  Cronje,  and  the  other  under  the  head  Commandant, 
had  closed  in  upon  a body  of  the  enemy  who  were  endeavoring  to 
make  a break  over  that  part  of  the  Spruit  towards  Bloemfontein. 
There  was  a lively  rifle  engagement  for  fully  an  hoi;r  at  this  point, 
but,  as  the  English  were  shot  down  from  right  and  left,  a white 
flag  was  hoisted,  and  some  400  troops  laid  down  their  arms.  They 
were  at  once  taken  northeast  to  the  Kloof  through  which  a portion 
of  the  captured  convoy  was  already  being  led.  While  another 
contest  at  the  junction  of  the  river  and  the  Spruit  was  proceeding, 
the  greater  part  of  Broadwood’s  force  had  succeeded  in  retreating 
towards  Bloemfontein  in  between  Piet  De  Wet’s  position  and  the 
road,  and  the  Boer  guns  were  tirmed  upon  these  with  an  accuracy 
of  aim  which  accounted  for  a large  number  of  men  and  horses. 
At  every  single  point  where  any  attempt  at  a rally  was  made  by 
the  English,  a Boer  officer  was  ready  with  a body  of  burghers  to 
rush  to  the  nearest  available  cover,  and  engage  the  group  thus 
attempting  to  make  a stand  against  the  resistless  farmers  with 
their  deadly  aim  and  galloping  ponies.  The  enemy  were  in  this 
way  easily  beaten  at  every  point  on  the  battle-fleld;  their  own 
Armstrongs  at  the  Waterworks  being  turned  upon  them  while 
Von  Losberg  was  sending  his  pom-pom  shells  into  their  flanks  as 
they  flew  towards  the  city.  Some  500  burghers  took  up  the  pur- 
suit of  the  fleeing  Tommies  as  far  as  the  ground  would  permit 
them,  but  their  tired  horses  were  unequal  to  the  task  of  heading 
them  off,  and  the  bulk  of  Broadwood’s  men  managed  to  clear  away; 
leaving  behind  them  400  prisoners,  including  18  officers,  7 Arm- 
strong guns,  12  cartloads  of  ammunition,  110  wagons  of  provision 
and  forage,  1,200  draft  mules,  oxen,  and  horses,  with  600  rifles, 
and  large  quantities  of  baggage,  tents,  etc.  The  killed  and  wounded 
on  the  English  side  were  not  counted  by  the  victors,  as  it  was 
necessary  for  them  to  retire  north  to  the  hills  before  British 
reenforcements  should  arrive  from  Bloemfontein,  where  the  guns 
27 


418 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


could  be  plainly  heard  during  the  battle  of  the  morning.  It  was 
estimated,  however,  that  Broadwood  lost  150  men  in  killed  and 
wounded  in  addition  to  his  prisoners.  The  Boer  casualties  num- 
bered three  men  killed  and  ten  wounded,  only. 

Lieutenant  Nix,  the  Netherlands  military  attache,  was  unfortu- 
nately hit  with  a fragment  of  an  English  shell  while  watching  the 
battle.  He  was  sitting  on  the  hank  of  the  Spruit  near  where  the 
American  and  French  attaches  were  located,  and  while  he  was  in 
the  act  of  looking  through  his  field-glasses  was  mortally  wounded 
in  the  chest.  He  was  a modest  young  officer,  only  twenty-three, 
who  had  made  himself  very  popular  with  all  with  whom  he 
had  come  in  contact  since  arriving  on  his  mission,  and  his  death 
was  much  lamented  by  the  Boer  officers.  He  had  been  only  re- 
cently married,  and  it  was  a deeply  affecting  scene  when  the  life- 
blood was  ebbing  away  through  a wound  that  could  not  be  stanched, 
while  the  poor  young  fellow  was  in  the  act  of  dictating  to  Captain 
Keichman  a letter  full  of  loving  expressions,  spoken  in  dying 
whispers,  to  his  young  wife  in  Holland. 

The  English  made  a wretched  exhibition  of  fighting  qualities 
and  of  generalship  in  this  instance,  considering  they  were  numeric- 
ally stronger  in  both  men  and  guns  than  He  Wet’s  forces,  and 
that,  being  so  near  Eoberts’  huge  army  that  their  guns  could  be 
heard,  reenforcements  would  be  sure  to  arrive  in  a few  hours’ 
time.  A large  number  of  mounted  men  rushed  southward  past 
Piet  De  Wet’s  position,  ventre  a terre,  at  the  first  attack  on  the 
camp,  and  made  off  in  the  direction  of  Bloemfontein  almost  with- 
out drawing  bridle.  Possibly  these  were  galloping  with  the  tidings 
of  the  battle,  and  in  order  to  obtain  help.  A smaller  body  raced 
back  on  the  Thabanchu  road,  pursued  for  several  miles  by  burghers 
who,  however,  were  unable  to  come  up  with  the  flying  Hussars. 
Finally  General  Broadwood  seems  to  have  collected  numbers  of  his 
troops  about  four  miles  southwest  of  the  Koorn  Spruit  drift,  from 
whence,  however,  he  made  no  attempt  to  go  back  for  his  guns. 
Here  both  the  general  and  his  troops  were  observed  about  noon  by 
General  Colvile,  who  had  left  Bloemfontein  at  daybreak  with  4,000 
men  in  order  to  cover  Broadwood’s  retirement  with  the  convoy. 
This  force  had  been  unable  to  march  the  distance,  some  fifteen 
miles,  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  fight,  but  Colvile’s  division  was 
within  some  six  miles  of  the  drift  over  the  Spruit  as  De  Wet’s  men 
were  removing  the  convoy,  guns  and  all,  northeast  to  the  hills. 
Not  only  were  close  upon  6,000  of  the  enemy  thus  in  sight  of  the 
1,500  Boers  in  the  very  act  of  clearing  the  field  of  the  trophies 
of  their  triumph,  but  a cavalry  brigade,  under  General  French, 
had  also  been  despatched  from  Bloemfontein  by  Lord  Eoberts 


SANNAS  POST 


419 


to  cooperate  with  Colvile.  This  auxiliary  force,  however,  mounted 
tho  it  was,  succeeded  in  reaching  the  scene  of  the  encounter  at 
ten  o’clock  on  Sunday  morning;  only  twenty-four  hours  too  late. 

In  the  whole  conduct  of  the  British  in  this  engagement,  officers 
and  men,  there  was  not  a single  redeeming  feature.  The  troops 
were  knocked  at  the  first  onset  into  a panic  from  which  they 
appeared  unable  to  recover,  while  the  officers  exhibited  neither 
the  spirit,  tact,  nor  capacity  to  avail  themselves  of  the  opportuni- 
ties which  the  number  of  men  and  guns  at  their  disposal,  and 
their  proximity  to  Bloemfontein,  gave  them  to  strike  back  at 
De  Wet’s  small  commando.  For  him  it  was,  in  every  sense,  a 
brilliant  achievement.  When  spoken  to  that  evening  upon  the 
encounter  and  its  lessons,  the  general  made  the  extraordinary  reply: 
“ We  feel  that  the  war  has  just  begun,  and  we  have  every  reason 
to  be  hopeful  of  the  result.”  That  is  now  (March,  1902)  near 
two  years  ago,  and  England  has  still  over  200,000  troops  in  South 
Africa  ! 

Following  up  his  succesful  coup  at  Sannas  Post,  General  De 
Wet  moved  rapidly  to  the  southeast  from  the  scene  of  his  victory 
with  the  object  of  locating  another  isolated  force  which  was  re- 
ported to  be  in  his  own  native  district  of  Dewetsdorp.  Tidings 
came  that  a body  of  oOO  British  had  entered  and  captured  this 
village  on  the  1st  of  April.  On  nearing  the  place  De  Wet  was 
informed  that  the  enemy  had  retreated  hurriedly  on  learning  of 
the  approach  of  the  Boers,  and  had  gone  towards  Reddersburg,  due 
south  of  Bloemfontein.  The  general  wheeled  his  commando  in 
that  direction,  and  was  soon  in  the  locality  of  the  British  encamp- 
ment. His  scouts  brought  him  information  of  the  strength  and 
position  of  the  foe,  and  plans  for  the  capture  of  the  troops  were 
soon  arranged. 

The  enemy’s  position  was  found  to  be  on  the  reverse  side  of  a 
long  kopje,  south  of  where  the  Boer  forces  had  halted,  and  it  was 
determined  to  place  the  Tommies,  as  at  Sannas  Post,  between  two 
fires,  in  a surprise  attack.  Half  of  the  commando  were  to  move 
round  the  southern  side  of  the  English,  while  the  other  half  re- 
mained to  the  north  ; this  section,  under  the  general’s  immediate 
command,  to  commence  the  fray. 

The  enemy  were  completely  surprised,  so  negligent  had  their 
officers  been  in  omitting  scouting  precautions.  They  made  a plucky 
stand,  however,  against  superior  numbers,  and  held  their  position 
during  the  whole  of  the  day.  De  Wet  gradually  drew  his  lines 
closer  around  his  adversaries,  and  placed  his  guns,  under  cover  of 
the  night,  where  the  British  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  a combined 
artillery  and  rifle  fire  on  the  following  morning.  When  the  light 


420 


TEE  BOER  FIOHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


on  Wednesday  enabled  the  officer  in  command  of  the  enemy’s  force 
to  recognize  the  hopelessness  of  any  continued  struggle,  he  ordered 
the  white  flag  to  be  hoisted,  and  surrendered. 

Twelve  officers  and  459  men  were  taken  prisoner.  There  were 
some  fifty  casualties  on  the  enemy’s  side.  De  Wet’s  loss  was  trivial. 

I chanced  to  meet  these  471  prisoners  on  their  way  to  Kroou- 
stad.  They  belonged  to  General  Gatacre’s  division,  and  were  a 
mixed  body  of  Royal  Irish  and  Mounted  Infantry,  and  all  wore  the 
appearance  of  fine  strapping  fellows.  One  of  them,  evidently  an 
English  Tommy,  mistaking  me  for  a Boer,  addressed  me  in  a de- 
fiant tone,  saying,  “ We’re  a coming  back  again,  you  bet  your 
life!  ” 

Having  despatched  his  batch  of  prisoners  round  bj^  the  east  of 
Lord  Roberts’  huge  army  at  Bloemfontein  on  to  Kroonstad  and 
Pretoria,  De  Wet  turned  east  again  and  made  for  Wepener,  close 
to  the  Basuto  border.  Here  a body  of  Colonial  British  under 
Colonel  Dalgettj'^  were  strongly  entrenched,  with  ammunition,  pro- 
visions, and  water.  They  had  heard  of  the  disasters  of  Saunas  Post 
and  Reddersburg,  and  had  made  all  possible  preparations  for  an 
expected  attack.  De  Wet’s  men  were  placed  to  the  best  advantage 
when  the  attack  was  delivered,  but  so  strong  had  the  British  officers 
rendered  their  entrenchments  and  so  stoutly  did  the  Colonial  troops 
hold  their  ground,  that  the  place  was  successfully  held  for  seventeen 
days,  until  the  besieged  were  finally  relieved  by  the  mounted  col- 
umns under  Generals  French,  Hart,  and  Hamilton,  with  whicli 
Lord  Roberts  had  resolved  to  clear  the  country  east  of  Bloemfon- 
tein preparatory  to  his  advance  northward  from  the  Free  State 
capital  to  Pretoria. 

While  the  siege  of  Wepener  was  in  progress  Commandant-General 
Louis  Botha,  accompanied  only  by  two  of  his  adjutants,  rode  from 
Osspruit  Camp  near  Brandfort  to  visit  General  De  Wet’s  laager. 
On  his  return  north  by  Thabancbu,  he  was  riding  within  a mile  of 
a British  camp,  in  the  dark,  believing  it  to  be  a Boer  laager,  when 
he  was  fortunately  met  by  a Boer  scout  who  was  watching  the 
movements  of  the  English,  and  who  thus  saved  the  head  of  the 
Transvaal  army  from  walking  straight  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 


Chapter  XXXIII 


THE  LAST  MEETING  OF  THE  VOLKSRAAD 


Dress  of  the  Boer  legislators — Empty  seats  in  the  chamber — ■ 
Wreaths  where  heroes  sat — President  Kruger’s  presence — IIis 

MANNER  OF  SPEECH A MEMORABLE  PRONOUNCEMENT  — - PRETORIA 

BURGHERS  AND  THE  SURRENDER — ThE  DEFENSE  OF  THE  CAPITAL  ABAN- 
DONED— The  Johannesburg  mines  spared — Men  of  profits  prevail 
OVER  MEN  OF  ACTION — MORE  CALUMNIES  AGAINST  PRESIDENT  KrUGER. 


X the  7th  of  May  the  Volksraad  met  in  the  palatial  legislative 


building  which  with  the  Palace  of  Justice  forms  the  chief 
architectural  attractions  of  Pretoria.  The  Transvaal  House  of 
Commons  was  a well-lighted,  handsome  chamber,  larger  and  far 
more  attractive  than  the  meeting  place  of  English  members  of 
Parliament.  The  Chairman’s  dais  was  raised  some  three  feet 
above  the  floor,  with  the  President’s  seat  to  the  right.  Below 
this  there  were  seats  reserved  for  members  of  the  Executive  Council, 
and  of  the  Administration;  the  latter  officials  being  permitted  to 
attend  the  sessions  of  the  Eaad  to  answer  questions,  but  not  being 
entitled  to  vote  or  otherwise  to  take  part  in  the  proceedings. 

The  members  of  the  Eaad  sat  in  a horseshoe  formation  of  seats 
in  a manner  similar  to  that  of  members  of  Continental  legisla- 
tures; each  member  having  his  allotted  chair,  with  a desk  in  front 
for  writing  and  kindred  purposes. 

In  an  outer  semicircle  of  seats,  the  members  of  the  Second  Eaad 
took  their  places  when  a joint  session  of  both  Chambers  became 
necessary. 

Tiers  of  chairs  were  placed  for  visitors  on  the  floor,  beyond  to 
the  right  and  left  of  the  “ Eaadsleden,”  and  these  were  soon  oc- 
cupied by  foreigners  and  others  who  were  wishful  to  witness  what 
looked  likely  to  be  the  closing  scene  in  the  legislative  life  of  the 
Transvaal  Parliament. 

It  was  to  me  a scene  as  pathetic  as  it  was,  in  many  respects, 
surprising.  I had  fully  expected  seeing  the  members,  almost  all 
of  whom  had  been  in  the  field  for  months,  coming  to  their  legis- 
lative duties  with  bandoliers  and  Mausers,  as  if  only  on  a hurried 
leave  from  the  lines  in  front  of  Eoberts’  moving  columns,  with  a 


422 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


soldier’s  eagerness  to  get  through  with  the  needed  speeches  and 
resolutions  so  as  to  lose  no  time  in  returning  to  their  commandoes 
again.  But  the  Boers  are  in  everything  a people  apart,  with  their 
own  methods  and  manners;  whether  in  warfare  or  in  law-making. 
The  members  assembled,  all  in  a uniform  black  dress,  including 
frock  coats,  tall  hats,  and  white  ties.  This  was,  it  appears,  the 
regulation  costume  prescribed  by  the  sartorial  rules  of  the  As- 
sembly, and  each  conformed  to  the  ordinary  obligation  of  this  rule 
on  this  momentous  occasion,  as  if  no  war  was  being  waged  any 
nearer  to  the  threatened  capital  of  the  South  African  Eepublic 
than  the  Philippine  Islands. 

The  dress  to  me  was  painfully  suggestive  of  a funeral  ceremony 
over  the  body  of  what  would  soon  be  a slain  Eepublic. 

On  several  seats  wreaths  of  mourning  were  placed,  denoting 
where  those  members  who  had  died  fighting  at  the  front  were  wont 
to  sit.  General  Jan  Kock’s  vacant  chair  recalled  his  heroic  stand 
at  Elandslaagte,  and  the  chivalry  of  England’s  soldiery  in  robbing 
this  wounded  officer  of  money  and  clothes,  and  leaving  him  thus 
exposed  for  ten  hours  without  medical  aid.  The  fate  of  Mr.  Barnard, 
member  for  Eustenburg,  who  was  killed  by  British  Kaffirs  at  Dere- 
depoort,  on  the  23rd  of  November,  evoked  even  a more  indignant 
feeling  against  the  enemy  that  could  enlist  as  allies  in  such  a war 
the  savages  who  butchered  women  and  children  on  that  occasion. 
General  Joubert’s  chair  bore  tokens  of  a grateful  remembrance, 
while  the  Vierkleur  was  thrown  across  the  seat  which  General  Piet 
Cronje,  now  in  St.  Helena,  occupied  before  the  war. 

Men  who  had  fought  in  noted  battles  were  soon  recognized,  even 
in  their  semi-clerical  attire,  as  with  bronzed  faces  or  scars  telling 
of  the  severity  of  the  struggle  they  had  gone  through,  they  entered 
and  took  their  seats.  General  Lukas  Meyer,  Chairman  of  the  Eaad, 
who  had  fought  so  well  from  Talana  Hill  to  Pieter’s  Heights,  was 
easily  known  by  his  herculean  and  soldierly  figure  and  handsome 
face.  Ben  Viljoen,  the  hero  of  Vaal  Krantz,  and  the  intrepid 
fighter  of  twenty  battles,  was  there,  as  anti-Eooinek  as  ever.  Gen- 
eral Tobias  Smuts,  one  of  the  heroes  of  Spion  Ivop,  looking  as 
genial  and  as  modest  as  the  brave  man  of  real  merit  generally  does 
on  like  occasions,  was  there,  and  a dozen  more  members  who  had 
borne  a less  prominent  but  equally  valiant  part  in  ’the  struggle 
against  the  enemy. 

Two  noted  members  were  conspicuously  absent,  Louis  Botha  and 
Jacob  H.  He  la  Eey.  Both  had  gone  to  the  front  seven  months 
previously,  straight  from  their  Parliamentary  duties  in  that  Cham- 
ber, and  had  within  that  time  by  their  genius  and  military  capacity 
written  their  names  on  the  scroll  of  fame  among  the  world’s  great 


TEE  LAST  MEETING  OF  THE  V0LK8RAAD  423 


commanders.  They  were,  that  day,  fighting  as  usual  like  lions  in 
front  of  overwhelming  numbers;  one  as  Joubert’s  successor  in  the 
headship  of  the  Transvaal  army,  and  the  other  as  the  most  generally 
trusted  ofiicer  of  the  Federal  forces. 

Color  was  added  to  the  otherwise  somber  scene  in  the  Chamber 
by  the  presence  of  the  foreign  consuls  and  attaches  in  their  full- 
dress  uniforms.  The  French,  Eussian,  German,  Italian,  Belgian, 
Portuguese,  and  ISTetherlands  representatives  were  in  attendance, 
while  jMr.  Hay,  nominally  representing  the  United  States,  was  a 
spectator  of  the  proceedings. 

There  was  a tedious  amount  of  congratulatory  speech-making  of 
a purely  ceremonial  character  before  the  President  entered  the 
Chamber.  The  Chairman  congratulated  the  Eaad,  and  the  oldest 
member  replied  in  return  courtesy,  congratulating  its  Chairman. 
The  same  formality  was  gone  through  between  the  Second  Eaad 
and  its  sessional  head,  while  each  member  of  the  Execiitive  Council 
was  next  singled  out  for  his  special  meed  of  commendation,  and  a 
suitable  reply  was  returned  in  due  form. 

In  the  midst  of  these  distributions  of  mutual  praise.  President 
Kruger  entered  from  behind  the  Speaker’s  chair,  and  immediately 
all  the  members  and  spectators  rose  as  a mark  of  respect  until  the 
Chief  Executive  took  his  seat.  Paul  Kruger  is  not  in  any  physical 
sense  an  impressive-looking  man.  He  is  massive  in  build,  keenly 
observant  of  everybody  and  everything  around  him,  and  naturally 
attracts  attention  through  the  rank  he  holds,  but  especially  from 
the  fact  that  he  is  the  one  man  of  this  generation  who  threw  down 
gage  of  battle  to  the  British  Empire.  You  cannot  well  picture 
the  man  out  of  his  fame,  or  you  would  regard  him  as  a common- 
place individual,  of  rough  exterior  and  markedly  unpolished  man- 
ners, who  might  pass  for  anybody  in  particular,  from  a prosperous 
farmer  to  a successful  city  merchant.  But  when  you  know  that 
the  man  before  you  is  Paul  Kruger,  that  he  has  been  through  life 
the  watchful  and  valiant  defender  of  Boer  liberties,  and  that  he 
has  within  the  previous  few  months  startled  the  whole  civilized 
world  by  his  work,  you  are  compelled  to  beat  back  the  prejudices 
of  your  eyes  and  do  homage  instead  to  the  man  whose  acts  have 
made  him  great,  as  he  rises  in  the  Assembly  to  which,  in  Grattan’s 
language,  he  stood  as  one  who  had  watched  at  its  cradle  and  might 
mourn  at  its  grave. 

A silence  as  of  a churchyard  fell  upon  the  whole  Assembly,  and 
again  the  suggestion  of  a funeral  service  was  forced  upon  the  mind, 
with  the  wreaths  on  the  vacant  chairs,  the  dark  costumes  of  the 
members,  and  the  long  prayer  in  which  the  proceedings  had  been 
previously  opened.  The  raucous  voice  of  the  speaker  sounded  like 


THE  VOLKSBAAD  BUILDING,  PRETORIA 


THE  LAST  MEETING  OF  THE  VOLKSEAAD  435 


the  valedictory  address  of  a minister  committing  a body  to  the 
custody  of  a grave,  and  the  suggestion  was  irresistibly  conveyed 
that  the  President  of  the  Transvaal  was  performing  the  burial  ser- 
vice upon  his  owm  Eepublic. 

Soon,  however,  this  mortuary  idea  was  dispelled.  The  Presi- 
dent’s voice  became  clearer  and  the  words  more  coherent;  the  ad- 
dress ringing  out  in  a mingled  strain  of  invective  and  defiance. 
It  was  the  first  time  I had  heard  him  speak.  His  deficiency  in  in- 
tellectual culture,  his  reputed  ignorance,  and  all  the  other  English 
kindly  testimonies  to  his  want  of  Anglo-Saxon  excellence,  while 
read  with  some  degree  of  skepticism,  invited  doubt  as  to  Oom  Paul’s 
gifts  of  eloquent  deliverance.  He  is,  however,  a natural  orator; 
rugged  in  speech,  lacking  in  measured  phrase  and  in  logical  balance; 
but  passionate  and  convincing  in  the  unaffected  pleading  of  his 
earnestness  which  is  joined  to  a happy  command  of  the  Boer  tongue 
in  all  its  native  power  of  persuasive  expression. 

The  action  of  the  hands  during  the  delivery  of  the  short  Presi- 
dential address  was  in  no  way  wanting  in  elocutionary  gesture, 
embracing  as  it  did  all  the  well-known  movements  of  finished  plat- 
form speaking.  There  were  a few  notes  in  the  left  hand,  but  they 
were  not  once  referred  to.  The  Speaker  soon  lost  himself  in  the 
warmth  of  his  subject,  and  he  held  his  audience  spellbound  until 
his  final  sentence  was  spoken  with  its  defiant  ring  and  meaning, 
“ I am  standing  alone!  Joubert  is  dead,  Kock  is  dead,  Wolmarans 
is  dead.  I stand  alone.  But  God  is  with  us.  Shall  we  lose 
courage?  Never!  Never!  Never!”  and  at  each  utterance  of 
this  word,  the  massive  hand  descended  on  the  desk  and  made  the 
Chamber  resound  with  the  emphasis  of  the  blow.  It  was  in  every 
word,  sentiment,  and  action  the  speech  of  Paul  Kruger. 

I give  the  following  somewhat  inaccurate  report  of  this  last  ut- 
terance of  the  President  before  the  Volksraad  of  the  doomed  little 
Eepublic  as  reported  in  the  Boer  press : 

“ His  Honor  said  that  extraordinary  circumstances  saw  the  Eaad 
assembled  under  unique  conditions.  ‘ You  know  how,  before  the 
war,  they  agitated  for  the  franchise.  You  know  what  concessions 
we  made ; how  the  burghers  demurred  and  accused  us  of  alienating 
from  them  their  birthrights.  In  order  to  avert  bloodshed,  we 
conceded  a seven  years’  franchise ; afterwards,  again  to  avert  blood- 
shed, a five  years’  franchise,  and  in  every  case  with  retrospective 
power,  so  that  all  who  so  desired  might  instantly  become  citizens 
of  this  State.  We  did  all  this  in  our  supreme  efforts  to  preserve 
peace  and  avert  war. 

“ ‘ But  they  were  not  satisfied.  Mdiat  did  they  want  ? Docu- 
ments in  our  possession  show  that,  by  manner  of  a devilish  con- 


426 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


spiracy — I will  call  it  that — they  had  already  schemed  the  an- 
nihilation of  the  twjD  Eepublics  as  early  as  1896.  We  were  to  be 
denied  a national  existence.  We  are  now  praying  to  God  in  the 
heavens  for  material  help.  We  are  struggling  against  a powerful 
and  vindictive  enemy,  who  seeks  to  destroy  us. 

“ ^ God  will  answer  our  prayer.  He  will  show  the  world  that 
Might  is  not  Right;  that  it  is  well  that  small  nations  maintain  a 
separate  existence,  and  that  He  will  not  permit  the  might  of  a 
Goliath  to  crush  us. 

“ ‘ Once  more,  to  avoid  further  bloodshed,  I appealed  to  the  Eng- 
lish nation. 

“ ‘ I appealed  to  Chamberlain  and  Salisbury.  What  did  they 
reply?  They  said  that  this  miserable  nation  of  Afrikanders  must 
cease  to  exist.  But  God  says  it  shall  not ! 

“ ‘ God  says  it  may  exist,  and  we  shall  see  who  shall  be  arbiter, 
these  politicians  or  our  just  God. 

“ ‘ Our  history  has  determined  us  never  to  surrender  our  heaven- 
given  rights. 

‘‘  ‘ See  what  we  have  already  accomplished ! A small  band  of 
30,000  has  contested  the  right  of  way  against  over  200,000,  and 
the  30,000  are  still  alive! 

“ ‘ They  may  send  thousands  more — ay,  hundreds  of  thousands. 

“ I will  not  prophesy ; but  it  is  my  firm  conviction  that  God  will 
say:  “ So  far  and  no  farther.” 

“ ' They  say  this  people  shall  no  longer  exist. 

“ But  it  is  not  for  them  to  decide.  God  governs. 

“ ^ God  reigns.  To  His  decision  we  must  bow ; but  He  is  with  us. 

“ ‘ Let  us  humiliate  ourselves  and  put  oiir  trust  in  Him. 

“ ‘ In  this  bitter  and  unequal  struggle,  even  if  England  invade 
the  land  we  will  triumph.  . 

“ ‘ “ Houd  moed.”  The  whole  world,  our  prisoners,  every  right- 
minded  community  is  praying  for  us.  We  shall  triumph,  for  we 
live  in  the  Lord. 

“ ' Let  each  man  do  his  duty  and  we  shall  triumph  as  assuredly 
as  the  sun  shines  upon  us  from  the  sky. 

“ We  have  “ mooi  gepraat  of  nie  mooi  gepraat.”  It  availed 
nothing  against  our  vindictive  and  voracious  foe,  oiir  eternal  foe, 
our  everlasting  enemy.  Since  1836  we  have  been  a free  people, 
and  with  God’s  help  we  will  remain  so. 

“ ‘ Let  us  be  obedient  to  His  teachings  and  stand  like  men. 

“ ‘ I am  standing  alone,  tho  the  State  Secretary  and  Schalk 
Burger  are  giving  me  splendid  and  loyal  assistance.  But  the  old 
familiar  faces  of  the  Executive  Council  are  no  more.  My  right 
hand,  Joubert,  is  dead;  Kock  is  dead;  Wolmarans  is  dead.  I stand 
alone. 

“ ‘ But  shall  we  lose  courage?  Never!  Never!!  Never!!!  We 
have  the  entire  and  whole-hearted  and  unanimous  sympathy  of 
peoples  with  us  throughout  the  world.’  ” 


THE  LAST  2IEET1NG  OF  THE  YOLK  SR  A AD  427 


The  heroic  old  man’s  eloquence  availed  nothing  with  some  of  the 
commercial  burghers  of  Pretoria  who  listened  to  the  memorable 
utterance.  The  officials  of  the  administration,  too,  were,  according 
to  report,  divided  in  feeling;  a few  being  in  favor  of  making  terms 
with  the  British,  who  were  advancing  each  day  nearer  to  the 
propert}',  buildings,  banking  accounts,  and  other  possibly  perishable 
belongings  of  men  who  had  made  money  out  of  the  Transvaal 
Government,  and  who  were  ready  to  earn  an  honest  penny  out  of 
the  invading  English  on  their  arrival.  There  were  only  a very  few 
of  such  men,  and  their  names  were  widely  known.  Contractors, 
jobbers,  lobbyists,  mine  agents,  and  syndicate  men  were  hovering 
round,  all  counseling  surrender,  and  denouncing  any  attempt  at 
defending  the  capital  against  Eoberts’  irresistible  march.  In  the 
hotels  and  in  the  streets  pro-British  partisans  were  openly  advising 
capitulation,  and  promising  the  concession  of  most  favorable  terms 
by  the  English  Commander-in-Chief  when  he  should  reach  Pretoria, 
if  the  Eepublic  would  only  lay  down  its  arms.  With  this  interested 
advice  of  English  adherents,  the  citizens  who  were  loyal  in  senti- 
ment, but  unwilling  to  sacrifice  their  business  or  have  their  savings 
confiscated,  joined  in  the  open  advocacy  of  surrender,  and  in  strong 
protest  against  Pretoria  being  subjected  to  the  injury  and  ordeal 
of  a siege. 

Two  questions  agitated  general  attention  during  the  days  preced- 
ing Eoberts’  final  advance  from  Kroonstad  to  Pretoria:  Should 
Pretoria  be  defended  to  the  death,  as  the  world  had  been  led  to 
believe  it  would  be?  and,  were  the  mines  of  Johannesburg  to  be 
made  the  medium  of  visiting  poetic  justice  upon  those  who  had 
provoked  the  war  by  means  of  the  millions  which  the  Eand  had 
yielded  to  these  cosmopolitan  money-mongers?  In  the  laagers 
where  I had  heard  these  questions  discussed  before  coming  back  to 
Pretoria,  the  sentiment  was  unanimous  in  favor  of  blowing  up  the 
accursed  mines.  They  were,  to  the  true  burgher  mind  and  imagi- 
nation, the  source  of  all  the  evils  which  had  befallen  the  State; 
the  cause  of  ruined  homes  and  of  thousands  of  mourning  home- 
steads. Justice,  therefore,  required  that  the  capitalists  of  London, 
Paris,  Berlin,  and  other  places  who  had  encouraged  England  to 
strike  at  the  life  of  the  Eepublic,  should  be  punished  in  their  in- 
vested wealth.  The  men  who  had  fought  held  these  views.  Those 
who  had  not  fought,  but  had  made  profits,  were  emphatically  op- 
posed to  any  extreme  measures  of  the  kind.  It  would  alienate 
German,  French,  and  American  feeling,  they  urged;  just  as  if  such 
feeling  had  in  any  way  effectively  exerted  itself  to  prevent  the  war. 
The  men  of  profits  prevailed.  President  Kruger  allowed  himself 
to  be  persuaded  that  the  blowing  up  of  the  mines  would  be  eon- 


428 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


sidered  by  European  powers  as  contrary  to  the  code  of  civilized 
warfare,  and  that  the  members  of  the  Government  could  be  held 
accountable  for  all  injury  done  to  foreign  investors’  interests  in 
any  destruction  of  property  which  v^as  not  the  result  of  a necessary 
measure  of  legitimate  warfare.  He  was  destined  to  learn  that,  as 
a reward  for  his  forbearance  in  preventing  the  blowing  up  of  the 
J ohannesburg  mines,  English  generals  were  to  openly  violate  every 
single  clause  of  the  code  of  warfare  agreed  upon  at  The  Hague,  and 
that  the  same  civilized  powers  who  would  have  had  their  sympathies 
alienated,  forsooth,  on  account  of  injury  done  to  property  on  the 
Band,  looked  in  absolute  indifference  at  the  burning,  destruction, 
and  violation  of  the  farms,  property,  and  homes  of  the  Boer 
Eepublics. 

Paul  Kruger’s  power  was  asserted,  and  the  holes  which  had  been 
drilled  into  the  shafts  of  the  wealthiest  gold  mines  did  not  receive 
the  explosives  which  were  to  have  wiped  out  £100,000,000  worth  of 
English  and  other  foreign  investments.  The  old  man  to  whom 
the  stock  jobbers  of  London  had  sent  the  blackguard  message  on  the 
declaration  of  war,  “ For  what  you  are  about  to  receive  may  the 
Lord  make  you  truly  thankful,”  rose  above  resentment,  and  thus 
saved  the  property  of  some  of  his  most  despicable  and  unmanly 
foes. 

The  expectant  world  was  equally  astonished  at  the  refusal  of  the 
Boers  to  defend  Pretoria.  A prolonged  stand  was  universally  ex- 
pected to  be  made  at  the  capital,  where  a circle  of  surrounding 
hills,  at  a convenient  distance  from  the  town,  with  strong  forts 
commanding  the  country  at  the  three  most  vulnerable  points  of 
approach,  led  the  public  everywhere  to  count  upon  a determined 
and  resourceful  resistance.  Stories  had  been  widely  circulated  of 
wonderful  siege  guns  which  would  be  found  mounted  on  the  Pre- 
toria forts,  with  a range  of  ten  miles ; of  labyrinthian  fortifications, 
underground  magazines,  and  of  mines  innumerable,  planted  over 
the  perimeter  of  the  threatened  city.  It  turned  out  that  there  were 
no  such  guns  in  existence,  and  no  such  mines,  and  the  resolution 
which  the  Executive  arrived  at,  rinder  the  circumstances,  not  to 
challenge  Eoberts  to  a final  combat  within  the  area  of  the  town’s 
situation,  was  subsequently  shown  to  be  eminently  practical  and 
Avise.  It  was  Christian  He  Wet’s  plan,  and  not  that  of  the  military 
critic  in  far-off  Europe  Avho  wanted  a big  fight  to  a finish  at  Pre- 
toria, which  Avas  calculated  to  cost  England  the  more  men,  money, 
and  prestige  before  the  finish  was  to  be  finally  fought  according  to 
Boer  plans  and  purposes. 

During  these  last  days  of  the  Transvaal  capital,  statements  of 
the  most  outrageous  character  were  industriously  circulated  night 


A GROUP  OP  LEADERS  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  WAR 


430 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


aud  day  against  the  President  by  pro-British  agents  within  Pre- 
toria and  a few  recreant  burghers.  He  had  taken  all  the  gold 
from  the  treasury;  had  commandeered  the  deposits  in  the  banks; 
was  secretly  negotiating  a surrender  with  Lord  Koberts,  and  was 
ready  to  fly  to  Europe  with  all  his  wealth,  etc.,  etc.  All  this  and 
kindred  calumnies  against  the  now  doomed  Republic  were  the  work 
of  a few  men  who  had  fattened  upon  the  State  in  its  strength  and 
prosperity,  and  who  were  now  hungry  to  participate,  as  they  ex- 
pected, in  a new  regime  in  which  this  treasonable  work  against  the 
falling  little  State  was  hoped  to  pave  the  way  for  future  favor  and 
reward. 

The  bullion  which  had  been  taken  to  a place  of  security,  was  part 
of  that  which  had  resulted  from  the  working  of  some  of  the  richest 
Rand  mines  by  the  Government.  This  resort  to  the  mines  for  the 
necessary  means  of  carrying  on  the  conflict  forced  upon  the  Re- 
public was  a perfectly  legitimate  proceeding  under  the  laws  of  the 
State.  Charters  were  given  and  titles  were  registered  under  a Con- 
stitution which  claimed  the  reasonable  use  of  all  property  within 
the  State  when  it  was  essential  to  utilize  such  means  in  defense 
of  the  country  against  external  aggression.  The  Transvaal  Execu- 
tive made  use  only  of  such  mines  as  would  yield  the  money  required 
in  a continuance  of  the  war,  and  the  bullion  round  which  so  many 
English  falsehoods  were  woven,  with  the  purpose  of  libeling  the 
character  of  the  President,  was  the  residue  of  what  the  Government 
had  commandeered  from  the  mines  in  the  service  of  the  State. 

Contractors  in  Pretoria  and  merchants  at  Delagoa  Bay  had  been 
paid  in  bullion  for  work  done  or  for  goods  supplied  to  the  Govern- 
ment, and  gold  shipped  to  Europe  by  these  persons  was  put  down 
by  English  correspondents  as  Mr.  Kruger’s  mercenary  provision  for 
his  selfish  exile  in  Holland. 

What  the  President  and  the  Executive  had  really  done  was  the 
simple  result  of  the  decision  arrived  at,  in  conjunction  with  General 
Botha,  not  to  defend  the  city.  The  bullion  in  the  treasury  was 
consequently  removed  eastward  to  a place  of  safety,  not  by  Mr. 
Kruger,  but  by  the  Government,  for  the  obvious  purpose  of  meet- 
ing the  further  expenses  of  the  war,  and  the  liabilities  already  in- 
curred. This  done  and  certain  State  papers  also  being  secured,  the 
President  and  the  members  of  his  administration  stood  ready  to 
evacuate  the  capital  when  the  right  moment  of  departure  should 
arrive. 


Chapter  XXXIV 


EVACUATION  OF  PRETORIA 


The  advance  of  Lord  Roberts — The  Boer  forces  fall  back — The  Eng- 
lish ENTER  Pretoria — Botha’s  final  words  in  the  abandoned 

CAPITAL  OF  THE  REPUBLIC. 


ROM  the  13th  of  March  until  the  30th  of  April  Lord  Roberts 


remained  at  Bloemfontein  with  his  huge  army.  This  long  in- 
action, following  the  sensational  British  victory  at  Paardeberg,  oc- 
casioned some  impatient  criticism  in  England,  where  the  real  con- 
dition of  the  British  troops  was  badly  understood.  The  delay  was 
a wise  resolve  on  the  part  of  the  English  general.  It  was  abso- 
lutely necessitated  on  his  part  by  the  wear  and  tear  his  troops  had 
undergone  in  the  month’s  marching  and  fighting  from  the  Modder 
River  Junction  to  the  Free  State  capital.  He  knew  well  how  that 
experience  had  affected  the  campaigning  spirit  and  capacity  of 
his  men,  and,  anticipating  a sterner  task  in  the  carrying  out  of 
his  resolve  to  reach  Pretoria,  he  prudently  gave  his  soldiers  a 
long  rest. 

Roberts  in  preparing  his  advance  on  Pretoria  adopted  the  same 
tactics  which  he  had  employed  in  deceiving  Cronje.  He  sent 
troops  to  Fourteen  Streams,  at  the  extreme  northwest  of  the  Orange 
Free  State,  as  if  it  was  his  intention  to  break  through  there  so  as 
to  avoid  the  hills  which  stood  in  the  way  of  a movement  due  north 
from  Bloemfontein  by  Brandfort,  Kroonstad,  and  the  Vaal  River. 
Many  of  the  Boer  officers  whom  I met  at  Brandfort  believed  this 
would  be  the  line  of  the  enemy's  march,  and  so  did  Villebois- 
Mareuil.  General  He  la  Rey,  however,  whose  judgment  has  been 
uniformly  right  in  critical  emergencies,  rejected  this  idea  as  absurd. 
He  held  that  Roberts  was  tied  to  the  railway  line  for  his  commis- 
sariat and  communications,  and  would  not  dream  of  marching  his 
huge  army  so  long  a distance  while  so  far  removed  from  his  base; 
especially  after  the  rude  experiences  which  his  convoy  underwent 
on  the  occasion  of  the  advance  from  Modder  River  Junction  to 
Bloemfontein.  Xotwithstanding  this  sound  view,  the  4,000  Boers 
in  and  around  Brandfort  at  the  end  of  April  were  weakened  by 
the  despatch  of  800  to  Fourteen  Streams  to  reenforce  Commandant 


432 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Andries  Cronje,  ■ndao,  with  some  1,500  more  burghers,  was  held  there 
by  a large  force  of  British  under  Lord  Methuen,  threatening  the 
Free  State  side  of  the  Vaal  Kiver  as  if  to  he  ready  for  an  advance 
at  that  point  into  the  yet  uninvaded  territory  of  the  South  African 
Bepuhlic, 

Tlie  Boer  forces  in  front  of  the  British  on  the  eve  of  Lord  Boberts’ 
advance  from  the  Free  State  capital,  were  located  as  follows:  At 
Brandfort,  the  then  nearest  Boer  position  to  the  British  army  at 
Bloemfontein,  General  De  la  Bey  was  in  chief  command  of  about 
3,000  burghers;  mainly  made  up  of  the  Ermelo,  Carolina,  and 
other  Transvaal  commandoes.  East  of  this,  some  dozen  miles 
away,  Generals  Philip  Botha  and  Kolbe  had  a combined  force  of 
1,500  men,  while  General  Christian  De  Wet,  and  other  Free  State 
officers  were  already  falling  back  before  the  extreme  right  wing  of 
Roberts’  army  from  the  districts  round  Thahanchu,  and  the  borders 
of  Basutoland,  north  towards  Kroonstad.  These  latter  commandoes 
numbered  from  1,500  to  2,500  men.  At  Fourteen  Streams,  on 
the  extreme  west,  Andries  Cronje  had  the  number  of  burghers 
already  mentioned.  The  total  Boer  forces  holding  a line  of  defen- 
sive positions  extending  right  across  from  east  to  west  of  the  Orange 
Free  State,  a distance  of  near  200  miles,  amounted  to  no  more 
than  8,000.  Less  than  half  of  these  were  available  for  De  la  Bey 
on  the  2nd  day  of  May  when  the  advanced  lines  of  a British  army 
of  30,000  emerged  from  behind  the  hills  east  of  Taffel  Kop  and 
made  for  the  village  of  Brandfort,  the  first  stage  on  Roberts’  journey 
to  Pretoria. 

As  already  related,  I chanced  to  be  with  Commandant-General 
Louis  Botha  at  Glencoe,  in  Natal,  when  the  news  of  the  British 
movement  on  Brandfort  was  received.  It  was  in  a telegram  from 
De  la  Rey  and  read  as  follows:  “ The  English  are  crossing  over 
the  plain.  They  are  as  numerous  as  locusts.  I cannot  shoot  them 
hack ! ” 

Every  possible  effort  was  now  made  to  send  help  to  De  la  Rey. 
General  Botha  left  Glencoe  at  once,  taking  with  him  the  Stander- 
ton  commando  from  the  forces  in  front  of  General  Buller.  He 
had  to  travel  north  from  Natal  to  Pretoria,  then  south  over  the  Vaal 
River  to  the  front.  While  transacting  some  business  in  the  capital, 
a large  number  of  the  men  who  had  come  with  him  took  train  hack 
again  to  their  homes,  in  and  around  Standerton.  Back  went  the 
young  general  that  same  night,  rallied  the  men  again,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  l)ringing  all  of  them  with  him  in  his  journey  to  join  De 
la  Rey.  It  was  manifest,  however,  from  this  painful  incident, 
and  from  the  general  reluctance  of  most  of  the  old  burghers  to 
return  to  the  front,  that  the  mass  of  the  elder  Boers  in  the  Trans- 


EVACUATION  OF  FRET OBI  A 


433 


vaal  and  Orange  Free  State  conunenced  to  look  upon  tlie  strirggle 
against  the  British  “ locusts  ” as  hopeless.  Cr'onje’s  surrender  had 
broken  the  heart  of  their  good  fortune,  and  the  failure  of  any 
European  power  to  intervene  in  their  behalf  dispelled  a lingering 
hope  in  an  ultimate  manifestation  of  that  Divine  assistance  in 
which  they  had  so  long  and  so  sincerely  believed. 

Before  Louis  Botha  could  reach  the  scene  of  renewed  action,  De 
la  Eey,  who  had  been  reenforced  by  a few  small  bodies,  including 
Blake’s  Irish  Brigade,  was  forced  back  from  Brandfort  and  retired 
towards  Smaldeel,  using  his  little  force  to  the  best  advantage  in 
retarding  the  too  rapid  progress  of  Eoberts.  It  was  not  possible, 
however,  to  stop  effectively  the  way  of  ten  men  by  the  efforts  of  one, 
and  this  was  the  disproportion  between  the  opposing  forces.  The 
English  general  sent  forward  a huge  mass  of  men  with  whom  to 
bear  down  resistance  in  his  immediate  front,  while  his  mounted 
troops  were  extended  for  miles  to  his  right  and  left,  with  the 
object  of  turning  the  Boer  positions  whenever  a stand  should  be 
made  by  De  la  Eey’s  center.  In  this  manner,  and  by  the  sheer 
weight  of  numbers  alone,  the  Boers  were  compelled  to  fall  back  from 
one  position  to  another,  without  being  able  to  make  any  effective 
stand  against  such  tactics  and  numbers. 

There  are  three  streams,  each  with  deep  beds,  crossing  the  road 
from  Brandfort  to  the  Vaal  Eiver;  the  Vet,  the  Zand,  and  the 
Valsch  rivers,  with  several  spruits  in  addition;  at  each  of  which  a 
fight  might  have  been  made  with  a force  of  10,000  men,  even 
against  Eoberts’  hosts.  But  with  De  la  Eey’s  4,000,  no  sooner 
were  the  beds  of  these  rivers  reached  and  occupied,  and  men 
placed  in  position  to  contest  the  passage  of  the  British  center  col- 
umn, than  a cloud  of  cavalry  would  be  seen  miles  to  the  right  and 
left,  on  the  north  of  the  stream,  menacing  the  burghers’  line  of 
retreat.  In  face  of  such  odds  there  was  no  alternative,  short  of 
a hopeless  fight  against  overwhelming  numbers  at  some  given  place, 
save  that  of  a continued  falling  back  upon  the  A^aal  Eiver. 

The  Commandant-Gleneral  caught  up  with  De  la  Eey  after  a three 
hours’  stand  had  been  made  at  the  Zand  Eiver.  Philip  Botha’s 
commando  had  made  a gallant  fight  at  this  stream,  in  which  several 
British  were  killed.  The  march  of  Eoberts’  column  was  arrested 
for  the  night,  while  the  Boer  guns  were  carried  safely  to  Venters- 
burg,  ahead.  Here  on  the  following  day  the  Commandant-Gleneral 
at  the  head  of  the  Ermelo,  Standerton,  and  Wakkerstroom  skeletons 
of  these  famed  commandoes  charged  a large  force  of  advancing 
English  who  were  a few  miles  in  front  of  Eoberts’  main  column, 
and  drove  them  back  upon  their  main  lines,  capturing  some  prison- 
ers. Occasional  encounters  of  this  kind,  and  isolated  acts  of  signal 
28 


434 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


bravery,  occurred  in  the  rear  of  what  was  now  a total  force  of  some 
5,000  Boers,  most  of  them  retiring  without  fighting — doggedly,  sul- 
lenly, hopelessly  retiring.  Night  and  day  from  the  time  of  the 
brief  combat  at  the  Zand  Eiver,  did  Generals  Botha  and  De  la 
Eey,  with  President  Ste}^,  appeal  to  and  implore  the  men  who 
had  fought  in  fifty  successful  engagements,  and  always  against 
odds,  to  turn  round  and  stand  with  the  few  men  who  were  con- 
testing every  mile  of  the  ground  with  the  advancing  foe.  In  vain. 
That  haunting  specter  of  Paardeburg  was  ever  present  to  the  eyes 
of  the  hitherto  resolute  men  who  had  so  frequently  fought  and 
beaten  England’s  best  troops.  Their  only  thought  seemed  to  be 
to  retire  behind  the  broad  and  deep  shelter  of  the  Vaal  Eiver. 

In  this  way,  under  the  most  discouraging  circumstances  for  the 
Federal  cause,  the  British,  to  their  own  agreeable  surprise,  were 
able  to  reach  Kroonstad,  half  the  distance  to  Pretoria,  in  one  of  the 
three  weeks  which  Lord  Eoberts  l)elieved  might  be  required  for  his 
task. 

On  the  11th  of  May  the  English  army  entered  the  temporary 
capital  of  the  Free  State.  Generals  Botha  and  De  la  Eey,  along 
with  President  Steyn,  moved  out  of  the  fever-stricken  town  as 
Eoberts’  forces  were  crossing  the  Valsch  Eiver,  at  the  southern 
boundary  of  the  place.  The  last  men  to  leave  Kroonstad,  however, 
were  Blake’s  Brigade,  who  were  nearly  caught  by  the  enemy  while 
engaged  in  a hurried  and  hungry  contest  with  the  viands  of  the 
Grand  Hotel. 

All  the  Boer  forces  from  east  to  west  of  the  Free  State  were 
now  falling  back  on  the  Vaal  Eiver,  the  boundary  line  between  the 
two  Eepublics,  while  the  once  dreaded  little  army  of  the  Tugela  was 
also  retreating  north  on  Laing’s  Nek,  through  which  it  had  passed 
into  Natal  just  seven  months  previously.  Eetiring  yet  fighting 
was  the  work  of  the  younger  Boers,  the  Cape  Afrikanders,  and  the 
Uitlander  Volunteers,  but  it  was  retiring  and  no  fighting  with  the 
mass  of  the  elder  burghers. 

At  the  Vaal,  there  was  only  the  semblance  of  a stand  made. 
The  English  cavalry  had  crossed  the  river  ten  miles  west  and  east 
of  Botha’s  retreating  column,  and  the  movement  was  still  back- 
ward ever.  The  railway  was  torn  up,  bridges  were  blown  down, 
culverts  were  destroyed,  but  this  was  about  the  extent  of  the  oppo- 
sition which  was  shown  by  the  demoralized  burghers  to  the  advance 
of  the  once-despised  Eooinek  foe. 

The  lines  of  the  retiring  Boer  army  became  thinner  as  the  Vaal 
Eiver  was  crossed  and  the  Transvaal  soil  was  reached.  Many  of  the 
Free  State  burghers  had  slipped  away  during  the  night,  and  the 
resisting  force  of  the  harassed  little  column  became  weaker  yet  by 


EVACUATION  OF  PBETOBIA 


435 


these  desertions.  These  were  still  the  elder  Boers,  but  tho 
they  left  the  ranks  at  this  juncture,  in  this  manner,  they  were  yet 
to  right  themselves  in  the  eyes  of  an  admiring  world,  and  to  prove, 
in  many  a daring  and  successful  encounter,  that  they  were  men 
who  had  been  only  temporarily  dispirited,  and  not  men  willingly 
beaten  in  the  fight  for  their  country’s  independence. 

From  the  Yaal  to  the  environs  of  Johannesburg  Botha’s  ranks 
were  increased  by  a few  hundred  men  who  had  gone  from  Pretoria 
and  the  towns  of  the  Band  to  help  to  keep  the  English  back.  The 
conflict  in  front  of  the  Boer  center  became  more  active  as  the  nature 
of  the  ground  grew  better  for  positions  of  advantage  on  one  side, 
and  more  difficult  for  Eoberts’  advance  on  the  other.  The  English 
had  fully  expected  that  extreme  measures  would  be  resorted  to  at 
Johannesburg  to  destroy  the  mines,  and,  possibly,  to  burn  the  city 
which  had  caused  the  war,  and  Eoberts’  plans  after  crossing  the 
^'aal  Eiver  were  directed  towards  the  defeat  of  such  purposes  should 
they  be  attempted.  Nothing  of  this  kind  took  place,  owing  to  the 
decision  arrived  at  by  President  Kruger,  and  the  occupation  of 
Johannesburg  was  effected,  after  some  desultory  firing  had  taken 
place  at  Germiston. 

The  English  had  at  last  planted  their  flag  over  the  gold-reefed 
city  of  evil  omen,  and  the  consciences  of  the  British  were  appeased 
in  the  knowledge  that  there  was  the  solid  advantage  of  the  richest 
gold  mines  in  the  world  on  the  side  of  the  Union  Jack,  as  a set  off 
against  the  moral  infamy  of  the  war  which  this  gold  had  provoked. 
The  fruits  of  the  crime  were  not  to  be  lost,  whatever  might  become 
of  the  honor  of  the  Empire. 

Inside  Pretoria  confusion  grew  more  serious  as  the  rapid  retreat 
of  the  Boers  from  the  Vaal  had  become  known  and  it  was  found 
that  the  capital  would  not  have  to  undergo  the  experience  of  a siege. 
This  news  emboldened  the  pro-British  partisans,  and  a plot  was 
set  on  foot  to  release  the  English  officers  still  held  as  prisoners  of 
war  within  the  city,  and,  in  conjunction  with  the  3,000  other  pris- 
oners at  Waterval,  to  seize  the  arsenal  and  hold  it  until  Eoberts 
should  arrive.  There  were  still,  however,  enough  of  police  and 
officials  available  to  stop  any  such  scheme  being  carried  out,  and 
this  fact  alone  prevented  the  execution  of  the  plot. 

On  the  29th  of  May  President  Kruger  and  other  members  of  the 
Executive  took  their  departure  from  the  city  eastward  to  Machado- 
dorp,  and  the  capital  of  the  little  Eepublic  was  left  to  its  fate. 

Three  days  later  Louis  Botha,  covered  with  dust  and  borne  down 
by  fatigue,  came  to  visit  his  wife  and  children  from  the  lines  be- 
yond the  boundary  of  hills,  and  to  see  to  the  proper  despatch  of  such 
war  materials  as  yet  remained  in  the  arsenal  and  other  places.  These 


EVACUATION  OF  PRETORIA 


437 


duties  attended  to,  the  Commandant-General  was  off  again  to  the 
front,  from  whence  the  booming  of  guns  and  the  shrieking  of  lyd- 
dite could  he  plainly  heard  in  the  town. 

Guns,  rifles,  ammunition,  provisions,  rolling  stock,  everything 
removal  within  the  city  that  would  be  useful  for  further  opera- 
tions were  expeditiously  sent  forward  on  the  Delagoa  Bay  railway; 
and  the  loyal  and  disloyal  citizens  awaited  with  conflicting  hopes 
the  advent  of  the  final  scene  in  the  war  drama  around  Pretoria. 

Down  from  the  gaps  leading  through  the  hills  from  the  south 
came  the  retreating  burghers  in  broken  commandoes,  all  making 
their  way  eastward  on  the  line  of  general  retreat.  Behind  them 
could  be  heard  the  guns  of  the  advancing  British,  and  the  proces- 
sion continued  through  Sunday  and  Monday  the  3rd  and  4th  of 
June.  Attempts  had  been  made  by  the  enemy  to  send  troops 
enough  round  by  the  north  and  south  of  the  city  to  cut  the  railway 
line  east  of  Pretoria  so  as  to  prevent  the  removal  of  heavy  guns  and 
stores  by  rail.  Botha  had,  however,  anticipated  these  movements, 
and  in  two  spirited  encounters,  one  against  General  French  and 
the  other  against  General  Hamilton,  the  men  he  had  posted  to 
guard  these  positions  had  driven  these  enveloping  forces  back  with 
loss,  and  left  the  railway  clear  for  the  final  rise  to  which  it  would 
be  put  in  Pretoria  in  the  service  of  the  Boer  Eepublie. 

On  the  night  of  the  4th  of  June,  Lord  Koberts  sent  a staff  officer 
under  a flag  of  truce  to  Commandant-General  Botha  demanding 
the  surrender  of  the  capital.  The  reply  was  returned  that  the 
English  could  take  possession  the  next  morning,  and  Adjutant 
Sandberg,  General  Botha’s  military  secretary,  and  another  officer 
were  commissioned  to  convey  to  Lord  Eoberts  the  intimation  that 
he  could  enter  the  Transvaal  capital  on  that  day. 

The  Boer  officers  and  men  who  had  no  secure  rest  since  leaving 
Kroonstad  slept  in  what  was  to  be  the  capital  of  the  Eepublie  for 
that  night  only,  and  early  the  following  morning,  the  5th  of  June, 
Louis  Botha  and  Lukas  Meyer  bade  farewell  to  their  families, 
vaulted  into  their  saddles,  and  followed  in  the  rear  of  the  still  re- 
treating Boer  columns,  eastward  out  of  Pretoria,  as  the  British  were 
entering  the  city  through  the  southern  gap  in  the  circle  of  surround- 
ing hills. 

Louis  Botha’s  last  words  on  leaving  the  city  thus  violated  again, 
after  twenty  years  of  freedom,  by  the  entry  of  the  British  flag, 
were,  “ We  will  fight  them  to  the  death ! ” 


Chapter  XXXV 


MAFEKING  AND  ELANDS  RIVER 

How  Mafeking  was  finally  relieved — ^Exploits  of  some  Australian 
“ Bushmen  ” under  General  Carrington — British  opinions  not 
FLATTERING  TO  BRITISH  VALOR. 

The  end  of  the  military  theatricals  carried  on  by  Baden-Powell 
and  Commandant  Snyman  came  on  the  17th  of  May,  in  a 
W'ay  which  tended  to  redeem  the  farcical  character  of  the  previous 
operations  from  a continuous  record  of  absurdity.  Two  forces 
started  for  the  town  from  Kimberley  and  Johannesburg,  respectively 
— one  to  relieve,  the  other  to  storm,  the  much-advertised  place. 
Colonel  Mahon,  at  the  head  of  1,000  picked  and  mounted  men,  and 
with  a battery  of  Horse  Artillery,  rode  north  from  Kimberley,  by 
Vryburg,  and  formed  a Junction  with  Colonel  Plumer  and  the 
troopers  who  had  been  attempting  in  vain  for  months  to  get  past 
the  few  Boers  who  carried  on  the  siege.  This  was  to  be  the  rescuing 
force. 

At  midnight,  on  the  8th  of  May,  a select  body  of  380  Rand  and 
Pretoria  Volunteers  left  Johannesburg  under  the  command  of  young 
Eloff,  a nephew  of  President  Kruger’s,  with  the  purpose  of  reach- 
ing Mafeking  before  the  relieving  force  from  Kimberley  could  ar- 
rive. It  was  to  be  a race  between  the  two  flying  columns  for  the 
prize  of  Baden-Powell’s  garrison.  Eloff — that  is,  Sarel,  of  that 
name — was  a brave  young  burgher  and,  unlike  others  of  his  name, 
was  very  popular  in  Pretoria.  He  had  offered  to  go  and  storm 
Mafeking  if  300  men  could  be  found  in  Pretoria  and  Johannesburg 
at  that  time  to  accompany  him.  The  necessary  number  were  soon 
mustered,  and  comprised  some  German  Hitlanders;  but  the  bulk 
of  the  men  were  burghers. 

Eloff  reached  the  Boer  lines  round  Mafeking  early  on  the  13th 
of  May,  and  proposed  his  plan  of  assault  to  General  Snyman.  This 
officer  refused  point  blank  to  entertain  the  proposition.  He  was 
senior  in  command,  and,  unless  Eloff  could  produce  President 
Kruger’s  own  orders  superseding  him,  he  was  resolved  to  remain 
superior  in  authority  and  to  carry  on  the  siege  according  to  his  and 


MAF EKING  AND  ELANDS  RIVER 


439 


his  commandoes’  ideas.  Eloff  was  furious  and,  calling  Snyman 
names  which  did  not  spell  either  “ courage  ” or  “ white  man,”  he 
resolved  with  his  own  brigade  alone  to  attack  the  town  forthwith. 

Consequently,  at  eleven  o’clock  that  night,  Eloff  at  the  head  of 
his  Volunteers  left  the  lines  of  investment  and  rushed  into  the 
native  location  which  had  been  one  of  the  strongest  posts  in  Baden- 
Powell’s  outer  defenses.  The  place  was  successfully  carried,  and 
it  was  felt  that  the  key  of  Mafeking  was  in  Boer  hands ; providing 
that  Snyman  and  the  investing  force  of  burghers  who  had  witnessed 
the  capture  of  the  Kaffir  kraals  would  now  come  on  and  help  to 
push  the  advantage  thus  gained  to  an  assault  upon  the  town  itself. 
They  did  not  come. 

Conflicting  accounts  are  given  of  what  followed  the  initial  suc- 
cess of  Eloff ’s  attack.  One  report  alleged  that  before  the  Volun- 


BOER  BATTERY  OUTSIDE  MAFEKING 


teers  had  started  to  penetrate  the  outer  British  lines,  a dozen  of 
them  turned  their  rifles  upon  some  of  Snyman’s  command  and  shot 
five  or  six  of  these  for  refusing  to  take  part  in  the  assault.  Another 
account  asserts  that  the  Volunteers,  after  capturing  the  native 
quarters,  overcome  by  the  five  or  six  days’  almost  continuous  jour- 
ney from  Johannesburg,  were  borne  down  with  fatigue  and  could 
not  be  induced  by  Eloff  to  push  forward  to.  the  main  attack;  they 
favored  waiting  for  the  morning;  while  yet  another  report  alleges 
that  Eloff’s  men  had  found  a drink-store  in  the  Kaffir  location  and 
had  unwisely  indulged  in  the  liquor,  hence  the  collapse  of  the  last 
attempt  to  capture  the  Mafeking  garrison. 

By  whatever  means,  natural  or  spirituous,  the  attackers  were  in- 
duced to  sleep  in  the  Kaffir  portion  of  the  Mafeking  lines,  they 
were  so  found  and  overwhelmed  shortly  after  midnight  by  Baden- 
Powell’s  forces.  After  a manly  fight  put  up  by  the  assailants  they 
were  defeated  by  their  more  numerous  foes.  They  left  ninety 
killed  and  wounded  on  the  field,  as  a proof  of  the  fighting  resolve 


440 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


which  had  animated  those  who  had  followed  young  Eloff,  and  as  a 
lasting  reproach  to  Baden-Powell’s  rival,  Snyman,  whose  poltroon- 
ery alone  stood  between  the  Volunteers  and  the  success  of  their  plan 
of  assault.  ElofE  and  the  balance  of  his  men  were  taken  prisoner, 
and  Mafeking  was  finally  relieved  by  Colonel  Mahon  and  his  troops 
four  days  subsequently. 

It  was  found  on  the  termination  of  the  siege  that  the  town  was 
amply  provisioned  for  six  months’  further  investment,  and  that 
there  had  actually  happened  none  of  tlie  hardships  and  little  of  the 
sensational  siege  experiences  which  had  been  persistently  advertised 
in  heart-rending  hut  heroically  posing  despatches  sent  to  all  parts 
of  the  British  Empire  during  the  continuance  of  the  serio-comic 
military  drama  at  Mafeking. 

General  Carrington’s  achievements,  in  conjunction  with  those  of 
General  Baden-Powell  soon  after  the  siege  was  raised,  have  not 
been  the  theme  of  a too  fervent  Jingo  praise.  Carrington’s  force 
was  composed  of  some  1,200  or  1,500  of  “ Australian  Bushmen  ” 
and  Ehodesian  troopers.  By  an  arrangement  with  the  Portuguese 
Government  which  astonished  all  who  understood  that  this  Power 
had  declared  its  neutrality,  the  Australian  portion  of  these  troops 
was  permitted  to  land  at  Beira,  with  its  horses,  artillery,  and 
equipment.  The  explanation  given  by  English  papers  of  this  ar- 
rangement was  that  “ a rising  of  the  Matabele  ” was  feared  in 
Rhodesia,  and  that  Carrington’s  force  was  being  despatched  thither 
by  way  of  Beira,  as  any  other  approach  through  British  territory 
was  barred  by  the  Boers.  The  real  destination  of  the  British  was 
Mafeking,  and  its  sole  object  an  attempt  to  relieve  that  place  from 
the  north. 

The  “ Bushmen,”  so-called,  were  the  choicest  lot  of  khaki-clad 
adventurers  who  had  enlisted  on  the  English  side  in  the  inglorious 
war.  They  were,  with  a few  exceptions,  Jackeroos,  Sundowners, 
and  similar  ne’er-do-wells  who  had  been  Bushmen  ” only  in  the 
sense  of  doing  an  occasional  job  of  sheep-shearing  which  would 
provide  drink  for  a fortnight’s  spree  at  the  nearest  liquor  store. 
They  enlisted  at  the  rate  of  five  shillings  per  day,  while  the  regular 
British  Atkins  had  to  expose  his  skin  in  the  field  for  about  one- 
third  of  this  remuneration.  The  “ Bushmen  ” were  therefore  join- 
ing in  a good  thing  when  engaging  to  sustain  the  martial  valor 
of  Australia  in  South  Africa,  at  the  price  of  ten  drinks  per  day. 

How  they  have  done  this  I will  allow  one  of  their  chaplains,  the 
late  Father  Timoney,  of  Sydney,  N.  S.  W.,  to  relate.  This  reverend 
gentleman  accompanied  these  select  Australian  warriors  as  their 
spiritual  guardian,  and  on  the  10th  of  December,  1900,  he  wrote  as 
follows  of  the  prowess  of  his  precious  charges: 


MAFEKING  AND  ELANDS  EIYER 


441 


“ A battle  in  South  Africa  means  that  two  bodies  of  men  strongly 
posted  on  two  hills  about  a mile  or  two  apart,  throw  lead  in  the  form 
of  shells  and  bullets  at  one  another,  until  the  guns  become  jammed 
or  until  the  rifles  become  red  hot,  or  nearly  so.  As  a rule  our 
casualties  are  few,  but  if  one  listens  to  the  mendacious  troopers 
the  enemy  has  lost  hundreds.  There  is,  of  course,  no  means  of 
ascertaining  the  losses  of  the  enemy.  Now  and  then  one  can  see 
through  glasses  a man  fall  from  his  horse,  but  the  lively  imagina- 
tion of  our  men  supplies  all  details,  gives  the  precise  number  of 
the  enemy  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  the  nature  of  the  wounds 
inflicted,  and  the  number  of  those  who  are  beyond  recovery.  It 
often  happens  that  the  enemy  escapes  without  losing  a man,  but  in 
our  camp  they  invariably  lose  dozens.  I have  heard  cooks,  tailors, 
and  other  artists  enumerate  the  number  of  Boers  whom  they  had 
killed,  and  modestly  refer  to  their  deeds  of  valor.  Most  of  these 
feUows  would  fail  to  strike  a haystack  at  a hundred  yards’  distance, 
and  a Boer  armed  with  a broomstick  would  annihilate  a company 
of  such  braggarts.  Besides,  these  swaggering  warriors  live  in  mortal 
terror  of  the  Boers,  and  it  would  require  a Baldwin  engine  to 
drag  them  within  range  of  the  Mauser  rifle.  I am  now  referring 
to  the  noisy,  rowdy  element  of  our  army,  to  the  men  who  neither 
do  nor  dare  anjdhing,  but  wbo  are  ever  gabbling  overland  recount- 
ing exploits  that  never  took  place.  I suppose  every  army  has  its 
coterie  of  worthless  individuals.  Anyhow,  we  are  singularly  privi- 
leged in  possessing  large  numbers  of  IMunchausens.  I marvel  what 
will  be  the  number  and  nature  of  the  stories  with  which  our  doughty 
warriors  will  entertain  their  friends  when  they  return  to  Austra- 
lia! ” — Sydney  {Australia)  “ Catholic  Press.” 


Following  the  occupation  of  Pretoria  by  Eoberts  and  the  relief 
of  Mafeking  by  Mahon,  General  De  la  Eey,  who  had  fought  in  the 
rear-guard  of  the  Boer  forces  from  Brandfort  to  the  Transvaal 
capital,  was  despatched  to  his  own  district  of  Lichtenburg  to  rally 
the  burghers  of  the  west  in  a campaign  against  the  operations 
of  Lord  Methuen  and  Baden-Powell,  who  had  several  thousand 
troops  at  their  disposal.  General  Carrington’s  incomparable 
warriors  from  Woolamaroo,  and  elsewhere,  were  also  swooping 
down  upon  the  hen  roosts  and  liquor  stores  of  the  Marico  regions 
carrying  fire  and  slaughter  into  the  farmyards  of  the  northwest  of 
the  Transvaal.  De  la  Eey’s  task  was  to  stand  in  between  these  three 
hostile  columns,  and  to  defend  such  homesteads  and  villages  as  had 
not  been  burned  in  the  Eustenburg  district  by  the  British  vandals. 

He  organized  a force  of  1,.500  men  out  of  the  burghers  who  had 
been  under  Snyraan’s  command,  and  placed  that  disgraced  com- 
mandant in  prison  for  cowardice.  With  this  small  force,  he  fought 
his  assailants  on  all  sides,  more  than  holding  his  own  against  three 


443 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


columns,  in  a series  of  brilliant  encounters.  He  succeeded  in  shut- 
ting Baden-Powell  (now  a general)  and  2,000  ti’oops  within  Eusten- 
burg,  in  August,  1900.  By  his  usual  display  of  military  judgment, 
he  had  detached  some  of  his  men  southward  to  harass  Lord 
Methuen’s  march,  and  so  well  were  these  plans  executed  that  the 
titled  guardsman  and  his  column  of  3,000  men  were  successfully 
kept  off  during  the  investment  of  Baden-Powell  in  Eustenburg. 
Finally,  the  newly-made  general  was  rescued  by  Hamilton  with 
a large  force  despatched  for  the  purpose  by  Lord  Eoberts  from 
Pretoria,  and  his  exploits  since  then  have  not  been  such  as  to  bring 
him  under  the  daily  notice  of  the  newspaper-reading  world.  He 
marched  with  his  2,000  men,  when  leaving  Eustenburg.  towards 
the  Elands  Eiver  where  a body  of  Ehodesian  and  other  troopers, 
under  Colonel  Hoare,  were  being  assailed  by  the  ubiquitous  De  la 
Eey.  Baden-Powell  knew  that  General  Carrington  and  the  invin- 
cible Woolamaroo  Brigade  were  marching  from  Zeerust,  directly 
west  of  Elands  Eiver,  also  to  the  relief  of  Hoare;  but  for  some 
unexplained  reason  the  defender  of  Mafeking,  tho  advancing  until 
within  earshot  of  the  Boer  guns,  returned  upon  his  footsteps, 
to  emerge  some  months  afterward  from  a too  oppressive  surfeit 
of  military  fame,  and  become  the  head  of  a special  constabulary 
force,  for,  presumably,  more  civic  duties. 

It  has  been  said,  in  explanation  of  General  Baden-Powell’s  action 
on  this  occasion,  that  he  believed  General  Carrington  had  joined 
hands  with  Colonel  Hoare,  and  that  his  aid  was  not,  in  consequence, 
required.  What  Carrington  and  the  “ Bushmen  ” did  on  the  occa- 
sion had  better  be  related  in  the  words  of  Jingo  lo3i'alty  itself,  so 
as  to  avert  a possible  charge  of  prejudiced  testimony  against  this 
volume. 

On  the  1st  of  January,  1901,  the  London  “Daily  Chronicle” 
published  the  following  statement: 

“ The  ^ Ehodesian  Times,’  just  to  hand,  gives  a full  account  of 
the  failure  to  relieve  the  Elands  Eiver  garrison  and  the  subsequent 
evacuation  of  Zeerust  by  General  Carring-ton,  as  told  by  several  of 
the  men  serving  in  the  Ehodesian  regiment.  They  all  reflect 
severely  upon  the  action  of  the  general.  The  ^ Ehodesian  Times,’ 
referring  to  these  statements,  says  : 

“ ‘ The  particular  events  narrated  in  the  following  columns  are 
the  gallant  defense  of  Elands  Eiver  by  some  400  Ehodesians  and 
Australians  on  Aug.  3 and  succeeding  days,  together  with  the 
lamentable  failure  of  General  Carrington  to  relieve  the  post,  and  the 
shameful  evacuation  of  Zeerust  with  the  consequent  breach  of 
faith  to  surrendered  neutrals  and  to  British  loyalists.  This  whole 
gtory  has  never  been  fully  told  before,  and,  in  order  that  free  and 


MAF EKING  AND  EL  AND  8 RIVER 


443 


fair  statements  might  be  obtained,  each  of  the  four  who  have 
contributed  a statement  has  been  interviewed  separately,  and  had 
no  idea  that  any  one  else  had  been  consulted.  There  are,  therefore, 
four  independent  accounts,  each  man  telling  all  he  could  and  believ- 
ing he  was  telling  the  whole  story.  Mere  hearsay  statements  have 
been  eliminated  as  not  being  evidence,  otherwise  the  accounts  are 
in  the  narrators’  own  language.  Yet  the  stories  are  practically 
identical,  and  it  seems  to  be  a fact  that  a British  general,  with  a 
complete,  well-equipped  force  of  1,200  men,  suffered  himself  to 
be  driven  backward,  fled  in  such  haste  that  he  never  knew  how  weak 
his  enemy  was,  and  then  evacuated  a fortified  defensible  position 
thirty-six  hours  before  the  first  small  body  of  the  enemy  appeared. 
It  is  a pitiful  tale ; a shameful  and  disgraceful  tale.  It  has  caused 
the  shedding  of  an  infinite  amount  of  l)lood,  and  prolonged  misery 
to  thousands,  both  of  British  and  Boer  families,  by  encouraging 
the  Boers  in  their  futile  resistance.  The  only  relief  in  the  story 
so  far  as  this  country  is  concerned  is  the  gallantry  of  the  Ehode- 
sians,  who,  under  Captain  “ Sandy  ” Butters,  declined  to  surrender, 
and  with  the  cry,  “ Ehodesians  never  surrender,”  held  the  advanced 
post  at  Elands  Elver,  and  made  the  defense  of  the  whole  camp 
possible,  until  Kitchener’s  welcome  relief  came.” 

The  end  of  the  operations  of  the  Methuen-Powell-Carrington- 
Hoare  forces  in  the  west  of  the  Transvaal,  in  the  months  of 
July  and  August,  1900,  was  the  rescue  of  the  lot  by  the  arrival, 
first  of  General  Hamilton,  and  then  of  Lord  Kitchener,  with  large 
relieving  columns,  and  the  subsequent  burning  of  hundreds  of 
farms  and  homesteads  and  of  numerous  villages  by  the  8,000  or 
10,000  British  who  had  failed  to  beat  or  capture  General  De  la  Key 
and  his  1,500  burghers. 


Chapter  XXXVI 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR— JUNE  TO  DECEMBER,  1900 

De  Wet’s  encounters — His  capture  of  the  Irish  Loyalist  Yeomanry 
AT  Lindley — De  la  Key’s  victory  at  Nitral’s  Nek — Surrender  of 
Prinsloo — An  American  Consul  where  he  ought  not  to  be — 
Early  fruits  of  Lord  Roberts’  drastic  policy — Burghers  return 

TO  THE  COMMANDOES — BURNING  A WIDOW’S  HOME — HeR  RETORT TuE 

CoRDUA  “ PLOT  ” — Battle  of  Dalmanutha — Lord  Roberts  annexes 
THE  Transvaal — Defeat  of  Ollivier — Correspondence  between 
Roberts  and  Botha — Death  of  Theron — President  Kruger  sails 
FOR  Europe — The  British  gain  control  of  Delagoa  Bay  railway — 
The  Foreign  Volunteers  return  home — De  Wet’s  policy  adopted 

BY  ALL  THE  BOERS — De  WeT  ESCAPES  FROM  A TRAP — CAPTURES  AND 

RECAPTURES — Is  DEFEATED  AT  BOTHAVILLE DISGRACEFUL  “REJOICINGS” 

AT  RETURN  OF  LONDON  VOLUNTEERS SaVAGB  PRESS  SENTIMENTS  IN 

England  — “ Concentration  ” camps  resolved  upon  — President 
Kruger  lands  in  France — Lord  Roberts  relinquishes  command  to 
Kitchener  and  returns  to  England — De  la  Rey  beats  Clements 
AT  NoOITGEDACHT — “ PuNCH’S  ” DIARY  OF  A WEEK’S  ACHIEVEMENTS  BY 
THE  British — De  Wet  again  baffles  surrounding  columns — ■ 
Second  Boer  invasion  of  Cape  Colony — Commandant  Kritzinger — 
Botha  captures  and  releases  the  oft-captured  Liverpools — 
Kitchener’s  summary  of  the  situation. 


EETUKNED  from  South  Africa  at  the  end  of  May,  1900,  and 


X was  thus  cut  off;  from  communication  with  the  Transvaal  and 
Free  State  leaders  in  the  held,  and  from  other  means  of  obtaining 
direct  Boer  information.  The  facts  and  incidents  relating  to  the 
events  recorded  in  this  diary  are  derived  mainly  from  sources  of 
general  knowledge,  and  are  not  included  in  the  volume  with  a 
guaranty  of  accuracy,  or  on  any  authority  other  than  that  which 
attaches  to  ordinary  public  report  carefully  examined. 

In  condensing  the  narrative  of  conhicts  and  occurrences  from  the 
1st  of  June,  1900,  to  the  present  date  into  the  form  of  a Diary  of 
the  War,  my  desire  is  to  give  my  readers  a rough,  consecutive 
record  of  the  combats  between  the  opposing  forces,  in  the  absence 
of  such  information  as  would  enable  me  to  continue  the  descriptive 
accounts  of  liattles,  as  in  previous  chapters.  Accurate  knowledge  is 
wanting  of  these  more  or  less  continuous  engagements,  and  of  other 
occurrences  in  South  Africa  since  the  English  possessed  themselves 
of  all  the  channels  of  communication.  They  still  enforce  a rigorous 


DIABY  OF  THE  ^yAB 


445 


press  and  jiostal  censorship,  and  only  leave  the  Boers  the  oppor- 
tunity offered  by  a chance  message  of  giving  to  the  public  in  Europe 
and  America  their  own  versions  of  victories  or  defeats,  or  of  their 
enemies’  methods  of  conducting  the  campaign. 

The  Boer  history  of  the  past  two  years,  and  of  the  struggle  on 
to  the  end  of  the  war,  will  be  told  by  competent  authority  some 
day,  and  the  following  imperfect  accoirnt  of  what  has  happened 
during  that  time  must  necessarily  take  the  place,  for  the  present, 
of  the  fuller  and  better  authenticated  record  which  has  still  to  be 
written. 

I omit  mention  of  numerous  small  encounters  between  detached 
bodies,  in  which  the  casualties  were  too 
few  to  lend  importance  to  such  skir- 
mishes. 

June  1-7. — Patrols  of  De  Wet’s, 
forming  part  of  scattered  commandoes, 
located  some  farm-burning  Britishers 
in  the  locality  of  Picksburg,  0.  F.  S., 
and  successfully  ambushed  them. 

Thirty  surrendered. 

De  Wet  captured  a convoy  at  Vrede- 
fort  Eoad,  on  its  way  to  Heilbron.  It 
consisted  of  150  Highlanders  who  were 
escorting  food  and  necessaries  for  Gen- 
eral Colvile’s  army,  in  the  northeast  of 
the  Free  State.  Fifty-five  wagons  and 
their  contents  were  secured.  The  daanie  theron,  the  great 

British  attempted  no  resistance.  An 

officer  from  De  Wet,  bearing  a white  flag,  rode  into  the  enemy’s 
camjD  with  a summons  to  surrender.  They  surrendered,  were  dis- 
armed, and  subsequently  released. 

Captain  Daanie  Theron  and  his  scouting  corps  were  attached  to 
De  Wet’s  commandoes  while  these  were  operating  in  the  rear  of 
Lord  Eoberts’  march  on  Pretoria.  It  is  a legend  of  the  Free  State 
laagers  that  the  Highlanders  who  were  captured  on  the  4th  of  June, 
had  been  piloted  during  a portion  of  their  journey  by  a young  lad, 
born  in  Kroonstad,  of  Scotch  parents,  who  rode  a bicycle  and  pro- 
duced a pass  bearing  Lord  Methuen’s  signature.  The  “ lad  ” dis- 
appeared the  night  before  the  convoy  fell  into  De  Wet’s  hands. 

The  capture  of  the  men  of  the  Duke  of  Cambridge’s  Own  13th 
Imperial  Yeomanry,  and  of  the  “Irish  Hunt  Corps”  (so  called 
from  its  select  composition,  since  it  comprised  earls,  landlords, 
judges’  sons,  and  Belfast  Orangemen),  occurred  as  follows,  on  the 
31st  of  May : It  was  the  first  adventure  of  this  section  of  the  Im- 


446 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


perial  Yeomanry  'V'olunteers  in  the  war.  Their  commanding  officer 
was  Colonel  Spragge,  and  they  were  under  orders  to  march  from 
Kroonstad  to  Lindle}^,  as  a reenforcement  for  General  Colvile’s 
column.  On  arriving  at  their  destination,  it  was  found  that  Col- 
vile  had  withdrawn  from  the  town  on  that  morning,  following  an 
engagement  with  a Boer  commando,  and  had  proceeded  due  north 
for  Heilbron,  a distance  of  some  fifty  miles. 

"While  considering  what  course  to  take  under  these  circumstances, 
it  was  discovered  by  Spragge  that  a Boer  force  had  surrounded 
Bindley,  and  was  about  to  attack  the  Duke’s  Own  and  the  Belfast 
“ huntsmen.”  The  British  officer  disposed  of  his  men  in  the  way 
best  calculated  to  enable  them  to  defend  themselves,  and  the  first, 
and  the  last,  fight  of  these  Irish  loyalists  in  the  war  began. 

Accounts  vary  in  the  details  of  the  struggle.  I have  been  assured 
that  not  half-a-dozen  burghers  lost  their  lives  in  the  conflict  with 
the  Yeos  during  the  three  days’  running  battle  which  ensued. 
Spragge  retreated  from  the  town  after  finding  that  his  assailants 
were  in  possession  of  the  hills  which  dominated  it.  He  was  pur- 
sued closely  by  De  Wet  and  his  men,  and  driven  into  a position 
where  he  was  easily  held  by  his  adversary,  until,"  on  finding  there 
were  no  reenforcements  coming  either  from  General  Colvile  in  the 
north,  or  Lord  Methuen,  who  was  somewhere  in  the  Kroonstad  dis- 
trict, the  corps  uplifted  the  white  flag  and  became  De  Wet’s  prison- 
ers. Less  than  ten  per  cent,  of  them  had  been  placed  hors  de  combat 
in  the  three  days’  fight.  Had  they  only  held  out  for  a few  hours 
longer.  Lord  Methuen  would  have  succeeded  in  reaching  them  from 
Kroonstad. 

After  being  disarmed,  the  whole  body  of  over  450  men  was  sent 
across  towards  the  Natal  border,  under  an  armed  guard  of  eight 
burghers.* 

Two  earls  were  among  the  surrendered  Yeos. 

On  the  7th  of  July  De  Wet  released  all  his  prisoners,  including 
the  titled  ones. 

On  the  6th  of  June  a composite  force  of  about  800  British  were 
in  charge  of  a huge  quantity  of  stores,  intended  for  Lord  Koberts’ 
army,  near  Eoodeval,  fifty  miles  north  of  Kroonstad.  General  Col- 
vile’s column  was  somewhere  east,  and  Lord  Methuen’s  immediately 
south,  of  this  position.  The  Derbyshire  Militia  Eegiment  and  other 
troops  were  in  camp  as  a protection  for  the  stores.  During  the 
night  Commandant  Nel,  with  a section  of  De  Wet’s  forces,  stole 
in  between  the  two  British  columns,  attacked  the  Militia  at  dawn, 
and  finally  captured  the  stores  and  ammunition.  The  Militia 

* “The  National  (British)  Review,”  January,  1901,  p.  666. 


DIAEY  OF  THE  WAE 


fought  well  for  four  or  five  hours  before  hoisting  the  white  flag. 
Over  400  surrendered. 

June  8-15. — During  the  middle  of  June  De  Wet’s  activity  was 
chiefly  directed  to  the  rear  of  Roberts’  army,  on  the  line  of  his 
communications,  where  Lord  Methuen,  with  a large  column,  was- 
defending  these  south  of  Kroonstad.  By  the  exercise  of  his  accus- 
tomed strategy,  the  Boer  general  enticed  his  opponent  away  north, 
in  the  direction  of  Heilbron,  and,  on  Methuen  walking  into  the 
snare,  De  Wet  wheeled  round  and  destroyed  the  railway  for  several 
miles  between  Smaldeel  and  Kroonstad,  after  which  he  successfully 
eluded  the  pursuit  of  the  returning  English  column. 

On  the  12th  Lord  Roberts  reported  an  engagement  between  his 
forces  and  those  of  General  Botha  eastward  of  Pretoria.  He  said : 
“ The  enemy  fought  with  great  determination,  and  held  our  cavalry 
on  both  flanks,  but  Hamilton  caused  the  enemy  to  fall  back  on  their 
second  position  eastward,  which  they  are  still  holding.”  Botha 
was  finally  compelled  to  retire  eastward,  while  Robert’s  forces  re- 
turned to  Pretoria. 

On  the  same  date.  Lord  Roberts  addressed  a letter  to  Com- 
mandant-General Botha  advising  him  to  give  up  the  struggle,  say- 
ing : “ The  British  force  under  my  command  so  greatly  exceeds  the 
Boer  army  in  numbers  that,  tho  the  war  may  be  prolonged  for 
a few  more  weeks,  there  can  be  but  one  result.” 

On  General  Botha  requesting  that  operations  should  cease  all 
along  the  line  of  hostilities,  during  an  armistice  which  would  en- 
able him  to  consult  with  other  generals  and  the  members  of  his 
Government,  Lord  Roberts  refused  this  condition  and  the  negotia- 
tions ended. 

The  British  general’s  “few  weeks”  are  now  (March,  1902) 
ninety  in  number,  and  the  war  is  not  yet  over. 

June  16-23. — A portion  of  De  Wet’s  commando  attacked  a train 
at  Leeuw  Spruit,  north  of  Kroonstad,  which,  according  to  report, 
contained  Lord  Kitchener.  The  English  general  is  said  to  have  had 
a narrow  escape  from  being  captured.  He  sprang  from  his  car- 
riage, seized  a horse,  and  rode  to  the  nearest  British  camp.  The 
attack  on  the  train  was  made  by  Theron  and  his  scouts. 

Sixty  miles  south  of  this  place  another  train  was  attacked  at 
Zand  River,  and  2,000  mail  bags  intended  for  Roberts’  army  were 
destroyed.  The  burghers  engaged  in  this  exploit  belonged  to  De 
Villier’s  command  under  Boerman. 

June  24-30. — A convoy  carr}dng  stares  for  the  English  garrison 
at  Lindley  was  assailed  by  some  of  De  Wet’s  men,  led  by  Gen- 
eral Philip  Botha.  A spirited  fight  ensued,  in  which  15  British 
were  killed  and  50  wounded.  The  convoy  fought  its  way  out 


448 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


of  the  encounter,  however,  and  sncceeded  in  reaching  its  desti- 
natio2i. 

July  1.-7. — Lord  Iloberts  desiiatched  a combined  cavalry  and  in- 
fantry force  of  near  10,000  men  with  thirty  guns  to  operate  against 
De  Wet  in  the  northeast  of  the  Free  State.  Generals  Hunter, 
llundle,  Clements,  and  Paget  were  in  command  of  separate  columns 
of  this  force.  De  Wet  and  Prinsloo  fell  back  south  before  these 
divisions  to  Bethlehem, where  they  fought  an  engagement,  and  were 
compelled  to  retire  still  southward  towards  the  Wittebergen  Hills. 
General  Prinsloo,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  largest  body  of  the  Free 
State  burghers  at  this  time,  made  for  the  Brandwater  region  of 
these  hills,  close  to  the  Basutoland  border,  where  he  allowed  himself 
to  be  surrounded  by  Hunter’s  forces,  now  divided  into  six  columns. 
De  Wet  and  President  Steyn,  with  1,500  men  and  six  guns,  doubled 
back  north,  under  cover  of  night,  and  successfully  broke  the  encir- 
cling cordon — one  of  the  objects  being  to  draw  off  the  pressure 
upon  Prinsloo’s  position. 

In  the  meantime.  General  Louis  Botha  with  a force  of  3,000 
men  fought  an  engagement  with  Colonel  Mahon  and  General 
Hutton,  in  command  of  some  8,000  troops,  at  Bronkhorstspruit, 
near  the  sixth  railway  station,  east  of  Pretoria.  This  fight  was 
mainly  one  of  artillery,  and  there  were  only  a few  casualties  on 
both  sides. 

July  §-15. — On  the  11th  of  July,  a section  of  General  De  la 
Eey’s  commando,  under  Commandant  Beyers,  attacked  General 
Smith-Dorrien  and  four  British  battalions  with  two  guns,  at  Heck- 
poort,  southwest  of  Pretoria,  defeated  them,  and  compelled  them 
to  retreat. 

On  the  same  date,  a few  days  after  General  Buffer  had  visited 
Lord  Eoberts  at  Pretoria,  and  the  meeting  of  the  two  generals  in 
the  Transvaal  capital  had  been  duly  acclaimed  by  the  English  war 
})ress  as  heralding,  “ the  final  conquest  of  the  Eepublic,”  General 
De  la  Eey  attacked  another  British  force  at  Nitral’s  Nek,  defeated 
them  with  a loss  of  over  300  men  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners, 
and  captured  two  guns.  This  engagement  was  fought  within  eigh- 
teen miles  of  Pretoria.  The  place  is  on  the  Eustenburg  road,  where 
it  crosses  a branch  of  the  Krokodil  Elver,  and  some  twenty-five 
miles  north  of  Heckpoort.  To  the  west  of  Nitral’s  Nek,  a high 
kop  dominates  the  lower  ridges  of  the  Magaliesberg  Hills.  It  was 
from  this  elevation  the  Boers  were  able  to  locate  the  exact  position 
of  the  enemy.  They  seized  the  heights  above  the  English  camp  to 
the  west,  while  a small  cooperating  body  advanced  from  the  oppo- 
site direction  and  occupied  another  hill  in  the  early  morning;  both 
contingents  opening  fire  simultaneously  upon  the  surprised  British. 


niAEY  OF  THE  ^yAB 


449 


Tliey  captured  the  enemy’s  guns  and  turned  them  ujion  the  second 
position,  which  was  ultimately  stormed  and  taken. 

The  English  forces  consisted  of  five  companies  of  the  Lincoln- 
shire Eeginient,  a squadron  of  the  Scots  Greys,  and  some  men  of 
the  Eoyal  Horse  Artillery  in  charge  of  the  guns.  The  fight  lasted 
for  some  hours,  and  terminated  in  a complete  victory  for  De  la 
Eey’s  men;  the  British  surrendering  on  finding  their  casualties  in- 
creasing under  the  fire  of  their  own  ginis  in  Boer  hands. 

On  the  same  date  a force  of  Dragoons,  Hussars,  and  other  regi- 
ments was  attacked  by  Commandant  Kemp  at  Waterval,  nearer 
still  to  Pretoria,  and  defeated,  the  British  retreating. 

July  16-23. — General  De  "Wet  and  President  Steyn  with  a well- 
mounted  flying  column  and  a few  light  guns  made  for  Bindley, 
pursued  by  General  Broadwood,  after  having  broken  through  Hun- 
ter’s surrounding  columns.  Broadwood  was  joined  in  the  pursuit 
by  other  officers  and  forces  who  were  met  on  the  route,  and  the 
combined  Britishers  got  in  touch  with  their  foes  on  the  19th.  De 
Wet  divided  his  commando  into  two  sections,  placed  one  under 
Commandant  Kel,  and,  agreeing  with  him  upon  a rendezvous  west 
of  the  railway  in  the  locality  of  Eeitzburg,  rode  past  Broadwood 
in  the  night-time,  attacked  and  captured  a convoy  north  of  Kroon- 
stad,  and  left  his  pursuers  far  behind.  On  reuniting  with  the  other 
section  of  his  force  at  a strong  position  near  Eeitzburg,  De  Wet 
awaited  the  approach  of  Broadwood  to  attack  him,  but  this  officer, 
on  reconnoitering  his  opponent’s  prejoarations,  refused  to  attack, 
and  awaited  reenforceraents. 

July  24-31. — In  the  meantime,  Prinsloo  remained  hemmed  in 
by  General  Hunter’s  surrounding  forces  in  the  Brandwater  region. 
He  surrendered  his  men,  three  guns  and  a million  rounds  of  am- 
munition, on  the  30th  of  July.  General  Ollivier,  who  had  charge 
of  the  Eouxville  commando,  with  whom  there  were  a body  of 
Cape  Tolunteers,  rode  through  the  British  lines  on  the  night 
previous,  and  got  away  north.  The  burghers  who  remained  with 
Prinsloo  numbered  3,500.  It  was  the  next  largest  surrender  of 
Boers  to  that  of  Paardeberg,  but,  unlike  Cronje’s  heroic  combat, 
it  possessed  no  redeeming  feature,  military  or  patriotic.  It  was 
an  action  worthy  of  Prinsloo’s  record  in  the  war,  which  was  barren 
of  a single  successful  engagement,  and  replete  with  instances  in 
which  his  discretion  held  no  intercourse  whatever  with  the  soldierly 
instinct  of  the  Boer. 

It  was  believed  in  Boer  circles  in  Europg  that  a large  proportion 
of  the  burghers  who  were  included  in  Prinsloo’s  surrender  were 
non-combatants. 

August  1-7. — A section  of  De  la  Bey’s  command  was  attacked 
29 


450 


THE  BOER  FT  GUT  FOR  FREEDOM 


near  tlie  Magalieslierg  range  of  lulls,  west  of  Pretoria,  l\y  General 
Hamilton.  Forty  English  were  killed  and  wounded  in  the  engage- 
ment. The  Boers  retreated  west;  their  casualties  were  not  reported. 

On  the  same  date  a train  containing  British  soldiers  and  supplies 
was  attacked  south  of  Kroonstad  hy  Theroii  and  his  scouts.  The 
train  was  derailed,  and  60  soldiers  Avere  made  prisoners.  It  hap- 
pened that  Colonel  Stowe,  United  States  Consul  at  Cape  Town,  was 
traveling  by  the  train.  He  tleAV  the  flag  of  the  great  Republic  from 
his  carriage  window ! The  attack  on  the  train  was  represented  by 
the  London  press  as  “ an  outrage  upon  the  American  flag.”  The  real 
outrage  consisted  in  the  United  States  flag  being  so  used  on  such 
an  occasion.  That  flag  had  no  right  to  fly  over  an  English  train 
carrying  armed  troops,  engaged  in  actual  Avar  against  a country 
towards  Avhich  IMr.  StoAA'e’s  Government  had,  at  least,  professed  the 
relations  of  neutrality. 

During  the  months  of  July  and  August,  reports  from  the  theater 
of  the  war  Avent  to  shoAV  that  Boers  AAdao  had  given  up  the  campaign 
after  the  capture  of  the  Transvaal  capital  Avere  returning  again  in 
considerable  numbers  to  the  fighting  laagers.  Lord  Roberts’  proc- 
lamations, and  the  treatment  accorded  to  burghers  Avho  had  gone 
home  to  their  farms,  Avere  responsible  for  this  renoAved  activity. 
“ Unconditional  surrender  ” Avas  the  English  general’s  terms  to 
men  Avho  had  fought  a valiant  and  unmatched  combat  for  their 
coiAiitry,  while  it  Avas  seen  that  those  Avho  had  been  induced  to  lay 
doAvn  their  arms  and  to  return  to  their  homes,  under  promises  not 
to  be  molested,  Avere  deprived  of  their  horses  as  AA^ell  as  of  weapons, 
and  left  unarmed  and  unprotected  amidst  the  Kaffirs  of  districts 
Avhich  the  Avar  had  largely  thinned  of  their  Avhite  inhabitants. 

A Aviser  and  a more  chivalrous  policy  on  the  part  of  the  British 
after  the  surrender  of  Pretoria;  a policy  which,  while  asserting 
England’s  predominancy  in  South  Africa  as  a result  of  the  Avar, 
Avould  have  remembered  and  acted  upon  Lord  Salisbury’s  public 
declaration,  “ that  England  Avas  seeking  neither  territory  nor  gold 
mines  ” in  the  hostilities  against  the  Transvaal,  but  the  vindication 
of  those  rights  and  claims  AAdiich  his  Government  had  proclaimed  to 
be  the  sole  purpose  of  their  armed  interference  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  the  RepiAblic;  this  Avould  have  ended  the  conflict  Avith  political 
credit  to  the  victors  in  the  struggle,  and  Avithout  embittering  Boer 
national  feeling.  Public  opinion  everywhere  Avould  have  acclaimed 
such  a policy  as  just,  prudent,  and  humane.  England  failed  to  rise 
to  the  level  of  such  an  attitude  of  national  manliness.  Roberts’ 
terms  Avere,  instead,  those  which  a victorious  English  army  has  ever 
imposed  upon  a Aveak  foe,  Biit,  in  this  instance,  the  grave  and 
costly  mistake  Avas  made  of  considering  the  Boers  as  being  beaten 


SOUTH  MIDDLE  TEANSYAAL 


452 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


when  they  had  lost  only  their  capital  and  the  railway  lines  held  by 
the  British,  while  seven-tenths  of  the  Transvaal  were  still  virtually 
in  their  possession.  The  British  blundered  brutally,  and  they  were 
destined  in  consequence  to  pay  for  their  revenge  to  an  extent  and 
in  a manner  of  which  they  had  no  thought  when  loudly  acclaiming 
their  already  dearly-purchased  triumph  in  the  capital  of  the  little 
Republic. 

One  of  the  most  stupidly  vindictive  measures  that  was  ever 
adopted  to  put  down  resistance  on  the  part  of  a spirited  adversary 
was  Lord  Roberts’  orders  that,  wherever  a railway  track  was  injured 
or  a train  fired  upon,  the  farms  for  a radius  of  ten  miles  were  to  be 
burned.  The  railways  were  practically  the  only  means  of  transport 
and  communications  for  the  British  armies  with  their  base  at  Cape 
Town,  Durban,  and  Port  Elizabeth,  and  this  being  so,  no  more  legit- 
imate acts  of  warfare  could  be  carried  out  than  attacks  upon  these 
most  vulnerable  lines  behind  the  enemy’s  advance.  The  spirit  and 
letter  of  the  code  of  civilized  warfare  were  specifically  and  auda- 
ciously violated  in  such  orders,  and  the  law  of  a savage,  vindictive 
vandalism  substituted,  by  the  British  generalissimo. 

One  of  these  English  decrees  was  being  put  in  force  by  some 
troops  between  Heidelberg  and  Standerton  in  the  Transvaal,  when 
the  lady  who  occupied  one  of  the  farms  doomed  to  the  flames  asked 
the  officer  who  had  notified  her  of  the  fate  of  her  home,  why  this 
deed  was  to  be  done? 

“ It  is  Lord  Roberts’  orders.  Madam.” 

“ But  what  have  I,  a widow,  done  to  have  my  children’s  home 
burned  ? ” 

“ The  railway  has  been  torn  up  a few  miles  away,  and ” 

“ But,  surely,”  replied  the  w'oman,  “ if  Lord  Roberts  and  150,000 
British  soldiers  cannot  protect  the  railway,  a widow  and  her  chil- 
dren cannot  be  expected  to  prevent  its  being  injured?” 

During  the  month  of  August  Lord  Roberts  added  a little  variety 
to  his  daily  reports  to  England  by  detailing  an  account  of  an  alleged 
Boer  plot  to  kidnap  himself.  This  feat  was  to  be  performed,  it 
appears,  inside  of  Pretoria,  with  a British  army  of  occupation  all 
round. 

The  instrument  of  the  “ plot  ” turned  out  to  be  a dissipated 
young  Uitlander,  who  had  served  in  the  Transvaal  Artillery.  His 
name  was  Cordua.  He  was  to  seize  Lord  Roberts,  on  a convenient 
opportunity,  and  carry  him  off  through  the  English  lines  to  those 
of  General  Botha ! This  was  the  English  story  of  the  precious  plot. 
When  the  facts  leaked  out,  it  transpired  that  the  whole  scheme,  in 
its  invention  and  purpose,  was  the  work  of  an  English  agent-provo- 
cateur, named  Gano,  who  had  found  a convenient  tool  in  Cordua  for 


DIARY  OF  THE  ^VAR 


453 


the  construction  of  the  sensational  “ conspiracy  ” in  which  Cordua 
was  to  be  the  principal  and  victim,  and  Uano  the  vigilant  and 
well-rewarded  agent  who  discovered  the  contemplated  “ crime.” 

Cordua  was  court-martialed,  found  guilty  on  the  evidence  of 
Gano,  and,  with  Lord  Eoberts’  approval,  shot  within  the  precincts 
of  Pretoria  Jail. 

The  entire  German  press  denounced  this  act  as  brutal  and  un- 
necessary. The  “ Vossische  Zeitung  ” voiced  the  views  of  its  con- 
temporaries in  saying:  “ It  is  another  hateful  incident  of  a war 
brimful  of  hateful  incidents.  Cordua  was  a man  quite  irrespon- 
sible; the  mere  creature  of  a British  agent-provocateur.” 

As  recorded  in  a previous  chapter.  General  De  la  Eey  with  a rela- 
tively small  force,  had  conducted  a brilliant  campaign  west  of  Pre- 
toria, after  his  victory  at  Nitral’s  iSiek  in  June,  and  Lord  Eoberts 
had  to  despatch  a large  number  of  troops  under  General  Ian  Hamil- 
ton to  extricate  Baden-Powell  from  Eustenburg,  and  to  rescue  other 
British  garrisons  which  the  indomitable  Lichtenburger  and  his 
splendid  commando  had  driven  into  defensive  positions.  By  the 
middle  of  August,  De  la  Eey  had  beaten  three  such  garrisons  into 
a retreat  and  compelled  Generals  Hamilton  and  Baden-Powell  to 
retire  to  the  shelter  of  greater  British  forces  nearer  Pretoria.  Gen- 
eral Carrington  with  his  incomparable  Australian  “ Bushmen  ” and 
A'eomanry  found  safety  in  what  is  believed  to  have  been  the  swiftest 
running  performance  on  record  in  the  war.  He  reached  a refuge  in 
Mafeking.  Methuen,  Carrington,  Baden-Powell,  and  the  relieving 
column  under  Ian  Hamilton,  thus  gave  De  la  Eey,  for  a time,  the 
wide  berth  of  the  entire  Eustenburg  and  Zeerust  districts  where  his 
effective  force  was  estimated  to  be  from  1,500  to  2,000  only.  Fi- 
nalH,  Lord  Kitchener  and  a strong  force  had  to  be  despatched  to 
Elands  Eiver  to  rescue  Colonel  Hoare  and  his  garrison  of  Ehode- 
sians  and  Yeomen,  whom  Carrington  and  Baden-Powell  had,  as 
related,  left  to  their  fate.  Hoare  had  made  a gallant  defense  be- 
fore his  rescue. 

Concurrently  with  these  events,  the  little  army  of  the  Tugela 
under  Christian  Botha  and  Lukas  Meyer  had  retired  before  General 
Buller,  evacuating  Natal  and  falling  back  through  the  southeast 
of  the  Transvaal,  in  line  with  General  Louis  Botha’s  retreat  east- 
ward along  the  Delagoa  Bay  railway.  There  was  very  little  fight- 
ing during  the  carrying  out  of  this  movement. 

After  bringing  his  forces  to  Laing’s  Nek,  General  Buller  sought 
an  interview  (in  June)  with  General  Christian  Botha,  which  was 
granted.  He  appealed  to  the  Boer  officer  to  give  up  the  struggle, 
which  was  now  hopeless  for  the  Transvaal,  adding : ‘‘  If  the  war  goes 
on  the  Boers’  homes  would  be  destroyed  and  their  property  would 


454 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


suffer  a great  deal  of  damage.”  (South  African  War  Despatches, 
Vol.  II.,  p.  85.)  The  Boer  general  replied,  that  the  Boers  would 
only  lay  down  their  arms  on  being  guaranteed  their  independence. 
General  Buller  wired  to  Lord  Eoberts  for  an  answer  to  the  ques- 
tions asked  by  Christian  Botha,  and  received  the  reply:  “ My  terms 
with  the  Transvaal  Government  are  unconditional  surrender.” 

In  his  report  to  Lord  Eoberts  of  this  interview.  General  Buller 
said : “ I have  in  front  of  me  about  half  the  Transvaal  forces  now 
in  the  field  ” (p.  87). 

Near  the  end  of  July  President  Steyn,  who  was  with  De  Wet  at 
Eeitzburg,  in  the  Free  State  due  south  of  Potchefstroom,  resolved 
upon  crossing  into  the  Transvaal  for  a conference  with  Generals 
Louis  Botha  and  De  la  Eey  and  the  members  of  the  South  African 
Eepublic.  The  British  forces  which  attempted  to  prevent  this 
movement  were  two  cavalry  and  two  infantry  columns,  south  of  the 
river,  under  Generals  Knox,  Hart,  and  Eidley.  On  the  north  side. 
Lord  Methuen  and  General  Smith-Dorrien  barred  the  way,  with 
other  columns,  while  Lord  Kitchener  was  in  chief  command  of  all 
the  surrounding,  pursuing,  and  hemming-in  forces.  De  Wet  not 
only  crossed  the  big  river  in  safety,  but  selected  .a  drift  for  the  pas- 
sage called  by  his  own  name,  and  rode  past  the  Kitchener  barriers, 
making  for  Eustenburg;  while  his  lieutenant.  Commandant  Nel, 
held  the  enemy  at  bay  near  Frederickstad.  Near  the  former  town, 
De  Wet  had  an  interview  with  De  la  Eey.  In  cool  contempt  for 
all  his  pursuers,  he  then  rode  eastward  to  within  twenty  miles  of 
Pretoria,  and,  learning  that  Baden-Powell,  who  had  been  rescued 
shortly  before  from  De  la  Eey  by  Ian  Hamilton,  was  near  by,  he 
wrote  him  a letter,  summoning  him  to  surrender.  After  this  joke 
at  the  expense  of  the  lords  and  generals  who  were  on  his  track,  he 
directed  his  course  northeast  of  Pretoria,  and,  with  a small  escort 
only,  succeeded  in  reaching  the  place  where  it  had  been  arranged 
that  President  Steyn  was  to  have  his  conference  with  the  Transvaal 
leaders. 

By  the  end  of  the  month  all  the  generals  who  had  been  engaged 
in  the  task  of  surrounding  De  Wet,  arrived  in  Pretoria  with  the 
tidings  of  their  failure. 

Of  all  the  numberless  achievements  which  will  immortalize  this 
great  Boer  general  in  military  annals  and  romance,  probably  no 
one  of  them  will  be  found  to  surpass  in  brilliancy  of  dash,  in  con- 
summate soldierly  tact,  courage,  and  resource,  this  running  fight 
between  1,500  Boers  and  the  columns  and  l)undles  of  generals  whom 
De  Wet  virtually  conducted,  in  the  carrying  out  of  his  piirpose,  for 
fully  200  miles,  from  the  borders  of  Basutoland  almost  to  Lord 
Eoberts’  headquarters  in  Pretoria. 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


455 


General  Olliyier,  who  also  broke  a^yay  from  Prinsloo’s  surrounded 
commandoes  on  the  30th  of  July,  on  the  2 7th  of  August  attacked 
Winburg,  held  by  General  Bruce  Hamilton.  The  Boer  general 
was  defeated  and  captured  along  with  three  of  his  sons  who  fought 
by  his  side.  It  was  Ollivier  who  was  mainly  instrumental  in  de- 
feating General  Gatacre  at  Stormherg,  on  the  10th  of  December, 
1899. 

Augu§t  23-30. — On  the  failure  of  Lord  Boberts’  plan  to  capture 
De  Wet  or  to  prevent  his  entering  the  Transvaal,  the  British  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  moved  all  his  available  forces  east  to  Belfast,  on 
the  Delagoa  Bay  line;  Botha  having  fallen  hack  beyond  this  point 
from  Widdelburg.  General  Buller  had  advanced  in  the  wake  of 
Christian  Botha’s  force,  parallel  with  the  line  of  Lord  Boberts’ 
movement,  so  that  the  two  British  armies  were  in  touch  near  Belfast, 
while  Louis  Botha’s  old  commandoes,  now  under  his  brother,  were 
able  to  cooperate  with  the  burghers  whom  the  Commandant-General 
had  led  from  the  Vaal  Biver  to  Dalmanutha. 

The  British  force  in  men  and  guns  (26,300  men  and  131  guns) 
enabled  Lord  Boberts  easily  to  outflank  the  slender  line  of  opposition 
which  Botha  had  to  extend  fully  twenty  miles  from  the  Zwarts 
Kopjes,  on  the  mountain  road  to  Lydenhurg,  south  to  a hill  at  Ber- 
gendal,  on  the  Delagoa  Bay  railway.  This  hill  was  held  by  no  more 
than  100  of  the  renowned  ‘‘  Zarps,”  or  Johannesburg  Police,  under 
Lieutenants  Pohlman  and  Yan  der  Merwe ; the  former  ha\dng  been 
one  of  the  Boer  officers  who  captured  the  ten  British  guns  at 
Colenso.  The  small  police  force  formed  the  left  wing  of  the  Boer 
lines  with  a solitary  pom-pom,  while  the  Commandant-General  and 
Ben  A'iljoen,  with  the  bulk  of  the  commandoes,  held  the  ground 
north  to  where  the  “ Black  Hills  ” overlooked  the  alpine  roadway 
which  led  to  Lydenhurg. 

The  fight  continued  for  the  greater  j^art  of  three  days,  and  ended 
in  a successful  attack  upon  the  ridge  at  Bergendal  held  by  the  Band 
Police.  General  French  had  succeeded  in  turning  Botha’s  right, 
while  General  Buller  had  carried  out  a similar  movement  against 
his  left,  and  then  turned  his  twenty  guns  upon  the  hill  held  by  the 
Zarps.  A counter  attack  in  support  of  the  Police  was  made  by 
Captain  Pretorius  with  a Long  Tom  and  a fifteen-pound  Creusot, 
from  a hill  some  8,000  yards  away.  The  Police  and  their  artillery 
support  held  the  hill  at  Bergendal  against  all  asaults  for  the  greater 
part  of  Sunday.  l)ut  had  finally  to  cede  to  tlie  overwlielming 
fire  of  the  enemy’s  guns.  In  vacating  the  hill  the  Zari)s  suffered 
severely,  losing  more  men  in  the  retreat  from  the  position  so  long 
and  so  heroically  held  than  during  the  whole  time  they  had  fought 
against  such  overwhelming  odds  to  retain  it.  Lieutenants  Pohl- 


456 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


man  and  Van  der  Merwe  were  killed,  along  with  about  twenty  of 
their  gallant  corps. 

Following  up  the  retiring  Boers  from  Dalmanutha,  a section  of 
Buller’s  force,  composed  of  the  Liverpool  Eegiment,  were  ambushed 
in  a hollow  among  the  hills  by  Botha’s  rear-guard,  and  decimated. 

September  1-7. — Lord  Eoberts  issued  a proclamation  annexing 
the  Transvaal.  This  easy  conquest  was  effected  in  the  following 
terms : 

“ Belfast,  September  1st  : Under  the  provisions  of  Her  Ma- 
jesty’s warrant,  dated  July  4,  1900,  I have  this  day  issued  a 
proclamation  announcing  that  the  Transvaal  will  henceforth  form 
part  of  Her  Majesty’s  dominions. 

‘‘  Egberts.” 

At  the  date  when  this  Chinese  Mandarin  method  of  beating  an 
enemy  was  put  in  force  the  British  troops  held  about  one-tenth  of 
the  territory  of  the  Transvaal. 

That  a general  who  could  so  easily  conquer  his  enemies,  on  paper, 
should  next  find  fault  with  their  system  of  fighting  was  natural  and 
to  be  expected.  The  correspondence  between  Lord  Eoberts  and 
General  Botha  on  this  head — the  unsoldierly  threats  of  the  Briton 
side  by  side  with  the  gentlemanly  and  dignified  attitude  of  the  Boer 
— is  so  typical  of  the  spirit  in  which  the  war  has  been  conducted  on 
both  sides,  and  so  illustrative  of  the  moral  and  martial  differences 
of  the  two  races,  that  the  letters  cannot  be  omitted  from  this  diary. 

The  British  Commander-in-Chief  wrote  as  follows: 

“ Army  Headquarters,  South  Africa. 

“ Sept.  2,  1900. 

“ Sir  : First — I have  the  honor  to  address  Your  Honor  regard- 
ing the  operations  of  these  comparatively  small  bands  of  armed 
Boers  who  conceal  themselves  in  the  railway,  thus  endangering  the 
lives  of  passengers  traveling  by  train,  who  may  or  may  not  be 
combatants. 

“ Second — My  reason  for  again  referring  to  the  subject  is  that 
except  in  the  districts  occupied  by  the  army  under  the  personal 
command  of  Your  Honor  there  is  now  no  large  body  of  Boer 
troops  in  the  Transvaal  or  Orange  Eiver  Colony,  and  that  the 
war  is  degenerating  into  operations  carried  out  by  irregular  and 
irresponsible  guerrillas.  This  would  be  so  ruinous  to  the  country 
and  so  deplorable  from  every  point  of  view  that  I feel  bound  to 
do  everything  in  my  power  to  prevent  it. 

“ Third — The  orders  I have  at  present  issued  to  give  effect  to 
these  views  are  that  the  farm  nearest  the  scene  of  any  attempt  to 
injure  the  line  or  wreck  a train  is  to  be  burnt,  and  that  all  farms 


DIARY  OF  THE  ^VAR 


457 


within  a radius  of  ten  miles  are  to  be  completely  cleared  of  all 
their  stock,  supplies,  etc, 

“ Fourth — In  connection  with  the  foregoing  the  time  has  now 
come  when  I must  refer  again  to  my  communication  of  the  5th  of 
August,  1900,  to  which  letter  Your  Honor  replied  on  the  15th  of 
August.  I feel  that  when  once  the  war  has  entered  into  the  stage 
of  irregular  or  guerrilla  fighting  I should  not  be  doing  my  duty 
towards  the  national  interests  if  I continued  to  permit  the  families 
of  those  who  are  fighting  against  us  to  remain  in  towns  guarded  by 
us.  This  is  not  now  a question  of  supj)ly  so  much  as  one  of  policy 
and  of  securing  ourselves  against  the  transmission  of  intelligence  to 
our  enemies.  I should  esteem  it  a favor,  therefore,  if  Your  Honor 
would  warn,  all  burghers  or  command  those  who  have  their  families 
living  in  districts  under  the  control  of  our  troops  to  make  early 
preparations  for  their  reception  and  accommodation.  The  removal 
of  these  families  will  commence  in  a few  days,  those  at  Pretoria 
being  the  first  sent.  They  will  proceed  by  rail  to  the  British  out- 
posts and  there  be  made  over  to  any  one  Your  Honor  may  depute 
to  receive  them. 

“ I will  keep  Your  Honor  informed  of  the  number  to  expect  day 
by  day  and  I will  take  this  opportunity  of  informing  you  that,  as 
nearly  all  the  passenger  vehicles  belonging  to  the  Netherlands  Rail- 
way Company  have  been  removed  eastward,  the  families  must, 
I regret  to  say,  travel  in  trucks,  for  the  most  part  open  ones.  I 
will  endeavor  to  provide  Mrs.  Kruger,  Mrs.  Botha  and  as  many 
other  ladies  as  possible  with  closed  carriages,  but  I am  not  sure  that 
I shall  succeed  in  finding  any.  I would  suggest  that  Your  Honor 
should  send  suitable  accommodations  for  them.  I need  not  say  how 
distasteful  this  measure  is  to  me,  but  it  is  forced  upon  me  by  the 
apparent  determination  of  you  and  your  burghers  to  continue  the 
war  after  all  doubt  as  to  its  ultimate  issue  has  ceased.  I have 
the  honor  to  be,  your  obedient  servant, 

“ Roberts,  Field  Marshal,  Commanding  in  South  Africa. 

“ To  his  Honor,  Commandant-Greneral  Louis  Botha.” 

To  this  letter  the  head  of  the  Boer  army  replied  as  follows : 

“ Commissariat  Camp,  Sept.  4,  1900. 

“ To  Lord  Roberts,  Field  Marshal,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
British  Troops  in  South  Africa  : 

“ Your  Excellency — In  reply  to  your  Excellency’s  letter  of  the 
2nd  I have  the  honor  to  make  the  following  reply,  to  wit:  Con- 
sidering that  our  military  forces  are  very  small  in  comparison  to 
those  of  your  army,  it  can  naturally  not  be  expected  to  find  large 
commandoes  of  Boers  everywliere  in  the  field,  and  therefore  it 
stands  to  reason  that  whatever  was  expected  from  our  side  was  to  be 
accomplished  by  small  bodies  (commandoes),  as  throughout  the 
whole  course  of  the  war  and  even  now  we  are  still  coin]>elled  to  cut 
our  forces  up  into  small  bodies  in  order  to  resist  the  robbing  patrols 


458 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


iintler  Your  Excellency’s  command,  who  ravage  the  country  and 
carry  away  stock  and  provisions  from  the  various  homesteads. 

“ Second — With  regard  to  your  contention  that  there  exists  no 
regular  body  of  war  forces  except  those  under  my  personal  com- 
mand, I deny  emphatically  any  such  statement,  since  our  military 
troops  are  still  divided  and  controlled  on  the  same  basis  as  in  the 
beginning  of  the  war  according  to  the  laws  of  the  country. 

“ Third — With  regard  to  article  3 of  your  letter  now  under  con- 
sideration, I am  already  cognizant  of  the  fact  that  similar  bar- 
barous acts  were  perpetrated  by  troops  under  your  command,  and 
that  not  only  near  or  along  railway  lines,  but  also  far  away. 

“ Whenever  your  troops  moved  about,  not  only  houses  were 
burned  down  or  blown  up  with  dynamite,  but  also  helpless  women 
and  children  were  driven  from  their  homes  and  deprived  of  food 
and  clothing  without  the  slightest  ground  for  any  such  deed. 

“ Fourth — With  regard  to  article  4 of  your  letter  now  under  con- 
sideration, I sincerely  regret  to  see  that  the  determination  of  me 
and  my  burghers  to  persevere  in  the  strike  for  our  independence 
will  be  avenged  by  you  on  our  wives  and  children.  Since  it  is  the 
first  instance  of  this  kind  known  to  men  in  the  history  of  civilized 
warfare  nothing  else  remains  for  me  to  do  but  to  protest  against 
your  proposed  intentions,  it  being  against  the  principles  of  civilized 
warfare  and  extremely  cruel  to  women  and  children. 

“ It  is  especially  cruel  in  the  case  of  aged  women  were  it  with 
regard  to  the  wife  of  His  Honor,  the  State  President,  who,  as  you 
must  be  aware,  cannot  travel  withoiit  fear  of  losing  her  life,  and  it 
would  simply  mean  a murder  to  force  her  to  travel  thus.  The 
pretext  mentioned  by  you,  viz.,  that  by  such  action  you  wish  to  pro- 
tect yourself  against  any  information  being  brought  over  to  us, 
is  doubtless  a delusion,  since  such  precaution  was  not  deemed 
necessary  by  you  when  our  troops  were  in  immediate  vicinity  of 
Pretoria.  It  is  unnecessary  to  add  that  we  have  never  received 
any  information  through  women  and  children  with  regard  to 
military  operations. 

“Fifth — In  case  Your  Excellency  persists  in  carrying  out  your 
plans,  which  I trust  will  not  be  the  case,  I request  Your  Excellency 
to  give  me  notice  in  time  of  date  and  particulars  of  their  expulsion, 
as  I intend  to  take  steps  to  send  the  families  on  to  Europe. 

“ Eeferring  to  Your  Excellency’s  remark  concerning  accommoda- 
tion for  the  families,  I am  prepared  to  send,  for  the  sake  of  their 
convenience,  cars  to  any  place  mentioned  by  Your  Excellency,  as 
also  machines  for  the  line  between  Watervaal  Biven  and  Watervaal 
Bridge,  provided  that  Your  Excellency  guarantees  the  safe  return 
of  such  cars  and  machines. 

■ “ Sixth — In  conclusion.  I wish  to  state  that  nothing  done  by  you 
to  our  women  and  children  will  prevent  us  from  continuing  the  war 
for  our  independence.  I have  the  lionor  to  l)e, 

“Louis  Botha,  Commandant-General.” 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


459 


During  the  latter  part  of  August  (and  the  whole  of  September) 
the  entire  western  Transvaal,  from  Krugersdorp  to  Mafeking  and 
from  the  Vaal  Eiver  to  Zeerust,  was  swept  by  Generals  Lord 
^lethuen,  Hart,  Douglas,  Cunningham,  Clements,  and  Broadwood, 
and  as  many  columns.  It  was  impossible  for  De  la  Eers  slender 
force  to  make  any  successful  stand  against  such  numbers,  and  he 
accordingly  avoided  an  encounter.  His  commando  was  spEt  into 
a dozen  small  sections,  and  these  hung  upon  the  flanks  of  the  seven 
or  eight  columns  of  the  enemy,  and  harassed  them  considerably. 
The  English  (especially  the  troops  under  Lord  Methuen)  burned 
numerous  villages  and  farms,  seized  great  numbers  of  cattle,  and 
created  much  devastation. 

Early  in  September  Captain  Daanie  Theron  was  killed  near  the 
town  in  which  he  had  spent  his  bo3Lood,  and  from  whence  he  had 
organized  his  corps  of  matchless  scouts.  He  had  attempted,  with 
a handful  of  men,  to  cut  the  water-main  which  supplied  Johannes- 
burg; advancing  within  ten  miles  of  that  unsavory  city  for  the 
purpose.  He  was  discovered  and  attacked  by  General  Hart,  and 
retreated  on  Krugersdorp,  closely  followed  by  the  English.  On 
the  Tth,  during  a skirmish  near  this  place,  the  man  who  had  lured 
so  mam'  convoys  into  Boer  hands,  held  up  so  many  trains,  and  had 
successfully  scouted  for  De  Wet,  met  a soldier’s  death.  He  lies 
buried  near  the  town,  which  has  probabty  contributed  more  heroes 
to  the  war  than  am’  other  town  in  the  two  Eepublics.  His  grave, 
if  the  enemy  gave  him  one,  will  be  a future  landmark  of  which 
Krugersdorp  will  be  proud.  His  fame  will  never  die  while  Boer 
memories  recall  the  triumphs  and  dangers,  the  perils  and  adven- 
tures of  the  greatest  war  fought  b}'  their  race.  What  fact  will  not 
furnish  from  his  wonderfully  daring  exploits  and  consummate 
ruses  against  the  Eooineks,  legend  and  the  pen  of  romance  will 
weave  round  the  name  and  genial  character,  the  bo^'ish  heroism, 
and  manly  deeds  of  Daanie  Theron. 

September  8-15. — General  Louis  Botha  fell  back  to  Lydenburg 
before  the  British  advance,  and  again  moved  north  as  the  enemy 
appeared  before  that  town.  The  evident  purpose  of  the  Boer  gen- 
eral was  to  entice  his  foes  further  into  the  alpine  fastnesses  of  the 
Zoutpansberg  regions,  where  the  climate  and  the  defiles  would 
greatly  favor  plans  of  Boer  resistance.  Eoberts,  however,  recalled 
Buller  from  further  pursuit,  and  the  campaign  for  the  possession 
of  the  Delagoa  Bay  railway  was  Inought  to  an  end  in  the  occupa- 
tion of  Kelspruit  by  the  English,  and  in  the  resolve  of  President 
Kruger  to  remove  into  Portuguese  territory  with  the  view  of  saihng 
for  Europe  from  Lourenzo  Marquez. 

This  step  was  pressed  upon  Mr.  Kruger  by  Commandant-General 


460 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Botha,  and  approved  by  President  Steyn.  It  was  obvious  that  it 
would  be  very  difficult  to  guard  and  protect  the  old  President  in 
a campaign,  such  as  would  henceforth  become  necessary,  of  small 
commandoes  and  swift  movements.  It  was  likewise  felt  that  a visit 
to  Europe  by  the  head  of  the  South  African  Eepublie  would  accen- 
tuate interest  in  the  no-surrender  phase  of  the  Boer  struggle. 
General  Schalk  Burger  was  appointed  President  of  the  Transvaal, 
pro  tern,  and,  all  due  arrangements  having  been  made,  Mr.  Kruger 

sailed  for  Marseilles  in  a Dutch  war- 
ship specially,  and  significantly,  placed 
at  his  disposal  by  the  young  Queen  of 
Holland. 

§eptember  16-23. — The  complete 
control  of  the  railway  connecting  the 
Transvaal  with  Lourenzo  Marquez 
gave  the  British  the  great  advantage 
of  thereby  cutting  off,  except  in  smug- 
gling operations,  all  Boer  access  to  the 
sea.  This  meant  the  loss  of  possible 
help  in  ammunition  from  European 
sources,  and  innumerable  other  depri- 
vations. It  marked  the  close  of  large 
operations  on  the  part  of  the  Boer 
commandoes  in  the  field,  and  the  com- 
mencement of  the  general  j)lan  of 
fighting  which  De  Wet  had  carried  on 
so  successfully  in  the  Free  State  since 
the  British  occupation  of  Bloemfon- 
tein. Henceforth  ammunition  would 
have  to  be  used  only  in  actual  combat, 
and  sparingly,  while  the  large  guns 
would  have  to  be  buried  or  destroyed. 
Two  of  the  “ Long  Toms  ” which  were 
such  conspicuous  actors  in  the  siege  of  Ladysmith  were  destroyed 
near  Komatipoort,  while  other  artillery  which  had  been  captured 
from  the  English  were  buried  or  rendered  useless.  Eoberts  did  not 
succeed  in  capturing  a single  Boer  gun  from  Pretoria  to  the  Portu- 
guese border. 

The  few  hundred  foreign  volunteers  who  had  been  with  General 
Botha  crossed  the  Portuguese  frontier,  and  surrendered  to  the  offi- 
cials of  that  country.  These  volunteers  included  most  of  those  I 
have  given  an  account  of  in  Chapter  XXYI.  Their  usefulness  in 
the  field,  in  a campaign  like  that  of  De  Wet’s,  would  be  handicapped 
by  their  ignorance  of  the  country  and  of  its  language  and,  especially. 


DIABY  OF  THE  ^yAB 


461 


by  their  deficiency  in  those  qualities  of  endurance  and  horseman- 
ship which  the  requirements  of  such  methods  of  fighting  impera- 
tively demanded.  They  were  dismissed  with  expressions  of  grate- 
ful appreciation  for  their  services  by  General  Botha  and  State 
Secretary  Eeitz,  and  they  ultimately  reached  their  destinations  in 
Europe  and  America. 

Colonel  Blake  and  a few  of  his  men  remained  behind  for  special 
work,  and  they  are  still  serving  the  Boer  cause  in  the  field.  So 
likewise  did  a few  German  and  Dutch  volunteers. 

September  24-30. — These  changes  in  the  military  situation 
called  for  another  of  Lord  Eoherts’  series  of  proclamations  scolding 
the  Boers  for  persisting  in  the  struggle,  and  threatening  them  with 
those  extra  pains  and  penalties,  not  yet  infiieted,  which  English 
armies  seldom  fail  to  fall  back  upon  in  British  warfare.  These 
menaces  did  not,  however,  accomplish  what  an  army  of  200,000 
British  troops  had  not  yet  succeeded  in  doing.  It  was  also  indus- 
triously circulated  by  all  kinds  of  agencies  that  General  Botha  had 
resigned  and  given  up  the  struggle. 

October  1-7. — A counter  proclamation  was  issued  by  the  Com- 
mandant-General on  the  6th  of  October,  in  the  following  terms: 


“ Whereas  I have  been  informed  that  the  enemy  circulates  all 
sorts  of  wrong  and  lying  reports  among  the  burghers,  about  the 
Government  and  myself,  our  officers  and  officials  are  charged  to 
communicate  the  following  information  to  the  general  public,  and 
wherever  telegraph  offices  are  in  working  order  to  wire  to  all  offices 
that  can  be  reached. 

“ The  Executive  Council,  after  consulting  his  Honor  the  State 
President  of  the  Orange  Free  State,  has  decided,  in  the  interests 
of  our  cause,  to  give  leave  of  absence  to  our  State  President  with  the 
order  to  go  immediately  to  Europe  in  order  to  assist  our  deputation 
there  in  the  work  they  have  before  them. 

“ The  Vice-President,  Mr.  Schalk  Burger,  has  been  sworn  in 
according  to  the  law,  and  is  now  Acting  State  President.  He  is 
assisted  by  the  State  Secretary  and  two  members  of  the  Executive 
Council,  Mr.  Lukas  Meyer  and  myself,  as  well  as  the  Assistant 
Slate  Solicitor  and  other  officials. 

“ In  short,  our  Government  exists  still  in  the  same  way  as  before 
and  is  now  in  my  immediate  neighborhood  and  in  direct  communi- 
cation with  me. 

“ The  news  given  out  by  the  enemy  that  I have  resigned  is  ab- 
solutely untrue.  To-day  I arrived  at  the  Eoosenekal,  and  I hoj^e 
to  visit  at  an  early  date  all  the  commandoes  personally. 

“ I trust  that  the  burghers  will  not  believe  those  false  reports, 
as  they  are  merely  given  out  to  insult  our  burghers,  and  to  try, 
in  a deceiving  manner,  to  make  them  act  against  their  duties  as 


4C2 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


citizens;  so  be  warned,  and  continue  the  struggle  that  has  already 
taken  so  many  dear  victims  from  iis. 

“ Let  the  blood  of  our  brave  dead  always  be  a strong  voice  induc- 
ing every  burgher  to  fight  for  real  liberty.  We  have  nothing  left 
to  lose,  but  ever3'thing  to  win.  The  Government  has  most  firmly 
decided  to  continue  the  struggle,  and  I am  convinced  that  our 
Inirghers  will  applaud  this  decision,  and  act  accordingly  until  the 
end. 

“ The  burghers  are  also  warned  against  fine  words  used  by  the 
enemy  to  deceive  them  so  as  to  make  them  put  down  their  arms, 
because,  according  to  the  proclamation  of  Lord  Roberts,  they  will 
all  be  transported  to  St.  Helena  or  Ceylon  as  prisoners  of  war,  and 
they  put  their  property,  as  it  were,  between  two  dangers,  for  in 
future  I will  deal  severely  with  all  property  of  those  who  put  down 
their  arms. 

“ Louis  Botha, 

“ Commanding  General. 

“ Roosenekal,  6 Oct.,  1900. 

“ Printing  office  of  the  Zoutpansberg  ‘ Wachter,’  Pietersberg, 
S.  A.  E.” 

October  §-15. — On  returning  to  the  scenes  of  his  many  pre- 
vious operations,  De  Wet  recommenced,  in  the  districts  around  Sen- 
ekal,  his  usual  tactics,  worrying  the  enemy’s  flying  columns,  attack- 
ing patrols,  and  picking  up  straggling  convoys  as  usual.  Early  in 
September  he  captured  a train  near  Ivroonstad  with  forty-four  cars 
laden  with  supplies.  His  reorganized  commandoes  were  divided 
into  four  divisions,  under  himself,  General  Philip  Botha,  and  Com- 
mandants Nel  and  Haasbroek.  While  acting  on  lines  of  sectional 
independence  these  forces  were  in  constant  touch  with  the  Chief 
Commandant,  and  were  always  ready  to  cooperate  in  any  of  his 
larger  plans. 

Jagersf ontein,  in  the  south  of  the  Free  State,  which  was  held 
at  the  time  by  a strong  British  garrison,  was  attacked  by  Com- 
mandant Visser  and  a few  men  near  the  end  of  October.  Some 
fifty  Boers  entered  the  town  during  the  night  unobserved,  and  at 
dajffireak  the  following  morning  opened  an  attack  upon  the  garri- 
son in  conjunction  with  the  main  body  under  Yisser  from  the  south 
of  the  village.  The  English  held  their  ground  during  a three 
hours’  fight,  when  Yisser  withdrew,  leaving  a dozen  of  his  men 
prisoners.  He  returned  again  the  same  night,  stormed  the  town, 
released  the  prisoners,  but  was  himself  killed  in  retiring  again 
from  the  place. 

The  English  garrisons  in  Jacobsdal,  Eauresmith,  Koffyfontein, 
and  Philippolis,  all  in  the  south  of  the  Free  State,  were  attacked 
by  small  commandoes  about  this  time.  The  former  place  was  cap- 


PJABY  OF  TTTF  WAF 


463 


tured  liy  Cniiuimndiint  Bosnian  wlio  was  killed  in  ilie  fight,  hut  the 
town  was  sulisequently  retaken  hy  a larger  British  force. 
Philippolis  underwent  a week  s siege ; armed  Kaffirs  being  con- 


GENERAL  LOUIS  BOTHA 


spicuously  employed  in  the  fighting  hy  the  British  garrison.  Com- 
mandant Scheepers,  a youthful  Boer  leader,  led  the  attacks  on  the 
place.  He  captured  some  reenforcements  sent  to  relieve  the  garri- 
son, hut  was  finally  driven  off  by  the  arrival  of  larger  bodies  of  the 
enemy. 


464 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


The  British  garrison  at  Eeddershurg,  the  ])lace  where  General 
De  AA  et  had  tonght  and  taken  near  500  prisoners  in  April,  was 
captured.  There  were  only  thirty  men  in  the  second  Reddersbiirg 
garrison,  and  as  they  made  no  resistance  to  the  250  Boers  who 
surprised  them,  they  were  released  after  being  disarmed.  The 
Boers  were  led  by  Brand  and  Hertzog. 

A fight  occurred  in  the  west  of  the  Free  State,  near  Iloopstad, 
between  a party  of  De  Villiers’  commando  and  the  escort  of  a 
convoy  under  Major-General  Settle  and  Colonial  troops.  The  Boers 
were  beaten  off  in  the  first  assault,  but  renewed  the  attack  again, 
and  pressed  it  so  rigorously  that  the  British,  who  were  a body  of 
mounted  Colonials,  retreated,  abandoning  two  Maxim  guns  and  the 
greater  part  of  the  convoy  to  their  assailants. 

Attacks  upon  railways  were  renewed  in  Natal  during  this  month; 
a party  of  Boers  tearing  up  the  line  within  a few  miles  of  Lady- 
smith. 

October,  1900,  being  the  anniversary  of  the  war,  the  Boers  were 
resolved  to  give  Lord  Roberts’  declaration  that  the  war  was  virtu- 
ally ended  the  most  objective  contradiction  in  fully  fifty  instances 
of  combative  activity.  In  the  whole  of  the  Free  State  fighting 
was  forced  by  numerous  small  commandoes,  many  of  them  led  by 
new  officers.  In  the  west  of  the  Transvaal,  De  la  Rey’s  men  ap- 
peared in  a dozen  centers,  and  showed  that  the  British  only  held 
the  few  towns  in  which  they  had  placed  garrisons. 

In  the  southeast  of  the  Transvaal,  it  was  found  necessary  by 
Lord  Roberts  to  recall  General  French  from  the  Free  State,  and 
send  him  with  a large  column  to  deal  with  the  Boer  forces  under 
General  Christian  Botha,  in  the  Ermelo  and  Carolina  districts. 
French  was  harassed  all  along  his  march  by  Botha’s  men,  who,  di- 
vided into  small  bodies,  hung  on  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  enemy 
until  he  reached  Heidelberg.  French’s  captures  were  chiefly  con- 
fined to  non-combatants,  and  to  sheep  and  cattle. 

French’s  column  had  not  yet  reached  Heidelberg  before  General 
Ben  Viljoen,  with  a section  of  Commandant-General  Botha’s  men, 
threatened  the  enemy’s  posts  at  Machadodorp,  east  of  Belfast.  A 
body  of  British  sent  to  attack  Viljoen  were  driven  back.  General 
Smith-Dorrien  arrived  with  reenforcements,  but  was  so  fiercely 
attacked  in  turn  that  he  was  compelled  to  retreat  back  to  Belfast; 
the  Boers  charging  into  his  rear-guard,  capturing  a number  of 
Canadians  and  killing  and  wounding  several  of  their  foes. 

Viljoen’s  success  on  this  occasion  was  dearly  bought  in  the  death 
of  Commandant  Fourie,  of  the  Middelburg  burghers,  one  of  the 
very  bravest  of  the  many  valiant  men  Avhom  this  war  has  revealed 
to  an  admiring  world.  He  had  fought  with  great  distinction  at 


DIABY  OF  THE  ^VAB 


465 


Colenso  and  in  all  the  Tugela  !)attles.  while  his  defense  of  the  Boer 
lines  against  Buller’s  forces  in  the  British  advance  for  the  final 
relief  of  Lad3"smith  merited  the  high  praise  which  General  Botha 
bestowed  upon  his  resourceful  daring  on  that  occasion. 

October  16-23. — De  Wet’s  operations  between  Bindley  and 
Kroonstad,  in  the  early  part  of  October,  forced  Lord  Eoberts  to  or- 
ganize another  “sweeping ’’movement  for  his  capture.  Four  columns 
of  mounted  men  under  Knox,  Dalgetty,  De  Lisle,  and  Porter  were 
despatched  to  surround  the  Boer  general  at  Heilbron,in  the  north  of 
the  Free  State,  where  scouts  had  located  him.  A circle  some  thirty 
miles  in  diameter  was  formed  round  the  town,  and  it  was  deemed 
almost  impossible  for  the  cornered  quarry  to  escape  this  time.  On 
drawing  the  British  lines  closer,  an  engagement  began  which  lasted 
for  the  greater  part  of  two  days.  De  Wet  fought  a determined 
battle  with  his  would-he  captors,  and  then,  extricating  himself  out 
of  the  elaborately  planned  trap,  he  retired  during  the  night  to  the 
northwest,  and  crossed  the  Taal  Eiver  near  the  very  drift  over 
which  he  had  conducted  President  Steyn  in  the  middle  of  August. 
His  object  now  was  to  meet  the  President  on  his  return  journey 
from  the  visit  he  had  paid  to  General  Botha  and  the  Transvaal 
Government.  Steyn  was  accompanied  by  Botha  and  a small  escort 
from  the  K3dstroom  district,  north  of  Pretoria,  to  the  Eustenburg 
district,  in  the  west,  in  which  a conference  was  held  with  De  la 
Ee3X  The  President  Avas  then  escorted  by  De  la  Eey’s  scouts  south 
to  the  Yaal  Eiver,  west  of  Klerksdorp,  from  whence  he  was  to  com- 
municate with  De  Wet. 

It  may  he  mentioned  here  that  it  was  during  the  visit  of  the  Free 
State  President  to  Generals  Botha,  Schalk  Burger,  and  Dr.  Eeitz 
that  the  second  systematic  invasion  of  the  Cape  Colony  was  re- 
solved upon.  The  object  Avas  twofold:  To  retaliate  for  the  farm- 
burning  and  general  vandalism  of  the  enemy  in  the  west  and  south- 
east of  the  Transvaal,  and  in  the  north  and  east  of  the  Free  State, 
and  for  the  more  important  purpose  of  showing  the  world  that  the 
Eepuhlics  AV'ere  able,  despite  Lord  Eoberts’  assertions,  to  hold  the 
greater  portion  of  the  TransAmal  and  Free  State,  and  to  invade 
British  territory  as  well.  The  plan  was  Mr.  Steyn’s,  and  was,  in 
both  a political  and  military  sense,  worthy  of  the  great  moral  leader 
of  the  Boer  nation  in  its  unequaled  fight  against  destruction. 

De  Wet  encountered  General  Barton  and  a large  force  some 
sevent3r  miles  south  of  Johannesburg,  on  the  20th,  when  the  enemy 
had  the  Avorst  of  the  encounter.  Generals  Knox,  De  Lisle,  and  other 
officers  from  whom  De  Wet  had  broken  away  at  Heilhron,  arrived 
Avith  reenforcements  for  Barton,  when  a fierce  fight  followed ; the 
casualties  being  about  equal  on  both  sides.  De  Wet  retired  west- 
30 


4GC 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


ward  during  the  night,  liaving  learned  of  tire  direction  in  which 
President  Ste}’)!  was  retracing  his  course  back  to  the  Pree  State. 

BJoveiiiber  1-7. — iS'ow  began  on  the  part  of  the  eneniy  a similar 
effort  to  that  of  August  to  capture  the  President  and  the  Chief 
Commandant  at  the  Vaal  Eiver.  All  the  drifts  east  and  west  of 
their  supposed  location  on  the  north  bank  were  blocked  b}'  many 
men  and  guns.  Generals  and  columns  were  to  the  right  of  them, 
left,  north,  and  south;  De  Wet  having,  all  told,  800  men  only.  A 
running  fight  was  kept  irp  for  three  days  but,  despite  the  number 

of  his  pursuers,  he  succeeded  in 
crossing  the  river.  Large  forces 
were,  however,  encountered  on 
the  south  side,  and  on  the  5th  a 
desperate  battle  occurred  near 
Bothaville.  The  fight  lasted  five 
hoirrs,  and  was  disastrous  for  De 
Wet.  He  lost  six  guns  and  100 
prisoners,  and  had  himself  a nar- 
row escape  from  being  captured. 
He  had  been;  strange  to  say,  sur- 
prised during  the  night  by 
Colonel  Le  Gallais’  men,  and 
while  the  combat  was  proceeding 
General  Knox  came  up  with  his 
column,  when  the  burghers  had 
to  quit  the  field,  leaving  their 
artillery  behind.  It  was  the  most 
serious  defeat  to  which  Christian 
De  Wet  had  yet  been  subjected 
during  the  war.  The  loss  of  his  entire  artillery  in  the  fight  was 
a severe  blow  both  to  the  Boer  general’s  following  and  to  his 
prestige.  About  forty  of  his  men  were  killed  and  wounded.  Col- 
onel Le  Gallais,  to  whom  the  credit  for  this  British  triumph  was 
really  due,  was  among  the  English  dead.  Knox  lost  thirty  killed 
and  wounded. 

The  return  home  of  the  City  of  London  Volunteers,  who  had 
campaigned  for  a few  months  in  South  Africa  with  little  or  no 
fighting  and  only  a very  few  casualties,  was  made  the  occasion  of 
one  of  the  silliest  and  most  disgraceful  exhibitions  of  popular  re- 
joicing that  was  ever  witnessed  in  any  city.  So  disgusting  was  this 
cockney  orgy  of  beer,  patriotism,  and  loyal  yahooism,  that  more 
than  one  of  the  London  Conservative  papers  expressed  a strong 
liope  that  the  center  of  the  Empire  might  not  again  be  the  scene  of 
such  “ loyalty,”  when  manifested  in  rowdyism  and  in  drunkenness. 


DIABY  OF  THE  ^YAB 


467 


rroclainations  of  martial  law  in  various  parts  of  Cape  Colonj^ 
nhich  were  intended  to  intimidate  the  JJuteli  sympathizers  with 
the  Boer  cause,  produced  the  opjjosite  etfect.  Kecruits  for  the  com- 
mandoes were  the  result  of  such  measures.  The  old  tyranny  of 
military  rule  only  evoked  the  old  revolt  against  this  kiiid  of  despot- 
ism, and  the  area  of  England's  troubles  in  South  Africa  was  thus 
deepened  and  extensively  widened. 

Summing  up  the  details  of  British  losses  during  the  first  month 
of  the  second  year  of  the  war — the  month  just  after  Lord  Eoberts 
had  “ annexed  ” the  Transvaal,  by  proclamation — I find  a record 
of  15  officers  and  165  men  killed  in  action;  70  men  who  died  of 
wounds;  360  who  died  of  disease  begotten  of  the  campaign;  20 
killed  in  accidents,  and  97  missing.  Thus,  not  counting  the  sick 
in  South  African  hospitals,  or  the  unfit  who  were  invalided  home, 
nor  all  troops  captured  and  again  released,  the  total  casualties  for 
October,  1900,  figure  to  727;  a number  not  much  under  the  average 
monthly  losses  previous  to  the  “ conquest  ” of  the  Transvaal  hy 
proclamation. 

November  8-15. — These  losses  and  encounters,  following  so 
soon  after  British  officers  and  papers  had  boasted  of  a termination 
of  the  war,  produced  a very  savage  outburst  of  journalistic  ferocity 
in  England.  Several  editors  openly  advocated  the  shooting  of  all 
Boers  found  in  arms  “ within  the  Queen’s  conquered  territories.” 
These  incitations  from  Great  Britain  naturally  incited  the  generals 
in  South  Africa  to  adopt  still  sterner  measures  in  the  prosecution 
of  the  war.  Houses  were  more  frequently  burned,  especially  in 
localities  where  raids  had  taken  place,  or  other  signs  of  reawakened 
Boer  activity  were  found.  Women  and  children  were  turned  out 
of  these  homesteads,  and  revenge  was  thus  taken  upon  them  (after 
having  been  made  British  subjects,  by  Lord  Eoberts’  proclamations) 
for  the  successful  acts  of  warfare  of  their  relatives.  A despatch 
from  Pretoria  about  this  period  gave  the  world  an  example  of  the 
civilization  which  England  had  imported  into  the  Transvaal.  This 
message  said:  “Not  a single  Boer  house  in  the  country  between 
Dundee  and  Vryheid  has  been  left  standing.  All  have  been  burned 
hy  the  British  troops.” 

That  these  measures  were  the  result  of  a humiliating  feeling  of 
anger  at  the  failure  of  a huge  British  army  to  put  down  the  deter- 
mined resistance  of  the  Boers,  was  manifest  from  the  relative  ex- 
tent of  territory  held  by  both  forces  at  the  commencement  of  the 
second  year’s  campaign.  From  the  Orange  Elver  to  Barberton,  in 
the  east  of  the  Transvaal,  a distance  of  500  miles;  from  Barberton, 
west  to  ]\Iafeking,  350  miles;  and  from  Vryheid,  in  the  south  of 
the  Transvaal,  to  Kimberley,  on  the  western  border  of  the  Free 


468 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOE  FREEDOM 


State,  the  English  troops  only  held  the  railway  lines  and  about 
thirty  towns  and  villages;  with  these  lines,  however,  subject  to 
attack  at  lit'ty  dilt'erent  points.  The  Boer  forces  were  in  virtical 
possession  of  the  intervening  sections  of  the  two  Eepublics,  and  of 
a great  portion  of  Cape  Colony.  Over  the  whole  of  the  territory 
thus  still  remaining  as  really  unconquered,  numerous  conflicts  had 
taken  place,  as  related,  during  the  month  of  October. 

It  was  now  resolved  hy  the  English  to  depopulate  the  towns  and 
villages  which  they  could  not  garrison  after  capturing.  The  in- 
habitants were  to  be  “ concentrated  ” in  central  camps,  and  to  be 
fed  by  the  British;  the  declared  object  being  to  prevent  the  non- 
combative  Boers  from  giving  assistance  or  information  to  the  fight- 
ing commandoes.  But  the  obvious  purpose  of  the  plan  was  to 
try  to  subdue  the  otherwise  unconquerable  burghers  in  the  field 
by  subjecting  their  wives  and  children  to  suffering  and  penalties 
for  the  continued  resistance  of  their  relatives.  It  was  a resort  to 
General  Weyler’s  plan  for  the  extermination  of  the  Cubans.  At 
the  same  time  all  press  correspondents,  except  a few  who  repre- 
sented rabid  Jingo  war  organs,  were  to  be  excluded  from  the  area 
of  hostilities  and  of  the  Weylerite  operations;  a significant  evidence 
of  the  kind  of  warfare  ” upon  which  the  British  had  resolved. 
All  food — even  growing  crops — cattle,  and  horses  were  to  be  swept 
from  the  veldt,  and  nothing  was  to  be  left  undone  to  end  the 
“ fanatical  ” resistance  of  the  very  people  who  were  to  have  been 
rescued  by  England’s  kindly  care  from  the  rule  of  “ a corrupt 
oligarchy,”  a year  previously. 

De  Wet  pulled  himself  together  so  soon  after  his  defeat  at  Botha- 
ville,  on  the  5th,  that  he  appeared  with  1,500  men  before  the  British 
garrison  in  his  native  village,  Dewetsdorp,  twelve  days  subsequently, 
and  summoned  the  500  Highlanders  and  others  who  held  the  place, 
to  surrender.  This  they  refused  to  do,  and  a fight  began  which 
continued  for  a week.  The  garrison  ultimately  flew  the  white  flag, 
and  De  Wet  got  two  of  the  enemy’s  guns,  in  part  payment  for  those 
which  he  had  lost  at  Bothaville. 

IVov ember  16-23. — President  Kruger  landed  in  Marseilles  from 
the  Dutch  warship  “ Gelderland  ” on  the  22nd,  and  was  accorded 
a popular  welcome  unparalleled  in  the  history  of  the  city’s  public 
demonstrations.  Deputations  were  present  with  addresses  from 
thirty  municipalities  of  France,  and  from  numerous  societies  in 
Holland,  Germany,  Italy,  and  Ireland.  In  a speech  which  he 
delivered  on  the  occasion  he  said : “ During  my  lifetime  I have 
had  to  fight  the  savages  of  South  Africa  many  a time.  But  the 
barbarians  we  have  to  fight  now  are  worse  than  the  others.  They 
even  urge  the  Kaffirs  against  us.  They  burn  the  farms  we  have 


DIARY  OF  TEE  \YAB 


469 


worked  so  hard  to  construct,  and  they  drive  out  our  women  and 
children  whose  husbands  and  brothers  they  have  killed  or  taken 
prisoners,  leaving  them  unprotected  and  roofless,  and  often  with- 
out food  to  eat.  But,  whatever  they  do,  we  will  not  surrender. 
We  will  fight  to  the  end.” 

From  Marseilles  to  Paris,  similar  manifestations  of  French  sym- 
pathy were  given  at  each  large  city,  culminating  in  a thorough 
Parisian  reception  at  the  hands  of  200,000  people  in  the  capital. 

IVoTeiiiber  24-30. — On  the  29th  the  French  Chamber  of  Depu- 
ties adopted,  without  dissent,  the  following  motion: 

“ The  Chamber  of  Deputies,  on  the  occasion  of  the  arrival  of 
the  President  of  the  Transvaal  in  France,  is  happy  to  address  to 
him  a sincere  expression  of  its  respectful  sympathy.” 

On  the  following  day  the  Senate,  in  like  manner,  passed  a similar 
resolution. 

December  1-7. — General  De  la  Eey  attacked  a convoy  which 
was  on  its  way  from  Pretoria  to  Kustenburg  on  the  3rd.  Fifteen  of 
the  escort  were  killed  and  twenty-three  wounded;  the  convoy  being 
captured.  So  active  were  the  general’s  forces  in  the  Western 
Transvaal,  where,  at  least,  half-a-dozen  British  columns  had  been 
operating  during  the  three  previous  months,  that  the  British  de- 
fenders of  Johannesburg  had  to  construct  barbed  wire  fences  round 
the  entire  city  as  a protection  against  night  raids  by  bands  of  De 
la  Eey’s  commandoes. 

Lord  Eoberts  relinquished  the  chief  British  command  in  South 
Africa  during  the  month  of  December,  and  sailed  for  England  to 
assume  the  position  of  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  British  Army, 
rendered  vacant  by  the  expiry  of  Lord  Wolesley’s  term  in  that  post. 

December  §-15. — General  Christian  Botha  attacked  a body  of 
British  in  the  Yryheid  district  of  the  Transvaal,  on  the  10th,  the 
flght  lasting  the  whole  day.  The  Boers  were  reported  as  losing 
100  in  killed  and  wounded;  the  enemy’s  casualties  being  6 killed, 
19  wounded,  and  30  missing.  The  English  report  of  this  engage- 
ment represented  the  Boers  as  “ drawing  off  ” from  the  battle-fleld 
at  seven  at  night,  but  it  was  not  stated  that  they  were  pursued. 

A party  of  Brabant’s  Horse  (noted  looters  and  house-burners) 
were  surprised  about  the  13th,  north  of  the  Orange  Eiver,  at  Zas- 
tron.  Free  State,  and  suffered  to  the  extent  of  4 killed,  16  wounded, 
and  120  prisoners. 

On  the  same  date  General  De  la  Eey  attacked  a large  force  of 
British  under  General  Clements  at  Ffooitgedacht,  in  the  region  of 
the  Magaliesberg  Hills,  forty  miles  southwest  of  Pretoria.  Generals 
Broadwood  and  Clements  were  employed  in  surrounding  De  la 


470 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


Key’s  commando,  1,000  strong,  at  the  time.  The  Boer  general  cut 

in  between  the  two  forces  during  the  night,  and  attacked  Clements’ 
column,  numbering  1,200,  in  the  early  hours  of  the  following  morn- 
ing. In  the  first  assault  by  the  Boers  the  English  held  their 
ground.  De  la  Eey  then  turned  his  attention  to  a position  on  a hill 
between  Clements’  camp  and  Broadwood’s  force  which  was  held  by 
four  companies  of  the  Northumberlands  and  some  other  troops. 
He  stormed  the  hill  and  captured  over  500  of  those  who  held  it, 
including  eighteen  officers.  This  dashing  feat  was  completely  suc- 
cessful, the  English  loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  as  in  prisoners, 
being  severe.  The  advantages  of  position  and  of  numbers  were 
entirely  on  the  British  side,  but  the  fierceness  of  De  la  Key’s  on- 
slaught, the  better  tactics  of  the  Boer  officers,  and  the  panic  created 
among  the  Northumberlands,  who  had  been  captured  at  Stormberg 
once  before,  gave  the  victory  to  the  West  Transvaal  Commandant- 
General. 

After  sweeping  the  hill  and  bagging  the  Northumberlands,  the 
Boers  rushed  on  the  main  camp  below  in  the  valley  and  drove 
Clements  out  of  it;  the  English  general  retreating  southward  to 
Heckpoort. 

The  name  “ Nooitgedacht  ” stands  for  “Never  thought  of  it,” 
in  the  Taal  (Boer)  tongue. 

While  the  fight  was  going  on.  General  Broadwood,  who  had  com- 
manded the  British  at  Sannas  Post,  was  within  seven  miles  of 
Clements’  encampment,  and  must  have  heard  the  guns.  After  in- 
flicting this  severe  punishment  upon  the  English  near  where  he  had 
previously  (in  July),  at  Nitral’s  Nek,  surprised  and  smashed  the 
Lincolnshire  Eegiment  and  taken  two  guns,  De  la  Key  withdrew  to 
Kustenburg,  and  soon  after  released  the  latest  British  who  had 
surrendered  to  him. 

The  total  number  of  the  enemy  killed  in  this  striking  Boer  vic- 
tory was  given,  in  the  first  English  press  reports,  as  5 officers  and 
9 men;  the  wounded  not  mentioned;  with  18  officers  and  555  men 
of  the  Northumberland  Fusiliers  and  of  Imperial  Yeomen  reported 
as  “missing.”  Later  and  correct  reports  gave  the  casualties  as 
56  officers  and  men  killed,  153  woiinded,  and  the  555  men  who 
had  surrendered  and  were  subsequent^  released.  These  figures 
represented  a total  of  764  casualties.  Commandant  Beyers’  com- 
mando, about  400  strong,  cooperated  with  De  la  Eey  in  the  final 
attack  on  Clements,  but  took  no  part  in  the  attack  upon  the  hill 
and  the  capture  of  the  force  which  held  it. 

During  this  time — the  anniversary  of  the  great  Boer  victories  of 
Stormberg,  Magersfontein,  and  Colenso — the  Boers  were  attacking 
British  columns  and  posts  in  the  Standerton  district,  in  the  south- 


DIARY  OF  THE  ^YAE 


471 


cast;  at  the  Magaliesberg  Hills,  in  the  southwest;  and  elsewhere, 
while  they  held  without  opposition  the  extreme  north  of  the  Trans- 
vaal. In  the  Free  State,  they  were  aggressive  at  Vrede,  Bethlehem, 
Eeddershurg,  and  other  places;  also,  across  the  Orange  Eiver,  in 
the  Aliwal  North  district  of  Cape  Colony,  and  in  the  northwest, 
in  the  Prieska  and  Britstown  regions  of  the  same  British  terri- 
tory. Still,  General  Lord  Eoberts,  when  leaving  South  Africa  for 
London,  shortly  before  the  defeat  of  General  Clements,  declared 
that  “ The  war  was  over  ! 

December  16-23. — During  the  preceding  part  of  this  month 
General  De  Wet  had  been  once  more  “ surrounded,”  “ pursued,” 

liemmed  in,”  “ harassed,”  and  all  but  captured,  as  heretofore;  only 
to  be  found,  as  usual,  doubling  upon  his  pursuers,  picking  up  un- 
considered trifles  of  men  and  provision,  and  moving  where  he 
wished  to  go  in  the  eastern  and  northern  regions  of  his  own  coun- 
try— the  familiar  scenes  of  numerous  previous  exploits,  and  of 
innumerable  marchings  and  countermarchings  of  his  enemies’ 
columns. 

These  events,  occurring  coincidently  with  Lord  Eoberts’  voyage 
to  England,  induced  (the  London)  “ Punch”  to  sum  up  the  situa- 
tion, for  the  British  army  in  South  Africa,  at  this  time,  as  follows : 

A Page  from  a Military  Diary. 

“ Monday.  The  war  practically  at  an  end.  Only  a few  thousand 
Boers  showing  fight,  in  various  directions. 

“ Tuesday.  Fighting  completely  ceased.  Only  a town  or  two 
taken  and  held  by  the  enemy. 

“ Wednesday.  Peace  nearly  concluded.  Only  a British  convoy 
attacked  and  captured. 

“ Thursday.  The  last  spark  extinguished.  Only  a few  score 
opponents  bidding  a large  army  defiance. 

“ Friday.  Every  man  coming  home.  Only  a garrison  retained 
to  hold  every  inch  of  territory  against  all  comers. 

“ Saturday.  The  last  day — absolutely.  Only  the  probability  of 
having  to  continue  the  defensive  movement  for  an  indefinite  period 
on  Monday.” 

In  General  De  Wet’s  movements  north  from  the  Caledon  Eiver, 
on  December  12,  he  was  joined  by  Commandant  Haasbroek  in  the 
region  of  Thabanchu,  near  the  Basuto  border.  The  British,  under 
General  Knox  in  strong  force,  were  in  command  of  hills  ahead 
of  the  anticipated  Boer  line  of  movement,  with  another  force  in 
the  rear.  The  situation  was  full  of  peril  for  the  menaced  com- 
mandoes, numbering  close  on  2.500  men,  Imt  it  is  emergencies  of 
tlie  kind  which  bring  into  play  De  Wet’s  inexhaustible  soldierly  re- 
sources. Finding  himself  so  placed  that  all  the  commanding 


472 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


heights  around  his  position  were  held  by  greatly  outnumbering  foes, 
he  decided  upon  a course  of  action  which  was  completely  success- 
ful. He  sent  Haasbroek  with  500  men  westward,  as  if  to  clear 
a way  for  the  commandoes  through  a place  called  Victoria  Nek, 
near  where  a big  body  of  Britishers  were  located,  but  he  had  re- 
solved to  make  a dash  through  a wide  opening  four  miles  in  ex- 
tent, in  another — a northern — direction,  and  past  two  strong  posts 
which  commanded  the  entrance  to  this  pass.  The  very  audacity 
of  the  move  secured  its  complete  success.  The  British  believed 
that  the  weakly  defended  exit  which  Haasbroek  was  watching, 
would  tempt  De  Wet  as  the  safest  passage,  while  they  felt  convinced 
that  the  strongly  protected  pass  to  the  north  was  secure  against  a 
possible  escape  in  that  direction. 

Selecting  his  time  for  his  contemplated  dash,  and  forming  his 
column  into  a wedge-like  line,  he  gave  the  word  and,  with  President 
Steyn  leading  the  charge  and  the  general  himself  bringing  up  the 
rear,  the  whole  commando  swept  in  a magnificent  spur-gallop  over 
the  level  veldt,  past  the  British  posts,  and  out  into  the  country 
behind  the  lines  of  General  Knox’s  surrounding  cordons.  It  was 
like  the  “ march  past  ” of  a hurricane,  and  was  one  of  the  finest 
exhibitions  of  cavalry  operations  given  in  the  whole  war. 

Haasbroek  successfully  dispersed  his  men  in  small  bodies,  after 
the  rush  of  De  Wet’s  forces,  and  the  English  generals  were  left  in 
sole  possession  of  the  valley  which  was  to  have  witnessed  the  final 
surrender  or  capture  of  the  Free  State  President  and  his  Chief 
Commandant.  De  Wet  lost  one  gun  and  twenty  prisoners,  only, 
in  the  engagement  with  General  Knox’s  columns. 

December  24-31. — During  the  latter  part  of  December,  1900, 
two  more  bodies  of  Free  State  burghers  commanded  by  J udge  Hert- 
zog  and  George  Brand  crossed  the  Orange  Eiver  in  a second  inva- 
sion of  Cape  Colony.  A (British)  '“^Treason  Court,”  which  had  been 
sitting  at  Colesberg,  was  compelled  to  leave  hurriedly  for  the  south, 
owing  to  the  incursion  of  more  “ rebels  ” into  the  locality. 

One  of  the  invading  Boer  columns  turned  west  towards  Prieska, 
where  there  had  been  severe  fighting  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  war ; 
Lord  Kitchener  having  been  despatched  there  at  that  time  by  Lord 
Eoberts  to  overawe  the  Dutch  population  with  a show  of  force. 
Britstown,  south  of  Prieska,.  was  held  in  this  second  invasion  for 
several  days  by  a Boer  force  which  had  captured  a squadron  of 
Yeomanry. 

This  renewed  fighting  along  the  line  of  British  positions  and 
communications  saw  the  coming  forward  of  another  Boer  leader 
at  this  time  who  was  destined  to  leave  his  mark  on  the  records  of 
the  revolt  in  Cape  Colony.  Commandant  Kritzinger  is,  I believe. 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


473 


of  German  extraction,  and  joined  the  Free  State  army  early  in  the 
n-ar.  He  fonght  with  distinction  in  the  Colesberg  campaign,  and 
remained  in  the  Southern  Free  State  districts  after  Generals  01- 
livier,  Grohler,  and  Lemmer  had  retreated  on  Kroonstad,  following 
the  surrender  of  Cronje  at  Paardeberg.  Information  about  Krit- 
zinger’s  early  life  and  of  his  operations  in  Cape  Colony  are  yet  to 
be  fully  obtained  when  the  struggle  now  going  on  terminates,  and 
access  can  be  had  to  sources  of  accurate  knowledge.  From  a picture 
purporting  to  be  that  of  the  new  commandant,  he  would  appear 
to  he  young,  tall,  and  handsome  in  appearance. 

He  appeared  in  the  Burghersdorp  district  of  the  Cape  Colony, 
in  December,  at  the  head  of  700  men,  and  had  an  encounter  with 


The  Scout  Field  Cornet  Commandant 

Jonas  Francis  General  De  Wet  Grahn 


Son  of  Com-  Field  Cornet  Secretary  to  Commandant  Nel 

mandant  Nel  Colson  General  Do  Wet 


GENERAL  CHRISTIAN  DE  WET  AND  STAFF 


the  9th  Lancers,  which  was  reported  as  being  indecisive  in  its 
results. 

On  the  30th  of  December  General  Louis  Botha  attacked  a British 
post  at  Helvetia,  a little  to  the  north  of  the  Delagoa  Bay  line  at 
Machadodorp,  some  150  miles  east  of  Pretoria,  killing  and  wound- 
ing about  sixty  of  the  enemy  and  taking  200  prisoners.  A 4.7 
naval  gun  was  taken  with  the  surrendered  British.  The  troops 
in  possession  of  the  place  were  the  Liverpool  Regiment.  The 
Boers  retired  with  their  prisoners  after  the  fight,  followed  by  an- 
other British  force.  The  Liverpools  were  disarmed  and  released 
after  a few  days.  They  had  been  captured  and  released  once 
before. 

Three  convoys  of  stores  and  ammunition  valued  at  £50,000  were 
captured  by  Boer  forces  at  Kuruman  (Griqualand  West)  and  in 
the  Cape  district  south  of  Colesberg  in  December,  The  escort  of 


474 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOE  FREEDOM 


the  Kuruman  convoy  made  no  resistance.  The  train  south  of 
Colesberg  which  was  held  up  contained  a small  force  of  Prince 
Alfred’s  Guards. 

On  the  31st  of  December,  1900,  commandoes  from  the  Free  State 
were  in  portions  of  British  territory  over  200  miles  south  of  the 
Orange  Eiver. 

The  general  situation  in  the  areas  of  hostilities  as  the  year  1900 
was  brought  to  a close  was  such  that  the  English  seemed  to  be 
more  occupied  in  defending  British  territory  in  South  Africa 
against  Boer  invasion  than  in  subduing  the  commandoes  which 
still  held  the  east,  south,  west,  and  north  of  the  Transvaal,  and 
almost  the  whole  of  the  east  of  the  Free  State  against  Lord 
Kitchener’s  armies. 

Lord  Kitchener  wound  up  the  year’s  reports  by  informing  the 
British  War  Office,  that  there  was  little  change  in  the  area  of  re- 
volt in  the  Cape  Colony,  that  General  French  had  occupied  Ven- 
tersdorp,  some  sixty  miles  from  Johannesburg,  that  General  Clem- 
ents was  strongly  opposed  by  De  la  Key’s  forces  near  Eustenburg, 
that  a convoy  was  captured  north  of  Kimberley,  and  that  Zeerust, 
north  of  Mafeking,  was  being  “ besieged  ” by  Boer  forces. 


Chapter  XXXVII 

DIARY  OF  THE  WAR— JANUARY  TO  JUNE,  1901 


Cape  Town  in  danger — Johannesburg  race-course  raided — Kitchener 

DECIDES  UPON  BLOCKHOUSES — He  NARROWLY  ESCAPES  CAPTURE — DE 
Wet  AGAIN  FIGHTS  HIS  WAY  OUT  OF  A DRIVE REPORTED  DEFEAT  OF 

Botha — Protest  by  Steyn  and  De  Wet  against  violations  of  rules 
OF  war  by  British — Piet  de  Wet  surrenders — Peace  rumors — 
Correspondence  between  Kitchener  and  Botha — Boer  generals 
all  reject  offered  terms — Commandant  Scheepers  appears  in 
Cape  Colony — General  Philip  Botha  killed — Character  sketch 
— Boer  Government  driven  from  Pietersburg — British  orders 
relating  to  use  of  white  flag — Various  encounters  in  C.vpe 
Colony — British  garrisons  besieged — Dutch  editors  imprisoned — 
Summary  of  the  enemy’s  losses — Wife  of  English  general 
APPEALS  TO  America  for  relief  of  Boer  women  and  children 
imprisoned  in  camps — English  military  view  of  the  situation — 
Battle  of  Vlakfontein — The  English  show  themselves  to  be 
“ POOR  losers.” 

January  1-7. — The  Boers  began  the  new  year  so  aggressively 
that  the  London  “ Standard  ” was  constrained  to  confess  there  were 
fears  for  the  safety  of  Cape  Town,  owing  to  the  progress  southward 
of  the  spirit  of  revolt  which  had  been  enkindled  nearer  the  Orange 
Eiver  border.  Guards  had  to  be  placed  to  protect  the  waterworks 
supplying  the  city,  as  a force  of  Boers  were  reported  to  be  making 
south  for  Worcester,  150  miles  distant.  Martial  law  was  pro- 
claimed in  all  the  districts  immediately  north  of  the  city.  At  the 
same  time  Boer  forces  were  operating  in  the  Craddock,  Maraisbnrg, 
Carnarvon,  Somerset  West,  Steynsburg,  and  Middelburg  districts 
of  Cape  Colony.  The  Commandants  with  these  columns  included 
Hertzog,  Wessels,  Fouche,  George  Brand,  Kritzinger,  Malan, 
Scheepers,  Pretorius,  and  Xieuwenhaut.  The  Dutch  population 
in  these  regions  were  credited  with  welcoming  the  invaders,  and 
with  supplying  their  wants  in  food  and  horses. 

Coincidently  with  this  extensive  invasion  of  British  territory  by 
Boer  forces,  necessitating  preparations  for  the  defense  of  Cape 
Town,  Lord  Roberts  was  being  rewarded  in  England  witli  an  Earl- 
dom and  a Garter,  for  having  “ ended  ” the  wai',  in  Decemlier. 

De  Wet  was  reported  as  active  in  the  Bethlehem,  Free  State,  dis- 


476 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


trict,  and  De  la  Eey  as  being  near  the  Vaal  Eiver,  south  of  Pot- 
chefstroom. 

A despatch  from  Bloemfontein  says  Lord  Kitchener  has  ap- 
proved of  a movement  “ to  send  Boer  agents  out  to  burghers  on 
commando,  to  make  known  to  them  the  terms  of  his  proclama- 
tion.” This  means  that  Boer  renegades,  acting  as  English  agents, 
wmuld  be  sent  to  the  laagers  to  induce  the  burghers  to  give  up 
the  fight.  If  Boer  generals  sent  Boer  agents  on  a similar  mission 
to  British  columns,  they  wmuld  be  shot  as  spies  or  as  advocates  of 
desertion. 

A German  volunteer  who  has  just  returned  from  the  front  tells 
a Berlin  paper  how  the  Boers  are  so  well  able  to  continue  to  fight. 
He  says: 

“ What  the  Boer  needs  he  obtains  in  abundance  from  the  Eng- 
lish. His  absolute  necessities  consist  of  dried  meat  and  maize 
flour.  With  the  flour  he  makes  his  cakes.  To  this  is  added  on 
most  days  some  of  the  delicious  English  conserves,  wagonloads  of 
which  fall  into  our  hands  from  time  to  time. 

“ Our  supply  of  ammunition  never  fails.  Many  of  the  Boers’ 
Mausers  have  been  buried,  but  most  of  our  men  are  now  armed 
with  Martini-Henrys  and  Lee-Metfords,  which  have  been  taken 
from  the  British.  Every  attack  on  a British  outpost  renews  our 
supply  of  ammunition  for  these  rifles.  The  Boers  are  very  careful, 
and  100  cartridges  last  a man  a long  time,  for  he  never  fires 
except  when  he  is  sure  of  hitting. 

‘‘  Our  supply  of  horses  is  also  supplemented  from  the  English 
stock,  and  it  is  surprising  how  the  horses  which  have  become  worn- 
out  under  the  English  soon  become  fat  and  sturdy  wdth  the  Boers. 
This  comes,  of  course,  from  the  fact  that  the  Englishmen  have  no 
heart  for  their  horses,  or  they  do  not  know  how  to  treat  them.” 


One  of  the  objects  of  the  Boer  invasion  of  Cape  Colony  was  to 
recover  some  of  the  horses  and  cattle  sent  there  from  the  Free  State 
by  the  enemy. 

On  the  7th  inst.  it  was  reported  that  three  British  columns  were 
in  pursuit  of  De  Wet,  east  of  the  Senekal  district  of  the  Free  State, 
and  that  General  Louis  Botha  was  moving  in  the  Ermelo  region 
of  the  (eastern)  Transvaal. 

January  8-15. — A section  of  one  of  the  three  columns  ventured 
too  close  to  De  Wet  at  Bindley  (where  he  had  captured  the  Irish 
Loyalists  last  June)  on  the  7th,  with  the  result  that  fifteen  were 
killed  and  over  twenty  wounded.  Tliese  troops  were  a detachment 
of  Lord  Kitchener’s  body-guard,  and  formed  part  of  General  Cliarles 
Knox’s  column.  Some  thirty-five  of  the  enemy  are  accounted  for 


DIABY  OF  THE  WAR 


k i 

iu  the  above  report,  but  uotliing  is  said  of  the  balance  of  Knox's 
men.  They  were  possibly  captured,  disarmed,  and  released,  as 
usually  happens  in  such  surrenders. 

Later  reports  of  this  victory  of  the  Commandant-General  add 
nearly  100  hundred  more  British  casualties  to  the  previous  list  of 
their  losses  at  that  fight. 

On  the  same  date  De  la  Eey  with  Commandant  SteenekamjD  is 
said  to  have  been  defeated  by  General  Babington’s  column,  north- 
west of  Pretoria.  It  is  claimed  that  the  Boers  were  forced  to  re- 
tire, after  losing  twenty  men  in  killed  and  wounded.  The  British 
loss  is  not  stated. 

A skirmish  is  reported  to  have  taken  place  in  Cape  Colony,  a 
hundred  miles  north  of  Cape  Town,  while  trenches  have  been  dug 
on  that  city’s  race-course;  farms  within  seven  miles  of  Kimberley 
have  been  raided  by  Boers;  cattle  have  been  carried  off  by  Boers 
within  four  miles  of  Pretoria,  and  an  invading  column  has  moved 
west  in  Cape  Colony,  towards  Clanwilliam,  as  if  making  for  Lam- 
berts, or  St.  Helena  Bay. 

Lord  Kitchener  reports  five  simultaneous  attacks  upon  as  many 
British  positions;  the  Boers  taking  advantage  of  darkness  in  each 
case.  Louis  Botha’s  men  made  an  assault  upon  Belfast  (where 
Lord  Eoberts  “annexed”  the  Transvaal),  and  were  beaten  off;  the 
British  acknowledge  losing  twentvf  killed  and  over  fifty  wounded. 
Boer  dead  said  to  be  twenty-four.  Later  reports  of  this  affair  re- 
late that  Ben  Viljoen  led  the  attack  and  captured  the  Eoyal  Irish 
who  garrisoned  the  town.  His  son  was  killed  in  the  encounter. 
Viljoen  held  the  town  for  two  hours  and  then  retired,  releasing  his 
prisoners. 

De  la  Eey  had  three  encounters  recently  with  columns  of  the 
enemy  in  the  Magaliesberg  regions,  west  of  Pretoria.  The  Eng- 
lish claimed  to  have  beaten  off  each  assault. 

Lord  Kitchener  reports  that  De  Wet  shot  one  of  the  “ peace  ” 
envoys,  and  flogged  two  more,  who  had  gone  to  his  commando  to 
ask  burghers  to  stop  fighting. 

January  16-23. — A British  convoy  going  from  Dundee  to  Vry- 
heid  was  attacked  at  the  Bloed  Eiver  by  some  of  Christian  Botha’s 
men. 

Aberdeen  and  Sutherland,  two  towns  near  the  center  of  Cape 
Colony,  have  been  entered  b}'^  Boer  forces  who  helped  themselves 
to  the  hospitality  denied  by  the  British  residents.  They  retired 
without  injuring  any  of  the  citizens. 

On  the  17th  Colvile’s  column  was  attacked  near  Standerton,  on 
the  Pretoria-JSTatal  railwa)^  by  a force  of  Christian  Botha’s  men. 
Eeported  repulse  of  Boers,  “ with  heavy  losses.”  On  the  same 


478 


THl^J  BOEB  FIGHT  FOR  FRFFDOM 


(late  an  attack  was  made  on  a Boer  force  at  Veutcrslnirg,  Free 
State,  which  was  successful. 

Zeerust,  in  the  western  Transvaal,  so  often  held,  alternately,  by 
Boers  and  British  during  the  past  twelve  months,  is  reported  again 
besieged  hy  some  of  De  la  Key’s  men.  Two  other  garrisons,  in  the 
south  of  the  Free  State,  have  been  evacuated  hy  the  British,  who 
took  the  inhabitants  over  the  Orange  River;  the  British  being  un- 
able to  hold  the  places,  Smithfleld  and  Rouxville,  against  the  op- 
posing Boer  forces. 

A body  of  Commandant  Beyers’  men  raided  the  race-course,  near 
Johannesburg,  where  the  cattle  of  the  British  garrison  were  grazing, 
on  January  17.  They  took  1,700  head  with  them,  but  lost  500  of 
these  in  the  darkness.  The  day  following  a mounted  British  force 
went  in  pursuit,  and  retook  the  500  straying  cattle.  The  report  of 
this  achievement  in  the  English  press  recorded  the  taking  of  500 
cattle  “ from  the  Boers,”  but  nothing  about  the  original  capture 
by  Beyers’  men  on  the  race-course. 

Reports  in  the  London  papers  of  this  date  made  reference  to 
the  “ relief  of  the  Hoopstad  garrison  ” in  the  northwest  of  the 
Free  State.  iSTo  intimation  had  previously  been  given  to  the  public 
that  any  British  force  had  been  besieged  in  that  town. 

Queen  Victoria  died  on  January  22. 

January  24-31. — A British  patrol  was  captured  at  Maraisburg, 
Cape  Colony,  on  the  24th. 

De  la  Rey  attacked  General  Cunningham  near  A^entersdorp, 
Transvaal,  on  the  26th,  and  was  making  things  warm  for  the  enemy 
when  General  Babington  arrived  with  reenforcements,  compelling 
the  Boers  to  retire.  Cunningham  had  over  forty  casualties.  An- 
other section  of  De  la  Ray’s  commando  captured  a small  body  of 
Yeomen  near  Lichtenburg,  De  la  Key’s  birthplace. 

South  of  Kimberley  a British  post  was  taken  and  a train  held 
up.  Boer  force  not  mentioned,  but  this  being  General  Kolbe’s 
ground,  where  the  genial  old  Free  Stater  fought  in  the  earlier  days 
of  the  war,  he  is  probably  still  hovering  near  the  Diamond  City. 

Christian  Botha  and  Tobias  Smuts  attacked  General  Smith- 
Dorrien  in  the  Carolina  district,  eastern  Transvaal,  the  light  last- 
ing five  hours.  The  Boers  retired,  hut  were  not  pursued.  No 
casualties  are  given  in  the  cabled  reports  of  the  fight. 

About  this  time  De  Wet  is  stated  to  he  in  three  places,  hundreds 
of  miles  apart. 

Olive  Schreiner,  the  gifted  axithoress,  is  forbidden  hy  martial-law 
officers  to  leave  the  district  in  which  she  resides. 

Damage  to  the  extent  of  £200,000  was  done  to  one  of  the  Rand 
mines  recently  hy  some  of  Beyers’  commando. 


DIABY  OF  THE  ^YAB 


479 


Lord  Kitclicner,  wliilc  traveling  towards  Middcll)nrg,  east  of  Pre- 
toria, had  a narrow  escape  from  being  killed  or  cajitured.  The  train 
was  derailed  and  fired  upon  by  a body  of  Boers.  They  were  doubt- 
less ignorant  of  the  presence  of  the  important  passenger  on  the 
train  thns  attacked,  or  a more  determined  assault  might  have  been 
delivered.  The  Boers  were  beaten  off. 

iSTews  from  Bloemfontein  that  another  of  the  “ peace  ” envoys, 
a man  named  Wessels,  has  been  shot  by  orders  of  General  De  Wet. 

It  is  circnlated  from  Lourenzo  Marquez  that  Colonel  Blake,  at 
thd  head  of  ‘‘  2,000  Boers,”  was  in  Portuguese  territory,  east  of 
Ivomatipoort,  with  the  object  of  releasing  the  surrendered  bur- 
ghers and  volunteers  in  the  hands  of  the  Portuguese  authorities. 
He  has  doubtless  a more  practical  purpose  in  view  with,  probably 
100  men  of  the  alleged  2,000. 

Hear  the  end  of  the  month  a British  post  at  Modderfontein,  on 
the  Gatsrand  Hills,  some  70  miles  southwest  of  Johannesburg,  was 
attacked  by  a force  of  De  la  Eey’s  men.  The  British,  who  were 
about  250  strong  and  had  a gun,  fonght  well  for  two  days.  Ee- 
enforcements  of  near  1,000  men  and  four  guns  were  sent  from 
Krugersdorp  by  the  English  in  that  garrison  to  relieve  the  Modder- 
fontein post.  Hews  of  this  movement  was  conveyed  to  Com- 
mandant Smnts  (Attorney-General  of  the  Transvaal),  who  was 
with  De  la  Eey’s  commandoes  at  the  time.  He  flung  800  men  with 
a pom-pom  into  the  hills,  across  the  path  of  General  Cunningham 
and  of  the  relieving  British  column.  These  were  hotly  attacked 
by  Smuts,  and  so  badly  mauled  that  their  progress  was  successfully 
arrested  until  the  Modderfontein  garrison  were  compelled  to  sur- 
render; 220  men,  a pom-pom,  a convoy,  and  large  quantities  of 
ammunition  falling  into  Boer  hands.  In  the  final  assault  upon  the 
plucky  garrison,  the  Boers  used  bayonets  which  they  had  previously 
captured  from  their  enemies.  Cunningham  was  driven  back  to 
Krugersdorj). 

Commandant  Smuts  is  a young  man,  aged  about  35,  of  medium 
height,  slender  in  build,  with  a strong,  intellectual  head  and  face. 
He  was  Attorney-General  of  the  South  African  Eepublic  in  1899. 
He  finished  his  education  in  Cambridge  University,  England.  He 
was  one  of  the  most  brilliant  young  men  in  the  Transvaal,  cul- 
tured, courteous,  and  gentlemanly;  a man  who  would  be  a credil 
and  an  ornament  to  any  government  in  existence.  My  last  even- 
ing in  Pretoria  was  spent  in  his  house.  Eoberts  was  then  advanc- 
ing on  the  Vaal  Eiver,  and  it  had  been  decided,  on  that  very  day, 
by  the  Transvaal  Executive,  that  Pretoria  was  not  to  be  defended. 
Mr.  and  Mrs.  Smuts,  therefore,  knew  they  would  soon  be  witliout 
a home,  but  there  was  neither  anger  nor  lamentation  in  the  conver- 


TTTE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEOOH 


4sn 

sation  which  took  place.  We  will  iiltiiiiatel}’  he  defeated  of 
course,”  said  Mr.  Smuts,  “ and  will  have  to  put  up  with  the  conse- 
quences, no  matter  how  serious  these  may  he;  hut  you  can  rest 
assured  that  England  will  have  to  pay  the  highest  price  she  has  ever 
yet  paid  for  victory,  before  she  turns  the  Transvaal  into  a South 
African  Ireland.” 

“ And  then  ? ” 

“ Well,”  replied  Mr.  Smnts,  smiling,  “ the  fight  for  Nationhood, 
under  the  new  conditions,  will  not  continue  quite  as  long  as  that 

which  your  country  has  made. 
We  are,  fortunately,  further 
away  from  England.” 

I have  learned  since  return- 
ing from  the  Transvaal  that  the 
little  girl,  eighteen  months  old, 
who  was  the  prattling  center  of 
attraction  on  that  evening,  died 
of  hardship  and  exposure  after 
the  British  occupation  of  Pre- 
toria. Mr.  Smuts  joined  De  la 
Ee}'',  following  the  battle  of  Dal- 
manutha,  as  assistant  general, 
and  has  since  distinguished  him- 
self as  one  of  the  most  capable 
and  daring  commandants  in  the 
field.  The  death  of  that  wee 
girlie  has  probably  cost  hundreds 
of  British  households  pangs  of 
sorrow  as  keen  as  those  which  the  brutality  of  the  Jingo  war  in- 
flicted upon  as  happy  a home  as  it  has  ever  been  my  privilege  to 
enter. 

February. — "While  on  his  way  south,  after  the  defeat  of  the 
British  detachment  near  Bindley,  De  Wet  fell  in  with  a force  of  the 
enemy  render  Major  Pilcher,  northeast  of  Bloemfontein.  He  en- 
gaged these  troops  on  the  southeastern  side  of  the  Brandfort  hills, 
not  far  from  Sannas  Post,  forcing  them  to  retire  towards  the  Free 
State  capital.  During  the  engagement  the  artillery  fire  attracted 
the  attention  of  Major  Crewe,  who  was  patrolling  the  same  district 
with  a composite  force.  This  second  English  column  advanced  to 
the  hill,  to  meet  De  Wet’s  men,  after  the  retreat  of  Pilcher.  Crewe 
and  his  force  were  immediately  attacked,  and  were  forced  to  retire 
in  the  direction  of  General  Knox’s  main  column.  They  were  am- 
bushed, however,  by  a section  of  De  Wet’s  men  who  had  moved  in 
their  rear  for  that  purpose,  and,  after  a four  hours’  fight,  Crewe  was 


DIABY  OF  THE  WAB 


481 


compelled  to  retreat,  leaving  his  convo}^,  a pom-pom,  and  a number 
of  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  De  Wet. 

The  extraordinary  circumstance  surrounding  this  engagement 
was  the  fact  that  Pilcher  and  Crewe,  with  their  respective  forces, 
were  two  out  of  six  columns  specially  organized  for,  and  actually 
engaged  in,  the  old  task  of  capturing  De  Wet  and  his  single  com- 
mando. Generals  Knox,  Hamilton,  Maxwell,  and  Colonel  White, 
each  at  the  head  of  a column,  were  the  other  commanders  who  for 
weeks  had  been  so  employed.  The  same  task  had  been  already 
undertaken  a dozen  times,  by  probably  a dozen  English  generals 
and  columns.  On  this  occasion  De  Wet  had  succeeded  by  one  of 
his  old  stratagems  in  sending  the  four  stronger  columns  of  the 
enemy  northeast  from  his  actual  objective,  on  a wild-goose  chase, 
while  he  doubled  southwest,  found  Pilcher  and  Crewe,  engaged  them 
in  detail,  as  related,  beat  them  both,  and  went  on  his  way  serenely 
while  the  six  British  officers  were  doubtless  settling  among  them- 
selves the  question,  which  of  them  was  most  to  blame  for  the  bril- 
liant manner  in  which  they  had  all  contributed  to  the  defeat  of 
the  united  purpose  of  the  columns. 

After  defeating  Crewe  and  Pilcher  and  once  more  shaking  him- 
self free  of  “ surrounding  ” columns,  De  Wet  crossed  the  Bloem- 
fontein-Pretoria  line,  a little  north  of  Brandfort,  and  made  for  the 
Orange  Eiver,  by  wheeling  south  and  fording  the  Modder  between 
the  Free  State  capital  and  Paardeberg.  He  met  with  no  serious 
opposition  while  traversing  the  country  up  which  he  had  dashed 
just  a year  previously  in  his  efforts  to  gain  possession  of  the  drifts 
east  of  Cronje’s  then  position,  and  to  forestall  the  English.  He 
now  swept  southward  past  Jagersfontein  and  Fauresmith,  which 
were  held  by  small  garrisons  of  the  enemy  who  made  no  attempt  to 
stop  his  well-equipped  commando.  He  crossed  Orange  Eiver  at  a 
drift  west  of  Korvals  Pont,  and  directed  his  course  towards  De  Aar, 
the  important  junction  and  garrison  on  the  Cape  Town-Kimberley 
line. 

Meanwhile  from  all  available  points  the  enemy’s  forces  were 
being  moved  by  horse  and  rail  to  cope  with  this  new  danger  in 
British  territory.  The  shouting  Jingoes  of  Cape  Town  appre- 
hended nothing  less  than  a march  on  their  delectable  city  by  the 
redoubtable  Boer  general.  It  was  fortunate  for  them  that  his 
available  force  would  not  permit  of  any  such  big  enterprise.  His 
objects  in  joining  in  the  invasion  which  Steyn  had  planned  in 
Kovember  were  political,  in  addition  to  having  more  immediate 
relations  to  the  plan  of  campaign  which  he  had  commenced  after 
the  occupation  of  Bloemfontein.  President  Steyn’s  chief  purpose 
was  to  strengthen  Mr.  Kruger’s  hands  in  Europe,  by  showing  the 
31 


482 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


Powers  and  the  public  how  an  army  of  250,000  British  soldiers  \vere 
not  alone  unable  to  defeat  the  Federal  forces  still  in  the  field  in 
two  Kepublics,  hut  also  incapable  of  preventing  the  Chief  Com- 
mandant of  the  Free  State  from  carrying  a commando  and  its 
baggage  a distance  of  300  miles,  between  lines  of  British  posts  and 
in  defiance  of  surrounding  ” columns,  in  the  execution  of  a plan 
to  invade  the  enemy’s  own  territory. 

This  political  purpose  carried  out,  De  Wet’s  military  objects 
were  to  recruit  the  commandoes  in  men  and  in  horses,  and  to 
divert  the  attention  of  the  British  forces  from  Hertzog,  Kritzinger, 
Malan,  Scheepers,  and  others  who  were  operating  in  the  west, 
center,  and  east  of  the  Colony. 

De  Wet  was  attacked  in  crossing  the  Kimberley  railway  north 
of  De  Aar  and,  as  he  had  no  less  than  200  carts  and  wagons  with 
him  at  the  time,  his  movements  were  considerably  impeded.  His 
rear-guard  fought  the  usual  containing  action  with  the  enemy’s 
advanced  lines,  and  enabled  the  commando  to  take  most  of  its  bag- 
gage out  of  danger.  Jn  carrying  out  this  plan,  some  wagons,  am- 
munition, and  horses  had  to  he  left  behind,  and  these,  together  with 
fifty  men  it  is  claimed,  were  captured  by  the  English.  De  Wet 
divided  his  commando  into  several  sections,  in  his  old  manner,  and 
then  proceeded  northwest  where  he  expected  to  join  Hertzog  and 
George  Brand. 

These  Commandants,  with  a small  force  of  about  700  well- 
mounted  men,  had  crossed  into  Cape  Colony  in  December.  They 
marched  almost  due  south,  through  the  center  of  the  Colony,  until 
reaching  Murraysburg,  meeting  with  little  opposition.  They  then 
directed  their  course  northwest,  into  the  wide  regions  of  Calvinia 
and  Clanwilliam. 

Having  carried  out  whatever  scheme  had  taken  the  astute 
Judge-Commandant  to  the  sea  at  the  mouth  of  the  Olifants  Kiver, 
he  turned  northeast,  this  time  followed  by  a force  of  Cape  Town 
volunteers,  “ Kitchener’s  Fighting  Scouts,”  who  always  prudently 
succeeded  in  keeping  within  a day’s  march  of  the  small  commando. 
Kear  the  end  of  February,  President  Steyn  and  De  Wet  met  Hert- 
zog and  Brand  between  Philipstown  and  Petrusville,  and  the  move- 
ments which  followed  were  the  result  of  the  conference  thus  held. 

Judge  Hertzog  is  in  the  Free  State  councils  and  forces  a counter- 
part to  Attorney-General  Smuts  in  the  Transvaal.  He  is  a la^v^^er 
and  soldier,  and  has  shown  himself  to  be  as  able  at  the  head  of  a 
commando  as  he  was  at  the  bar  of  the  Eepublic.  I had  the  pleasure 
of  meeting  him  in  Kroonstad  in  1900.  He  is  about  45  years  old. 
of  medium  height,  and  of  a Spanish  type  of  face;  with  a keen  and 
subtle  intellect  that  would  suggest  a German  metaphysician  rather 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


483 


than  a Dutch  lawyer.  His  wife,  a charming  and  cultured  lady,  was 
subjected  to  the  indignities  and  suifering  of  a concentration  camp 
after  the  capture  of  the  two  capitals — thanks  to  Lord  Eoherts’ 
British  chivalry  in  making  war  upon  the  wives  and  children  of  his 
foes,  in  order  to  bring  them  under  English  rule,  and  to  a proper 
appreciation  of  all  its  blessings. 

Having  obtained  a large  supply  of  fresh  horses  from  Hertzog  and 
Brand,  De  Wet  and  President  Steyn  prepared  to  retrace  their 
course  back  again  to  the  northeast  of  the  Free  State.  The  com- 
mando was  split  up  under  Froneman,  Hel,  and  others,  and,  with 
the  cooperation  of  Brand  and  Hertzog,  it  became  an  easy  task  to 
mislead  the  enemy  as  to  the  particular  drift  over  the  Orange  Kiver 
which  would  be  utilized  by  De  Wet.  Each  section  acted  as  a decoy 
to  the  blundering  British,  and,  while  half-a-dozen  generals  and 
colonels  were  wiring  daily  that  they  were  on  the  point  of  captur- 
ing President  Steyn  and  his  Chief  Commandant,  these  men  crossed 
the  river  on  the  28th  of  February,  between  Horvals  Pont  and  Zand 
Drift,  with  convoy  and  spare  horses,  and  revealed  to  their  pursuers 
where  they  really  were  when  casualties  in  a fight  near  Philippolis, 
in  the  Free  State,  a few  days  afterward,  had  to  be  attended  to  by 
a British  ambulance. 

The  expedition  from  near  Heilbron,  in  the  north  of  the  Free 
State,  to  De  Aar,  in  Cape  Colony,  and  back — a total  distance  of 
fully  700  miles — took  about  seven  weeks  in  its  execution.  De 
Wet’s  flying  column  did  not  exceed  2,000  men  on  starting,  and  with 
this  body  he  fought  and  defeated  forces  of  the  Lindley  garrison;  in 
passing  beat  Pilcher  and  Crewe,  in  detail,  east  of  Brandfort,  and 
took  a gun  and  convoy;  faced  south,  with  Bloemfontein  on  his  left, 
and  half-a-dozen  English  posts  on  his  right,  and  swept  by  them  with 
soldierly  contempt  for  their  impotent  knowledge  of  his  movements; 
crossed  the  Orange  Eiver,  after  Kitchener  and  his  generals  had 
had  a fortnight’s  notice  of  his  intention  to  invade  Cape  Colony; 
entered  British  territory  and  remained  there  a fortnight;  fought 
several  skirmishes  during  that  time  with  the  enemy’s  forces  who 
had,  as  usual,  “ surrounded”  him;  formed  a Junction  with  Hertzog; 
obtained  fresb  horses  and  some  recruits,  and  then  faced  backward 
to  recross  the  river,  guarded  at  a dozen  points  by  as  many  British 
forces;  regained  the  north  bank;  brushed  aside  whatever  opposition 
lay  in  his  path  north  to  Fauresmith,  and  arrived  in  the  east  of  the 
Free  State  again  with  a loss  of  less  than  150  of  the  men  who  rode 
with  him  during  the  whole  of  that  splendid  performance. 

It  was  one  more  added  to  the  many  brilliant  achievements  of  the 
great  leader,  and  a corresponding  exhibition  of  the  hopeless  inepti- 
tude of  his  military  opponents.  But  what  generals  and  colonels 


484 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


and  columns  galore  liad  failed  to  do  with  tlieir  “ fl^dng  ” detach- 
ments and  brigades,  the  London  press,  resolved,  for  a time  at 
least,  to  accomplish. 

By  the  end  of  February  the  news  agencies  ended  the  war,  in  the 
most  satisfactory  manner  possible,  to  themselves:  President  Steyn 
was  believed  to  have  surrendered;  De  Wet  was,  at  last,  hopelessly 
beaten,  and  on  the  point  of  being  captured;  Christian  Botha  was 
negotiating  for  terms  with  the  English  general  in  front  of  him, 
while  Commandant-General  Louis  Botha  had,  according  to  one 
report,  “ surrendered  to  Lord  Kitchener,  at  Middelburg,  before 
nine  o’clock  on  yesterday  ” — the  28th  of  February.  And  in  this 
way  another  month  of  the  war  was  ended. 

While  still  in  Cape  Colony,  a proclamation  signed  by  Presi- 
dent Steyn  and  General  De  Wet  was  issued  charging  the  British 
with  a systematic  violation  of  all  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare 
accepted  by  the  Powers  at  The  Hague  Conference.  The  proclama- 
tion alleged,  “ that  rape,  robbery,  house-burning,  and  other  crimes 
were  committed  by  the  enemy  in  insolent  defiance  of  all  regard  for 
sex,  age,  or  property.”  The  document  ended  in  the  declaration: 

“ The  Eepublics  are  not  conquered.  The  war  is  not  finished. 
The  burgher  forces  of  the  two  States  are  still  led  by  responsible 
officers,  as  from  the  commencement  of  the  war,  under  the  super- 
vision of  the  Governments  of  both  Eepublics.” 

Early  in  February  the  following  announcement  was  made  by 
the  British  War  Office: 

“ In  view  of  recent  Boer  activity  in  various  directions,  his 
Majesty’s  Government  have  decided,  in  addition  to  the  large  forces 
recently  equipped  locally  in  South  Africa,  to  reenforce  Lord 
Kitchener  by  30,000  mounted  troops  be^'ond  those  already  landed 
in  Cape  Colony.” 

This  was  two  months  after  Lord  Eoberts  had  received  an  Earl- 
dom for  having  finished  the  war. 

During  De  Wet’s  movement  south  into  Cape  Colony,  Lord 
Kitchener  organized  another  “ sweeping  ” expedition  for  the  south- 
eastern districts  of  the  Transvaal,  where  Louis  Botha  was  reported 
to  be  at  the  head  of  “ 7,000  Boers.” 

Kitchener’s  columns  were  to  move  as  follows  against  the  Com- 
mandant-General, and  to  keep  in  touch  with  each  other  : General 
Smith-Dorrien’s  from  Wonderfontein,  General  Campbell’s  from 
Middelburg,  General  Alderson’s  from  Eerste  Fabrieken,  General 
Knox’s  from  Kaalfontein,  Major  Allenby’s  from  Zuurfontein, 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


485 


General  Dartnell’s  from  SjDrings,  and  General  Colvile’s  from  Grey- 
lingstad. 

These  columns,  being  fully  equipped  for  so  big  an  enterprise, 
set  out  on  what  was  confidently  hoped  to  be  a movement  as  success- 
ful as  Lord  Eoberts’  march  ujjon  the  Modder,  just  a year  previously, 
and  the  capture  of  Cronje  which  followed.  French  and  Smith- 
Dorrien,  both  of  whom  had  played  conspicuous  parts  in  that,  the 
most  important  English  victory  of  the  war,  were  the  leading  officers 
in  this  second  great  enterprise  for  the  cornering  and  capture  of 
Botha.  It  was  also  to  be  General  French’s  second  attempt  in  the 
same  region  to  accomplish  Botha’s  downfall. 

The  Commandant-General  was  in  the  East  Transvaal  at  this 
time,  in  touch  with  his  brother  Christian  Botha,  and  Tobias  Smuts 
of  Ermelo,  with  a combined  force  of  some  4,000  men.  They  had  also 
a large  number  of  non-combatants,  and  women  and  children  with 
them,  and  much  stock  of  cattle  and  sheep;  the  Carolina,  Ermelo, 
and  Bethel  districts  being  the  richest  pasture  districts  of  the 
Transvaal.  Lord  Kitchener,  learning  of  all  this,  laid  his  plans,  had 
his  seven  columns  organized,  and,  everything  being  prepared  for  a 
culminating  swoop,  confided  the  execution  of  the  work  to  General 
French. 

Botha  was  at  Bothwell,  near  Carolina,  when  French  set  forth  to 
find  him,  while  his  scattered  forces  and  non-combatant  following 
were  in  laagers  southward  toward  Lake  Chrissie,  Ermelo,  and 
Amsterdam.  French’s  plan  was  to  move  a force  under  Smith- 
Dorrien  east  and  north  of  Bothwell,  so  as  to  bar  a Boer  retreat 
towards  Lydenburg,  while  French  himself  was  to  lead  his  own 
right  wing,  in  a corresponding  movement,  to  the  south,  or  left,  of 
Botha;  the  remaining  columns  to  operate  in  between;  the  grand 
object  begin  to  pin  the  Boer  commandoes  in  against  the  Swaziland 
border,  and  force  them  to  fight,  in  a corner  against  overwhelming 
forces,  to  a finish. 

Smith-Dorrien’s  column  reached  the  locality  of  Bothwell  in  a 
four  days’  march — covering  thirty  miles — and  was  suddenly  and 
fiercely  attacked  on  the  6th  of  February  by  Botha.  The  Com- 
mandant-General had  easily  divined  the  purpose  of  the  movement 
against  him,  and  had  resorted  to  the  favorite  Boer  tactics  of  fight- 
ing a determined  rear-guard  action  against  the  enemy,  so  as  to 
retard  his  advance  and  enable  the  impedimenta  of  the  laagers  to 
obtain  a safe  start  upon  an  agreed  direction  of  retreat.  Botha’s 
main  plan  was,  to  hold  Smith-Dorrien  in  check  until  the  Boer 
column  would  be  in  line  with  Ermelo,  on  its  retreat  to  the  hills  of 
Piet  Eetief,  and  then  to  wheel  round,  face  and  harass  French  who 
was  moving  direct  south  on  Ermelo,  and  contain  him  until  the 


486 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


burghers,  their  women,  children,  and  cattle  had  passed  on  to  the 
Eandbergen  hills  south  of  Amsterdam.  In  the  carrying  out  of 
these  rival  plans  Botha  showed  himself  the  successful  opponent  of 
the  ablest  cavalry  general  in  the  enemy’s  service. 

He  attacked  Smith-Dorrien  as  related,  beat  him  to  a stand- 
still for  two  days,  inflicting  a loss  of  upward  a hundred  men,  and 
then  moved  ofi;  in  the  rear  of  his  o\vn.  retiring  column.  General 
Tobias  Smuts  held  his  own  town  of  Ermelo  until  French  appeared 
from  the  north,  when  he  fell  back  and  joined  the  two  Bothas,  who 
now  with  united  forces  delayed  and  worried  French  and  his  seven 
columns  until  it  was  no  longer  possible  for  them  to  remain  where 
their  lines  of  communication  were  imperiled  every  day,  after  the 
great  coup  had  failed.  Instead  of  enclosing  Botha  between  himself 
and  Smith-Dorrien,  French  found  all  his  columns  faced  by  a thin 
line  of  sharpshooters  twenty  miles  in  extent,  by  which  he  was  pre- 
vented from  making  more  than  seven  miles  progress  per  day,  even 
with  his  cavalry. 

The  English  made  the  best  show  possible  in  their  reports,  as 
against  the  second  palpable  failure  of  French  to  carry  out  the  plan 
for  which  his  latest  and  largest  command  had  been  organized  and 
equipped. 

They  published  the  following  list  of  achievements: 

“ Two  hundred  and  eighty-two  Boers  ‘ known  to  have  been  killed 
and  wounded  in  action’;  56  prisoners  of  war;  183  surrendered;  one 
15-pounder  gun;  462  rifles;  160,000  rounds  small  ammunition; 
3,500  horses;  74  mules;  3,530  trek  oxen;  18,700  cattle;  155,400 
sheep;  1,070  wagons  and  carts. 

“ British  casualties  : Five  officers  and  41  men  killed;  4 officers 
and  108  men  wounded.” 

The  following  additional  captures  were  reported  later  : 

One  19-pounder  Krupp  gun,  one  howitzer,  one  Maxim  com- 
plete, 20,000  rounds  small  ammunition,  153  rifles,  388  horses,  52 
mules,  834  trek  oxen,  5,600  cattle,  9,800  sheep,  287  wagons  and 
carts. 

“ Boers’  casualties,  4 killed,  5 wounded,  300  surrendered.” 

The  guns  here  reported  as  having  been  captured  had  all  been 
buried  months  previously,  and  rendered  useless,  by  the  Boers. 
Fully  seventy  per  cent,  of  the  Boers  mentioned  as  taken  and  sur- 
rendered were  non-combatants,  women,  and  children.  Botha’s 
actual  losses,  in  killed  and  wounded,  did  not  reach  150,  during  the 
four  weeks  in  which  it  took  the  seven  British  columns  to  march 
through  the  southeastern  Transvaal  against  the  relatively  small 


DIARY  OF  THE  ^YAB 


487 


opposing  forces.  The  cattle,  sheep,  and  wagons  were  the  stocks 
and  belongings  of  the  rich  farms  which  the  English  picked  up  as 
they  passed  along,  and  it  was  in  the  seizure  of  these  where 
French’s  main  triumph  lay.  It  turned  out  afterwards  that  a large 
quantity  of  this  stock  was  retaken  by  the  Boers. 

It  was  during  the  progress  of  this  loudly  heralded  movement  for 
the  ending  of  the  war  in  the  Transvaal  that  De  Wet  and  Steyn  had 
made  their  dash  south  to  Cape  Colony  and  back  again,  and  it  was 
this  achievement,  and  not  French’s  capture  of  women  and  sheep, 
which  evoked  the  admiration  of  the  on-looking  world. 

French  reached  Heidelberg,  on  the  Natal-Pretoria  railway,  by  the 
27th  of  February,  followed  by  a responsive  flourish  of  London 
journalistic  trumpets  over  his  magnified  triumphs.  The  victory- 
making editors  did  not  know  at  the  time  that  Lord  Kitchener  had 
already  invited  Botha  to  a conference,  for  the  28th,  to  discuss  a 
possible  ending  of  the  war;  induced  thereto,  doubtless,  by  the  raid 
of  De  Wet  into  British  territory,  and  all  which  that  might  mean  in 
the  way  of  stimulating  further  revolt  within  Cape  Colony. 

On  the  6th  of  March — seven  days  following  the  London  rejoic- 
ings at  French’s  capture  of  Ermelo,  Carolina,  etc., — Louis  Botha 
was  penning  a manifesto  to  the  Boers,  from  this  same  Ermelo,  en- 
couraging them  to  fight  to  the  death  for  Transvaal  independence. 

The  minor  events  in  February  were  dwarfed  by  the  two  rival 
movements  briefly  summarized,  and  do  not  call  for  specific 
mention. 

March  1-7. — On  the  1st,  Lord  Kitchener  reported  the  capture 
of  eighty  of  Kitchener’s  Fighting  Scouts.  He  forgot  to  add  that 
these  surrendered  to  a body  of  200  of  Hertzog’s  commando,  almost 
without  a fight.  This  very  much  fighting  body,  at  least  in  name, 
was  a Cape  Town  volunteer  force,  and  resembled  in  their  martial 
prowess  and  triumphs  the  incomparable  “ Bushmen  ” who  have 
been  described  in  earlier  chapters,  from  accounts  of  their  characters 
and  doings  supplied  to  the  press  by  their  chaplain.  The  Cape 
Town  heroes  were  a body  of  notorious  braggarts  and  looters,  and 
it  was  in  consequence  of  their  doings,  and  those  of  Brabant’s 
Horse,  a kindred  Colonial  farm-pillaging  force,  that  General  De 
Wet  and  Mr.  Steyn  issued  the  proclamation  referred  to  on  page  484. 

On  the  5th,  De  la  Eey,  with  a force  not  particularized,  attacked 
the  British  garrison  in  his  native  town,  Lichtenhurg,  which  is  some 
fifty  miles  nearer  Johannesburg  than  ]\Iafeking.  The  garrison 
numbered  500  men  and  had  two  guns.  The  attack  continued  dur- 
ing the  whole  day  and  was  going  badly  for  the  defenders  on  the  day 
following,  when  reenforcements  arrived  from  the  nearest  posts 
of  the  enemy,  compelling  De  la  Eey  to  abandon  the  siege.  The 


488 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


British  losses  were  reported  at  fifty-six  killed  and  wounded.  The 
Boer  casualties  are  unknown.  Lichtenburg  district  has  been 
“ swept  ” repeatedly  by  columns  under  Lord  Methuen,  General 
Bahington,  and  other  British  officers. 

Maraisburg,  north  of  Craddock,  Cape  Colony,  was  taken  and 
occupied  by  a Boer  column  on  the  7th  of  March. 

March  §-31.- — Piet  De  Wet,  brother  of  the  famous  general,  sur- 
rendered to  the  British  during  this  month.  He  stated  his  motive 
to  be  a desire  to  bring  a hopeless  war,  which  was  working  the  ruin 
of  the  two  Eepublics,  to  a finish.  Motives  other  than  this  were 
attributed  to  him  by  the  Boers  in  the  field.  He  had  been  an 
admirable  fighter  from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  had  shown 
himself  a most  capable  officer  when  in  command  of  men.  In  the 
campaign  around  Colesberg,  in  December  and  January  (1899-1900), 
he  exhibited  some  of  the  very  best  qualities  of  Boer  generalship. 
After  laying  down  his  arms  he  addressed  a long  letter  to  his  brother 
begging  him  to  give  up  the  struggle  against  the  British. 

A correspondence  between  General  Louis  Botha  and  Lord 
Kitchener  was  published  at  this  period  which  gave  rise  to  a general 
expectation  that  peace  might  soon  eventuate.  It  was  alleged,  on 
the  English  side,  that  Botha  was  seeking  an  excuse  to  surrender, 
and,  on  the  pro-Boer  side,  that  Kitchener  was  more  desirous  of 
peace  than  his  Government.  The  alarming  manner  in  which  the 
second  invasion  of  Cape  Colony  was  proceeding  had  much  to  do 
with  the  total  abandonment  of  Lord  Roberts’  “ unconditional  sur- 
render ” terms,  and  with  bringing  about  a conference  between 
Lord  Kitchener  and  General  Louis  Botha.  It  transpired,  after- 
ward, that  it  was  not  the  Boer  leader  who  first  expressed  a desire 
for  the  meeting. 

The  conference  took  place  at  Middelburg,  east  of  Pretoria. 
Kitchener  offered  terms  which  would  virtually  amount  to  Canadian 
Home  Rule,  ‘‘  as  soon  as  practicable,”  after  the  war  ended.  Botha 
agreed  to  communicate  these  terms  to  the  other  Boer  generals. 
Kitchener,  in  his  report  of  the  conference,  said  that  Botha  “ had 
showed  good  feeling.” 

Mr.  Chamberlain  did  not  approve  of  all  that  Kitchener  had  pro- 
posed, and  amended  his  terms.  On  the  final  submission  of  these  to 
Botha,  the  latter  replied  to  Kitchener,  saying,  “ After  the  mutual 
exchange  of  views  at  oiir  interview  at  Middelburg  on  the  28th  of 
I'ebruary,  it  will  not  surprise  your  Excellency  to  know  that  I do 
not  feel  disposed  to  recommend  that  the  terms  of  your  letter  shall 
have  the  consideration  of  my  Government.” 

A Boer  commandant  appeared  with  a body  of  men  at  Aberdeen, 
in  Cape  Colony,  on  March  10.  lie  raided  the  town,  released 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


489 


the  prisoners  from  the  jail,  and  retired  in  the  direction  of  another 
invading  column  further  west. 

Commandant  Kritzinger  with  a force  of  700  mounted  men  has 
raided  the  Bedford  district  of  Cape  Colony  of  its  horses.  He  was 
pursued  by  Colonels  He  Lisle  and  Corringe,  and  fought  several 
running  engagements  with  their  forces  from  the  12th  to  the  18th 
inst.,  when  he  was  reported  as  having  been  worsted  on  the  last  date, 
and  forced  to  retire  north  into  the  Craddock  region. 

At  the  very  time  when  the  British  press  was  informing  the  public 
of  General  Botha’s  anxiety  to  surrender,  he  was  circulating  the 
following  proclamation  among  the  Boers  of  the  two  Eepublics : 

“ Dear  Brothers, — The  tendency  of  Lord  Kitchener’s  letter  tells 
you  very  plainly  that  the  British  Government  aims  at  nothing  else 
but  the  total  destruction  of  our  African  people,  and  that  it  is 
absolutely  impossible  for  us  to  accept  the  terms  offered  therein. 
In  fact,  little  else  does  the  letter  contain,  and  even  much  less  than 
the  British  Government  would  be  obliged  to  do  if  we  should  one  day 
have  to  give  up  the  struggle.  Beware!  It  will  give  us  a Legisla- 
tive Council  to  consist  of  its  own  officials  and  members  appointed 
by  itself.  The  wishes  of  the  people  are  not  considered  at  all.  It 
also  proposes,  as  a great  favor,  this,  that  only  one  million  pounds 
are  to  he  made  available  to  cover  our  national  debts,  whereas,  ac- 
cording to  legal  advice,  should  at  an  unwished-for  time  matters 
turn  out  unfavorably,  the  British  Government  must  hold  itself 
responsible  for  all  the  national  debts,  and  cannot  simply  take 
away  our  State  profits.  Our  burghers  have  done  some  hard  fight- 
ing, but  how  could  this  be  avoided  when  the  existence  of  our 
nationality  is  unjustly  threatened  ? It  was  hard  for  them  to  have 
to  spill  so  much  blood  and  shed  so  many  tears  in  this  war,  but  it 
would  he  much  harder  if  we  should  have  to  give  up  our  country. 

“ I sincerely  sympathize  with  the  burghers  whose  families  have 
been  removed.  Let  not  one  despair  on  account  of  this,  for  he  who 
despairs  and  gives  in  is  not  only  unjust  towards  his  own  people,  but 
also  puts  aside  his  own  faith. 

“ The  more  severely  we  are  grieved  by  the  enemy  the  more 
courageously  we  must  defend  our  ground  and  our  just  claims. 

“ Let  us,  like  Daniel  in  the  lions’  den,  put  our  trust  in  the  Lord, 
for  in  His  time  and  in  His  way  he  is  sure  to  deliver  us. 

“ (w.s.)  Louis  Botha, 

“ Commandant-General. 

“ Ermelo,  1.5th  of  March,  1901.” 

General  Philip  Botha  was  killed  in  an  action  on  the  21st,  the 
particulars  of  whicli  I have  not  seen  published  anywhere.  The 
reports  said  he  was  killed  on  Doornberg,  in  the  northeast  of  the 
Free  State.  Philip  Botha  was  General  De  Wet’s  most  capable 


490 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


lieutenant  in  all  his  movements  after  the  surrender  of  Cronje.  He 
operated,  generally,  in  the  northeast  section  of  the  Free  State, 
near  where  his  splendid  farm  was  located  (and  burned  by  the 
British),  and  in  the  southeast  of  the  Transvaal.  He  was  the  oldest 
of  the  Botha  family,  and  of  five  In-others,  all  fighting  in  the  war. 
He  was  one  of  the  handsomest  men  in  the  Federal  armies:  tall 
and  dark,  and  as  courteous  as  a cultivated  Spaniard,  I spent  some 


Photo  by  Mr.  Davitt 

GENERAL  PHILIP  BOTHA  AND  STAFF 

Commandant  George  Brand  the  extreme  figure  on  left 


time  with  him,  east  of  Brandfort,  in  April,  1900,  and  he  impressed 
me  greatly  by  his  all-round  capacity,  gentlemanly  bearing,  and 
genial  disposition.  His  commando  were  devotedly  attached  to 
him,  and  would  follow  him  anywhere.  He  had  three  sons  in  his 
cohimn  at  the  time,  and  two  of  these  are  reported  as  being  wounded 
in  tlie  figlit  in  which  tlie  general  was  killed.  A combat  occurred  at 
Yrede,  near  General  Pliilip  Botha’s  home,  on  the  day  on  which 
his  death  was  announced  in  the  ])ress,  and  this  was  probably  the 
occasion  of  the  fatal  encounter  for  him.  Should  this  sunnise  be 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


491 


correct,  a brave  man’s  death,  near  his  own  homestead,  fighting  the 
ruthless  enemy  of  his  race  and  of  nationhood,  lent  a dramatic 
interest  to  the  general’s  last  stand  which  would  be  in  keeping  with 
his  soldierly  patriotism  throughout  the  war. 

I have  done  this  volume  the  honor  of  dedicating  it  to  his  memory. 

The  reported  result  of  the  fighting  round  Vrede  was  the  retreat 
of  the  British  after  a stubborn  resistance  by  the  Boer  force. 

On  the  22nd,  Commandant  Smuts  fought  an  engagement  with  a 
force  of  Yeomen  near  Ivlerksdorp,  southwest  of  Johannesburg. 
The  British  appear  to  have  got  the  worst  of  the  encounter,  tho  the 
ultimate  results  of  the  fight  involved  De  la  Eey  in  the  biggest 
disaster  experienced  by  him  in  the  war. 

The  brush  with  the  Yeomanry  on  the  22nd  led  to  a surprise 
attack  the  following  day  upon  De  la  Eey’s  laager  between  Klerks- 
dorp  and  Lichtenburg.  General  Babington,  with  two  large 
columns  came  to  the  assistance  of  the  Yeomanry,  and  followed 
Smuts,  who  retired  north  in  the  direction  of  De  la  Eey’s  laager 
and  convoy.  The  entire  force  with  De  la  Eey  at  Kaffir  Kraal  at 
this  time  was  about  1,000  men.  These  fought  a resolute  rear- 
guard action  under  the  command  of  De  la  Ee)^,  but  tbe  British 
mounted  forces  were  so  strong  that  the  Boers  had  to  abandon  all 
their  guns  and  the  entire  convoy.  Most  of  the  artillery  taken  by 
the  English  had  been  captured  from  them  previously.  De  la  Eey 
lost  fifty  killed  and  wounded  and  over  100  prisoners  in  the  two 
days’  fighting.  With  the  exception  of  Abram’s  Kraal,  where  he 
fought  Lord  Eoberts  for  a whole  day  with  300  Eand  Police,  this 
was  his  first  defeat  in  a stand-up  fight. 

April  1-15. — A dozen  small  engagements  at  widely  separated 
places,  from  Lydenburg  in  the  northeast  Transvaal  to  Aberdeen  in 
Cape  Colony,  were  reported  during  the  past  week.  The  Boers 
captured  a large  supply  train  near  the  Katal  border;  the  British 
beat  Commandants  Malan  and  Fouche  in  a five  hours’  fight  at 
Blaaukrantz,  in  Cape  Colony;  Scheepers  was  also  engaged  and 
forced  north;  while  Commandant  Fourie,  in  the  southeast  of  the 
Free  State,  had  a running  fight  of  twenty  miles  with  General  Bruce 
Hamilton’s  column. 

The  most  important  movement  at  present  reported  from  the  seat 
of  the  war  is,  however,  the  progress  of  a British  force,  under  the 
command  of  Colonel  Plumer,  in  an  advance  north  from  Pretoria,  by 
the  Pietersburg  line,  towards  Kylstroom.  Ko  effective  resistance 
was  offered  by  opposing  Boer  forces,  and  tbe  towns  and  districts 
in  that  region  were  occupied  by  tbe  enemy  with  very  little  opposi- 
tion. Pietersburg  had  been  the  seat  of  Transvaal  Government 
for  several  months,  and  the  purpose  of  the  Plumer  column  was  to 


492 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


attack  the  2:)lace.  This  was  successfully  done;  General  Schalk 
Burger  and  the  acting  members  of  the  Transvaal  Executive  retir- 
ing from  the  town  further  east  into  the  Zoutj^ansherg  regions, 
whither  they  were  not  pursued.  Anticijoating  this  movement 
on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  the  Boer  supplies  of  cattle,  food,  and 
ammunition  in  Nylstroom  and  Pietersbui’g  had  been  trans- 
ferred to  secure  locations  long  before  the  arrival  of  the  English 
forces. 

During  the  past  fortnight  the  press  agencies  which  had  “ cap- 
tured ” De  Wet  in  attempting  to  recross  the  Orange  River  at  the 
end  of  February,  told  the  public  that  the  general  was  known  to  be 
in  the  Senekal  district,  a little  south  of  where  he  started  from  in 
his  dash  on  Cape  Colony  in  January.  It  ajipears,  however,  accord- 
ing to  better  informed  sources,  that  he  has  been  on  the  Natal  border 
where  he  has  held  a conference  with  Commandant-General  Botha. 

A dozen  attacks  upon  supply  trains  are  reported  from  as  many 
localities;  most  of  them  occurring  in  Cape  Colony. 

General  French’s  columns  are  said  to  be  devasting  the  entire 
Carolina,  Ermelo,  Bethel,  and  Piet  Retief  districts  in  the  Transvaal. 

A troop  of  5th  Lancers  and  Imperial  ITeomanry  were  attacked 
early  in  the  month  and  captured  north  of  Aberdeen,  Cape  Colony, 
by  Boer  forces  under  Kritzinger  after  several  hours’  fighting. 

Owing  to  the  increasing  number  of  surrenders  made  by  British 
officers  to  Boer  forces,  an  order  was  issued  in  this  month  by  the 
AVar  Office,  warning  all  whom  it  might  concern  that  officers  who 
should  raise  the  white  flag  in  presence  of  the  enemy  would  be  tried 
Ijy  court-martial. 

Commandants  Kritzinger,  Scheepers,  Fouche,  and  Van  Reenan 
are  reported  “ as  active  ” in  the  Cape  Colony  districts  of  Aberdeen, 
Murraysburg,  and  Middelburg,  respectively. 

A force  of  A^eomanry  under  Major  De  Burg  was  surrounded  in  a 
district  of  Cape  Colony,  not  mentioned,  by  a body  of  Boers  led  by 
Commandant  George  Brand,  a son  of  ex-President  Brand  of  the 
Free  State.  To  Brand’s  demand  that  the  enemy  should  lay  down 
their  arms,  De  Burg  readied,  “No  surrender.”  The  Boer  officer 
then  addressed  a courteous  note  to  his  opponent,  saying  enough  of 
blood  had  been  already  shed,  and  that  he  gave  him  five  minutes  to 
decide  whether  more  of  his  men  were  to  be  sacrificed.  De  Burg 
then  surrendered. 

Al)out  tlie  same  period,  a body  of  Brabant’s  Horse  were  attacked 
and  taken  liy  Commandant  Malan. 

Commandant  Groblaar  sustained  a defeat  by  General  Dartnell’s 
column  in  the  AHyheid  district  of  tlie  Transvaal.  Two  liundred 
Boers  are  said  to  have  surrendered.  Probably  most  of  them  are 


DIABY  OF  THE  WAB 


493 


non-combatants,  as  it  would  be  otherwise  reported  had  they  been 
armed  fighters. 

A train  of  provisions  was  captured  near  Molteno,  Cape  Colony, 
at  this  date. 

Eeports  likewise  spoke  of  a “ continued  siege  of  Zeerust  by  the 
Boers.”  This  plaCe  is  in  the  Marico  district  of  the  West  Transvaal, 
northeast  from  Mafeking,  in  the  region  where  lieutenants  of  De  la 
Key’s  have  operated  against  the  enemy’s  columns  since  the  fall  of 
Pretoria. 

The  news  agencies  have  again  disposed  of  De  Wet.  Last  week 
he  was  located,  in  the  course  of  three  days,  in  places  three  hundred 
miles  apart.  This  week  the  correspondents  who  are  “ surrounding  ” 
him  in  this  way  announce  that  he  is  reported  to  be  insane. 

In  the  meantime  Lord  Kitchener  has  decided  upon  the  building 
of  chains  of  blockhouses,  bullet-proof  in  construction,  along  the 
lines  of  his  communications,  for  the  better  protection  of  the  rail- 
ways, and  as  impediments  to  De  Wet’s  and  other  Boer  mobility. 

April  16-23. — Clearly  Kitchener  is  tiring  of  the  office  of  mes- 
senger of  evil  tidings. 

Kews  relating  to  the  siege  of  Hoopstad  says  that  1,500  British 
troops  were  shut  up  there  and  isolated  for  over  ninety  days.  There 
was  not  a word  of  any  such  siege  sent  by  Lord  Kitchener  (for 
publication)  to  London,  until  the  place  had  been  relieved. 

On  the  16tb  Commandant  Smuts  was  attacked  and  defeated  near 
Klerksdorp  by  Colonel  Eawlinson  and  a greatly  superior  force. 
Smuts  lost  a gun,  6 killed,  and  30  prisoners. 

At  a meeting  of  representative  Free  State  Boers,  held  at  Boshof 
(supposed  to  be  in  the  possession  of  the  English),  near  Kimberley, 
southwest  of  Hoopstad,  on  the  16th  of  April,  Mr.  Steyn  was  re- 
elected President  of  the  Orange  Free  State;  his  first  term  of  five 
years  having  expired.  At  this  time,  and  virtually  since  Hertzog  and 
Brand  led  the  invasion  into  Cape  Colony  in  December,  all  the 
western  and  southwestern  districts  of  the  Free  State  have  been  in 
Boer  hands.  Hence  the  Presidential  election  at  Boshof. 

A messenger  from  General  Louis  Botha  to  President  Kruger 
arrived  in  Holland  on  the  20th  of  April.  He  reported  that  State 
Secretary  Eeitz  commissioned  him  to  say  that  the  Boers  could 
maintain  the  struggle  against  England  “ comfortably,  for  two  or 
three  years  more.” 

Three  editors  of  Dutch  papers  in  Cape  Colony  were  tried  by 
juries  for  “ seditious  language  ” and  sent  to  prison.  One  of  these, 
Mr.  Cartwright,  is  of  English  nationality. 

The  British  column  sent  north  towards  Pietersburg  to  clear  the 
country  of  Boers  and  cattle,  was  reported  as  being  entirely  success- 


494 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


ful;  large  nunibers  of  men  and  cattle  were  captured,  and  sent  south 
to  Pretoria.  Information  from  Boer  sources,  however,  states  that 
the  men  thus  taken  were  chiefly  non-combatants,  and  that  the 
“ large  numbers  ” were  mainly  composed  of  women  and  children. 
Behind  Plumer’s  column  a party  of  Boers  swooped  down  upon  and 
captured  a patrol  of  Hussars  near  Nylstroom.  While  Plumer’s 
column  was  operating  northeast,  in  the  manner  previously  related. 
Generals  W.  Kitchener  and  Douglas  were  cooperating  with  it,  in  a 
northwestern  direction,  from  the  Delagoa  Bay  railway;  both  move- 
ments having  for  object  the  clearing  of  the  Lydenburg  and  Pieters- 
burg  regions  of  cattle  and  of  non-combatants. 

Twenty-five  men  of  the  Prince  of  Wales’  Light  Horse  were  am- 
bushed near  Kroonstad,  presumably  by  some  of  De  Wet’s  burghers, 
about  this  time. 

A patrol  of  the  9th  Lancers  were  attacked  and  captured,  but 
the  locality  of  the  mishap  (in  Cape  Colony)  was  not  reported. 

The  latest  fighting  in  the  Dordrecht  district  of  the  same  Colony 
resulted  in  the  Boers  being  compelled  to  retire. 

General  French,  who  had  been  despatched  by  Lord  Kitchener 
on  another  “ sweeping  ” expedition  to  the  southeast  of  the  Trans- 
vaal, was  not  heard  from  for  weeks.  Eumor  said  he  had  been 
captured  by  General  Botha,  but  the  report  was  not  true.  He  was 
engaged  in  forcing  the  Boers  in  that  region  to  fall  back  eastward, 
again,  towards  Swaziland,  and  his  efforts  were  credited  with  having 
“ cleared  the  country  of  all  its  people  and  stock.”  This  would 
be  the  fourth  clearance  of  the  series,  counting  General  Buller’s 
march  eastward  last  June. 

A train  containing  food  and  forage  was  held  up  by  a Boer  force 
at  Molteno,  south  of  Stormberg,  in  Cape  Colony. 

* The  Boxburg  commando  of  106  men  is  reported  to  have  sur- 
rendered, voluntarily,  at  Middelburg,  Transvaal. 

April  24-30. — English  reports  from  South  Africa  claim  that 
there  are  18,000  Boers  now  in  the  hands  of  the  British,  as  prisoners. 
Fully  7,000  of  these  must  he  non-combatants  and  young  boys. 

On  the  24th  it  was  reported  by  the  War  Office  that  a British 
escort  under  Major  Twyford,  on  its  way  from  Belfast  to  Lydenburg, 
was  ambushed.  The  escort  probably  protected  a convoy,  and  both 
were  captured;  probably  by  some  of  Ben  Viljoen’s  men,  as  this  is 
the  district  he  has  recently  had  under  his  protection.  The  major 
was  killed,  and  his  men  surrendered. 

The  month  ends  with  more  captures  of  Boers,  including  two 
commandants  who  are  not,  however,  known  to  fame. 

Despite  the  sweepings  of  cattle,  sheep,  women,  and  children 
made  by  the  French,  Dartnell,  Plumer,  and  other  officers,  auCi. 


DIARY  OF  THE  ll'A/? 


495 


heralded  in  the  war  press  as  important  achievements,  it  is  clear 
that  the  Boers  have  retaliated  in  attacks  on  trains,  convoys,  and 
escorts  in  Cape  Colony,  Xatal,  the  Free  State,  and  the  Transvaal, 
in  a very  effective  manner  against  the  enemy  during  April. 

In  the  “ Xational  Eeview  ” for  Maj%  1901,  an  English  military 
expert  epitomized  the  progress  made  by  the  British  armies  in  the 
conquest  of  the  Orange  Free  State,  up  to  the  end  of  April,  as 
follows  : 

“ At  present  the  Boers  are  in  almost  indisputable  possession 
of  all  the  Colony  except  the  railway  and  the  places  on  it.  We  have 
just  abandoned  Hoopstad,  which  we  held  since  last  June.  Dewets- 
dorp  has  been  for  months  a Boer  center  of  supplies  ; Philippolis, 
Fauresmith,  Petrusburg,  Luckoff,  and  probably  Smithtield,  Wep- 
ener,  and  Eouxville,  are  governed  by  Boer  Landrosts.^' 

This  survey  of  the  situation  extended  to  the  Transvaal  and  Cape 
Colony  reveals  a state  of  things  equally  discouraging  for  the 
British.  During  the  month  of  April  Lord  Kitchener  organized 
three  great  “ sweeping  ” movements  in  the  Transvaal;  one,  led  by 
General  French,  to  operate  through  the  eastern  districts;  one,  under 
Colonel  Plumer,  to  clear  the  country  northeast  from  Xylstroom  and 
beyond  Pietersburg  where  the  Transvaal  Executive,  with  stores  and 
ammunition,  were  located;  and  another,  cooperating  with  Plumer, 
working  north  by  west  from  the  Delagoa  Bay  line.  These  forces 
were  the  best  at  Kitchener’s  disposal,  and  were  led  b}"  the  ablest  of 
his  officers.  Their  marches,  encounters,  successful  rushes,  captures 
of  men,  ammunition,  and  cattle,  etc.,  were  trumjDeted  from  day  to 
day  in  the  British  press  with  the  assurances  of  the  news  agencies 
that  the  Boers  were  dispirited  by  these  exhibitions  of  Kitchener’s 
strength  and  resources,  and  were  on  the  point  of  giving  up  the 
fight. 

By  the  end  of  the  month  the  three  columns  were  back  again 
from  where  they  had  started,  laden  with  large  quantities  of  cattle 
and  loot,  and  with  numbers  of  Boer  women  and  children,  and  other 
non-combatants.  But,  no  sooner  had  the  English  columns  left  the 
localities  into  which  they  had  marched,  than  the  fighting  Boers 
were  found  in  or  near  the  places  they  had  occupied  before  the 
approach  of  the  enemy,  reduced  comparatively  few  in  number. 
The  commandoes  had  held  off  from  the  superior  strength  of  the 
columns,  and  avoided  direct  encounters,  but  harassed  them  on  their 
way,  hung  on  their  rear  and  flanks,  and  then  resumed  their  various 
districts  again  after  the  enemy  were  compelled  to  return  to  where 
the  railwaj's  gave  them  the  only  hold  they  have  upon  the  country. 

The  fact  that  the  Eastern  Transvaal  is  now  to  be  raided  again, 


496 


THE  BO  EE  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


this  time  by  six  columns,  is  tlie  strongest  ])roof  of  the  failure  of  the 
previous  ‘‘ sveejhngs  by  Frencli  ami  >Smith-Dorrien,  and  of  the 
movements  anterior  to  these  in  which  other  generals  figured. 
Botha  was  already,  once  again,  at  Ermelo,  at  the  end  of  April. 

In  Cape  Colony  operations  have  taken  a somewhat  similar 
course.  The  various  commandoes  have  held  more  or  less  to  the 
districts  in  or  near  to  which  they  penetrated  three  months  ago. 
They  have  refused  decisive  engagements  by  breaking  into  small 
sections,  when  superior  forces  came  near,  and  joined  again  in  a 
neighboring  locality  when  the  enemy  went  back  to  the  railway. 
Kritzinger  has  been  the  most  active  of  the  invading  Commandants 
during  the  past  month,  and  has  scored  in  frequent  skirmishes  with 
patrols  and  escorts.  Hertzog  still  remains  in  the  northwestern 
regions,  where  he  has  a country  almost  as  large  as  France  to  roam 
over,  and  from  whence  he  can  supply  fresh  horses  to  De  Wet  and 
his  men  in  the  Free  States. 

May  1-7. — The  month  of  May  opens  for  Cape  Colony  with  the 
item  of  news  that  “ fighting  is  almost  of  daily  occurrence.” 

It  would  appear  from  the  latest  accounts  regarding  the  doings 
of  General  Babington’s  column  round  Klerksdorp,  southwest  of 
J ohannesburg,  that  his  victory  over  De  la  Eey  on  the  24th  of  April, 
at  Kaffir  Kraal,  was  greatly  exaggerated  in  the  press.  On  the  28th 
of  the  same  month,  “ large  Boer  forces  ” were  reported  to  be 
laagered  at  Haartebeestfontein,  in  the  same  locality,  while  on  the 
4th  of  May  it  was  cabled  that  Babington  had  been  “ heavily  en- 
gaged ” with  De  la  Ee3^  Language  like  this,  in  news  from  Pre- 
toria to  the  English  press,  is  frequently  found,  in  the  light  of  later 
accounts,  to  relate  to  occurrences  which  the  Boers  woidd  not  admit 
to  be  defeats  for  their  side. 

General  Viljoen  is  reported  to  be  at  Ermelo  with  Botha,  while 
the  news  agencies  are  again  distributing  De  Wet  over  widely 
separated  areas.  His  latest  place  of  activity  is  said  to  be  Harrismith, 
near  the  Katal  border,  where  he  is  credited  with  having  4,000  men 
at  his  disposal. 

May  8-31. — A new’  invading  column,  800  strong,  has  entered 
Cape  Colony,  from  the  Free  State,  under  Latigan,  a native  of  Coles- 
berg.  They  are  believed  to  be  reenforcements  for  Malan  and 
Fouche,  w’hose  men  are  operating  in  the  center  districts  of  the 
Colony. 

On  the  10th  of  May,  Commandant-General  Botha  addressed 
a letter  to  Lord  Kitchener  expressive  of  his  desire  to  see  the  war 
brought  to  an  end,  and  requesting  to  know  whether  the  British 
Commander-in-Chief  would  facilitate  the  passage  through  the  Eng- 
lish lines  of  two  messengers  or  deputies  from  Botha  who  would 


DIAUY  OF  THE  WAR 


497 


proceed  to  Europe  to  consult  Avith  President  Kruger.  Lord 
Kitchener  replied  in  a feAv  days,  declining  to  do  anything  that 
Avould  seem  a recognition  on  his  part  of  Mr.  Kruger’s  status ; saying 
he  could  only  negotiate  through  Boer  leaders  in  the  field.  He, 
however,  intimated  that  he  Avould  ask  the  English  Government  to 
allow  any  message  Botha  might  desire  to  send  to  Mr.  Kruger  to  be 
forwarded  direct.  A message  w'as  sent  in  this  manner,  the  terms  of 
which  have  not  been  made  public. 

In  due  course,  the  following  reply  reached  General  Botha  and 
Mr.  Schalk  Burger  from  Presidents  Kruger  and  Steyn,  and  was 
circulated  among  the  laagers  in  the  two  Eepublics: 

“ The  Governments  of  the  South  African  Eepublic  and  Orange 
Free  State,  with  the  advice  of  the  said  chief  officers,  and  taking 
into  consideration  the  satisfactory  report  of  his  Honor  State  Presi- 
dent Kruger,  and  the  deputation  in  the  foreign  country,  and  con- 
sidering the  good  progress  of  our  cause  in  the  Colonies,  where  our 
brothers  oppose  the  cruel  injustice  done  to  the  Eepublics  more  and 
more  in  depriving  them  of  their  independence,  considering  further 
the  invaluable  personal  and  material  sacrifices  they  have  made  for 
our  cause,  which  would  all  be  worthless  and  vain  with  a peace 
whereby  the  independence  of  the  Eepublics  is  given  up,  and  further 
considering  the  certainty  that  the  losing  of  our  independence  after 
the  destruction  already  done  and  losses  suffered  will  drag  with  it 
the  national  and  material  annihilation  [ ?]  of  the  entire  people,  and 
especially  considering  the  spirit  of  unbending  persistence  with 
which  the  great  majority  of  our  men,  women,  and  children  are  still 
possessed,  and  in  which  we  see  with  thankful  acknowledgment  the 
hand  of  the  Almighty  Protector,  resolve,  that  no  peace  will  be  made 
and  no  peace  conditions  accepted  by  which  our  independence  and 
national  existence,  or  the  interests  of  our  Colonial  brothers,  shall  be 
the  price  paid,  and  that  the  war  will  be  vigorously  prosecuted  by 
taking  all  measures  necessary  for  maintenance  of  independence 
and  interests.” 

General  He  Wet  had  issued  a manifesto  to  the  burghers  in  the 
Free  State,  in  April,  which  anticipated  the  decision  of  the  Federal 
Governments.  The  following  is  an  extract  : 

“ Brothers,  do  not  let  our  belief  and  trust  in  the  Lord  be  shaken. 
Many  precious  lives  have  already  been  sacrificed  for  the  sake  of 
our  great  cause;  those  lives  call  on  us  to  go  on.  Let  us  not  be 
depressed,  but,  like  men,  endure  the  Avorst,  faithfully  observe  our 
duties  to  our  country  and  nation,  and  humbly  wait  on  the  God  of 
our  fathers,  who  is  still  our  God.  He,  at  His  good  time,  will  give  a 
joyful  issue. 

“ Finally,  I wish  to  observe  that  if  I and  our  Government  were 
so  foolish  as  to  accept  the  proposals  of  Lord  Kitchener,  I am  con- 
32 


498 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


vincecl  that  the  great  majority  of  our  people,  if  not  all,  who  are  now 
lighting,  would  not  agree;  for  to  accept  those  proposals  means 
nothing  less  than  the  complete  subjection  of  the  Afrikander  people, 
and  the  subjection  of  a people  is  more  bitter  than  to  think  of  the 
death  of  every  single  burgher.” 

On  the  23rd,  General  Christian  Botha  was  reported  to  be  in  the 
rear  of  one  of  the  six  new  columns  engaged  in  again  clearing  the 
Eastern  Transvaal.  He  was  following  Colonel  Stewart,  who  was 
moving  towards  General  Blood’s  main  body,  east  of  Standerton. 
Commandant  Swartz,  of  Colenso  fame,  with  a number  of  Botha’s 
men,  seems  to  have  gone  ahead  of  Stewart,  and  to  have  been  am- 
bushed by  superior  forces  advancing  from  Blood’s  position  to  meet 
Stewart.  He  was  one  of  the  best  of  the  secondary  Boer  com- 
manders in  the  held,  and  notably  distinguished  himself  during  the 
Tugela  campaign.  It  was  he  and  Commandant  J oshua  J oubert  who 
held  Langwani  Hill  against  Buller’s  right  wing,  on  the  15th  of 
December,  1899.  His  loss  is  a serious  one  to  Botha’s  commandoes. 

Down  in  the  Yentersdorp  district,  so  often  visited  by  General 
Babington,  Commandant  Liebenberg  attacked  and  captured  a 
British  convoy,  and  killed  and  wounded  over  thirty  of  its  escort 
on  the  23rd. 

On  the  25th,  Kritzinger’s  commando  attacked  and  captured  a 
British  post  near  Maraisburg,  Cape  Colony.  Forty  men  sur- 
rendered. 

Zeerust,  in  the  Marico  region  of  the  Western  Transvaal,  is  once 
again  reported  to  be  “besieged  by  the  Boers.” 

During  this  month  the  public  have  learned  some  interesting 
facts  about  sieges  of  places  like  Zeerust,  which  Lord  Kitchener’s 
huge  forces  are  believed  in  England  to  be  holding  with  ease  against 
the  Boers.  The  following  letter  appeared  in  the  Shields  “ Daily 
Xews  ” of  the  12th  inst.  It  refers  to  Hoopstad,  a place  mentioned 
several  times  already  in  this  diary.  It  is  in  the  northwest  of  the 
Free  State,  close  to  the  Vaal  Kiver,  and  about  seventy  miles  east 
of  the  Kimberley-Mafeking  railway  line. 

“ Corporal  G.  Donkin,  of  the  2nd  Northumberland  Fusiliers,  at 
present  at  the  front,  in  a letter  to  his  uncle.  Detective-sergeant 
Cowe,  South  Shields,  gives  an  interesting  description  of  the  siege 
of  Hoopstad. 

“ We  have  been  having  a very  hot  time  of  it  in  Hoopstad,”  he 
writes.  “ We  have  been  hemmed  in  by  the  Boers  on  all  sides, 
and  fighting  every  day.  We  couldn’t  get  any  communication  with 
any  place,  as  the  wires  were  all  cut  between  Brand  fort  and  Bloem- 
fontein. We  tried  to  get  native  runners  through,  but  every  one  we 
tried  was  captured. 


DIABY  OF  THE  WAR 


499 


Lord  Methuen  was  coming  to  relieve  ns,  hut  when  he  got  to 
the  Yaal  Eiver  it  was  Hooded,  and  he  couldn't  cross  at  any  of  the 
drifts,  so  he  had  to  make  for  Fourteen  Streams,  and  come  round 
to  us,  so  that  made  a difference  of  another  month  to  us,  and,  to 
make  things  worse,  we  were  on  half  rations,  with  no  tobacco. 

“ All  the  men  were  smoking  hay  and  bits  of  sacking  steeped  in 
nicotine.  Our  horses  had  no  food  whatever,  only  what  they  could 
pick  up  on  the  veldt.  Every  man  was  in  rags.  Some  had  sacks 
on  for  trousers.  We  looked  a fine  mob  when  the  column  arrived  on 
the  1st  of  April,  with  Lord  Erroll  in  command,  who  gave  the  order 
that  Hoopstad  had  to  be  evacuated.  It  was  welcome  news  in  one 
way  to  us,  and  not  in  another. 

“ We  were  glad  to  get  away  to  get  a bit  of  food  and  to  be  newly 
fitted  out,  but  still  it  was  hard  after  holding  it  so  long,  and  fight- 
ing so  hard,  and  also  taking  into  account  the  men  we  had  lost,  to 
leave  it  with  no  troops  in  it.  It  was  like  giving  the  Boers  the  best 
of  it.” 

For  several  months  this  garrison  had  held  out,  with  never 
a word  from  Lord  Kitchener  about  the  plight  to  which  it  was 
reduced  by  Boers  who  w'ere  represented  in  the  English  press  as 
being  hunted,  dispirited,  and  broken  from  one  end  of  the  Free 
State  to  the  other.  If  Hoopstad  only  had  a defender  with  the 
journalistic  instincts  of  a Baden-Powell,  the  world  would  have 
heard  something  of  its  garrison  during  these  two  hundred  and 
forty  days.  I have  been  unable  to  discover  who  the  Boer  officer 
was  who  commanded  during  this  long  siege.  Dr.  Baumann  was 
Landrost  of  Hoopstad  in  April,  1900.  He  traveled  with  me  from 
Kroonstad  to  a place  midway  between  the  two  towns  when  I visited 
Colonel  Yillebois-Mareuil,  at  the  end  of  March.  He  was  not, 
however,  at  that  time,  a fighting  Boer.  Several  of  the  leading 
ljurghers  of  Hoopstad,  who  were  attached  to  General  Cronje’s  com- 
mand, surrendered  at  Paardeberg.  Probably  Generals  Kolbe  and 
Du  Toit,  who  took  part  in  the  investment  of  Kimberley  up  to  the 
raising  of  the  siege  of  that  place,  will  be  found  to  be  the  men  who 
gave  the  British  in  Hoopstad  the  lively  time  alluded  to  in  the 
above  letter. 

A Parliamentary  return  relating  to  the  farm-burning  operations 
of  the  British  army  was  issued  during  this  month  which,  even  on 
the  admission  of  English  authority,  revealed  the  extent  to  which 
the  British  had  deliberately  violated  the  code  of  civilized  warfare 
signed  and  agreed  to  by  England  at  The  Hague  Conferences. 
Houses  were  burned,  “ because  the  owners  were  on  commando,” 
and  for  other  reasons  which  should  have  secured  their  inviolability. 
The  districts  in  which  the  Boers  fought  most  stubbornly  were  those 
in  which  the  “ sweeping  ” columns  that  passed  over  them  burned 


500 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


most  homes.  To  the  eternal  disgrace  of  the  officers  concerned  in 
the  shameless  vandalism  of  the  act,  the  home  of  Christian  De  Wet 
was  razed  to  the  ground,  as  had  been  already  the  homes  or  farms 
of  Generals  Philip  and  Louis  Botha,  and  of  scores  of  other  Boer 
Commandants.  No  officers  of  any  civilized  nation  would  have 
treated  in  this  manner  the  homes  of  brave  Christian  foemen. 
Despicable  in  every  light  tho  the  action  is,  it  is  only  in  accord 
with  the  traditions  of  the  British  army,  whether  fighting  in  Amer- 
ica, Ireland,  or  India.  No  consideration  of  honor  or  of  chivalry 
can  ever  be  credited  to  the  soldiery  of  England  when  the  foe  they 
are  in  the  field  against  is  one  too  weak  or  unwilling  to  resort  to 
retaliation. 

A total  of  630  farms  are  admitted  to  have  been  thus  burned,  but 
this  is  obviously  a number  far  below  the  extent  of  the  actual 
destruction  carried  out.  The  British  will  be  found  to  have  dev- 
astated all  the  districts  in  the  Transvaal  and  Free  State  through 
which  their  forces  have  passed.  Soldiers,  in  their  private  letters  to 
England,  have  boasted  of  this,  and  many  correspondents  have 
borne  testimony,  so  early  as  August  of  last  year,  to  the  burning  of 
farms  and  villages  which  was  being  carried  out  by  the  English 
troops  on  their  lines  of  march  at  that  time. 

So  thoroughly  did  the  British  perform  their  house-burning 
work,  and  so  ruthlessly  did  they  compel  Boer  women  and  children 
to  enter  the  concentration  camps,  that  Mrs.  Maxwell  (an  Ameri- 
can), wife  of  General  Maxwell,  the  English  Military  Governor  of 
Johannesburg,  wrote  a public  appeal  during  this  month  to  the 
friends  of  the  Boers  in  the  United  States,  in  behalf  of  22,000  Boer 
women  and  children,  who  were  taken  from  their  homes  by  the 
English  and  imprisoned  in  these  enclosures.  She  described  the 
women  as  being  in  “ a wretched  condition,”  both  as  to  dress,  food, 
and  sleeping  accommodation. 

Just  three  years  ago  similar  barbarous  deeds  were  about  to 
cause  a war.  Their  perpetration  elicited  the  following  historic 
indictment : 

“ The  efforts  of  Spain  to  suppress  the  insurrection  have  been 
increased  by  the  addition  to  the  horrors  of  the  strife  of  a new  and 
inhuman  phase,  happily  unprecedented  in  the  modern  history  of  a 
civilized  people.  The  peasantry,  including  all  dwelling  in  the  open 
agricultural  interior,  were  driven  into  the  garrison  towns  or  iso- 
lated places  held  by  the  troops.  The  raising  and  movement  of  pro- 
visions were  interdicted,  fields  were  laid  waste,  dwellings  unroofed 
and  fired,  and  mills  destroyed.  . . . The  agricultural  popula- 
tion . . . was  herded  within  the  towns  and  their  immediate 

vicinage,  deprived  of  means  of  support,  rendered  destitute  of 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


501 


shelter,  left  poorly  clad,  and  exposed  to  most  insanitary  conditions. 
. . . From  month  to  month  the  death  rate  increased  to  an 

alarming  ratio.  . . . The  reconcentration,  adopted  avowedly 

as  a war  measure  to  cut  off  the  resources  of  the  insurgents,  worked 
its  predestined  result.  It  was  extermination.  The  only  peace  it 
could  beget  was  that  of  the  wilderness  and  the  grave.  ...  A 
long  trial  has  proved  that  the  object  for  which  Spain  has  waged  the 
war  cannot  be  attained.  The  fire  of  insurrection  may  flame  or  may 
smolder  with  varying  seasons,  but  it  has  been  and  it  is  plain  that  it 
cannot  be  extinguished  by  the  present  methods.  ...  In  the 
name  of  humanity,  in  the  name  of  civilization  . . . the  war 

in  Cuba  must  stop.” — President  McKinley’s  Message  to  Congress, 
April,  1898. 

There  was  one  horror,  however,  which  General  IVeyler  did  not 
resort  to  in  the  methods  of  warfare  which  brought  upon  Spain  the 
retribution  that  deprived  her  of  Cuba  and  the  Philippines.  The 
Spanish  general  did  not  arm  savages  against  the  Cubans,  or  employ 
them  in  his  plan  of  campaign  as  auxiliaries,  as  Lords  Koberts  and 
Kitchener  have  done. 

On  the  18th  of  May,  the  following  despatch  was  published  in  the 
London  press: 

“ Dueban,  May  17,  1901. 

“ Mr.  Brunner,  member  of  the  Katal  Legislative  Assembly  for 
the  Eshowo  District,  writes  as  follows  to  the  Katal  ‘ Mercury  ’ : 

“ ‘ Steps  have  been  taken,  with  the  cognizance  of  the  highest 
military  authorities  in  the  country,  to  let  loose  the  natives  upon 
their  already  demoralized  enemy,  permission  being  given  to  them  to 
loot  and  plunder. 

“ ‘ The  natives  of  Zululand  have  been  instructed  by  the  military 
officers  to  arm  and  invade  the  Vryheid  districts.  Thousands  of 
head  of  Boer  cattle  were  brought  in  and  handed  over  to  Colonel 
Bottomley,  and  the  Zulus  were  allowed  10  per  cent,  of  all  the 
plunder. 

' As  a result  of  this  action  the  Dinizulu  and  Zsibepu  tribes  are 
again  on  the  war-path.’ 

“ Mr.  Brunner  also  publishes  a telegram  of  protest  sent  to  the 
Premier  of  Katal,  and  what  is  stated  to  be  the  latter’s  reply,  to 
the  effect  that  he  had  sent  protest  after  protest  to  the  military 
authorities,  but  that  he  believed  that  Colonel  Bottomley  had 
greatly  exceeded  the  instructions  given  in  the  original  order. — 
Eeuter.” 

As  repeatedly  shown  in  this  volume,  facts  accumulate  in  the 
progress  of  the  war  proving  that  the  employment  of  savages  has 
been  continuous  and  systematic  by  the  British  from  the  com- 
mencement; as  armed  scouts,  for  the  defense  of  garrisons,  for  cattle- 


502 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


raiding,  and  for  other  military  purposes.  And  this,  too,  in  face  of 
the  solemn  undertaking,  given  in  the  House  of  Commons  by  Mr. 
Balfour  on  the  eve  of  the  war,  that  no  colored  auxiliaries — not  even 
Indian  native  troops— would  be  employed  by  the  British  during 
hostilities.  And,  when  these  armed  Kaffirs  are  caught  looting  and 
acting  as  armed  scouts  and  spies,  and  shot  in  consequence  by  the 
Boers,  the  English  who  have  so  armed  these  savages  accuse  the 
Boers  of  “ murdering  natives  ” ! 

A battle  was  fought  at  Vlakfontein  between  General  Kemp 
of  De  la  Key’s  commandoes,  and  the  enemy’s  troops  under  Gen- 
eral Dixon  on  the  29th  of  May,  and  is  reported  on  the  1st  of 
June.  Vlakfontein  is  in  the  Lichtenburg  country,  south  of  De 
la  Key’s  birthplace.  De  la  Key,  according  to  the  reports  of  the 
enemy,  had  suffered  a severe  defeat  at  the  hands  of  General  Babing- 
ton  in  the  latter  end  of  March,  when  he  lost  the  whole  of  his 
artillery.  His  chief  lieutenant’s  attack  on  Dixon’s  troops  was 
therefore  a double  surprise.  Dixon’s  force  consisted  of  1,500 
men,  with  seven  guns.  The  British  were  returning  to  camp 
after  burning  burgher  farms,  when  Kemp  and  his  men  rushed  the 
rear-guard  of  the  English  column,  and  captured  two  guns.  The 
Derbyshire  Kegiment  and  some  A'eonianry  were  in  charge  of  these 
guns.  They  gave  way  before  the  rush  of  the  Boers;  that  is,  the 
Yeomen  did.  The  remainder  of  Dixon’s  force  wheeled  back  and 
engaged  their  assailants  when,  according  to  Lord  Kitchener,  these 
were  driven  off.  The  official  British  losses  are  given  as  6 officers 
and  51  men  killed;  6 officers  and  115  men  wounded;  and  1 officer 
and  7 men  missing.  Four  more  men  died  later  of  their  wounds. 
Kemp’s  reputed  loss,  according  to  Kitchener,  was  41  Boers  killed. 
Lord  Kitchener  estimates  Kemp’s  attacking  force  at  1,200.  Ko 
English  report  ever  reduces  the  numbers  engaged  on  the  Boer  side. 
The  tendency  always  is  to  exaggerate  those  which  attack. 

The  usual  calumnies  against  the  Boers  when  they  succeed  in 
infficting  a “ mishap  ” on  their  enemies,  were  repeated  l)y  the  Jingo 
press  on  the  authority  of  Lord  Kitchener’s  “ rumors  ” that  some 
of  the  British  wounded  had  been  killed  by  their  victors  at  Vlak- 
fontein. One  sensational  story  alleged  that  surrendered  gunners 
were  shot  for  refusing  to  “ instruct  ” their  Boer  captors  how  to 
use  the  guns  which  Kemp’s  men  had  taken.  The  patent  absurdity 
of  this  story  was  its  best  refutation.  It  was  found,  however,  that 
when  Brigadier-General  Dixon’s  official  report  of  the  disaster  was 
published  by  the  War  Office  there  was  no  reference  whatever  to  the 
alleged  ill-usage  of  woinided  by  the  burghers. 

It  would  appear  that  the  temporarily  captured  guns  had  been 
in  the  charge  of  some  Yeomen  in  Dixon’s  command,  and  that  these 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


503 


troops  had  not,  to  put  it  mildly,  exhibited  a light-to-a-finish  dis- 
position in  the  encounter.  The  libels  upon  the  Boers  naturally 
emanated  from  those  who  had  been  whipped  by  them. 

The  following  unbiased  testimony  disposes  of  these  calumnies 
once  again,  and  does  honor  to  those  other  English  soldiers  who  can 
manfully  do  justice  to  their  foes  : 

The  London  “ Standard,’’  July  13,  1901,  published  a letter  dated 
Jirly  11,  signed  “ Without  Prejudice,”  in  which  the  writer  said  : 

“ On  reading  the  terrible  accounts  of  the  ill-treatment  of  the 
wounded  at  Vlakfontein,  I feel  impelled  to  send  you  some  extracts 
from  a letter  written  by  my  son,  a Yeoman,  who  was  wounded 
in  that  engagement.” 

Yot  a word  in  the  wounded  Yeoinan’s  account  of  the  battle  re- 
lated to  outrages  by  Boers.  On  the  contrary  he  declared  that  “ The 
Dutchmen  were  very  decent  in  their  behavior.” 

On  the  13th  of  Jidy,  1901,  the  Belper  “Yews”  published  a 
letter  from  Private  Victor  Booth,  1st  Devonshire  Kegiment,  from 
Xaauwpoort  Yek,  in  which  he  told  the  story  of  the  Vlakfontein 
tight.  He  charged  the  Yeomen  “ with  not  fighting  like  men.  They 
ran  away  from  the  guns.”  His  only  references  to  the  wounded 
being  injured  were  in  these  words: 

“ A good  many  of  the  wounded  were  awful  burnt,  as  the  enemy 
set  fire  to  the  veldt.  We  had  to  get  away  the  best  we  could  in  the 
night,  and  had  to  march  twenty  miles,  as  the  enemy  were  too  strong 
for  us.” 

The  veldt  was  fired  by  the  Boers  for  the  purposes  of  their  attack 
during  the  battle. 

Another  account  of  the  same  engagement  was  given  in  a letter 
written  by  Private  S.  Davey,  1st  Battalion  Sherwood  Fusiliers,  also 
written  from  Yaauwpoort  Yek,  and  published  in  the  Eushcliffe 
“ Advertiser  ” on  the  13th  of  July,  1901.  He,  too,  relates  how  the 
A'eomen  “ retired,”  leaving  two  guns  within  500  yards  of  the  Boers. 
He  gives  a spirited  account  of  the  gallant  efforts  made  to  retake 
the  guns,  and  how  dozens  of  men  were  shot  down  in  the  attempt; 
eighty-nine  of  his  regiment  being  killed  and  wounded  before  the 
cannon  were  recovered.  He  made  no  allusion  whatever  to  any  ill- 
treatment  of  the  wounded  by  the  Boers. 

Writing  to  the  “ Daily  Yews,”  Mr.  Patrick  McCue,  Poor  Law 
Guardian,  Sunderland,  quoted  a letter  from  his  son,  a private  in 
the  Derbyshire  Kegiment,  in  which  he  said  (referring  to  Vlakfon- 
tein): 

“ The  Boers  behaved  like  men,  never  shooting  when  they  could 


504 


THE  BOER  FI  OUT  FOR  FREEDOM 


take  prisoners,  and  even  apologized  because  they  had  to  take  our 
rifles  and  ammunition.” 

Private  McCue  added  the  illuminating  comment  upon  the  foul 
charges  made  by  the  “ retiring  ” Yeomen  against  their  foes,  tliat 
“ we  captured  thirty  of  the  enemy.  One  had  explosive  ammuni- 
tion and  was  accordingly  shot.” 

June  1-8.  ■ — It  was  reported  that  three  engagements  between 
small  bodies  of  combatants  had  occurred  in  Cape  Colony.  Near 
Dordrecht,  close  to  the  Orange  Eiver,  a detachment  of  Yeomanry 
was  captured  and  subsequently  released. 

General  Ben  Viljoen  attacked  a convoy  escorted  by  1,000  troops 
and  two  guns,  and  fought  a running  combat  for  two  days  with 
them,  2)ursuing  them  close  to  Standerton,  on  the  Pretoria-Natal 
line.  The  English  reports  speak  of  the  determined  character  of 
the  Boer  attack;  Viljoen’s  men  riding  to  within  fifty  yards  of  the 
guns  in  attempts  to  capture  them.  This,  it  may  be  added,  took 
place  in  the  district  over  which  six  columns  set  out,  early  last 
month,  “ to  sweep  ” off  human  beings  and  food,  for  the  fifth  time. 

News  of  the  relief  of  Zeerust  was  published  at  this  time.  Lord 
Methuen’s  forces  had  forced  the  Boers  to  raise  the  siege,  which  had 
continued  “ for  months.”  No  information  about  the  plight  of  the 
garrison  had  been  given  to  the  public  before  the  announcement  of 
Methuen’s  arrival  before  the  town. 

Lord  Kitchener  reported  that  Jamestown,  Cape  Colony,  had  sur- 
rendered to  Kritzinger’s  commando  on  the  morning  of  the  2nd  of 
June,  after  four  hours’  fighting.  The  garrison  were  subsequently 
released. 

Tidings  of  a “ dashing  British  victory  ” was  published  the  same 
time  in  the  London  press.  Four  hundred  Boers,  under  Com- 
mandant Beyers,  were  attacked  by  240  British,  under  Colonel 
Wilson  at  Warmbaths,  in  the  Transvaal.  The  report  related  de- 
tails as  follows  : 

“ Colonel  Wilson,  commanding  the  2nd  Kitchener’s  Scouts,  hear- 
ing that  Commandant  Beyers  had  sent  an  advance  commando  north 
in  charge  of  all  his  supplies  preparatory  to  his  retirement  with  his 
main  force,  made  a wide  turning  movement,  and  came  within  sight 
of  the  Boers  thirty-four  miles  west  of  Warmbaths.  The  Boers  were 
outspanning  and  were  unconscious  of  the  vicinity  of  the  British 
troops.  Colonel  Wilson  attacked  at  daybreak.  We  captured  8,000 
cattle,  and  18  wagons.  All  the  supplies  which  could  not  be  taken 
away  were  burned. 

“ After  the  Boers  fled,  the  main  commando  was  sighted,  and  the 
British  retired,  getting  away  with  all  their  captures,  in  spite  of 
attempts  to  retake  them.  The  prisoners  taken  numbered,  including 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


505 


a few  native  followers,  one  hundred.  The  Boers  abandoned  their 
ambulance  in  their  flight.  As  the  result  of  this  engagement.  Com- 
mandant Beyers  has  been  left  practically  without  transport  and 
supplies. — Eeutek.” 

Cabled  to  by  the  Secretary  for  War  for  a confirmation  of  this 
brilliant  performance,  Lord  Kitchener  replied  as  follows  : 

“ Lord  Kitchener,  in  reply  to  a telegram  from  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  War  respecting  the  alleged  surprise  of  General  Beyers’ 
commando,  states  that  the  report  is  without  foundation.” 

On  the  6th,  De  Wet  was  reported  as  being  attacked  while  with  a 
large  convoy,  near  Eeitz,  in  the  northeast  of  the  Free  State. 
General  Elliot,  in  command  of  one  of  General  Eundle’s  “sweeping” 
columns,  came  up  with  the  Chief  Commandant  and  engaged  him. 
The  fight  was  a stubborn  one,  and  resulted,  according  to  the  en- 
emy’s reports,  in  the  capture  of  the  convoy,  and  in  the  killing  of 
seventeen,  and  the  wounding  of  three  Boers — an  incongruous  list 
of  casualties;  the  English  acknowledging  a loss  of  30  killed  and 
of  24  wounded. 

A few  days  later,  a report  came  from  Berlin  that  the  encounter 
was,  in  reality,  a victory  for  De  Wet.  The  account  being  as  follows: 

“ De  Wet  made  a successful  attack  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  of 
June  on  Elliot’s  Brigade  between  Lindley  and  Eeitz,  and  forced 
Elliot  back  to  Lindley,  The  English  losses  were  4 officers  and  26 
men  killed;  5 officers  and  53  men  wounded,  some  prisoners,  trans- 
port wagons,  and  a large  number  of  cattle.” 

Fighting  near  Jacohsdal,  west  of  the  Free  State,  and  several 
other  minor  engagements  are  reported  between  the  3rd  and  the 
7th  inst. 

One*  report  locates  Judge  Hertzog  and  George  Brand  at  Petrus- 
hurg,  where  they  are  said  to  have  been  “ peacefully  occupied  for 
two  months.”  Petrusburg  is  midway  on  the  road  from  Bloemfon- 
tein to  Kimberley,  and  too  near  the  large  British  garrisons  of  these 
two  cities  to  lend  credence  to  the  truth  of  this  report.  Petrusville, 
in  the  northwest  of  Cape  Colony,  is  probably  the  resting-place  of 
the  two  Commandants  and  their  forces. 

I have  learned  from  a German  source  an  account  of  a remarkable 
encounter  which  occurred  near  Heilbron,  in  De  Wet’s  country,  on 
the  7th  inst.  A son  of  General  Phili]^  Botha’s,  probably  Charles, 
in  company  with  eleven  other  Boers  were  patrolling  witli  a pom- 
pom, which  was  in  charge  of  Lieutenant  Strydum.  They  came  in 
sight  of  a British  column — one  of  four  engaged  under  General 


50G 


THE  BO  EE  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Eunclle  in  sweejnng  the  northeast  of  the  Free  State  at  the  time.  It 
was  estimated  to  he  2,000  strong,  and  had  six  light  guns.  Botha 
and  Strydum  took  up  position  on  a ridge,  and  began  an  attack  on 
the  column,  at  5,000  yards’  range;  Strydiim  running  his  pom-pom 


“ ON  GUARD  " 


from  one  position  to  another,  under  cover  of  the  ridge,  and  creating 
tliereby  the  imjn’ession  that  the  Boers  had  the  service  of  two  guns, 
d’he  dozen  Imrghcrs  held  the  British  column  for  four  hours,  killed 
some  of  the  enemy,  and  then  wheeled  off  with  men  and  gun 
unscathed. 


DIARY  OF  THE 


507 


June  8-15. — Eeiiter’s  correspondent  at  Johannesburg  has 
cabled  an  apology  to  the  press  on  the  10th  for  having  published  the 
report  -which  charged  the  Boers  of  General  Kemp’s  commando  with 
shooting  British  wounded  at  the  battle  of  Vlakfontein. 

The  British  surprised  two  Boer  laagers  in  Cape  Colony,  and 
captured  43  prisoners,  and  15,000  rounds  of  ammunition.  Locali  - 
ties not  specified  in  the  reports. 

Lord  Kitchener  cabled  on  June  15  as  follows: 

“ Kear  Webnansrust,  twenty  miles  south  of  Middelburg  (ninety 
miles  east  of  Pretoria),  350  Mounted  Victorian  Kifies,  of  General 
Beaston’s  column,  were  surprised  in  camp  by  a superior  force  of 
Boers  at  7.30  p.ii.  on  the  13th  of  June.  The  enemy  crept  up  to 
within  a short  range  and  poured  a deadly  fire  into  the  camp,  killing 
3 officers  and  16  men,  and  wounding  4 officers  and  38  men.  Only 
3 officers  and  50  men  escaped  to  General  Beatson’s  camp.  The 
remainder  were  taken  prisoner  and  released.  Two  pom-poms  were 
captured  by  the  enemy.” 

These  Boers  would  be  Viljoen  men. 

Murraysburg,  in  the  very  center  of  Capo  Colony,  was  captured 
and  occupied  by  a force  of  Kritzinger’s  commando  on  the  13th. 

June  16-30. — A body  of  Colonial  Mounted  Eifles  were  out  in 
the  Craddock  region  of  Cape  Colony  in  search  of  Commandant 
Malan.  Kritzinger  was  in  search  of  the  pursuers,  came  up  with 
them  while  they  were  off-saddled,  attacked  them,  and  made  the 
survivors  prisoners,  after  a two  hours’  fight.  Fourteen  British 
were  killed  and  wounded;  66  being  captured  and  then  released. 

A fight  which  lasted  for  twelve  hours  has  taken  place  at  Eich- 
mond  in  Cape  Colony.  The  town  was  held  by  a force  of  the  North 
Staffordshire  Militia,  under  Captain  Hawkshaw,  and  was  attacked 
by  Commandant  Malan.  After  a prolonged  combat  the  Boers 
withdrew,  on  learning  of  the  approach  of  British  reenforcements. 

It  has  been  reported  that  fully  6,000  young  Dutchmen  of  Cape 
Colony,  farmers’  sons,  had  joined  the  invading  Boer  forces  since 
Hertzog,  Malan,  Kritzinger,  Scheepers,  Brand,  and  other  Com- 
mandants had  carried  the  war  again  across  the  Orange  Eiver. 

Near  the  end  of  the  month  news  agencies  represented  General 
Botha  as  falling  back  before  the  (fifth)  “sweeping”  movement  of 
the  British,  in  the  southeastern  Transvaal;  adding  that  “ his  sur- 
render is  hourly  expected.” 


Chapter  XXXVIII 

DIARY  OF  THE  WAR— JULY  TO  DECEMBER,  1901 


Location  of  the  Boee  generals — Kitchener’s  “ sweeping  move- 
ments ” — Close  call  of  President  Steyn — Kitchener  banishes 
ALL  Boer  leaders — “ Mr.  Dooley  ” on  Kitchener’s  “ Rules  of 
War  ” — “ Murdered  ” peace  envoy  comes  to  life — British  fight 
AT  GrASPAN  under  COVER  OF  BOER  WOMEN StEYN  REPLIES  TO 

Kitchener’s  proclamation — “ Your  jurisdiction  extends  only  as 

FAR  AS  YOUR  EXCELLENCY’S  CANNON  CAN  REACH  ” LOTTER  CAPTURED 

— Kitchener’s  “ bag  ” — Brilliant  British  victory  over  young 
GIRLS — Victories  of  De  la  Rey,  Botha,  Smuts,  Kritzinger,  and 
Groblaar — Zulus  employed  by  British  in  defense  of  Fort 
Prospect  and  Itala — The  “ movables  ” of  a British  mobile 
COLUMN — The  British  “ bloody  assizes  ” — Lotter  hanged — 
Scheepers  captured  in  hospital — De  Wet  killed  again — Buller 
TALKS  TOO  MUCH  AND  IS  REMOVED — CANON  GORE  ON  CONCENTRATION 

Camps — Chamberlain’s  comparison  of  British  and  German 
SOLDIERS  enrages  GERMANS — BOTHA’S  SLASHING  VICTORY  AT  BrAKEN- 
LAAGTE — Cooked  reports  of  British  War  Office — Miss  Hobhouse 

TELLS  TRUTH  ABOUT  CONCENTRATION  CamPS Is  FORCIBLY  DEPORTED 

Kritzinger  captured — Haasbroek  killed — How  De  Wet  “ laid  in  ” 
HIS  Christmas  supplies. 

July  1-31. — The  diary  of  events  during  this  month  might  be 
summarized  in  a sentence;  large  “sweeping”  movements  by 
Kitchener’s  many  columns,  in  the  Transvaal,  Free  State,  and  Cape 
Colony;  with  the  double  object  of  cornering  commandoes  and  cap- 
turing stock;  with  very  little  success  against  the  armed  Boers,  hut 
with  considerable  results  in  the  seizure  of  cattle,  horses,  and  wagons. 
The  Federal  Commandants  played  a watching  and  waiting  game. 
The  winter  season  urges  such  a plan  upon  leaders,  whose  men  are 
neither  too  well  fed  nor  too  warmly  clad;  men,  also,  who  have,  in 
most  cases,  been  fighting  with  their  officers  almost  incessantly  since 
October,  1899.  The  grass,  too,  drinks  deeply  of  the  winter  rains  in 
South  Africa,  and  crops  have  to  be  sown  and  looked  to  in  places 
where  the  non-combatants  have  all  been  swept  into  the  concentra- 
tion camps.  Boer  plans,  therefore,  called  for  the  splitting  up  of 
commandoes  into  small  laagers,  and  for  the  distribution  of  men 
over  wide  areas  in  Ihe  avoidance  of  conflicts  with  the  big  battalions 
of  the  enemy. 

The  chief  Boer  Commandants  were  located  as  follows  for  their 


DIAEY  OF  THE  Tr.4i? 


oon 


winter  caiiq^aign;  in  the  extreme  east  of  the  Transvaal  (north  of 
the  Krokodil  Kiver,  and  thence  northwestward,  through  the  Lyden- 
burg  regions,  on  to  I’ietersburg),  tteneral  Viljoen  and  Commandant 
Muller  had  their  laagers  distributed.  Westward,  and  north  of 
Middelburg,  Colonel  Trichardt  (a  native  of  Middelburg,  and  head 
of  the  Transvaal  Artillery  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  war)  formed 
a connecting  link  between  A'iljoen,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  north- 
ern commandoes  in  the  Olifants  Kiver  districts  on  the  other. 
Southeastward,  on  the  Swaziland  border.  General  Tobias  Smuts  was 
in  connection  with  Yiljoen’s  left,  with  the  Delagoa  Bay  railway  and 
its  English  posts  in  between.  South  of  Smuts,  Commandant 
Groblaar  extended  the  broken  line  of  Boer  resistance  on  to  Christian 
Botha  and  Commandant  Opperman,  south  of  Standerton;  while  the 
Commandant-General  and  his  brother-in-law.  General  Cherrie 
Emmet,  were  holding  the  extreme  southeastern  angle  of  the  Trans- 
vaal, in  between  I^atal  and  Zululand. 

In  the  western  Transvaal,  De  la  Eey  remained  almost  inactive  in 
the  country  between  Eustenburg  and  Lichtenburg.  His  able  lieu- 
tenant, General  Beyers,  formed  a slender  link  from  Warmbad,  north- 
eastward, with  Trichardt  and  Muller,  while  Commandants  Kemp, 
Smuts,  Liebenberg,  Van  Heerden,  and  others  were  in  their  usual 
sphere  of  activity  and  observation,  west  of  the  Magaliesberg  Hills, 
and  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Vaal  as  far  as  Wolmaranstad. 

In  the  Free  State,  General  De  Wet  was  in  his  own  country,  in 
the  northeast,  but  revealed  himself  very  little  in  action  during  this 
time.  His  principal  Commandants,  Froneman,  Kel,  Haasbroek, 
Alberts,  Strydum,  Tan  Kiekirk,  with  George  Brand  who  had  re- 
turned from  Cape  Colony,  carried  the  chain  of  defensive  observa- 
tion south  to  the  borders  of  Cape  Colony,  with  big  breaks  in  the 
line.  In  the  west  of  the  Free  State,  small  bodies  under  Baden- 
horst,  Erasmus,  De  Villiers,  Tan  Zyl,  Kolbe,  and  Conroy  operated 
from  the  Hoopstad  district  across  into  Griqualand,  while  Myburg, 
Tan  den  Berg,  and  others  did  the  same  from  the  Boshof  region 
south  to  the  Orange  Eiver. 

In  Cape  Colony  the  situation  was  one  which  would  best  be 
described  as  of  varying  uniformity.  Malan  and  Fouche  were  in 
the  eastern  districts,  pursued  in  the  usual  way  by  troops  who  failed 
to  drive  them  back  to  the  Free  State.  In  the  center  regions,  Krit- 
zinger  remained  in  comm-and  until  Attorney-General  Smuts  (now 
military  general)  left  De  la  Eey’s  commandoes  and  assumed  the 
direction  of  the  campaign  hitherto  carried  on  by  Kritzinger. 
Commandants  Scheepers,  Lotter,  Smit,  Latigan,  Marais,  and  others 
formed  links  with  widely-divided  gaps  across  the  colony  with  Hert- 
zog  in  the  far  western  regions  of  the  Cape. 


THE  BOER  FTGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


alO 


Against  these  (lis])ositious  of  Boer  forees.  Kitchener  continnecl 
his  plan  of  “ sweeping  " cohnnns,  along  with  tlie  further  erection 
of  blockhouses  for  the  ])roteetion  of  railways  aiul  the  corralling  of 
commandoes  within  certain  areas.  In  Caj^e  Colony  General  French 
had  the  chief  direction  of  such  forces  and  operations  as  the  con- 
tinued presence  of  the  invading  Boers  demanded. 

The  fighting  for  the  month  began  in  a dozen  small  encounters 
in  Cape  Colony  between  the  invading  bands  and  their  assailants. 
There  were  few  casualties  on  either  side ; the  Boers  evading  planned 
attacks,  as  if  they  were  well  informed  of  the  movements  of  French’s 
forces. 

On  the  4th,  at  Kaboomspruit,  some  of  Beyers’  men  blew  up  a 
train  carrying  British  troops  north  from  Pretoria  to  Pietersburg, 
killing  nine  of  their  enemies.  On  the  12th  a British  post  south  of 
the  Vaal,  on  the  line  to  Kroonstad,  was  stormed  and  taken  by  a 
force  probably  under  Alberts  and  Strydum.  An  old  seven-pound 
gun  was  also  taken,  and  there  were  a dozen  British  casualties.  Ben 
Viljoen  attacked  and  demolished  a blockhouse,  about  the  same  time, 
in  his  eastern  district,  but  did  not  carry  off  the  defenders. 

On  the  13th,  General  Broadwood,  who  was  engaged  in  “ sweep- 
ing ” the  northeastern  Free  State  district  around  the  town  of 
Reitz,  doubled  back  on  his  march  during  the  night-time  by  a cir- 
cuitous route,  and  succeeded  in  surprising  President  Steyn  and 
members  of  his  Government  who  had  come  into  the  place  in  the 
wake  of  the  English  column ; believing  that  Broadwood  was  passing 
in  a direct  march  north  to  Heilbron.  There  were  only  a few 
burghers  with  the  President,  and  the  surprise  was  so  complete  that 
he  escaped  half-dressed,  according  to  the  English  reports,  while 
Generals  A.  Cronje  (of  Winburg)  and  Wessels,  Mr.  Steyn’s  brother- 
in-law,  and  about  thirty  other  persons  were  captured.  Some  State 
papers  and  a sum  of  money  also  fell  into  English  hands. 

General  Andries  Cronje  has  a good  record  in  the  war.  He  fought 
in  the  Natal  campaign  with  He  Wet,  and  was  with  him  in  the 
battles  of  Reitfontein  and  Nicholson’s  Nek.  He  also  campaigned 
with  He  Wet  when  he  was  transferred  from  Natal  to  join  General 
P.  Cronje’s  forces  at  Magersfontein,  and  was  one  of  the  many 
officers  who  tried,  in  vain,  to  induce  his  more  illustrious  namesake 
to  cross  the  Modder  River,  to  the  south,  after  commencing  his 
retreat  on  Bloemfontein,  and  join  forces  with  He  Wet  and  Philip 
Botha  before  Roberts’  legions  could  have  time  to  bar  the  way  to 
the  Free  State  capital. 

General  Wessels  had  the  command  of  the  Free  State  forees  in 
front  of  Kimberley  for  a couple  of  months  after  the  war  began, 
but,  on  finding  that  younger  and  more  capable  men  were  required 


DIABY  OF  THE  ^YAR 


511 


i'or  the  task  of  handliiig'  large  coinmaiidoes,  he  patriotically  re- 
quested to  he  relieved  of  his  responsibility,  and  was  superseded. 
These  captures  are  of  little  importance  from  a military  point  of 
view,  as  both  generals  had  ceased  to  participate  in  active  ojrerations. 

Some  of  the  papers  found  by  Broadwood  were  subsequently  pub- 
lished by  the  English,  and  revealed  a divergence  of  view  between 
President  Steyn  and  State  Secretary  Eeitz  on  the  question  of  send- 
ing delegates  to  Europe  to  consult  with  President  Kruger  how 
best  to  open  up  negotiations  for  peace.  Reitz,  Botha,  and  Viljoen 
appeared  (according  to  what  purported  to  be  a translation  of  a 
letter  from  Eeitz  to  Steyn)  to  favor  this  course,  in  the  month  of 
]\Iay,  Avhile  the  Free  State  President  was  vehemently  opposed  to 
all  further  negotiations,  and  in  favor  of  continuing  the  struggle 
against  an  Empire  which  they  had  humiliated  before  the  great 
Powers  and  had  punished  so  severely  for  its  crime.  He  pleaded 
passionately  against  any  surrender  to  a foe  who  knew  not  what 
honor  or  a loyalty  to  treaties  meant,  and  called  upon  the  leaders 
of  the  sister  Eepuhlic  to  fight  on  for  independence,  and  to  trust  to 
God  and  to  the  chance  fortunes  of  some  European  complication 
which  might  aid  them  against  the  enemy.  Events  had  already 
shown  that  this  stern  stand  of  this  strong  man  was  approved  by 
President  Kruger,  and  determined  the  question  at  issue. 

On  the  15th  one  of  General  French’s  columns  surprised  Com- 
mandant Scheepers’  laager  near  Aberdeen,  in  Cape  Colony,  and 
captured  thirty  men,  Scheepers  barely  escaping. 

The  day  following  this  event  Commandant  Fouche  attacked  and 
defeated  a British  jDost  near  Aliwal  Korth,  killiiig  and  wounding 
twenty-four. 

On  the  20th  Mrs.  Kruger,  wife  of  the  Transvaal  President,  died 
in  Pretoria,  after  a three  days’  illness. 

During  the  latter  half  of  this  month  the  following  events  were 
reported : 

A party  of  British  were  ambushed  near  Petrushurg,  Orange  Free 
State.  Sixteen  “missing.”  Boer  force  probably  under  Myhurg. 

Lord  Kitchener  sent  this  despatch  from  Pretoria,  on  the  23rd : 

“A  train  from  Cape  Town,  with  113  details  and  stores,  was  held 
up,  captured  and  burned,  eight  miles  north  of  Beaiifort  West  (Cape 
Colony),  on  the  morning  of  the  21st.  Casualties  : Three  killed 
and  18  wounded. 

“ French  reports  that  Crahhe,  with  300  men,  was  attacked  in 
the  mountains,  near  Craddock,  by  Kritzinger  at  dawn.  The  horses 
stampeded.  An  all-day  fight  followed.  Crahhe  fell  back  on 
iMortimer.” 

On  the  same  date  as  the  mishap  to  the  Cape  Town  train,  a Boer 


512 


THE  BOEB  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


(.'oiiimaiulo  uiidfr  lieiieral  'J’obias  8niuts  atlackod  tlio  Briti.sh  and 
native  garrison  at  Brejnersdor]),  in  Swaziland,  and  eairtured  the 
place  alter  a determined  resistance.  The  tight  was  reported  to 
have  lasted  eight  hours,  the  British  ultimately  retreating,  and  being 
followed  by  the  Boers.  The  British  troops  were  a detachment  of 
Steinaeher  s Horse,  and  a number  of  Swazi  allies.  The  enemy  lost 
ten  killed  and  thirty  missing,  not  counting  their  Swazi  comrades. 
The  Boer  casualties  were  reported  as  “ heavy  ” by  the  usual  Kaffir 
informants. 

A son  of  the  late  General  Philip  Botha,  Captain  Charles  Botha, 
and  two  Field  Cornets  were  reported  killed  in  a fight  between  pa- 
trols near  Tafel  Kop,  in  the  Free  State,  only  a few  miles  from 
where  young  Botha’s  home  stood  before  it  was  burned. 

A Parliamentary  paper  issued  in  London,  July  24,  gives  the 
number  of  Boers  in  concentration  camps  as  14,622  men,  24,711 
women,  and  43,075  children.  There  were  also  23,489  Kaffirs  simi- 
larly detained. 

A battle  which  continued  for  a whole  day  was  fought  at  Nqutu, 
on  the  Zululand  border,  between  a small  commando  under  General 
Emmet,  and  a body  of  200  Hussars  under  Colonel  Henderson. 
The  British  narrowly  escaped  the  loss  of  a field  battery.  The 
Boers  charged  the  enemy’s  position  repeatedly,  and  ultimately 
forced  him  to  retreat. 

A fight  between  General  Walter  Kitchener  and  General  Ben 
Viljoen,  northeast  of  Middelburg,  is  said  to  have  resulted  in  the 
capture  by  the  former  of  a pom-pom  (previously  taken  from  the 
English),  20  wagons  of  provisions,  and  32  prisoners. 

August  1-7. — English  reports  from  Cape  Colony  say  that  num- 
bers of  the  Boer  invaders  are  being  gradually  driven  north  to  the 
Orange  Eiver  by  General  French’s  columns.  Judge  Hertzog  is 
located  at  Fauresmith,  in  the  south  of  the  Free  State.  If  this 
news  is  correct,  he  has  reti;rned  after  a six  months’  campaign  in 
British  territory,  during  which  time  he  has  fought  dozens  of  en- 
gagements, and  traversed  hundreds  of  miles  of  the  enemy’s  coun- 
try, from  whence  he  has  sent  large  supplies  of  horses  to  He  Wet. 

Lord  Kitchener  issued  a proclamation  on  the  7th,  which  ends: 

“ Now  therefore  I,  Lord  Kitchener,  &c.,  under  instructions  from 
his  Majesty’s  Government,  proclaim  and  make  known  as  follows  : 

“ All  Commandants,  Field  Cornets,  and  leaders  of  armed  bands, 
being  burghers  of  the  late  Republics,  still  engaged  in  resisting  his 
Majesty’s  forces,  whether  in  the  Orange  River  Colony  and  the 
Transvaal  or  in  any  other  portion  of  his  Majesty’s  South  African 
Dominions,  and  all  members  of  the  Governments  of  the  late  Orange 
Free  State  and  the  late  South  African  Republic,  shall,  unless  they 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


513 


surrender  before  15th  of  September  next,  be  permanently  banished 
from  South  Africa;  the  cost  of  the  maintenance  of  the  families  of 
all  burg'hers  in  the  field  who  shall  not  have  surrendered  by  the  15th 
of  September  shall  be  recoverable  from  such  burghers,  and  shall  be 
a charge  upon  their  property  movable  and  immovable  in  the  two 
Colonies.” 

This  fulmination  cannot  reasonably  be  expected  to  frighten  into 
siibmission  the  j^eople  to  whom  it  is  addressed,  any  more  than  they 
have  been  convinced  of  their  defeat  by  the  dozens  of  a similar  kind 
already  printed  and  circiilated.  The  Boers  cannot  well  reply  in 
kind,  as  they  (presumably)  have  no  printing  presses,  but  they  will 
probably  continue  to  offer  all  possible  resistance  to  foes  who  have 
burned  their  homes,  imprisoned  their  wives  and  children  in  con- 
centration camps,  and  who  are  candid  enough  to  say  that  they 
will  not  allow  the  leaders  of  the  Boer  nation  to  live,  after  the  war, 
in  their  own  country.  When  all  is  lost  except  honor,  men  will  still 
fight  against  an  enemy  who  knows  neither  honor  nor  magnanimity 
in  his  methods  of  warfare.  It  becomes  a sacred  duty  to  the  cause 
of  liberty  to  do  so. 

Mr.  Doole3'’s  comments  upon  Lord  Kitchener’s  military  procla- 
mations and  abuse  of  his  Boer  antagonists  reflected  non-English 
opinion  about  this  period,  on  the  British  conduct  of  the  war : 

“ Lord  Kitchener  wrote  th’  notice.  He’s  a good  writer.  ‘ Ladies 
an’  gintlemen,’  he  says,  Mhis  war  as  a war  is  now  over.  A"e  may 
not  know  it,  but  it’s  so.  Ye’ve  broke  th’  rules  an’  we  give  th’  fight 
to  ourselves  on  a foul.  Th’  first  principle  in  a war  again  England 
is  that  th’  inim^'  shall  wear  r-red  or  purple  coats  with  black  marks 
f’r  to  indicate  th’  location  iv  vital  organs  be  day  an’  a locomotive 
headlight  be  night.  They  shall  thin  gather  within  aisy  range  an’ 
at  th’  wurrud  “ fire  ” shall  fall  down  dead.  Anny  remainin’  standin’ 
aftherward  will  be  considered  as  spies.  Shootin’  back  is  not  allowed 
be  th’  rules  an’  is  severely  discountenanced  be  our  laclin’  military 
authorities.  Anny  attimpt  at  concealmint  is  threachery.  Th’ 
scand’lous  habit  iv  pluggin’  our  gallant  sojers  fr’m  behind  rocks 
an’  trees  is  a breach  iv  internaytional  law.  Eethreatin’  whin  pur- 
sooed  is  wan  iv  our  copyrighted  manoovers  an’  all  infringmints 
will  he  prosecuted.  At  a wurrud  fr’m  us  th’  war  is  over  an’  we  own 
ye’re  counthry.” 

A “ blockhouse  ” near  Brandfort,  Orange  Free  State,  was  rushed 
by  a party  of  Boers  (on  the  7th)  and  captured  after  severe  fighting. 
British  loss:  Seven  killed  and  a number  wounded.  The  Boers 
were  probably  led  by  Commandant  Alberts. 

Kear  the  Sabi  Eiver,  in  the  northeast  Transvaal,  twenty-five 
33 


514 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


men  of  a British  mounted  force  were  ambushed  and  captured.  This 
is  in  the  Viljoen-Muller  district. 

August  8-15. — Lord  Kitchener  reports  that  Andreas  Wessels, 
the  “ peace  ” envoy  whom  De  Wet  had  “ shot  ” on  the  12th  of 
January  last,  has  reached  Kroonstad,  not  from  the  other  world, 
but  from  Heilhron.  It  was  the  “ murdering  ” of  Wessels  and  Mor-  ^ 
gendall  by  the  Free  State  Commandant-General,  as  truthfully  de- 
scribed by  Eeuter  and  other  Jingo  news  agencies,  which  caused  the 
war  press  of  London  to  denounce  De  Wet  as  “ a murderer  and 
ruffian,”  and  to  call  for  his  summary  punishment — when  taken. 

An  engagement  between  Colonel  Corringe  and  Commandant 
Kritzinger  took  place  near  Steynshurg,  in  the  Stormberg  district  of 
Cape  Colony.  The  Boers  were  reported  beaten  and  several  prison- 
ers taken.  Commandant  Erasmus  was  reported  mortally  wounded 
in  the  engagement. 

Vanrhynsdorp  in  the  west  Cape  Colony  was  taken  by  Comman- 
dant Maritz  on  the  7th  of  this  month,  and  the  British  driven  out. 

August  16-31. — Fifty  of  French’s  scouts  were  attacked  and 
captured  near  Bethesda,  Free  State,  by  Commandant  Haasbroek. 
The  British  surrendered  to  the  usual  “ superior  ” forces  of  the 
'Boers  with,  however,  only  one  man  killed  and  three  wounded. 

A Boer  laager  near  Bronkhorstspruit  (40  miles  east  of  Pretoria) 
was  attacked  by  a British  force,  who  were  driven  off  with  a loss 
of  twenty  men  in  killed  and  wounded.  Boer  loss  heavy,  as  usual, 
and  their  force  superior,  as  always  happens  when  a “ mishap  ” 
occurs  to  the  other  side. 

The  London  “ Gazette  ” published  a long  despatch  from  Lord 
Kitchener  in  which  he  gives  detailed  reports  of  British  operations 
from  May  to  July.  He  accounts  for  a large  number  of  Boers  who 
were  killed  or  captured,  and  devotes  several  paragraphs  to  a vigor- 
ous abuse  of  those  of  his  foes  who  will  persist  in  fighting  for  their 
coimtry’s  liberty.  He  estimated  the  number  of  Boers  still  in  the 
field,  including  those  operating  in  Cape  Colony,  at  13,500. 

He  remarked,  incidentally,  that  numbers  of  the  Imperial  Yeo- 
manry who  had  been  recently  recruited  in  England,  and  forwarded 
to  the  seat  of  war,  were  found  unable  to  ride  or  shoot  on  reaching 
their  destination.  On  a shipload  of  these  returned  warriors  reach- 
ing England  later  they  were  described  as  “ street  loafers  and  disease- 
ridden  rapscallions,”  by  a Jingo  newspaper. 

About  the  20th  Commandant  Kritzinger  was  reported  to  have 
crossed  the  Orange  Elver  “ with  100  followers.”  It  is  an  English 
report,  and  nothing  is  said  about  what  has  happened  to  the  balance 
of  a commando  which  was  frequently  referred  to  as  being  800  or 
1,000  strong,  when  inflicting  a “ mishap  ” upon  the  British.  Prob- 


niARY  OF  THE  ^YAR 


615 


ably  the  balance  of  his  men  were  Cape  Volunteers  who  have  scat- 
tered to  their  homes  for  rest  after  a six  months’  hot  campaign. 

General  De  la  Eey,  apparently  well  informed  of  the  situation  in 
Cape  Colony,  sent  (Attornej’-General)  General  Smuts  with  a body 
of  300  men  to  reenforce  Kritzinger’s  commando.  Smuts  rode  from 
near  Potchefstroom  with  his  small  flying  column  in  the  rear  of 
the  huge  sweeping  movement  which  Lord  Kitchener  was  having 
carried  out  at  this  time,  and  which  extended  almost  across  the 
Free  State  from  east  to  west.  Smuts’  task  was  to  ride  south  for 
200  miles,  and  cross  into  Cape  Colony  while  columns  under  Gen- 
erals Hart,  Knox,  and  Pilcher  and  Colonels  Thorneycroft,  Lord 
Basing,  Eawlinson,  Damant,  and  Murray  were  on  his  route,  and 
liable  to  reach  the  Orange  Eiver  before  him.  It  was  a task  worthy 
of  General  De  Wet,  and  was  as  successfully  carried  through  as  if 
the  great  Free  Stater  was  in  the  saddle. 

General  Smuts  formed  a junction  with  Kritzinger  in  the  south- 
eastern corner  of  the  Free  State,  close  to  Basutoland,  and  the  latter 
then  passed  over  the  river  again,  with  the  men  brought  down  from 
De  la  Eey’s  forces  by  Smuts.  After  this  splendid  bit  of  work. 
Smuts  wheeled  round,  and  made  north  by  the  Basutoland  frontier, 
pursued  by  a few  of  the  British  columns.  He  obtained  some  more 
men  in  the  Wepener  district,  doubled  back  past  his  pursuers,  and 
rode  over  the  Orange  Eiver  into  the  Aliwal  Korth  district  of  Cape 
Colony  by  the  end  of  the  month. 

Lord  Kitchener  reports  as  follows,  from  August  24-31 : 

“Pretoria,  25  August. 

“ Sworn  evidence  has  been  brought  to  my  notice  by  General 
Elliot  that  on  6th  of  June  Lieutenant  Mair,  of  the  Kew  South 
Wales  Artillery,  and  Privates  Harvey  and  Blunt  were  shot  down  at 
Graspan,  near  Eeitz,  after  they  had  surrendered. 

“ I have  forwarded  to  Steyn  and  Botha  copies  of  these  state- 
ments.” 

In  prompt  response  to  tMs  message  the  British  War  Secretary 
cabled  Kitchener: 

“We  understand  you  have  as  yet  received  no  satisfactory  assur- 
ances respecting  the  murder  of  our  wounded  at  Vlakfontein. 

“ In  view  of  the  occurrences  reported  in  your  telegram  of  25th 
inst.,  we  are  of  opinion  that  you  should  notify  by  proclamation  that 
the  members  of  any  commando  by  which  such  an  outrage  may  be 
committed  who  may  be  captured  and  after  trial  proved  to  have 
been  present  on  such  an  occasion,  will  be  held  guilty  whether  they 
actually  committed  the  deed  or  not;  that  the  leader  of  the  com- 
mando will  be  sentenced  to  death,  and  other  members  of  the  com- 


51G 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


iiiando  punished  by  death  or  less  sentence,  according  to  the  degree 
of  their  complicity.” 

The  allegation  in  Lord  Kitchener’s  despatch  is  made  over  two 
months  after  the  event  is  said  to  have  happened;  a circumstance 
which  does  not  greatly  tend  to  corroborate  the  facts.  Similar 
charges  were  made  in  connection  with  the  battle  of  Vlakfontein, 
and,  tho  the  War  Secretary  repeats  them  in  the  above  revengeful 
message,  no  evidence  has  been  produced  to  substantiate  charges 
which  numbers  of  British  soldiers  have  voluntarily  declared  to  be 
unfounded. 

The  Boer  version  of  the  affair  of  the  6th  of  June  puts  quite  an- 
other complexion  upon  the  shooting  of  the  British  officer.  If  this 
statement  of  the  case  is  true,  Lord  Kitchener’s  indignation  is  some- 
what uncalled  for.  The  story  is  told  in  the  Dutch  and  German 
press,  as  follows: 

“ In  a recent  number  of  the  ^ Deutsche  Wochenzeitung  in  den 
Xiederlanden  ’ appeared  a statement  made  by  Mrs.  Cremer,  66  years 
okL  a cousin  of  the  late  Minister  for  the  Colonies  of  Holland.  This 
lady,  her  daughter,  and  her  daughter-in-law,  had  been  removed 
from  Graspan  to  the  concentration  camp  at  Kroonstad.  Her  eldest 
son,  when  Commandant  of  the  Senekal  commando,  was  killed  near 
Thaba  K’chu,  and  two  others  are  prisoners  of  war  in  Ceylon. 
Three  days  after  her  arrival  in  the  concentration  camp  at  Kroon- 
stad old  Mrs.  Cremer  digd,  in  consequence  of  the  terror  to  which 
she  had  been  exposed  at  Graspan.  Her  death,  however,  is  no 
obstacle  to  the  investigation  of  the  truth  of  this  affair,  as  all  the 
women  and  children  who,  at  that  time  were  subjected  to  the  same 
treatment,  confirm  the  truth  of  the  account,  and  may  be  found  in 
the  camp  at  Kroonstad,  says  the  correspondent  of  the  ‘ Deutsche 
Wochenzeitung.’  The  account,  translated,  runs  thus: 

“'On  the  6th  of  June,  near  Graspan,  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Eeitz,  the  Boers  attacked  the  English  transport,  among  whom  were 
Mrs.  Cremer  and  other  Boer  women  and  children.  When  some 
Englishmen  had  been  wounded,  and  the  Boers  came  nearer,  the 
women  were  ordered  to  come  down  from  the  wagons  and  place 
themselves  before  the  soldiers,  who  would  then  shoot  at  the 
approaching  Boers  from  under  their  arms.  There  was  also  a soldier 
who  fired  from  under  the  arm  of  Mrs.  Cremer.  The  bullets  of  the 
Boers  killed  eight  women  and  two  children.  When  the  Boers  per- 
ceived this,  they  ceased  firing,  they  roared  like  ferocious  animals, 
ran  at  the  circle  of  Englishmen  with  the  butt-end  of  their  guns, 
and,  as  if  they  were  mad  dogs,  struck  down  the  Tommies.  But 
before  this  happened  some  twenty  Boers  at  least  had  been  killed 
by  the  English  soldiers.  The  Boers  wanted  to  take  the  wagons  with 
the  women  along  with  them,  but  when  they  saw  that  a large  British 


DIAHY  OF  THE  WAE 


517 


force  was  drawing  near  they  contented  themselves  with  carrying 
off  the  trek  oxen.  They  left  alone  the  wagons  with  the  women  and 
children;  the  others  were  burned.  In  the  hand-to-hand  fight 
between  the  English  soldiers  and  the  Boers,  one,  Geradus  Muller, 
was  killed  on  the  English  side.  He  was  a Free  Stater  who  had 
served  as  guide  to  the  English.  His  two  brothers  fell  on  the  Boer 
side.  The  father  of  these  persons  felt  deeply  the  shame  brought 
upon  him  by  his  son  Geradus.’  ” 

The  German  weekly  exclaims  in  connection  with  this  case,  that 
if  the  brother  officers  of  the  officer  in  command  of  those  troops 
do  not  demand  his  shoulder-knots  to  be  torn  off,  the  fact  will  he 
an  everlasting  shame  to  the  British  colors. 

In  its  number  of  the  13th  of  October,  the  “ Xieuwe  Eotter- 
damsche  Courant  ” says  that  from  an  ex-prisoner,  now  staying  in 
the  Xetherlands,  they  have  received  a confirmation  of  the  account 
published  by  the  “ Deutsche  Wochenzeitung  ” of  the  crime  com- 
mitted by  the  English  at  Graspan,  in  the  Orange  Free  State,  on  the 
Boer  women  and  children.  This  ex-prisoner  also,  heard  from  the 
late  Mrs.  Cremer  herself  this  account  in  the  very  same  words, 
which  at  the  time  was  confirmed  by  her  fellow-prisoners  who  had 
been  present  when  the  crime  was  committed. 

Lord  Kitchener  has  cabled  from  Pretoria  news  of  the  following 
mishap : 

“ Three  officers  and  sixty-five  men  who  were  sent  north  of  Lady- 
brand  (Orange  Free  State),  on  the  right  of  Elliot’s  columns,  were 
surrounded  on  unfavorable  ground  and  captured  by  a superior 
force.  One  man  was  killed  and  four  were  wounded.  The  j^risoners 
were  released.  Am  holding  an  inquiry.” 

This  British  force  was  composed  of  the  Black  ^Yatch  who  were 
so  badly  cut  up  at  Magersfontein.  The  attack  in  this  instance  was 
led  by  De  AYet  in  person,  and  was  the  only  action  in  which  he  has 
taken  part  since  June.  Kitchener  likewise  reported  that  he  had 
received  “ a long,  argumentative  statement  from  Mr.  Steyii  ” in 
reply  to  the  last  proclamation  of  the  English  Commander-in-Chief. 

It  is  a long  statement,  truly,  but  it  was  the  only  occasion  which 
this  truly  great  leader  has  availed  of  since  war  was  declared  for 
the  vindication  of  himself  and  his  heroic  little  State  for  their  self- 
sacrificing  resolution  to  meet  a possible  Sedan  for  their  country 
and  liberty  rather  than  desert  the  sister  Eepublic  in  her  life  or 
death  struggle  against  the  British  Empire. 

The  letter  was  as  follows: 

“ 15th  August,  1901. 

“ Y^our  Excellency, — I have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 
of  your  letter  of  6th  of  August,  1901,  enclosing  the  proclamation 


518 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


of  even  date.  The  not  unfriendly  tone  of  yonr  letter  encourages 
me  to  reply  somewhat  at  length  to  yonr  Excellency’s  writing.  I 
have  noted  that  not  only  by  you  in  your  letter,  but  also  by  respon- 
sible statesmen  on  your  side,  it  is  affirmed  that  the  declaration  of 
war  by  the  South  African  Eepublic  and  the  invasion  of  British 
territory  were  the  cause  of  the  war.  I hardly  consider  it  necessary 
to  remind  you  that  in  1895,  when  the  South  African  Eepublic  was 
unarmed  and  at  peace,  trusting  that  her  neighbors  were  civilized 
nations,  an  iinexpected  attack  was  made  on  her  from  British  terri- 
tory. I consider  it  unnecessary  to  point  out  to  you  that  when 
this  foolish  undertaking  (which  could  only  have  been  undertaken 
by  a man  who  had  become  insane  through  his  vanity)  failed,  and  all 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  South  African  Eepublic,  the  Government 
of  the  South  African  Eepublic,  relying  on  the  sense  of  justice  of 
the  English  nation,  handed  over  all  the  persons  taken  prisoners 
by  them,  and  deserving  of  death  according  to  international  law, 
to  her  Majesty’s  Government.  I do  not  consider  it  necessary  to 
point  out  to  you  that  when  a just  jiidge  sentenced  the  leaders  of 
the  expedition  to  imprisonment  the  principal  men  were  not  kept 
in  prison  till  they  had  served  their  time,  but  were  released  on  some 
trivial  cause  or  other  before  the  expiration  of  their  term.  I do  not 
ydsh  to  remind  your  Excellency  that  when  a Parliamentary  Com- 
mission was  appointed  to  examine  into  the  cause  and  reason  of 
the  above-mentioned  expedition  that  Commission,  instead  of  ex- 
amining into  the  case,  kept  back  certain  evidence,  and  when  the 
Commission,  in  spite  of  the  great  influence  which  was  brought  to 
bear  on  them  during  the  Session,  found  the  chief  conspirators 
and  Mr.  Ehodes  guilty  and  reported  them  as  such  to  the  Parlia- 
ment, Mr.  Chamberlain,  who  was  one  of  the  members  of  the 
Commission,  defended  Mr.  Ehodes  in  direct  opposition  to  his 
own  report.  A"our  Excellency  must  admit  that  the  South  Afri- 
can Eepublic,  like  the  civilized  world,  had  the  perfect  right  to 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Jameson  Eaid,  which  we  at  first 
thought  had  been  undertaken  by  irresponsible  persons,  was  not 
unknown  to  her  Majesty’s  Government,  at  least  not  to  all  of  them. 
I do  not  wish  to  remind  you  that  since  that  time  not  only  has  no 
reasonable  compensation  been  paid  out  to  the  South  African 
Eepublic,  as  was  promised  at  that  time,  but  she  has  been  constantly 
bothered  with  despatches  and  threats  concerning  her  internal 
government.  I need  not  remind  your  Excellency  how  outside  in- 
fluence was  also  made  use  of  in  getting  up  petitions  to  her  Majesty 
concerning  alleged  grievances,  in  order  to  give  her  Majesty’s  Gov- 
ernment the  desired  opportunity  for  meddling  with  the  internal 
poliey  of  the  South  African  Eepublic. 

“ When  in  the  course  of  1899  troops  were  massed  on  the  borders 
not  only  of  the  South  African  Eepublic,  but  also  of  the  hitherto 
friendly  Orange  Free  State,  and  when  it  became  evident  to  the 
South  African  Eepublic  that  the  English  did  not  desire  the  removal 


DIARY  OF  THE  IVAR 


519 


of  the  grievances,  which  are  now  declared  on  all  hands  never  to 
have  existed,  hut  the  destruction  of  the  independence  of  the  above- 
named  Kepuhlics,  she  desired  the  British  Government  to  withdraw 
the  troops  from  her  borders,  and  to  have  all  disputes  settled  by 
arbitration.  This  happened  three  weeks  after  the  British  Govern- 
ment had  issued  its  ultimatum,  and  about  a month  after  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Orange  Free  State  had  received  a telegram  from  the 
High  Commissioner  asking  her  to  remain  neutral,  thereby  distinctly 
proving  that  the  British  Government  was  determined  to  wage  war 
against  the  South  African  Eepuhlic.  This  telegram  was  sent  to  the 
Orange  Free  State,  tho  it  was  well  known  that  the  Orange  Free 
State  had  entered  into  a defensive  treaty  with  the  South  African  Ee- 
public  in  1897.  When  the  South  African  Eepuhlic  decided  to  guard 
her  borders  against  the  enemy  who  lay  there  in  the  vicinity,  I was 
obliged  to  take  one  of  the  most  painful  steps  to  me — viz.,  to  break 
the  ties  of  friendship  which  existed  between  us  and  the  British 
Government,  and  to  be  true  to  our  treaty  and  stand  by  the  South 
African  Eepuhlic.  That  we  were  perfectly  Justified  in  our  belief 
that  the  British  Government  was  firmly  resolved  to  wipe  out  the 
two  Eepublics  has  been  proved  distinctly  since  the  war  broke  out. 
It  has  not  only  been  proved  by  documents  which  have  fallen  into 
our  hands,  from  which  it  is  distinctly  evident  that  since  1896  (that 
is,  since  the  Jameson  Eaid)  the  British  Government  was  firmly, 
resolved  to  invade  both  Eepublics;  hut  only  lately  it  was  acknowl- 
edged by  Lord  Lansdowne  that  he  had,  as  early  as  June,  1899,  dis- 
cussed with  Lord  Wolseley,  then  Commander-in-Chief  of  her 
Majesty’s  forces,  as  to  the  best  time  for  invading  the  two  Eepublics. 
Your  Excellency  will  thus  see  that  we  did  not  draw  the  sword, 
but  that  we  only  pushed  away  the  sword  that  was  already  laid 
at  our  throats.  We  only  acted  in  self-defense,  one  of  the  holiest 
rights  of  man,  in  order  to  maintain  our  existence;  and  for  that 
reason  I consider,  with  all  due  reverence,  that  we  have  the  right 
to  trust  in  a righteous  God. 

“ I further  note  that  your  Excellency  again  refers  to  the  im- 
possibility of  intervention  by  some  foreign  Power  or  other,  and 
you  make  it  appear  that  we  are  only  continuing  the  struggle  in  the 
hope  of  this  intervention.  With  your  Excellency’s  permission,  I 
wish  to  explain  clearly  our  position  as  regards  intervention.  It  is 
this.  We  have  hoped,  and  still  hope,  that  the  moral  feeling  of  the 
civilized  world  would  oppose  the  crime  that  England  is  perpetrating 
here  in  South  Africa — viz.,  that  she  is  trying  to  destroy  the  exist- 
ence of  a young  nation — yet  we  were  always  fully  determined,  if 
that  hope  was  not  destined  to  be  realized,  to  exert  our  utmost 
power  in  opposition,  with  firm  confidence  in  a merciful  God,  and 
that  is  still  our  unchangeable  resolve  to-day. 

“ I also  note  that  your  Excellency  takes  it  for  granted  that  our 
struggle  is  hopeless.  I do  not  know  on  what  grounds  you  base  this 
opinion;  hut  let  us  compare  for  a moment  our  mutual  conditions 


520 


THE  BOEE  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


at  the  present  time  and  a year  ago,  after  the  surrender  of  General 
Prinsloo.  A year  ago,  the  Cape  Colony  was  altogether  peaceful  and 
free  from  our  commandoes;  the  Orange  Free  State  was  almost 
wholly  in  your  hands,  not  only  the  principal  towns,  railways,  and 
other  villages,  hut  also  the  Avhole  country  except  where  Com- 
mandant Haasbroek  was  with  his  commandoes.  In  the  South  Afri- 
can Kepuhlic  it  was  the  same;  it  was  almost  altogether  in  your 
hands,  except  where  General  De  la  Eey  was  ndtli  his  commandoes, 
and  where  General  Botha  was  with  his,  far  in  the  Boschveld.  At 
present  the  Cape  Colony  is,  so  to  say,  covered  by  our  commandoes, 
and  they  are  in  temporary  possession  of  the  greater  part  of  the 
Cape  Colony,  where  they  move  about  as  they  wish  and  where  they 
are  joined  by  many  of  our  kindred  and  others,  Avho  thus  oppose 
themselves  to  the  gross  injustice  carried  on  against  the  Eepuhlies. 
I willingly  admit  that  in  the  Orange  Free  State  your  Excellency 
is  in  possession  of  the  capital,  the  railway,  and  a few  villages  not 
situated  on  the  railway  line,  hnt  this  is  all  that  you  possess.  The 
whole  Orange  Free  State,  with  the  exception  of  the  above,  is  in  our 
possession,  and  in  almost  all  the  chief  towns  we  have  appointed 
Landrosts,  or  where  the  town  is  not  in  our  possession  we  have 
Landrosts  in  the  districts  so  that  order  and  peace  are  maintained- by 
us  and  not  by  your  Excellency.  In  the  Transvaal  this  is  also  the 
Case.  There,  too,  Landrosts,  etc.,  are  appointed  by  that  Govern- 
ment and  provision  made  for  the  maintenance  of  order  and  peace. 
If  your  Excellency  will  permit  me,  your  jurisdiction  extends  only 
as  far  as  yoiir  Excellency’s  cannon  can  reach. 

“ If  your  Excellency  views  the  Eepuhlies  from  a military  stand- 
point, then  you  must  acknowledge  that  during  the  last  year,  in 
spite  of  the  overwhelming  force  brought  against  us,  our  cause  has 
progressed  wonderfully,  and  there  can  he  no  talk  of  hopelessness, 
so  that  if  your  proclamation  is  based  on  this  it  has  now  less  right  to 
exist  than  a year  ago.  Now,  as  regards  the  35,000  men  whom  your 
Excellency  asserts  to  have  in  your  hands,  it  is  impossible  for  me  to 
say  anything  about  them  as  regards  number.  This,  however,  I wish 
to  say,  that  except  those  men  who  either  have  been  misled  from 
their  duty  to  their  Government  by  your  predecessor’s  proclama- 
tions, or  who  have  gone  over  to  the  enemy  on  account  of  a spirit  of 
treachery,  or  for  other  reasons,  and  who,  thank  God,  are  compara- 
tively few  in  number,  the  remainder  consists  of  those  who  have 
been  honestly  taken  prisoners,  and  are  still  held  as  such,  and  old 
and  sickly  men  and  young  boys  who  were  not  yet  fit  for  service,  and 
who  were  taken  by  force  from  their  farms  by  your  Excellency’s 
troops  and  confined  in  camps  against  their  will.  It  cannot,  there- 
fore, be  expected  of  us  to  believe  in  earnest  that  the  persons  falling 
under  these  last  two  heads  are  living  there  in  peace  of  their  own 
free  will.  I can  in  truth  affirm  that,  except  the  prisoners  of  war 
and  the  few  who  have  gone  over  to  the  enemy,  the  great  majority 
of  the  fighting  burghers  are  still  in  arms.  As  regards  the  few  who 


DIABY  OF  THE  11U72 


521 


have  gone  over  to  the  enemy  (which  hardly  ever  happens  now),  I 
can  only  say  that  we  do  not  stand  alone  in  that  res^^ect,  for  history 
teaches  us  that  in  all  wars  for  independence,  as  the  American  war, 
for  instance,  there  have  been  such,  and  we  can  only  try  to  go  on 
without  them.  As  regards  the  Id.OOO  wonieti  and  children,  who, 
according  to  your  Excellency,  are  being  maintained  in  the  camps, 
it  seems  to  me  that  your  Excellency  does  not  know  in  what  a bar- 
barous way  these  poor  defenseless  people  were  torn  from  their 
homes  by  your  forces,  while  all  their  property  and  goods  were 
destroyed;  so  that  these  poor  innocent  victims  of  the  war,  at  the 
approach  of  a hostile  force,  would  flee  in  all  weathers,  at  all  hours 
of  the  day  or  night,  from  23laee  to  place,  in  order  not  to  fall  into 
their  hands.  ...  To  say  that  they  are  in  camps  of  their  own 
free  will  is  altogether  opposed  to  the  facts,  and  to  assert  that  these 
women  were  brought  to  the  camps  because  the  Boers  refused  to 
provide  for  their  families  (as  the  Minister  for  War  is  said  to  have 
done  recently  in  the  Parliament),  is  a slander  which  wounds  us 
less  than  the  slanderer. 

“ As  regards  the  proclamation  itself,  I can  assure  your  Excellency 
that  for  myself  it  will  make  no  difference  to  me  in  the  fulfilment 
of  my  duty,  such  as  my  conscience  and  the  enemy  dictate,  faith- 
fully to  the  end.  Our  country  is  ruined,  our  homes  and  goods 
destroyed,  our  cattle  carried  off  or  killed  in  thousands,  our  women 
and  children  captured,  insulted,  and  carried  into  captivity  by 
soldiers  and  low  Kaffirs,  and  hundreds  of  them  have  already  sacri- 
ficed their  lives  for  the  liberty  of  their  fatherland.  Shall  we,  can 
we  now  draw  back  from  doing  our  duty,  when  our  persons  are 
threatened  with  banishment  ? Shall  we  now  break  our  faith  with 
the  hundreds  of  dead  and  prisoners  who,  relying  on  our  fidelity, 
willingly  gave  their  lives  and  their  liberty  for  the  fatherland?  Or 
shall  we  become  untrue  to  our  trust  in  a righteous  God,  who  has 
hitherto  preserved  us  in  such  a wonderful  manner  ? I am  con- 
vinced that  if  we  were  to  act  thus  we  would  be  despised,  not  only 
by  your  Excellency  and  every  other  honest  man,  but  also  by  our- 
selves. I will  conclude  with  assuring  you  that  no  one  is  more  anx- 
ious than  myself  to  see  peace  restored,  and  I am  therefore  ]3repared 
to  meet  your  Excellency  at  any  time  in  order  to  discuss  terms  with 
you  whereby  peace  may  be  brought  about.  But  that  you  may  not 
be  misled  I must  repeat  that  no  peace  will  be  acceptable  to  us  in 
which  the  independence  of  the  two  Eepublics  and  the  interests  of 
our  Cape  Colony  brothers  who  have  joined  us  are  not  maintained. 
If  it  is  a crime  to  fight  in  self-defense,  and  if  such  crime  must  be 
punished,  then  I think  that  his  i\Iajesty’s  Government  ought  to  be 
satisfied  with  the  destruction  of  the  country,  the  chastisement  of 
women  and  children,  and  the  general  misery  which  has  been  caused 
by  this  war.  It  is  in  your  Excellency’s  power,  more  than  in  that  of 
any  other  man,  to  make  an  end  to  this  war.  and  by  so  doing  to 
restore  this  unhappy  part  of  the  country  to  its  former  prosperity. 


523 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


“ We  ask  for  no  magnanimity;  we  only  demand  justice. 

“ I enclose  a translation  of  this  writing,  so  that  your  Excellency 
may  not  be  prevented  from  understanding  the  exact  contents  of 
my  letter  through  a wrong  translation,  as  was  reeently  the  case  with 
a letter  which  I wrote  to  the  Government  of  the  S.  A.  Eepublic, 
and  which  fell  into  your  hands  at  Beitz,  and  was  published  by  you, 
hut  in  such  a way  that  we  hardly  recognized  it,  for  not  only  was 
it  quite  wrongly  translated  in  some  places,  hut  sentences  were 
added  which  I have  never  written,  and  other  parts  were  left  out  al- 
together, so  that  quite  a wrong  interpretation  was  given  to  the  let- 
ter. I have  the  honor  to  he,  your  Excellency’s  obedient  servant, 

“ (Signed)  M.  T.  Steyn, 

“ State  President  of  the  Orange  Free  State.” 

A British  convoy,  west  of  Kimberley,  in  charge  of  Imperial  Yeo- 
manry was  attacked  and  captured  by  Commandant  Conroy  on  the 
28th,  when  9 of  the  English  were  killed  and  23  wounded. 

De  la  Bey  had  a running  fight  with  Lord  Methuen’s  rear-guard 
north  of  Klerksdorp,  as  the  titled  Guardsman  was  moving  on  that 
town  with  another  “ sweeping  ” of  wagons  and  cattle,  on  the  31st. 

September  1-30. — The  passing  of  the  winter  and  the  resent- 
ment caused  by  Lord  Kitchener’s  outlawry  decrees  roused  the  Boer 
Commandants  to  renewed  activity  in  September.  The  enemy  had 
played  all  the  havoc  possible  with  whatever  property  in  crops, 
cattle,  or  homesteads  had  previously  escaped  the  work  of  his  col- 
umns during  June,  July,  and  August.  They  had  taken  away  even 
the  Kaffirs’  cattle, and  destroyed  their  mealie  crops  so  as  to  devastate 
completely  the  Transvaal  and  Free  State,  and  it  was  over  this 
howling  wilderness  of  ruin  that  the  now  slender  commandoes  were 
once  again  to  engage  the  British  whenever  a chance  for  a blow 
presented  itself. 

Early  in  the  month  a provision  train  was  destroyed  within 
twenty  miles  of  Pretoria,  with  9 killed  and  17  wounded  of  the 
enemy.  From  the  Free  State  and  Cape  Colony  reports  of  casual 
encounters  increased,  and  the  published  casualty  lists  showed  that 
the  Boers  were  not  wasting  much  of  their  ammunition. 

On  the  5th,  Commandant  Lotter  with  130  men  was  attacked  by 
a large  British  force,  and  was  taken  after  as  plucky  a fight  as  a 
brave  man  ever  made.  He  lost  19  killed,  and  had  over  50  wounded 
before  his  small  commando  gave  in.  Last  month  a British  force, 
not  much  less  in  number  than  Letter’s,  held  up  their  hands  to  De 
Wet  on  losing  one  man  killed  and  four  wounded;  a circumstance 
which  induced  Lord  Kitchener  to  order  an  immediate  inquiry. 
Lotter  was  surprised  early  in  the  morning,  and  was  so  overmatched 
in  numbers  and  guns  that  the  enemy  only  had  20  casualties  in  the 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


523 


unequal  encounter.  This  is  the  first  really  effective  blow  struck 
by  General  French  at  the  second  Boer  invasion  of  Cape  Colony. 
It  will  naturally  tend  to  discourage  recruiting  for  the  commandoes 
in  this  district  of  the  Cape. 

Lord  Kitchener  in  sending  his  usual  weekly  despatch  to  the  War 
Office,  spoke  of  the  enemy  still  facing  his  legions  as  follows : 

“ Pretoria,  9th  September. 

“ Since  2nd  of  September  columns  have  again  got  good  results. 
Total  bag,  including  all  separately  reported,  being  681,  composed 
of  67  Boers  killed,  67  wounded,  38-1  prisoners,  163  surrenders,  also 
179  rifles,  65,211  rounds  small-arm  ammunition,  371  wagons, 
3,100  horses,  9,000  cattle,  and  various  other  stocks  captured.” 

“ Total  bag!  ” This  chivalrous  language  recalls  that  of  the 
officers  who  boasted  of  their  “ jiig-sticking  ” at  Elandslaagte,  when 
relating  the  daring  feats  of  the  Lancers  who  had  killed  wounded 
and  surrendered  Boers.  One  searches  in  vain  throughout  the  rec- 
ords of  the  whole  war  to  find  a word  or  a phrase  on  the  part  of  a 
Boer  Commandant,  in  speaking  of  the  British,  that  can  be  called 
brutal.  But,  the  Boer  generals  are  Christians  and  gentlemen. 

Colonel  Scohell,  who  defeated  Letter,  has  been  promptly  pro- 
moted. He  fought  and  won  his  victory  with  six  men  to  one. 

The  first  casualty  lists  published  by  the  War  Office  after  Kitchen- 
er’s last  “ bag  ” speak  of  fighting  at  fifteen  different  places,  between 
the  2nd  and  the  9th.  Death,  too,  has  its  “ bags  ” of  British,  as  well 
as  the  Commander-in-Chief  his  complement  of  Boers  and  cattle. 

On  the  11th  inst.  the  following  brilliant  British  victory  was  duly 
recorded : 

“ Cradock,  11th  September. 

“ Kine  girls,  aged  between  15  and  20,  and  one  married  woman, 
have  been  charged  here  with  harboring  the  King’s  enemies  and  sup- 
plying them  with  food  and  other  things,  on  the  occasion  of  the 
Boer  invasion  of  Maraisburg.  Two  were  discharged,  but  the  others 
were  sentenced  to  thirty  days’  imprisonment.— Reuter.” 

This  achievement  for  British  law  and  arms  could  only  be  suitably 
dealt  with  in  the  language  of  the  inimitable  Dooley. 

At  the  end  of  last  month  De  la  Eey  was  in  touch  with  Lord 
IMethuen’s  cohmin  west  of  Klerksdorp,  one  of  the  most  “ swept  ” 
districts  of  the  Transvaal.  The  valiant  Lichtenburger  had  a run- 
ning fight  with  Methuen  north  to  the  Marico  River  in  which  the 
English  admit  their  loss  to  be  some  40  men  in  killed  and  wounded. 
]\rore  will  probably  be  found  in  the  next  casualty  list. 

Previous  to  this  encounter  with  De  la  Eey,  Methuen’s  was  one 


524 


THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


of  six  columns  engaged  in  a carefully  planned  attempt  to  capture 
the  hero  of  Ylakfontein,  General  Kemp,  who  was 'again  near  his 
old  haunts,  at  Olif ant’s  Kek.  The  six  columns  laboriously  hemined 
in  Kemp.  He  succeeded  in  passing  hy  Lord  Methiien  in  the  night- 
time,- and  got  away  leaving  some  carts  and  wagons,  and  losing  a 
few  prisoners. 

General  Botha,  who  had  been  hovering  near  the  Katal  border, 
in  the  locality  of  his  own  home,  in  August  fell  upon  a British  force 
under  Major  Gough  which  was  engaged  in  “ sweeping  ” the  Utrecht 
regions.  He  employed  the  invariable  and  successful  Boer  tactics 
of  showing  a small  section  of  his  force  ahead  of  the  enemy,  so  as 
to  invite  a pursuit,  planting  another  body  where  they  would  be 
on  the  flank  of  the  advancing  Tommies.  Gough  was  equal  to 
the  occasion,  and  on  reaching  the  point  where  his  adversary  wished 
him  to  be,  he  was  attacked  in  front  and  flank  and  was  easily  de- 
feated; losing  some  15  killed,  25  wounded,  and  Gvo  guns;  when 
150  more  put  up  their  hands. 

This  fight  occurred  the  day  following  the  date  (15th  of  Septem- 
ber) which  was  the  limit  in  time  mentioned  in  Kitchener’s  procla- 
mation of  August  7 for  the  outlawry  of  those  Boer  leaders  who 
would  not  surrender. 

Scheeper’s  Nek,  where  Botha  won  this  victory,  is  some  30  miles 
north  of  Dundee  (in  Natal),  in  the  Utrecht  district,  which  adjoins 
the  Vryheid,  where  Botha’s  home  was  located. 

On  the  same  date.  General  Smuts  rushed  the  17th  Lancers  who 
formed  part  of  several  columns  by  which  he  was  surrounded  at 
Elands  Eiver,  near  Tarkastad,  due  south  of  Stormberg,  in  Cape 
Colony.  The  gallant  ex-Attorney-General  led  the  dash  in  upon 
the  Lancer  side  of  the  ring;  he  and  his  men  shooting  their  way 
through,  killing  25,  and  wounding  30  of  their  foes  in  the  encounter. 

On  the  18th,  the  day  following  the  mishap  to  the  Lancers,  a pa- 
trol with  two  guns  of  the  noted  “ U ” Battery  were  surrounded 
and  captured  a few  miles  south  of  Saunas  Post;  the  place  where 
De  "Wet  won  his  great  victory  shortly  after  the  fall  of  Bloemfontein. 
This  same  “ U ” Battery  figured  in  General  Broadwood’s  disaster 
on  that  occasion;  these  being  the  only  guns  which  were  saved  l:)y 
the  retreating  English  force  on  that  day. 

The  Boers  numbered  200  in  this  latest  “ mishap,”  according  to 
the  English  report,  and  the  English  137  Mounted  Infantry,  Avith 
the  battery  service.  The  Boers  had  no  guns,  so  that  the  advantage 
in  fighting  equipment  AA-as  decidedly  on  the  side  of  the  British. 
The  Boer  officers  Avho  took  the  surrender  of  the  Lancers  Avere  Com- 
mandants Ackerman  and  Coetzee. 

On  the  21st  Commandant  Kritzinger  finding  himself  in  a similar 


DIAEY  OF  TIIF  WAB 


525 


position  to  that  from  wliicli  General  Smuts  snatched  a victory  on 
the  16th,  repeated  his  exploit  and  rushed  a body  of  Lovat’s  Scouts, 
in  the  Zastron  district,  on  the  Basutoland  border.  The  attack  was 
made  in  the  dark  and  was  characterized  by  great  pluck  on  the  part 
of  the  Boers,  who  rode  into  the  British  camp  and  took  the  enemy’s 
fifteen-pound  gun. 

Counting  the  English  casualties,  as  reported  by  the  British  them- 
selves, from  September  15th  to  the  22nd — the  week  immediately 
following  Lord  Kitchener's  date  of  threatened  penal  consequences 
for  those  Boers  who  should  pro- 
long the  war — the  Boers  seem 
to  have  responded  by  killing  60, 
wounding  133,  and  capturing 
341  of  Lord  Kitchener’s  troops; 
not  omitting  the  still  more  dam- 
aging blow  where  men  with  no 
guns  cajjtured  6 from  their  foe- 
men. 

On  the  26th  of  September, 

Commandant  Grohlaar  attacked 
a British  entrenched  jjosition  at 
Port  Prospect,  inside  the  Zulu- 
land  border,  which  was  stoutly 
defended  by  a mixed  force  of 
Durham  artillery,  with  two 
guns,  and  Zulus.  The  Boers 
had  no  artillery,  and  were  con- 
sequently at  a disadvantage  with 
the  British  and  Zulus  entrenched  behind  well-prepared  sangars. 
The.  attack  was  discontimied  after  several  hours’  duration.  Cap- 
tain C.  A.  Eowley,  in  rejjorting  the  affair  to  his  superior  officer, 
said  (South  African  Despatches,  Cd.  695,  p.  64):  “About  this  time 
(10  A.w.)  a part}^  of  Ziduland  Kative  Police  gallantly  led  by  Ser- 
geant Gumbi,  broke  through  and  reenforced  me.” 

General  Lytleton,  in  forwarding  Captain  Eowley’s  report  to 
Lord  Kitchener,  “ recommended  Sergeant  Gumbi,  Zululand  Police, 
for  such  reward  as  is  deemed  suitable.” 

The  assault  on  Fort  Prospect  by  Commandant  Grohlaar  was 
made  to  synchronize  with  a more  important  attack  by  General 
Christian  Botha  upon  an  entrenched  English  force  at  Itala  Mount, 
also  inside  the  Zululand  border.  The  garrison  at  Itala  consisted 
of  some  400  troops,  including  the  artillery  service  of  three  guns, 
and  Colonel  Chapman,  of  the  Eoyal  Dublin  Fusiliers,  was  in  com- 
mand. 


52u 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


The  attack  by  a portion  of  Botha’s  commando  took  the  form  of 
a midnight  surprise,  with  the  obvious  intention  of  thereby  avoiding 
the  enemy’s  guns ; the  Boers  having  no  artillery  with  which  to  cope 
with  that  of  their  adversaries. 

The  strength  of  the  attacking  force  on  this  position  and  that  of 
Fort  Prospect  has  been  greatly  exaggerated  in  the  English  reports. 
Commandant  Groblaar  had  no  more  than  150  men,  while  Christian 
Botha’s  commando  at  the  time  numbered  less  than  500.  Com- 
mandant-General Louis  Botha,  said  to  have  led  the  attack,  was  not 
within  a dozen  miles  of  the  scene  of  action  at  the  time.  He  was 
engaged  in  watching  with  another  portion  of  his  commando  for  a 
possilDle  intervention  by  General  Bruce  Hamilton’s  division,  which 
had  followed  in  the  wake  of  the  Boer  column  since  the  defeat  of 
Major  Gough  at  Bloed  River.  The  assault  on  Fort  Prospect  was 
a tactical  maneuver  of  Botha’s  to  confuse  the  enemy’s  larger  forces 
moving  in  the  locality  where  the  simultaneous  blows  were  planned. 
These  forces  consisted  of  Generals  Bruce  Hamilton’s  and  Clement’s 
columns,  under  the  direction  of  General  Lytleton,  and  the  tw'O 
engagements  on  the  .26th  were  fought  virtually  within  a circle 
formed  by  English  troops.  Louis  Botha  was  in  observation  of  the 
movements  of  these  columns  on  a hill  some  twelve  or  fifteen  miles 
away,  while  his  brother  ivas  carrying  out  the  attack  on  the  fortified 
garrison  at  Itala. 

The  surprise  at  midnight  was  not  completely  successful;  the 
enemy  being  well  on  the  alert,  while  the  position  was  found  to  be 
much  stronger  than  was  expected.  In  Colonel  Chapman’s  report 
of  the  fight  to  Lord  Kitchener  (published  by  him  in  his  despatch 
of  the  8th  of  October,  1901)  there  is  the  following  account  of  the 
defense  which  was  made: 

“ At  twelve  midnight,  25th  and  26th,  rapid  fire  was  heard  from 
the  advance  post  on  the  top  of  the  Itala  (held  by  Lieutenants 
Lefroy  and  Kane  with  80  men),  and  continued  for  about  fifteen 
minutes,  when  it  suddenly  ceased  for  half  hour.  It  then  recom- 
menced and  continued  for  half  hour,  when  all  firing  from  the  top 
ceased.  A verbal  report  was  received  about  2 a.m.  from  this  post 
that  they  had  been  surrounded  by  about  500,  who  rushed  it,  and 
that  all  were  either  killed  or  taken  prisoners.  This  was  true  to  a 
great  degree,  but  many  men  refused  to  surrender,  escaped  down 
the  south  side  of  the  mountain  and  fought  it  out  the  whole  day, 
doing  considerable  execution,  from  the  number  of  dead  Boers  found 
on  that  side. 

“ The  action  was  now  general  all  round  the  camp,  the  fire  terrific, 
and  continued  without  cessation  till  4 a.m.;  the  Boers  during  this 
phase  charged  close  up  to  the  trenches;  many  dead  were  picked 


527 


DIABY  OF  THE  WAR 

up  two  and  three  yards  from  them;  at  -1  a.m.  the  fire  suddenly 
ceased.  At  dawn,  6 a.m.,  thinking  the  Boers  had  cleared,  the  native 
scouts  were  ordered  out  to  clear  up  the  situation,  and  Lieutenant 
Fielding,  Eoyal  Army  Medical  Corps,  proceeded  up  the  hill  to  look 
for  wounded;  suddenly  the  fire  broke  out  with  increased  energy  and 
continued  from  that  time  till  7.30  p.m.  (19  hours).  Lieutenant 
Fielding  could  not  return,  and  was  detained  by  the  Boers.  . . . 

The  night  was  very  bright,  there  being  a nearly  full  moon,  and  the 
guns,  coming  into  action  during  the  first  phase,  and  making  excel- 
lent practise  on  the  kopjes  1,100  yards  north  and  ridge  3,400  yards 
north,  materially  helped  to  keep  down  the  fire.  At  dawn,  when 
the  attack  recommenced,  they  continued  to  fire  for  half  hour,  when 
they  became  the  target  for  every  rifle,  so  I ordered  them  to  cease 
and  the  men  to  take  cover.” 

Colonel  Chapman’s  forces  suffered  so  severely  that  he  retreated 
at  midnight  on  the  27th,  leaving  his  wounded  and  dead  behind, 
with  a burying  party  of  unarmed  men. 

Armed  Zulus  were  freely  employed  in  the  defense  of  Itala,  as  at 
Fort  Prospect.  Colonel  Chapman  says  of  these  auxiliaries  in  his 
report  (South  African  Despatches,  Cd.  695,  p.  62)  : 

“ I sent  out  native  scouts  to  reconnoiter;  they  reported  that  all 
Boers  had  cleared.  . . . The  native  scouts,  employed  by  me 
under  Guide  Collins,  brought  in  early,  ample,  and  accurate  in- 
formation. During  my  stay  in  Zululand,  they  have  been  constantly 
in  the  Boer  laagers,  and  it  is  to  their  being  able  to  so  quickly  trans- 
mit information  that  we  were  quite  prepared  when  the  attack 
began.” 

And  it  is  the  very  officer  who  writes  thus,  who  also  (five  lines 
above  this  grateful  acknowledgment  of  the  services  of  his  Zulu 
allies),  says:  “The  Boers  shot  harmless  natives.”  Spies  in  Boer 
camps,  and  armed  scouts  fighting  inside  British  garrisons,  are 
“ harmless  natives,”  to  shoot  whom  is  an  outrage  in  this  highly 
intelligent  British  officer’s  opinion! 

The  British  losses  in  the  engagement  amounted  to  over  120  men 
put  out  of  action,  not  counting  Zulus.  The  Boer  losses  were,  on 
Kaffir  authority,  said  to  be  heavy. 

The  battle  of  Fort  Itala  was  a victory  for  General  Christian 
Botha,  as  Colonel  Chapman  retired  under  cover  of  midnight,  leav- 
ing his  wounded  behind.  Chapman’s  charges  that  the  Boers  had 
stripped  and  robbed  the  dead  and  wounded  were  prompted  by  the 
chagrin  of  defeat,  and  were  absolutely  untrue.  It  is  to  the  soldierly 
credit  of  numerous  British  officers  and  men  that  many  of  them 
have  risen  above  this  kind  of  feeling,  and  have  frequently  repaired. 


52S 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


in  manly  terms,  the  injury  done  to  the  character  of  their  Boer  foe- 
men  by  men  of  narrower  and  meaner  minds.  In  this  instance 
Lieutenant  Fieldiiig,  of  the  British  Aml)nlance,  bore  this  testimony: 

“ Xothing  could  exceed  the  kindness  and  courtesy  of  General 
Christian  Botha  to  the  wounded.  It  was  only  his  presence  and 
influence  which  resti’ained  his  burghers  from  robbing  the  wounded, 
and  on  several  occasions  he  struck  burghers  for  trying  to  do  so.” 
— (Cd.  965,  p.  63.) 

And  it  is  the  same  officer.  Colonel  Chapman,  who  penned  the 
above  calumnies  against  his  victors,  that,  in  the  same  despatch, 
sends  on  and  countersigns  the  refutation  of  these  unsoldierly  im- 
putations by  the  officer  of  the  Army  Medical  C'orps  whose  duty  it 
was  to  attend  to  the  wounded  who  had  been  left  by  Chapman  to 
the  care  of  his  enemies ! 

Following  up  their  victory  on  the  26th,  the  Boers  under  Christian 
Botha  captured  a large  convoy  on  its  way  to  Fort  Prospect. 

In  the  tight  at  Itala  the  English  reports  say  the  Boers  had  three 
Commandants  killed,  Opperman,  Potgieter,  and  Scholz. 

On  the  30th  of  September,  after  these  series  of  British  mishaps 
had  again  reminded  the  British  public  of  the  “ ended  ” war,  the 
London  “ Globe,”  a paper  claiming  to  be  the  organ  of  the  ultra 
Imperialist  Jingoes,  represented  Lord  Eoberts’  successor  in  South 
Africa  as  having  issued  army  orders  to  his  troops  containing  the 
following  exquisite  comment  uj^on  unnecessar}'^  impedimenta  to 
English  mobility : 

“ The  Commander-in-Chief'  in  South  Africa  desires  to  impress 
upon  officers  in  command  of  mobile  columns  that  the  object  of  such 
commands  is  mobility.  He  has  learned  that  such  forces  have 
carried  about  with  them  furniture,  kitchen  ranges,  pianos,  and 
harmoniums,  which  nullify  that  object.  He  orders  that  these 
articles  must  be  handed  over  at  the  nearest  stores.” 

It  is  not  always  safe  to  accept  a Continental  version  of  British 
action  in  this  war  as  an  unbiased  statement.  When  sympathy  is 
markedly  on  the  weak  side  there  is,  inevitabljq  a prejudiced  senti- 
ment against  the  stronger  power  in  the  fight.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  English  have  shown  themselves,  in  the  mirror  of  their  press, 
to  he  almost  incapable  (with  a few  very  honorable  exceptions)  of 
writing  fairly  of  their  foes.  Truth  has,  therefore,  to  walk  cautiously 
when  searching  for  facts  as  they  occurred,  instead  of  accepting  them 
as  represented.  Pretoria  correspondent  of  the  Vienna  “ Pester 
Lloyd”  related  a story  the  other  day  which  is  not  without  many 
an  actual  parallel  in  the  records  of  a war  waged  between  35,000 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


539 


farmers  and  250,000  British  soldiers.  Tlie  statement  is,  that  when 
the  town  of  Willowmore  in  the  south-center  of  Cape  Colony  was 
attacked  a few  weeks  ago  l)y  the  Boers,  it  was  held  by  400  Cape 
Town,  or  other  Cape  Colony,  volunteers.  The  attacking  force,  23 
strong,  rode  into  the  place,  attacked  and  killed  seven  of  the  de- 
fenders, whereupon  the  393  survivors  fled  into  the  houses  and  there 
remained;  refusing  a challenge  from  the  invaders  to  come  out  and 
fight. 

General  De  la  Bey  followed  Louis  Botha  in  offering  the  Eng- 
lish a stern  reply  to  Lord  Kitchener’s  proclamation.  He  had  been 
hovering  on  the  flanks  of  Methuen’s  march  to  Zeerust  in  the  early 
part  of  September,  and  succeeded  in  inflicting  some  punishment 
upon  him.  Colonel  Kekewich,  the  defender  of  Kimberley,  was  in 
command  of  a column  w'hich  was  engaged  with  Methuen’s  in 
“ sweeping  ” operations  in  De  la  Key’s  country,  north  of  Lichten- 
burg.  This  column  was  1,000  strong,  including  the  service  of 
three  guns  and  a pom-pom  section.  They  were  in  camp  on  the 
banks  of  the  Selous  Eiver,  between  Eustenburg  and  Zeerust,  at  a 
place  called  Moedwill,  on  the  29th  of  September. 

At  dawn  the  following  morning,  De  la  Eey  drove  in  the  pickets 
west  of  the  river,  and  rushed  a number  of  his  men  up  the  bed  of 
the  stream  passing  the  left  of  the  enemy,  which  rested  on  a drift. 
Having  lodged  a body  of  burghers  there,  practically  out  of  reach 
of  Kekewich’s  guns,  he  attacked  the  other  extreme  of  the  enemy’s 
camp  from  the  northwest,  and  poured  in  some  deadly  volleys  be- 
fore the  English  artillery  could  be  brought  to  play  against  him. 
]\[anifestly  De  la  Key’s  plan  was  to  surprise  the  camp  in  the  early 
morning  from  the  bed  of  the  river,  and  to  rush  the  guns  before  the 
light  would  enable  Kekewich  to  organize  a proper  defense,  but  the 
attack  was  not  well  timed,  and  the  force  at  De  la  Key’s  disposal  was 
not  sufficiently  strong  to  carry  his  plan  through.  He  made  a furi- 
ous onslaught  on  his  foes,  as  usual,  and  put  close  upon  200  of  them 
out  of  action;  Kekewich’s  losses  being  4 officers  killed,  and  23 
wounded,  including  himself;  51  men  killed,  and  115  wounded. 
The  action  only  continued  for  an  hour  and  a half,  and  when  the 
Boers  drew  off,  not  a single  dead  or  wounded  man  of  De  la  Key’s 
was  found  on  the  field.  The  English  reports  about  “ heavy  Boer 
losses  ” were  the  usual  liberal  estimates  of  the  foes  they  hoped  they 
had  accounted  for  in  the  fight. 

In  Lord  Kitchener’s  despatch  of  the  8th  of  October  he  pays  the 
following  tribute  to  the  determined  character  of  De  la  Key’s 
attack  : 

“ To  give  some  idea  of  the  severity  of  the  fire  to  which  the  troops 
34 


530 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


were  subjected  it  may  be  mentioned  that  three  pickets  were  prac- 
tically annihilated,  and  that  out  of  a party  of  twelve  men  of  the 
Derbyshire  Eegiment  which  was  guarding  a drift,  eight  men  were 
killed  and  four  wounded/’ 

October  1-7. — ^The  situation  in  Cape  Colony  has  changed; 
commandoes  which  were  said  last  month  to  be  retreating  north  are 
now  reported  advancing  south  again;  General  Smuts  being  near 
Sheldon,  Meyburg  and  Fouche  in  the  Transkei,  Scheepers  in  the 
south-center  still,  Malan  in  the  De  Aar  regions,  and  Marais,  Smit, 
and  Theron  in  the  extreme  southwest. 

The  capture  of  a British  post  at  Gun  Hill  near  Ladysmith,  and 
the  appearance  of  Boer  patrols  on  the  Drakensbergs,  along  with 
the  continuance  of  the  Cape  Colony  invasion,  give  the  public  an 
idea  of  the  wide  extent  of  the  Boer  resistance,  as  the  third  year  of 
the  war  commences. 

The  English  are  sweeping  everything  before  them — in  the  Court- 
Martial  trials.  Here  there  are  no  Boer  ambushes  to  fear.  Several 
more  rebels  have  been  hung  or  shot,  in  the  customary  British  man- 
ner; frequently  on  the  evidence  of  Kaffirs;  all  with  the  laudable 
intention  of  inviting  Dutchmen  to  be  loyal  to  the  authority  which 
employs  the  hangman  as  one  of  the  most  ancient  institutions  of 
English  rule. 

Mr.  Broeksma,  a former  Public  Prosecutor  of  the  Transvaal  Ee- 
public,  was  tried  in  Pretoria  on  a charge  of  receiving  treasonable 
documents  from  Dr.  Leyds  in  Brussels.  He  was  shot. 

October  8-15. — English  press  opinion  developed  into  a strong 
criticism  of  Lord  Kitchener  and  his  methods  as  a result  of  the 
three  or  four  striking  Boer  victories  reported  during  the  last  week 
in  September.  Significance  was  added  to  these  “ mishaps,”  com- 
ing as  they  did  after  the  expiry  of  the  date  on  which  the  English 
generalissimo’s  proclamation  had  fixed  the  outlawry  of  those  Boer 
officers  and  officials  who  should  still  persist  in  fighting  for  their 
country.  An  uneasy  feeling  was  also  manifest  at  strange  rumors 
which  asserted  that  numbers  of  “ missing  ” British  Tommies  had 
joined  the  Boer  commandoes.  The  Jingo  press  clamored  for  mar- 
tial law  for  the  whole  of  Cape  Colony.  This  demand  was  speedily 
responded  to,  and  the  seaport  cities  of  Cape  Town,  Port  Elizabeth, 
and  East  London  are  now  placed,  with  the  country  districts,  under 
military  men.  Two  years  ago  to-day,  October  11,  1901,  Sir  Alfred 
Milner  and  Mr.  Chamberlain  precipitated  war  for  the  alleged  pur- 
pose of  giving  “ fuller  freedom,”  and  other  blessings  reputed  to  be 
known  to  British  rule,  to  the  Boer  Eepublics.  On  the  second  an- 
niversary of  the  still  prosecuted  war,  the  English  colony  of  the 


DIARY  OF  TEF  WAR 


531 


Cape  finds  itself  deprived  of  all  civil  liberty,  and  placed  under  the 
despotic  rule  of  martial  law,  by  Mr.  Chamberlain,  still  Colonial 
Secretary,  and  Sir  Alfred  Milner,  promoted  to  be  a Lord. 

A small  body  of  Kitchener’s  Scouts  were  ambushed  by  a Boer 
force  near  Heilbron,  Orange  Free  State,  on  the  11th.  Heilbron 
lies  within  the  De  Wet  sphere  of  operations. 

Commandant  Lotter,  who  was  captured  in  September,  as  related, 
was  hung  at  Middelburg,  Cape  Colony,  on  the  11th.  He  had  made 
a gallant  defense  in  his  last  stand  against  forces  six  times  his 
strength,  and  was  only  taken  after  fifty  per  cent,  of  his  small  com- 
mand were  put  out  of  action.  He  was,  in  every  sense,  a brave  and 
gallant  soldier  on  the  side  of  freedom,  and  hence  his  execution, 
like  a common  criminal,  at  the  hands  of  English  law. 

Commenting  upon  this  and  other  court-martial  crimes  perpe- 
trated under  Lord  Kitchener’s  orders,  several  German  and  Austrian 
papers  denounced  the  British  general  as  “ a hangman.” 

The  leading  residents  of  Middelburg,  Dutch  and  British,  were 
ordered  to  attend  the  execution  by  the  military  authorities.  This 
doing  to  death,  in  this  shameful  way,  of  a foeman  who  had  so  often 
beaten  his  enemies  in  open  fight,  and  who  had  signalized  himself 
in  many  an  engagement  as  a chivalrous  soldier,  was  one  more  added 
to  the  thousand  disgraceful  acts  of  the  British  in  this  war. 

In  the  Ladysmith  district,  south  Cape  Colony,  Commandant 
Scheepers  has  also  been  captured.  He  was,  it  appears,  suffering 
from  enteric  fever  and  appendicitis  for  some  time,  and  was  taken 
while  riding  in  a cart  behind  his  men.  The  fate  meted  out  to  Lotter 
will,  of  course,  be  that  of  Scheepers  too. 

He  is  still  under  25  years  of  age.  With  a band  of  other  young 
men,  which  seldom  exceeded  300  in  number,  he  has  inflicted  num- 
berless small  “ mishaps  ” upon  the  minor  class  of  British  and  Colo- 
nial officers  in  charge  of  troops  greatly  outnumbering  his  com- 
mando. He  has  humiliated  the  English  military  caste  in  this  way, 
and  exhibited  its  patent  incompetency  in  the  field.  Herein  lies  his 
chief  crime.  Charges  of  holding  up  and  burning  trains  are  as 
absurd  Avhen  made  against  subordinate  Boer  officers,  engaged  in 
regular  warfare,  as  if  they  were  made  against  Botha  or  De  la  Eey. 
But  all  this  will  avail  him  nothing  with  the  Power  which  executed 
Eobert  Emmet,  and  would  have  shot  or  hung  George  Washington 
had  he  been  captured  like  Scheepers. 

October  16-31. — A Boer  commando  500  strong,  under  Marais, 
Smit,  Theron,  and  Louw,  has  succeeded  in  reaching  the  seacoast,  at 
Saldhana  Bay,  a distance  of  some  eighty  miles  northwest  from  the 
capital  of  Cape  Colony.  This  force  approached  the  sea  through  the 
rich  grazing  country  of  the  Berg  Eiver  Valley,  and  it  is  believed 


532 


TUB  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


they  have  obtained  many  recruits  and  much  siqjplies  from  the 
people  in  Hopefield  district.  The  nearest  point  of  railway  commu- 
nication with  Cape  Town  is  at  Malmesbury,  about  equal  distance 
between  Hopefield  and  Cape  Town. 

Eumors  from  German  sources  allege  that  two  squadrons  of  Brit- 
ish Lancers  have  deserted  into  Ehodesia,  and  that  this  act  is  sympto- 
matic of  the  discontent  now  prevailing  among  the  British  troops, 
owing  to  the  hardships  and  the  interminable  aspect  of  the  war. 

After  Botha’s  sharp  blows  at  the  British  in  Zululand,  he  was 
followed  up  in  the  usual  way  by  the  columns  under  General  Lytle- 
ton.  For  the  space  of  a week  the  public  were  led  to  believe  he  could 
not  escape  the  forces  in  pursuit  of  him.  He  is  now  said  to  be  in 
the  mountainous  region  of  Piet  Eetief,  between  his  own  country 
(Vryheid)  and  Swaziland,  while  the  columns  are  somewhere  else. 

General  De  Wet  has  been  killed  again.  The  death,  however,  is 
not  believed  to  be  very  serious,  as  he  has  recovered  from  at  least 
six  similar  mishaps  inflicted  upon  him  by  Jingo  news  recorders. 
The  news  of  this  latest  killing  of  the  great  Commandant  comes 
from  ISTatal. 

Over  500  Boers  were  reported  killed  and  captured  (74  killed) 
by  the  various  English  columns  from  the  21st  to  the  28th  of  this 
month,  with  400  rifles  and  8,000  cattle  taken. 

General  Buller  was  relieved  of  his  recently  appointed  command 
of  the  First  Army  Corps  by  the  Secretary  for  War  on  the  22nd  of 
October,  for  a speech  delivered  on  the  10th  inst.,  at  a lunch  given 
in  his  honor  by  the  King’s  Eoyal  Eifles.  His  appointment  to  this 
command  had  evoked  very  strong  protests  from  several  Jingo  or- 
gans, on  account  of  his  record  in  the  Tugela  campaign  against 
General  Botha,  and  for  his  alleged  message  to  General  White  ad- 
vising the  surrender  of  the  Ladysmith  garrison  after  the  battle  of 
Colenso.  This  criticism  angered  the  general,  and  provoked  him 
to  indulge  in  the  after-dinner  effusion  which  has  caused  the  War 
Office  to  remove  him  from  the  post  so  recently  conferred  upon  him. 
The  whole  bungling  business  of  the  promotion  and  the  degradation 
of  the  first  British  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  war  within  so  brief 
a space  of  time  has  provoked  comments  in  the  press  of  other  coun- 
tries not  complimentary  to  the  English,  their  military,  and  their 
cabinet  ministers. 

On  the  28th  De  la  Eey  and  Kemp  defeated  a column  of  Methuen’s 
command  under  Von  Donop,  which  was  employed  in  burning  farms 
and  crops  in  the  Marico  Eiver  district,  in  the  northwestern  Trans- 
vaal. The  British  were  nearing  a spruit  when  they  were  assailed 
by  a body  of  300  Boers  under  Commandants  Kemp  and  Oosthuizen. 
While  the  head  of  the  British  column  was  thus  engaged,  De  la  Eey 


DIARY  OF  THE  ^VAR 


533 


M’ith  the  bulk  of  his  force  rode  at  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy, 
inflicting  severe  punishment  upon  him,  and  carr3dng  off  a number 
of  wagons.  The  fight  lasted  only  half  an  hour,  but  the  English 
losses  amounted  to  2 officers  and  26  men  killed,  and  5 officers  and 
50  men  wounded.  The  British  report  stated  that  40  Boers  were 
killed,  including  Commandant  Oosthuizen. 

The  fight  took  place  at  Kleinfontein,  the  Boers  retiring  westward 
after  the  engagement.  The  reported  loss  of  40  killed,  with  no 
account  of  the  number  wounded,  was  probably  a Methuen  or  a 
Kaffir  exaggeration. 

Canon  Gore  (since  made  Bishop  of  Winchester  by  Lord  Salis- 
bury) wrote  a letter  to  the  “Times”  of  the  28th  inst.  on  the  sub- 
ject of  infant  mortality  in  the  Concentration  Camps.  The  follow- 
ing extract  needs  no  accompanjdng  comment: 

“ Hitherto  the  conscience  of  the  country  has  been  actively  or 
passively  as  a whole  supporting  the  war;  but,  unless  I am  very  much 
mistaken,  it  must  peremptorily  require  that  immediate  steps,  how- 
ever costlj’ — whether  by  the  speedy  introduction  of  suitable 
nourishment  into  the  camps  in  sufficient  abundance,  or  by  the 
removal  of  the  camps  to  the  sea — be  taken  to  obviate  this  un- 
exampled and  horrible  death  rate  among  the  children  for  whose 
protection  we  have,  by  a policy  which  may  have  been  mistaken,  but 
is,  at  any  rate,  not  now  reversible,  made  ourselves  responsible. 
Otherwise  I believe  the  honor  of  our  country  will  contract  a stain 
which  we  shall  not  be  able  to  obliterate,  and  the  whole  Christian 
conscience  of  the  country  will  be  outraged  and  alienated.” 

The  total  English  losses  in  killed,  wounded,  deaths  from  disease, 
“invalided  home,”  and  missing,  for  the  month  of  October — the 
third  October  of  the  war — amounted  to  98  officers  and  2,471  men. 

November  1-7. — The  German  press  has  violently  denounced 
Mr.  Chamberlain’s  speech  at  Edinburgh  (in  which  he  asserted  that 
the  British  army  in  South  Africa  had  conducted  the  war  at  least 
as  humanely  as  the  Germans  had  behaved  in  the  Franco-German 
conflict)  as  containing  “ an  unheard  of  calumny  ” against  the  Ger- 
man army.  Indignation  meetings  have  been  called  for  to  protest 
against  the  insult  leveled  at  the  whole  Germanic  Empire  in  com- 
paring its  soldiers  with  thQse  employed  by  England  in  South 
Africa. 

A report  from  Berlin  asserts  that  6,000  horses  have  been  seized 
by  Boers  at  a British  remount  station  some  five  hours’  journey  by 
rail  from  Cape  Town.  Ko  allusion  to  this  “ mishap  ” has  appeared 
in  the  English  press. 

On  this  date  Lord  Kitchener  reported  a “ severe  attack  ” upon 


534 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Colonel  Benson’s  column  at  Brakeulaagte,  about  midway  between 
Standerton,  on  the  Johannesburg-Natal  line,  and  Middelburg,  on 
the  Pretoria-Delagoa  Bay  railway.  The  place  lies  east  of  a line 
of  blockhouses  running  north  from  Greylingstadt  to  Balmoral. 
No  district  in  the  Transvaal  has  been  so  frequently  “occupied,” 
“ cleared,”  and  “ swept  ” by  British  troops  during  the  past  year. 
The  attacking  force  was  commanded  hy  General  Louis  Botha  in 


“unarmed”  natives 

“ The  ‘ King’  publishes  this  photograph  of  the  native  scouts  who  led  Benson’s  column  on  the 
night  march  which  preceded  the  tight  at  Brakenlaagte.  We  reproduce  it,  by  permission,  for  its 
additional  interest  as  a comment  on  the  repeated  statements  that  during  the  war  the  natives  used 
on  our  side  have  not  been  armed.”— London  “Morning  Leader,”  February  8,  1902. 


person  and  led  liy  his  brother.  General  Christian  Botha.  The  Eng- 
lish version  of  the  tight  jmts  the  assailants  of  Benson  at  about  1,000, 
while  pro-Boer  accounts  in  the  Continental  press  gave  an  estimate 
of  500. 

Lord  Kitchener  permitted  the  actual  facts  to  appear  in  graduated 
instalments.  In  the  first  report  the  Boers  had  been  favored  by  a 
fog;  in  the  next,  by  rain;  while  in  a later  version,  derived  from 
other  sources,  the  burghers  rode  in  at  a spur-gallop  upon  and 
literally  over  the  British,  shooting  them  right  and  left  from  their 
saddles.  The  enemy’s  casualties  were  also  minimized  in  the  earlier 
accounts,  They  were  put  down  at  S14  killed  and  wounded.  In 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


535 


the  final  reports  the  actual  numbers  were  found  to  be  15  officers, 
including  Colonel  Benson,  killed,  and  17  wounded,  with  a total  of 
86  officers  and  men  killed,  and  216  wounded;  302  casualties  in  all. 
This,  however,  does  not  include  the  armed  Kaffir  scouts  who  were 
part  of  Benson’s  force,  fought  with  the  English,  and  also  paid  for 
doing  so  in  killed  and  wounded. 

The  British  column,  which  consisted  of  four  or  five  detachments 
with  six  guns,  had  been  operating  in  the  Bethel  district  of  the 
southeastern  Transvaal  for  some  weeks  in  further  devastating  that 
section  of  the  country.  On  the  22nd  of  October  Benson  attacked 
a Boer  laager,  and  captured  some  40  prisoners.  On  the  25th  his 
rear-guard  was  in  turn  attacked  by  a force  under  Commandant 
Groblaar,  who  was  beaten  off,  with  results  not  recorded.  Mani- 
festly these  attentions  to  Benson’s  column  were  part  of  a concerted 
scheme  of  attack  planned  by  General  Botha,  who,  on  learning  of 
the  exact  strength  and  locality  of  the  British,  rode  a distance  of 
60  miles  from  the  border  of  Zululand  with  300  men  under  his 
brother’s  command,  and  united  his  force  with  Groblaar’s,  with  the 
object  of  striking  at  the  enemy  on  the  first  favorable  opportunity. 
This  chance  came  early  in  the  morning  of  the  29th  ult.  as  the 
British  were  encamped  at  Brakenlaagte. 

Botha  had  disposed  of  his  force  in  such  a manner  as  to  allow 
Benson  to  pass  between  the  Boer  lines  and  to  halt  for  the  night. 
The  British  rear-guard  with  two  guns  occupied  a ridge  some  two 
miles  from  the  enemy’s  main  laager,  and  it  was  upon  this  body 
that  Christian  Botha  fell  with  resistless  force.  With  300  men  he 
rode  at  a gallop  on  the  British  in  the  most  dashing  manner,  bear- 
ing down  all  resistance.  Colonel  Benson  and  other  of  the  enem3r’s 
officers  were  near  the  guns  and  fought  valiantly  to  save  them,  hut 
they  were  all  shot  down,  and  the  two  fifteen-pounders  were  taken 
by  the  victors.  After  killing  and  wounding  300  of  his  foes,  Botha 
wheeled  off  with  his  triumph  and  trophies  and  was  lost  to  all  the 
field-glasses  of  the  remaining  British  officers  when  the  morning  sun 
lit  up  the  veldt  and  revealed  the  deserted  country  eastward  towards 
Ermelo  and  Lake  Chrissie. 

What  lent  great  significance  to  this  slashing  victory  of  Botha’s 
was  the  fact  that  three  British  columns,  each  as  large  as  Benson’s, 
under  Colonel  Plumer,  General  Walter  Kitchener  (brother  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief ),  and  General  Bruce  Hamilton  were  each  and 
all  in  pursuit  of  the  Boer  Commandant-General  when  this  '^mis- 
hap ” occurred.  The  British  public  had  been  regularly  informed 
for  the  last  two  months  of  Botha’s  “ narrow  escapes  ” from  these 
columns ; of  his  being  “ hunted,”  “ surprised,”  and  of  “ the  capture 
of  his  hat  and  reYolver  ” on  ono  occasion,  Luring  this  period,  as 


536 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


a matter  of  fact,  he  had  fought  Major  Gough  and  taken  three 
guns  and  over  100  men ; had  seen  his  lieiitenants  successfully  assail 
Forts  Prospect  and  Itala  in  Zululand;  had  captured  two  convoys 
of  Bruce  Hamilton’s ; fought  and  beat  a body  of  troops  in  the 
Yryheid  district,  and  surprised  and  overwhelmed  the  gallant  Ben- 
son on  the  29th  of  October,  as  detailed,  Avith  a force  inferior  to  any 
single  one  of  the  enemy’s  columns,  and  Avithout  a single  gun. 

On  the  31st  of  December  the  folloAving  letter  relating  to  this 
victory  of  Botha’s,  and  dealing  with  the  alleged  “ great  losses  ” 
inflicted  on  the  burghers  in  the  battle,  appeared  in  the  London 
“Daily  Ncavs”: 

“ COOKED 

“ Sir, — In  further  proof  (if  proof  Avere  needed)  of  the  way 
‘ cooked  ’ accounts  of  the  Avar  are  served  out  to  the  gullible  British 
public  by  the  War  Office  and  Jingo  press,"I  enclose  a letter  to  hand 
this  day  from  a relative  in  the  South  African  Constabulary.  The 
underlined  portion  (Avhich  you  may  like  to  quote)  speaks  for  itself. 

“ I am,  sir,  faithfully  yours, 

“John  Burnham. 

“ Brentford. 

“ ^ We  aren’t  far  from  Avhere  Colonel  Benson  and  his  staff  got 
cut  up.  An  account  of  it  in  the  papers  has  reached  us  this  mail, 
and  it  says  the  enemy  lost  heavily.  I think  they  lost  fifteen;  it 
wasn’t  more  than  tAventy  at  the  most,  and  our  losses  were  over  a 
hundred  and  fifty.  It  Avas  a desperate  affair  indeed.  They  keep 
you  in  the  dark  in  England  of  hoAV  the  war  is  being  carried  on. 
It’s  a very  poor  account  of  it  indeed  of  that  fight.’  ” 

November  8-15. — The  Privy  Council  of  England  this  day  dis- 
missed the  appeal  addressed  to  it  by  a Cape  Colonist  against  arrest 
and  imprisonment  under  martial  laAAq  Avhich  Avere  held  to  be  justi- 
fiable by  the  Colonial  courts.  Mr.  Frederic  Harrison  (in  an  ad- 
dress delivered  in  Newton  Hall,  London,  a feAV  days  subsequently) 
dealt  Avith  this  decision  of  the  Privy  Council  as  follows: 

“No  more  outrageous  prostitution  of  justice,  no  more  insolent 
defiance  of  accepted  and  recognized  laAV,  had  occurred  in  English 
courts  since  the  time  of  Jeffreys  and  Scroggs,  and  the  other 
apostate  creatures  of  Stuart  tyranny,  than  Avere  to  be  found  in  the 
dicta  of  the  Lord  Chancellor  of  England.  Mr.  Marais,  a British 
subject,  living  at  Paarl,  in  Cape  Colony,  Avas  arrested,  with  others, 
thirty  miles  or  so  from  Cape  Town,  in  a district  where  no  war  or 
insurrection  existed,  Avas  carried  to  Beaufort  West,  300  miles  away, 
and  had  been  kept  in  gaol  ever  since  Avithout  trial  or  formal  charge. 
He  appealed  from  the  Supreme  Court  at  Cape  Town  to  the  Privy 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


537 


Council  here,  which  declined  even  to  hear  his  ease  or  ask  why  he 
was  imprisoned;  and  he  (]\'Ir.  Harrison)  presumed  that  if  the  sol- 
diers were  to  shoot  or  torture  Mr.  Marais,  the  Privy  Council,  by 
their  decision,  would  say  that  it  was  no  affair  of  theirs,  and  that 
they  would  not  even  inquire  what  had  been  done.” — “ Daily  Hews,” 
Hovember  11,  1901. 

One  more  evil  act  and  precedent  added  to  the  thousand  and  one 
evil  actions  already  put  down  to  England’s  account  through  this 
calamitous  war. 

Miss  Emily  Hobhouse,  niece  of  Lord  Hobhouse,  who  visited 
several  of  the  concentration  camps  in  South  Africa  in  the  early 
part  of  this  year,  and  published  her  impressions  in  England,  was 
yesterday  prevented  from  landing  in  Cape  Town.  She  was  ulti- 
mately removed,  by  force,  to  another  ship,  and  compelled  to  return 
to  England.  This  is  a decided  victory  for  Lord  Milner. 

De  Wet  appears  again  in  the  northeastern  region  of  the  Orange 
Free  State  with  a number  of  followers.  This  is  the  first  movement 
of  the  Free  State  Commandant-General  since  his  latest  death  at 
the  hands  of  Eeuter. 

A British  convoy  on  the  way  from  Lambert’s  Bay  to  Clan- 
william  (Cape  Colony)  has  been  ambushed  and  captured,  by  Com- 
mandant Maritz,  at  Bevendam. 

November  16-23. — De  Wet  with  some  400  men  attacked  the' 
rear-guard  of  Colonel  Byng’s  column  while  carrying  off  stock  near 
Heilbron  (0.  F.  S.).  The  fight  continued  for  two  hours,  after 
which  the  Boers  drew  off.  Twelve  English  casualties. 

On  the  16th  of  November,  the  British  press  published  a des- 
patch from  Reuter  of  a letter  from  Middelburg,  Cape  Colony, 
dated  October  25,  which  contained  this  account  of  some  British 
Colonial  fighting : 

“ On  the  13th  inst.  about  200  men  of  Smuts’  commando,  under 
Van  der  Venter,  Karsten,  and  Botha,  attacked  a post  at  Doorn- 
bosch,  near  Somerset  East,  held  by  about  50  men  of  the  Somerset 
District  Mounted  Troops.  Captain  Thornton,  of  the  Cape  Police, 
with  130  men  of  the  same  District  Mounted  Troops,  went  to  the 
relief  of  the  place,  but  were  unable  to  prevent  its  surrender  after 
a very  feeble  resistance.  In  his  report  Captain  Thornton  states 
that  he  took  up  a fairly  strong  position  and  was  confident  of  hold- 
ing his  own,  but  the  men  under  him  having  fired  off  most  of  their 
ammunition  when  the  enemy  was  over  2,000  yards  away,  refused 
to  fight  on  the  nearer  approach  of  the  Boers,  saying  they  would 
be  shot  if  they  did,  and  incontinently  surrendered,  only  one  man 
being  slightly  wounded. 

“ Thus,  180  men  with  rifles  and  190  horses  fell  into  the  hands 


538 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


of  the  enemy.  From  the  above  account  it  will  he  seen  at  once  that 
the  surrender  must  have  been  intentional,  for  it  is  inconceivable 
that  180  men  would  surrender  a strong  position  to  an  equal  force 
with  practically  no  resistance  unless  by  prearrangement.” 

November  24-30. — A report  of  the  “ capture  of  Boer  Com- 
mandant ” by  Colonel  Eimington  a few  days  ago  turns  out  to  have 
omitted  a slight  matter  of  fact  relating  to  the  capture,  at  the  same 
time,  of  100  British  by  Commandant  Groblaar.  The  affair  oc- 
curred near  Villiersdorp.  Groblaar,  of  General  Botha’s  force,  was 
retiring  before  Eimington’s  column  when  he  encountered  Major 
Fisher  and  100  men  whom  he  took  with  him,  after  some  fighting. 
Commandant  Buys  was  wounded  and  left  behind,  and  so  fell  into 
Eimington’s  hands.  The  English  were  subsequently  released. 
Major  Fisher  was  dangerously  wounded  in  the  encounter. 

Commandant  Joubert,  of  George  Brand’s  commando,  was 
wounded  and  captured  in  a fight  in  the  southeast  of  the  Free  State 
with  a section  of  General  Knox’s  forces.  Some  forty  more  Boers 
were  also  taken  on  the  same  occasion. 

The  British  losses  during  the  month  of  November,  according  to 
the  War  Office  report,  were:  Officers  killed,  24;  men,  193;  died  of 
disease,  236  (officers  and  men);  accidental  deaths,  45;  missing  and 
prisoners,  77 ; wounded,  435 ; sent  home  as  invalids,  3,242.  Total 
of  the  enemy  put  out  of  action  for  the  month,  4,252. 

December  1-T. — Particulars  of  General  De  Wet’s  recent  attack 
upon  a column  under  Colonel  Wilson,  near  Heilbron,  and  of  how 
Colonel  Eimington  rescued  Wilson  and  “ outwitted  ” the  Boer 
general,  show  that  the  British  had  a narrow  escape  from  a serious 
mishap.  Wilson  left  Heilbron  with  his  column  (strength  not  given), 
and  found  himself  attacked  when  clear  of  the  town.  He  was  pur- 
sued in  a running  fight  for  three  days,  the  distance  covered  by  his 
force  being  only  fourteen  miles  in  that  time.  He  was  finally  com- 
pelled to  stand  when  finding  Boers  in  front  as  well  as  behind  him. 
He  heliographed  to  Colonel  Eimington,  who  was  north  of  the  Vaal 
Eiver,  for  help,  and  that  officer  started  at  once  to  his  rescue.  He 
covered  over  thirty  miles  in  his  rescue  ride,  and  succeeded  in  join- 
ing his  men  to  Wilson’s.  It  was  found  necessary,  however,  to  turn 
the  united  column  back  to  Heilbron,  and  to  fight  all  the  way  for 
the  protection- of  the  convoy  with  Wilson’s  force,  which  appears 
to  have  been  the  main  object  of  De  Wet’s  attentions.  Eimington 
had  to  abandon  two  of  his  wagons  to  the  Boer  forces,  but  succeeded, 
by  the  ruse  of  lighting  misleading  fires  during  the  night,  in  escap- 
ing from  his  pursuers.  No  information  is  given  of  the  losses  iri 
killed  oy  wounded  on  either  side, 


DIARY  OF  THE  ^fAR 


539 


December  8-15. — A body  of  Colonial  Constabulary  raided  the 
village  of  Bothaville  and  carried  off  a dozen  prisoners.  They  were 
pursued,  the  prisoners  rescued,  and  the  constabulary  driven  back 
across  the  Valsch  Eiver.  Bothaville  is  in  the  northwest  of  the 
Free  State,  on  the  Transvaal  border,  where  De  Wet  suffered  a severe 
“mishap”  in  November,  1900. 

General  Bruce  Hamilton  reports  an  attack  upon  and  the  capture 
of  another  Boer  laager  in  the  Ermelo  district,  at  a place  called 
Witkraans.  Sixteen  Boers  were  killed  and  seventy  armed  prisoners 
were  taken;  among  them  being  Field  Cornet  Badenhorst  of  Box- 
burg;  a noted  officer  who  fought  with  General  Botha  during  the 
Tugela  campaign.  One  of  the  guns  captured  by  the  Boers  at 
Brakenlaagte  was  retaken  in  this  surprise  of  Piet  Viljoen’s  force. 

Another  report,  from  Zululand,  says  that  General  Louis  Botha 
was  severely  wounded  in  an  engagement  at  Luneberg,  being  shot 
through  the  left  leg  below  the  knee,  and  narrowly  escaped  capture 
by  crawling  into  the  bush.  Eighty  Boer  prisoners  are  said  to  have 
been  taken  on  the  same  occasion. 

December  16-23. — Commandant  Kritzinger  in  attempting 
with  a force  of  150  men  to  cross  the  De  Aar-Naauwpoort  railway, 
between  Hanover  and  Taaibosch  (Cape  Colony),  was  fired  upon 
from  a blockhouse.  The  Commandant  and  his  men  retired,  five 
being  wounded.  Kritzinger  returned  under  fire  again  to  carry 
off  one  of  his  wounded  men,  when  he  was  hit  and  so  severely 
wounded  that  he  was  taken  prisoner,  together  with  his  five  wounded 
companions. 

Kritzinger  is  a citizen  of  the  Orange  Free  State  aged  about 
twenty-seven.  He  has  been  the  most  successful  of  the  numerous 
Commandants  who  invaded  the  Cape  Colony  in  retaliation  for  the 
farm-burning,  and  looting  measures  resorted  to  by  the  British 
after  the  enemy’s  occupation  of  Pretoria.  More  detailed  references 
are  made  to  him  in  previous  entries  in  this  diary. 

The  trial  of  Commandant  Scheepers  for  “ murder,”  etc.,  com- 
menced at  Graaff  Eeinet,  Cape  Colony,  on  the  18th  of  December. 
There  were  thirty  charges  made  against  him.  One  charge,  “that 
he  had  made  war  on  the  enemies  of  the  Boer  Eepublics  ” would 
include  all  the  others.  According  to  reports  sent  to  the  German 
press  his  trial  was  forced  on  while  he  was  suffering  severe  illness. 
This  indecent  haste  to  gratify  the  revengeful  feeling  of  the  Cape 
loyalists  is  worthy  of  those  whose  volunteers  he  had  so  frequently 
whipped  in  the  field. 

Eecent  meetings  between  Botha,  De  Wet,  and  other  Boer  gen- 
erals, believed  to  have  taken  place  in  the  southeast  of  the  Transvaal 
for  the  purpose  of  discpssing  “ terms  of  surrender, ” are  now 


540 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


reported  to  have  been  convened  for  the  consideration  of  a renewed 
plan  of  campaign. 

Major  McMicking,  while  marching  with  100  men  near  Vrede- 
fort,  Orange  Free  State,  was  attacked  by  a Boer  force,  and  driven 
back  over  the  railway.  He  escaped  nnder  cover  of  the  night. 

President  Steyn,  writing  to  a friend  in  Germany,  speaks  of  the 
struggle  and  of  his  hopes  in  the  same  undaunted  spirit  with  which 
he  has  carried  on  the  conflict  for  independence  since  Mr.  Kruger’s 
departure  from  South  Africa: 

“ The  situation  is  uncommonly  favorable  to-  the  Boers.  The 
certainty  reigns  everywhere  that  the  war  can  never  end  success- 
fully for  the  British.  Neither  he  nor  other  commanders  think  of 
giving  up  even  an  inch  of  territory,  much  less  their  full  indepen- 
dence. It  was  to  he  expected  that  the  war,  even  if  it  came  to  an 
end  for  the  present,  would  he  carried  on  for  generations,  for  in  the 
Transvaal  there  was  gold  under  every  stone,  and  the  English  would 
never  rest  till  they  had  got  possession  of  it  all.  He  is  ready  to 
tight  to  the  end,  but  not,  as  was  believed  a year  ago,  to  the  bitter 
end,  but  to  a happy  one.” 

Commandant  Cherrie  Emmet,  brother-in-law  of  Commandant 
General  Botha,  has  been  for  some  time  jDast  in  charge  of  a section 
of  the  old  A^ryheid  commando  which  figured  so  conspicuously  in 
General  Lukas  Meyer’s  forces  during  the  early  months  of  the  war. 
Commandant  Emmet  is  about  30  years  old,  tall  and  athletically 
built.  It  Avas  he  and  Commandant  Pohlman  of  the  Johannes- 
burg Police  who  brought  in  the  ten  Armstrong  guns  Avhich  were 
taken  at  Colenso. 

On  Dingaan’s  Day  (December  IG)  President  Steyn,  General  De 
Wet,  and  the  Boer  forces  in  the  northeast  of  the  Free  State,  as- 
sembled at  Kaffir  Kop,  near  Lindley.  Patriotic  speeches  Avere  made 
and  all  counsels  of  surrender  to  the  enemy  Avere  denounced  and 
repudiated.  This  region  has  been  overrun  by  British  SAveeping 
columns  at  least  a dozen  times,  and  is  at  present  more  or  less 
“ enclosed  ” by  lines  of  blockhouses. 

Commandant  Haasbroek  Avas  killed  in  an  engagement  on  the  16th 
of  December,  as  he  was  leading  a company  of  40  men  in  an  attack 
upon  a column  of  the  enemy  under  Major  Marshall,  near  Senekal, 
Orange  Free  State.  The  Commandant  had  left  the  main  body  of 
the  Boers  under  Celliers  and  Latigan,  some  three  miles  behind, 
and  was  intent  upon  making  a diverting  attack  on  a section  of 
Marshall’s  force  to  cover  a surprise  assault  by  Celliers’  on  the  Eng- 
lish column.  He  Avas  killed  by  a bullet  in  the  head.  On  learning 
of  the  death  of  their  leader  his  commando  retreated.  Haasbroek 
Avas  one  of  De  Wet’s  most  capable  lieutenants. 


DIABY  OF  THE  TOi? 


541 


In  the  eastern  Transvaal,  near  Berginderlyn,  200  British,  en- 
gaged in  searching  and  wrecking  farms,  were  surprised  and  over- 
whelmed by  a force  of  300  Ermelo  burghers  vinder  Commandant 
Britz.  The  report  says  “ the  casualties  were  severe.”  The  Boers 
are  credited  with  having  charged  with  determination.  Subsequent 
accounts  of  this  action  say  that  3 officers  and  5 men  were  killed, 
with  2 officers  and  30  men  wounded.  A “ number  ” of  Major 
Bridgeford’s  companies  were  reported  captured. 

Colonel  Park  wms  attacked  at  Elandspruit  (north  Transvaal)  by 
a small  body  of  patroling  Boers  under  Commandant  Muller  having 
a pom-pom.  They  were  driven  off  after  several  hours  of  fighting, 
leaving  8 killed  and  3 wounded.  Park’s  loss  was  admitted  to  be 
7 killed,  and  6 officers  and  18  other  men  wounded. 

According  to  a letter  from  Kimberley  in  the  “ Standard  ” of  this 
date,  Kuruman,  in  Bechuanaland,  was  attacked  and  looted  by  a 
Boer  force  a few  weeks  ago.  Ko  allusion  to  or  account  of  this 
“ mishap  ” has  been  made  in  any  of  Lord  Kitchener’s  daily  or 
weekly  reports  to  the  British  War  Office. 

After  celebrating  Dingaan’s  Day  at  Kaffir  Kop  in  company  with 
President  Stejm,  General  De  Wet  appears  to  have  moved  south- 
eastward and  crossed  the  road  leading  from  Harrismith  to  Bethle- 
hem. A line  of  blockhouses  was  being  constructed  along  this  road 
by  the  English,  and  two  or  three  of  the  enemy’s  columns  were 
operating  in  the  district. 

On  the  18th,  one  of  these  columns,  under  the  command  of 
Colonel  Dartnell,  ran  up  against  De  Wet’s  force,  south  of  the 
Bethlehem  road,  some  thirW  or  forty  miles  west  of  Harrismith, 
in  a hilly  region.  Particulars  of  the  encounter  were  not  published, 
but  as  it  was  acknowledged  in  the  British  press  that  Dartnell  and 
his  Light  Horse  “ retired  towards  the  Elands  Eiver,”  it  may  be 
reasonably  assumed  that  the  English  were  forced  to  retreat  in  the 
direction  of  their  base. 

December  24-31. — Three  successive  and  apparently  successful 
attacks  by  Boer  forces  are  reported  on  the  24th.  Colonel  Damant, 
operating  with  Colonel  Eimington,  was  surprised  by  a force  of 
800  Boers  at  Tafelkop,  about  midway  between  Yrede  and  Frank- 
fort, in  the  northeast  of  the  Free  State.  The  Boers  were  led  by 
M.  Botha  (probably  a son  of  the  late  General  Philip  Botha,  whose 
home  was  in  the  Vrede  district)  and  rushed  a kopje  on  which  the 
English  column  had  taken  position.  The  British  were  overwhelmed 
and  lost  a gun.  Damant  went  to  the  rescue  of  the  position  with  a 
single  company,  almost  every  one  of  whom  was  wounded,  including 
the  officer  in  command.  This  bravery  enabled  other  British  forces 
to  operate  on  the  flank  of  the  attacking  Boers,  while  Colonel  Eim- 


542 


TBE  BOER  EIGKT  FOR  FREEDOM 


ington’s  arrival  with  another  column  caused  Botha  and  his  men 
to  retire,  but  with  two  captured  guns.  The  English  casualties 
were  given  as  22  killed,  and  the  same  number  wounded.  Another 
British  column,  composed  mainly  of  Yeomen,  about  500  strong, 
under  Colonel  Firman,  was  encamped  on  Christmas  Eve  on  a kopje 
at  Tweefontein,  guarding  the  Bethlehem  end  of  the  blockhouse 
line.  This  kopje  was  an  isolated  hill,  the  southern  side  being  very 
steep,  with  the  northern  side  sloping  gradually  to  the  level  of  the 
veldt.  The  Yeomen  were  in  charge  of  considerable  stores  for  the 
blockhouses,  and  had  a gun  and  a pom-pom. 

Manifestly  De  Wet  required  these  stores  for  Christmas.  He 
appears  to  have  remained  in  the  region  south  of  the  Bethlehem- 
Harrismith  road,  in  among  the  spurs  of  the  Eoodebergen  hills, 
since  his  brush  with  Dartnell,  waiting  for  his  quarry.  He  selected 
Christmas  Eve  for  his  swoop,  and  at  two  in  the  morning  of  the 
24th  his  men,  in  bare  feet,  scaled  the  precipitous  southern  side  of 
the  hill,  dashed  in  upon  the  sleeping  camp,  and  overwhelmed  the 
Yeomen.  On  climbing  to  the  top  of  the  kopje  they  had  rushed 
the  pickets,  wrenched  the  rifles  from  their  hands,  and  then  swept 
resistlessly  through  the  laager  bayoneting  many  of  their  enemies 
with  the  weapons  they  had  seized  on  gaining  the  summit  of  the  hill. 

The  English  were  under  the  command  of  Major  Williams  of  the 
South  Staffordshire  regiment,  in  the  temporary  absence  of  Colonel 
Firman.  Williams  was  killed,  along  with  six  other  officers,  in  at- 
tempting to  rally  their  men  to  meet  the  Boer  surprise  attack. 
Eight  other  officers  were  wounded  in  the  flght.  The  total  English 
casualties  amounted  to  63  killed,  55  wounded,  and  246  surrenders. 
De  Wet  virtually  captured  the  whole  camp,  its  defenders,  and 
stores;  including  the  gun,  pom-pom,  and  ammunition;  and  having, 
in  this  characteristic  manner,  despatched  a “ mishap  ’’-Christmas 
greeting  to  England,  moved  off  with  his  force,  “ pursued  ” as  usual 
by  the  columns,  new  and  old,  by  which  he  has  been  followed  during 
the  last  eighteen  months. 

So  ended  the  year  1901  with  the  great  general  of  the  Free  State 
still  signalizing  himself  as  ever  in  a brilliant  display  of  the  finest 
fighting  qualities. 


Chapter  XXXIX 

DIARY  OF  THE  WAR— JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1902 

Victories  of  De  Wet,  Botha,  and  Hebtzog — Depressing  effect  on 
British  army — Martial  law  still  more  harshly  enforced  in  Cape 
Colony — Kitchener  cables  for  Canadian  scouts — Organization 
OF  Boer  traitors  into  “ National  Scouts  ” — Reuter  canard  of 
Boer  treachery  exploded — The  German  Chancellor  on  Chamber- 
lain’s INSULT  TO  German  army — “ He  is  biting  on  granite  ” — 
WOLMARANS  CAPTURED — SCHALK  BURGER  WRITES  KITCHENER,  DE- 
NOUNCING CRUELTY  OF  CONCENTRATION  POLICY — APPALLING  LIST  OF 

DEATHS  OF  CHILDREN — BrUTAL  EXECUTION  OF  SCHEEPERS CAPTURE  OF 

ViLjoEN — Unauthorized  inC'ervention  on  behalf  of  Boers  by 
Prime  Minister  of  Holland — Letter  of  Smuts  to  Botha — Kitch- 
ener PLANS  “ drive  ” TO  CAPTURE  De  WeT  AND  STEYN — HiS  “ WATER- 
HAUL  ” — Boer  operations  in  the  Zuikerboshrand — De  la  Key’s 
VICTORY  at  YsTER  SpRUIT — KITCHENER  “ AVENGES  MaJUBA  DAY  ” BY 
HUGE  CAPTURES  OF  SHEEP  AND  CATTLE — TwO  EXAMPLES  OF  KITCHENER’S 
“ Kaffir  estimates  ” — Vilonel,  the  Benedict  Arnold  of  South 
Africa — Australian  petition  for  recall  of  “ Kangaroo  ” Volun- 
teers— De  la  Key  defeats  and  captures  Lord  Methuen — He 
RELEASES  THE  WOUNDED  GENERAL — MISTAKEN  GENEROSITY  OF  THE 

ACT — How  IT  WAS  RETURNED BRITISH  CHARGE  BOERS  WITH  TREACHERY 

BECAUSE  DRESSED  IN  CAPTURED  KHAKI — DEATH  OF  CECIL  RHODES. 

January  1. — The  New  Year  begins  with  news  that  fighting 
occurred  at  Laing’s  Nek  and  Warmbaths  in  the  Transvaal;  Botha’s 
Pass,  Heilbron,  Bethulie,  and  Philippolis  in  the  Free  State,  and  in 
the  Calvinia,  Wellwood,  and  the  Middelburg  districts  of  Cape 
Colony,  in  the  closing  days  of  the  old  year.  De  Wet  was  located 
on  some  hills  south  of  Heilbron,  shortly  after  his  dashing  exploit 
on  Christmas  Eve. 

At  Philippolis  (south  of  the  Free  State,  near  the  Orange  Eiver), 
Hertzog’s  commando  attacked  a force  of  400  British,  captured  their 
wagons,  and  helped  themselves  to  the  Christmas  cheer  which  these 
contained. 

Some  recent  despatches  from  Pretoria  speak  of  the  depressing 
effect  produced  there  by  the  latest  successes  of  De  Wet  and  Botha, 
and  give  expression  to  the  feeling  that  still  more  reenforeements 
must  be  sent  to  Lord  Kitchener  if  there  is  to  be  a speedy  termina- 
tion to  the  war. 

The  doings  of  the  martial-law  administrators  in  Cape  Colony, 
as  revealed  in  letters  which  have  arrived  by  mail  in  Germany  and 


544 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


England,  read  like  a chapter  from  the  history  of  British  Govern- 
ment in  Ireland,  in  1798.  Three  “ rebels  ” were  shot  at  De  Aar, 
four  more  were  hung  at  Burghersdorp,  Middelburg,  and  Cradock  ; 
the  friends  of  the  victims  and  the  general  public,  in  each  place, 
being  compelled  to  attend  the  executions ! Several  more  “ rebels  ” 
have,  it  appears,  been  shot  in  other  places,  while  a young  man 
named  Hoffme3'er  Louw,  of  exemplary  character  and  of  strong 
religious  feeling,  was  publicly  hung  at  Colesberg  for  having  been 
on  commando.  To  maintain  the  orthodox  British  reputation  for 
legal  brutality,  seven  girls,  all  under  the  age  of  twenty,  were  tried 
and  sent  to  prison  for  a month,  for  the  crime  of  having  sung  the 
Boer  National  Anthem  in  the  hearing  of  some  English  officials. 
Manifestly  the  making  of  another  Ireland  in  Cape  Colony  is  in 
full  swing,  as  an  additional  result  of  the  war  against  the  Boer 
Eepublics. 

Lists  of  casualties  published  in  the  press  reveal  the  fact  that 
fighting  took  place  recently  in  many  places  not  otherwise  men- 
tioned in  the  ordinary  war  news  from  Pretoria.  It  appears  also 
that  the  total  casualties  in  the  fight  with  De  Wet  on  the  24th  of 
December  amounted  to  400,  while  it  is  believed  he  took  a big  haul 
of  ammunition  along  with  the  two  captured  guns. 

On  the  30th  of  last  month  a fight  took  place  in  the  Calvinia  dis- 
trict, West  Cape  Colony,  in  which  the  2nd  Dragoon  Guards  had 
some  twenty  casualties.  The  Boers  were  probably  Louw’s  men. 

Oh  the  3rd  inst.  General  Bruce  Hamilton  captured  100  prisoners, 
including  General  Erasmus  and  a considerable  amount  of  stock  in 
the  Ermelo  district.  It  is  not  made  clear  whether  this  Boer  officer 
is  Commandant  D.  Erasmus,  who  had  charge  of  the  Pretoria  and 
other  commandoes  and  failed  to  cooperate  with  Lukas  Meyer  in 
the  attack  upon  General  Penn  Symons,  in  the  battle  of  Talana 
Hill.  It  may  possibly  be  Jacob  Erasmus,  who  has  been  reported 
captured  once  or  twice  before.  In  either  case  the  loss  to  the  Boer 
fighters  still  in  the  field  will  not  be  particularly  discouraging. 

A detachment  of  Scots  Greys  sent  to  surprise  a small  Boer  force 
near  Bronkhurstspruit  (40  miles  east  of  Pretoria)  were  them- 
selves surprised,  on  meeting  with  a vigorous  reception  which  cost 
them  twenty  casualties;  seven  being  killed.  The  district  east  to 
Middelburg  is  under  the  care  of  men  of  Trichardt’s  small  com- 
mando, who  were  probably  those  who  encountered  the  Scotchmen. 

Lord  Kitchener  has  cabled  to  Mr.  Chamberlain  suggesting  the 
despatch  to  South  Africa  of  some  Canadian  scouts  as  trained 
trackers.”  Canada  responds  by  promising  the  required  help. 

The  body  called  “ National  Scouts,”  said  to  have  been  organized 
out  of  burghers  who  are  sick  of  the  war,  and  of  the  Boer  leaders, 


DIARY  OP  THE  WAR 


545 


has  invited  the  by-name  of  “ National  Skunks  ” from  their  kin- 
dred still  in  the  field. 

Lord  Milner  presided  at  the  resurrection  of  the  Johannesburg 
“ Star,”  which  played  so  notorious  a part  in  the  Ananias  propa- 
ganda preceding  the  war.  No  more  suitable  person  could  have 
graced  such  an  occasion.  The  Ten  Commandments  were  probably 
not  referred  to  by  the  Chairman  or  company  during  the  ceremony. 

Casualty  lists  continue  to  appear  which  speak  of  encounters  not 
mentioned  in  Lord  Kitchener’s  weekly  reports.  The  losses  are 
probably  considered  too  small  to  call  for  notice  otherwise.  They 
tell,  all  the  same,  of  the  dogged  resistance  of  the  Boers  everywhere 
there  are  half-a-dozen  of  them  left  to  fight,  and  they  speak  of  the 
continued  penalty  which  the  aggressor  in  this  unparalleled  war 
has  to  pay  in  lives,  as  well  as  in  money,  for  the  attempt  to  destroy 
a little  nation. 

Another  calumny  against  the  Boers  by  the  veracious  Eeuter  has 
been  mailed.  It  was  published  as  follows,  on  the  2nd  inst.: 

“ Pretoria,  Wednesday. 

News  recently  reached  Warmbaths  that  six  Boers  in  the 
vicinity  were  desirous  of  surrendering. 

“ Two  Intelligence  Officers  named  Steere  and  Kerr  went  to  ascer- 
tain particulars,  a few  men  following  as  a precaution.  Steere  and 
Kerr,  riding  in  advance,  came  on  some  Boers,  and  began  parley- 
ing with  them,  when  fire  was  opened  by  other  Boers,  who  were 
concealed. 

“ Both  officers  were  shot  dead. — Eeuter  Special.” 

The  War  Office  has  published  the  following  notice: 

“ Lord  Kitchener  has  replied  to  a telegram  of  inquiry  that  the 
report  recently  circulated  that  two  Intelligence  Officers,  named 
Steere  and  Kerr,  had  been  treacherously  shot  by  the  Boers  near 
Warmbaths  is  without  foundation.” 

Early  in  the  week  General  Christian  Botha  and  Commandant 
Opperman  (the  latter  having  been  “killed,”  for  the  second  time,, 
at  the  battle  of  Mount  Itala)  were  engaged  with  one  of  the  “ sweep- 
ing ” columns,  under  General  Spens,  in  the  southeastern  Trans- 
vaal. The  Boer  officers  appear  to  have  enticed  some  of  the  enemy 
to  engage  in  a chase  of  retreating  foemen,  with  the  result  that  18 
of  those  who  accepted  the  invitation  were  killed,  including  5 officers, 
while  28  were  wounded.  The  engagement  came  off  near  Stander- 
ton,  inside  a blockhouse  and  fenced  district,  “ swept  ” of  Boers 
full  twenty  times  during  the  past  two  years. 

Several  laagers  are  reported  about  the  same  time  as  being  sur- 
prised and  captured  by  the  British.  Little  or  no  fighting  is 
35 


Ud  THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 

recorded  in  Cape  Colony,  while  General  De  Wet  is  still  pursued  hy 
General  Elliot’s,  and  other  columns,  in  his  own  country.  He  is 
said  to  have  received  reenforcements  recently  from  General  Louis 
Botha. 

January  8-15. — The  German  Imperial  Chancellor,  replying 
in  the  Eeichstag  to  Mr.  Chamberlain’s  Edinburgh  speech,  in  which 
the  British  army  in  South  Africa  had  been  compared  to  the  German 
army  in  France  in  words  flattering  to  the  khaki  soldiers,  said : 

“ The  German  army,  however,  stands  too  high,  and  its  shield 
is  too  bright  to  be  touched  by  any  unjust  Judgment,  and  the  words 
apply  which  Frederick  the  Great  used  of  a man  who  had  spoken 
ill  of  his  army,  ‘ Let  the  man  be,  and  don’t  excite  yourselves.  He 
is  biting  on  granite.’  ” 

On  the  13th  and  14th  a fight  took  place  at  Doornfontein,  near 
Griquatown,  about  100  miles  west  of  Kimberley.  The  British 
report  24  casualties;  the  officer  of  the  detachment.  Major  White- 
head,  with  several  of  his  men,  being  killed.  The  name  of  the 
Boer  officer  who  attacked  the  enemy  is  not  given.  It  is  probably 
Conroy  or  De  Yilliers. 

The  British  have  recovered  one  of  the  guns  taken  from  Colonel 
Benson  in  the  battle  of  Brakenlaagte. 

General  Botha  is  located  on  the  Zulu  border,  convenient  to  Natal, 
and  is  believed  to  be  concerting  with  De  Wet  a plan  of  operations 
for  the  New  Year. 

General  Bruce  Hamilton’s  column  surprised  a laager  near  Er- 
melo,  and  took  40  prisoners,  including  Major  Wolmarans  of  the 
Transvaal  Staats  Artillery.  Wolmarans  was  one  of  the  founders 
of  that  splendid  body;  having  been  sent  to  Europe  when  young 
by  General  Joubert  to  study  the  German  artillery  system  after  the 
Franco-German  war.  He  took  part  in  the  siege  of  Ladysmith, 
was  court-martialed  and  suspended  for  a brief  period  on  account 
of  the  successful  night  attack  made  on  a “ Long  Tom  ” which  was 
under  his  charge  at  the  time.  He  subsequently  served  with  Botha 
during  part  of  the  Tugela  campaign,  and  was  in  charge  of  his 
Krupps  at  the  battle  of  Spion  Kop. 

De  Wet  has  had  a fight  with  General  Elliot’s  column  at  a drift 
near  Elands  Kop  (Lindley  district).  He  had  two  guns  and  a 
pom-pom,  and  succeeded  in  holding  the  English  back  with  his 
artillery  until  his  men  and  baggage  got  safely  away. 

In  the  latest  Blue  Book  dealing  with  the  war,  a letter  from 
acting-President  Schalk  Burger  to  Lord  Kitchener,  in  reply  to  the 
latter’s  proclamation  of  the  7th  of  August  last,  is  printed.  The 
concluding  paragraph  reads: 


DIAEY  OF  THE  ^S^AR 


547 


“ While  I am  writing  about  this,  I cannot  help  pointing  out  to 
your  Excellency  the  improper  way  in  which  those  poor  families 
were  removed,  in  rain  and  cold,  on  uncovered  wagons,  insulted  by 
Kaffirs  and  soldiers,  and  taken  with  youfr  Excellency’s  columns  as 
a protection  to  your  troops,  in  this  way  preventing  an  attack  from 
our  side.  I feel  convinced  that  if  the  atrocities  and  the  inhuman 
treatment  of  our  families  are  brought  before  the  noble  and  Chris- 
tian portion  of  the  English  people*  in  their  true  light,  they  would 
exclaim,  ‘ Away  with  such  shame.’  But  the  truth  is  being  con- 
cealed; but  still  we  believe  and  trust  that  altho  there  may  be  no 
justice  with  England’s  influential  (great)  men,  there  is  a just 
God,  and  truth  and  right  must  be  victorious.” 

A body  of  Boers  under  Commandants  Kemp  and  Celliers,  of  De 
la  Key’s  commando,  crossed  the  Maf eking  line,  and  brought  back 
large  quantities  of  cattle.  They  were  opposed  by  British  posts 
south  and  west  of  the  scene  of  General  Baden-Powell’s  fame,  but 
fought  their  way  back  with  their  seizures. 

January  16-23. — The  latest  returns  of  the  mortality  in  the 
concentration  camps  show  that  the  English  are  killing  their 
imprisoned  foes — women,  children,  and  non-combatants — more 
quickly  than  they  are  disposing  of  the  Boers  in  the  field.  In  the 
seven  months  from  June  to  December,  1901,  no  less  than  16,321 
persons  died  under  the  British  Weyler  treatment.  This  appalling 
rate  amounts  to  close  on  one  in  four  per  annum  of  the  total  popu- 
lation of  the  camps ! Twelve  thousand  two  hundred  and  sixty-five 
children  are  included  in  this  six  months’  British  “ bag  ” ; children 
whose  crime  consists  in  being  born  Boer.  And  a morally  rotten 
“ Christian  ” world  reads  these  figures  in  its  papers,  says,  “ How 
shocking ! ” and  turns  to  the  latest  Stock  Exchange  quotations  of 
the  Band  mines. 

Dr.  Visser,  of  Johannesburg,  who  rendered  splendid  ambulance 
service  to  the  Boer  armies  early  in  the  war,  has  been  tried  for 
treason  and  on  other  charges  before  a military  tribunal. 

The  following  despatch  appeared  in  the  press  on  the  20th : 

“ Graaff  Reinet,  January  17. 

“ Commandant  Scheepers  was  brought  into  the  Church  Square 
here  to-day,  and  Colonel  Henniker  read  the  sentence  of  death 
which  was  passed  by  the  Court  and  confirmed  by  Lord  Kitchener. 
The  trial  of  Commandant  Kritzinger  will  commence  next  week. 

“January  18. 

“Commandant  Scheepers  was  shot  here  at  three  o’clock  this 
afternoon. — Reuter.” 

This  doing  to  death  of  a brave  young  soldier  can  add  no  dis- 
grace to  a war  which  has  already  covered  England  with  every  kind 


548 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


of  dishonor.  It  only  sustains  the  reputation  of  British  arms  in  a 
war  engineered  by  lies  for  the  purpose  of  plunder. 

Commandant  Scheepers  was  tried  before  a court  of  three  officers 
of  minor  rank;  men  of  the  stamp  he  had  so  often  and  so  easily 
thrashed  in  the  field.  He  was  charged  with  “ arson  ” and  with 
“ murdering  natives.”  The  arson  consisted  in  burning  the  Gov- 
ernment buildings  at  ]\Iurraysburg,  Cape  Colony,  together  with 
two  houses  of  Boer  adherents  who  had  gone  over  to  the  British. 
He  had,  however,  given  no  less  than  eight  days’  notice  to  garrison 
the  place  before  he  entered  it.  He  spared  the  magistrate’s  house, 
saying  to  his  son : “ I have  not  the  heart  to  turn  your  mother  into 
the  street,  tho  if  I did  my  conduct  would  be  less  cruel  than 
that  of  your  British  officers,  who  have  burned  down  our  homes  in 
the  darkness,  and  left  our  mothers  and  sisters  to  shiver  in  their 
night-dresses  by  the  side  of  the  sheep  kraal.”  It  was  officers  who 
had  themselves,  in  all  probability,  burned  some  of  the  thousands 
of  homes  destroyed  in  the  Transvaal  and  Free  State  who  made 
this  act  of  retaliation  against  a Government  building  “ a crime.” 

The  charge  of  shooting  natives  was  even  more  hypocritical  in 
its  shameless  effrontery.  These  natives  had  been  armed  and  em- 
ployed as  spies  and  scouts  by  the  English.  They  had  been  warned 
by  Kritzinger  and  Scheepers,  when  Cape  Colony  was  invaded,  that 
they  would  be  severely  dealt  with  if  they  took  up  arms  against  the 
Eepublics,  but  would  not  be  molested  if  they  remained  neutral.  On 
the  other  hand,  British  Ministers  in  Parliament  had  declared,  on 
the  eve  of  the  war,  that  no  native  people  would  be  brought  into  the 
struggle  by  England.  English  officers,  nevertheless,  armed  Kaffirs 
and  employed  them  in  that  kind  of  work  which  is  most  dangerous 
and  obnoxious  to  an  enemy — spy  work  and  scouting;  and  when 
these  were  caught  in  arms,  and  so  engaged,  they  were  rightly  shot 
by  the  Boer  Commandants.  To  an  official  at  Murraysburg  who 
denied  that  the  natives  in  that  locality  had  been  so  employed, 
Scheepers  replied:  “You  deny  using  natives  against  us!  Why,  I 
have  shot  them  at  200  yards,  and  in  the  front  line  of  fire,  where 
your  own  men  shrank  from  going.  At  that  range  I once  gave  the 
order  to  knock  over  some  thirteen  colored  scouts  when  your  column 
was  advancing  to  the  attack  some  600  yards  behind.”  The  inci- 
dent here  recorded  surely  offers  sufficient  explanation  of  why  a coiirt 
of  British  officers  should  condemn  such  a foeman  to  death. 

The  facts  thus  related  are  taken  from  a manly  Christian  protest 
of  an  English  clergv^man,  the  Eev.  Dewdney  Wm.  Drew,  on  the 
22nd  of  January,  which  was  sent  in  an  uncensored  letter  from 
Cape  Town  to  the  “ Daily  News  ” of  London,  and  published  in 
that  journal  on  the  12th  of  February  of  this  year. 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


549 


Several  other  Englishmen  have  borne  testimony  to  Scheepers’ 
kindness  towards  captured  British  troops.  He  had  spared  many 
a life  which  had  been  forfeit  in  the  rules  of  war,  and  was  al- 
ways found  to  be  generous  and  humane  to  the  enemies  who  fell 
into  his  hands.  But  these  are  qualities  which  shame  the  kind  of 
English  officer  described  by  Scheepers  as  fighting  from  behind 
armed  savages,  and  hence  the  verdict  which  has  just  been  carried 
into  execution. 

Misled  by  press  reports  into  the  belief  that  Scheepers,  tho  con- 
demned to  death,  was  not  yet  executed.  Senator  Teller  gave  notice 
he  would  move  in  the  United  States  Senate  a resolution  which 
had  already  been  adopted  in  the  House  of  Representatives.  It 
read  as  follows: 

“ Scheepers  is  known  to  have  been  captured  while  sick  and 
wounded  in  hospital,  in  violation  of  the  Geneva  Convention.  His 
execution  will  lead  to  acts  of  retaliation  and  reprisal,  and  it  is 
therefore  resolved,  the  House  of  Representatives  concurring,  that 
the  President  should  request  Great  Britain  to  set  aside  the  sen- 
tence in  the  interest  of  humanity,  and  to  accord  Scheepers  the 
privileges  and  immunities  guaranteed  by  the  Geneva  Convention.” 

Commandant  Wessels,  at  the  head  of  200  invaders  in  the  Crad- 
dock district  of  Cape  Colony,  captured  50  of  the  Town  Guard  who 
went  out  to  find  the  Boers  and  did  not  return. 

Colonel  AYilson,  with  a column  of  400  men  and  a gun,  came  in 
contact  with  a body  of  Boers  north  of  Frankfort  (north  Free  State) 
on  the  25th,  and  fared  badly.  The  English  were  mainly  composed 
of  the  Cape  Town  volunteers,  “ Kitchener’s  Fighting  Scouts,” 
while  the  Boers,  in  about  equal  numbers,  were  under  Commandants 
Alberts  and  Strydum.  Strydum  had  been  ambushed  the  day  be- 
fore, along  with  40  of  his  men,  and  the  British  with  their  captives 
were  attacked  by  Alberts  and  Meyer  on  the  way  back  to  Frankfort. 
Strydum  and  his  men  were  released  by  the  rescuing  party,  who 
then,  in  a running  fight,  pursued  the  British  a distance  of  a dozen 
miles  to  the  shelter  of  a larger  British  force. 

General  Ben  Y'iljoen  has  been  captured  with  two  of  his  adjutants 
near  Lydenburg  under  circumstances  which  would  suggest  treach- 
ery of  some  kind.  It  appears  the  English  were  informed  of  a visit 
which  the  general  was  paying  to  a farm  distant  some  miles  from 
his  laager,  and  in  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy’s  lines.  A party  of 
British  lay  in  ambush  for  him  on  his  return,  and  fired  point  blank 
upon  the  surprised  officer  and  his  men.  A bullet  went  through  his 
coat,  and  one  of  his  adjutants  was  shot  dead.  His  capture  is  hailed 
by  the  British  press  as  a severe  blow  to  the  Boer  army.  This  is 


550 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


true,  but  not  to  the  extent  its  enemy  believes.  Viljoen  has  been  a 
dashing  leader  all  along,  but  more  of  an  impetuous,  dare-devil  sol- 
dier than  of  a commander  of  the  type  of  Botha  or  De  la  Eey.  His 
recklessness  at  Elandslaagte,  born  of  too  great  a contempt  for  the 
English  soldier,  had  something  to  do  with  the  defeat  of  General 
Kock’s  ill-fated  commando.  Everything  that  true  courage  could 
do  in  one  man  was  attempted  by  Viljoen  to  retrieve  the  fortunes 
of  that  disastrous  day;  but  the  battle  was  lost  by  want  of  judgment 
in  Kock  and  in  himself,  and  not  for  pluck  to  fight  a combat  so 
unequal  as  that  between  800  men  and  two  guns,  against  4,000 
British  and  three  batteries  of  artillery.  He  was  wounded  in  the 
engagement,  but  was  in  the  field  again  at  Modderspruit  a few  days 
afterward.  He  took  part  in  the  ill-judged  siege  of  Ladysmith 
until  Louis  Botha  succeeded  Joubert,  when  the  fiery  Ben  took  his 
Hand  veterans  with  him  to  the  Tugela.  His  defense  of  Vaal 
Krantz  with  a force  of  seventy  or  eighty  men  and  a Maxim-Horden- 
felt,  against  a force  twenty  times  his  strength  in  men  and  guns, 
and  his  heroic  rescue  of  his  gun  after  holding  the  hill  for  most  of 
a day,  will  rank  as  one  of  the  bravest  stands  made  on  any  battle- 
field in  the  records  of  war.  He  fought  under  Louis  Botha  in  the 
retreat  from  Pretoria  eastward,  and  was  appointed  to  the  command 
of  the  Lydenburg  and  northeastern  districts  of  the  Transvaal,  after 
the  Boers  abandoned  the  defense  of  the  Delagoa  Bay  railway.  He 
attacked  and  took  Belfast  from  the  British  as  mentioned  in  this 
diary;  his  young  son,  a lad  of  15,  being  killed  by  his  side  on  that 
occasion.  He  it  was  who  also  captured  the  Victoria  (Australian) 
Volunteers  at  Wilmansrust,  when  the  prowess  of  these  Kangaroo 
Imperialists  did  not  excite  the  admiration  of  General  Bateson.  He 
showed  great  resource  as  an  officer  in  his  operations  during  1901 
against  the  various  columns  and  forces  with  which  he  had  to  con- 
tend in  the  mountainous  regions  committed  to  his  care.  After  the 
many  able  Commandants  who  have  been  killed  or  captured  during 
the  past  year,  it  will  be  no  easy  task  to  find  a competent  successor 
for  his  commando.  He  will  probably  be  succeeded  by  his  brother 
Piet  Viljoen. 

I met  General  Viljoen  in  Pretoria  on  the  occasion  of  the  last 
meeting  of  the  Volksraad.  He  presented  me  with  the  picture  of 
himself  which  appears  in  this  volume.  He  is  a handsome,  athletic- 
built  man  in  the  very  prime  of  life;  aged  about  40,  standing  5 feet 
10  inches  in  height,  with  a German  cast  of  features,  blue  eyes,  and 
lightish  hair  and  mustache. 

His  reply  to  Lord  Kitchener’s  series  of  proclamations  in  Sep- 
tember last  contained  the  following  sarcastic  references  to  the 
British  army: 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


551 


“We  are  accused  of  murdering  Kaffirs;  but  when  Kaffirs  are 
found  by  us  as  bands  of  robbers  and  murderers  we  treated  them 
according  to  law  and  justice,  and  did  not  take  Kaffirs  prisoners 
without  cause.  Considering,  however,  that  according  to  the  in- 
formation sent  us  by  Lord  Kitchener,  these  bands  of  robbers  must 
be  English  soldiers,  we  shall,  in  future,  treat  them  as  such. 

“ Further,  it  is  said  that  we  continue  the  war  without  being 
sufficiently  provided  with  arms  and  supplies;  every  Boer,  however, 
knows  that  we  are  amply  provided  with  arms,  ammunition,  and 
supplies — by  the  English  Government.” 

Commandant  Beyers  attacked  the  British  camp  in  Pietersburg 
(north  Transvaal)  on  the  25th,  and  carried  off  a number  of  the 
imprisoned  Boers. 

The  English  report  the  capture  of  several  more  laagers  in  the 
Transvaal  and  Free  State. 

Efforts  to  bring  about  peace  have  been  made  by  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter of  Holland.  He  has  visited  London,  and  subsequently  ad- 
dressed a note  to  the  British  Government,  offering  the  services  of 
his  Ministry  to  bring  about  a cessation  of  hostilities,  with  a view 
to  such  a settlement  of  the  war  as  might  be  mutually  satisfactory. 
Dr.  Kuyper  has  apparently  acted  in  this  manner  not  alone  without 
the  authority,  but,  it  is  said,  without  the  knowledge,  of  the  Boer 
leaders  in  Europe. 

Lord  Kitchener  reports  further  successes  of  General  Bruce  Ham- 
ilton in  the  Ermelo  districts,  and  of  other  “ sweeping  ” columns  in 
the  western  Transvaal  and  Free  State;  General  French  claiming 
that  the  Boer  forces  in  Cape  Colony  are  dwindling  in  number,  and 
no  longer  demanding  very  serious  attention. 

A few  days  ago,  a British  colonel  and  seven  of  his  men  were 
killed  in  a fight  with  Kieuhoudt’s  force  in  the  southwest  of  the 
Free  State,  near  the  Eiet  Eiver. 

February  1-8. — Mr.  Fischer,  the  head  of  the  Free  State  section 
of  the  Boer  leaders  in  Europe,  in  an  interview  with  a Paris  paper, 
expresses  himself  as  follows  on  the  execution  of  Commandant 
Scheepers : 

“ Mr.  Fischer  describes  the  shooting  of  Scheepers  as  a miserable 
assassination,  and  his  trial  as  a sinister  comedy.  H knew  Scheepers, 
and  can  tell  you  I would  be  less  unlikely  to  be  an  assassin  myself 
than  Scheepers — the  gentlest  of  men.’  ‘ Why  do  not  the  Boers 
resort  to  reprisals  ? ’ ‘ That  is  not  in  their  nature.  A Boer  will 

never  kill  in  cold  blood  a disarmed  enemy.  Besides,  the  execution 
of  men  like  Letter,  Louw,  and  Scheepers  injures  the  English  more 
than  the  most  rigorous  reprisals  could  do.’  ” 


552 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Two  correlated  jdeces  of  news  come  from  Johannesburg  on  this 
1st  day  of  February. 

The  first  is  that  Mrs.  De  Wet,  wife  of  the  general,  is  now  de- 
tained in  a concentration  camp  in  Natal,  with  her  youngest  chil- 
dren. This  act  is  so  characteristic  of  English  ideas  of  chivalry 
that  it  requires  no  comment.  It  is  possibly  due  to  the  action  of 
Lord  Milner  rather  than  to  that  of  Lord  Kitchener. 

The  other  item  relates  that  twenty-three  British  columns  are 
now  engaged  in  the  task  of  capturing  her  husband.  The  number 
twenty-three  may  be  the  complement  of  all  the  various  columns 
and  divisions  which  have  been  heretofore  fruitlessly  employed  in 
the  same  task,  and  are  now  to  be  combined  in  one  overwhelming 
final  effort.  Eumor  says  that  it  is  the  British  Commander-in- 
Chief’s  resolve  to  have  De  Wet  as  a prisoner,  if  alive,  for  the  occa- 
sion of  King  Edward’s  coronation,  in  June.  President  Steyn  is 
reported  to  be  with  his  Chief  Commandant,  and  both  are  believed 
to  be  well  within  the  circle  of  blockhouses,  fences,  and  living  col- 
umns now  being  drawn  round  the  coveted  prize  of  the  two  most 
formidable  foes  of  the  British  still  in  the  field. 

Lord  Lansdowne  has  returned  a courteously-worded  reply  to  Dr. 
Kuyper’s  offer  on  the  part  of  the  Dutch  Ministry  to  cooperate  in 
efforts  to  bring  about  peace.  The  British  Foreign  Secretary  says, 
in  substance:  His  Majesty’s  Government  will  receive  and  consider 
any  proposals  made  by  Boer  leaders  in  the  field  to  Lord  Kitchener, 
but  will  not  recognize  the  status  of  Boer  representatives  in  Europe. 

A letter  of  General  Tobias  Smuts  to  Commandant-General  Botha, 
written  last  September,  and  found  by  the  British  in  a surprised 
laager,  has  been  published  by  Mr.  Chamberlain.  It  is  a manly,  dig- 
nified, and  patriotic  letter  which  will  do  the  Boer  cause  no  disserv- 
ice. It  appears  that  General  Smuts  has  been  deprived  of  his  rank 
by  Louis  Botha  for  having  burned  Bremersdorp,  in  Swaziland, 
after  capturing  the  town  from  a mixed  force  of  British  and  Swazi 
troops.  This  proceeding  displeased  the  Commandant-General,  as 
“ being  opposed  to  Boer  principles,”  and  he  marked  his  condemna- 
tion of  the  act  by  the  severe  punishment  of  degradation.  No  friend 
of  the  Boer  cause  can  read  General  Smuts’  letter  without  feeling 
that  a great  wrong  has  been  done  to  a brave  officer  and  a most 
loyal  burgher  for  doing  that  once  which  the  British  have  system- 
atically done  as  a necessary  war  measure.  Doubtless  Louis  Botha 
felt  that  English  examples  of  barbarism  were  the  worst  of  crimes 
in  Boer  officers,  and  had  to  be  stopped  by  stern  penalties.  But, 
while  this  speaks  volumes  for  the  humanity  of  the  Boers,  the  pun- 
ishment by  which  the  lesson  was  enforced  was,  under  Ml  the  cir- 
cumstances, unjust  and  excessive, 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


553 


I had  the  pleasure  of  enjoying  General  Smuts’  hospitality  in  his 
camp  at  Brandfort  with  General  De  la  Eey,  in  April,  1900.  He 
was  then  in  charge  of  the  Brmelo  and  Carolina  commando;  having 
been  the  representative  of  the  former  district  in  the  Volksraad  be- 
fore and  during  the  war.  He  is  a man  of  medium  height,  with 
dark  hair  and  beard,  of  gentlemanly  appearance,  and  aged  about 
forty.  He  speaks  English  like  a man  of  education,  and  would 
suggest,  in  his  general  conversation,  a jovial  man  of  the  world  who 
hated  war  and  the  killing  of  men  as  thoroughly  as  if  he  were  a 
member  of  the  Society  of  Friends.  He  was  a Progressive  in  the 
Volksraad,  and  opposed  to  the  Kruger  Party,  as  were  De  la  Eey 
and  Louis  Botha;  but  "when  England  forced  the  Transvaal  to  de- 
fend its  life  he  was,  tho  a very  wealthy  burgher,  one  of  the  first 
men  in  the  field.  He  has  fought  right  through  the  war,  and  has 
taken  part  in  most  of  the  battles  in  which  Louis  Botha  commanded. 
He  it  was  who  took  the  second  batch  of  reenforcements  up  the  steep 
side  of  Spion  Kop,  and  helped  to  win  that  splendid  victory  for 
Boer  pluck.  Part  of  the  story  of  that  memorable  fight  which  I have 
given  in  a previous  chapter  was  taken  down  from  General  Smuts’ 
dictation  in  his  tent  at  Brandfort.  It  is  in  keeping  with  his  manly 
nature  to  conclude  his  letter  of  protest  to  his  superior  and  friend 
by  saying:  “ I wish  to  give  you  the  assurance  that  I have  never  lost 
sight  of  the  interest  and  the  success  of  our  cause.  I always  served 
this  cause  in  all  sincerity,  and  I hope  to  do  so  in  future,  also,  as  a 
private  burgher.” 

On  the  4th  inst.  a defeat  of  a portion  of  De  Wet’s  commando  is 
said  to  have  taken  place  in  the  Eeitz  region  of  the  Free  State. 
Commandant  Hears  with  a force  said  to  he  300  strong  and  two 
of  the  guns  captured  by  De  Wet  on  Christmas  Eve  were  surprised 
early  in  the  morning  and  routed;  the  guns  being  retaken  by  the 
English  forces. 

On  the  same  date  Lord  Kitchener  reports  the  defeat  and  capture 
of  130  men  of  De  la  Eey’s  commando  and  the  capture  of  their 
leader.  Commandant  Sarel  Alberts,  by  Colonel  Kekewich’s  column, 
in  the  Western  Transvaal. 

February  8-15. — The  twenty-three  columns  engaged  in  what 
was  to  be  the  morally  certain  capture  of  De  Wet  have  failed  in  their 
attempt.  A great  cordon  was  drawn  round  him,  after  months  of 
preparations,  and  so  sure  was  Lord  Kitchener  of  the  success  of  his 
latest  plan  and  attempt  that  he  proceeded  from  Pretoria  to  Wolve- 
hoek  in  the  expectation  of  being  in  at  the  death  or  capture  of  the 
quarry.  He  has  returned  to  headquarters  without  his  prisoner. 

The  lines  inside  of  which  De  Wet  and  his  men  were  penned,  like 
so  many  wild  beasts  offering  sport  to  hunters,  were  in  the  form  of 


554 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


a triangle,  with  sides  some  eighty  miles  deep  and  a base  of  sixty; 
the  apex  being  at  Wolvehoek,  on  the  Pretoria-Kroonstad  railway, 
about  twenty  miles  south  of  the  Vaal  Biver.  The  enclosing  line 
from  thence  extended  southward  to  Kroonstad,  and  was  formed  of 
blockhouses,  barbed-wire  fences,  armored  trains,  and  troops.  The 
base  line  extended  across  eastward,  so  as  to  place  the  districts  of 
Lindley  and  Eeitz  to  the  north  of  it,  when  it  took  a northern  direc- 
tion, at  the  junction  with  the  Wilge  Biver,  west  of  Beitz,  and  fol- 
lowed that  stream  up  to  Frankfort;  crossing  from  thence,  north- 
west, to  rejoin  the  western  line  at  Wolvehoek,  enclosing  Heilbron 
in  its  sweep. 

The  base  line  east  from  Kroonstad  was  held  by  mixed  bodies  of 
infantry  and  cavalry,  with  blockhouses,  trenches,  and  barbed  wire; 
while  the  line  going  north  to  Frankfort  was  composed  almost  en- 
tirely of  mounted  troops,  so  posted  that  they  were  practically  in 
touch  over  a distance  of  forty  miles. 

The  great  plan  which  thus  demanded  the  services  of  twenty-three 
columns  in  its  execution  required  the  closing  in  of  the  eastern  line 
and  that  of  the  base  upon  the  western,  or  railway,  line  where  ar- 
mored trains,  guns,  and  searchlights  were  to  deal  with  the  hunted 
Boers  when  forced  in  that  direction  by  the  moving  walls  of  enemies 
behind.  This  was  to  be  the  culminating  scene  in  the  vast  “ drive.” 
The  quarry  was  inside  the  net.  It  only  remained  to  draw  the 
strings  and  to  kill  or  capture  the  doomed  game. 

On  the  night  of  the  5th  or  6th  it  is  believed  that  De  Wet  and 
Steyn  assembled  their  officers  and  men  in  the  valley  of  the  Bhen- 
oster  Biver,  between  Lindley  and  Heilbron,  and  took  council  how 
best  to  escape  the  latest  Kitchener  sweeping  scheme.  There  was 
only  one  practicable  way  out  of  the  net,  and  that  was  by  the  plan 
which  had  always  suggested  itself  on  similar  occasions.  The  com- 
mando would  split  into  small  sections,  make  feints  upon  certain 
points  of  the  surrounding  line,  far  apart,  trust  to  the  usual  blunder- 
ing of  the  enemy  for  chances,  and  to  rely  upon  all  or  any  of  these 
for  avenues  or  opportunities  to  reach  the  veldt  beyond  the  sur- 
rounding foemen. 

Once  more  the  great  Commandant  showed  himself  the  splendid 
tactician  the  admiring  world  recognizes  him  to  be.  Attacks  were 
made  at  a dozen  points  in  the  darkness  of  the  night  of  the  7th. 
The  enemy’s  guns  responded,  all  along  the  line,  where  suspected 
Boers  were  believed  to  be ; and  in  the  general  confusion  and  excite- 
ment thus  made  some  cattle  were  driven  against  the  wire  fence  in 
a few  places  and  broken.  Some  Boers  were  killed;  more,  who  had 
failed  to  get  through  or  had  blundered  against  a blockhouse  or 
column,  were  taken  prisoner;  but  when  the  twenty-three  generals. 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


555 


colonels,  and  majors  in  command  of  the  twenty-three  columns  en- 
gaged in  the  performance  reported  upon  the  “ bags  ” thus  made  on 
the  morning  of  the  8th,  neither  De  "Wet  nor  Steyn  were  found 
inside  the  broken  net. 

In  what  particular  direction,  or  at  what  point,  or  when,  the 
President  and  the  general  broke  through,  or  got  away,  is  yet  to 
be  learned.  The  English  give  a dozen  contradictory  reports.  One 
theory  alleges  that  De  Wet  formed  some  700  burghers  into  a col- 
umn, dressed  in  khaki,  commanded  by  an  “ English  ” officer  who 
gave  orders  loudly  in  the  khaki  tongue,  wheeled  his  men  early  in 
the  morning  of  the  7th  upon  the  line  which  barred  the  way  to  the 
south,  and  rode  through  in  the  direction  of  Bethlehem,  unchal- 
lenged. 

Such  a daring  and  romantic  stratagem  would  be  no  more  than 
worthy  of  the  victor  in  a hundred  fights  and  emergencies  requiring 
his  rare  and  resourceful  qualities,  but  it  is  probably  no  more  than 
a guess  at  the  means  which  enabled  him  to  set  the  military  world 
laughing  once  more  at  his  discomfited  enemy.  It  is  certain  that 
the  newspaper-reading  public  of  every  civilized  land  hailed  with 
delight  the  news  that  appeared  on  the  morning  of  the  10th  an- 
nouncing that  the  most  popular  living  personage  of  the  age  had 
baffled  his  foemen  once  again. 

The  exaggerated  results  of  “ the  great  drive,”  which  were  dilated 
upon  by  the  Jingo  press,  were  effectively  discounted  by  the  cold 
facts  and  figures  of  Lord  Kitchener’s  weekly  report  on  the  10th. 
d’his  report,  which  included  all  the  results  of  the  operations  of  the 
entire  British  army  in  South  Africa  for  the  week,  accounted  for 
only  69  Boers  killed,  17  wounded,  574  prisoners,  and  57  surrenders. 
The  number  of  rifles  taken  were  480,  which  shows  that  237  of  the 
prisoners  were  unarmed,  non-combatants. 

All  the  facts,  therefore,  even  on  the  English  showing,  go  to 
demonstrate  that  the  huge  drive  which  was  to  have  crushed  De  Wet 
was  turned  by  him  into  a huge  fiasco  for  Lord  Kitchener. 

In  the  Calvinia  district  of  Cape  Colony,  a British  detachment  of 
100  troops  were  attacked  and  driven  in  upon  their  column,  with  25 
killed  and  wounded,  during  this  week. 

Commandant  Malan  scored  a smart  victory  over  a British  con- 
voy escort  between  Beaufort  West  and  Frasersburg,  in  Cape  Colony, 
a few  days  back.  The  English,  about  160  strong,  in  charge  of  60 
donkey  wagons,  and  under  the  command  of  Major  Crofton,  laagered 
for  the  night  in  a strong  position.  Eesorting  to  the  very  ele- 
mentary tactics  of  feinting  to  assail  one  side  of  the  camp  while 
intending  the  real  attack  on  the  opposite  side,  Malan  rushed  the 
laager  at  midnight  from  the  south,  and  captured  it;  Crofton  and 


556 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


about  a dozen  of  his  men  being  killed,  while  some  50  more  British 
were  wounded.  The  Boers  galloped  into  the  camp,  and  fired  from 
their  saddles;  the  encounter  resembling  in  many  of  its  features  De 
Wet’s  brilliant  feat  at  Tweefontein  on  Christmas  Eve.  Malan  took 
some  of  the  wagons,  and  burned  the  others.  Large  reenforcements 
arrived  for  the  enemy  before  the  Boer  force  completed  its  victory, 
and  with  these  Malan  fought  a retiring  engagement.  Tho  greatly 
outnumbered,  he  got  his  men  and  some  of  the  British  booty  away, 
with  trifling  losses  on  his  own  side. 

In  the  center  of  Cape  Colony,  in  the  Kiehmond  region.  Com- 
mandant Wessels  still  holds  his  ground,  thus  connecting  a con- 
tinued line  of  Boer  operations  across  from  east  to  west  of  the 
Colony,  despite  all  General  French’s  efforts  to  drive  the  invaders 
back  over  the  Orange  Kiver. 

On  the  12th  a portion  of  De  Wet’s  force  who  had  broken  through 
Kitchener’s  big  “ net  ” on  the  7th  and  8th,  were  located  on  some 
hills  near  Klip  Eiver  Station  by  the  British.  This  district  is  almost 
surrounded  by  blockhouses,  and  lies,  in  addition,  between  the  two 
main  railway  lines  running  to  Johannesburg  and  Pretoria  from 
the  Free  State  and  Katal,  respectively.  The  Klip  Kiver  flows 
south  from  near  Johannesburg,  almost  parallel  with  the  railway, 
and  falls  into  the  Vaal  River  close  by  the  boundary  station  of 
Vereeniging.  To  the  east  of  Vereeniging,  and  stretching  as  far 
as  Heidelberg,  there  are  broken  ranges  of  “ rands,”  or  low  hills, 
with  the  general  name  of  Zuikerboshrand,  and  it  was  to  the  shelter 
of  these  hills  that  Commandants  Alberts,  Grobler,  and  Van  der 
Westhuizen  took  the  men  whom  they  had  led  through  the  northern 
section  of  the  Kitchener  cordon. 

The  position  into  which  they  rode  ought  to  have  been  a closer 
trap  to  enter  and  a far  more  difficult  one  to  escape  from  than  the 
wider  area  from  which  they  had  broken  away  four  days  previously. 

A British  force,  stated  to  have  been  320  strong,  under  Major 
Dowell,  was  sent  from  Vereeniging  to  dislodge  the  burghers.  These 
latter  appear  to  have  been  a smaller  body  than  their  pursuers. 
They  were  observed  by  the  garrison  at  Vereeniging  when  on  the 
trek  to  the  Zuikerbosh.  The  troops  detailed  for  the  attack  upon 
them  would  not  be  sent,  by  any  intelligent  officer,  in  inferior  num- 
bers to  engage  Boers  occupying  a position  among  hills.  My  view 
is  that  Albert’s  and  Grobler’s  men  numbered  no  more  than  250 
men. 

Major  Dowell  entrained  his  detachment  at  Vereeniging,  and 
proceeded  thus  to  Klip  River  Station.  He  then  advanced  along 
the  river,  northeast  to  where  the  open  veldt  rises  into  the  Zuiker- 
bosb  hills.  The  British  officer  left  his  horses  on  this  veldt,  under 


DIARY  OF  THE  ^YAR 


557 


a guard,  and  began  to  climb  the  low  hills  in  search  of  the  Boers. 
These  tactics  determined  the  plans  of  the  watchful  burghers,  who 
at  once  divided  their  force;  sending  half  round  to  their  left  to 
fire  upon  and  stampede  the  British  horses,  and  to  assail  the  enemy 
in  the  rear,  while  the  other  half  were  to  entice  the  English  further 
into  the  hills,  by  a pretended  running  away  ” maneuver  which 
has  so  often  led  blundering  British  officers  into  the  exact  place  in 
which  their  adroit  adversaries  had  carefully  arranged  to  attack 
them. 

Major  Dowell  was  thus  easily  led  into  a position  impossible  for 
him  to  hold,  and  soon  found  himself  and  his  men  fired  upon  from 
all  sides.  The  horses  had  already  been  shot  at  and  stampeded, 
and,  unable  to  hold  his  men  together  any  longer  after  a dozen 
casualties,  he  ordered  a retreat.  The  Boers,  seeing  their  chance, 
leaped  into  their  saddles  and  rode  in  upon  the  retiring  English, 
scattering  them  in  all  directions.  Major  Dowell  and  six  other 
officers  valiantly  refused  to  save  themselves  by  running  away. 
They  made  a gallant  stand,  and  w'ere  all  shot  down;  the  major 
being  killed  and  the  other  six  wounded.  The  mass  of  their  men 
had  bolted  towards  Klip  Eiver  Station,  and  most  of  the  British 
casualties  occurred  during  the  pursuit  of  these  by  the  Boers.  The 
English  lost  10  killed  and  about  50  wmunded  in  this  encounter. 
The  Boer  loss  was  trifling. 

February  16-28. — On  the  18th  the  same  Boer  force  scored 
another  triumph,  even  nearer  to  Johannesburg  and  Pretoria  than 
the  scene  of  the  previous  defeat  of  the  British.  General  Gilbert 
Hamilton  was  attacked  south  of  Nigel,  at  a place  called  Klippan, 
by  Grobler  and  Alberts,  who  captured  some  50  Dragoons  after  a 
brief  fight.  There  were  10  English  wounded,  and  none  killed. 
General  Hamilton’s  force  was  declared,  in  the  English  reports,  to 
be  “ too  weak  ” to  dislodge  their  opponents.  No  mention  is  made, 
however,  in  the  English  reports  of  the  numbers  engaged  on  either 
side. 

It  has  just  been  discovered  that  a Boer  prisoner  who  was  taken 
some  weeks  ago  after  a skirmish  in  Cape  Colony,  is  Judge  Kock, 
eldest  son  of  General  Jan  Kock,  who  was  wounded  at  Elandslaagte 
and  died  from  exposure  and  neglect  at  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
Judge  Kock  was  fighting  as  a common  burgher  when  captured. 
In  1896  he  presided  over  the  Court  before  which  Jameson  and  the 
other  captured  leaders  of  the  “ Eaid  ” were  tried  in  Pretoria. 

On  the  20th  three  British  columns  surprised  Colonel  Trichardt’s 
laagers  northeast  of  Middelburg,  Transvaal,  and  captured  150 
prisoners.  It  is  said  in  the  reports  that  one  of  the  laagers  was 
that  of  the  Transvaal  Government,  but  that  the  members  of  the 


558 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Executive  had  succeeded  in  escaping.  They  were  probably  encamp- 
ments of  sick  and  of  non-combatants  only,  as  no  casualties  are 
reported. 

The  latest  news  of  General  De  Wet  reports  him  as  having  broken 
back  north  (after  his  ride  south  out  of  Kitchener’s  net)  into  the 
very  district  of  Keitz,  from  whence  some  30,000  British  troops 
succeeding  in  driving  him  twelve  days  ago,  when  he  objected  to 
being  captured.  No  stronger  proof  of  the  failure,  so  far,  of  the 
blockhouse  system  to  end  the  war  could  be  given  than  this  return 
of  the  Free  State  general  into  the  very  center  of  the  sphere  of  its 
most  elaborate  development  and  application.  The  defeat  of 
Dowell  and  Hamilton’s  forces,  inside  even  a narrower  and  stronger- 
fenced  area,  since  the  great  failure  of  the  7th  and  8th,  by  a section 
of  De  Wet’s  men,  almost  justifies  the  name  “blockhead”  system 
which  the  irreverent  Boers  have  given  to  this  latest  offspring  of 
England’s  military  genius. 

Following  the  general  plan  of  concerted  action  which  Botha, 
De  Wet,  and  De  la  Eey  have  adopted  during  the  past  year,  as  a 
means  of  relieving  each  other  of  the  enemy’s  pressure  when  di- 
rected in  detail  against  either  of  the  chief  cooperating  commandoes, 
De  la  Eey  delivered  a smashing  blow  at  one  of  Lord  Methuen’s 
columns  and  convoys  on  the  early  morning  of  the  25th.  The 
locality  of  this  latest  Boer  victory  is  also  very  significant.  Like 
the  fights  at  Klip  Eiver  and  Nigel,  it  took  place  within  the  hear- 
ing of  a strong  British  garrison,  alongside  a Kitchener  area  of 
blockhouses  and  barbed-wire  fences,  and  close  to  a railway  line. 

The  scene  of  the  encounter  was  about  a dozen  miles  southwest 
of  Klerksdorp,  which  is  the  terminus  of  the  railway  running  west- 
ward from  the  Eand  through  Potchefstroom;  a distance  of  about 
eighty  miles  from  Johannesburg.  Klerksdorp  is  also  the  chief 
British  garrison  in  the  southwest  Transvaal,  and  has  been  taken 
and  retaken  by  the  opposing  forces  several  times  during  the  war. 
The  district  west  and  north  of  the  town  has  seen  more  fighting 
during  the  past  two  years  than  any  other  locality  in  the  theater 
of  operations,  excepting  De  Wet’s  region  in  the  northeastern  Free 
State.  Klerksdorp  has  been  for  some  time  past  the  base  for  British 
operations  against  General  De  la  Eey  and  his  chief  lieutenants,  who 
are  defending  the  western  regions  of  the  Transvaal  against  Lord 
Methuen’s  and  other  British  columns,  and  convoys  are  periodically 
sent  out  from  there  to  such  smaller  garrisons  as  are  held  by  the 
English  in  minor  towns  or  villages,  west  and  south. 

On  the  night  of  the  24th,  one  of  such  convoys,  with  an  escort  of 
700  troops,  composed  of  the  5th  Battalion  Imperial  Yeomanry, 
forming  part  of  Colonel  Von  Donop’s  column  of  Methuen’s  force. 


DIARY  OF  TUB  ^VAR 


659 


encamped  near  a spruit,  on  the  convoy’s  return  from  Wolmaran- 
stad  to  Klerksdorp.  They  were  mounted  troops,  had  two  guns  and 
a pom-pom,  and  were  commanded  by  Colonel  Anderson. 

Yster  Spruit,  twelve  miles  southwest  of  Klerksdorp,  runs  due 
south  into  the  Vaal  Eiver,  and  cuts  the  road  from  Wolmaranstad  to 
Klerksdorp  with  one  of  the  usual  water-worn  hollows  peculiar  to 
South  Africa.  The  English  laagered  to  the  north  of  this  spruit, 
with  the  Vaal  Eiver  to  their  right,  the  scrubby  veldt  to  their  left, 
and  the  road  to  Klerksdorp  right  before  them,  running  through 
their  camp. 

The  movements  of  convoys  to  and  from  Wolmaranstad  were 
known,  of  course,  to  the  vigilance  of  De  la  Eey,  and  it  is  evident 
from  all  the  facts  of  the  fight  on  the  25th  that  the  Boer  general 
had  marked  this  escort  for  attack  on  its  return,  and  when  near 
Klerksdorp;  that  is,  when  the  British  would  least  expect  to  be 
surprised.  The  country  due  north  of  Yster  Spruit  is  the  Liehten- 
burg  region,  De  la  Bey’s  native  district,  and  every  inch  of  it  is 
known  to  the  great  Commandant.  It  is  a mixed  ” country  of 
rands,  veldt,  and  scrub,  and  well  suited  to  the  execution  of  one 
of  those  dashing  exploits  for  which  De  la  Eey’s  name  is  now 
synonymous. 

During  the  night  of  the  24:th,  he  rode  in,  probably  from  the 
region  of  the  Haartebeest  hills,  with  a force  about  equal  to  that  of 
the  British,  and  disposed  of  his  men  so  as  to  attack  the  enemy  in 
the  early  morning.  He  separated  his  command  into  three  divi- 
sions, in  accurate  anticipation  of  what  the  British  would  do  when 
surprised,  and  results  answered  in  every  detail  to  his  plan  and 
expectations.  A body  of  men  three  miles  in  front  of  Colonel 
Anderson  would  prevent  the  intervention  of  reenforcements  from 
Klerksdorp,  where  the  guns  would  be  heard  when  the  action  be- 
gan; a force  on  the  enemy’s  left  fiank,  under  cover  of  the  scrub, 
would  do  the  chief  work  of  the  first  attack,  while  the  hollow 
spruit,  in  the  rear  of  the  English,  would  offer  shelter  for  those 
burghers  who  were  to  engage  the  rear-guard,  and  to  create  the 
demoralizing  impression  on  the  Tommies  that  they  were  being 
assailed  by  the  usual  “ superior  Boer  forces,”  on  all  sides. 

The  British  were  fired  upon  from  the  scrub,  to  their  left,  when 
the  convoy  began  to  move  off  shortly  after  four  o’clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  25th.  The  distance  between  the  Boers  in  the  low 
bush  and  the  flank  of  the  escort  was  only  500  yards.  The  Boers 
had  worked  up  as  close  as  this  to  the  enemy’s  lines  in  the  night 
time,  owing  doubtless  to  the  very  careless  scouting  and  picket 
work  of  the  English,  so  near  the  end  of  their  journey  back  to 
Klerksdorp.  The  British  returned  the  fire  with  both  rifles  and 


560 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


guns,  and  gave  all  their  attention  to  the  assailants  of  their  left 
flank.  The  attack  eased  off  for  a while,  and  the  convoy  recom- 
menced its  march,  when  De  la  Eey’s  men  swept  in  and  over  the 
rear-guard  of  the  English,  firing  from  their  saddles,  in  utter  dis- 
regard of  the  enemy’s  guns.  They  galloped  along  the  confused 
line  of  their  foes,  overwhelming  them  by  their  dash,  and  riding 
down  all  opposition. 

The  Klerksdorp  garrison  despatched  a reenforcement  of  200 
mounted  men  on  hearing  the  guns,  hut  these  were  encountered 
by  a detachment  of  burghers  who  held  them  back  on  the  road  until 
Colonel  Anderson’s  force  was  smashed,  the  guns  taken,  and  the 
capture  of  the  convoy  escort  completed. 

According  to  the  English  report  Colonel  Anderson  had  20 
men  killed,  with  about  100  men  wounded.  All  the  others  were 
taken  prisoner,  disarmed,  and  immediately  released,  as  usual. 

The  English  give  the  strength  of  Colonel  Anderson’s  column 
at  600,  and  that  of  De  la  Eey’s  at  “ from  1,200  to  1,700  rifles.” 
This  is,  obviously,  the  kind  of  report  which  the  British  supply  on 
all  such  occasions.  Their  casualties  alone  mount  up  to  650,  when 
the  lists  are  scrutinized,  while  it  has  been  found  a fairly  accurate 
rule  to  dock  British  estimates  of  the  Boer  strength  in  a Boer  vic- 
tory by  at  least  100  per  cent,  of  men.  At  Magersfontein  Lord 
Methuen  reported  there  were  some  16,000  Boers  in  front  of  him. 
There  were  really  only  one-fourth  of  that  number.  At  Colenso 
General  Buller  estimated  Louis  Botha’s  commandoes  to  be  equal 
in  men  to  the  British  troops — said  by  the  Boers  to  be  23,000,  and 
admitted  by  the  English  to  be,  at  least,  16,000.  As  a matter  of 
actual  fact,  Botha’s  burghers  at  Colenso  numbered  under  5,000. 

In  this  instance  De  la  Eey’s  whole  force  would  probably  be  the 
complement  of  the  British  escort.  Allowing  for  the  men  detailed 
for  the  purpose  of  holding  back  the  Klerksdorp  reenforcements, 
the  Boers  actually  engaged  in  settling  accounts  with  the  convoy 
escort  would  be  under  rather  than  over  the  number  of  British  rifles 
opposed  to  their  attack.  It  is  a patent  absurdity  to  conjecture,  as 
Lord  Kitchener  does  in  his  report,  that  all  the  burghers  of  the 
West  Transvaal,  and  all  De  la  Eey’s  chief  officers,  concentrated  at 
Yster  Spruit  to  deal  with  700  British  troops,  mainly  composed  of 
Yeomanry.  Kemp  may  have  been  with  his  chief,  and  probably 
Potgieter,  but  Colliers  and  Lemmer  (killed  several  times  already 
in  British  reports),  Wolmarans  and  Vermaas,  were  in  all  likelihood 
engaged  in  other  districts.  Commandant  Liebenberg,  who  has 
operated  in  the  Klerksdorp  country  during  the  past  year,  may  have 
been  where  his  intimate  local  knowledge  of  the  ground  would  be 
of  great  assistance  in  the  execution  of  De  la  Eey’s  coup. 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


561 


Tlie  English  reports  speak  of  the  gallantry  of  the  British  rear- 
guard, which  was  composed  of  IsTorthumherland  Fusiliers,  and  give 
an  all-round  praise  to  the  performance  of  their  own  side.  The 
casualties  do  attest  both  the  fierce  nature  of  the  Boer  attack,  and 
the  stubborn  resistance  that  was  made  by  a portion  of  Colonel 
Anderson’s  troops.  But  there  are  no  facts  connected  with  the 
fight  so  dominant  and  significant  as  those  which,  even  on  English 
testimony,  speak  of  the  gallop  of  the  Boers  in  upon  their  enemies, 
even  after  the  full  morning  light  had  revealed  the  whole  situation 
to  the  English,  and  some  two  hours  after  the  encounter  had  first 
commenced.  Two  English  guns  and  a pom-pom,  a compact  force 
of  700  British,  carts  and  wagons  to  fight  behind,  and  a British 
garrison  a few  miles  ahead,  offered  no  effective  check  to  the  splen- 
did corps  of  mounted  burghers  who  dashed  in  iipon  and  rode  down 
an  enemy  whose  organs  in  the  press  have  boasted  again  and  again 
of  the  reluctance  of  the  Boer  “ to  face  cold  steel.”  Men  who  not 
only  do  so,  hut  face,  fight,  and  capture  English  guns,  in  broad 
daylight,  from  a force  equal  to  their  own,  without  the  help  of 
artillery,  are  silent  about  their  own  deeds.  They  let  the  narratives 
of  their  surrendered  prisoners  speak  the  moral  of  the  victory  so 
gained  to  those  who  can  only  hope  that  numbers  alone  will  wear 
down  or  subdue  a foeman  equal  to  such  courage  and  resource. 

Two  days  after  the  disaster  to  Colonel  Anderson’s  force,  a report 
of  Lord  Kitchener  attempted  to  redress  the  balance  of  damaged 
prestige  by  its  story  of  the  capture  of  (singular  coincidence!)  the 
same  number  of  Boers  in  the  southeastern  Free  State  as  the  Eng- 
lish taken  by  De  la  Eey  in  the  southwestern  Transvaal. 

The  report  relates  that  a number  of  Boers,  about  700  strong, 
tried  to  break  through  the  northeast  side  of  the  Kitchener  Free 
State  ‘‘^net,”  still  stretched,  along  the  Wilge  Elver.  They  drove 
a huge  herd  of  “ 6,000  cattle  ” (how  these  had  got  inside  the  net, 
which  was  cleared  a fortnight  previously,  is  not  told)  against  the 
section  of  the  line  held  by  Kew  Zealand  A^olunteers.  These  shot 
back  both  beasts  and  men.  The  Boers  lay  down  behind  the  dead 
animals,  and  returned  the  fire.  They  were  beaten  off,  and  are 
said  to  have  gone  south,  pressed  by  pursuing  troops  until  they  were 
forced  up  against  the  Harrismith-Van  Eeenan  line  of  blockhouses 
and  barbed  wire,  where  they  were  ultimately  captured.  Adding  to 
these  the  other  “ hags  ” of  the  week’s  operations  (including  3,000 
horses,  28,000  cattle,  and  60,000  sheep)  the  English  Commander- 
in-Chief  declared,  “ These  satisfactory  results  are  very  appropriate 
on  Majuba  Day!  ” It  illustrates  the  state  of  mind  into  which  Lord 
Kitchener  has  been  driven  by  the  events  of  this  war,  that  he  should 
have  attempted,  in  this  reference  to  Majuba,  to  ignore  the  signifi- 
36 


5G2 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


cance  of  De  la  Eey’s  victory  at  Yster  Spruit  by  a statistical  array 
of  cattle  and  sheep,  as  a marked  demonstration  of  military  capacity 
on  the  part  of  an  army  of  230,000  British  troops. 

The  Boers  taken  near  the  Harrismith  line  were  mostly  non- 
combatants.  They  comprised  the  camp-followers,  cattle  drivers, 
and  attendants  of  some  of  the  fighting  sections  of  De  Wet’s  forces, 
along  with  old  men.  The  number  of  fighting  Boers  put  out  of 
action  would  probably  correspond  with  the  casualties  among  the 
New  Zealanders  in  the  fight  on  the  23rd.  These  are  given  at  20 
killed  and  38  wounded  in  the  English  reports. 

The  month  closes  with  this  report  from  Pretoria,  relating  to  the 
capture  of  the  British  convoy  and  escort  on  the  25th  : 

“ Ivekewich’s  and  Grenfell’s  columns  are  pursuing  De  la  Eey’s 
forces,  which  are  reported  to  have  scattered.  Lord  Methuen  has 
started  with  a column  from  Vryburg  towards  Lichtenburg,  to  try  to 
intercept  the  enemy.” 

March  1-7. — Accounts  from  Boer  sources  of  the  killed  and 
wounded  on  their  side  in  the  fights  at  Itala  Mount  and  Fort  Pros- 
pect, in  September  last,  and  at  Brakenlaagte  in  October,  have 
come  to  hand.  H.  S.  Oosterhagen,  of  the  Transvaal  Identity  De- 
partment, certifies  in  a communication  dated  December  12,  1901, 
that  the  number  of  Boers  killed  at  Itala  and  Fort  Prospect  was  a 
total  of  16,  and  that  4 more  out  of  41  wounded,  died.  At  Braken- 
laagte, where  Colonel  Benson’s  rear-guard  was  overwhelmed  by 
Christian  Botha,  the  Boer  casualties  were  13  burghers  killed,  and 
40  wounded.  Lord  Kitchener’s  estimate  put  down  44  killed  and 
100  wounded  to  the  British  account;  or  near  150  per  cent,  above 
the  actual  Boer  losses. 

These  figures  offer  an  illuminating  comment  upon  English  re- 
ports of  losses  inflicted  upon  the  Boers.  Eeuter  had  cabled  from 
Ladysmith  that  300  Boers  were  left  dead  on  the  field,  after  the 

failure  ” of  the  attacks  upon  Forts  Itala  and  Prospect. 

In  a “ Life  of  Count  ATllebois-Mareuil  ” by  his  friend  M.  Jules 
Caplain,  which  has  just  been  published  in  Paris,  the  author  clearly 
shows  that  the  gallant  French  officer  met  his  fate  at  Boshof,  in 
April,  1900,  not  by  a shell,  as  was  generally  stated  and  believed 
at  the  time,  but  by  a rifle  fired  almost  point  blank  at  him,  on  re- 
fusing to  lay  down  his  arms.  In  my  account  of  the  fight,  in 
Chapter  XXV,  I give  the  common  version  of  how  he  was  killed. 

The  “ General  ” Yilonel  who  is  at  present  exciting  the  admira- 
tion of  the  English  by  his  boastful  letters  to  President  Steyn  and 
General  De  Wet,  published  in  the  British  press,  is  the  Benedict 
Arnold  of  the  Boer  armies.  He  is  a man  on  the  youthful  side  of 


VIABY  OF  THE  ^YAR 


563 


thirty,  and  of  good  address  a:id  education.  He  fought  in  the  Free 
State  commandoes  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war.  A too  ardent 
ambition  to  rise  rapidly  in  military  rank  caused  him  to  become 
insubordinate,  and  he  was,  in  consequence,  relegated  to  the  dis- 
tasteful task  of  commandeering.  This  duty  was  the  anti-climax 
to  his  dreams  of  distinction,  and  he  became  discontented.  From 
this  frame  of  mind  to  actual  treachery  was  a transition  resulting 
from  wounded  vanity,  and  he  deserted  to  the  British. 

He  supplied  the  enemj'  with  information  relating  to  the  move- 
ments and  plans  of  General  He  TTet  and  President  Steyn,  and  en- 
gaged in  the  work  of  seducing  other  Boer  officers  to  follow  his  base 
example.  One  of  his  letters  was  intercepted  by  a Free  State  In- 
telligence Officer,  and  an  appointment  was  made  for  an  interview. 
The  traitor  fell  into  the  trap,  was  captured,  and  put  upon  trial 
for  treason. 

The  trial  took  place  at  Eeitz,  in  the  northeast  of  the  Free  State, 
which  was  then  the  seat  of  Government.  So  merciful  did  the 
Boer  Court  view  the  abominable  crime  of  which  the  culprit  was 
proved  guilty,  that  he  was  sentenced  only  to  five  years’  imprison- 
ment. 

Against  this  lenient  penalty  he  appealed,  and  his  application 
was  allowed.  The  second  trial  took  place  at  Fouriesburg,  and  was 
presided  over  by  Judge  (now  Commandant)  Hertzog.  The  pris- 
oner defended  himself.  He  pleaded  that  he  had  acted  in  obedience 
to  his  conscientious  feeling,  and  threw  himself  on  the  mercy  of 
the  Court.  The  Judge  confirmed  the  former  sentence,  declaring 
that  the  name  of  Vilonel  would  be  forever  synon3fmous  in  Boer 
memory  and  tradition  with  that  of  traitor  to  their  country  and 
cause. 

Subsequently  the  English  surprised  the  place  where  Vilonel  was 
imprisoned,  and  he  was  liberated.  He  was  thus  restored  to  the 
labor  of  treachery  for  which  he  had  been  so  leniently  punished  by  a 
Boer  tribunal,  and  is  now  the  malignant  enemy  of  those  who  had 
considerately  spared  his  life.  He  has  become  a leader  of  the  “ Na- 
tional ” Scouts  at  Bloemfontein,  and  it  is  the  vaporings  of  this  man 
which  are  at  present  inspiring  the  English  with  renewed  hope  in 
an  early  termination  of  the  war. 

A petition  numerously  signed  has  been  presented  to  the  Senate 
of  the  Australian  Commonwealth,  praying  that  all  Australian 
Volunteers  serving  with  the  British  in  South  Africa  should  be 
recalled.  The  petitioners  say; 

“ Our  Australian  troops,  in  certain  cases  against  their  will,  have 
been  largely  engaged  in  this  horrible  work  of  burning  down  the 
means  and  results  of  a people’s  industry  and  subsistence,  of  sub- 


564 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


jecting  their  women  and  children  to  deportation  and  disease,  and 
of  leaving  a vast  region  of  God’s  once  fertile  earth  a barren  waste.” 

News  received  from  Cape  Colony  through  German  and  Dutch 
channels  gives  details  of  the  e.xecution  of  Commandant  Scheepers, 
which  were  not  found  in  the  English  reports  of  that  military  mur- 
der. It  appears  that  he  was  conducted  to  the  place  of  execution 
by  his  enemies,  with  a military  band  playing  exultingly  in  the  pro- 
cession! He  was  so  ill  that  he  was  conveyed  there  in  an  ambu- 
lance. He  manfully  requested  to  be  allowed  to  stand  up,  and  to 
face  his  executioners  with  unbandaged  eyes.  This  request  was 
refused.  The  firing  party  detailed  for  the  task  of  killing  him  stood 
ten  paces  off,  and  the  reports  relate  that  half  his  body  was  blown 
away  by  the  volley.  The  chair  to  which  the  young  and  gallant 
officer  had  been  strapped  was  then  broken  up,  and  the  fragments 
thrown  on  top  of  the  body  of  this  victim  of  English  savagery. 
The  execution  took  place  on  the  21st  of  January,  and  the  Min- 
ister responsible  to  the  British  Parliament  for  the  conduct  of  the 
war  in  South  Africa  had  “ no  information  ” on  this  matter  on  the 
7th  of  March  when  questioned  if  these  details  of  Scheepers’  execu- 
tion were  in  accordance  with  facts. 

March  8-15. — At  the  close  of  the  last  month,  when  forwarding 
a final  account  of  the  defeat  and  capture  of  one  of  Lord  Methuen’s 
columns  and  convoys.  Lord  Kitchener  cabled  from  Pretoria  that 
Kekewieh’s  and  Grenfell’s  columns  “ were  pursuing  De  la  Key’s 
forces,”  and  that  Methuen,  with  another  column,  “ had  started 
from  Vryburg  towards  Lichtenburg  to  try  and  intercept  the  en- 
emy.” The  publication  of  this  news  was  a piece  of  the  usual  Eng- 
lish bluster  and  bluff  which  has  passed  with  the  British  public  for 
military  efficiency  on  the  part  of  their  generals  throughout  this 
war.  The  great  Boer  general  has  his  own  independent  intelligence 
department,  however,  and  in  this  instance  he  would  seem  to  have 
known  much  more  about  Methuen’s  movements  than  Lord  Kitch- 
ener or  the  English  War  Office. 

After  his  defeat  of  Colonel  Anderson  on  the  25th  of  February, 
De  la  Key  retired  northwest  from  Klerksdorp  to  the  Haartebeest 
hills,  which  form  an  irregular  dividing  line,  running  north  and 
south,  between  the  Potchefstroom  and  Lichtenburg  districts  of  the 
Western  Transvaal.  These  hills  have  been  a center  of  De  la  Key’s 
defensive  operations  since  he  took  charge  of  this  division  of  the 
Kepublic,  following  the  fall  of  Pretoria  and  the  complete  re- 
arrangement of  Federal  commands.  It  is  from  their  shelter  he 
has  often  witnessed  the  English  armies  making  their  devastating 
marches  through  the  very  district  in  which  he  was  born  on 


DIARY  OF  THE  \YAR 


565 


the  one  hand,  and  of  the  country  southwest  of  Ivlerksdorp  on  the 
other;  to  folloAr  and  strike  at  any  one  of  them  which  might  not 
in  its  strength  in  men  and  guns  be  too  unequal  a force  for  his 
commando  to  engage.  Here  in  this  favorite  and  familiar  haunt 
the  General  awaited  the  developments  which  would  necessarily  fol-_ 
low  from  the  defeat  he  had  inflicted  upon  the  enemy’s  column  at 
Yster  Spruit. 

Lord  Methuen  was  at  VrjLurg  when  Colonel  Anderson’s  column 
met  with  its  mishap  on  the  25th  of  last  month.  A direct  line  west- 
ward for  about  ninety  miles  from  where  He  la  Eey  was  located 
on  the  evening  of  that  date,  would  pass  a little  to  the  north  of  the 
town  of  Vryburg,  which  is  roughly  about  midway  between  Kim- 
berley and  Mafeking,  on  the  railway  line  from  Cape  Town  to 
Bulawayo.  It  is  the  chief  British  garrison  after  Ivlerksdorp  for 
the  southwestern  Transvaal,  and  lies  a little  over  the  western 
border,  in  the  Beehuanaland  territory. 

Methuen  started  from  Vryburg  on  the  2nd  of  March  with  a 
force  of  about  1,000  mounted  men  and  300  or  400  infantry;  mak- 
ing a column  of  1,400  troops,  with  a convoy  of  supplies  for  his 
force.  He  had  four  guns  and  one  or  two  pom-poms. 

His  march  lay  northeastward  in  a line  parallel  with  the  Harts 
Eiver,  which  has  a course  southwestward  through  the  Lichten- 
burg  district.  At  Graspan  Methuen  would  have  a farm  of  General 
De  la  Ee3f’s  twelve  miles  to  his  right.  Two  marches  north  of  this 
point  he  came  in  touch  with  a small  Boer  force  under  Van  Zyl, 
whose  homestead  lies  a few  miles  westward  of  De  la  Eey’s.  This 
was  on  the  5th,  or  three  days  after  Methuen  had  left  Vryburg. 
Van  Zyl  was  on  reconnaissance  in  connection  with  De  la  Eey’s 
plans,  and  acted  as  a decoy  for  the  British  column,  which  was 
compelled  to  move  slowly  owing  to  its  ox  convoy.  It  is  evident 
that  Methuen  followed  Van  Zyl’s  retreating  burghers,  and  that 
these  retired  towards  where  De  la  Eey  intended  that  the  attack 
upon  his  old  adversary  of  Enslin,  Modder  Eiver,  and  Magersfontein 
was  to  be  made.  This  spot  is  close  by  the  Klein  Harts  Eiver,  in 
an  open  country,  almost  due  west  of  Klerksdorp,  and  about  a dozen 
miles  from  the  hills  from  whence  De  la  Eey  was  to  swoop  down 
upon  his  foe. 

The  Boer  attack  was  again  planned  for  the  early  morning,  but, 
unlike  the  surprise  at  Yster  Spruit,  this  encounter  was  to  be  a rush 
upon  the  rear  of  the  enemy’s  column;  the  slow-moving  ox-wagons 
in  the  front  being  a guaranty  to  the  calculating  Boer  general  that 
Methuen’s  force  would  not  march  ahead  of  the  convoy  to  any 
stropg  position  lying  in  that  direction. 

The  success  of  Van  Zyl’s  decoying  tactics  enabled  De  la  Eey  to 


566 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


swing  his  commando  to  the  south  of  Methuen’s  force  in  a night 
ride.  He  would  jmoceed  for  this  purpose  due  south  from  the 
liaartebeest  hills,  parallel  with  the  Makewassi  Spruit,  for  about  ten 
miles,  and,  crossing  this  stream,  sweep  westward  towards  the  Harts 
Iiiver,  where,  at  or  near  Eooikraal,  he  would  find  himself  in  the 
early  morning  of  the  6th  in  the  immediate  rear  of  the  English 
column  on  its  slow  march  north  towards  where  Methuen  expected 
to  join  hands  with  two  other  British  forces. 

The  Boer  movement  was  calculated  to  a mile,  and  to  time,  with 
De  la  Bey’s  accustomed  precision;  every  inch  of  the  ground  being 
known  to  him.  In  the  ricie  across  from  the  Makewassi  Spruit  to 
the  west,  he  would  pass  within  a dozen  miles  of  his  own  farm, 
which  lies  in  the  center  of  the  fertile  country  the  English  have 
turned  into  a howling  desert  of  ruined  homesteads.  He  was  thus 
sure  of  his  ground,  and  no  less  confident  that  he  was  about  to 
inflict  upon  the  person  of  the  general  who  had  committed  most 
of  this  ruin  a chastisement  which  would  ring  round  the  world, 
and  proclaim  again  the  indomitable  character  of  the  Boer  resist- 
ance to  British  aggression. 

De  la  Bey’s  plan  of  attack  was  to  he  one  of  his  irresistible  rushes 
upon  the  enemy;  a charge  in  the  fine  old  stjde  of  cavalry  fighting, 
which  has  so  often  broken  down  all  British  resistance,  and  smashed 
to  atoms  the  boasted  prowess  of  English  valor  in  this  war.  It 
was  not  in  any  sense  to  be  an  ambush,  or  surprise  attack.  The 
Boer  general  had  maneuvered,  by  aid  of  Van  Zyl’s  skirmishes,  to 
bring  Methuen  into  the  locality  where  the  superb  burgher  horse- 
men could  sweep  in  upon  all  sides  of  the  enemy,  and  where  real 
fighting  capacity  should  decide  the  fortunes  of  the  day.  The 
English  would  not  have  it  to  say  that  they  were  fired  upon  from 
behind  rocks,  or  assailed  from  the  cover  of  scrub,  or  other  shelter. 
It  was  to  be  a combat  in  the  open,  almost  between  equal  numbers 
— for  De  la  Bey’s  force,  even  according  to  British  estimates,  was 
said  to  be  only  a few  hundred  more  than  Methuen’s.  The  enemy, 
however,  had  the  advantage  in  artillery  and  machine  guns. 

The  English  reports  of  the  fight  admit  that  De  la  Bey’s  men 
were  clearly  seen  three  miles  away,  on  the  early  morning  of  the 
6th.  This  fact  enabled  Lord  Methuen  to  collect  his  lines  to  meet 
the  attack.  He  closed  these  in  upon  the  ox  and  mule  convoys 
ahead,  and  had  his  guns  ready  to  meet  the  impact  of  the  Boer 
rush. 

A noted  incident  in  this  memorable  fight  was  the  refusal  of  De 
la  Bey  to  i;se  the  guns  he  had  captured  at  Yster  Spruit  a few 
days  previously;  that  is,  in  the  first  instance.  He  knew,  of  course, 
that  Methuen  had  artillery,  and  all  the  ordinary  practises  of  war- 


DIARY  OF  THE  IVAR 


567 


fare  woiild  dictate  the  shelling  of  the  enemy,  as  a preliminary  to  a 
charge  upon  his  position.  But  the  great  Boer  general  knew  more 
than  military  tacticians  teach  in  their  manuals.  He  knew  that 
men  count  before  everything  in  successful  attacks,  and  sure  of  the 
stamina  of  those  around  him  in  their  saddles,  and  counting  at 
their  right  value  the  troops  he  was  about  to  assail,  he  relegated 
the  services  of  his  guns  to  a subsequent  part  of  the  action,  and 
resolved  to  rush  his  whole  commando  in  a resistless  ride  on  Meth- 
uen’s column,  and  overwhelm  Tommies,  guns,  convoy,  and  all. 

This  he  did  in  a kind  of  crescent-shaped  sweep  upon  the  en- 
emy’s rear-guard,  enveloping  their  flanks  at  the  same  time.  De- 
spite the  labored  attempts  of  Lord  Kitchener  and  of  privileged 
press  correspondents  to  represent  the  English  as  making  deter- 
mined stands,  fighting  coolly  and  gallantly,  and  all  the  rest,  the 
combat  was  virtually  over  in  the  first  charge  of  De  la  Key’s 
burghers  upon  Methuen’s  mounted  troops.  These,  acting  as  rear- 
guard and  as  screens  to  the  column  and  convoy,  broke  at  once, 
and  fled.  There  are  no  other  words  for  their  action.  They 
ran  away,  as  fast  as  their  horses  could  carry  them  across  the  Harts 
Eiver  valley,  westward  to  the  Maribogo  region,  pursued  for  five 
miles  by  some  of  De  la  Key’s  men.  This,  even  English  reports 
admit. 

It  was  Methuen’s  infantry  who  stood  their  ground.  A fight  was 
put  up  by  this  remnant  of  his  force,  which  continued  for  a few 
hours.  The  Boers  rushed  two  of  the  English  guns,  shot  down 
their  service,  and  captured  them.  The  other  guns  were  also  well 
defended,  while  Lord  Methuen  collected  parts  of  his  broken  column 
into  a neighboring  kraal.  He  bravely  discarded  all  thought  of 
cover  and  of  danger,  and  did  all  that  a gallant  offlcer  could  do  to 
retrieve,  in  a forlorn  defense  of  his  remaining  guns  and  convoy, 
the  disgrace  of  the  bolting  of  his  mounted  men  in  the  beginning 
of  the  battle.  It  was  now  only  a question  of  bringing  the  Boer 
guns  to  hear  upon  the  kraal  to  finish  the  fight,  and  Commandant 
Celliers  turned  Colonel  Anderson’s  two  fifteen-pounders  upon  the 
British  within  the  enclosure,  and  rendered  the  situation  hopeless 
for  the  enemy  inside. 

Lord  Methuen  had  in  the  meantime  been  wounded  severely  in 
the  thigh.  Colonel  Townsend  was  also  down,  whereupon  De  la 
Key  summoned  the  enemy  to  surrender,  and  the  battle  was 
over,  with  about  40  English  killed,  100  wounded,  and  all  who  did 
not  run  away  prisoners.  Lord  Methuen,  Lieutenant-General  and 
second  in  military  rank  to  Lord  Kitchener  in  South  Africa,  fell 
into  the  hands  of  his  chivalrous  victor,  with  his  guns,  convoy, 
and  column — or  all  that  had  remained  of  it  on  the  battle-field. 


568 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


The  prompt  release  of  Lord  Methuen  by  De  la  Eey  astounded 
the  press  of  the  civilized  world  by  its  knightly  magnanimity.  It 
created  a painful  impression  among  the  friends  of  the  Boer 
cause  everywhere,  by  its  uncalculating,  and  seemingly  unpatriotic, 
generosity.  Neither  the  captured  general  nor  the  British  army 
merited  any  such  consideration  at  Boer  hands.  Lord  Methuen 
was  the  first  English  general  to  asperse  the  Boers  in  the  war. 
He  libeled  them  at  Belmont,  Enslin,  and  Modder  Eiver  in  un- 
founded charges;  allegations  made,  too,  in  true  English  fashion, 
with  the  object  of  attempting  to  offset  the  true  charges  of  Boer 
officers  that  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare  had  been  deliberately 
violated  by  Methuen’s  troops  at  each  of  these  battles.  His  officers 
arrested  a Boer  ambulance  at  Modder  Eiver,  and  sent  doctors  and 
assistants  serving  under  Eed  Cross  ensigns,  as  prisoners  to  Cape 
Town.  All  this  was  known  to  De  la  Eey,  who  had  fought  Methuen 
in  his  attempt  to  relieve  Kimberley,  and  whose  superb  plan  of  ag- 
gressive defense  at  Magersfontein  enabled  Cronje  to  inflict  upon 
this  general  and  a powerful  British  army  one  of  the  greatest  de- 
feats of  the  war. 

The  fate,  too,  of  Commandants  Lotter  and  Scheepers  was  present 
to  De  la  Eey’s  mind  when  he  released  his  captive.  These  officers 
had  been  executed  for  burning  Government  buildings  in  Cape 
Colony,  and  for  shooting  armed  Kaffirs.  Methuen  had  burned 
farms  and  villages  in  the  Transvaal  and  Free  State,  and  his  men 
had  killed  wounded  Boers  at  Modder  Eiver.  De  la  Eey’s  own 
homestead  had  been  burned  by  his  troops,  and  the  entire  district 
in  which  he  was  born — the  locality  in  which  poetic  justice  decreed 
the  defeat  and  capture  of  Methuen  at  his  hands — bore  testimony 
to  the  barbarous  methods  resorted  to  by  the  British  in  their  Avar- 
fare  against  the  people  AAdiom  they  had  so  monstrously  wronged. 

I remember  General  De  la  Eey  telling  me  in  Brandfort,  in  April, 
1900,  hoAV  his  father’s  home  had  been  burned,  and  his  property 
destroyed  by  the  English,  in  the  Forties. 

An  ex-telegraphist  in  the  Boer  service,  writing  a few  days  ago 
to  the  “ Kieuwe  Eotterdamsche  Courant,”  says  that  he  received 
the  folloAving  message  at  Pilgrimsrust,  for  the  Transvaal  Executive, 
from  General  De  la  Ee}^,  last  summer: 

“ I have  also  received  information  that  my  Avife  has  been  driven 
from  our  farm  by  Lord  Methuen’s  column.  Our  farm  has  been 
destroyed,  the  houses  have  been  burnt  down,  and  my  wife  has  been 
put  doAAm  in  a j^laee  Avhere  no  houses  are  to  he  found  for  miles 
around.  She  has  put  up  at  a thatched  Kaffir  hiAt,  where  she  must 
have  stayed  already  a considerable  time  before  she  was  found  by 
our  people.  What  Ioav  measures  the  enemy  have  recourse  to,  what 


DIARY  OF  THE  ^YAR 


569 


personal  injuries  may  be  inflicted  upon  me,  tho  they  may  grieve 
me  to  my  innermost  soul,  there  will  be  no  abatement  in  my  zeal 
to  pursue  our  struggle  to  the  end.” 

But  the  deeds  of  the  British  had  no  influence  upon  this  Chris- 
tian hero’s  action.  He  saw  only  a distinguished  enemy  in  his 
hands,  to  whose  wounds  no  Boer  ambulance  could  attend;  thanks 
to  Kitchener’s  and  Methuen’s  own  measures  in  preventing  even 
a Bed  Cross  service  of  humanity  penetrating  to  the  Boer  com- 
mandoes. Discarding  every  thought  except  what  his  chivalrous 
nature  prompted  him  to  do,  De  la  Eey  sent  his  captive  in  his  own 
wagon  to  Klerksdorp,  allowing  him  to  take  even  his  papers  and 
personal  effects  along  with  him. 

It  was  in  every  sense  a noble  deed,  nobly  done,  and  so  the  whole 
of  Christendom  has  recognized  and  pronounced  it.  Such  knightly 
courtesy  arrested  the  thought  of  civilization  and  told  it,  in  this  one 
act,  how  unmeasurable  is  the  moral  distance  which  divides  the 
Boer  from  the  British  race  in  all  that  concerns  the  conduct  of  this 
war.  This  was  by  no  means  a solitary  instance  of  Boer  generosity. 
Their  whole  treatment  of  prisoners  has  been  as  persistently  kind 
and  humane  from  the  beginning  as  that  of  their  enemies  has  been 
the  reverse.  "We  need  only  to  refer  to  the  account  already  given 
of  the  treatmicnt  accorded  by  British  officers  and  men  to  General 
Jan  Kock,  who  was  captured  while  dangerously  wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Elandslaagte,  to  establish  this  fact. 

De  la  Eey  has,  however,  in  his  release  of  Lord  Methuen,  enor- 
mously increased  the  prestige  of  the  Boer  cause,  and  gained  for  it 
the  flxed  adhesion  of  tens  of  thousands  of  wavering  supporters  in 
Europe  and  America.  The  defeat  of  so  important  a general,  so 
soon  after  the  capture  of  Colonel  Anderson’s  column,  and  so  near, 
in  both  instances,  to  the  center  of  Lord  Kitchener’s  authority  and 
operations,  has  also  an  importance  far  beyond  the  mere  success  of 
the  engagement.  It  means  additional  recruits  for  the  Boer  com- 
mandoes in  Cape  Colony,  and  for  the  English  a considerable  pro- 
longation of  the  war.  These  results  might  also  have  followed  had 
Methuen  been  retained  as  a prisoner  in  some  Boer  laager.  Krit- 
zinger’s  life  would  likewise  have  been  saved,  whereas  no  reliance 
can  now  be  placed  upon  English  forbearance  when  their  general 
has  been  delivered  up  without  any  condition  attaching  to  the 
release. 

While  Lord  Methuen  was  still  in  Boer  hands  the  English  press 
allowed  itself  to  be  swayed  for  a few  hours  by  a feeling  of  appre- 
ciation of  De  la  Eey’s  chivalry.  Lord  Eoberts  eulogized  him  in 
the  House  of  Lords,  and  even  Eoyalty  was  reported  to  have  ex- 


570 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


pressed  an  interest  in  the  fate  of  General  Kritzinger — the  day 
following  the  disaster  at  Tweehosh.  When,  however,  the  titled  offi- 
cer was  hack  in  the  English  lines,  the  British  press  reverted  again  to 
its  more  congenial  task  of  maligning  the  Boers.  They  had 
worn  khaki,  and  were  dressed  in  English  uniforms,  and,  therefore, 
fought  unfairly.  These  papers  omitted  to  charge  the  Boers  at  the 
same  time  with  using  English  rifles  and  guns  served  with  English 
ammunition,  as  well.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  English  press, 
all  this  goes  to  establish  the  had  faith  of  the  Boers.  The  English 
will  not,  or  cannot,  see  the  side  of  the  Boer  character  which  en- 
ables the  remnant  of  a little  nation  to  strip  British  soldiers  of  their 
clothes,  rifles,  and  ammunition  with  which  to  keep  up  the  struggle 
for  independence.  The  troops  who  allow  themselves  to  be  so 
stripped  and  disarmed,  frequently  by  inferior  numbers  of  burghers, 
are  lauded  by  the  same  British  press  for  their  soldierly  qualities, 
but  the  men  who  flght  a huge  army  with  its  own  weapons  and 
convoys,  captured  in  the  dashing  style  of  Yster  Spruit  and 
Tweehosh,  are  to  he  shot  if  caught  in  the  clothes  of  the  yielding 
Tommies. 

Marcli  16-31. — On  March  26,  Cecil  Khodes  died  near  Cape 
Town  of  heart  disease. 

Following  so  soon  after  the  defeat  and  capture  of  Lord  Methuen, 
the  death  of  the  organizer  and  paymaster  of  the  infamous  Jameson 
Raid  is  another  blow  to  England  in  this  war  of  repeated  disasters 
to  her  arms  and  prestige.  In  the  sense  that  the  Raid  of  1895-6 
was  the  cause  of  the  present  war,  Mr.  Rhodes  can  he  said  to  have 
been  the  senior  partner  with  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  Lord  Milner 
in  the  responsibilit}^  for  the  crime  against  civilization  and  human- 
ity which  is  still  creating  misery,  bloodshed,  and  horror  in  South 
Africa.  Mr.  Rhodes  and  others  coveted  the  Rand  mines  just  as 
other  Englishmen  and  associated  adventurers  had  coveted  the 
diamond  mines  of  Kimberley.  These  succeeded  in  persuading 
a previous  Colonial  Secretary  and  High  Commissioner  to  violate  a 
treaty  bearing  England’s  signature,  in  order  that  the  Boers  should 
not  he  the  masters  of  a piece  of  territory  so  fabulously  rich.  What 
was  done  with  the  Sand  River  Treaty  of  1852  was  repeated  with 
the  London  Convention  of  1884.  Diamonds  and  gold  wera  weighed 
against  treaties  and  conventions,  and  the  national  honor  and  inter- 
national credit  and  character  of  England  were  relegated  to  a secon- 
dary place. 

The  man  whom  the  Boers  believe  to  be  the  author  of  the  war 
has  gone  to  his  account.  He  has  not  seen  the  success  of  the  plans 
which  have  plunged  the  Republic  he  wished  to  despoil  into  its 
present  condition  and  have  dragged  the  Empire  he  was  ambitious 


DIARY  OF  THE  WAR 


571 


to  ■sviden  and  enrich  into  the  Serbonian  bog  of  disaster  and  dis- 
grace where  it  still  flounders.  Unless  satisfactory  terms  are  ac- 
corded to  his  leaders,  the  ragged  burgher  contending  valiantly  for 
his  country  and  freedom,  even  tho  hope  appears  to  have  deserted  his 
cause,  will  flght  on  with  renewed  belief  in  God’s  protecting  power 
when  he  learns  that  Cecil  Ehodes  has  been  summoned  to  the  judg- 
ment seat  of  the  Almighty. 

Almost  coincidently  wilh  the  death  of  Cecil  Rhodes,  a movement 
in  the  direction  of  peace  has  begun.  Mr.  Schalk  Burger,  Dr.  Reitz, 
General  Lukas  Meyer,  and  Commandant  Krogb,  comprising  the 
Executive  of  the  Republic,  arrived  in  Pretoria  from  Balmoral,  on 
the  23rd.  They  had  entered  the  latter  place  under  a flag  of  truce, 
and  were  at  once  accommodated  with  a special  train,  in  which  they 
journeyed  to  the  capital.  Here  they  were  met  by  an  olficer  repre- 
senting Lord  Kitchener.  After  a stay  of  a few  hours,  they  con- 
tinued the  train  journey  to  Kroonstad,  near  which  place  the 
English  Commander-in-Chief  was  expected  to  be  found  at  the  time. 

The  publication  of  this  news  in  the  English  press  made  a pro- 
found impression  upon  the  popular  mind.  It  was  received  with  a 
universal  feeling  of  relief.  The  promise  of  a speedy  ending  of  the 
war,  which  the  news  was  made  to  mean,  was  as  welcome  as  it  was 
unexpected,  following,  as  it  did,  so  speedily  after  the  dramatic 
victory  of  De  la  Eey  at  'Tweebosh;  and  optimistic  views  asserted 
themselves  in  spite  of  the  prevailing  ignorance  of  the  origin  or  real 
object  of  the  Boer  mission. 

Manifestly  Mr.  Schalk  Burger  had  received  Lord  Kitchener’s 
communications  relating  to  the  attempt  Avhich  was  made  by  the 
Premier  of  Holland  to  initiate  peace  proceedings  in  January  last. 
Lord  Lansdowne’s  conciliatory  reply  to  Dr.  Kuyper’s  proposals, 
and  the  British  promise  to  facilitate  the  transmission  of  the  corre- 
spondence between  the  Dutch  and  English  governments  to  the 
Boer  leaders  in  the  held,  called  for  some  such  action  as  Mr.  Burger 
and  Dr.  Reitz  have  now  taken. 

April  1-30. — The  events  of  April  may  be  summarized  as  chiefly 
comprising  the  revelations  of  the  murder  of  Boer  prisoners  by  the 
Australian  Bushveldt  Carbineers;  the  varying  fortunes  and  phases 
of  the  peace  negotiations  throughout  the  month;  and  the  desultory 
flghting  in  Cape  Colony  and  in  parts  of  the  Transvaal  and  Free 
State. 

The  facts  relating  to  the  cold-blooded  shooting  of  twelve  Boers, 
and  of  a German  missionary,  were  first  piiblished  by  the  London 
“ IMorning  Leader,”  on  the  3rd  inst.  They  created  a great  sensa- 
tion, and  were  indignantly  denied  by  the  war  journals.  On  the 
5th,  the  War  Ofiice  issued  an  official  note  confirming,  almost  to  a 


572 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


detail,  the  revelations  of  the  spirited  progressive  organ  which  has 
given  such  a consistent  and  courageous  opposition  to  the  Jingo 
policy.  The  official  document  related  this  story:  On  October 
last  (1901),  the  military  authorities  in  South  Africa  learned  of  the 
doings  of  a corps  of  irregular  Colonials,  called  the  Bushveldt  Car- 
bineers, which  had  been  operating  northeast  of  Pietersburg  (North 
Transvaal),  for  some  three  months.  It  was  found  that  two  British 
officers.  Lieutenants  P.  J.  Handcock  and  H.  H.  Morant,  were 
guilty,  as  principals  or  as  accessories,  in  twelve  murders  of  sur- 
rendered Boers,  and  of  a Eev.  C.  A.  D.  Tlesse,  a German  missionary, 
who  had  acquired  knowledge  of  the  guilt  of  these  and  of  their 
companions.  A court-martial  was  held  in  January  upon  the 
officers,  including  three  others  of  the  same  corps — Major  Lenehan 
and  Lieutenants  Picton  and  Witton.  Morant  and  Hancock  were 
sentenced  and  shot,  and  the  others  were  punished  by  imprisonment 
and  cashiering. 

The  crimes  were  committed  in  the  most  deliberate  manner,  for 
motives  which  are  not  yet  fully  explained.  Eeports  allege  that  one 
party  of  Boers  were  believed  to  he  in  possession  of  £20,000,  and 
that  they  were  killed  by  Morant  and  his  gang  with  the  object  of 
plunder.  Other  statements  say  that  these  deeds  were  but  a some- 
what brutal  and  careless  execution  of  the  “ orders  ” issued  by  the 
London  Jingo  papers,  about  that  period,  to  treat  Boers  taken  with 
arms  in  their  hands  “ as  bandits.”  Ugly  rumors  of  many  other 
murders  are  also  circulated,  in  which  certain  other  Colonial  British 
Corps  are  mentioned  as  having  signalized  themselves  in  similar 
deeds. 

No  news  of  these  crimes,  known  to  Lord  Kitchener  and  the 
British  War  Office  in  October,  1901,  was  allowed  to  leak  out  until 
the  Morning  Leader  ” published  the  facts,  six  months  after  the 
murders  had  occurred. 

It  was  during  the  months  of  October  and  November  last  that 
charges  of  murdering  natives  were  leveled  against  Boer  officers  by 
the  English  "War  Secretary,  at  a time  when  the  Bushveldt  crimes 
were  known  to  him,  and  concealed  from  public  knowledge. 

It  was  probably  the  murder  of  the  German  missionary  which 
compelled  the  British  war  authorities  to  deal  summarily  with  the 
gang  of  Colonial  desperadoes  who  had  too  literally  interpreted  the 
“take-no-prisoners”  language  of  the  war  editors  of  London. 

Two  reports  of  engagements  early  this  month  relate  to  an 
encounter  with  De  la  Eey,  near  the  scene  of  his  recent  defeat  of 
iMethuen,  and  to  a most  sensationally  described  fight  between  Com- 
mandant Alberts  with  a small  body  of  Boers  (near  Heidelberg, 
Transvaal),  and  a force  of  Hussars  and  Dragoons.  The  British 


DIABY  OF  THE  WAR 


573 


acknowledge  175  casualties  in  the  encounter  with  De  la  Rev,  and 
claim  that  “ ten  Boers  were  killed  and  eighteen  wounded  ” in  “ one 
of  the  most  prolonged  and  desperate  fights  since  the  war  com- 
menced,” in  the  affair  with  the  Dragoons,  who  are  said,  by  the 
same  British  report,  to  have  come  out  of  the  encounter  covered 
with  glory.”  Commandant  Pretorius  is  reported  killed  in  this  last 
fight,  and  it  is  claimed  that  De  la  Eey  lost  in  the  engagement  with 
the  enemy  at  Boschbult,  Kleinharts  River,  as  many  men  as  his 
adversaries. 

General  Kritzinger  has  been  acquitted  of  the  charges  for  which 
he  was  placed  on  trial.  Commandant  Scheepers  was  tried  and 
executed  on  similar  accusations  and  evidence,  but  the  former  officer 
had  the  great  advantage  of  having  his  case  considered  after  Lord 
Methuen’s  defeat,  capture,  and  instant  release  by  De  la  Rey. 
Kritzinger  owes  his  life  to  General  De  la  Rey’s  chivalrous  treat- 
ment of  his  captive,  and  to  that  alone. 

A report  received  from  Commandant  J.  C.  Smuts  (Transvaal 
Attorne3’-General)  by  President  Kruger  has  been  published  in  the 
Dutch  press,  in  which  he  gives  a short  account  cf  the  expedition 
which  he  led  to  the  Cape  Colony  from  the  western  Transvaal  in 
August  of  last  year,  and  which  is  briefly  referred  to  under  date  in 
this  Diary.  He  relates  the  encounters  which  took  j^lace  between 
his  small  force  of  3d0  men  and  the  enemy.  He  reenforced  Krit- 
zinger’s  burghers  with  100  of  these  men,  and  began  his  marches 
and  engagements  in  the  enemy’s  country  with  the  remaining  240. 
He  sums  up  the  work  of  his  commando  as  follows: 

“ They  have  killed  and  wounded  372  of  the  enemy;  taken  and  dis- 
armed 429  prisoners,  in  addition  to  capturing  a gun  and  a Maxim, 
with  many  rifles  and  wagon-loads  of  ammunition,  in  addition  to 
1,136  horses  and  mules  captured  on  the  battle-fields.  Within  two 
months  they  have  traveled  through  every  District  of  the  Cape 
Colony,  crossed  the  most  dangerous  mountain  chains,  in  sight  of 
the  enemy,  and  have  enabled  me  to  obtain  complete  information  as 
to  the  military  and  political  situation  in  Cape  Colony.” 

During  the  early  part  of  the  present  month  (April)  Commandant 
Smuts  and  his  little  force  were  besieging  the  town  of  Ookiep,  in  the 
northwest  of  Cape  Colony;  having  already  captured  a small  gar- 
rison in  the  same  region  and  compelled  another  to  abandon  its 
position  and  to  retire  to  the  seacoast  to  the  protection  of  an  English 
warship. 

The  Boer  leaders  assembled  at  Klerksdorp,  in  the  southwest 
Transvaal,  on  the  9th  inst.,  in  a conference  to  decide  upon  peace 
or  a continuation  of  hostilities.  The  meeting  was  held  with  the 


574 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


concurrence  of  Lord  Kitchener,  and  comprised  Mr.  Schalk  Burger, 
Dr.  Keitz,  General  Louis  Botha,  General  De  la  Bey,  General 
Lukas  Meyer,  and  Commandant  Ivrogh,  on  the  part  of  the  Trans- 
vaal; and  President  Steyn,  General  De  Wet,  Judge  Hertzog,  and 
Mr.  Ollivier,  representing  the  Free  State.  ISTo  particulars  of  the 
discussions  have  yet  transpired,  nor  has  an}^  information  leaked  out 
that  can  give  a true  indication  of  the  nature  of  the  proposals  under 
consideration. 

On  the  12th  the  Conference  adjourned  to  Pretoria,  where  the 
members  remained  in  consultation  until  the  18th,  having  been 
joined  by  Commandant  J.  C.  Smuts,  fresh  from  the  siege  of 
British  forces  in  the  west  of  Cape  Colony.  Tho  the  Boer  leaders 
in  this  distant  field  of  operations  are  not,  apparently,  included 
in  the  deliberations  at  Klerksdorp,  the  late  Attorney-General 
of  the  Eepuhlic  was  evidently  deemed  to  be  an  indispensable 
adviser  to  his  confreres,  and  was  sent  for.  So  accommodating 
were  the  English  authorities  in  helping  the  work  of  peace  that 
Commandant  Smuts  was  allowed  to  travel  on  a British  ship  to 
Cape  Town  in  order  to  reach  Pretoria  as  soon  as  possible. 

The  Conference  adjourned  on  the  above  date;  the  members 
returning  to  their  commandoes  to  consult  with  the  burghers  in  the 
field  upon  the  proposals  submitted  to,  or  by,  them  for  peace,  and 
to  arrange  for  the  holding  of  meetings  for  the  election  of  delegates 
to  a plenary  convention,  or  “ Commando  Volksraad,”  at  Vereen- 
iging,  next  month. 

For  the  remainder  of  the  month  of  April  interest  in  the  war 
centered  exclusively  in  the  burgher  convention;  the  general  impres- 
sion being  that  the  decision  which  would  be  reached  would  ter- 
minate the  war. 


Chapter  XL 


PEACE  AND  ITS  TERMS 

History  of  the  negotiations — Kitchener's  letter  to  Schalk  Burger 
— The  Klerksdorp  con^ference — Boer  terms  refused  by  England — 
Boers  are  asked  to  submit  new  proposals — President  Steyn’s 

CONSTITUTIONAL  OBJECTIONS A COMMANDO  CONVENTION  SUMMONED — 

A DRAMATIC  VINDICATION  OF  BOER  LOYALTY  TO  DEMOCRATIC  PRINCIPLES 

The  ••  VOLKSRAAD  ” AT  VeREENIGING A DELEGATED  COMMISSION 

APPOINTED  TO  NEGOTIATE  TERMS  WITH  LORD  KITCHENER TlIE  FINAL 

VOTE  OF  THE  CON^'ENTION ThE  TERMS  OF  PEACE — THE  CaPE  “ REBELS  ” 

— Honorable  conditions  oe  surrender  obtained — The  alternatives 

TO  SURRENDER ENGLAND'S  CLIMB  DOM^N  FROM  PREVIOUS  PROPOSALS 

— What  the  Boers  have  lost  and  won — Their  record  in  the  war 
— The  world’s  opinion — The  future  of  the  race — Freedom  only'  a 
question  of  time — What  the  British  Empire  has  had  to  pay  for 

COilPLETING  THE  JaMESON  RAID LOSSES  IN  LWES,  INVALIDS,  MONEY, 

CHARACTER,  AND  PRESTIGE — RELATIVE  FIGHTING  STRENGTH  OF  THE 

Boers  and  British  in  the  war — An  unparalleled  result — The 
Boer  losses  in  the  campaign. 

OX  the  last  day  of  May,  190'2,  peace  was  agreed  to  at  Pretoria. 

The  steps  leading  to  this  ending  of  the  war  are  related,  in 
official  English  despatches,  as  follows; 


“From  Lord  Kitchener  to  the  Secretar}^  of  State  for  War. 

Pretoria,  12th  March,  1902. 

6.55  p.  m. 

Schalk  Bnrger  states,  in  answer  to  my  letter  forwarding  cor- 
respondence with  Xetherlands  Government,  that  he  is  prepared  to 
make  peace  proposals,  hut  wishes  first  to  see  President  Steyn,  and 
asks  for  safe  conduct  through  our  lines  and  hack.  Shall  I accede 
to  this  request? 


Lord  Kitchener’s  covering  letter  to  General  Schalk  Burger  is 
not  included  in  the  published  State  papers. 

The  Klerk'sdorp  meeting,  already  referred  to,  followed  from  this 
communication;  the  acting  President  of  the  Transvaal  intimating 
to  the  British  Commander-in-Chief  that  the  Transvaal  Executive 
were  desirous  of  making  proposals  to  him  which  should  form  the 
basis  of  direct  negotiations  for  peace. 

On  the  12th  of  April,  the  Boer  leaders  submitted  proposals  to 


576 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Jjord  Kitchener  at  Pretoria,  which  were  calhecl  by  him  to  London. 
They  were  refused,  hut  in  a courteously  Avorded  reply,  by  the 
British  Government,  Avho  expressed  tlie  hope  that  “ the  present 
negotiations  might  result  in  peace.” 

This  refusal  was  communicated  to  the  Boer  representatives  on 
the  14th,  by  Lords  Kitchener  and  Milner.  “ We  then  endeavored 
to  induce  them  to  make  fresh  proposals,”  says  Lord  Kitchener, 
“but  President  Steyn,  who,  throughout,  acted  as  their  leading- 
spokesman,  took  the  line  that,  while  the  Boer  governments  were 
competent  to  make  peace,  they  Avere  not  competent  to  surrender  the 
independence  of  their  country;  that  only  the  people  could  do  this 
— the  people,  as  explained,  meaning  the  burghers  in  the  field.” 

Further  intervicAvs  and  correspondence  folloAved,  leading  to  the 
consent  of  the  British  Government  to  the  proposal  that  the  burgh- 
ers in  the  field  should  be  consulted  by  their  leaders  in  order  that 
arrangements  might  be  made  for  submitting  to  them,  through  a 
delegate  convention  at  Vereeniging,  the  conditions  of  peace  Avhich 
the  leaders  could  not,  Avithout  the  people’s  direct  sanction,  accept. 

It  AA^as  agreed  betAveen  the  Boer  representatives  and  Lord 
Kitchener  that  each  commando  in  the  field  Avas  to  elect  two  dele- 
gates; that  no  foreigners  in  the  Boer  ranks  should  attend  the  Con- 
vention, and  that  the  burghers  in  arms  in  the  Cape  Colony  Avere  not 
to  jAarticipate  in  the  deliberations. 

The  Conference  adjourned  on  the  18th  of  April  for  three  weeks, 
or  for  whatever  time  might  be  required  in  which  to  organize  the 
necessary  meetings  of  burghers  for  the  election  of  delegates. 

One  significant  and  illuminating  fact  has  stood  out  in  the  record 
of  these  negotiations,  which  gives  to  friends  and  foes  alike  a true 
reading  of  the  political  character  of  the  Boers  and  of  their  con- 
stitution. This  is  the  thoroughly  democratic  and  representative 
nature  of  the  proceedings  at  Klerksdorp  and  Vereeniging.  Noth- 
ing could  well  offer  a more  dramatic  refutation  of  the  ante-war 
slanders  of  the  English  about  a “ Boer  Oligarchy  ” than  the  Boer 
insistence  upon  adherence  to  the  ruling  principle  of  the  Transvaal 
constitution,  in  the  summoning  and  holding  of  this  unique  Yolks- 
raad  of  the  fighting  burghers.  Elections  had  to  be  held  by  the 
commandoes,  despite  the  continuance  of  hostilities,  in  order  that 
dulv  accredited  delegates  only  should  have  the  final  consideration 
of  the  supreme  question — ^hoAV  to  end  the  Avar.  Neither  to  Presi- 
dents nor  to  Generals  would  the  burgher  democracy  hand  over  the 
authority  of  the  people.  The  GrondAvet  gave  to  the  “Power- 
holders,”  or  people,  this  sovereign  right,  and  never,  perhaps,  in 
the  history  of  Avars,  has  there  been  seen  a similar  exercise  of  a 
popular  franchise,  in  conjunction  with  the  fighting  duties  of  a 


PEACE  AED  ITS  TEEMS 


577 


volunteer  army,  such  as  was  witnessed  during  the  proceedings  at 
Vereeniging. 

On  the  17th  of  May,  the  Convention  deputed  Presidents  Steyn 
and  Burger  to  intimate  to  Lord  Kitchener  the  appointment  by  the 
delegates  of  a Commission  to  represent  them  in  direct  negotiations 
with  the  British  representatives,  with  the  view  of  ending  the  war. 
This  Commission  consisted  of  Generals  Louis  Botha,  De  la  Eey, 
and  De  Wet,  Judge  Hertzog,  and  Attorney-General  Smuts.  Fin- 
ally, the  following  terms  were  submitted  to  the  Convention  at 
Vereeniging,  approved  by  a vote  of  5-1  for,  and  6 against,  and 
signed  by  ten  delegated  Boer  representatives,  and  Lords  Kitchener 
and  Milner,  in  Pretoria,  at  11  o’clock  on  Saturday  night,  the  31st 
of  May,  1903: 

His  Excellencj^  General  Lord  Kitchener  and  his  Excellency 
Lord  Milner,  on  behalf  of  the  British  Government,  and  Messrs.  M. 
T.  Ste}Ti,  J.  Brebner,  General  C.  K.  De  Wet,  General  C.  Ollivier, 
and  Judge  J.  B.  M.  Hertzog,  acting  as  the  Government  of  the 
Orange  I'ree  State,  and  Messrs.  S.  W.  Burger,  F.  W.  Eeitz,  Generals 
Louis  Botha,  J.  H.  De  la  Eey,  Lukas  IMeyer,  Krogh,  acting  as  the 
Government  of  the  South  African  Eepublic,  on  behalf  of  their 
respective  burghers  desirous  to  terminate  the  present  hostilities, 
agree  on  the  following  Articles: 

1.  The  burgher  forces  in  the  field  will  forthwith  lay  down  their 
arms,  handing  over  all  guns,  rifles,  and  munitions  of  war  in  their 
possession  or  under  their  control,  and  desist  from  any  further  resist- 
ance to  the  authority  of  his  Majesty  King  Edward  VII.,  whom  they 
recognize  as  their  lawful  Sovereign.  The  manner  and  details  of 
this  surrender  will  be  arranged  between  Lord  Kitchener  and  Com- 
mandant-General Botha,  Assistant  Commandant-General  De  la 
Eey,  and  Chief  Commandant  De  Wet. 

2.  All  burghers  in  the  field  outside  the  limits  of  the  Transvaal 
or  Orange  Eiver  Colony,  and  all  prisoners  of  war  at  present  outside 
South  Africa  who  are  burghers,  will,  on  duly  declaring  their  accept- 
ance of  the  position  of  subjects  of  his  Majesty  King  Edward  VII., 
be  gradually  brought  hack  to  their  homes  as  soon  as  transport  can 
he  provided  and  their  means  of  subsistence  insured. 

3.  The  burghers  so  surrendering,  or  so  returning,  will  not  be 
deprived  of  their  personal  liberty  or  their  property. 

4. '  Ko  proceedings,  civil  or  criminal,  will  be  taken  against  any 
of  the  burghers  surrendering,  or  so  returning,  for  any  acts  in  con- 
nection with  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  The  benefit  of  this  clause 
Avill  not  extend  to  certain  acts,  contrary  to  usages  of  war,  which 
have  been  notified  by  Commander-in-Chief  to  the  Boer  Generals, 
and  which  shall  be  tried  by  court-martial  immediately  after  the 
close  of  hostilities. 

5.  The  Dutch  language  will  be  taught  in  public  schools  in  the 

37 


578 


TEE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


Transvaal  and  Orange  River  Colony  where  the  parents  of  the  chil- 
dren desire  it,  and  will  be  allowed  in  courts  of  law  when  necessary 
for  the  better  and  more  effectual  administration  of  justice. 

6.  The  possession  of  rifles  will  be  allowed  in  the  Transvaal  and 
Orange  River  Colony  to  persons  requiring  them  for  their  protec- 
tion, on  taking  out  a license  according  to  law. 

7.  Military  administration  in  the  ITansvaal  and  Orange  River 
Colony  will  at  the  earliest  possible  date  be  succeeded  by  civil 
government,  and,  as  soon  as  circumstances  permit,  representative 
institutions,  leading  up  to  self-government,  will  be  introduced. 

8.  The  question  of  granting  the  franchise  to  natives  will  not  be 
decided  until  after  the  introduction  of  self-government. 

9.  No  special  tax  will  be  hnposed  on  landed  property  in  the 
Transvaal  and  Orange  River  Colony  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the 
war. 

10.  As  soon  as  conditions  permit,  a Commission,  on  which  the 
local  inhabitants  will  be  represented,  will  be  appointed  in  each  dis- 
trict of  the  Transvaal  and  Orange  River  Colony,  under  the  presi- 
dency of  a magistrate  or  other  official,  for  the  purpose  of  assisting 
the  restoration  of  the  people  to  their  homes  and  supplying  those 
who,  owing  to  w'ar  losses,  are  unable  to  provide  themselves  with 
food,  shelter,  and  the  necessary  amount  of  seed,  stock,  implements, 
etc.,  indispensable  to  the  resumption  of  their  normal  occupations. 

His  Majesty’s  Government  will  place  at  the  disposal  of  these 
Commissions  a sum  of  £3,000,000  for  the  above  purposes,  and  will 
allow  all  notes  issued  under  Law  1 of  1900  of  the  South  African 
Republic  and  all  receipts  given  b}^  officers  in  the  field  of  the  late 
Republics,  or  under  their  orders,  to  he  presented  to  a Judicial 
Commission,  which  will  be  appointed  by  the  Government,  and  if 
such  notes  and  receipts  are  found  by  this  Commission  to  have  been 
duly  issued  in  return  for  valuable  consideration,  they  will  be  re- 
ceived by  the  first-named  Commissions  as  evidence  of  war  losses 
suffered  by  the  persons  to  whom  they  were  originally  given. 

In  addition  to  the  above-named  free  grant  of  £3,000,000,  his 
Majesty’s  Government  will  be  prepared  to  make  advances  on  loan 
for  the  same  purposes,  free  of  interest  for  two  years,  and  afterwards 
repayable  over  a period  of  years  with  3 per  cent,  interest.  No 
foreigner  or  rebel  will  be  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  this  clause. 


These  terms  will  not  be  weighed  and  considered  by  the  public 
in  the  light  of  an  agreement  between  ec[ual  combatants  in  a thirty- 
two  months’  war.  They  are  conditions  offered  to  the  remnant 
of  the  armed  forces  of  two  little  Republics  (which  had  in  the 
beginning  a united  popidation  numbering  less  than  half  of  that 
of  the  single  city  of  Birmingham)  after  having  fought  one  of  the 
most  brilliant  campaigns  in  the  records  of  military  history  against 
the  might  and  resources  of  one  of  the  world’s  greatest  Empires. 


PEACE  AND  ITS  TERMS 


579 


There  can  be  no  suggestion  of  defeat  in  a peace  compact  so  ob- 
tained. A surrender  of  independence  so  valiantly  defended  only 
comes  when  nearly  three-fourths  of  the  entire  people  of  the  Trans- 
vaal and  Free  State  have  been  swept  from  their  homes  into  con- 
centration camps  and  prisons  by  the  military  measures  of  foes 
overwhelming  in  their  numbers.  There  is  no  single  parallel  to 
such  a defense  of  national  liberty  in  the  annals  of  civilized 
warfare.  There  can,  therefore,  be  no  possible  humiliation  in  a 
surrender  so  made.  This,  however,  is  but  the  negative  state- 
ment of  the  Boer  position  in  the  final  chapter  of  the  great  cam- 
paign. The  terms  of  peace  signed  by  England’s  representatives, 
on  the  31st  of  May,  1902,  have  to  be  compared  with  the  previous 
conditions  which  her  generals  and  statesmen  had  insisted  upon, 
in  order  rightly  to  appreciate  all  the  Boers  have  gained  in  reject- 
ing previous  British  proposals. 

On  the  3rd  of  June,  1900,  Lord  Eoberts  proudly  proclaimed  in 
Pretoria:  “My  terms  to  the  Transvaal  are  unconditional  sur- 
render.” He  would  allow  burghers  to  go  their  homes  on  relin- 
quishing arms  and  horses,  but  neither  officers  who  had  commanded 
forces  in  the  field,  nor  leaders  who  had  taken  an  active  part  in 
“ the  policy  which  led  to  the  war,”  were  to  be  permitted  a like 
privilege.  They  were  to  be  specially  penalized  by  arrogant  con- 
querors; probably  I'anished  for  life  to  some  remote  part  of  the 
British  Empire,  in  the  customary  English  manner. 

At  the  Middleburg  Conference  between  Lord  Kitchener  and 
General  Louis  Botha,  in  February,  1901,  the  proposals  finally  sub- 
mitted to  the  Boer  leader,  on  the  instructions  of  Mr.  Chamberlain 
(tho  a complete  departure  from  Lord  Eoberts’  uncompromising 
demands)  were,  in  every  particular,  more  stringent,  and  on  each 
point  of  the  negotiations  less  liberal,  than  the  document  signed 
by  Lords  Kitchener  and  Milner  just  fifteen  months  subsequently. 
The  Colonial  Secretary  went  so  far  in  his  hostile  attitude  to  the 
peace  propositions  of  1901  as  to  refer  to  Lord  Kitchener’s  soldierly 
offer  to  his  valiant  foes  of  a proximate  representative  government, 
as  “ a preposterous  proposal.”  * Mr.  Chamberlain  now  agrees  to 
what  he  then  scornfully  repudiated.  He  would  consent  to  a loan 
of  £1.000,000  to  the  Boers,  with  which  to  rebuild  their  burned 
homes  and  farms,  then.  They  are  to  receive  £3,000,000  as  a free 
grant,  now;  and  to  have  additional  sums  loaned  to  them,  free  of 
interest,  for  the  first  two  years.  They  were  to  be  deprived  of  arms, 
under  the  Eoberts’  terms  of  1900.  Arms  are  to  be  given  them 
under  the  conditions  of  1902.  Lord  Milner’s  “banishment” 
proclamation  of  September  last,  whereby  all  the  Boer  leaders  and 

* Hansard,  vol.  92,  p.  135. 


580  THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 

officers  who  should  not  la)^  down  their  arms  on  a given  date  were  to 
be  expatriated  and  their  farms  sold,  has  no  place  in  the  above 
agreement.  While,  final!}".  General  De  Wet,  who  was  furiously 
assailed  by  the  Government  press  last  year  as  a “ Commandant  of 
bandits,”  as  a man  with  whom  no  soldierly  relations  could  be 
maintained  by  Britain’s  stainless  warriors,  on  account  of  the  alleged 
shooting  of  ‘‘  peace  ” envoys,  was  duly  recognized  in  the  recent 
negotiations  by  England’s  representatives.  He  signed  the  conven- 
tion, or  treaty,  securing  peace,  as  the  acting  President  of  the  Pree 
State  Government. 

The  one  agreement  apparently  come  to  by  the  Boer  leaders  which 
is  the  least  satisfactory,  under  all  the  circumstances,  and  which 
tends  to  reflect  upon  their  loyalty  to  the  Cape  “ rebels,”  is  the 
following  condition,  tacitly,  but  not  explicitly,  accepted  by  them. 
Lord  Milner  relates  in  his  despatch  of  May  13  that  he  read  this 
condition  to  the  Boer  delegates,  and  “ left  them  a copy.” 

“ His  Majesty’s  Government  must  place  it  on  record  that  the 
treatment  of  Cape  and  Natal  Colonists  who  have  been  in  rebellion 
and  wlio  now  surrender  will,  if  the}"  return  to  their  Colonies,  be 
determined  by  tlie  Colonial  Governments  and  in  accordance  with 
the  law  of  the  Colonies,  and  that  any  British  subject  who  has 
joined  the  enemy  will  be  liable  to  trial  under  the  law  of  that  part 
of  the  British  Empire  to  which  he  belongs.  His  Majesty’s  Govern- 
ment are  informed  by  the  Cape  Government  that  the  following 
are  their  views  as  to  the  treatment  which  shall  be  granted  to  British 
subjects  in  Cape  Colony  now  in  the  field,  or  who  have  surrendered 
or  have  been  captured  since  April  12,  1901:  With  regard  to  the 
rank  and  file  they  should  all  upon  surrender,  after  giving  up  their 
arms,  sign  a document  before  the  resident  magistrate  of  the  district 
in  which  the  surrender  took  place,  acknowledging  themselves  guilty 
of  high  treason,  and  the  punishment  to  be  awarded  to  them,  pro- 
vided that  they  shall  not  be  guilty  of  murder  or  other  acts  contrary 
to  the  usages  of  civilized  warfare,  should  be  that  they  shall  not  be 
entitled  for  life  to  be  registered  as  voters  or  to  vote  at  any  Parlia- 
mentary election,  divisional  council,  or  municipal  election.  With 
reference  to  justices  of  the  peace  and  field  cornets  and  all  other 
persons  holding  official  positions  in  Cape  Colony,  or  who  may  have 
occupied  the  position  of  Commandant  of  the  rebel  or  burgher 
forces,  they  shall  be  tried  for  high  treason  before  the  ordinary 
Court  of  the  country,  or  such  special  Coiirt  properly  constituted 
by  law,  the  punishment  for  their  offenses  to  be  left  to  the  discretion 
of  the  Court,  with  this  proviso,  that  in  no  ease  shall  penalty  of 
death  be  inflicted.  The  Natal  Government  are  of  opinion  that 
rebels  should  be  dealt  with  according  to  the  law  of  the  Colony.” 

It  is  possible  that  this  part  of  the  peace  compact  is  no  more  than 


,581 


PEACE  ITS  TERMS 

a declaration  of  opinion  as  to  what  the  English  would  wish  to  he 
done  with  the  Cape  “ rebels  ” if  a policy  of  vengeance  were  a prud- 
ent measure  of  punishment  to  carry  through.  It  is  more  apolo- 
getic than  punitive,  however,  in  its  probable  purpose,  and  may  be  a 
means  resorted  to,  on  a secret  understanding  with  the  Boer  lead- 
ers, of  leaving  the  question  of  amnesty  for  the  Cape  allies  of  the 
Republic  to  the  prerogative  of  King  Edward.  Should  it  be  read 
otherwise,  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events,  as  a consent  of  indif- 
ference on  the  part  of  the  Boer  leaders  to  the  fate  of  their  brave 
and  faithful  confederates  of  the  Cape,  the  fact  would  sully  the 
otherwise  chivalrous  record  of  the  Federal  (^iefs,  and  cost  them 
and  their  cause  a large  share  of  the  world’s  admiring  sympathy. 

I do  not  think  it  necessary  to  modify  the  view  expressed  in 
previous  pages  that  “ unless  honorable  terms  ” were  given  to  the 
Boer  leaders,  the  war  would  go  on  until  the  commandoes  were 
captured  or  decimated.  The  terms  set  out  above  are  such  as  fully 
Justify,  under  the  circumstances,  the  act  of  surrender  by  which 
those  honorable  conditions  are  now  obtained. 

There  is,  however,  another  word  to  be  said  in  their  behalf,  in 
this  connection.  What  alternative  to  the  acceptance  of  the  im- 
proved British  proposals  offered  itself  to  Messrs  Steyn  and  Schalk 
Burger?  The  enemy  of  the  Boers  had  warred  upon  their  wives 
and  children.  They  had  burned  their  homes.  Tens  of  thousands 
of  women  and  children  were,  in  consequence  of  this  vandalism, 
imprisoned  in  the  concentration  camps.  They  were  held  there  as 
hostages,  thereby  threatening  the  very  life  of  the  Boer  nation  in 
the  military  measures  which  had  already  doomed  twelve  or  fourteen 
thousand  children  of  the  fighting  burghers  to  swell  the  list  of  casu- 
alties of  the  vital  Republican  forces.  Twenty-five  thousand  adult 
Boers  were  prisoners  of  war,  while  almost  all  the  non-combatant 
burghers  had  likewise  been  incarcerated  in  prisons  or  in  the 
AVej’lerite  camps.  Continued  resistance  could  not,  therefore,  in 
reason  be  expected  by  the  few  thousand  combatants  left  in  the 
field,  and  bereft  of  all  ambulance  service,  when  they  were  offered 
the  alternative  of  the  amended  English  terms  of  peace. 

What  have  they  won  in  addition  to  the  conditions  on  which  they 
consent  to  lay  down  their  arms?  All  the  world,  excepting  the 
British,  awards  to  the  Boers  the  whole  glory  and  valor  of  the  war. 
They  are  the  moral  victors  in  the  fight.  They  alone  monopolize 
the  admiration  of  the  nations,  who,  however,  have  looked  on  in  a 
shameless,  selfish  indifference  to  the  ultimate  fate  of  the  little 
Republics.  But  they  are  constrained  to  applaud  the  only  heroes 
revealed  in  the  war.  Boer  names  and  Boer  battle-fields  will  hence- 
forth give  to  the  cause  of  national  liberty  in  all  laijds  the  inspira- 


582 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


tion  which  has  hitherto  come  from  the  examples  of  other  times. 
No  other  people  have  ever  achieved  a like  success,  in  so  over- 
matched a striiggle,  or  have  done  braver  deeds  in  the  truest  spirit 
of  Christian  chivalry  and  courage;  and  to  the  end  of  time  their 
heroic  combat  with  the  might  and  truculence  of  the  British  Empire 
will  ring  through  the  ages  as  one  of  the  great  achievements  of 
which  all  civilized  mankind  can  feel  a common  human  pride. 

The  future  of  this  now  favored  race  in  the  world’s  esteem  is 
neither  dark  nor  hopeless.  A people  who  have  so  fought  can 
never  be  finally  subjugated.  The  memories  of  Dundee,  Modder- 
spruit,  Stormberg,  Colenso,  Magersfontein,  Spion  Kop,  and  of  a 
hundred  smaller  victories  will  proudly  recall  the  fighting  superior- 
ity of  the  Boers  in  all  the  engagements  in  which  their  English  foes 
did  not  outnumber  them  by  too  great  odds,  and  will  make  ultimate 
freedom  only  a question  of  time  and  opportunity.  They  inhabit 
countries  six  thousand  miles  away  from  England,  and  this  fact 
alone  is  the  guarantee  to  such  a strong  and  prolific  race  that  the 
British  will  be  no  more  able  to  hold  them  and  their  now  disaffected 
kinsmen  of  Cape  Colony  (as  Ireland  is  held)  in  subjected  discon- 
tent to  a foreign  power,  than  they  were  able  to  retain  in  colonial 
relationship  the  people  who  successfully  waged  the  American  War 
of  Independence. 

The  present  overthrov/  of  the  Boer  nations  is  but  a Pyrrhic 
victory  for  Eugland.  They  have  dragged  down  to  the  dust  in  their 
fall  the  military  rej^utation  and  moral  credit  of  the  British  Empire, 
and  from  the  lessons  of  the  latest  war  against  the  Eepublics,  which 
began  in  the  Jameson  Eaid  and  was  arrested  in  its  progress  by  the 
peace  of  Vereeniging,  will  assuredly  come  the  full  vindication  of 
the  liberty-loving  Dutch-Huguenot  race,  in  the  birth  of  a senti- 
ment and  of  a patriotism  from  the  throes  of  the  recent  conflict 
which  will  alone  find  contentment,  peace,  and  satisfaction  in  a free 
and  independent  United  States  of  South  Africa. 

The  cost  which  the  Eepublics  have  made  Great  Britain  pay  for 
completing  the  unfinished  crime  of  the  Jameson  Eaid,  is  not  calcu- 
lated to  encourage  other  great  Powers  to  follow  the  English  example 
and  take  the  lives  of  small  nations.  The  British  losses  in  killed, 
and  in  deaths  from  wounds  and  from  disease,  total  1,072  officers 
and  20,870  men.  Five  thousand  eight  hundred  and  seventy-nine 
more  men  are  hopelessly  invalided,  as  a result  of  wounds  and  sick- 
ness. The  total  number  of  the  British  wounded  is  given  at  22,829. 
There  were  3,116  officers,  and  72,314  men  sent  home  as  temporarily 
invalided  during  the  two  years  and  eight  months  of  the  campaign. 
These  figures  relate  only  to  the  returns  up  to  the  31st  of  May,  1902. 

No  complete  returns  of  the  number  of  British  prisoners  taken 


PEACE  AND  ITS  TEEMS 


583 


by  the  Boers  have  yet  been  given,  and  the  figures  that  have  been 
published  on  this  head  are  speculative.  Estimates  as  high  as 
25,000,  and  as  low  as  9,000,  have  been  put  forward.  Probably 
15,000  would  be  nearer  the  actual  number. 

The  Boers  also  captured  upwards  of  70  British  guns  during  the 
war. 

The  cost  to  the  British  taxpayers  has  been  nearly  three  times 
the  expense  incurred  in  the  war  against  Russia  in  the  early  fifties. 
The  British  Treasury  estimate  of  the  total  expenditure  in  the 
present  war  up  to  the  31st  of  March,  1903  (for  which  money  has 
been  voted  by  Parliament)  was  a sum  of  £222,974,000.  Of  this  sum, 
£152,657,000  had  been  expended  on  the  31st  of  March  last.  The 
expense  of  winding  up  the  war,  compensating  the  Boers  for  the 
burning  of  their  homes,  etc.,  will  probably  require  the  greater  por- 
tion of  the  latest  sum  provided  for  active  hostilities.  The  full 
monetary  cost  of  the  Imperial  edition  of  the  Jameson  Raid  will, 
therefore,  not  fall  short  of  £200,000,000. 

Up  to  the  31st  of  January  of  this  year,  England  had  engaged  in 
the  task  of  crushing  the  Boer  resistance,  a total  of  338,749  soldiers 
and  volunteers. 

Against  this  enormous  force  the  two  Republics  never  succeeded 
in  placing,  at  any  one  period  of  the  campaign,  33,000  armed  burgh- 
ers, Cape  “ rebels,”  and  volunteers  in  the  field.  I am  confirmed  in 
this  estimate  by  Attorney-Gleneral  Smuts,  who,  in  his  report  to 
President  Kruger,  in  Januar}^  1902,  says: 

“ As  your  Honor  knows,  I have  had  a great  deal  to  do  with  the 
mobilization  of  our  burgher  forces  from  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
and  I am,  therefore,  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  numerical 
strength  of  our  different  commandoes  in  the  Republics  and  the 
Colonies.  My  opinion  is  that  we  never  had  more  than  32,000  in 
the  field.” 

This  was  also  the  estimate  given  me  by  President  Steyn,  Judge 
Hertzog,  Dr.  Reitz,  General  Philip  Botha,  and  others  qualified  to 
speak  with  knowledge,  in  1900.  Assuming  that  10,000  Cape 
volunteers  entered  the  Republican  armies  after  Lord  Roberts’ 
house-burning  campaign,  and  during  Lord  Kitchener’s  concentra- 
tion-camp operations,  as  is  generally  supposed,  and  that  from 
five  to  ten  thousand  previous  non-combatants  and  boys  joined  the 
Transvaal  and  Free  State  commandoes  to  fill  the  gaps  made  by 
the  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners  in  the  campaign,  the  total 
resisting  strength  of  the  two  Republics  throughout  the  war  would 
fall  short  of  50,000  rifles. 

The  number  of  British  troops  put  out  of  action  from  the  12th  of 


584 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


October,  1899,  to  the  31st  of  May,  1902 — in  killed,  deaths  from 
wounds  and  disease,  in  surrenders  to  the  Boers,  and  in  permanent 
and  temporary  invalids — is  more  than  double  the  entire  numerical 
strength  of  all  the  forces  mustered  by  the  Transvaal  and  Orange 
Free  State  for  the  defense  of  the  Eepublics;  a result  without 
a single  parallel  in  the  history  of  any  other  war  between  civilized 
nations. 

The  Boer  losses  are  yet  unknown.  I estimate  the  killed,  and 
deaths  from  wounds  and  disease,  at  about  5,000.  The  number  of 
prisoners  has  been  given  at  25,555.  These  are  Mr.  Secretary 
Broderick’s  most  recent  figures.  Among  these  there  are  783  boys 
under  16,  and  1,025  men  over  60  years  of  age.  Last  November  the 
generally  accepted  English  estimates  of  Boer  prisoners  was  between 
thirty  and  forty  thousand. 

The  concentration-camp  scheme  of  British  operations  against 
the  Eepublics  tells  its  own  story  of  Boer  casualties. 


Chapter  XLI 


CONCLUSION— ENGLAND’S  COWARDLY  AND 
UNCHRISTIAN  WARFARE 

IlJVESTIGATION  OF  CHAEGES  THAT  BOEKS  VIOLATED  RULES  OF  WAR  RESERVED 
FOR  another  book BRITISH  VIOLATIONS  DISCUSSED  IN  THIS CHAM- 

BERLAIN’S HYPOCRITICAL  CONTENTION  THAT  CONCENTRATION  IS  A 
HUMANE  POLICY,  FORCED  UPON  BRITISH  BY  BoTHA’s  MILITARY 
ORDERS — These  bear  the  contrary  interpretation — Milner  contra- 
dicts Chamberlain — He  avows  concentration  to  be  purely  a mili- 
tary measure — Lord  Roberts,  while  denying  general  policy  of 

DEVASTATION,  JUSTIFIES  SPECIFIC  ACTS — BULLER  MAKES  THREAT  TO 

Botha  that  continued  resistance  by  Boers  will  result  in 
DESTRUCTION  OF  THEIR  HOMES — He  FULFILS  IT  BY  BURNING  BOTHA’S 
FARM— Burning  of  farms  of  De  Wet  and  other  Boer  leaders — - 
Cowardly  nature  of  British  warfare — Equaled  only  by  the  cam- 
paign OF  CALUMNY  CARRIED  ON  BY  BRITISH  PRESS  AND  GOVERNMENT — 
Hypocrisy  of  the  civilized  world — Its  shudders  over  Armenian 
OUTRAGES — Christian  prayers  for  success  of  unchristian  war— 
How  England  has  mammonized  the  nations. 

A DETAILED  examination  of  the  charges  made  against  the 
Boers,  by  British  officers  and  the  English  press,  for  alleged 
outrages  against  British  wounded,  the  Bed  Cross  flag,  etc.,  is  not 
possible  in  this  volume.  Any  such  investigation  would,  necessarily, 
demand  a counter  statement  of  Boer  charges  on  these  and  upon 
other  violations  of  the  recognized  rules  of  civilized  warfare  by  the 
enemy.  Such  an  investigation  would  require  the  space  of  another 
hook,  and  abundant  matter  for  such  a supplementary  volume  is  at 
my  disposal,  and  will  be  published. 

In  the  meantime,  a statement  made  by  Mr.  Chamberlain  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  on  the  20th  of  January,  1902,  relating  to  the 
causes  which  are  now  said  by  the  English  to  have  led  to  the  forma- 
tion of  the  concentration  camps,  requires  some  examination.  These 
are  the  Colonial  Secretary’s  allegations; 

“ In  the  first  place  I ask  them  to  remember  how  the  concentra- 
tion camps  arose.  They  will  find  that  they  arose  because  General 
Botha  declared  his  intention  of  burning  and  destroying  the  farms, 
and  of  compelling  the  inhabitants  to  take  action  and  join  his 
forces.  Lord  Kitchener  offered  to  General  Botha  to  allow  these 
people,  the  women  and  children,  to  remain  in  their  own  homes,  and 
even  undertook,  as  far  as  possible,  to  supply  them  with  food,  if 


586 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


General  Botha  would  consent  to  their  neutrality.  General  Botha’s 
reply  was  clear  and  categorical.  He  said,  ‘ I have  the  right  to  im- 
press all  these  people.  They  will  suffer  if  they  do  not  come  to  me,’ 
and  when  asked  what  was  the  alternative,  he  replied,  ‘ You  had 
better  remove  them  out  of  the  country,  or  otherwise  I shall  punish 
them.’  (Ministerial  cheers.)  That  is  the  first  letter,  but  we  have 
an  intercepted  letter  from  General  Smuts  to  General  Botha,  in 
which  he  says,  ‘You  know  that  with  regard  to  the  transport  of 
women  you  instructed  me  to  load  them  into  the  British  lines.’ 
(Ministerial  cheers.)  Then,  Sir,  for  the  humanity,  unprecedented 
in  the  history  of  war,  with  which  we,  upon  whom  these  women  and 
children  have  been  forced,  have  accepted  the  duty  and  responsi- 
bility in  the  name  of  humanity,  we  are  accused  of  loathsome 
cruelty.  (Ministerial  cheers.)  ” 

The  dates  of  the  letter  of  Botha’s  here  referred  to,  and  of  the 
conversation  between  him  and  Lord  Kitchener,  are  most  important 
factors  in  the  controversy,  and  Mr.  Chamberlain  did  not  mention 
them.  Neither  did  the  Colonial  Secretary  read  the  intercepted 
letters. 

General  Botha’s  circular — not  a letter,  as  described — was  dated 
the  3rd  of  December,  1900,  and  this  is  the  document ; 

“ From  the  Commandant-General  to  all  Military  Officers,  Land- 
rosts,  etc. 

“ Whereas,  it  appears  that  there  is  a difference  existing  in  the 
treatment  of  burghers  who  have  surrendered  their  arms  to  the 
enemy,  or  have  taken  the  oath  of  neutrality,  and  whereas  it  is 
desirable  to  lay  down  regulations  for  the  even  treatment  of  such 
burghers,  therefore  it  is  hereby  resolved  as  follows; 

“ (1.)  All  Field  Cornets  are  instructed  to  frame  lists  of  all 
burghers  in  their  wards  who  have  laid  down  their  arms,  and  taken 
the  oath  of  neutrality.  Herein  is  included  the  burghers  who,  on 
being  called  up,  have  again  taken  up  arms. 

“ (2.)  All  persons  liable  to  service  whose  names  appear  on  the 
aforesaid  lists,  and  who  refuse,  on  being  called  up  by  the  Field 
Cornet,  to  take  up  arms  again,  must  immediately  be  sent  up  to  the 
nearest  jail  for  punishment  according  to  law. 

“ (3.)  The  movable  property  of  persons  mentioned  in  (2)  must 
be  taken,  and  a proper  inventory  made  by  the  Field  Cornet  con- 
cerned, in  conjunction  with  his  Commandant  and  his  General  of 
Division  for  commando  purposes.  Care  must  be  taken  in  all  cases 
that  sufficient  means  of  livelihood  are  left  for  the  support  of  the 
wife  and  family. 

“ (4.)  Burghers  who  are  not  fit  for  active  service,  and  who  have 
taken  the  oath  of  neutrality,  must  be  called  up  before  the  Landrost 
or  Field  Cornet  concerned  therewith,  to  take  an  oath  as  set  forth 


CONCLUSION 


587 


in  the  form  below.  Those  who  refuse  to  comply  must  be  dealt  with 
in  terms  of  Law  No.  4 of  1900. 

“ (5.)  All  Landrosts  and  Field  Cornets  must  take  heed  that  all 
passes  or  permits  issued  by  the  enemy  are  returned  by  the  burghers 
who  again  take  up  or  have  taken  up  arms,  and  by  burghers  who 
have  taken  the  oath  in  terms  of  (4). 

“ FORM  OF  OATH 

“ I,  the  undersigned  burgher  of  the  South  African  Eepublic, 
declare  under  oath  that  the  oath  of  neutrality  taken  by  me,  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy,  was  taken  by  me  without  the  sanction  of  my 
military  officers,  and  I consider  the  same  null  and  void. 

“ Louis  Botha, 

“ Commandant-General.” 

It  will  be  seen  by  a study  of  this  circular  that  it  does  not,  in  any 
sense,  bear  out  the  interpretation  placed  upon  its  terms  by  Mr. 
Chamberlain.  “ Care  must  be  taken,”  says  General  Botha,  “ in  all 
cases  that  sufficient  means  of  livelihood  are  left  for  the  support  of 
the  wife  and  family,”  even  of  burghers  who  had  sworn  to  give  up 
the  fight  for  the  Eepublic. 

There  is  not  a syllable  about  burning  the  homes  of  such  men, 
while  in  the  intercepted  letter  written  by  General  Tobias  Smuts  to 
General  Botha,  which  is  dealt  with  under  date  in  the  Diary  of  the 
War,  it  is  shown  that  the  Commandant-General  actually  degraded 
his  friend  and  a brave  officer  from  the  rank  of  general  for  having 
burned  the  town  or  village  of  Bremersdorp,  in  Swaziland,  after 
having  driven  a force  of  British  and  savages  out  of  it. 

With  reference  to  the  conversation  between  Lord  Kitchener  and 
General  Botha,  which  took  place  at  Middelburg,  on  the  28th  of 
February,  1901,  there  is  not  a single  word  in  Lord  Kitchener’s 
report  of  that  interview  which  agrees  with  Mr.  Chamberlain’s  state- 
ment in  the  House  of  Commons. 

The  report  was  presented  to  Parliament  in  March,  1901,  and 
Lord  Kitchener’s  despatch,  dated  March  1,  is  found  on  page  2. 
Its  first  sentence  reads : “ I have  had  a long  interview  with  Botha, 
who  showed  very  good  feeling,  and  seemed  anxious  to  bring  about 
peace.” 

On  the  same  page  there  occurs  the  following  sentence:  “He 
(Botha)  referred  to  pecuniary  assistance  to  repair  burnt  farms, 
and  to  enable  farmers  to  start  afresh.  I said  I thought  some  as- 
sistance would  be  given.”  In  other  words,  at  the  very  interview 
mentioned  by  the  Colonial  Secretary,  the  British  Commander-in- 
Chief  was  promising  Botha,  as  a condition  of  peace,  money  from 
the  British  Exchequer  for  the  rebuilding  of  the  Boer  farms  already 
burned  by  the  English  in  the  year  1900! 


588 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


So  much  for  the  documents  and  conversation  referred  to  by  Mr. 
Chamberlain  on  the  20th  of  January,  1902. 

Writing  to  the  Uitlander  Committee  of  Cape  Town,  early  in 
September,  1901,  Lord  Milner,  through  his  private  secretary,  made 
the  following  frank  avowal  of  the  cause  which  led  to  the  formation 
of  the  concentration  camps: 

“ The  formation  of  concentration  camps  has  been  adopted  purely 
on  military  grounds  as  a means  of  hastening  the  end  of  the  war, 
which  is,  after  all,  the  first  interest  of  the  refugees  themselves; 
and  as  a military  measure  it  is,  his  Excellency  believes,  succeed- 
ing.-— London  ‘ Morning  Leader,’  October  7,  1901.” 

In  the  Blue  Book  presented  to  Parliament  in  June,  1900 

Correspondence  between  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  South 
Africa  and  the  Boer  Commanders  ”),  there  are  other  facts  and 
statements  which  blow  to  the  winds  the  Colonial  Secretary’s 
“ humanity  ” explanations. 

On  the  3rd  of  February,  1900,  Presidents  Kruger  and  Steyn 
addressed  a communication  to  Lord  Eoberts,  calling  his  attention 
to  “ the  burning  and  blowing  up  of  farmhouses  and  of  the  devasta- 
tion to  farms  and  of  goods  therein,  whereby  unprotected  women 
and  children  are  deprived  of  food  and  cover  ” (Blue  Book,  page  3). 

Lord  Eoberts  replies,  saying  that  the  charges  thus  made  had  not 
been  substantiated,  and  that  it  was  his  intention  to  conduct  the 
war  with  “ as  little  injury  as  possible  to  peaceable  inhabitants  and 
private  property.” 

On  the  13th  of  May,  Lord  Eoberts  issued  a proclamation  from 
Bloemfontein,  warning  all  persons  against  the  wanton  destruction 
of  public  or  private  property  within  the  territories  of  the  Free 
State  and  South  African  Eepublic  (p.  4). 

On  the  16th  of  May,  General  Botha  replied  to  this  proclamation 
(a  copy  of  which  Lord  Eoberts  had  sent  to  him),  giving  specific 
cases  of  such  destruction,  and  adding:  “Your  troops  continue  to 
carry  on  the  greatest  barbarities  ” (p.  5). 

Lord  Eoberts  replies,  on  May  18,  saying  the  cases  referred  to  by 
General  Botha  “ are  found  to  be  devoid  of  foundation.” 

General  De  Wet  sends  Lord  Eoberts,  on  the  19th  of  May,  a list 
of  farms  burned  by  the  British. 

Lord  Eoberts  answers  by  saying  there  were  reasons  why  these 
farms  were  destroyed,  which  justified  the  action  (p.  5). 

On  the  4th  of  July,  General  Botha  addressed  a further  protest 
to  Lord  Eoberts,  and  gave  him  another  list  of  Boer  farms  burned 
by  the  English,  including  Botha’s  own  farm,  and  that  of  Field 
Cornet  Badenhorst,  near  Standerton. 


CONCLUSION 


589 


On  the  10th  of  July,  General  De  Wet  wrote  to  Lord  Eoberts, 
giving  him  a list  of  farms  burned  near  Lindley  and  Heilbron,  and 
declaring  he  would  retaliate  upon  British  property  in  the  Free  State 
and  Cape  Colony,  “ in  order  to  put  a stop  to  such  barbarities,” 
unless  farm-burning  was  discontinued  by  Lord  Roberts’troops(p.7). 

On  the  28th  of  July,  Lord  Eoberts  replied  to  General  Botha, 
saying  he  had  not  yet  received  reports  about  farm-burning  near 
Standerton,  and  expressing  the  hope  that  the  reported  destruction 
of  Botha’s  own  farm  was  unfounded.  He,  however,  declares  that, 
where  telegraph  or  railway  lines  have  been  cut  by  Boer  forces,  farms 
in  the  vicinity  will  be  destroyed. 

In  a letter  to  General  De  Wet,  dated  August  3,  Lord  Eoberts 
definitely  declares:  “I  have  found  it  necessary  (in  consequence  of 
alleged  shooting  of  British  from  certain  farmhouses)  to  take  such 
steps  as  are  sanctioned  by  the  customs  of  war  to  put  an  end  to  these 
and  to  similar  acts,  and  have  brxrned  down  the  farmhouses  at  or 
near  which  such  deeds  have  been  perpetrated.” 

On  the  13th  of  August,  Lord  Eoberts  encloses  a copy  of  a report 
from  General  Buller,  in  which  this  officer  admits  having  ordered 
the  burning  of  General  Louis  Botha’s  farm,  along  with  several 
others  in  the  Standerton  district,  because  telegraph  wires  had  been 
cut  and  the  railway  injured,  and — the  Boers  had,  in  fact,  continued 
opposing  General  Buller’s  forces. 

On  the  15th  of  August,  General  Botha  again  brings  under  Lord 
Roberts’  notice  the  continued  burning  of  farms,  and  of  women  and 
children  being  driven  from  their  homes  and  compelled  to  walk  for 
miles  to  other  shelter,  owing  to  the  looting  of  their  conveyances. 
He  complains  of  small  bodies  of  British  going  about  in  the  charac- 
ter of  scouts,  but  who  are  robbers,  committing  theft  under  the  guise 
of  English  soldiers.  He  further  categorically  denies  the  statements 
in  General  Buller’s  report  that  there  were  any  reasons  beyond  those 
prompted  by  the  spirit  of  barbarism  for  the  burning  of  his  own 
and  other  farms  near  Standerton. 

To  this  communication.  Lord  Roberts  replied  in  a letter  ending 
as  follows: 

“I  should  be  failing  in  my  duty  to  Her  Majesty’s  Government 
and  to  Her  Majesty’s  Army  in  South  Africa  if  I neglected  to  use 
every  means  in  my  power  to  bring  such  irregular  warfare  to  a con- 
clusion. The  measures  which  I am  compelled  to  adopt  are  those 
which  the  customs  of  war  prescribe  as  being  applicable  to  such 
cases;  they  are  ruinous  to  the  country,  entail  endless  suffering  on 
your  Honor’s  fellow  countrymen,  and  must,  I regret  to  inform  your 
Honor,  necessarily  become  more  and  more  rigorous  ” (p.  12), 


590 


TEE  BOER  EIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


On  the  2nd  of  September,  Lord  Roberts  further  wrote  to  General 
Botha,  sa3dng,  inter  alia: 

“ The  orders  I have  at  present  issued,  to  give  efPect  to  these 
views,  are  that  the  farm  nearest  the  scene  of  any  attempt  to  injure 
the  line  or  wreck  a train  is  to  be  burnt,  and  that  all  farms  within 
a radius  of  ten  miles  are  to  be  completely  cleared  of  all  their  stock, 
supplies,  etc.”  (p.  12). 

If  any  further  proof  were  needed  in  refutation  of  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain’s charges  against  General  Botha  they  are  found  in  the  Colonial 
Secretary’s  own  admissions,  when  he  was  defending  Lord  Roberts 
for  the  burning  of  farms  a year  before  the  interview  between  Lord 
Kitchener  and  the  Transvaal  Commandant-General  had  taken 
place.  Speaking  in  the  House  of  Commons,  on  the  7th  of  Decem- 
ber, 1900,  Mr.  Chamberlain  said: 

“ Lord  Roberts  was  placed  in  the  most  difficult  position.  He 
had  his  base  at  least  1,500  miles  away  from  his  front  in  a most 
difficult  country,  and  served  only  by  a single  line  of  railway.  Any 
catastrophe  to  that  railway  might  have  been  a catastrophe  to  the 
whole  arm}^.  It  is  all  very  well  to  talk  about  humanity,  but  we 
must  take  into  account  humanity  to  our  army.  (Ministerial  cheers.) 
It  was  the  clear  duty  of  Lord  Roberts  to  take  any  steps  in  his  power 
to  prevent  the  cutting  of  the  lines;  accordingly  it  was  proclaimed 
that  in  the  case  of  destruction  of  the  line  persons  in  the  vicinity 
would  be  held  responsible,  and  farms  might  be  destroyed.” 

The  Colonial  Secretary’s  statement  on  the  20th  of  January,  1902 
{“  the  humanity,  unprecedented  in  the  history  of  war,  with  which 
we,  upon  whom  these  women  and  children  have  been  forced,  have 
accepted  the  duty  and  responsibility  in  the  name  of  humanity,” 
etc.),  read  in  the  light  of  the  foregoing  extracts  from  his  own 
Blue  Books,  and  specific  assertions  as  quoted  above,  is  nothing  less 
than  a gross  insult  to  the  public  intelligence. 

Further  evidence  is  not  needed  with  which  to  refute  what  Mr. 
Chamberlain’s  own  documents  completely  deny;  but  two  additional 
pieces  of  testimony  will  help  to  illustrate  the  value  that  is  to  be 
attached  to  English  Ministerial  charges  against  the  Boers.  On 
the  4th  of  June,  1900,  as  related  under  that  date  in  the  Diary 
of  the  War,  General  Buller  had  an  interview  with  General  Chris- 
tian Botha,  near  Laing’s  Kek.  The  English  general’s  report  of 
the  conversation  to  Lord  Roberts  is  printed  at  pages  85  and  86  of 
the  “ South  African  Despatches,”  Yol.  II.,  February,  1901.  Gen- 
eral Buller  reports  himself  as  saying  to  Botha  (p.  85):  “If  the 
war  goes  on,  the  Boers’  stock  would  be  lost,  their  homes  destroyed, 


CONCLUSION 


591 


and  their  property  would  suffer  a great  deal  of  damage,  and  he 
wants  to  avoid  that.” 

It  was  on  the  24th  of  the  following  month  this  same  chivalrous, 
English  officer  reported  to  Lord  Eoberts  that  he  had  burned  Com- 
mandant-General Louis  Botha’s  farm  and  others  near  Standerton. 

In  the  Blue  Book  relating  to  the  number  of  Boer  farms  burned 
by  the  British,  which  has  been  already  quoted  from,  the  following 
samples  of  the  reasons  given  for  the  destruction  of  the  homes  of 
the  men  engaged  in  the  war  against  the  English  are  found; 

“ Destroyed  because  the  owner  was  on  commando,  and  the  house 
near  where  the  accident  and  destruction  of  Ehenoster  Station  took 
place.  This  man  had  taken  an  active  part  in  destruction  of  line 
and  station,  so  it  was  stated.  Men’s  kits  were  found  in  this  house. 

“ Letters  were  sent  to  fighting  General  Lemmer  to  warn  him  of 
the  consequences  if  he  touched  the  telegraph  line.  He  cut  it  three 
times,  so  his  three  wretched  hovels  at  Zamenkomst,  where  the 
break  occurred,  were  burnt. 

“ Izaak  Buurman  was  the  leader  of  a band  which  persistently 
attacked  the  railway  line  south  of  this  section.  In  his  house  was 
found  a roll  of  his  commando. 

“ J.  H.  Visagie  shot  native  scout  “ Bob,”  and  had  been  on  com- 
mando with  the  Wakkerstroomers  since  he  is  stated  to  have  sur- 
rendered and  taken  the  oath  of  neutrality. 

“ Men  on  commando  in  the  immediate  neighborhood,  notice  hav- 
ing previously  been  sent  to  the  laager  that  their  houses  would  be 
burned  if  they  did  not  come  in,  or  were  not  at  their  houses  by  the 
date. 

“ This  house  was  burnt  without  orders,  and  culprits  cannot  be 
traced.  The  man,  however,  is  one  of  the  Magaliesberg  snipers. 

“ This  man  was  reported  to  have  shot  a man  in  Eoberts’s  Horse 
while  watering  his  horse,  and  so  his  house  was  burnt.” 


The  same  Blue  Book  contains  this  official  record  of  the  burning 
of  the  following  home: 


District. 

Name  of  ViUage 
or  Farm. 

Name  of  Owner. 

Date  of 
Destruction. 

Reasons  for  De- 
struction. 

Rhenoster 

River. 

— 

Christian 

De  Wet. 

— 

— 

The  story  of  the  war,  as  I have  attempted  to  tell  it,  from  the 
Boer  point  of  view,  is  not,  and  necessarily  could  not  be,  a full  or 
complete  version  of  the  whole  campaign.  Indeed,  the  later  portion 
of  the  narrative  (Diary  of  the  War)  has  been  mainly  compiled  from 
information  gleaned  through  anti-Boer  sources.  Yet  no  British 
censorship  could  silence,  and  no  stereotyped  English  laudation  of 


592 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


its  own  prowess  conld  keep  back  from  the  public  everywhere,  the 
knowledge  of  the  continued,  dauntless  fight  of  this  little  nation 
of  heroes  for  their  country’s  independence.  For  fully  two  years 
and  eight  months  the  Boers  have  fought  against  the  cruelest  odds 
which  ever  enabled  a purpose  of  naked  wrong  to  triumph  by  the 
mere  weight  of  brute  force  over  a righteous  cause  heroically  upheld. 
With  commandoes  decimated,  homes  destroyed,  wives  and  children 
in  prison  camps,  babies  dying  of  “ military  measures,”  stock  and 
food  looted,  crops  uprooted,  and  devastation  carried  systematically 
by  England's  quarter  of  a million  of  men  into  almost  every  corner 
of  the  Transvaal  and  Free  State,  still  the  men  who  believed  in  God 
and  freedom  gave  way  only  to  death  or  to  overwhelming  opposition. 
Loss  of  guns,  of  supplies,  of  almost  everything  except  faith  and 
courage,  saw  them  at  Vlakfontein,  Itala,  Brakenlaagte,  Tweefon- 
tein,  Tweebosh,  and  in  a dozen  other  victories  gallantly  achieved, 
show  the  enemy,  even  when  armed  with  artillery,  how  easily  this 
war  could  have  settled  forever  the  question  of  who  should  rule 
in  the  Transvaal,  if  courageous  manhood  and  not  numbers  had  to 
determine  that  right. 

There  were  45,000  women  watching  50,000  children  inside  of 
barbed  wire  fences  surrounded  by  British  soldiers,  during  the  later 
stages  of  the  war.  They  were  imprisoned  in  camps  in  which 
14,000  of  these  children  have  died  of  sickness  induced  by  the 
privations  inflicted  upon  them.  They  were  taken  from  their 
homes  by  England’s  troops  as  a military  measure,  and  they  were 
imprisoned  as  a means  of  subduing  the  spirit  of  resistance  of 
husbands,  fathers,  and  sons  fighting  for  independence.  These 
women  bore  their  suft'erings  in  a spirit  of  the  noblest  patriotism. 
They  addressed  no  appeal  or  reproach  to  the  burghers  in  the  field 
on  account  of  the  hardships  to  which  they  were  subjected.  Their 
children  died  before  their  eyes,  but  they  still  defiantly  urged  their 
country’s  defenders  to  continue  the  fight  against  the  callous  and 
unmanly  foe  that  could  disgrace  civilized  humanity  by  warring 
upon  the  helpless  as  well  as  the  combative  section  of  the  two 
Republics.  These  are,  surely,  nobler  heroines  than  those  of 
romance  who  are  loved  and  honored  for  the  imaginary  devotion 
with  which  they  remain  true  to  some  idea  that  has  kinship  with 
the  bravery  of  men  engaged  in  a just  and  holy  cause.  But  the 
world  looked  on — the  civilized  Christian  world  of  churches,  and  of 
preachers  of  the  Gospel,  and  of  novel  readers — at  this  barbarous 
spectacle  in  South  Africa,  with  about  as  much  real  indignation  as 
if  Lord  Kitchener  and  his  220,000  troops  were  inflicting  all  the 
horrors  of  British  warfare  upon  a Commonwealth  of  criminals  or 
brigands,  and  not  upon  two  little  Republics  made  up  of  one  of  the 


CONCLUSION 


593 


bravest  races  in  Europe,  and  of  the  most  intensely  and  sincerely 
Protestant  Christian  people  on  earth. 

This  same  world  of  churches  and  of  moralists  is  that  which  a 
few  years  ago  called  out  hysterically  for  tlie  punishment  of  Turkey 
on  account  of  outrages  perpetrated  upon  Armenian  Christians. 
America,  Great  Britain,  France,  were  appealed  to  in  behalf  of  a 
people  who  do  not  possess  a single  racial  quality  that  could  compare 
with  the  Christian  manliness  of  the  Boer  nation.  Had  14,000 
Armenian  children  been  slain  by  “ the  military  measures  ” of 
Abdul  Hamid,  the  ships  of  France,  America,  and  of  England  would 
have  entered  tire  Dardanelles  in  obedience  to  the  outraged  feelings 
of  a united  Christian  world.  But  Abdul  Hamid  does  not  own  gold 
mines,  or  regulate  the  money-markets  of  Paris,  Hew  York,  and 
Berlin  from  Constantinople.  He  has  not  this  “ Christian  ” ad- 
vantage. Moreover,  he  is  a Mohammedan.  He  is  outside  the  pale 
of  Christianity,  and  can  therefore  be  coerced  into  a compliance 
with  the  humane  mandate  of  an  interested  Christian  public  opinion. 

England  has  killed  14,000  Cliristian  children,  has  imprisoned 
45,000  Christian  women  in  barbed  wire  enclosures,  has  devastated 
two  Christian  countries  where  there  was  less  poverty  and  less  vice 
than  in  any  other  Christian  community  in  the  world,  and  has 
armed  savages  to  help  her  in  a war  which  had  its  origin  in  motives 
as  base  and  as  odious  as  ever  prompted  a Sultan  of  Turkey  to  burn 
an  Armenian  village  or  to  massacre  his  rebellious  subjects.  And 
yet  Cardinal  Vaughan,*  in  the  name  of  the  Catholic  Church  of 
England,  the  Archbishop  of  Canterbury  in  behalf  of  the  Protes- 
tants, and  Mr.  Plugh  Price  Hughes  for  the  Honconformists,  of  the 
same  enlightened  Christian  nation,  piously  called  down  God’s 
blessing  upon  the  arms  which  were  thus  to  kill  a little  Christian 
nation  in  South  Africa.  And  the  United  States,  Austria,  and 
other  countries,  equally  Christian,  enlightened,  and  humane,  con- 


* “It  is  now  a question  of  something  more  than  of  what  is  lawful.  The 
question  is,  Shall  the  British  Empire  be  allowed  to  fall  to  pieces  by  supineness 
and  by  want  of  determination  and  self-denial?  The  answer  is,  No. 

“This  Empire  has  been  raised  up  by  the  same  Providence  that  called  the 
Koman  Empire  into  existence,  and  as  God  used  the  one  towards  the  attainment 
of  His  own  Divine  purposes  of  mercy,  so  does  He  seem  to  be  using  the  other. 

“While  we  realize  with  grateful  confidence  the  most  honorable  mission  with 
which  God  seems  to  have  entrusted  us,  we  must  endeavor  not  to  be  altogether 
unworthy  of  it.  and  must  determine  to  make  God,  both  in  national  and  private 
life,  the  first  object  of  our  love  and  service.  And  then,  we  must  be  ready  per- 
sonally and  collectively  to  make  every  sacrifice  necessary  or  useful  for  the  ful- 
filment of  His  trust. 

“For  these  purposes,  you  will  please  to  recite  on  Sundays,  until  further 
orders,  after  the  principal  Mass  or  at  Benediction,  the  prayers  to  be  found  in 
the  ‘Manual’  among  the  ‘Occasional  Prayers,’  and  headed  ‘In  Times  of 
Calamity.’ 

“Herbert  Cardinal  Vaughan.’’ 


594 


THE  BOER  FIGHT  FOR  FREEDOM 


tinued  to  sell  horses  and  supplies  to  the  power  which  waged  such 
a war. 

The  explanation  of  this  horrible  anomaly  in  the  moral  standards 
of  the  day  is  not  far  to  seek.  England,  by  her  money-markets 
and  press  and  commerce;  by  her  howling  hypocrisy  in  pulpit  and 
Pai'liament;  has  successfully  mammonized  the  world.  By  her  ra- 
tionalistic missionaries,  her  newspapers,  and  the  influence  of  her 
wealth,  she  has  morally  debased  Christianity,  and  has  enthroned 
the  creed  of  human  cupidity  in  the  Temple  oiit  of  which  the  gentle 
Savior  of  Nazareth,  with  His  gospel  of  love,  and  of  justice  and  hu- 
manity, once  banished  the  money  changers.  This  is  why  Cardinals 
and  Archbishops,  papers  and  stock  exchanges,  politicians  and  cabi- 
nets, looked  on  as  unmoved  at  the  horrors  of  the  concentration 
camps  as  the  Herodian  High  Priests  probably  did  at  the  measures 
which  carried  out  the  wholesale  murder  of  the  Judean  children 
1,900  years  ago.  It  also  explains  why  a United  States,  a France, 
and  a Germany  continued — at  least  in  their  Governments — the 
passive  spectators  of  the  most  dishonorable  and  unchristian  war 
that  has  ever  disgraced  a civilized  age. 


END 


IKDEX 


(Note.— “Map,”  followed  by  index  numbers,  such  as  “ eg",”  refers  to  large  map  following 
index.  The  numeral  refers  to  the  vertical  section,  and  the  letter  to  the  horizontal  section,  in 
which  the  place  may  be  found.) 


A.asvogel  Kop,  396.  Map,  190 
Aberdeen,  raided  by  Boer  commandoes,  477, 
488,  489  ; British  captured  near,  492 ; 
Scheepers’  laager  near,  captured,  511.  Map, 
6? 

Abram’s  Kraal,  Battle  of,  400, 401 ; Boer  losses 
at,  401.  Map,  190 

Ackerman,  Adjutant,  wounded  at  Colenso, 
283 ; mentioned,  524 

Acton  Homes,  action  near,  338.  Map,  107 
Administrative  ability  of  Boers,  79-81 
Afrikanders  on  Boer  side,  number  of,  238-240 
Albert  Junction.  Map,  '7f 
Alberts,  Commandant  Sarel,  capture  of,  553  ; 
at  Klippans,  557  ; at  Heidelberg,  572;  men- 
tioned, 549 

Albrecht,  Major  Richard,  his  services  to  Boers, 
331,  332 ; at  Modder  River,  201,  k)3 ; at 
Magersfontein,  221 ; covers  retreat  of  Cronje 
at  Klip  River,  387  ; commands  guns  at  Paar- 
deberg,  389 ; breakdown  of  guns  of,  393 ; 
mentioned,  61,  70,  210 

Aliwal  North,  English  treaty  with  Boers  at,  7, 
8,  199  ; number  of  Boer  allies  from,  2^,  ^9  ; 
British  post  defeated  near,  511 ; mentioned, 
48.  Map,  7/ 

Ambulance  help  for  Boers,  335,  336 
American  Volunteers  among  the  Boers,  327 
Ammunition  for  Boer  guns,  manufacture  of, 
in  Johannesburg,  313,  314 
Anderson,  Colonel,  disaster  to,  at  Klerksdorp, 
559-561,  564 

Arbitration  proposed  by  President  Kruger,  46 
Armament  of  Staats  Artillery,  61 
Armored  trains.  See  Trains,  armored 
Artillery,  primary  object  of,  in  battle,  278 ; 
Boer,  at  Siege  of  Ladysmith,  288  ; Corps  of 
Staats,  60,  61 ; excellent  handling  of  the 
Boer,  280 

Arundel.  Map,  6/ 

Assurances  demanded  from  Britain  by  Trans- 
vaal, 51 

Australian  troops  at  Colesberg,  361, 362 ; char- 
acter of,  440,  441,  453 : petition  against  em- 
ployment  of,  in  farm  burning,  563 ; murder 
of  Boer  prisoners  by,  571,  572 

Babington,  Gleneral,  478;  engagements  near 
Kafllr  Kraal,  491 ; victory  of,  exaggerated, 
496  = 

Badenhorst,  Field  Comet,  captured,  539  ; farm 
of,  burned,  582 

Baden-Powell,  General,  defense  of  Mafeking 
by,  177-181  ; employs  Kaffirs,  109 ; letter 
from,  to  General  Snyman,  181 ; sends  tracks 
laden  with  dynamite  against  Boers,  99  ; op- 
erations of,  at  Rustenburg,  441,  4^ ; men- 
tioned, 93,  454 


Bakathla  tribe  aid  British  against  the  Boers, 
172-175 

Balfour,  Mr.  A.  J.,  on  employment  of  native 
auxiliaries,  171,  502 
Bantjes,  Collector  of  Taxes,  138 
Baralong  natives,  employment  of,  169, 177 
Barendsen,  Captain,  334 
Barkly  East,  number  of  Boer  allies  from,  238, 
239.  Map,  7/ 

Barnard,  Mr.,  member  of  Yolksraad,  422 ; at 
Deredepoort,  174 

Barton,  General,  battle  with  De  Wet,  465 
Basutos  revolt  against  English,  7 
Bateson,  English  soldier,  175 
Baumann,  Dr.,  Landrost  of  Hoopstad,  499 
Beacon  Hill,  engagement  at,  247 
Beaston,  General,  507 

Beaufort  West,  train  derailed  at,  511;  fight 
near,  555.  Map,  5g 

Bedford  district  raided  by  Kritzinger,  489. 
Map,  7g' 

Begbio  foundry  in  Johannesburg,  313 ; dyna- 
mite explosion  in,  315 
Beira,  Australian  troops  landed  at,  440 
Beit,  Alfred,  27 

Belfast,  Lord  Roberts  moves  to,  455 ; Viljoen 
leads  attack  on,  477 ; captured  from  British, 
550.  Map,  Sc 

Belmont,  battle  of,  185,  186,  188-193  ; Boer 
losses  at,  192  ; mentioned,  85,  183.  M^ap,  6e 
Benson,  Colonel,  defeated  by  Botha  atBraken- 
laagte,  534-536,  562 

Bergendal,  attack  of  Boers  on,  455.  Map, 
451 

Berginderlyn,  British  attacked  at,  541 
Best,  Lieutenant,  of  Inniskillings,  surrender  of, 
378,  379 

Besters  Station,  skirmish  at,  143,  144.  Map, 
8e 

Bethel.  Map,  8d 

Bethesda,  British  scouts  captured  near,  514 
Bethlehem,  engagement  at,  448.  Map,  8e 
Bethulie  commando  at  Stormberg,  236. 
Map,  6/ 

Bevendam,  British  convoy  ambushed  at,  537 
Beyers,  Commandant,  engagement  at  Heck- 
poort,  448 ; raids  Johannesburg  racecourse, 
478 ; attacks  British  camp  in  Pletersburg, 
551  ; mentioned,  504,  509 
Biggarsberg  Range,  407.  Map,  107 
Birmingham,  Boer  arms  and  ammunition  pur- 
chased in,  66 

Blaaukrantz,  capture  of  armored  train  at,  243, 
244 ; fighting  at,  491 

Blaaukrantz  Spruit,  engagement  near,  371. 
Map,  107 

Black  Watch  at  Magersfontein,  217, 221 ; losses 
of,  222 


596 


INDEX 


Blake,  John  Franklin,  Colonel  of  Blake's  Irish 
Brigade,  318,  319  ; commands  Irish  Brigade 
at  Modderspruit,  147  ; suggests  use  of  dyna- 
mite at  Ladysmith,  290  ; remains  in  Boer 
service,  461  ; wounded,  152  ; mentioned,  160, 
479 

Blake’s  Irish  Brigade,  at  Colenso,  257  ; covers 
retreat  of  Botha  past  Ladysmith,  382 ; men- 
tioned, 115,  121,  433,  434 
Blaubank,  capture  of  British  convoy  at,  386. 
Map,  190 

Blignaut,  Piet,  robbed  after  death,  139 
Blockhouse  near  Brandfort  rushed,  513 
Blockhouses,  to  be  built,  493 ; failure  of,  658 
Bloemfontein,  first  object  of  attack,  84 ; occu- 
pied by  British,  401 ; British  rest  at,  431. 
Map,  7e 

Bloemhof.  Map,  6tf 
Blunt,  Private,  shooting  of,  515 
“ Bob,”  native  scout,  shot,  591 
Bodenstein,  Assistant  Commandant,  139 
Boer,  armaments,  British  knowledge  of,  56-59 
commandants,  location  of,  for  winter  cam- 
paign, 1901,  509  ; and  English  Governments, 
comparison  of,  22-24  ; forces,  disposition  of, 
226 ; forces,  disposition  of,  at  commence- 
ment of  war,  83,  84  ; forces  at  Modderspruit, 
147 ; forces  at  Stormberg,  strength  of,  233  ; 
officers  who  surrendered  at  Paardeberg, 
names  of,  398  ; women,  aggressive  spirit  of, 
77 ; women,  aid  rendered  by,  to  De  Wet, 
409 

Boers,  settlement  of,  in  South  Africa,  1 ; Eng- 
lish Convention  of  1852  with  the,  7, 8;  Cham- 
berlain’s opinion  of,  in  1881,  10  ; Froude  on 
character  of,  36,  37  ; characteristics  of  the, 
37-39  ; and  British,  comparison  of  patriot- 
ism of,  77,  78;  administrative  ability  of 
the,  79-81 : military  system  of  the,  70, 
276 ; mistakes  of,  at  beginning  of  war,  93  ; 
wounded,  killed  by  Lancers  at  Elandslaagte, 
135-137;  slanderous  charges  against,  193,196; 
treatment  of  wounded,  after  Enslin,  ,197 ; 
bayoneting  of  wounded,  at  Modder  River, 
206  ; London  “ Globe  ” on  character  of,  208; 
number  of  Afrikanders  on  side  of,  238-240  ; 
number  of,  surrendered  at  Paardeberg,  397  ; 
effects  of  Cronje’s  surrender  on,  432-434; 
how  able  to  continue  fighting,  476 ; accused 
of  inhuman  treatment  of  wounded  at  Vlak- 
fontein,  502,  503,  507  ; in  concentration 
camps,  number  of,  July,  1901,  512  ; losses 
of,  up  to  Paardeberg,  405;  total  casualties  of, 
during  the  war,  582,  584;  number  of,  in  war, 
581;  at  Abram’s  Kraal,  401;  at  Belmont, 
192;  at  Brakeiilaagte,  462;  at  Colenso,  277; 
at  second  battle  of  Colenso,  379  : at  Elands- 
laagte, 135,  141;  at  Magersfontein,  222;  at 
Modder  River,  205,  206  ; at  Nicholson’s  Kop, 
160;  at  Paardeberg,  396,  397;  at  Stormberg, 
237  ; at  Talana  Hill,  116 
Bond  Ministry  at  Cape,  185 
Boomplaats,  7.  Map,  190 
Booth,  Private  Victor,  quoted  on  fight  as  Vlak- 
fontein,  503 

Border  Regiment  at  Colenso,  262,  263 
Boshof,  skirmish  near,  309,  110  ; election  held 
at,  493.  Map,  6« 

Boskop  Hill,  Creusot  gun  mounted  on,  87 
Bosman,  Commandant,  killed  at  Jacob8dal,463 
Bosmans  River,  Zulus  defeated  at,  5.  Map, 
107  (Bushman’s) 

Botha  (of  Boshof),  Field  Cornet,  103,  183 
Botha,  Lieutenant  C.,  168 
Botha,  Captain  Charles,  remarkable  encounter 
of,  505,  506  ; killed,  512 

Botha,  General  Christian,  interviews  with  Gen- 
eral Buller,  453, 454,  590, 591 ; operations  of,  in 
Ermelo  district,  464  ; attacks  British  in  Vry- 
heid  district,  469  ; attacks  Itala  Mount,  525, 
526;  kindness  of,  to  British  wounded  at  Itala, 


528 ; defeats  Colonel  Benson  at  Brakenlaagte, 

534,  535  ; engagement  near  Standerton,  545  ; 
referred  to,  455,  477,  478,  485,  498,  509 

Botha,  General  Louis,  sketch  of  hie  life,  161- 
164 ; Villebois-Mareuil’s  opinion  of,  304 ; com- 
mands Meyer’s  forces  at  Modderspruit,  149  ; 
relieves  General  Meyer,  241 ; captures  armored 
train  near  Frere,  243  ; report  on  engagement 
at  Willow  Grange,  247,  248  ; in  command  at 
Colenso,  251-274 ; reports  of  battle  of  Co- 
lenso by,  271,  273 ; on  Boer  artillery  at  Co- 
lenso, *281 ; letter  on  death  of  Colonel  Ville- 
bois  Mareuil,  311 ; opposes  Warren’s  advance 
near  Acton  Homes,  338 ; in  command  at 
Spion  Kop,  342-355 ; on  artillery  service  at 
Spion  Kop,  343 ; his  main  reason  for  not 
attacking  Warren’s  retreat,  350;  reaches 
Vaal  Krantz,  368 ; account  of  battle  of  Vaal 
Krantz  by,  370  ; narrow  escape  of,  ^0 ; di- 
rects despatch  of  war  material  from  Pretoria, 
435,  437 ; correspondence  with  Lord  Kitch- 
ener, 488  ; engagement  at  Bronkhorstspruit, 
448 ; reply  to  Lord  Roberts  on  Boer  methods 
of  warfare,  457,  458 ; proclamation  against 
lying  reports  of  British,  461,  462 ; attacks 
Helvetia,  473,  474  ; attacks  Smith-Dorrien  at 
Bothwell,  485,  486  ; invited  to  conference  by 
Kitchener,  487, 488;  proclamation  to  Boers  on 
British  peace  terms,  489  ; letter  to  Kitchener 
asking  leave  to  consult  Kruger,  496,  497 ; 
farm  of,  burned,  500,  588, 589  : defeats  Major 
Gough,  524 ; defeats  Colonel  Benson  at  Brak- 
enlaagte, 534-536  ; reported  wounded,  539  ; 
degrades  General  Smuts,  552 ; circular  on 
treatment  of  burghers  who  have  surrendered, 
586-587;  complains  of  destruction  of  Boer 
farms,  588-589;  in  peace  negotiations,  574, 577; 
referred  to,  337,  422,  432,  459,  492, 509, 5:32, 546 
Botha,  M.,  attacks  British  at  Tafelkop,  541, 542 
Botha,  Mrs.  Louis,  carriage  to  be  provided  for, 
457 

Botha,  General  Philip,  mentioned,  161,  393, 
577  ; message  to  Cronje,  390  ; aids  De  Wet 
at  Poplars  Grove,  400 ; attacks  convoy  at 
Lindley,  447  ; killed,  490 
Botha’s  Pass,  102.  Map,  107 
Bothaville,  De  Wet  defeated  at,  466 : raid  on, 
539 

Bothwell,  Smith-Dorrien  attacked  at,  485,  486 
Bottomley,  Colonel,  501 
Bourgeois,  M.,  46 

Boxburg  commando,  254  ; surrender  of,  494. 
Map,  8(f 

Brabant’s  Horse,  492 ; party  of,  surprised  at 
Zastron,  469 

Brakenlaagte,  Colonel  Benson  defeated  at,  534, 

535,  5.39,  546,  562 

Brakfontein,  attack  on  hills  near,  366.  Map, 
107 

Brand, , son  of  ex-President,  wounded  at 

Vaal  Krantz,  370 

Brand,  George,  invades  Cape  Colony,  472  ; 
captures  British  in  Cape  Colony,  492 ; men- 
tioned, 370,  482,  509,  513 
Brandfort,  De  Wet  at,  409  ; De  la  Rey  forced 
back  from,  433 ; blockhouse  near,  rushed. 
513.  Map,  7« 

Brandspruit.  Map,  7f 
Brandwacht  on  Spion  Kop,  surprise  of,  340 
Brandwater  region,  General  Prinsloo  sur- 
rounded in,  448 

Bremersdorp  captured  by  Smuts,  512  ; burning 
of  town  of,  587.  Map,  9ti 
Bridgeford,  Major,  541 
Bridges  guarded,  85 
Bridle  Drift.  Map,  107 
Briel,  Field  Cornet,  171 

British,  and  Boers,  comparison  of  patriotism 
of,  77,  78 ; troops  in  Natal  at  commence- 
ment of  war,  82  ; number  of,  in  Kimberley, 
183 ; total  number  of,  employed  in  the  war. 


INDEX 


597 


583  ; total  casualities  of,  during  the  war, 
583-584;  cost  to,  of  the  war,  583;  dead  im- 
perfectly buried  at  Magersfontein,  223  ; 
fosses  at  Colenso,  275 ; at  second  battle  of 
Colenso,  379  ; at  Elandslaagte,  141  ; at 
Magersfontein,  222;  at  Modderspruit  and 
Nicholson's  Kop,  159  ; at  Talana  Hill,  117 
Britz,  Commandant,  attacks  British  at  Bergin- 
derlyn,  541 

Broadwood,  General,  commands  British  at 
Sannas  Post,  412-419  ; pursues  He  'Wet  and 
Steyn,  449  ; surprises  Steyu  at  Reitz,  510  ; 
mentioned,  469,  470 
Broeksma,  Mr.,  shot  for  treason.  530 
Bronkhorstspruit,  engagement  at,  448  ; attack 
on  Boer  laager  near,  514  ; Scots  Greys  sur- 
prised near,  544.  Map,  Sc 
Brunner,  Mr.,  letter  on  arming  of  natives,  501 
Buffalo  River,  ilap,  107 
Bulawayo,  171.  Map,  8a 
Buller,  General  Sir  Redvers,  arrival  in  Natal, 
251  ; at  battle  of  Colenso,  260-274  ; joined 
by  General  Warren,  337  ; forward  move- 
ment of,  after  Colenso.  338 ; held  back  at 
Vaal  Krantz,  369  ; second  attempt  on  Colenso 
by,  372-382 ; meeting  with  Lord  Roberts, 
448  ; follows  Lord  Roberts  to  Belfast,  455  ; 
interview  with  Christian  Botha,  453,  454 ; 
burning  of  General  Botha’s  farm  by,  589  ; 
relieved  of  command  of  First  Army  Corps, 
532  ; referred  to,  186,  454,  459 
Bullock,  Colonel,  action  of,  at  Colenso,  283  ; 
at  Colenso,  270,  271 

Bulwana  Hill,  287,  288,  297 ; hospital  camp 
near,  285,  293.  Map,  107 
Burdett-Coutts,  Sir.,  336 
Burger,  General  (see  Schalk  Burger) 

Burgher  force  of  Orange  Free  State,  63 
Burghersdorp,  commando  of,  at  Stormberg, 
23-3,  236  ; number  of  Boer  allies  from,  238, 
a39  ; Commandant  Kritzinger  at,  473.  Map, 
7/ 

Burke  Hospital  in  Pretoria,  335 
Burnham,  John,  letter  on  “ cooked  ” accounts 
of  the  war,  536 

Butters,  Captain  “Sandy,”  defense  of  Elands 
River  post  by,  443 
Buurman,  Izaak,  591 
Byng,  Colonel,  attacked  by  He  Wht,  537 


Caesar's  Camp,  Boer  attack  on,  295,  298  ; Ville- 
bois-Mareuil  at,  305.  Map,  107 
Caledon  River.  Map,  7e 
Calvinia,  fight  at,  544  ; district,  British  detach- 
ment drivhn  back  in,  555.  Map,  Zf 
Camps,  concentration,  creation  of.  468  ; causes 
leading  to  origin  of,  585,  586,  588 ; number 
of  Boers  in,  Jiiiy,  1901,  512  ; mortality  of, 
547  ; Canon  Gore  on  infant  mortality  in,  533 
Cannon  Kopje,  Mafeking,  180 
Cape  Colony,  first  act  of  British  aggression  in, 
1 ; settlement  of  Boers  in,  1.  2 ; martial  law 
proclaimed  in.  467  ; invaded,  496  ; second 
invasion  of,  465,  472  ; He  Wet's  expedition 
into,  483  ; Boer  movements  in,  530  ; J.  C. 
Smuts’  expedition  into,  573 
Cape  Town,  fears  for  safety  of,  475.  477,  481  ; 

placed  under  martial  law.  Map,  Zg 
Capitalists  in  Johannesburg,  their  methods,  28 
Carleton,  Colonel,  152  ; at  Modderspruit,  148  ; 

surrenders  at  Nicholson’s  Kop,  157 
Carnarvon,  Boers  active  in.  475 
Carolina  burghers  at  Spion  Kop,  ,340,  342,  347  ; 

names  of,  killed  at  Spion  Kop,  351 
Carolina  district,  492  ; fighting  in,  478.  Map, 
Zd 

Carrington,  General,  character  of  Australian 
troops  of.  440,  441,  453  ; evacuation  of  Zee- 
rust  by,  442,  443 
Cartwright,  Mr.,  493 


Cavalry,  Colonel  Von  Braun’s  opinion  of  Brit- 
ish, 331 

Celliers,  Jacob,  at  Colesberg,  359 
Celliers,  Commandant  Jan,  at  Spion  Kop,  .344, 
345 ; at  battle  of  Abram’s  Kraal,  400,  401  ; 
mentioned.  540, 547 
Cemetery  Hill.  Map,  107 
Censor,  British  military,  the,  and  his  work,  105 
Cetewayo,  Zulu  chief,  108 
Chamberlain,  Joseph,  on  Boers  in  1881, 10  ; on 
limits  of  British  interference  in  Transvaal, 
44  ; his  reply  to  Sir  Edward  Clarke,  48  ; on 
employment  of  natives,  171  ; German  denun- 
ciation of,  for  Edinburgh  speech,  533  ; Ger- 
man Chancellor's  reply  to  Edinburgh  speech 
of,  546  ; amends  Kitchener’s  terms  to  Botha, 
488  ; on  origin  of  concentration  camps,  585, 
586 ; defends  burning  of  Boer  farms,  590  ; 
mentioned,  84,  404,  530,  531,  570 
Chapman,  Colonel,  report  on  defense  of  Itala 
Mount,  526,  527 

Charges  of  corruption  against  Transvaal  Gov- 
ernment, 25-29 

Charlestown,  87,  102.  Map,  Zd 
Chicago,  Irish-American  contingent  from,  325, 
327 

Chieveley,  251,  252.  Map,  107 
Churchill,  Winston,  capture  of,  244,  245 
City  of  London  Volunteers,  return  home  of,  466 
Clanwilliam,  477.  Map,  3g' 

Clarke,  Sir  Edward,  on  the  British  demands,  48 
Clements,  General,  in  command  at  Rensberg, 
362  ; surprised  at  Nooitgedacht,  469,  410  ; 
mentioned,  358,  448,  474 
Clery,  General,  at  Colenso,  262 
Coetzee,  Commandant,  524 
Coghill,  Vyvian,  account  of  battle  of  Elauds- 
laagte  by,  134,  135 

Colenso,  battle  of,  251,  274 ; description  of 
battle-ground  at,  252  ; determining  factor  in 
battie  of,  280  ; disposition  of  Boer  forces  at, 
254,  256,  257;  British  losses  at,  272,  275;  Boer 
losses  at,  272,  277  ; Buller’s  second  attempt 
on,  372-^2.  Map,  8e 

Colesberg,  Boer  allies  from,  number  of,  238, 
2.39  ; situation  of,  357 ; campaign  around, 
356-.364 ; flisht  of  “treason  court”  from, 
472.  Map,  6/ 

Coleskop,  assault  on,  by  British,  ,360,  361 
Colley,  General,  mention  of,  87,  89 
Colvile,  General,  convoy  for,  captured,  445  ; 

mentioned,  418,  446,  477 
Concentration  camps.  See  Camps,  concentra- 
tion 

Connaught  Rangers,  at  Colenso,  262,  263,  265 ; 
at  Pieter’s  Hill,  376 

Conroy,  Commandant,  captures  convoy  near 
Kimberley,  522 

Convention  of  1852,  terms  of,  7,  8 
Cooper,  Colonel,  attacked  by  He  Villiers,  242 

Coruua , alleged  plot  of,  to  kidnap  Lord 

Roberts,  452  ; executed,  453 
Cornulier,  Rear-Admiral,  302 
Corringe,  Colonel.  489 ; engagement  near 
S,eyhsburg  by,  514 

Corruption,  charges  of,  against I'ransvaal  Gov- 
ernment, 25-29 

Cossacks  in  Boer  service,  333,  ,3.34 
Coster,  Dr.  Hermans,  his  body  robbed  by  Brit- 
ish, 140 

Courtney,  Mr.  Leonard,  quoted,  404 
Courts  in  Transvaal.  18,  19 
Crabbe,  Colonel,  attacked  near  Cradock,  511 
Cradock,  Boers  active  in,  475 ; fight  at,  511  ; 
district  of,  invaded  by  Commandant  Wes- 
sels,  549.  Map,  6g 
Cremer,  Mrs.,  treatment  of,  516,  517 
Creusot  guns  of  the  Boers,  67,  68 ; at  Lady- 
smith, effects  of,  288 
Crewe,  Major,  ambushed,  480,  481 
Crofton,  Major,  killed,  555 


598 


INDEX 


Cronje,  General  Andries,  operations  of,  144, 
145;  at  Nicholson’s  Kop,  154,  156;  at  battle  of 
Sannas  Post,  410,415,417;  covers  retreat  of 
De  Wet  to  Poplar  Grove,  393, 394 ; at  Fourteen 
Streams,  432  ; captured,  510  ; son  of,  killed, 
395  ; mentioned,  182,  365,  386 
Cronje, General  Piet,  sketch  of  his  life,  198-200; 
brevity  of  his  despatches,  95 ; carried  no 
weapons  in  the  battle-field,  99 ; Villebois- 
Mareuil’s  opinion  of,  305  ; treatment  of  pris- 
oners proposed  by,  101  ; complains  against 
arming  of  natives,  169  ; entrusted  with  opera- 
tions south  of  Kimberley, 186  ; investment  of 
Mafeking  by,  177-180;  at  battleof  Magersfon- 
tein,  210-224;  first  discovers  enemy’s  advance 
at  Magersfontein,  215,  216 ; speech  of,  at 
Magersfontein,  214,  215  ; report'on  battle  of 
Magersfontein,  222;  inactio’,;  of,  after  Magers- 
fontein, 371,  383,  886  : comiiiands  at  Modder 
River,  200-208  ; attempt  to  cross  the  Modder 
frustrated,  395,  396 ; entrenches  himself  at 
Paardeberg,  389  ; urged  to  break  through 
English  lines  at  Paardeberg,  389,  390 ; sur- 
render of,  at  Paardeberg,  380,  396  ; proclama- 
tion by  President  Kruger  on  surrender  of, 
382 ; effects  of  surrender  of,  on  the  Boers, 
432,  433,  434  ; army  of,  at  Wolfe  Spruit,  388  ; 
careless  scouting  of,  384  ; made  subordinate 
to  Ignaas  Ferreira,  384 ; his  seat  in  Volks- 
raad,  422 ; references  to,  29,  30,  35,  85,  93,  94, 
193,  407 

Cunningham,  General,  at  Ventersdorp,  478, 
479 

Dalgetty,  Colonel,  465  ; at  Wepener,  420 
Dalmanutha,  278  ; British  ambushed  near,  455, 
456.  Map,  451 

Damant,  Colonel,  attacked  at  Tafelkop,  541 
Dannhauser,  British  outpost  at,  103,  104;  evac- 
uated, 120.  Map,  9e 

Dartneil,  Colonel,  engagement  with  De  Wet, 
541  ; defeats  Groblaar,  492,  493 
Davey,  Private  S.,  quoted  on  fight  at  Vlakfon- 
tein,  503 

De  Aar  Junction,  important  British  base,  185  ; 
military  stores  at,  93 ; treatment  of  Boer 
prisoners  at,  207 ; relief  of,  227  ; referred  to, 
83,  85,  182.  Map,  5/ 

De  Burg,  Major,  surrender  of,  492 
DelagoaBay,  suggested  occupation  of,  47.  Map, 
10 

De  la  Eey,  General  Jacob  Hercules,  life  of,  98, 
99  ; treatment  of  wife  of,  568,  669  ; his  eldest 
son  killed,  205  ; home  of,  burned,  500  ; first 
victory  of  war  secured  by,  94  ; eulogized  by 
Lord  Roberts,  569  ; Villebois-Mareuil’s  opin- 
ion of,  306  ; compares  Roberts’  advance  to 
swarm  of  locusts,  371,  432  ; defeats  Colonel 
Anderson,  564;  determined  attack  on  Colonel 
Kekewich,  529,  630  ; running  fight  with  Me- 
thuen, 523  ; at  battle  of  Abram’s  Kraal,  400, 
401 ; at  Belmont,  188,  189 ; his  report  on 
battle  of  Belmont,  191 ; engagement  at 
Boschbult,  572,  573;  forced  back  from  Brand- 
fort,  433  ; takes  supreme  command  in  Coles- 
berg  district,  358,  384  ; summoned  to  aid  of 
Colesberg  Boers,  228  ; assails  Colonel  Hoare 
at  Elands  River,  442  ; at  battle  of  Enslin,  194- 
197  ; disaster  to,  at  KaiBr  Kraal,  491  ; in- 
vestment of  Kimberley  by,  182-187  ; defeats 
British  at  Kleinfontein,  532, 533  ; in  skirmish 
near  Klerksdorp,  522  ; delivers  smashing  at- 
tack on  Klerksdorp,  558-561  ; attacks  Lich- 
tenburg,  487,  488 ; selects  position  at  Mod- 
der River,  201  ; at  Modder  River,  201-203 ; 
report  on  battle  of  Modder  River  by,  205 ; 
engagement  at  Nitrai’s  Nek,  448,  449  ; opera- 
tions of,  after  Nitrai’s  Nek,  453 ; surprises 
General  Clements  at  Nooitgedacht,  469,  470  ; 
divines  plans  of  Roberts  on  Pretoria,  431 ; 
defeated  near  Pretoria,  477  ; in  engagement 


at  Eensberg  Siding,  362 ; defeat  and  capture 
of  Methuen  at  Eooikraal  by,  565-569 ; suc- 
ceeds Prinsloo  in  command  at  Rooilaagte, 
194  ; shuts  Baden-Poweli  within  Rustenburg, 
442  ; at  Slingusfontein,  863  ; active  in  West- 
ern Transvaal,  469  ; attacks  Ventersdorp, 
478  ; captures  Vryburg,  182  ; in  peace  nego- 
tiations, 574,  577;  mentioned,  92,  357,  393, 
422,  454,  475,  509 

De  la  Rey,  Mrs.,  British  treatment  of,  568,  569 
Deredepoort,  72,  85  ; attack  on  Boer  women  at, 
171-176  ; list  of  murdered,  etc.,  at,  176 
De  Souza,  Mr.,  Secretary  to  Pretoria  War  Otfice, 
245 

De  Villiers,  Commandant,  engagement  by, 
242  ; at  storming  of  Piatrand,  294,  296,  298, 
299  ; defeats  British  near  Hoopstad,  464 
Devonshire  Regiment  at  Colenso,  270 
De  Wet,  General  Christian,  sketch  of  his  life, 
164-167  ; burning  of  home  of,  500,  585  ; re- 
places Prinsloo,  384 ; succeeds  Ferreira  as 
Commandant  General,  393  ; aid  rendered  to, 
by  Boer  women,  409  ; attempted  capture  of, 
454  ; number  of  columns  engaged  in  capture 
of,  552-555  ; false  accusations  against,  586  ; 
issues  appeal  to  Boers  to  continue  fighting, 
409,  410  ; activity  of,  in  rear  of  Roberts,  447; 
obtains  fresh  suijply  of  horses,  483 ; issues 
proclamation  against  British  methods  of  war- 
fare, 484  ; issues  manifesto  to  burghers,  497, 
498  ; treatment  of  Boer  envoys,  477  ; engage- 
ment with  Colonel  Dartneil,  541 ; complains 
of  destruction  of  Boer  farms,  582,  583 ; de- 
feats Major  Pitcher,  480,  481 ; doubling  tac- 
tics of,  481 ; captures  convoy  at  Blau  bank, 
386 ; severely  defeated  at  Bothavilie,  466  ; de- 
feats British  at  Dewetsdorp,  468  ; fights  Gen- 
eral Elliot  near  Elands  Kop,  546  ; ambushes 
British  near  Picksburg,  445 ; escapes  from 
British  at  Heilbron,  465 ; attacks  Colonel 
Byng  near  Heilbron,  537  ; attack  on  Colonel 
Wilson  near  Heilbron,  538  ; captures  convoy 
near  Kroonstad,  449 ; defeats  British  near 
Ladybrand,  517  ; defeats  General  Knox  at 
Lindley,  476,  477 ; wins  battle  of  Nichol- 
son’s Kop,  153-159  ; operations  of,  round 
Paardeberg,  389,  390  ; onslaught  on  British 
at  Paardeberg,  392,  393  ; driven  back  at  Pop- 
lars Grove,  899,  400 ; proposes  fight  to  a 
finish  at  IPretoria,  428 ; captures  British 
force  at  Reddersberg,  419,  420  ; engagement 
with  General  Elliot  near  Reitz,  505 ; vic- 
tory of,  at  Sannas  Post,  412-419 ; renews 
activity  in  Senekal  district,  462;  escajies  from 
General  Knox  in  Thabanchu  district,  473, 
472 ; captures  stores  at  Tweefontein,  542  ; 
holds  Waterfall  Drift,  385;  besieges  Wepener, 
420 ; in  peace  negotiations,  574,  577,  580; 
minor  references  to,  144,  145,  182,  199,  388, 
448,  475,  478,  492,  509,  532,  568 
De  Wet,  Mrs.,  167;  detained  in  concentration 
camp,  552 

De  Wet,  Piet,  167,  410;  supersedes  General 
Schoeman,  357,  358;  in  engagement  at  Coles- 
berg, 359,  360 ; at  battle  of  Sannas  Post, 
415-418  ; surrender  of,  488 
Dewetsdorp,  418 ; British  defeated  at,  468. 
Map,  7e 

Dingaan,  Zulu  chief,  attacks  Boers,  4,  5 
“Diugaan’s  Day,”  5,  540 
Diniznlu,  Zulu  chief,  108 
Dirks,  Justus,  138 
“ Disloyal  Colonists,”  64 
Dixon,  General,  in  battle  at  Vlakfontein,  502 
Donegal,  Major,  letter  to  Boer  Secretary  of 
State  from,  140 

Donkin,  Corpora!  6.,  account  of  siege  of 
Hoopstad  by,  498,  499 

Dooley,  Mr.,  comments  on  Lord  Kitchener’s 
banishment  proclamation,  513 
Doorcbosch,  Boer  attack  on,  537,  538 


INDEX 


599 


Doomfonteln,  fight  at,  546 

Doom  Kop,  3k) ; Boer  Long  Tom  on,  366,  367; 

Cronje’8  action  at,  200.  Sap,  107 
Dordrecht,  number  of  Boer  allies  from,  238. 
3Iap,  7/ 

Douthaite,  Field  Comet,  390 

Dowell,  Major,  killed  at  Vereeniging,  556,  557 

Drakensberg  4,  6.  Map, 

Drew,  Eev.Dewdney  \Vm.,  protest  by,  against 
execution  of  Scheepers,  548 
Drieling  Hill,  34)3,  347 
Drankenness  in  Transvaal,  23 
Dublin  Fusiliers  at  Colenso,  262-265 
Dum-dum  bullets  found  in  possession  of 
British,  95,  lai,  177, 181 
Dundee,  82  ; British  position  at,  103  ; descrip- 
tion of  town  of,  105  ; unwise  selection  of,  as 
a British  base,  110  ; British  motives  for 
holding.  111 ; Boer  attack  on  British  at, 
111-119 ; taken  possession  of  by  Erasmus, 
124.  Map,  9e 

Dnndonaid,  Lord,  raises  siege  of  Ladysmith, 
380 

Du  Plessis,  Commandant,  mention  of,  172,  183 
Du  Plooy,  Commandant,  228 
Du  Ploo'y,  Field  Cornet,  233 ; at  Stormherg, 
236 

Du  Preez,  Field  Comet,  171,  172 ; at  Vaal 
Krantz,  367  ; at  defense  of  Pieter’s  HiU,  380 
Durban.  Map,  7« 

Du  Toit,  Free  State  General,  referred  to,  187, 
305,  385,  388 

Du  Toit,  Lieutenant  Mike,  heroism  of,  119; 

at  Ladysmith,  288 
Du  Toit,  Rev.  Mr.,  214 

Dynamite  used  against  Boers,  99 ; proposed 
use  of,  at  Ladysmith,  290 


Eager,  Colonel,  mortally  wounded,  236 
Early,  English  photographer,  murdered,  174, 
176 

East  London,  placed  under  martial  law,  530. 
Map, 

“East  London  Despatch”  on  British  garrison 
at  Stormherg,  231 

Education,  condition  of,  in  South  African 
Republic,  13, 14 
Elands  Kop,  fight  near,  546 
Elandslaagte,  battle  of,  126-141  ; description 
of  battlefield,  130 ; British  soldiers  buried  by 
Boers  at,  146  ; “pig-sticking”  of,  171,  214  ; 
mentions,  171,  284.  Map,  9e 
Elands  River,  fight  at,  524;  Colonel  Hoare  as- 
sailed at,  442,  443.  Map,  230 
Elandsprait,  Colonel  Park  attacked  at,  541 
Elliot,  General,  engagement  with  DeWet,  near 
Reitz,  505 ; fights  De  Wet  near  Elands  Kop, 
546 

Eloff,  Sarel,  attempted  capture  of  Mafeking 
by,  438440 

Emmet,  Cherrie,  at  Colenso,  270 ; in  command 
at  Fort  Wylie,  254;  defeats  British  at 
Nqutu,  512 ; mentioned,  283, 509,  540 
England,  Convention  with  Boers  in  1852  by,  7, 
8 ; final  answer  of,  to  Transvaal's  demands, 
53,  54 

English  and  Boer  Governments,  comparison 
of,  22-24 

English  language,  teaching  of,  in  Transvaal,  14 
Enslin,  Battle  of,  19^196.  Map,  190 
Erasmus,  Major,  organizer  of  Staats  Artillery, 
330;  in  charge  of  artillery  against  Ladysmith, 
288 

Erasmus,  Commandant  Daniel,  577 ; account 
of,  109;  advances  against  Glencoe,  104 ; takes 
possession  of  Dundee,  124 ; failure  of,  at 
Talana  Hill,  112, 117  ; incapacity  of,  122, 123, 
146;  movements  of  his  commando,  120;  re- 
ported mortally  wounded,  514 ; capture  of, 
544 


Ermelo  held  by  Smuts,  486 ; Boer  laager  near, 
surprised,  546.  Map,  Od 
Ermelo  district.  General  Botha  in,  476 
Erroll,  Lord,  499 

Estcourt,  dash  on,  241,  245-250.  Map,  8e 
Executive,  the  Transvaal,  29 
Explosion,  dynamite,  in  Begbie’s  foundry  in 
Johannesburg,  315 

Fagerskold,  Baron  Helge,  334 ; killed  at  Ma- 
gersfontein,  217,  219 

Fahey,  Michael,  killed  at  Vaal  Krantz,  368 
Farms,  burning  of,  456-459,  467,  588-591  ; in 
Marico  River  district,  532  ; parliamentary  re- 
turn on,  499,  500;  vindictiveness  of,  452 
Farquhar’s  farm,  149.  Map,  107 
Fauresmith  commando  at  Belmont,  189.  Map,  6/ 
Ferreira,  Ignaas,  appointed  chief  commandant 
Orange  Free  State  forces,  384  ; accidentally 
killed,  392,  .393;  referred  to,  187,  385,  388,  389 
Ficksburg,  farm-burning  near,  445.  Map  7e 
Fielding,  Lieutenant,  527;  on  kindness  of  Boers 
to  wounded  at  Itala,  5^ 

Fingo  natives,  employment  of,  169 
Firman,  Colonel,  stores  captured  from,  642 
Fischer,  Mr.,  on  execution  of  Scheepers,  551 
Fitzclarence,  Captain,  169 
Flygare,  Field  Cornet,  leader  of  Scandinavian 
Corps,  211,  334  ; at  Magersfontein,  217 ; 
kilied,  219 

Forces,  permanent,  of  Transvaal,  60 
Foreign  legion,  formation  of,  under  Villebois- 
MareuU,  306,  307;  Europeans  of  note  in,  330, 
331 

Foreign  volunteers  in  Boer  commandoes,  65 
Fort  Prospect,  Boer  attack  on,  525,  526  ; Boer 
losses  at,  562 

Fort  Wylie,  Boer  occupation  of,  254 ; British 
attack  on,  260,  264 

Forts  of  Pretoria  and  Johannesburg,  312,  330 
Fouche,  Commandant,  defeats  British  post 
near  Aliwal  North,  511;  referred  to,  491,  492, 
509,  530 

Fourie,  Commandant,  491,  577;  defense  of 
Grobler’s  Kloof  by,  373,  374;  killed  at  Mach- 
ododorp,  464 

Fourteen  Streams,  British  troops  sent  to,  431 ; 

Andreis  Cronje  at,  432.  Map,  6e 
Franchise,  residental,  for  aliens,  44 
Franco-German  War,  referred  to,  407;  Cham- 
berlain’s allusion  to  German  behavior  in,  533 
Frankfort,  engagement  near,  549.  Map, 
Fraserbnrg,  fight  near,  555.  Map,  if 
Frederickstad,  454.  Map,  7d 
French,  General,  De  Wet’s  opinion  of,  167; 
attempted  capture  of  Louis  Botha,  484-487  ; 
movements  of  columns  of,  494, 495 ; in  charge, 
in  Cape  Colony,  510;  operations  of,  in  Cape 
Coiony,  512;  engagement  at  Colesberg,  359, 
360;  his  plan  of  attack  at  Elandslaagte,  131, 
132;  operations  of,  in  Ermelo  district,  464; 
relief  of  Kimberley  by,  384,  385 ; at  Modder- 
spmlt,  148,  151;  seizes  hill  and  drift  at  Paar- 
deberg,  388;  arrival  of,  at  Naauwpoort,  357; 
skirmish  with  Boers  east  of  Pretoria,  437; 
operations  of,  in  North  Transvaal,  492;  men- 
tioned, 226,  474,  556 

Frere,  capture  of  armored  train  near,  243. 
Map,  8e 

Froneman,  Commandant,  at  Klip  Drift,  386; 
encourages  Cronje  at  Paardeberg';  393,  394  ; 
mentioned,  388, 483 

Froude,  J.  A.,  on  English  treatment  of  the 
Boers,  2;  on  breach  of  treaty  of  Aliwal 
North,  8;  on  character  of  Boers,  36,  37 


Galapaud,  Lieutenant,  military  correspondent, 
256 

Galway,  Lieutenant,  144 
Ganetzky,  Count  Alexis  de,  335 


600 


INDEX 


Gatacre,  General,  advance  on  Stormberg  by, 
231,  232 ; severe  measures  of,  229 ; referred 
to,  225,  226,  420 

Gatsrand  Hills,  attack  on  British  on,  479 
Geduld,  Kruger’s  farm,  27 
German  Corps  of  Volunteers,  329-332;  at 
Elandslaagte,  131,  135 

Girls  imprisoned  for  aiding  Boers,  523  ; im- 
prisoned for  singing  Boer  anthem,  544 
Glencoe,  British  at,  82,  103-106.  Map,  9e 
“ Globe,”  London  newspaper,  on  character  of 
the  Boers,  208  ; on  impedimenta  of  British 
officers,  5^ 

Gloucester  Regiment  at  Eeitfontein,  145 
Gold  mines  of  Transvaal,  27 
Goodyear,  Captain,  169 

Gordon  Highlanders  at  Magersfontein,  219, 

220,  221 

Gore,  Canon,  on  infant  mortality  in  concentra- 
tion camps,  533 

Gough,  Colonel,  commands  British  at  Belmont, 
186 ; Major,  defeated  at  Scheeper’s  Nek, 
524,  526 

Graspan,  191,  194 ; alleged  shooting  of  sur- 
rendered British  at,  515-517.  Map,  6e 
Greene,  Conynghame,  British  agent  at  Pre- 
toria, 45,  47  ; presents  final  answer  of  British 
Government,  53,  54 
Grenfell  pursues  He  la  Eey,  562,  564 
Grey,  Adjutant,  wounded  at  Colenso,  283 
Grimwood,  General,  at  Modderspruit,  151 
Griqualand  West,  Boer  allies  from,  number  of, 
238  239 

Grobblaar,  Field  Comet,  390 
Groblaar,  General  E.  R.,  233;  casnalities  in 
commando  of,  at  Stormberg,  237  ; retreat  of, 
to  Kroonstad,  410 ; defeated,  492,  493 ; at- 
tacks Fort  Prospect,  525,  526  ; at  Klippan, 
557  ; references  to,  85,  227,  228,  509,  535,  538 
Grower’s  Kloof,  294;  held  by  Boers,  373. 
Map,  107 

Grondwet,  the  Transvaal  fundamental  law,  16, 
17,  19,  72 

Groothuizen,  Lieutenant,  343 
Grunberg,  Leon,  services  of,  to  Boers,  311-316, 
333 

Gumbi,  Sergeant,  Zululand  police,  525 
Gun  Hill,  British  post  captured  at,  530 
Guns,  capture  of  British,  at  Colenso,  274 
Guttman,  Miss,  333 

Haartebeest  Hills,  564.  Map,  100 
Haartebeestfontein,  496.  Map,  100 
Haasbroek,  Commandant,  joins  He  Wet  in 
Thabanchu  district,  471,  472  ; is  killed, 
540 

Hague  Conference,  46 
Hall,  Major,  killed  at  Elandslaagte,  135 
Hamilton,  General,  at  Modderspruit,  151 ; 
skirmish  with  Boers  east  of  Pretoria,  437, 
447  ; defeats  Boers  at  Magaliesberg  Hills,  451 
Hamilton,  General  Bruce,  captures  Boers  in 
Ermelo  district,  544 ; surprises  Boer  laager 
near  Ermelo,  546  ; successor  of,  in  Ermelo 
district,  551 ; attacked  at  Winburg,  455;  men- 
tioned, 491,  535 

Hamilton,  General  Gilbert,  attack  on,  at  EUip- 
pan,  557 

Hamilton,  General  Jan,  relieves  Baden-Powell 
at  Rustenburg,  442, 454 

Harrismith,  85  ; Boer  prisoners  taken  at,  552  ; 
burghers’  losses  of,  at  Platrand,  298.  Map, 
8e 

Harrison,  Frederic,  on  trial  of  Mr.  Marais, 
536,  537 

Hart,  Genera],  division  of,  at  Colenso,  262, 264, 
265 

Hart’s  Brigade,  General,  attack  on  Pieter’s 
Hill  by,  374,  376,  377 
Harts  River,  Methuen  at,  565.  Map,  100 
Harvey,  Private,  shooting  of,  515 


Hassell,  Captain  John,  of  American  Volun- 
teers, 327 

Hawkshaw,  Captain,  battle  at  Richmond,  507 
Heckpoort,  defeat  of  Smith-Dorrien  at,  448 
Map,  100 

Heilbron,  escape  of  He  Wet  from,  465 ; re- 
markable encounter  near,  505,  506  ; Kitch- 
ener’s Scouts  ambushed  near,  531  ; Colonel 
Byng  attacked  near,  537  ; He  Wet  attacks 
Colonel  Wilson  near,  538  ; commando  at 
Colesberg,  360.  Map,  8d 
Helpmaakar.  Map,  107 
Helvetia  attacked  by  Louis  Botha,  473,  474  ; 

Boer  victory  at,  477.  Map,  7e 
Henderson,  Colonel,  fights  battle  at  Nqutu, 
612 

Henniker,  Colonel,  at  trial  of  Commandant 
Scheepers,  547 

Hertzog,  Judge  Qater  Commandant),  sketch 
of,  482,  483 ; invades  Cape  Colony,  472 ; 
located  at  Pauresmith,512;  captures  wagons 
at  Philippolis,  543 ; iii  peace  negotiations, 
574,  577;  referred  to,  475,  482,496,  563,  566 
Hesse,  Rev.  C.  A.  D.,  murdered  by  Australian 
Bushveldt  Carbineers,  572 
Highland  Brigade  at  Magersfontein,  215,  221 
Hildyard,  General,  242  ; division  of,  at  Colenso, 
263,  264,  266,  268  ; report  on  engagement  at 
Willow  Grange,  247 

Hinton, , services  of,  at  Tugela,  353,  354 

Hoare,  Colonel,  assailed  at  Elands  fever,  442  ; 

rescue  of,  453 
Hobbs’  Land  Farm,  144 
Hobhouse,  Miss  Emily,  refused  permission  to 
land  in  Cape  Town,  5.37 
Holland,  natives  of,  settle  in  South  Africa,  1,  2 
Hollander  Corps  of  Volunteers,  328,  329;  at 
Elandslaagte,  131 
Hunger’s  Poort,  338 

Honeynest  (Honingnest)  Kloof.  Map,  6« 
Hoopstad,  mission  of  Colonel  Villebois-Marenil 
to,  307 ; fight  near,  464 ; siege  of,  493  ; par- 
ticulars of  siege  of,  498,  499  ; relief  of,  478. 
Map,  7d 

Hopefield  district,  Boer  recruits  from,  532. 
Map,  3ff 

Hospital  at  Bulwana  Hill,  285,  293 
Hospitals,  English  mismanagement  of,  336 
Hughes,  Hugh  Price,  588 
Hu^enots  settle  in  South  Africa,  1 
Hunter,  General,  448 ; attempted  capture  of 
Long  Tom,  by,  291 ; surrender  of  General 
Prinsloo  to,  449 

Hutton,  General,  engagement  at  Bronkhorst- 
spruit,  448 


Identify  Department,  the  Boer,  276,  277 
Impatl  Hill,  description  of,  106  ; British  cap- 
tured at,  115  ; Commandant  Erasmus’  con- 
duct at,  122 

Impey,  Richard,  killed  at  Elandslaagte,  1.35 
Ingogo,  references  to  battle  at,  87,  108.  Map, 
8d 

Inhumanity  of  British  at  Elandslaagte,  137, 138; 
at  Talana,  138 

Inniskillings  at  Colenzo,  262, 263 ; at  attack  on 
Pieter’s  Hill,  376,  377 
Intombi  Spruit,  hospital  camp  near,  285 
Irish  Brigade,  Blake’s,  147,  317  ; organization 
of,  318 ; duty  assigned  to,  319 ; varied  ser- 
vices of,  320  ; average  muster  of,  322 ; their 
services  at  Modderspruit,  152  ; atLadysmith, 
action  of,  289,  290 

Irish  Brigade,  Second,  nationalities  composing, 
325  ; services  of,  322-325 
Irish  Hunt  Corps,  surrender  of,  at  Bindley,  445, 
446 

Itala  Mount,  attack  on,  by  General  Botha,  525- 
527  ; Boer  losses  at,  562 
Italian  Corps  of  Volunteers,  332, 333 


INDEX 


601 


Jackal  Tree  Fort,  British  attack  on,  169 
Jacobsdal,385  ; captured  by  De  Wet,  386  ; Free 
State  laager  at,  185  ; Boer  Red  Cross  service 
arrested  at,  392 ; captured  by  Commandant 
Bosnian,  462, 463  ; commando,  194.  Map,  6e 
Jagersfontein  attacked  by  Boers,  462 
Jameson,  Dr.,  mentioned,  9,  373 
Jameson  Raid,  referred  to,  41,  181,  199,  312, 
404,  557,  570 

Jamestown,  Cape  Colony,  surrendered  to  Boers, 
504 

Jarvis,  Captain,  4,  5 

Johannesburg,  city  of,  orderly  administration 
of,  12 ; capitalists  in,  27,  28  ; exodus  of 
Uitlanders  from,  74,  76 ; refugees  of,  197 ; 
manufacture  of  ammunition  for  Boers  in, 
313,  314  ; dynamite  explosion  in,  315  ; Ital- 
ians  killed  in  explosion  in,  333  ; fort  of,  312, 
330  ; proposal  to  blow  up  mines  at,  427,  435 ; 
occupied  by  British,  435  ; surrounded  by 
barbed  wire  fence,  469 ; racecourse  raided, 
478.  Map,  Id.  Police — See  Zarps 
Joubert,  Commandant,  captured,  538 
Joubert,  David,  nephew  of  General  Joubert,  266 
Joubert,  Joshua,  498 
Joubert,  Pierre,  88 

Joubert,  General  Piet,  his  letter  to  Queen 
Victoria,  3-10 ; character  of,  32 ; sketch 
of  life  of,  88,  89  : his  seat  in  Volksraad, 
422 ; death  of,  250 ; Viilebois-Mareuil’s 
opinion  of,  303,  304  ; instructions  issued  by, 
87,  88  ; protests  against  buying  more  guns, 
68  ; objects  to  firing  on  fleeing  foe,  348  ; held 
at  Biggarsberg,  407  ; blunder  of,  concerning 
Dundee,  124  ; consents  to  dash  on  Estcourt, 
242 ; his  lines  of  investment  at  Ladysmith, 
287 ; objections  of,  to  storming  of  Lady- 
smith, 292,  293,  297 ; blunder  of,  regarding 
Ladysmith,  286,  287 ; opposes  use  of  dyna- 
mite at  Ladysmith,  290  ; on  proposed  storm- 
ing of  Mafeking,  178 ; at  battle  of  Modder- 
spruit,  146-152 ; invasion  of  Natal  by,'  102  ; 
in  engagement  at  Willow  Grange,  248,  249; 
mentioned,  69,  84,  92,  93,  123,  146,  214,  241, 
285 

Justice  in  Transvaal,  administration  of,  18 

Kafiir  Kop,  Boer  meeting  at,  540 
Kaffir  Kraal,  496  ; disaster  to  De  la  Rey  at,  491 
Kaffirs,  employment  of.  in  the  fleld,  72  ; armed, 
used  by  British  as  scouts,  104  ; employed  as 
allies  by  the  English,  168-176,  548 ; employed 
by  Baden-Powell,  169,  171 ; looting  by,  at 
Spion  Kop,  352 ; in  Benson’s  force  at  Bra- 
kenlaagte,  535 ; armed  for  service  against 
the  Boers,  501.  See  Zulus 
Kampersdam,  Boer  “ Long  Tom  ” at,  385 
Kane,  Lieutenant,  at  Itala,  526 
Kekewich,  Colonel,  in  command  at  Kimber- 
ley,  183 ; attack  on,  at  Selous  River,  529, 
530  ; capture  of  Commandant  Sarel  Alberts 
by,  553  ; mentioned,  210,  562,  564 
Kelly,  Field  Cornet,  171 
Kelly-Kenny,  General,  385, 387,  388 
Kemp,  Commandant,  547 ; defeats  British  at 
Waterv'al,  449 ; fight  with  British  at  Vlak- 
fontein,  502,  507  ; escapes  from  Methuen, 
524 ; defeats  British  at  Kleinfontein,  532, 
533 

Kemp,  Field  Comet,  254 
Kerr,  alleged  shooting  of  ofiicer,  545 
Khama,  native  chief,  172 ; aids  British,  173 
Kimberley,  Lord,  new  settlement  named  from, 
8 ; on  Boer  armaments,  57 
Kimberley,  diamond  mines  of,  199  ; first  dia- 
mond found  at,  357  ; version  of  fight  at 
Kraaipan,  96  ; convoy  near,  captured  by 
Boers,  522  ; importance  attached  to,  by  the 
Boers,  181,  182  ; siege  of,  181-187  ; General 
French’s  dash  on,  363  ; relief  of,  384,  385  ; 
mentioned,  83,  94,  178,  Map,  6e 


Kipling,  Rudyard,  33 ; quoted,  327 
Kirsten,  Commandant,  in  charge  of  camp  at 
Deredepoort,  173 

Kitchener,  Lord,  denounced  as  “ a hangman,” 
531  ; called  the  “British  Weyler,”  M7  ; at- 
tack on  Crouje  at  Paardeberg,  391  ; narrow 
escape  of,  at  Leeuw  Spruit,  447  ; sends  Boer 
agents  to  burghers,  476  ; narrow  escape  of, 
near  Pretoria,  479 ; invites  Louis  Botha  to 
conference,  487,  488  ; correspondence  with 
Louis  Botha,  488 ; refuses  to  recognize 
Kruger’s  status,  497 ; De  Wet's  opinion  on 
proposalsof,  497. 498;  proclamation  threaten- 
ing banishment  against  Boer  leaders,  512, 
513  ; Dooley’s  comment  on  proclamation  of, 
513 ; General  Viljoeu's  reply  to  proclam.a- 
tions  of,  551 ; letter  to,  from  President  Steyn, 
517,  522  ; promises  General  Botha  financial 
aid  to  rebuild  farms,  587  ; reports  shooting 
of  British  after  having  surremlered,  515. 516  ; 
order  concerning  hindrances  to  mobility, 
528;  on  yeomanry,  514 ; in  peace  negotia- 
tions, 571.  575-577;  minor  mention  of,  474, 
477,  553,  562 

Kitchener,  General  Walter,  535;  fights  Yiljoen, 
512 

Kitchener's  Fighting  Scouts,  character  of,  487; 

ambushed  near  Heilbron,  531 
Kleinfontein,  fight  at,  532,  533 
Klerksdorp.  skirmishes  near,  491,  493,  522  ; 
Babington’s  victory  at,  exaggerated,  496 ; 
successful  attack  on,  by  De  Wet,  558-561; 
conference  of  Boer  leaders  at,  573.  Map.  'id 
Klip  Drift,  385  ; inactivity  of  Cronje  at,  386, 
387.  Map,  190 

Klipfontein  farm,  British  surprised  at,  232, 233, 
235,236 

Klippan,  skirmish  at,  557 
Klip  River,  tributary  of  Tugela,  285,  286,  293, 
294.  Map,  451 

Knox,  General  Charles,  defeat  of,  476,  477 in 
fight  at  Bothaville,  466  ; attempts  capture  of 
DeWet,  471,  472  ; referred  to,  465,  474,  480 
Kock,  General,  J.  11.  M.,  sketch  of  his  life, 
141,  142 ; treatment  of,  by  British,  139-141  ; 
composition  of  his  commando,  126 ; com- 
mands Boers  at  Elandslaagte,  128-142 ; his 
seat  in  Volksraad,  422;  shot  at  Elandslaagte, 
134,  1.35  ; mentioned,  29,  30,  35, 123,  144 
Kock,  Philip  Rudolph,  charges  against  British 
by,  139 

Kock,  Judge,  son  of  General  Kock,  prisoner, 
557 

Koedesberg,  attack  on,  by  General  Macdonald, 
384.  Map,  190 
Koedesrand,  389.  Map,  190 
Koffyfontein.  Map,  6« 

Kolbe,  General,  385,  388,  389 
Komatipoort,  85.  Map,  Oc 
Koorn  Spruit,  attack  on  British  at,  412,  418. 
Map,  411 

Kraaipan,  first  battle  of  war  at,  94-96  ; capture 
of  armored  train  at,  177.  Map,  6(i 
Kritzinger,  Commandant,  account  of,  473 ; 
raids  Bedford  district,  489  ; captures  British 
near  Aberdeen,  492 ; captures  British  post 
near  Maraisburg.  498 ; attacks  Colonel  Crabbe 
near  Cradock,  511  ; defeated  near  Steyns- 
burg,  514  ; captures  gun  from  Lovat’s  Scouts, 
525  ; captured.  539  ; acquitted,  573;  alluded 
to.  475,  482. 496,  504,  507,  509.  569 
Krokodil  Pool,  skirmish  at,  172.  Map,  7c 
Kroonstad,  British  prisoners  sent  to,  420  ; 
temporary  capital  of  Free  State,  434 ; train 
attacked  near,  451  ; train  captured  at,  462  ; 
British  ambushed  near,  494.  JIap.  7d 
Kruger.  President  Paul,  his  character,  29,  30, 
36  ; his  home  in  Pretoria,  26  ; salary  of,  27  ; 
murder  of  relatives  of,  176  ; conference  with 
Sir  Alfred  Milner,  44  ; his  treatment  of  Brit- 
ish prisoners,  101,  197 ; accused  of  carrying 


603 


INDEX 


bullion,  etc.,  from  Pretojia,  430 ; on  de- 
struction of  Boer  farms,  588  ; special  recep- 
tion to  Chicago  Irish-American  contingent, 
325 ; proclamation  on  surrender  of  Cronje, 
382  ; attends  last  meeting  of  Volksraad,  4^ ; 
his  address  to  the  Volksraad,  425,  426  ; arrives 
at  Bloemfontein,  399  ; departs  from  Pretoria, 
4^  ; appeal  for  peace  by,  400,  403 : letter 
from, urging  continuation  of  war,  497;  departs 
for  Europe,  459, 460 ; reception  of,  in  France, 
468 ; speech  at  Marseilles,  468,  469  ; men- 
tioned, 84,  89,  177,  199,  241,  6H 
Kruger,  Mrs.,  carriage  to  be  provided  for,  457; 
death  of,  511 

Krugersdorp,  Captain  Theron  killed  at,  459. 

Map,  7(7 ; corps  at  Elaudslaagte,  133 
Kuruman,  British  convoy  captured  at,  474 ; 

looted  by  Boers,  541.  Map,  hd 
Kuyper,  D.,  efforts  of,  to  bring  about  peace, 
551 ; Lord  Landsdowne’s  reply  to  offer  of, 
622 


Labuscagne,  Cronje’s  mascot  companion,  200 
Ladybrand,  British  defeat  near,  517.  Map,  7e 
Ladysmith,  situation  of,  285,  286 ; G.  W. 
Steevens  on  condition  of,  ^9 ; suggested 
use  of  dynamite  at,  31  ; British  forces  in, 
146  ; composition  of  garrison  of,  285 ; neces- 
sity for  relief  of,  251  ; transfer  of  sick  and 
wounded  from,  285,  293 ; Boer  artillery  at, 
288 ; Joubert’s  lines  of  investment  at,  287 ; 
siege  of,  284-299  ; proposed  storming  of,  292, 
293 ; plan  of  Colonel  Villebois  to  storm, 
292-294 ; siege  of,  raised  by  Lord  Dundonald, 
^0  ; mention  of,  82,  178,  250.  Map,  8e 
Laing’s  Nek,  85;  description  of,  102.  Map,  8d 
Lancaster  Regiment,  Royal,  at  Spion  Kop, 
342, 343 

Lancashire  Fusiliers  at  Spion  Kop,  342,  344, 
346;  Regiment  at  Grobler’s  Kloof,  373,  374 
Lancers,  Boer  engagement  with,  at  Colesberg, 
359,  360;  woundecl  Boers  killed  by,  at  Elands- 
laagte,  135-137;  at  Magersfontein,  220;  suffer 
heavily  atTatham’s  Farm,  284;  rumored  de- 
sertion of,  532 

Land  Laws  of  Transvaal,  19,  20,  23 
Landrost’s  Courts,  19 

Landsdowne,  Lord,  65;  speech  on  war  by,  47; 
on  Boer  armaments,  59;  reply  to  Dr.  Kuy- 
per’s  offer,  552 

Langwani  Hill,  Colenso,  281;  strategical  value 
of,  256;  Boer  forces  on,  257;  attack  on  British 
from,  261;  British  attempts  to  capture,  265, 
266 ; captured  by  British,  372,  380.  Map, 
107 

Latigan,  Commandant,  540;  invades  Cape 
Colony,  496 

Lee-Metfords,  damaged,  found  at  Vaal  Krantz, 
370 

Leeuw  Spruit,  Theron  attacks  train  at,  447. 
Map,  'Id 

Lefroy,  Lieutenant,  at  Itala,  526 
Le  Gallais,  Colonel,  defeats  De  Wet  at  Botha- 
ville,  466;  killed,  466 

Legionnaires,  ViUebois-Mareuil’s  appeal  to, 
308,  309 

Lemmer,  General,  retreat  of,  to  Kroonstad, 
410;  destruction  of  hovels  of,  585 
Leon,  Sara,  engineer,  services  of,  87,  188,  312, 
313;  repairs  Long  Tom,  291 ; gun  erected  by, 
at  Kampersdam,  385 

Lepeltakkeeft,  J.  A.,  murdered  by  English 
officer,  139,  140 

Lever,  Dr.  Charles  J.,  on  British  abuse  of  Red 
Cross,  207 

Lichtenburg,  478;  attack  on,  by  De  la  Rey, 
487,  488 ; commandant,  560;  captures  con- 
voy, 498.  Map,  7d 

Lincnwe,  native  chief,  attack  on  Boer  women, 
by,  171-176 


Lindley,  surrender  of  Irish  Hunt  Corps  at,  445, 
446;  British  convoy  attacked  at,  447;  defeat 
of  General  Knox  at,  476,  477.  Map,  7d 
Liverpool  Regiment,  ambushed,  456;  defeated 
at  Helvetia,  473 

Llewellyn,  Noel,  Rhodesian  officer,  173,  175 
Lombard,  Jan,  Commandant  of  Hollander 
Corps,  328;  commands  Hollander  Corps  at 
Elandslaagte,  1.32 

Lombard’s  Kop,  Boers  surprised  on,  291 ; men- 
tinned,  148,  149,  287.  Map,  107 
London  Convention  of  1884, 11,  570 
Long,  Colonel,  reckless  action  of,  at  Colenso, 
266-268  ; loss  of  guns  at  Colenso  by,  319 
“Long  Tom”  gun  at  Kimberly,  313;  of  Lady- 
smith, 288,  305,  382;  attempted  capture  of, 
at  Ladysmith,  290,  291 

Loosberg,  Otto  Von,  service  of,  at  Saunas  Post, 
331 

Letter,  Commandant,  capture  of,  522,  523,  577; 
hung,  531,  568 

Looting  by  Kaffirs,  102;  by  British  at  Elauds- 
laagte,  137,  138 

Lourenzo  Marquez  Railway,  British  control 
of,  460.  Map,  Wc 
Louw,  Hoffmeyer,  execution  of,  644 
Lubbe,  Commandant,  at  Belmont,  189;  wounded 
at  Belmont,  191 ; at  battle  of  Enslin,  194,  195 
Luneberg,  engagement  at,  539 
Lydenburg,  455  ; General  VUjoen  captured 
near,  549.  Map,  8c 

Lynch,  Arthur,  Colonel  of  Second  Irish  Brig- 
ade, 322-325 

Lyttelton,  General,  532  ; crosses  Tugela  at 
Potgeiter’s  Drift,  338 

McBride,  John,  319 ; organizer  of  Blake’s 
Irish  Brigade,  318;  Boer  testimonials  to,  320 
McCue,  Private,  quoted  on  fight  at  Vlakfon- 
tein,  503,  504 

Macdonald,  General,  attack  on  Boers  at  Koedes- 
berg  by,  384,  386 

Machadadorp,  battle  near,  464.  Map,  9c 
Mackfarlane’s  Siding,  engagement  with  ar- 
mored train  at,  183.  Map,  6e 
McKinley,  President,  quotation  from  message 
of,  500,  501 

McMicking,  Major,  driven  back  near  Vrede. 
fort,  540 

Mafeking,  Kaffirs  employed  at,  169;  siege  of, 
177-181 ; attempted  capture  of,  by  Sarel  Eloff, 
438-440;  mentioned,  83,  92,  99.  Map,  6c 
Magaliesberg  Hills,  448;  Boers  defeated  at,  451 
Magaliesberg  snipers,  591 
Magersfontein,  situation  of,  185  ; battle  of, 
209-224.  Map,  190 

Mahon,  Colonel,  engagement  at  Bronkhorst- 
spruit,  448  ; relief  of  Mafeking  by,  440,  441 
Mair,  Lieutenant,  shooting  of,  515 
Majuba  Hill,  description  of,  102;  battle  of, 
mentioned,  9,  87,  154.  Map,  8cf 
Makewassi  Spruit,  566 

Malan,  Commandant,  battle  at  Richmond,  507 ; 
captures  train  near  Rosemead,  474  ; captures 
some  of  Brabant’s  Horse,  492  ; victory  over 
British  near  Fraserburg,  555 ; referred  to, 
475,  482,  491,  509,  530 

Malmesbury,  railway  town,  532.  Map,  Zg 
Mansvelt,  Professor,  on  education  in  Trans- 
vaal, 13,  14 

Marais,  Mr.,  trial  of,  under  martial  law,  536, 
537 

Maraisburg,  475 ; British  patrol  captured  at, 
478  ; British  post  captured  near,  498.  Map, 
230 

Marico  River,  fight  near,  523.  Map,  7c 
Maritz,  Commandant,  captures  Vanrhynsdorp, 
514  ; ambushes  convoy  at  Bevendam,  537 
Mark  IV.  ammunition.  See  Dum-dum  bullets 
Marquardt,  Rev.  Mr.,  on  imperfect  burial  of 
English  dead  at  Magersfontein,  223 


INDEX 


603 


Marseilles,  President  Kruger’s  reception  in, 
468,  469 

Marshall,  Major,  defeats  Boer  force  near 
Senekal,  540 

Martial  law,  results  of.  543,  544 ; Frederic  Har- 
rison on,  536 ; proclamation  of,  in  certain 
districts.  5^  ; law  proclaimed  in  Cape 
Colony,  467 

Mausers,  Boer  dependence  on  the,  220,  278 
Masim  guns  of  Boers,  66,  67 
Masimofif,  Colonel  Eugene,  307,  335 
Maxwell,  Mrs.,  appeal  on  behalf  of  Boer 
women  by,  500 

Mears,  Commandant,  defeated  in  Reitz  region, 
553 

Mentz,  Nicholas,  bravery  of,  at  Spion  Kop,  355 
Merwe,  Dr.  van  der,  treatment  of,  by  British, 
138 

Methuen,  Lord,  commands  at  Belmont,  188-193; 
report  on  battle  of  Belmont,  191 ; accused  of 
massacre  at  Belmont,  193 : at  Enslin.  194- 
197 ; forces  Boers  from  Zeerust,  504 ; in 
skirmish  near  Klerksdorp,  522 ; running 
fight  with  De  la  Rey,  523 : defeated  and 
captured  at  Rooikraal.  565-567 ; release  of, 
568  : letter  to  Mademoiselle  Villehois,  311  ; 
slanderous  charges  against  Boers  by,  193, 
196 ; first  English  General  to  asperse  the 
Boers,  568  ; referred  to,  186,  384,  3^ 

Meyer,  Lukas  Johannes,  life  of,  108,  109  ; ad- 
vances against  Glencoe,  103  ; commands  at 
battle  of  Talana  Hill,  111-119 ; at  Modder- 
spruit,  149,  151  ; illness  of,  241  ; at  last  meet- 
ing of  the  Volksraad,  422  ; in  peace  negotia- 
tions, 571,  574,  577;  mentioned,  123,  147,  149, 
437 

Middelburg,  conference  between  Botha  and 
Kitchener  at,  488;  commandoat,  Blaaukrantz 
Spruit,  371;  atColenso,  373,  374.  Map,  8c: 
“Military  Notes”  found  on  British  officer  at 
Dundee,  58,  59 

Military  organization  of  the  Boers,  70 
Milner,  Sir  Alfred,  conference  with  President 
Kruger,  44 ; demands  declaration  of  Free 
State  attitucle,  52 ; on  origin  of  concentra- 
tion camps,  5^  ; in  peace  negotiations,  576, 
577,  referred  to,  45,  530,  Ss,  570 
Mochudie,  Boer  women  and  children  captured 
at,  175.  Map,  7c; 

Modderfontein,  Boer  attack  on,  479 
Modder  River,  battle  of,  200-208.  Map,  6e 
Moddergpruit,  battle  of.  146-152  ; humanity  of 
Boers  after  battle  of,  141 ; station,  287.  Map, 
107 

Molengraff,  Professor,  Chief  of  Identity  De- 
partment, 276,  277  ; on  Boer  casualties  up  to 
Paardeberg,  405 

Molteno,  236  ; country  around.  231,  232  ; trains 
captured  near,  493,  494.  Map.  'if 
Money  market,  power  of  English,  594 
Moneypenny,  of  Johannesburg  “Star,”  105 
Monte  Christo,  British  artillery  on,  379.  Map, 
107 

Mooi  River,  engagement  at,  247,  248 
Morgaff,  Prince,  335 

Moselekatse,  Kaffir  chief,  attacks  on  Boers  by, 
3,  4 

Mostert,  Field  Comet,  at  Vaal  Krantz,  367 
Mount  Alice,  British  guns  on,  338, 339, 355,  365. 
Map,  107 

Muller,  Commandant,  509  ; at  Elandspruit,  541 
Muller,  Geradus,  killed,  517 
Muller.  Sergeant.  236 

Murraysburg,  482 ; captured  by  Boers,  507  ; 
burning  of  government  buildings  at,  548. 
Map,  5g 

Naanwpoort,  railway  junction,  93 ; relief  of, 
227  ; General  French  at,  357.  Map,  6f 
Naboomspruit,  train  blown  upj  at,  510.  Map, 
8c 


Natal,  region  of,  purchased  by  Boers,  4 ; an- 
nexed by  England,  6 ; Boer  invasion  of,  102; 
carbineers,  144,  145 

“National  Review”  on  progress  made  bv 
British,  495 
Natives.  See  Kaffirs 
Naval  Brigade  at  Enslin,  196 
Nel,  Commandant,  at  Frederickstad,  454  ; at 
Nicholson’s  Kop,  154,  156  ; at  storming  of 
Platrand,  294,  296 ; captures  British  stores 
at  Roodeval,  446  ; at  Tathain’s  Farm,  2^  ; 
referred  to,  144,  145,  449.  483 
Nelspruit,  occupied  by  British,  459.  Map.  9c; 
Nesbit,  Captain,  captured  at  Kraaipan,  95,  96. 
Map,  9c 

New  Bush  (Kimberley),  first  diamond  found 
at.  357 

Newcastle,  British  fall  back  on,  102,  105.  Map, 
M 

“New  Republic,  The,”  of  Lukas  Meyer,  108, 
16:3 

New  Zealanders  at  Colesberg,  362 
Nicholson’s  Kop,  description  of.  133 ; occu- 
pied by  Colonel  Carletoii,  148,  152 ; battle 
of.  133-160.  Map,  107 

Nitral's  Nek,  British  defeated  at,  448,  449. 
Map,  451 

Nix.  Lieutenant,  Netherlands  military  attache, 
killed,  418 

Nooitgedacht.  British  force  surprised  at,  469, 
470  ; meaning  of  the  name,  470.  Map.  9c 
Northumberland  Fusiliers,  captured  at  Nooit- 
gedacht, 470 
Nqutu,  battle  at,  512 

Nugent,  Captain,  wounded  at  Talana.  115 
Nylstroom,  hussars  captured  near,  494.  Map, 
8c 

Oath,  form  of,  for  burghers,  581 
O'Connor,  Captain,  of  Chicago  Irish-American 
contingent,  325,  327 
Officers,  Transvaal  army,  24 
O’Hara,  Michael,  325 

Olifant's  Nek,  Commandant  Kemp  at,  524. 
Map,  451 

Ollivier,  John  Hendrik,  sketch  of  life  of,  237, 
238  ; retreat  of,  to  Kroonstad,  410  ; escapes 
from  Brandwater  region,  449 ; captured  at 
IVinburg,  455;  in  peace  negotiations,  574, 577 
Olsson,  Carl  Albers,  of  Scandinavian  Corps, 
219,  334 

Onderbroek  Kop,  287 

Onderbroek  Spruit,  Boer  lines  at,  373,  374,  .376 
Oom  Piet,  bravery  of,  at  Spion  Kop,  354,  355 
Oosterhagen,  H.  S.,  member  of  Identity  De- 
partment, 277  ; report  on  Boer  losses  at  Itala 
and  Fort  Prospect,  562 

Oosthuizen,  Sarel,  Acting  Commandant,  254; 
at  defense  of  Pieter's  Hill,  377  ; defeats  Brit- 
ish at  Kleinfontein,  532  ; killed,  533 
Opperman,  Commandant,  said  to  be  killed, 
528 ; not  killed  at  Mount  Itala,  545 ; men- 
tioned, 509 

Orange  Free  State,  vulnerable  border-line  of, 
84 ; comes  to  aid  of  Transvaal,  55;  bur- 
gher military  force  of,  61,  63;  and  Transvaal 
text  of  treaty  betrveen,  65 ; annexation  of, 
401 

Orange  River  bridge,  description  of  country 
at,  183,  185  ; settlement,  Boer  revolt  in,  7 
Orange  territop:  annexed  by  England,  7 
O’Reilly,  of  Irish  Brigade,  bravery  of,  319 
O'Reilly,  John,  finds  first  diamond  at  Kim- 
berley, 357 
Osspruit  Camp,  277 

Owen,  C.  M.,  English  Commissioner,  7 

Paardeberg,  Cronje’s  rear  guard  reaches,  388  ; 
battle  of,  389-398  ; surrender  of  Cronje  at, 
380,  396  ; names  of  Boer  officers  who  surren- 
dered at,  398.  Map,  190 


604 


INDEX 


Paardeberg  Hill,  385  ; British  in  possession  of, 
390 

Pall,  Lieutenant,  field  telegraphy  of,  887 
Paget,  General,  448 

Paris,  President  Kruger’s  reception  in,  469 
Park,  Colonel,  attacked  at  Elandsprnit,  541 
Parnell,  supposed  resemblance  between,  and 
General  De  Wet,  165 

Patriotism  of  Boers  and  British,  comparison 
of,  77,  78 

Peace  Negotiations,  begun  by  Transvaal  Ex- 
ecutive, 571;  continued  at  Klerksdorp  Con- 
ference, 573,  574;  history  of,  till  conclusion 
at  Pretoria,  57.5-583 

Pepworth  Hill,  Joubert’s  position  at  151,  156, 
287,  288.  Map,  107 

"Pester  Lloyd,”  story  of  British  cowardice  at 
Willowinore,  in,  5^,  529 
Petrusburg,  British  force  ambushed  near,  511. 
Map,  6« 

Philippolis,  siege  of,  463,  4G3  ; British  wagons 
captured  at,  543.  Map,  6f 
Phillips,  Captain  March,  on  Uillanders,  42 
Pietermaritzburg,  6.  Map,  9c 
Pietersburg,  temporary  seat  of  Transvaal  Gov- 
ernment, 491  ; attack  on,  491,  492  ; attack  on 
British  camp  in,  551 ; mentioned  171,  493, 
494.  Map,  86 

Pieter’s  Hill,  position  of,  374 ; held  by  Boers, 
373.  376,  380.  Map,  107 
Piet  Retief  District,  General  French  in,  492. 
Map,  9tf 

" Pig-sticking”  by  British  Lancers,  136,  171 
Pilclier,  Major,  driven  back,  480,  481 
Platboomfort,  attacked  by  Baden- Powell,  180, 
181 

Platrand,  surprise  attack  upon  the,  294-299 ; 
assault  on,  337 

Plumer,  Colonel,  attack  on  Pietersburg,  491, 
492  ; movements  of  column  of,  494,  495  ; re- 
ferred to,  173,  535 

Pohlman,  Lieutenant,  at  Coleuso,  257,  370 ; 

killed  at  Bergendorp,  4.55,  456 
Pole-Carew,  General,  at  Modder  River,  202-205 
Polfontein,  engagement  at,  362.  Map,  100 
Police,  Johannesburg.  See  Zarps 
Police  Force  of  Transvaal,  61,  62 
Pom-poms  of  Boers,  description  of,  67 
Poplars  Grove,  De  Wet  retreats  to,  394  ; driven 
back  at,  399,  400.  Map,  190 
Port  Elizabeth,  troops  forwarded  from,  227 ; 

placed  under  martial  law,  530.  Map,  6y 
Portuguese  concession  to  Boers,  7 
Potchefstroom,  town  of,  founded,  7 ; com- 
mando at  Mafeking,  178,  180.  Map,  "/I 
Potgieter,  Commandant,  at  defense  of  Pieter’s 
Hill,  373,  377  ; wounded,  379  ; killed,  528 
Potgieter,  Field  Cornet,  actions  of,  near 
Elandslaagte,  127  ; imprudence  of,  131 
Potgieter,  Hendrik,  5,  7 
Potgieter’s  Drift,  Buller’s  forces  at,  338.  Map, 
107 

Pretoria,  city  of,  12  ; first  object  of  attack,  84  ; 
fort  at,  312,  330  ; last  meeting  of  Volksraad 
in,  431-427  ; proposed  defense  of,  427,  428  ; 
Lord  Roberts’  preparations  for  advance  on, 
431  ; Boer  evacuation  of,  435,  437  ; De  la  Rey 
defeated  near,  477.  Map,  8c 
Pretorius,  Andreas,  Boer  leader,  defeats  Din- 
gaan, 5 

Pretorius,  Captain,  commands  artillery  at 
Talana  Hill,  112;  at  Bergendal,  455  ; excel- 
lent handling  of  artillery  by,  at  Colenso,  264, 
280, 281  ; at  Ladysmith,  288  ; reported  killed, 
573;  referred  to,  147,  151 
Pretorius,  Field  Cornet,  in  engagement  at 
Besters,  144 

Pretorius,  Henning,  founder  of  Transvaal  Artil- 
lery, 281 

Pretorius, Willie,  his  body  robbed  by  British,  139 
Prieska,  238  ; Boers  invade,  472.  Map,  5c 


Prinsloo  (of  Carolina),  Commandant,  at  Spion 
Kop,  340 

Prinsloo,  Jacob,  Commandant,  85,  187  ; in 
joint  command  against  Kimberley,  182  ; in- 
activity of,  144  ; blundering  of,  at  Belmont, 
188,  189,  192 ; hie  report  on  battle  of  Bel- 
mont, 192  ; succeeded  in  command  by  De  la 
Rey,  194 ; at  Modder  River,  201,  203 
Prinsloo,  Martinus,  85;  at  Tatham’s  Farm.  284; 

surrender  of,  to  General  Hunter,  448,  449 
Prisoners,  treatment  of  first,  taken  in  the  war, 
101 

“Progressional,”  the,  by  Secretary  Reitz, 
33,  34 

" Punch  ” on  the  War,  471 
Putterskraal,  British  garrison  at,  238,  239,  356. 
Map,  7/ 

Racecourse  at  Johannesburg  raided,  478 
Ramdam,  Boers  fall  back  on,  191,  194.  Map, 
190 

Rand  and  the  war,  the,  74  ; mines  of  the,  41 
Riindbergen  hills,  Boers  at,  486 
Rawlinson,  Colonel,  defeats  Smuts  near 
Klerksdorp,  493 

“ Rebels,”  execution  of,  in  various  places, 
under  martial  law,  544 

Red  Cross,  violations  of,  by  British,  1.38,  207, 
336  ; abuse  of,  at  Mafeking,  178  ; abuse  of, 
at  Colenso,  275;  arrest  of,  at  Jacobsdal,  392; 
arrest  of,  by  Methuen,  568;  alleged  Boer  vio- 
lations of,  585 

Reddersburg,  capture  of  British  force  at,  419, 
420 ; British  garrison  at,  captured,  464. 
Map,  7e 

Reichman,  Captain,  military  attache,  418 
Reitfontein,  engagement  at,  143-146.  Map,  hf 
Reitz,  F.  W.,  State  Secretary,  30;  character  of, 
.33  ; “ Progressional,”  by,  33,  34  ; “ The 
Wearing  of  the  Green,”  by,  .34  ; on  British 
proposals,  45  ; reply  to  Lord  Salisbury,  403- 
405  ; in  peace  negotiations,  571,  574,  577; 
mentioned,  46,  51 

Reitz,  engagement  near,  505;  Boers  surprised 
at,  by  Broadwood,  510 ; Free  State  papers 
captured  at,  511.  Map,  8(7 
Reitzburg,  449,  454.  Map,  7(7 
Religion  in  Transvaal,  17 
Rensburg,  skirmish  at,  362-364.  Map,  6(7 
Reserves,  English,  called  out,  50 
Retief,  Piet,  massacre  of,  4 
Rhenoster  Station,  destruction  of,  591.  Map, 
411 

Rhodes,  Cecil,  at  Kimberley,  181-183 ; death 
of,  570,  571  ; mentioned,  9,  27,  188 
Rhodes  Drift,  skirmish  at,  171,  172 
" Rliodesian  Times  ” on  evacuation  of  Zeerust, 
442,  443 

Ricchiardi,  Camillo,  Colonel  of  Italian  Corps, 
.332, 1333 

Richard,  Isabeau,  88 

Richmond,  Cape  Colony,  fight  at,  507.  Map,  5/ 
Rimington,  Colonel,  at  Villiersdorp,  538;  in 
engagement  at  Tafelkop,  541,  542 
Roberts,  Lord,  De  Wet’s  opinion  of,  167 ; Boer 
anxiety  at  advance  of,  .371  ; scheme  of  opera- 
tions before  Paardeberg,  .384  ; offers  to  take 
over  Cronje’s  wounded  at  Paardeberg,  392  ; 
takes  possession  of  Bloemfontein,  401 ; seri- 
ous blunder  of,  410;  preparations  for  advance 
on  Pretoria,  431  ; Boer  forces  in  front  of,  in 
advance  on  Pretoria,  432  ; letter  to  General 
Botha  on  prolongation  of  the  war,  447;  meet- 
ing with  General  Buller,  448;  effects  of  proc- 
lamations of,  451.  452  ; alleged  Boer  plot  to 
kidnap,  452,  453;  demancls  unconditional 
surrender  of  Boers,  454  ; complains  to  Gen- 
eral Botha  of  Boer  methods  of  warfare,  456, 
457  ; annexes  Transvaal,  456  ; made  com- 
mander in  chief  of  British  army,  469  ; deco- 
rated, 475 ; on  destruction  of  Boer  farms. 


INDEX 


605 


588,  590 ; eulogizes  De  la  Rey,  569  ; men- 
tioned, 285,  459,  471 

Rondavels  Drift,  Cronje's  headquarters  at,  385. 
Map,  190 

Roodeval,  capture  of  British  stores  at,  440. 
Map,  'id 

Rooikraal,  defeatand  capture  of  Lord  Methuen 
at  565-569 

Rooilaagte,  battle  of,  194-196  ; features  of 
country  round,  194.  Map,  190 

Roos, , services  of,  at  Tugela,  353 

Rooseiiekal,  461 

Rosemead,  train  held  up  at,  474.  Map,  Qf 
Rouxville,  478  ; commando  at  Stormberg,  233- 
2.35.  Map,  7f 

Rowley,  Captain  C.  A.,  defends  Fort  Prospect, 
525 

Salaries,  reduction  of  official,  in  Transvaal,  80, 
81 

Saldhana  Bay,  Boer  force  reaches,  531.  Map, 
'^9 

Salisbury,  Lord,  quoted,  451  ; reply  to  Boer 
appeal  for  peace,  403;  State  Secretary  Reitz’s 
reply  to,  403-405 

Sand  River  Convention,  the.  8,  11,  48,  199,  570 
Sand  River,  Boer  stand  at,  433.  Map,  411 
Sandberg,  J.  C.,  General  Botha’s  military 
secretary,  329,  330  ; on  danger  of  newspaper 
reports,  256, 257  ; at  Spion  Kop,  .347  ; intima- 
tion of  evacuation  of  Pretoria  by,  437 
Sannas  Post,  battle  of,  412-419  ; British  patrol 
captured  near,  524.  Map,  411 
Scandinavian  Corps  in  Boer  service,  3.33,  3:34  ; 
at  Mafeking,  178,  334 ; at  Magersfontein, 
211,  217,  219 

Schalk  Burger,  General,  patrols  Swazi  frontier, 
168  ; objects  to  storming  of  Ladysmith,  293, 
294  ; at  Spion  Kop,  340,  347  ; retires  from 
Pietersburg,  492  ; appointed  acting  Presi- 
dent of  Transvaal,  460,  461  : letter  from,  in 
reply  to  proclamation  of  Kitchener,  546,  .547  ; 
in  peace  negotiations,  571,  574,  575,  577; 
mentioned,  29,  30,  .35,  147,  365,  497 
Scheepers,  Commandant,  besieges  Philippoiis, 
463  ; laager  of,  captured,  511  ; capture  of, 
5.31  ; trial  of,  539  ; execution  of,  547-549, 564, 
568  ; Mr.  Fischer  on  execution  of,  551;  men- 
tioned, 491,  492.  5.30 

Scheepers  Nek,  Major  Gough  defeated  at,  524 
Schiel,  Colonel,  founder  of  German  Corps,  127, 
128.  312,  329,  330  ; taken  prisoner,  1.35 
Schneider  & Co.,  Creusot  gun  makers,  312 
Schoeman,  General,  inaction  of,  228 ; elected 
to  command  of  Colesberg  burghers,  356 ; 
superseded  by  Commandant  Piet  De  tVet, 
.357,  358 

Scholtznek,  Kriegsraad  held  at,  210.  Map,  190 
Scholz,  Commandant,  killed,  528 
Schreiner  Cabinet,  the,  185,  227 
Schreiner,  Olive,  forbidden  to  leave  her  dis- 
trict, 478 

Scobell,  Colonel,  defeats  Commandant  Lotter, 
522,  523 

Scots  Greys,  surprised  near  Bronkhurstspruit, 
544 

Scouts,  Canadian,  wanted  for  South  Africa, 
544  ; National,  formation  of.  544,  .545  ; Rus- 
sian, in  Boer  service,  333.  334 
Seaforth  Highlanders  at  Magersfontein,  217, 
219  221 

Sechele.  Kaffir  chief,  89 
Selous  River,  battle  at,  529,  5.30 
Selukwe  Kopje,  173 

Senekal.  engagement  near,  540 ; commando, 
.365  ; district,  476.  Map,  7« 

Serfontein,  Commandant,  made  prisoner,  192 
Settle,  Major-General,  driven  back  near  Hoop- 
stad,  464 

Shepstone,  Sir  Theophilus,  8 

Shuttle,  Commandant,  in  Johannesburg,  315 


Simon,  Lieutenant,  Austrian  volunteer,  3.30 
Skiet  Drift  held  by  English,  .366 

Slechtkinip, , services  of,  at  Tugela,  353 

Slingusfonteiii,  engagement  at,  363 
Snialdeel,  De  la  Rey  retires  on,  4.33.  Map,  411 
Siiiit,  Commandant,  referred  to,  154 ; heroism 
of,  at  Elandslaagte,  134 
Sinith-Dorrien,  General,  defeated  atHeckpoort, 
448 ; defeated  at  JIachadodorp,  464 ; at- 
tempted capture  of  Louis  Botha,  484,  485 ; 
mentioned,  388,  454,  478 
Smitlifleld,  233 ; Boer  attack  on,  478 ; com- 
mando at  Stormberg,  233-236.  Map,  hf 
Smuts,  Transvaal  Attorney-General,  after- 
wards Commandant,  32  ; sketch  of,  479,  480; 
defeated  near  Klerksdorp,  491,  493 ; is  at 
attack  on  Modderfontein,  479 ; joins  Krit- 
zinger  near  Basutoiand,  515;  hghts  Lancers 
at  Elands  River,  524  ; summarizes  results  of 
foray  into  Cape  Colony,  573;  besieges  Ookiep, 
573;  in  peace  negotiations,  574,  577;  gives 
estimate  of  number  of  Boer  soldiers,  58.3 
Smuts,  General  Tobias,  of  Ermelo  ; sketch 
of,  553;  on  horrors  of  Spion  Kop,  .352;  at 
defense  of  Pieter’s  Hill,  377  ; at  last  meet- 
ing of  Volksraad,  422  ; holds  town  of  Er- 
melo, 486;  captures  and  burns  Bremersdorp, 
51 2,  552 ; degraded  by  General  Botha,  552, 
581  ; mentioned,  342,  365,  478,  485,  509,  530 
Snyman,  Commandant,  92,  173 ; at  Krokodil 
Pool,  172  ; succeeds  Cronje  at  Mafeking,  180  ; 
refuses  to  storm  Mafeking,  438,  439 ; im- 
prisoned for  cowardice,  441 
Snyman,  Fort,  attack  by  natives  on,  169 
Somerset  West,  Boers  at,  475.  Map,  6gr 
South  African  Republic.  See  Transvaal 
Spencer,  Herbert,  on  Transvaal  laws,  21  ; on 
British  interference  in  Transvaal,  49 
Spens,  General,  attacked  by  Botha,  545 
Spies  in  General  Gatacre’s  camp,  229 
Spion  Kop,  description  of,  ,339  ; battle  of,  340- 
355  ; brandwacht  surprised  on,  ,340 ; British 
losses  at,  350,  351  ; Federal  losses  at,  350 ; 
imperfect  hurial  of  British  dead  at,  .352,  353 
Spragge,  Colonel,  surrender  of,  at  Bindley,  446 
Staats  Artillerv,  corps  of,  60,  61  ; organization 
of,  1330 

“ Standard  ” (London)  on  humanity  of  Boers 
at  Magersfontein,  22.3 

“Standard  and  Diggers’  News”  on  Winston 
Churchill,  244,  245 

Standerton,  102  ; attack  on  Colvile  near,  477  ; 
commando,  attack  on,  at  Ladysmith,  291  ; 
commando  at  Vaal  Krantz,  367 ; district, 
hurning  of  farms  in,  588,  589,  591.  Map,  8d 
“ Star,”  Johannesburg,  resurrection  of,  545 
Stations  on  railway  to  Kimberley,  185 
Steenekamp,  Commandant  P.  A.,  233;  defeated 
near  Pretoria,  477 

Steere,  alleged  shooting  of  officer,  545 
Steevens,  G.  W.,  on  condition  of  Ladysmith, 
289  ; on  humanity  of  Boers  at  Modderspruit, 
141 

Steinacher's  Horse,  defeated  at  Bremersdorp, 
512 

Stewart,  Colonel,  sweeping  movement  of,  498 
Steyn,  President,  despatch  to  Sir  Alfred  Mil- 
ner, 50  ; on  attitude  of  Free  State,  52  ; issues 
a “ Gazette  Extraordinary,”  55  ; arrives  at 
Scholtznek  with  reenforcements,  209,  210  ; 
on  loyalty  of  Irish  to  Boers,  320  ; appeal  for 
peace  by,  400,  403;  appeals  to  Boers  to  stand, 
400,  434 ; plans  second  invasion  of  Cape 
Colony,  465  ; proclamation  against  British 
methods  of  warfare,  484  ; elected  president 
of  Orange  Free  State,  493  ; letter  from,  urg- 
ing continuation  of  war,  497;  nearly  captured 
at  Reitz,  510  ; state  papers  of,  captured,  511; 
letter  to  Lord  Kitchener  reviewing  events  of 
the  war,  517-522  ; letter  on  Boer  situation  in 
November,  1901,  540  ; attempts  of  British  to 


606 


INDEX 


capture,  554-555  ; in  peace  negotiations,  574, 
576,  577;  on  destruction  of  Boer  farms,  588; 
mention  of,  84,  185,  :107,  448,  454, 482, 483,  552 
Steyneburg,  Boers  defeated  near,  514;  mention 
of  Boers  near,  233,  235,  475.  Map,  6f 
Stormberg  Junction,  British  garrison  at,  82, 
229,  231  ; General  Gatacre’s  advance  on,  231, 
232;  strength  of  Boer  forces  at,  233  ; casual- 
ties of  Boers  at,  237.  Map,  'if 
Stowe,  Colonel,  U.  S.  Consul,  action  of,  451 
Stuckenberg,  Lieutenant  of  German  Corps, 
killed,  206,  3.32 

Styrdum,  Commandant,  505 ; in  engagement 
near  Frankfort,  549 

Suffolk  Regiment  at  storming  of  Coleskop, 
360,  361 

Surprise  Hill,  Boer  guns  on,  287 
Sutherland,  invaded  by  Boers,  477.  Map,  4(7 
Swanepoll,  Commandant,  at  Stormberg,  233, 
235,  2;37 

Swartz,  Commandant,  ambushed  and  killed, 
498 

Swartzkop,  English  battery  on,  .366,  367.  Map, 
107 

Swaziland,  burghers  of,  at  Colenso,  254,  265; 
police,  62.  >Iap,  9(2 

Swazis  employed  in  British  service,  168,  512 
Symons,  General  Penn,  103  ; despatches  of,  to 
Sir  George  White,  104  ; attack  on,  at  Dun- 
dee, 111-119  ; death  of,  114 

Tabanamyana  Hill,  captured  by  Warren,  339 
Tafelkop,  engagements  at,  512,  541,  542.  Map, 
7d 

“ Tailings,”  thrown  up  in  diamond  digging,  183 
Talana  Hill,  description  of,  105  ; battle  of,  111- 
119  ; mentioned,  103,  196.  Map,  107 
Tatham’s  Farm,  battle  at,  284 
Taxation,  in  Transvaal,  20,  22,  23 
Teesdale,  village,  357.  Map, 

Telegraph,  cutting  of,  by  Boers,  589,  591 
Telegraphy,  FielcT,  of  Lieutenant  Paff,  287 
Teller,  Senator,  resolution  in  behalf  of  Com- 
mandant Scheepers,  549 
Thabanchu,  411,  412;  operations  of  De  Wet 
near,  471,  472.  Map,  7e 
Theron,  Daanie,  services  of,  to  General  Botha, 
3.53,  354  ; wounded  at  Spion  Kop,  355  ; joins 
Cronje  at  Paardeberg,  with  messages,  394, 
395  ; acts  as  guide  to  British,  445  ; attacks 
train  near  Kroonstad,  451  ; killed,  459 
Thorneycroft,  Colonel,  action  of,  at  Spion 
Kop,  .344-346 ; blamed  for  retiring  from 
Spion  Kop,  348 

Thornton,  Captain,  surrender  of,  at  Doom- 
bosch,  5.37,  5.38 

Timoney,  Father,  on  Australian  “Bushmen,” 
441 

Trains,  Armored,  description  of,  98 ; use  of, 
atKraaipan,  94-96  ; at  Mackfarlane’s  Siding, 
183  ; capture  of,  near  Frere,  243 
Transvaal,  Boer  population  of  (1899),  577  ; Ad- 
ministration of  Justice  in,  18;  education  in. 
13,  14  ; the  Executive  of  the,  29 ; Govern- 
ment, charges  of  corruption  against,  25-29  ; 
internal  progress  of,  after  1884,  11-13  ; prin- 
ciples of  government  of,  16, 17  ; land  laws  of, 
19, 20  ; frontier  of,  83  ; police  force  of,  61 , 62  ; 
Staats  Artillery  of,  69  ; permanent  forces  of 
the,  60 ; final  (iespatch  of,  to  British  Govern- 
ment, 51  ; and  Orange  Free  State,  text  of 
treaty  between,  65  ; I.ord  Roberts’  proclama- 
tion annexing,  456 

Treaty  between  Transvaal  and  Orange  Free 
State,  65 

Trichardt,  Colonel,  Boer  artillery  at  Lady- 
smith, under,  288  ; captures  a number  of 
British,  121  ; laagers  of,  surprised  near  Mid- 
delburg,  557,  558  ; minor  mention  of,  87, 147, 
282,  284,  509,  541 

Trichardt’s  Drift,  338.  Map,  107 


Tugela  River  at  'Colenso,  banks  of  the,  252- 
254;  number  of  men  required  to  guard,  338. 
Map,  9« 

Tuli,  172.  Map,  8(j 
Tweebosh,  570  (see  Rooikraal) 

Tweefontein,  capture  of  British  stores  at,  542. 
Map,  8c 

Twyford,  Major,  killed,  494 

Uitlanders,  pretended  grievances  of,  42;  aims 
of  the,  49;  in  Boer  commandoes,  65;  join 
with  Boers,  74 ; British,  on  Boer  side  at  Elauds- 
laagte,  names  of,  141 ; enfranchised  for  de- 
fense of  the  Republic,  320 
“ Ultimatum,”  President  Kruger’s  so-called,  40 
Uuited  States,  sells  horses  to&itain,  593 
Utrecht  commando  at  storming  of  Platrand, 
295-298,  305;  at  Spion  Kop,  347.  Map,  9d 
Uys,  Pieter,  Boer  leader,  4,  5 

Vaal  Krantz,  Boer  occupation  of,  367;  battle 
at,  368-370;  Boer  reoccupation  of,  369; 
British  and  Boer  losses  at,  370.  Map,  107 
Vaal  River,  arrival  of  Boers  at,  3, 6;  Boer  stand 
at,  434.  Map,  6-7d 
Valsch  River,  433.  Map,  411 
Van  Dam,  Commandant,  at  Colesberg,  361; 

mentioned,  147,  156,  157 
Van  Dedem,  Baron,  brings  messages  to  Ville- 
bois,  307 

Van  der  Merwe,  Captain,  94;  Field  Cornet, 
commands  Boers  at  Belmont,  186,  188,  189; 
Gert,  Commandant,  413;  Lieutenant,  killed 
at  Bergendorp,  456 

Van  Reenan’s  Pass,  .372  ; Prinsloo  at,  103,  143. 
Map,  8« 

Vanrhynsdorp  taken  by  Commandant  Maritz, 
514 

Van  Wyk,  Field  Cornet,  254 
Van  Zyl,  decoys  Methuen  near  Rooikraal,  565, 
566 

Vaughan,  Cardinal,  orders  prayers  for  British 
success,  593 

Vechtkop,  Kaffir  attack  on  Boers  at,  4 
Ventersburg,  attack  on  Boers  at,  478.  Map,  8(f 
Ventersdorp,  General  Cunningham  attacked 
at,  478;  district,  convoy  captured  in,  498. 
Map,  7d 

Venterstad,  number  of  Boer  allies  from,  238 
Vereeniging,  324;  Dowell’s  forcesat,  556;  Com- 
mando Volksraad  at,  574,  576.  Map,  451 
Vermaak,  Signatius,  bravery  of,  at  Platrand, 
298 

Vet  River,  433.  Map,  411 
Victoria,  Queen,  General  Jonbert’s  letter  to, 
3-10  ; death  of,  478 

Victorian  Volunteers  captured  at  Wilmans- 
rust,  550 

Viljoen,  Commandant  Ben,  account  of,  550  ; 
son  of,  killed,  477  ; at  last  meeting  of  Volks- 
raad, 422  ; attacks  British  convoy,  504  ; de- 
feated by  General  W.  Kitchener,  512  ; his  re- 
ply to  Lord  Kitchener’s  proclamations,  551  ; 
British  soldiers  buried  by,  146 ; saves  pom- 
pom at  Vaal  Krantz,  368 ; Rand  Brigade 
of,  at  Vaal  Krantz,  367 ; losses  at  Vaal 
Krantz,  370  ; leads  attack  on  Belfast,  477  ; 
at  Colenso,  254  ; defeats  British  at  Machado- 
dorp,  464  ; at  Spion  Kop,  342,  347  ; captured 
near  Lydenburg,  549;  references  to,  126,  128, 
130,  365,  496,  507,  509,  510 
Viljoen,  Daniel,  prowess  of,  near  Rensburg, 
364 

Villebois-Mareuil,  Count  Georges  de,  sketch  of 
life  of,  301-311;  appeal  to  French  Legion- 
naires by,  308,  309  ; forms  Foreign  Legion, 
306,  307  ; on  strategical  value  of  Langwani 
Hill,  256 ; on  Colonel  Long’s  action  at 
Colenso,  266  ; credited  with  planning  de- 
fense of  Colenso,  282 ; plan  of,  to  storm 
Ladysmith,  292,  293 ; at  storming  of  Plat- 


INDEX 


607 


rand,  295  ; reconnoiters  Boer  positions,  304- 
306 ; his  opinion  of  Joubert,  303,  304 ; on 
guard  required  for  Tugela  Kiver,  338  ; 
praises  Cronje’s  laagers,  383 ; has  high 
opinion  of  De  la  Rey,  306  ; killed,  310,  311  ; 
correct  account  of  death  of,  563  ; mentioned, 
266,  319,  385,  431 

Yilliersdorp,  fight  at,  538.  Map,  8(f 
Vilonel,  “ General,”  Boer  traitor,  562,  563 
Visagie,  J.  H.,  house  of,  burned,  591 
Visser,  Commandant,  killed  at  Jagersfontein, 
462 

Visser,  Br.,  tried  for  treason,  547 
Vlakfontein,  battle  at,  502  Boers  accused  of 
inhuman  treatment  of  wounded  at,  503,  503  ; 
apology  for  charges  against  Boers  at,  507  ; 
inhumanities  at,  referred  to,  515,  516.  Map, 
451 

Vlaskamp,  Dr.  Adolf,  charges  against  British 
by,  138 

Volksraad,  the  Transvaal,  17,  19,  23 ; en- 
franchises Uitlanders  for  defence  of  the 
Republic,  320  ; last  meeting  of,  421-437 
Volksrust,  Boers  assembled  at,  84,  87.  Map, 
8d 

Volunteers,  foreign,  in  Boer  service,  300 ; 
number  of,  238-340 ; Irish  Brigade,  318- 
322;  Second  Irish  Brigade,  323-325;  Chicago 
Irish- American  contingent,  325-337  ; Ameri- 
can Volunteers,  327  ; Hollander  Corps,  328, 
339  ; German  Corps,  329-3.32  ; Italian  Corps, 
3.33  ; leave  Boer  service,  460,  461 
Von  Braun,  Colonel,  his  opinion  of  British 
cavalry,  331 

Von  Donop,  Colonel,  558 
Von  Goldek,  Baron,  Hungarian  volunteer,  330 
Von  Losberg,  in  charge  of  Boer  artillery  at 
Sannas  Post,  413,  417 
Von  Wichmann,  Lieutenant,  343 
Von  Wrangel,  Baron,  grandson  of,  with  the 
Boers,  307,  ^1 

“ Vossische  Zeitung  ” on  execution  of  Cordna, 
453 

Vrede,  combat  at,  490.  Map,  8(f 
Vredefort,  296, 540  ; road  (weg),  British  convoy 
captured  at,  445.  Map,  411 
Vryburg,  second  chief  British  garrison  in 
Transvaal,  94,  565 ; captured  by  De  la  Rey, 
182.  Map,  6(f 

Vryheid,  commando,  337  ; at  storming  of  Plat- 
rand,  295298 ; part  of,  surprised  on  Spion 
Kop,  340 

Vryheid  district,  British  in,  attacked  by  Chris- 
tian Botha,  469.  Map,  9(f 

Wagon  Hill,  Boer  attack  on,  294-296,  298. 
Map,  107 

Wakkerstroom,  89  ; commando  at  TalanaHill, 
114,  115,  117,  119.  Map,  9cf 
Warmbaths,  false  rumor  of  fight  at,  504,  505. 
Map,  8c 

Warren,  General,  joins  General  Buller,  337; 
crosses  Tugela,  338 ; retreat  across  Tugela 
after  Spion  Kop,  348,  350 ; captures  Tabana- 
myana  Hill,  339 

Waterfall  Drift,  Boer  forces  at,  385.  Map,  190 
Waterval,  British  defeated  at,  449.  Map,  8c 
Waterval  Boven,  4.58.  Map,  451 
Waterworks  at  Sannas  Post,  412  ; skirmish  at, 
417.  Map,  411 

Watson,  Colonel,  assault  on  Coleskop,  by,  360 ; 
killed.  361 

Watt,  Dr.,  treatment  of,  by  British,  138 
Wauchope,  General,  213 ; at  Magersfontein, 
216  ; death  of.  217,  223 

“Wearing  of  the  Green,  The,”  by  Secretary 
Reitz,  34 

Webb,  Trooper,  at  Fort  Snyman,  169 
Webster,  David,  169 

Welmansrust,  British  surprised  near,  507 
Wepener,  siege  of,  by  De  Wet,  4^.  Map,  Te 


Wessels,  Andreas,  peace  envoy,  alleged  shoot- 
ing of,  479,  514 

Wessels,  Commandant,  556 ; invaded  Cradock 

Wessels,  J.  C.,  Free  State  General,  85,  187; 
commands  Boers  at  Kimberley,  182  ; extent 
of  command  of,  188  ; captured  at  Reitz, 
510,  511 

West  Surrey  Regiment  at  Colenso,  270 

White, , British  spy,  404,  405 

White,  General  Sir  George,  146  ; letter  from, 
concerning  General  Kock,  140,  141 ; move- 
ment of,  in  aid  of  General  Yule,  145  ; mo- 
tives of,  for  defending  Ladysmith,  286  ; 
removes  sick  and  wounded  from  Ladysmith, 
285,  293  ; in  command  at  Modderspruit,  147- 
151  ; report  on  casualties  at  storming  of 
Platrand,  297 

Whitehead,  Major,  killed  at  Doornfontein,  546 
Wilge  River,  engagement  at,  561.  Map,  8(f 
Williams,  Major,  killed  at  Tweefontein,  542 ; 

English  soldier,  murdered  by,  137 
Willow  Grange,  engagement  at,  247-249 
Willowmore,  story  of  British  cowardice  at, 
528,  529 

Wilmansrust,  capture  of  Australians  at,  550 
Wilson,  Colonel,  504  ; attacked  by  De  Wet  near 
Heilbron,  538  ; engagement  with  Boers  near 
Frankfort,  549 ; Major,  171 
Wiltshire  Regiment,  surrender  of  number  of, 
at  Rensburg,  364 

Winburg,  General  Ollivier,  captured  at,  455. 
Map,  7e 

Witkraans,  capture  of  Boer  laager  at,  539 
Wittebergen  Hills,  448.  Map,  7/ 
Witwatersrand,  gold  reefs  on,  27.  Map,  7c 
Wodehonse,  number  of  Boer  allies  from,  238, 
239.  Map,  230 

Wolfe  Spruit,  Cronje's  army  at,  388.  Map,  190 
Wolmarans,  J.  M.,  29,  30,  35 
Wolmarans,  Major,  147,  353 ; at  Ladysmith, 
288  ; organizer  of  Staats  Artillery,  330,  546  ; 
commands  artillery  at  Spion  Kop,  343,  348,; 
captured  near  Ermelo,  546 
Wolmaranstad,  559 

Wolseley,  Lord,  his  plans  against  the  South 
African  Republics,  47 
Wolvehock,  554.  Map,  Id 
Women,  Aggressive  spirit  of  Boer,  77 
Woodgate,  General,  mortally  wounded,  344 
Worcester,  475.  Map,  3g 
Wright  & Co.,  foundry  of,  in  Johannesburg, 
313 

Yeomanry  found  unable  to  ride  or  shoot,  514 
Yster  Spruit,  565 ; British  laager  in.  559.  Map, 
100 

Yule,  General,  retreat  of,  to  Ladysmith,  123, 
124, 144,  146 

Zamerkomst,  telegraph  cut  at,  591 
Zand  Rit'er.  See  Sand  River 
“Zarps,”  or  Johannesburg  Police,  the,  61,  62, 
328,  401  ; at  Bergendal,  455 ; at  Colenso, 
^7,  270 ; at  Colesberg,  359-362 ; at  defense 
of  Pieter’s  Hill,  380 

Zastron,  party  of  Brabant’s  Horse  surprised  at, 
469.  Map,  'if 

Zastron  district,  fight  in,  525 
Zeederberg,  Field  Comet,  at  Spion  Kop,  342 
Zeerust,  Boer  siege  of,  references  to,  474,  478, 
493,  498,  504  ; evacuation  of,  by  General  Car- 
rington,  442,  443.  Map,  100 
Zeppelin,  Cornet,  killed,  331 
Zoutpansberg,  2M,  257,  380.  Map,  96 
Zuikerboshrand,  556.  Map,  451 
Zulus  attack  Boers  at  Bosmans  River,  5 ; aid 
British  at  Fort  Prospect,  525 ; employed  in 
defense  of  Itala,  527.  See  Kaffirs 
Zwarts  Kopjes,  455.  Map,  107 
Zwartsrand,  assault  on,  361,  362 


korannaI 


, SOUTH  AFRICAN  REPUBLIC, 

Orange  Free  State  and  Cape  Colon). 

THE  BOER  EIGHT  FOB  FREEDOM 


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